Contentious dynamics for sociopolitical change?: the case of the Islah Party in the Republic of Yemen.

Conference paper: Contentious politics group, “Homage to Charles Tilly. Conflict, power and collective action: contributions to the sociopolitical analysis of contemporary

societies.” Madrid 7-8 May, 2009.

By

Anahi Alviso-Marino, PhD candidate at the Department of Political Science, University Paris-1 Sorbonne (France) and University of Lausanne (Switzerland), and researcher at the Centre Français d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales de Sanaa (Yemen).

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Gracias por enseñarme, inspirarme y cambiarme querido professor…

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Introduction

Since its establishment in 1990 the Islah Party, (literally Reform Party or “Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” al-Tajammu‘ al-Yemeni lil-Islah) has been the result of a pluralist dialogue between different groups and ideologies, simultaneously organized around different personalities. However, this pluralistic practice that until today has maintained the party externally united but not internally cohesive, has never been free of what Charles Tilly called “contentious repertoires,” that is, arrays of contentious performances that are currently known and available within some set of political actors.1 These repertoires2 have produced over time what this paper proposes to analyze as contentious dynamics inside the party, which are the product of distinctive actors who have constructed their own political narratives and practices.

The first dynamic is characterized by a mobilization that revolves around allegiance to the president of the Republic, Ali Abdullah Saleh. It is performed by members of the Islah Party who have repeatedly expressed publicly their support and loyalty for the president. This allegiance is related to the political formula Yemen’s government is characterized by: a formula based on power relations determined by tribal, religious, economic and political elites’ positions. This dynamic and its repertoire have been produced mainly by two prominent members of the party, sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani and sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, the paramount leader of the Hashed tribal confederation who was replaced after his death in 2007 by his son Sadeq al- Ahmar. Within the trajectory of this dynamic, the last episode or sequence of continuous interaction3 observed therein occurred during the summer of 2008 when a special purpose association was created by al-Zindani and Sadeq al-Ahmar, in order to establish what attempted to be a religious repressive authority in Yemen, the “Vice and Virtue Authority.” The creation of such authority was perceived as a political act and a performance of power that aimed at changing alliances inside the party before the parliamentary elections scheduled for April 2009, which the reformist and modernist wing of the same party boycotted and delayed to 2011.

This reformist group is the one that leads the second contentious dynamic. This second dynamic mobilizes around the creation of a viable opposition against president Saleh. Its trajectory has been consolidated throughout the years, although not without difficulties, leading to the creation of what today constitutes the main opposition party, the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP, al-Liqa’ al-Mushtarak). The JMP is a coalition of six parties,4 among which the Islah Party and the Socialist Party are the most prominent

1 “Contentious Politics Class Slides and Notes. 2007. Prepared by Charles Tilly and Ernesto Castañeda. Columbia University.” Part 1, p. 39.2 Tilly defines repertoire (social movement repertoire) as the employment of combinations from among the following forms of political action: creation of special-purpose associations and coalitions, public meetings, solemn processions, vigils, rallies, demonstrations, petition drives, statements to and in public media, and pamphleteering. Tilly, Charles, Social Movements, 1768-2004, Paradigm Publishers, Colorado, 2004, p.3.3 Class slides, part 1, p. 43.

4 The parties that conform the JMP are: the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Islah), Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), Nasserite Unionists Political Party (NUPP), Baath Socialist Party (BSP), Federation of Popular Yemeni Forces (PF), Al-Haqq party, and September Party, a small party which ceased to attend JMP meetings prior to the 2006 elections. National Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), “Report on the 2006 Presidential and Local Council Elections in the Republic of Yemen,” 2006, p. 8.

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political formations. The last episodes observed within this contentious repertoire were the demonstrations and boycott held by the JMP, which refused to participate in the parliamentary elections of 2009 according to the conditions dictated by president’s Saleh party, the General People’s Congress (GPC, al-Mu’tamar al-sha‘bii al-‘amm). Following the boycott an agreement was reached between the opposition and the ruling party wherein the elections which should have been held in April 2009 were postponed until 2011.

These two groups of mobilizations, actors, and trajectories throughout the years have resulted in two main dynamics or standardized performances that have created what this paper proposes to analyze as opposite claims and programs for reform, which have amounted to what today can be explained as contentious dynamics inside the Islah Party. This paper will first review the history of the Islah Party in order to first give the reader an approach to the different groups, allegiances, and coalitions that are intertwined inside one single political formation. Secondly, the paper will disentangle the two dynamics aforementioned by tracing and analyzing the actors, performances, and repertoires that characterize each of the two dynamics independently. Finally, all these elements will be brought back together, merged with Tilly’s work on contentious politics, in order to provide a broader analysis of the party as a whole, so as to understand the significance of these dynamics, what are the possible scenarios towards which they are leading the party, and to what other scenarios they can be pertinent.

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Overview of the Islah Party: “a mixed bag of Islamists”5

In 1990 the North (or Yemen Arab Republic, YAR6) and the South (or People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen, PDRY7) united to form one single republic (Republic of Yemen, ROY). After unification significant political opportunities appeared for parties and all kinds of organisations, which were banned and considered illegal before unification. Within this process, the Islah Party or Reform Party was established only four months after the unification (13 September 1990) “to be a lively continuation of the modern Yemeni Reform movement and a framework for all who seek to reform and change the current situation to a better one guided by Islamic faith and shari’a.”8

The city of Tai’iz, commonly considered to be the fulcrum of knowledge and enlightenment, was the site for the establishment of the religious core of al-Ikhwan al-Muslimiin or Muslim Brotherhood, whose roots in Yemen date to the 1930’s.9 The Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood included some of the same people who would later transform the search for reform in Yemen into the Islah Party. Among the former members of the Islah Party were tribal leaders, religious scholars, and merchants. As Dresch and Haykel explain “the formation of Islah seemed to merge basically ‘the old’ and ‘the new’.”10 Divided along different ideologies, the Islah Party is formed by three major streams or groups that are also divided on the basis of support for important personalities. It is in this line of thought that Michaelle Browers, following the analysis of Jillian Schwedler, has called the Islah Party “a mixed bag of Islamists,” who focus less on the political party as a whole and more on the party actors working through alternative political forums.11 The three major groups that characterize this political formation up to today are the tribal stream, the intellectual reformist group, and the conservative group.

The tribal stream was led until December 2007 by sheikh Abd’ Allah al-Ahmar, head of Yemen’s most influential tribal confederation,12 the Hashed.13 Sheikh Abd’ Allah al-Ahmar was the founder of the Islah Party and remained its president until his death. Also recognized as one of the most powerful individuals in Yemen and a symbol

5 Expression borrowed from Browers, Michaelle, International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), “Origins and architects of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Parties,” 39, 2007. 6 The YAR was established in 1962 through a military coup against a theocratic state ruled by a hereditary line of Zaydi Imams.7 The PDRY was established in 1967, when the British troops withdrew from the port of Aden giving place to the birth of the People’s Republic of South Yemen (PRSY), which in 1970 adopted a Marxist orientation and converted the PRSY into the People Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY).8 Political Action Program of the Yemeni Islah Party, Draft for the Yemeni Republic, p. 5.9 Wiktorowicz, Quintan, Islamic activism, a social movement theory approach, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, 2004, p. 210.10 Dresch, P. and Haykel, B., International Journal of Middle Eastern Studies (IJMES), “Stereotypes and political styles: Islamists and tribesfolk in Yemen,” Vol. 27, No. 4, Nov. 1995, p. 406.11 Browers, Op. Cit., p. 566. Jillian Schwedler’s work referred by Browers is Faith in Moderation, Islamist parties in Jordan and Yemen, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.12 Yemen’s tribal system is dominated by two main tribes, the Hashed and the Bakil. This organization does not reject the state, and coexists with it. A more detailed analysis of tribes in Yemen is provided in Dresch and Haykel, Op. Cit. 13 One of the main tribal confederations of the country, and the same tribe to which the former president Ali Abdullah Saleh belongs to. Arrabyee, Nasser, Al-Ahram Weekly, “Better this devil”, 14-20 September, 2006.

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of the close relationship between the government and the party,14 sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar served as speaker of North Yemen’s National Assembly, a position he held under two parliaments in unified Yemen.15 After he passed away at a hospital in Saudi Arabia, his eldest son and successor to the Hashed tribal sheikhdom, sheikh Sadeq Abdullah Bin Hussein al-Ahmar, replaced his father as paramount leader of the tribe. Sadeq al-Ahmar has also been appointed to the Government’s Consultative Council (majlis al-shura) under the Islah label.16 Albeit the most prominent, al-Ahmar father was accompanied in the tribal stream by another distinctive sheikh, Naji Abd al-Aziz al-Sha’fi, an eminent leader of the Bakil tribal confederation, with whom he has not consistently presented a “tribal front” within the party.17 The tribal stream still exerts an important influence over the government and constitutes a “reservoir” of people and votes among which allegiance to the government constitutes a priority.18

The second group is the intellectual reformist and “Islamist” group, integrated by Muslim Brotherhood ideologues. This group that François Burgat has called “the modernist wing,”19 promotes a moderate and modernist elite, marked by an ideological setback in favour of a pragmatic approach.20 The prominent “professors” (asatidh)21 of this wing are Muhammad Abdullah al-Yadumi, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisi and Muhammad Qahtan. Al-Yadumi has been re-elected president of Islah, a post he has held since sheikh al-Ahmar passed away in 2007.22 Former vice-first minister, al-Anisi is Secretary General of the party and Qahtan is one of the ten members that compose the High Committee of Islah (al-hay’at al-‘uliyya).23 These three figures have promoted the dialogue with the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP, a former ideological enemy of the Islah Party). Additionally, as Browers notes, they have been among the major “architects”24

of Yemen’s Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), a coalition of parties that has become the main opposition to the ruling General People’s Congress (GPC).

Lastly, there is the conservative group, internally considered the radical faction

14 In 1982, when the General People’s Congress (GPC, President Ali Abdullah Saleh’s party) was created, Sheikh al-Ahmar was appointed to the permanent council of this party. Bonnefoy, L. et Poirier, M., Le Rassemblement yéménite pour la réforme (al-Islah): la difficile construction d’un projet d’alternance, paper to be published by the Lebanese Center for Policy Studies, Beirut, 2009 15 Wiktorowicz, Ibid.16 Bonnefoy, et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 6.17 Wiktorowicz, Ibid.18 Bonnefoy, et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 4.19 Burgat, François, Le Monde Diplomatique, “Yemen: on which side? Collateral damage from an illegal war,” April 2003.20 Bonnefoy, et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 20.21 “Unlike al-Zindani and al-Ahmar, Islah leaders al-Yadumi, Qahtan, and al-Anisi are each referred to not as “Sheikh” in Islah party documents, but as “professors” (ustadh), signifying their status as party intellectuals rather than as religious authorities or spiritual guides. The Sheikh-professor distinction may indicate a juxtaposition of “traditional” and “modern” as well.” Browers, Op. Cit., p. 575 and 585.22 The Islah Party re-elected al-Yadumi as successor to Sheykh al-Ahmar in the presidency of the party during the second part of the Fourth Conference of the Islah Party, held on March 12th, 2009. Yemen Times, 16th March 2009.23 Bonnefoy, et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 20.24 Browers, Op. Cit.

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due to its religious creed based on the Salafi25 (or Nadji or Wahabi26) interpretation of Islam. This stream is represented and led by sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani, one of the founders of the Yemeni Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Zindani is a prominent figure in the party: he was Chairman of the Islah Party’s Shura Council (majlis al-shura) until 2007, continues to be one of its 130 members, and is one of the ten members of the High Committee of Islah (al-hay’at al-‘uliyya). In addition to his political obligations, he is also the rector of the al-Iman University in Sana’a, “an international non-profit Islamic University whose goal is to graduate both male and female pious working scholars carrying the message of Faith verbally and practically.”27 Al-Zindani’s name appears on the United States Treasury Department List as a “specially designated global terrorist,” although he remains openly in Yemen.28 He was convicted in the United States of supporting terrorism29 due to “his relations with Osama bin Laden when both met during the Afghan-Russian war.”30 The conservative stream, “mostly because of its ties with Islamic movements in other Muslim countries, has a strong influence over the party’s international policies.”31

25 Highly conservative, the Salafis are considered fundamentalists who seek a literal application of Islamist teachings. Some Salafis are also called Wahhabis because of their ties to Saudi Arabia. They are considered to be more conservative than Brotherhood members, particularly concerning pluralism and the role of women. In the case of Yemen, the role of the Salafis becomes important in terms of their ties with neighboring Saudi Arabia, who opposed Yemeni unification supporting both Yemeni Socialist Party leaders and Northern elites in an effort to keep the country divided. Salafis have been confrontational in promoting their brand of Islam, and the breath of their activities would not be possible without Saudi financing. Schwedler, Jillian, Journal of Democracy, “Democratization in the Arab world? Yemen’s aborted opening,” National Endowment for Democracy and the Johns Hopkins University Press, Vol. 13.4, 2002, p. 48-55. Also see Bonnefoy, Laurent in Qu’est-ce que le Salafisme?, Ed. Rougier, Bernard, Presses Universitaires de France, France, 2008.26 Wahhabism actively opposes both the main Yemeni schools--Zaydi Shi'ism in the north and Shafi'i-Sunnism in the south and in the Tihamah. Though little is known of Yemeni Wahhabism, it appears to have a particularly strong following in the northern Province of Sa'dah where it was introduced by local men who had converted while studying religion in Saudi Arabia or fighting with the mujahidin in Afghanistan. Given that this region is in the Zaydi heartlands of northern Yemen, the popularity there of Wahhabism is surprising. The Wahhabis, as others dub them (or Sunnis as they prefer to be called), gained key positions in state schools, opened religious teaching institutes and established or took over a number of mosques. Shelagh Weir, Middle East Report Online (MERIP), “A Clash of fundamentalisms: Wahhabism in Yemen,” MERIP 204, July-September 1997.

27 Al-Sheykh al-Zindani, Abdul Majeed, Signs and miracles of Prophet Messenger (Peace be upon him), Al-Iman University, Sana’a, 2003.28 Phillips, Sarah, Yemen’s democracy experiment in regional perspective. Patronage and pluralized authoritarism, Palgrave, New York, 2008, p. 138. 29 A Web site of the Yemeni Defense Ministry reported the sources as saying that the United States (US) request was part of a letter from US President George W. Bush to Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh, but did not note whether the US asked Yemen to hand in al-Zindani or just hold him in Yemen. The US also expressed objection for including Al-Zandani in the Yemeni delegation accompanying President Saleh to the Organization of the Islamic Conference summit in Mecca, Saudi Arabia, in the end of 2005. The letter noted that Al-Zandani is among those accused by the United Nations of financing terror, noting that he is not allowed to travel and that including him in an official delegation is considered as a violation of UN resolutions. Kuwait News Agency (KUNA), 23 November, 2006.30 Al-Zaidi, Hassan, Yemen Times, “al-Zindani: My reservation is due to security and intelligence factors,” November 28.31 Al-Yemeni Hezam, Ahmed A., The dynamic of democratization. Political parties in Yemen, Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 2003, p. 51.

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Another feature of the Islah party, which is worthy of mention, is its political trajectory, which contributes to understanding Yemen’s political development. The Islah Party has engaged throughout these years in complex and fascinating power relations: From close participation with the ruling GPC party, to what Jillian Schwedler and Janine Clark have called “Islamist-leftist cooperation,”32 a platform of opposition to the ruling party.

In April 1993 during the first parliamentary elections held in unified Yemen, Islah joined the ruling coalition government, winning 62 seats out of 301.33

In October of the same year president Saleh appointed sheikh al-Zindani as member of the presidential council composed by five members.34 Also in 1993, sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar was elected speaker of the parliament with the votes of the ruling GPC.35 A short civil war followed lasting from may to July 1994. Throughout the war, the collaboration between the ruling power and the Islah Party was maintained: the Islamist stream within the Islah Party theologically legitimated the war of the north against the “impious” southern socialists.36

However, the post 1994 political prospects changed. After the southern socialists were defeated, the president and his ruling party no longer needed allies to defeat the Yemeni Socialist Party. Nevertheless, the Islah Party prevailed on certain points such as the revision of the constitution. Yet, as Browers elucidates, “the group was less successful in maintaining its power position as a ruling partner in the new government. Islah’s political marginalization and ultimately its shift toward a more oppositional role vis-à-vis the GPC is directly tied to GPC success in its struggle for domination over the YSP.”37

This marginalisation became visible in the 1997 parliamentary elections when “the GPC returned to its old custom of being the sole ruling party winning an absolute majority of the seats in the parliament and all but one of the government portfolios.”38

Islah’s influence continued to diminish and the party entered in a decline that, as Schwedler stresses, was caused by a broader field of alliances, not only those between the GPC and Islah, which altered the structure of political opportunities.39 Among these new alliances, the Islah Party began a dialogue prior to the 1997 elections with the YSP and other parties of the Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition (HCCO) to address mounting irregularities in voter registration and other violations of electoral law.40

Despite this first visible rupture marked by the year 1997, sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar was re-elected speaker of the parliament, which was “an outcome that had less 32 Schwedler, J., and Clark J., International Institute for the Study of Islam in the Modern World (ISIM), “Shades of Islamism: Islamist-leftist cooperation in the Arab world,” ISIM Review 18, Autumn 2006.33 President Saleh’s General People’s Congress (GPC) won 121, and the Yemeni Socialist Party (ruling party in the South) obtained 56 seats. Dresch and Haykel, Op. Cit., p. 40634 Bonnefoy et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 16. Three members of the GPC and two socialists previously formed this council. 35 Ibid.36 Ibid.37 Browers, Op. Cit., p. 559.38 Burgat, Op. Cit .39 Wictorowicz, Op. Cit., p. 206.40 Browers, Op. Cit. p. 559.

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to do with his leadership of the Islah Party than with his position as head of the Hashed tribes and his personal relationship with the president.”41

In addition, during the 1999 presidential elections the Islah Party did not present a candidate and nominated president Saleh as its own candidate.42 Thus the GPC won the elections with the 96.3 % of the votes.43

The 2001 local council elections revealed the beginning of a significant shift in relations between political parties, a trend also recorded by the National Democratic Institute (NDI) in a report concerning the elections. For the first time neither the Yemeni Socialist Party nor Islah negotiated seats with the GPC in advance of the election, and a genuine opposition appeared to be developing.44

The adoption of an oppositional strategy was marked by collaboration amongst the various oppositional party, lead mainly by the YSP. Since 1995 the YSP was engaged in the HCOO, a council which reunited the opposition by bringing together reformists figures. The approach between socialists and Islahis was symbolised by the dialogue started by Jarallah ‘Umar, “the only socialist intellectual and activist that possessed the skills and traits necessary to play the role of “architect” of the ‘joint meeting’ coalition. Indeed, it took great negotiations skills and generous compromises to bring together the YSP, Islah, Nasserites, Baath, and other smaller parties, around a common cause, which all agreed was the protection of democratic life in Yemen.”45

During the 2001 local council elections Islah in alliance with its former archenemy, YSP, and other opposition parties it had previously opposed, engaged in the opposition.46 As Sarah Phillips notes, “Islah performed quite well in these elections, winning at least 22 percent of the seats in the preliminary count. However, since the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referenda (SCER) never released the official results, it is safe to assume that the opposition, particularly Islah, probably did better than this. Sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, however, once again allied with the president to limit the effectiveness of the local councils that his party had been relatively successful in contesting, by supporting the law that all governors and local council heads be appointed by the executive.”47

2002 witnessed the assassination, under unclear conditions, of YSP’s Jarallah ‘Umar.48 It was not until the 2003 parliamentary elections that the opposition platform of the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP), which ‘Umar helped to build, participated in the electoral panorama. The diverse political parties implicated in this project came to cooperate across significant ideological divides, instead of challenging each other

41 Ibid. 42 Phillips, Op. Cit. p. 142. As the author narrates, “Saleh was furious with Islah being so blatant in its support of him as to announce its decision publicly before the GPC even had the chance to do so, thus undermining the presiden’s claims to holding (and winning) a competitive democratic election.”43 Wedeen, L. in Al-Rasheed Madawi and Vitalis, Robert, ed Counter Narratives. History, contemporary society, and Politics in Saudi Arabia and Yemen, Palgrave, New York, 2004, p. 252.44 NDI report on the 2006 elections in Yemen, p. 8. 45 Browers, Op. Cit. p. 571.46 Ibid, p. 570.47 Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 143. 48 ‘Umar was assassinated after delivering a speech at an Islah party conference. Browers, Michaelle, Op. Cit. p. 573. About the death of Jarallah ‘Umar read also Carapico, S., Wedeen, L., and Wuerth, A., Middle East Report Online (MERIP), “The death and life of Jarallah ‘Umar,” 31 December 2002.

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directly, in order to formulate a real opposition to the ruling party. Specifically, Islah promised to withhold from running candidates in 30 districts where the YSP's prospects were better, while the YSP, recognizing its relative weakness, agreed not to campaign in 130 constituencies where Islah stood a good chance. 49

After this first electoral experience, in 2005 the JMP published a common project for reform. Among its most significant features was a call to replace the current system of “one-person rule,” in which power is concentrated in the president’s hands and corruption is encouraged, with a parliamentary system predicated on a separation of power, with an independent judiciary, and administrative decentralization.50

The existence of a real opposition, as well as the issue of whether or not the political system, more so than the society, was ready for a change of power, were questioned by the presidential and local council elections, held on September 2006. Although the candidate for the JMP, Faisal Bin-Shamlan,51 represented a certain challenge, Ali Abdullah Saleh was re-elected as president of the Republic of Yemen, a post that he had been holding since Yemen’s unification in 1990.52 However, the support that brought him to power almost a decade ago was reduced from 96.3%53 votes in 1999, to 77.17% in 2006. Furthermore, opposition parties refused to accept the vote result, alleging that Saleh won only 68.86% of votes, not 77.17%.54

In summary, the Joint group provided Islah with a platform to effectively contend the GPC dominated structure, and also exemplified a fascinating shift of alliances. Islah was able to challenge the GPC due to important public support that proved the opposition to be more successful than in previous elections. The last presidential elections held in September 2006 demonstrated how the Islah Party, inside the JMP coalition, had effectively reached a broader sector of the society. Their more “moderate discourse” generated political inclusion, a tendency that has been observed since the 2003 parliamentary elections.55

Since past elections in 2003 and 2006, the JMP and Islah inside this coalition, have been slowly and not without several constraints, formulating a plausible opposition.

49 Carapico, Sheila, Middle East Report Online (MERIP), “How Yemen’s ruling party secured an electoral landslide,” May 16, 2003.50 Browers, Op. Cit., P. 578.51 Faisal Shamlan held the post of minister of infrastructure and oil in the socialist government of South Yemen before it merged with the north in 1990. Since then, he has been a member of parliament in the unified Yemen, and held the post of oil and mineral resources minister. BBC News, “Yemen opposition candidate named,” Friday 30 June, 2006. As Bonnefoy and Poirier point out, “Islah’s Islamists found in Shamlan a means to overcome leadership conflicts that divide the Islah party. Shamlan is also identified with the Muslim Brotherhood for in 1990 he participated to the establishment of the Free Yemeni Platform (al-Minhar al-Yemeni al-Hurr) considered as the equivalent of the Muslim Brotherhood in the South of the country. Later one Shamlan returned to the political arena as an independent candidate.” Op. Cit. p. 19.

52 Aditionally, Ali Abdullah Saleh ruled the North (YAR) since 1978.53 Al-Rasheed M., and Vitalis, R., ed Op. Cit, p. 252.54 Yasser Al-Mayasi, “Salih wins another term, Opposition criticizes results”, Yemen Times, from 25 September to 27 September 2006.55 Schwedler, J., and Clark, J. Comparative Politics, “Who opened the window? Women’s activism in Islamist parties,” CUNY, Vol. 35, Number 3, April 2003.

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In the time leading to the 2009 parliamentary elections, the JMP coalition boycotted the preparation for the April election, refusing to participate under the conditions dictated by the GPC. By consequence of these actions, the election was postponed to 2011. As Marine Poirier explains, after more than two years of contentious debate between the two parties concerning reform of the electoral system, the joint statement that the opposition and government reached would appear to draw Yemen temporarily out of its interparty crisis. It also constituted an apparent victory for the opposition.56

The success of the Islah party’s cooperation with the JMPC coalition formulating a real opposition, has resulted in an increase of support for the party. This support is also linked to the moderation of the party’s political discourse as well as its great capacity to mobilize several sectors of the society.

As is largely demonstrated by Clark, Schewdler, Phillips and recently Bonnefoy and Poirier,57 the resources of mobilization within Islah Party has (sometimes explicitly political and sometimes affirming themselves as apolitical) gained the party a broad and effective support at the grassroots level. In light of this, charitable organisations which are affiliated with Islah via porous networks of connection,58 fill the gaps left by the state and gain the party support. Given the popularity of this charitable and welfare work as well as its efficacy, it generates support that “flows back to the party, arguably whether the original program is officially affiliated with Islah or not.”59

If the Islah Party as part of the JMP coalition cannot win the state power at the institutional level, it is likely that their moderate-inclusive program as well as the increasing popular support they gain from its grassroots charitable activities will affect their success in terms of “moral hegemony.” These notions resonate with Gramsci’s “passive revolution,” which “aims not simply to capture state power (as the insurrectionists do in their ‘frontal attack’) but also focuses on the gradual capture and possession of the society by exerting moral and intellectual leadership over civil institutions and processes.”60 In this vein, a true revolution for Gramsci is not only about winning state power, but it also implies winning the society by institutional, intellectual, and moral hegemony to change (or reform in the case of Islah) the society rather than take over the state’s power. This bottom-up approach helps to elucidate Islah Party’s reach of influence within Yemeni society. This bottom-up approach also contains the passage between political Islam to notions of social Islam. It is here, we can observe the transition and relationship between political work executed in order to gain power through elections and the charitable and social work performed in order to reform the society.

56 Poirier, Marine, Arab Reform Bulletin of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Score one to the opposition?,” March 2009. 57 Clark and Schwedler in Wiktorowicz, Op. Cit., Phillips, Op. Cit., and Bonnefoy and Poirier, Op. Cit.58 Alviso-Marino, Anahi, Islamic social and political activism: Porosities and demarcations between the Islah Charity and the Islah Party in Yemen, article to be published in 2009 by the Centre Français d’Archéologie et de Sciences Sociales de Sanaa (CEFAS) and the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung (FES), under the research program entitled « Associations au Yémen 1991-2004: émergence ou continuité de la société civile ?.» 59 Phillips, Op. Cit. p. 144. 60 Gramsci, Antonio, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, International Publishers, New York, 1971, p. 106-114.

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Dynamic of contention number 1:

The Islah Party was established based upon a tribal and conservative formula, which together with the inclusion of prominent Yemeni merchants and intellectuals, have formed a complex mix of ideologies, interests, personalities, and ideas of reform. As Schwedler elucidates, its emergence as a political party might be better described as an organizational transformation of allies of the political elite to best take advantage of new institutional opportunities, not to be mistaken with a political opposition brought into the system as a result of democratic political openings.61

Some of Islah’s leaders were key figures in the ruling elite that came about to constitute the government of the unified Republic of Yemen (ROY) in 1990. The conservative and religious stream led by sheikh al-Zindani, and the tribal stream led by sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar (and since his passing away by his son Sadeq al-Ahmar), have always maintained a strong and close relationship with the president of the republic, which is the first feature that characterizes this dynamic of contention.62

The relationship between president Saleh and important figures of the Islah Party can be traced to the early days of the Yemen Arab Republic (YAR), which Saleh led until unification with the South in 1990. “After 1962, Muslim Brotherhood leaders formed the group’s first formal consultative council under the leadership of sheikh al-Zindani. The group later joined other conservative trends in supporting the new republican leadership against the more left-leanings members of the revolutionary guard. Thus, from the earliest days of the YAR, the Muslim Brotherhood, who was at the core of the formation of the Islah Party, had close relations with the political elite.”63

Al-Zindani remained its leader until the late seventies, when leadership changed in what has been described as an internal coup against the sheikh.64 Following these events, al-Zindani left to Saudi Arabia where his ties with the wahabbi and salafi movement strengthened. Upon his return to Yemen, president Saleh appointed and maintained al-Zindani in posts always close to him. It is worth noting that since as early as the 1970s al-Zindani has also acted as an adviser to Saleh on educational matters.65 This power was derived from his ties with the Saudi Kingdom, the control of an important network of thousands of Islamist institutes (ma’hid ‘ilmiyyah),66 his lucrative business investments, and his strong Islamist credentials.

Al-Zindani has always maintained a radical repertoire that has frustrated

61 Schwedler, Faith in Moderation (2006), Op. Cit., p. 64-65.62 It must be clarified that, as stressed by Schwedler, “ the labels “tribal” and “religious” wrongly suggest a level of cohesiveness among the various branches that obscures complex relationships and does not reflect the group’s internal dynamics. In practice tribal leaders are also religious, and many Islamists have tribal ties.” Schwedler, (2006), p.70. Labels such as radical, conservative and moderate might also be understood as part of the indigenous language that internally describes these tendencies. However in neither case these categories are to be understood as free from a certain level of ambiguity or uncertainty, so as to avoid obscuring the complex relations between the personalities and groups thus named.63 Ibid.64 Ibid.65 Browers, Op. Cit. p. 568.66 Al-Zindani set up these institutes in 1973 where a radical version of Islam was taught. The number of these institutes increased over the 1990s but began to decline in the early twenty-first century in part as president Saleh sought to strengthen relations with Washington. Schwedler (2006), p. 72 and 176.

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particularly the Muslim Brotherhood trend inside Islah, and generally the party as a whole for his almost systematic contradiction of formal Islah positions. Among the most important instances of this contradictory repertoire are his position regarding unification and democracy. Al-Zindani opposed the terms of unification considering it cooperation with the South’s avowedly secular, Leftist regime, which he considered communist, infidel, and full of non-believers. Although al-Zindani’s position towards this issue was highly radical, it must be noted that the majority of the political actors brought together under the banner of Islah as an Islamist political party aimed in large part to aid the leaders of the former North in defeating the South’s Socialist Party in national elections and thus diminishing southern power in post-unification Yemen.67

This pictures the manner in which they engaged in unification as a member of a coalition with the ruling GPC. The Islah Party thus defended unification but this defense was not free from an important antagonism with the YSP. In relation to democracy, al-Zindani opposed it characterizing democratic practices as secular tools of Western imperialism.68 Nevertheless, the party, since 1993 was engaged increasingly in a democratic narrative.69 The radical repertoire put forward by al-Zindani has consequently provoked frustrations and contention with the party and with the Muslim Brotherhood trend, which remained more moderate than al-Zindani’s rhetoric. In any case, however radical al-Zindani’s repertoire of contention has been, it has never undermined his relationship with president Saleh and Islah’s leadership has never been successful in challenging him.

In addition to this, other members of the Muslim Brotherhood maintained allegiance to president Saleh through a group called the “Islamic Front.” Muslim Brotherhood members, conservative tribal leaders, and a few Islamist groups, thus created another strong tie with Saleh through their willingness to fight for the regime. Consequently, when Saleh inaugurated the GPC on 1982, Islamic Front members were prominent among their numbers.70

The Islah Party established after unification, reunited members of the Islamic Front and the Muslim Brotherhood among others like tribal sheikhs and merchants. This is how, in addition to the initial agreement between the leaders of the North and South to achieve unification, the collection of political actors who later formed Islah was effectively a partner to the northern political elite, at the expense of the southern elite.71

In this light, the political formula of unification was marked by the fact that president Saleh “secured de facto political authority in large part through patronage, the granting of economic favors, and the allocation of prominent government positions, resources, and salaries to tribal sheikhs and other clients.”72 When in 1993 Yemen held parliamentary elections for the first time, a pluralist assembly was produced after elections in which the GPC won the largest bloc. The Islah Party came in second and the South’s Socialist Party, the YSP, came in third. As a result of this, the head of the large Hashed tribal confederation from which president Saleh hailed, Sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, was elected speaker of the parliament with the votes of the ruling GPC. In October of the same year, al-Zindani was appointed as member of the five-person 67 Schwedler (2006), Op. Cit., p. 176.68 Ibid, see page 180. 69 Ibid, p. 185.70 Ibid, p. 71.71 Ibid, p. 7572 Ibid, P. 61

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presidential council. When only one year later the country was plunged into a short civil war, the relationship between the president and sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar played an important role in proving that the president’s political authority rested in part on the consent of local elites and their support in bringing their constituencies to respect government authority in certain spaces.73 As Schwedler elaborates “there is considerable evidence that during the conflict, few tribal groups became involved, leaving the two armies of North and South to fight it out.” In this light, she quotes Carapico who “has argued that Saleh accomplished this feat through bribes and promises to various tribal leaders, and through the considerable mediation efforts of sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar.”74 Following the war and with the defeat of the secessionist south, the YSP entered a political decline. Islah’s members were given posts in the new GPC cabinet and occupied high positions such as first deputy prime minister (Islah’s highest executive position in the government).75 However, the aftermath of the civil war marked the beginning of Islah’s political marginalization from the government as a party. Although the relationship between certain personalities such as al-Ahmar and al-Zindani remained close, the relationship between the regime and Islah deteriorated. As Schwedler demonstrates, Islah leaders were given primarily service ministries after the 1994 war, and disputes between Islah and GPC ministers arose around the issue of corruption. By 1995 several Islah ministers resigned their posts. The power of Islah as a party had greatly diminished by 1996 as president Saleh was appointing fewer and fewer Islah members to cabinet positions, and Islah ministers continued to resign. When the 1997 parliamentary elections approached, the GPC no longer needed Islah in the coalition government and agreements on the campaigns fell apart.76

Once again in 1997, sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar remained close to the president. He was reelected speaker of the parliament despite the deterioration of relations between his party and the regime. The decline of Islah in the ruling coalition led by Saleh’s GPC continued throughout the years and in the 1999 presidential elections Islah did not present a candidate on its own, but rather nominated Saleh who was reelected president with an absolute majority of the votes. During the last years of the nineties, Islah entered a process of marginalization and decline as part of the coalition with the ruling regime that made it enter the political scene at the beginning of the decade. Simultaneously, personal ties between the president and certain tribal and religious members remained strong and prolonged allegiance to the president despite the marginalization the party as a whole experimented. The last years of the nineties were also the period that marked the beginning of the dialogue between Islah and the socialists, a dialogue that later during 2001 and 2002, would develop into the formation of an opposition coalition marked by an Islamist-leftist cooperation. It was in 2003 when this coalition first participated in elections. Until today they continue to do so as an opposition coalition to the ruling party. This coalition and their repertoires of opposition comprise the second dynamic of contention this paper will deal with in the following section.

Although in 2003 Islah participated in the elections as an opposition party inside the JMP coalition, “the parliamentary bloc of the ruling GPC nominated sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, president of the opposition Islah Party. The GPC announcement to

73 Ibid, p 62.74 Ibid, p. 61.75 Ibid, p. 104.76 Ibid, p. 104-107.

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nominate Al-Ahmar followed a meeting of the two men in Aden after which Al-Ahmar declared his support of president Saleh’s candidacy in September’s elections.”77 Since the decline of the relationships between Islah and Saleh’s regime, the relationship between al-Ahmar and Saleh went also through some difficulties, especially in terms of al-Ahmar’s stance on the “War on Terror” that started alter the September 11 attacks, in 2001, and in relation to his viewpoints about Islah after it became an opposition party.78

Despite these differences they have remained close allies. Since his passing away in 2007 his son and heir to the leadership of the Hashed tribe, Sadeq al-Ahmar, has not contradicted this alliance with the president of the republic.

The role Islah leaders maintained by “remaining central to the highest circles of power even as Islah’s influence decreased”79 became more complex as Islah started to formulate an increasingly viable political opposition. As the Islah party shifted alliances and turned to other parties in order to construct what today has become an opposition to the ruling GPC, both sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar and al-Zindani have performed contentious repertoires, under the form of public statements, against their party and in favor of president Saleh. Already in 2003, when the JMP first appeared on the political scene as a contending political force, al-Ahmar showed support to Saleh instead of supporting his own party, a support that was rewarded with the GPC nomination of the sheikh. This somehow contradictory nomination (GPC nominated a member of the opposition party, and al-Ahmar supported the party he was supposed to politically oppose) reflected the complexity of power relations when tribal and political allegiance is at stake. In the following elections where Islah participated in the JMP-led opposition in 2006, the JMP presented Faisal Bin Shamlan as presidential candidate to compete against Saleh and the GPC. In this instance, al-Zindani and al-Ahmar “made a final-hour decision to back Saleh’s reelection despite their parties’ formal position as sponsors of a JMP presidential candidate.”80 These acts were framed as “personal decisions” made by the two sheikhs and not by the party.

The following year, 2007, ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar was reelected party chairperson despite attempts to replace him in violation of Islah bylaws that limit leadership to three terms.81 By the end of that year ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar died and his son Sadeq replaced him as paramount leader of the Hashed tribe.

In the summer of 2008, Sadeq al-Ahmar joined al-Zindani in the establishment of an authority that once again, went against the party’s ideas and political positions: on July 15th 2008, and in front of a crowd of some 6000 male attendees, they declared the establishment of the “Authority for the Protection of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice” (Vice and Virtue Authority, VVA, Hayat al-fadhila ), the first of its kind in the Republic of Yemen. Under the slogan “May the ship (Islam/Yemen) not sink,”82 the ‘ulama, sheikhs and notables of Yemen announced their decision to hold annual meetings instead of forming the permanent committees that had been strongly rejected.83

77 Yemen Times, “Crisis in Parliament,” 5 February, 2003.78 Ibid.79 Schwedler (2006), p. 113.80 Browers, Op. Cit. p. 582.81 Ibid.82 Document from the Virtue Authority, miltaqa al fadila al awal li ‘ulama wa mashaikh wa wajha al Yemen. June, 2008.83 After strong criticisms from journalists, writers and politicians, who viewed the job of such committees as the responsibility of the state, the clerics and tribesmen retracted from establishing committees of

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In August, a second conference was held in which the members of the Virtue Authority elected sheikh al-Zindani as president and discussed ways to implement the resolutions they had presented at their previous gathering in July.84 In this second reunion, and after a month of constant social criticism, al-Zindani declared that “the government should be utilized to combat moral malpractices by empowering the already-extant Virtue Police and by emboldening the general prosecution as well as the Ministry of Endowments and Guidance.”85 A stress was put by this very authority on the state’s responsibility and legitimacy to prevent vice and promote virtue, as opposed to an external and non-governmental authority. By the end of August, while it was clear that this authority would not become a replica of the Saudi Committee for the Propagation of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice, the debate around it had just begun.

The distribution of two important documents during the inaugural conference provoked significant reactions. The first document contained the Virtue Authority’s goals, which defined the organization as an authority with the aim to revive, spread and deepen what Islam considers virtuous, and to confront and remove from society what it considers as vicious. This document also included statements from the ‘ulama denouncing the critiques the authority had received from journalists, as well as suggesting ways to implement “virtue” (amongst them, the segregation of women at work).86 The second document was a booklet called “Letter from the ‘Ulama of Yemen Concerning Women’s Quota,”87 which explained the legal opinion of the ‘ulama (fatwa) against the quota system aimed at allocating 15 percent of the electoral bodies’ seats to women. This quota system has been supported on paper and never on real acts by the government since 2006. In light of this, the distribution of the fatwa at the establishment of the VVA opened again the debate about Islah leaders’ position towards women’s participation. This undermined Islah’s position by means of association of al-Zindani to the controversial fatwa, bringing back the debate of women’s participation as candidates and not only as members of the Islah Party. It also contributed to push forward the image of the government as supportive of women’s political participation, although their number in the ruling GPC is far from being close to their number in Islah, which amounts the largest female participation in all Yemen.88

By the end of the summer of 2008, this authority was reduced to only holding meetings without having any legitimate power to patrol the streets in search of vice. But if this authority has done anything, it has opened several debates. Since its very inception its detractors saw in the Virtue Authority a political organization rather than a

promoting virtue and combating vice. Arrabyee, Nasser, “Rescuing Yemen from drowning in vice,” Yemen Observer, 16 July, 2008.84 Maktaf, ‘Abdu, “miltaqa al fadila iantakhaba al Sheikh ‘Abd al-Majid al-Zindani raisan lil haia,” al-Shaqaiq magazine, number 153, 2008.

85 Al-Kibsi, Mohammed, “Vice and Virtue Committee elects its leadership,” Yemen Observer, August 12, 2008.86 Document from the Virtue Authority, Ibid.87 Risala ‘ulama al-Yemen bisha’n al-kuta al-nisa’ia, 2008.88 Following a recent report from the Women National Committee, the Islah Party ranked first in women’s participation in the higher positions of the party, the ruling party, the GPC, ranked second and the Socialist Party third. 8 women out of 13 men in Islah are members of the General Secretatiat; 13 women out of 150 men are members of the Consultative Council (Majlis al-Shura); and 140 women our out 273 men are members of the Supreme Authority in the Supervisory organs, Women National Committee: Wada’ al mara’ fi al-Yemen 2007, page 103.

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religious one, created with the political aim to provoke a division inside the opposition parties before the parliamentary elections scheduled to be held on April 2009. When sheikh al-Zindani appeared in front of the crowds of ‘ulama and sheikhs that first gathered in July, his actions led to talk about a possible “division inside the Islah Party”89 due to the rejection of the Virtue Authority on the part of the Islah party90 and the JMP coalition Islah is part of.91 With the creation of this Authority, al-Zindani and Sadeq al-Ahmar presented a political program that talked about “people’s personal life and their understanding and practice of Islam, which differed from Islah’s program that focuses on the country, the political situation, corruption, society and culture,” as explained Nabil al-Sofee,92 former editor in chief of Islah’s mouthpiece al-Sahwa and currently independent from the party.

As academic, researcher and social activist Raufah Hassan elucidated, “this coalition between the conservative group in Islah supported by the tribal stream brought about a political formula that was at the very inception of the Islah party in the 90s.’ The conservatives have always pushed for a more conservative program and reading the map of Yemen’s politics, now al-Zindani seems to be making pressure, showing that if they exclude or put him aside, he is going to react.” 93

In the words of Nabil al-Sofee “in the end, al-Zindani is not against Islah. He is just trying to gain more support for his ideas and for his stream within the party.” These recent events thus appear to be just another chapter in the long experience of pluralistic practices inside the Islah Party. Although the positions of al-Ahmar father and now his son Sadeq, and al-Zindani vary and differ in certain points, they share the maintenance of a strong alliance with president Saleh. As Raufah Hassan elucidated, this is just

89 Several journalists, analysts and politicians have suggested this possibility, such as Farouk al-Salihi, from the Yemen Times “Al-Zindani’s new authority: a spoiler or split in the Islah party?,”(4-6 August); Hooria Mashoor and Tawkkol Karman (interviewed in August and September 2008); and politicians from the Islah Party as quoted by Nasser Arrabyee in the Yemen Observer, “Rescuing Yemen from drowning in vice,” (16 July) and Mustafa Ahmad al-Numan in the Yemen Times, “Between religion and politics” (11-13 August, from al-Eshteraki.net). Finally, this possibility was presented even before the Virtue Authority held its first conference, through the JMP’s statement rejecting the Virtue Authority and stating that the authority’s real intentions were political and aimed to confuse political life, Marepress.net (12 July, 2008). 90 Even at the first conference held by the Virtue Authority in 15 July, 2008, “no prominent politicians from the Islah Party attended the meeting except sheikh al-Zindani.” Arrabyee, Nasser, Op. Cit. “The absence of the highly respected scholar Yasin Abdulaziz al-Qubati and all Islah Party leaders from the conference is a clear and strong indicator that the idea of both, al-Zindani and al-Dharihi (member of Islah) faced strong opposition. The idea was labeled as a hurried action, aimed at creating an atmosphere of animosity between members of Yemeni society,” Mustafa Ahmad al-Numan, Op. Cit. 91 The JMP released a public statement where the coalition refused the formation of the Vice and Virtue Authority, and where it also supported the idea of this authority being a political formation rather than a religious one. In the statement the JMP declared: “The formation of the Vice and Virtue Committee should not conceal the real political intentions behind its formation, which aims to confuse political life in a helpless and exposed attempt to divert the attention from the corruption of the government.” Maarebpress.net, 12 July, 2008. 92 Nabil al-Sofee is the current editor in chief of NewsYemen.net and the monthly magazine Abuab. Ancient member at the office of Communication in the Islah Party, he was member of the party’s majlis al-shura during three years and editor in chief of Islah’s newspaper al-Sahwa from 2000 to 2005. Interview held on 13 September, 2008, Sana’a.93 Interview with Raufah Hassan, professor at the University of Sana’a and head of the Cultural Development Programs Foundation, 15 September, 2008, Sana’a. Part of this interview was published by the author in a series of interviews published between September and October called “Women respond to the Vice and Virtue Authority” in The Yemen Observer, 23 September, 2008.

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“another wave of the same phenomenon,” that is, of the dynamic of contention put forward by al-Zindani and al-Ahmar father and son.

Dynamic of contention number 2:

The second dynamic of contention is characterized by a mobilization that opposes the previous dynamic: this dynamic contests Saleh and his ruling GPC party and its trajectory has evolved transforming, not without difficulties, reformist and modernists actors inside Islah into the “architects” of the JMP, a coalition of parties that today is the most important challenger to Saleh’s GPC. Among the most well known actors responsible for this approach are Muhammad Abdullah al-Yadumi, ‘Abd al-Wahhab al-Anisi and Muhammad Qahtan, known to be part of the “modernist wing” inside Islah.

As it was explained in the overview of the Islah Party, since 1994 the ruling GPC started to marginalize Islah. Almost at the same time, in 1995, the Socialist Party allied with several smaller, mostly left-leaning parties in order to coordinate a platform of opposition, the Higher Coordination Council for the Opposition Parties (HCCO, al-Majlis al-a‘laa li-l-tansiiq). In 1997 eight parties were members of this coalition: the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP), the Arab Socialist and Nationalist Baath Party (Hizb al-Ba‘th al-‘arabî al-ishtiâakî al-qawmî), the Popular Nasirist Unity Organization (Tanzîm al-wahdawî al-sha‘âbî al-nâsirî), al-Haqq (zaydi conservative party), the Yemeni Union Gathering (secular left, Tajamu‘ al-wahdawi al-yamanî), the Union of Yemeni Brothers (liberal and left-leaning Hizb Râbita Ibnâ’ al-Yaman), the Union of Popular Forces (UPF, zaydi liberal party, Itihad al-Quwa al-Sha‘abiyya), and the Constitutional Freedom Party (liberals close to YSP, Hizb al-Ahrâr al-Dusturî).94

In April 1997 Islah began a dialogue with the YSP and with other parties of the HCCO approaching the reformative elites and encouraging the institutionalization of a cooperation platform95 to address irregularities and violations in the parliamentary elections held the same year. As Browers stresses, “although the precise date of JMP’s establishment is unclear, these series of meetings mark the first time the appellation was used, indicating coordination between HCCO members and Islah. Little reference to the JMP was found again until Islah allied with other opposition parties following the 2001 elections, after which the name entered into common use. In this sense, the appellation seems to refer specifically to an opposition alliance that includes Islah.”96

1997 thus marks the first visible rupture and the formation of an opposition that in 2001 appears to be developing, and that in 2002 is strengthened by the approach of YSP number two Jarrullah ‘Umar and Islah. In 2002 ‘Umar was assassinated after “delivering a speech at an Islah party conference that confirmed the two parties’ commitment to join in fighting issues of common concern.”97 The conditions under which ‘Umar was assassinated remained unclear and mutual accusations circulated about the responsibility of the crime: members of Islah accused the GPC of being behind the assassination, intended to deteriorate the relations among the opposition. Conversely, the GPC accused Islah of being behind the murder accusing an Islahi activist of being ‘Umar’s killer.98

94 Bonnefoy, et Poirier, Op. Cit., p. 16-1795 Ibid, p. 18.96 Browers, Op. Cit., p. 569.97 Ibid, p. 573.98 For a detailed version see Carapico, Wedeen, and Wuerth, Op. Cit., Schwedler (2006) p. 212, and Browers, Op. Cit. p. 573.

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Following these events, in 2003 the JMP coalition participates for the first time in parliamentary elections and in the 2006 elections presents a candidate, Faisal Bin Shamlan, for the post of president. Although it did not win the election, the JMP appeared to be gaining support, winning 22% of the votes, especially since in 2006 president Saleh and his party did not obtain an absolute majority of the votes (77.17%) as compared to 1999 (96.3%).

Subsequent to the 2006 elections, GPC and JMP engaged in a dialogue based on the recommendations made by European Union (EU) observers upon the way elections were held. EU recommendations included transparent vote counting, enforcement of elections law, media fairness, and improving voter register and electoral law. Specific reforms included prohibiting voters from registering an employment address as a domicile of record (an important limitation considering the size of Yemen’s military); and neutrality in terms of the use of state owned media and public budget. The JMP also insisted on having access to a soft copy of the voter registry, which in 2006 contained hundreds of thousands of underage and duplicate registrations.99 As a result of this process, the JMP started to advocate for the adoption of a list or proportional representation system of election, in opposition to the “first past the post” or majority electoral system currently in use in Yemen. Given the refusal of the government to change a system that has long benefited it, the JMP boycotted parliamentary sessions during July 2008. Consequently, the GPC dominated parliament passed legislation without implementing any electoral reforms as requested by the JMP and blaming the opposition coalition for the failure of consensus. In August, Saleh selected the members of the Supreme Commission for Elections and Referendums (SCER) without counting with the JMP. In turn, the JMP called for a boycott of the registration process. Registration started in November, triggering numerous protests and demonstrations, which ended in massive detentions, clashes with security forces, and killings. 100

As JMP official statements denounced, “the government and its ruling party seized finances belonging to al-Baath party, imposed a complete prohibition on al-Haqq party, fired members of the opposition from their jobs and aimed to conduct elections amid dangerous national splits in the country, including problems in the south and consequences of the Sa'ada war.”101

During the last months of this “escalating rhetoric” as Marine Poirier has called it,102 the JMP maintained its boycott and declared elections would be illegal if held without any contesting political force to the GPC. The GPC on its side, threatened that elections would take place with or without the JMP. In mid February 2009, less than two months prior to the scheduled date, both parties reached an agreement in which elections were postponed until 2011 and a tentative plan to reform the electoral system was set in action. As reported by Yemen Times, the JMP confirmed that the proportional list system in elections would be applied in 50 percent of the electoral constituencies whereas the other 50 percent would remain under the individual electoral system. The agreement also included conducting political reforms, the most important of which are constitutional amendments, the formation of a new SCER, amending the election law

99 Yemen Times, “The roots of protest: prior elections impact future polls,” 22 November, 2003.100 In order to read a description of these protests and demonstrations as they occurred throughout several governorates of the country, refer to Yemen Times, “Protests against voter registration process in many governorates,” 19 November, 2008. 101 Yemen Times, “Opposition confirms election boycott,” 15 February, 2009.102 Poirier, Op. Cit.

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and reviewing voter registration. Further, the agreement included the two-chamber system, which means that members of both parliament and the majlis al-shura will be elected.103

This agreement was seen by members of the Islah Party “as an opportunity to reform the constitution and laws, and to develop the political system as a whole; an opportunity for the nation and for reform.”104 The GPC has also insisted on this perception of the postponement of the elections as an opportunity “not for the GPC, JMP, parliament members, etc, but an opportunity for civil society.”105

Whether the ruling party and the JMP will take the necessary steps to prepare for reforming the electoral system remains to be seen. Reforming the electoral system is a major change for the electorate needs to be effectively represented, which is a process that needs time in order to be implemented. Also transparency needs to be proven and not only theoretical. In view of all these circumstances and conditions, decisions and changes have to be made in a timely fashion moving from dialogue into decision and implementation. Is at the crossroads of this political moment that the country now is.

The contentious dynamic led by what has been analyzed as the reformist and modernist group inside Islah, has overall led the party to join an opposition coalition that throughout the years has managed to propose a possibility for political change. This possibility has proven more plausible regarding recent events in which the boycott maintained by the JMP led to a postponement of the elections and an agreement with the government to begin reforms of the electoral system. As Marine Poirier has pointed out “it constitutes an apparent victory for the opposition.”106 The limits and possibilities that will confront or advance Islah’s modernist wing and the coalition it is part of, the JMP, remain to be seen.

103 Yemen Times, “Elections postponed,” 25 February, 2009. 104 Recorded from Sultan Al-Atwani, secretary general of the Nasserite party, at the Second Session of the 4th General Conference held by the Islah Party on 11 March, 2009, Sana’a.105 Sultan al-Barkani, the GPC parliamentary bloc's secretary general, speech pronounced at the conference “Postponing the elections: justifications and objectives,” held on 17 March, 2009, Sana’a.106 Poirier, Marine, Op. Cit.

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Conclusions

The Islah Party in Yemen has long been a recurrent site for researchers in Yemeni studies, due to its richness of multiple actors, narratives, streams, and mobilizations encompassed within it. As Schwedler wrote, “Islah is a microcosm of the broader field of Islamist politics in Yemen.”107 The usefulness of this pluralism as it coexists inside a single party, has also served to illustrate internal democratic workings. In a world in which the media has long essentialized Islamist activism and mobilization, reducing it to inflexible and rather radical forms of performing sociopolitical claims, it appears crucial to disentangle and rework such orientalist productions of knowledge. In this light, this paper aimed at fleshing out dynamics that occur within the Islah party, not with the intention of presenting the party as an irreconcilable site of contention, but rather so as to explain these contentions as part of a pluralist dialogue coexisting inside Islah. This pluralist dialogue is often explained by party members as an example of democratic practices. This paper, neither tried to defend such line of thought, for though it may be relatively true, it also obscures a reality that is far more complex than that. In this sense, “democratic pluralist practices” need to be approached with nuance, for it is also true to this case that the party re-elects the same party leaders year after year for the past fifteen years.108 This paper has tried to avoid as much as possible obscuring complex relations when characterizing actors, mobilizations, and trajectories as part of the analysis of dynamics proposed. However, in order to categorize the dynamics I analyze, I might have incurred in short-cuts that in the end could actually obscure what I tried to disentangle. In any case, this paper aims to be a preliminary approach to these and other dynamics inside Islah, and a first essay to use Tilly’s contentious politics approach to the case of Yemen.

The existence of contentious dynamics inside this political formation dates to the establishment of the party, which originally aimed at bringing together different ideological groups in order to put forward a project of reform, which was based on the prolongation of political alliances when the two Yemens unified in 1990. That the Islah Party was never a cohesive unit has always been present and thus studied by Schwedler, Clark, Haikel, Dresch, Burgat, Phillips, Browers, Bonnefoy and Poirier among others. However, analyzing this lack of cohesiveness as two main dynamics of contention have become clearer given recent events. For example, the latest attempt of al-Zindani and Sadeq al-Ahmar to create a moral police rejected by the party and by the JMP coalition, and the achievements of the JMP, including the Islah party, in boycotting the elections and formulating a more and more plausible opposition.

Considering these dynamics renders Islah Party to be a space of contentious politics understood as “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers of claims and their objects when a) at least one government is a claimant, an object of claims, or a party to the claims, and b) the claims would, if realized, affect the interests of at least 107 Schwedler (2006), Op. Cit., p. 205108 Ibid, p. 195.

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one of the claimants.”109 In the case of the Islah Party, episodic interaction led by the two groups analyzed, the conservative and tribal stream and the modernist wing, has been marked by public statements and mobilizations. Each group has collectively interacted inside the party and also outside, creating, maintaining and breaking coalitions of power with the government and against the government. The government has been object of claims, as in the case of the JMP boycott against the government’s arrangement of the 2009 parliamentary elections. It has also been party to the claims through the alliance maintained by sheikh ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar and al-Zindani, who advanced Saleh’s interests inside the party. The claims definitely affected the interests of these groups and of the party whether realized or not. Despite the fact that al-Zindani and Sadeq al-Ahmar’s effort to make effective the Vice and Virtue Authority failed, their actions affected the party and the greater coalition of which Islah is a member, provoking reactions on all sides and a demarcation from the party as a whole. In the case of the reformist group that has pushed forward a coalition with the JMP that aimed at a change in power, their actions as competitors to the ruling party have greatly affected the entire political scene. Their boycott has delayed elections while pushing forward a program of reform of the electoral system.

Following Tilly, Tarrow and McAdam’s division of contentious politics, the case of Islah falls into the subcategory of transgressive contention.110 Transgressive contention consists of what has been already defined as contentious politics plus two other variables: c) at least some parties to the conflict are newly self-identified political actors. For example, the JMP coalition developed after the Islah Party and was not a previously established actor. The VVA appeared as a new actor in the summer of 2008 as well. And/or d) at least some parties employ innovative collective action. The VVA, for example, was an innovative and unprecedented collective-self representation of Islah’s conservative leaders, which adopted unprecedented means of action.

The two dynamics of contention studied in this paper search for different projects of reform. In the first case, the contention performed by al-Zindani and al-Ahmar father and son shared the idea of a reform project based on an Islamist worldview and, at the same time, the necessity to maintain an alliance with president Saleh. However, they differ in the sense that al-Zindani’s project is based on “a radical Islamist worldview, perhaps the most rigid of the party’s main leaders and in accordance with radical salafism.”111 In the case of ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar his reform project is based on an Islamist worldview which locates shari’a at the center of reform projects but that shares more with Muslim Brotherhood perspectives than those of al-Zindani.112

In the case of the second dynamic, the reform defined by the members of the modernist wing inside Islah together with the JMP, is a project based not on an Islamist worldview, although not in contradiction to it, but in search of a reform that would provoke a change in governmental power. They thus seek political change through reform, rather than revolution, of the political system.

These two projects of reform, groups of actors, types and forms of mobilization,

109 McAdam, D., Tarrow, S. and Tilly, C., Dynamics of contention, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2001, p. 5.110 Ibid, p. 7-8. 111 Schwedler (2006), p. 180.112 Ibid.

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and trajectories, amount to two distinctive dynamics that contend the cohesiveness of the party although not its unit (at least so far). Until today, these contentious politics inside Islah have not provoked the division of the party. In the case of al-Zindani, the rest of the party has been powerless to challenge him and have instead sought to keep him at arm’s length.113 A similar case is that of ‘Abd Allah al-Ahmar, head of the main tribal confederation in Yemen from which Saleh himself hailed and without which the political system cannot be understood nor maintained. As Phillips argued, the conservative group inside Islah, as well as the tribal stream, has seen their weight considerably diminished since 2007.114 In this sense, their latest actions might be considered as a reaction to this loss of weight and a way to prove that if put aside, they will react. In addition to this, the actors leading this dynamic cannot be expelled from the party due to the position they occupy in the power relations upon which Yemen is based. More importantly, in a country were elections are a “performance of power” rather than a contest, Islah does not want to be completely outside of power.115 Dividing the party through a separation from this dynamic could provoke such thing.

As for the second dynamic, the idea of division is more complex: the actors that led the trend and pushed towards a coalition of opposition did demarcate themselves from groups like al-Zindani’s and al-Ahmar’s. However, they did so without a break from the party but rather including it inside an opposition coalition. This dynamic has thus somehow divided positions, but pushing for a reform framed within the coalition Islah is part of. The Islah Party thus continued to be an un-cohesive unit.

Applying the approach of contentious politics to the case of the Islah Party opens the field to cases in which contentious dynamics coexist, provoke divisions that affect the party as a whole and the political system, and albeit maintain an un-cohesive unit. It constitutes an example of pluralistic practices (democratic or not completely so), where division happens in subtle or perceptible ways, and while maintaining a strategic unity that tries not to be outside of power. Although it is difficult to say to what extent these contentious dynamics can divide the Islah Party or not, they provoke a change inside and outside the party. Lastly, these contentious dynamics can also matter to cases framed in authoritarian and conservative contexts as they happen in a country that remains a military autocracy under the leadership of president Saleh, and inside a party that was established based on a conservative interpretation of Islam, where the conservative stream still exercises power inside the party.

113 Ibid, p. 179.114 Phillips, Op. Cit., p. 139, note 4. 115 Ibid, p. 195.

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