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The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Page 1: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation

Michael SchilmoellerThursday May 19, 2011

SAAC

Page 2: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

2

Outline

• The construction of conservation supply curves

• Fifth Power Plan findings• Sources of premium value• Sixth Power Plan findings

Page 3: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

3

Construction and Representation

• Construction of Supply Curves– Lost opportunity– Discretionary

• Implementing the Supply Curves

Page 4: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Discretionary Conservation“Raw” Values, Sixth Power Plan Final

0

500

1000

1500

2000

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3000

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4000

0 10

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0

MW

a by

202

9

2006 $/MWh

Page 5: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Discretionary ConservationSampled Values, Sixth Power Plan Final

0

500

1000

1500

2000

2500

3000

3500

4000

0.0 50.0 100.0 150.0 200.0 250.0

Qu

anti

ty (

MW

a)

Price (RL $2006/MWh)

New Discretionary Supply Curve200 Trials of 40 MWa Samples

Page 6: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Sampling the Discretionary Conservation

• Conservation Premium\Olivia Conservation 090421.xls

Page 7: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Lost Opportunity ConservationSixth Power Plan Final

0.0

50.0

100.0

150.0

200.0

250.0

0 50 100 150 200 250

MW

a

Price RL $2006/MWh

Supply curve data and linear interpolation

2010i 2011i

2012i 2013i

2014i 2015i

2016i 2017i

2018i 2019i

2020i 2021i

2022i 2023i

2024i 2025i

2026i 2027i

2028i 2029i

2010 2011

2012 2013

2014 2015

2016 2017

2018 2019

2020 2021

2022 2023

2024 2025

2026 2027

2028 2029

Page 8: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Accessing the Supply Curves

Cost Assuming No Producers' SurplusSupply Curve

0.0

20.0

40.0

60.0

80.0

100.0

120.0

0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90

MWa Available Annually

Le

ve

liz

ed

Co

st

(20

04

$/M

Wh

)

Hydro Supply Curve

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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Quantity of Energy (MW-mo)

Ma

rke

t P

ric

e (

20

04

$/M

Wh

)

Lost opportunity

Discretionary

Page 9: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Accessing the Supply Curves

Page 10: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Sources of Value

• It is well-understood that much of the value of energy efficiency stems from its below-market cost. In the Sixth Power Plan, for example, the Council estimates the availability of over 2200 MWa of conservation in the Region at or below $30/MWh.

C:\Backup\Plan 5\Portfolio Work\Olivia\SAAC 2010\110519 SAAC Meeting\Conservation Premium\The sources of premium value 101206 1600.lnk

Page 11: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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0

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0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 60 65 70

Quantity of Energy (MWa)

Mar

ket

Pri

ce

Long-term equilibrium market price

The Premium

δ

Page 12: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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AnalysisThe Effect of

Additional Conservation

36900

37000

37100

37200

37300

37400

37500

23600 23650 23700 23750 23800 23850 23900

Cost (NPV $M 2004)

Ris

k (T

ailV

@R

90 N

PV

$M

200

4)

.

0-LO/0-DS

10-LO/5-DS

plan 1141, "Base case plan"

plan 4326, "Plan withenhanced conservation"

Page 13: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Components of Cost Reduction

Additional conservation at $50/MWh

Total System Costs

SCCT deferral

Reduced market prices

Page 14: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Price-takers Still See Benefits

Additional conservation at $50/MWh

Total System Costs

SCCT deferral

Page 15: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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SCCT Deferral

• Why does conservation defer single cycle combustion turbines?– Low-capital cost resources are the traditional

solution for risk management– SCCT have low capital cost– Conservation has high capital cost

• Under what conditions does conservation hold an advantage over SCCTs?

Page 16: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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SCCT Deferral$Net Benefit per $Expense

0

2000

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18000-1

-0.8

-0.6

-0.4

-0.2 0

0.2

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0.6

0.8 1

1.2

1.4

1.6

1.8 2

2.2

2.4

2.6

2.8

Ratio ($Net Benefit\$Expense)

Fre

qu

ency

SCCT discretionary conservation lost opportunity conservation

Page 17: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Value of Capacity

• Operate under circumstances of relatively lower electricity market prices and volatility– This is the consequence of having the

additional resources that give us protection against uncertainty

• Do not even pay for themselves– If we want to reduce risk, we have to pay the

insurance premium of extra capacity that may not be used frequently enough to cover costs.

From the previous slide, it is evident that in this plan SCCT and conservation

Page 18: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Value of Capacity• Conservation performs better than SCCT

under these circumstances, because it gives value under low market prices.

• Additionally– The quality of capacity is better than

conventional resources, because it is not subject to forced outages

– In particular, the quality of conservation capacity is better than wind, the “other” resource candidate without fuel cost

Page 19: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Sources of Premium Value

• Capacity deferral• Protection from fuel and electricity price

excursions, in particular due to carbon risk• Short-term price reduction• Purchases at below-average prices

(“dollar-cost averaging”)• Opportunity to develop and resell

conservation energyC:\Backup\Plan 5\Portfolio Work\Olivia\SAAC 2010\110519 SAAC Meeting\Conservation Premium\The sources of premium value 101206 1600.lnk

Page 20: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Capacity Deferral– If a utility anticipates capacity requirements

for energy or for risk mitigation (reserves), conservation capacity has value

– Shape of conservation: the greater the on-peak conservation contribution, the greater the deferral on a per-MWh or average MW energy basis. Because energy efficiency tends to have greatest effect when requirements are large, it tends to have more reduction on-peak than off-peak

Page 21: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Capacity Deferral– Conservation recovers its value at all price levels. In

futures with anticipated low price, due perhaps to RPS legislation or technology innovation, dispatchable resources would dispatch very infrequently and have less opportunity to cover their fixed cost. (More generally, see the next bullet.)

– The high-risk futures for the region are those with high load requirements/high prices for electricity and low requirements/low prices. Neither of these makes high-heat rate dispatchable resources (SCCTs) attractive as a risk-mitigation measure, regardless of their “expected” capacity factor.

Page 22: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Operating Value Excursions

– The fixed cost of conservation protects utilities short of resources* from electricity price risk

– An uncertain future carbon penalty, which would only increase these prices, contributes significantly to this value

– All utilities subject to fuel price volatility benefit

* Electricity price risk mitigation can shrinks, disappear, or actually increase if the amount of conservation (or other non-dispatchable resource) exceeds a utility’s minimum load requirement.

Page 23: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Short-term power price reduction

– Even in a market, such as that in the PNW, that is surplus most of the time, reducing prices can reduce costs• The net cost is determined by the timing of sales

and purchases relative to market prices. If the PNW sells off-peak in the spring – at low prices – and buys on-peak in the winter – at high prices, it is more likely to see these effects

• Off-peak sale prices are constrained below by zero, while on-peak purchase prices are unconstrained

Page 24: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Conservation acquisition at below-average prices

– If the supply curve for conservation is convex, rather than linear, there is a “constant dollar averaging” effect.

– A premium minimizes our foregoing acquisition of inexpensive conservation during periods of low wholesale market prices for electricity

– This effect is especially important to lost opportunity conservation

*If the supply curve were to have an exponential shape (p=eq), the effect would be exactly constant dollar averaging.

Page 25: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Opportunity to develop and resell conservation energy

– Many utilities maintain that their avoided cost is much lower than the wholesale market for electricity, and consequently, there is little incentive for them to develop their conservation up to wholesale market prices

– Given that other utilities seek energy at market (or at a premium over market), a resell opportunity may exist. Sales to other utilities reduce total cost.

– There is anecdotal evidence that even full-requirements customers of BPA can enjoy benefits from developing conservation in their service territory for use by other utilities

Page 26: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Conclusion• Above-market conservation provides

more cost-effective risk mitigation than alternative resources

• For low-risk plans, cost effectiveness of conservation may be higher than long-term view of average wholesale market price for electricity

Page 27: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Outline

• The construction of conservation supply curves

• Fifth Power Plan findings• Sources of premium value• Sixth Power Plan findings

Page 28: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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Effect of Premium on Conservation Energy and Cost

Page 29: The Cost-Effectiveness Premium for Conservation Michael Schilmoeller Thursday May 19, 2011 SAAC

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End