The European Union and Border Conflicts - The Transformative Power of Integration

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The European Union and Border Conflicts: The Transformative Power of IntegrationAuthor(s): Thomas Diez, Stephan Stetter and Mathias AlbertReviewed work(s):Source: International Organization, Vol. 60, No. 3 (Summer, 2006), pp. 563-593Published by: The MIT PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/3877820 .

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The EuropeanUnion and BorderConflicts: he TransformativePower of ntegration

ThomasDiez, Stephan tetter,and MathiasAlbert

Abstract Our article nalyzes he mpact f theEuropeanUnion EU) onborder

conflicts,nparticularow ntegrationnd association rerelated o conflictrans-formation.eapproachhisssuefrom theoreticallys wellas empiricallyroundedconstructivisterspective.n thisbasis wepropose stagemodelof conflictevel-

opment,ased onthedegree f securitizationnd societal eachof conflictommu-nication.We argue hat heEU can transformorder onflictsndpropose four

pathway-modelfEU impact. his modelcomprises orms fEU impact hat re,on the onehand, ither ctor-drivenr ndirectlyausedbythe ntegrationrocessandhave,on the otherhand, s theirmaintarget ither articular oliciesor thewider ocietyn border onflictreas.We then pplythismodel to a comparativestudy fborderonflicts,herebynalyzinghe onflictsn Northernreland, reece-

Turkey,yprus, urope'sNorthEU-Russia) and srael-Palestine. e finish ith

specificationfthe onditions fpositive ndnegative U impact.

Integrationillhelptoovercome onflictsndmaintain eace andstability:hiswas a widespreadegitimizationorEuropeanUnion EU) enlargementowardcentral ndEastern urope.'Yet theargument as farfrom ew.Both academicdiscussions s well as thepublicdebatehavecommonlyeenEuropean ntegra-

We aregratefulo Gesa Bluhm,Olga Demetriou, atyHayward, ertti oenniemi,emalKirisci,Yosef

Lapid, AndreyMakarychev,avid

Newman,David

Officer,ichelle

Pace, SergeiProzorov,BaharRumelili,MyriaVassiliadou, evgenia iktorova,obiasWerron, ntjeWiener, aimYacobi,andthereviewers nd editors fthisournalfor heir timulatingnputs,riticism,ndsupportnthepreparationfthis rticle. udiences t theUniversitiesfBielefeld, annover,ndOsnabrtick,ilk-entUniversityAnkara), heViessmann entre t Wilfrid aurierUniversityWaterloo, anada) andthecopaneliststtheBISA conferences002 and2003,the SA/CEEISA conference003,the SAAnnualConvention004,theECPR Joint ession ofWorkshops004,and theECPR SGIR Meeting2004havehelped oshapeandrefine he rgumentsresented.We also thank postolosAgnantopou-los forhiseditorialssistance. his article uildson a research roject n "The EU andBorder on-flicts: he mpact f ntegrationndAssociation"EUBorderConf),undedy grantrom he uropeanUnion's ifthrameworkrogrammeSERD-2002-00144),with dditionalundingytheBritish cad-emy. ee also (http://www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk)or urthernformation.

1. Higashino 004.

Internationalrganization0, Summer 006,pp.563-593? 2006byThe IO Foundation. DOI: 10.1017/S0020818306060218



564 Internationalrganization

tion s a crucial actornmaintainingeace n Western)urope fterWorldWar I,and in particularn contributingo the asting esolutionf theFranco-Germanconflict.2et howexactly oes integrationelptobringbout hepeaceful rans-

formationfborder onflicts,nd underwhich onditions?s its mpact lwayspositive, r canintegrationlso lead to the ntensificationf suchconflicts?oesthepower f ntegrationxtend o association? ntil ecently,hese uestions ave

hardly eenaddressed.3et there s a need to understandetter heway nwhich

integrationnd association ffect order onflicts ithin he EU (forexample,Northernreland), t itsborders,ld (for xample,Greece-Turkey)nd new(forexample, reasbordering ussia in Europe'sNorth), nd in its associatednearabroad for xample,srael-Palestine).n addition,heEU is now also facing he

challenge f a contested e-facto order,which he EU itself oes notformally

recognizeCyprus).In this rticle,we develop theoryfthepower f ntegrationnd associationinborder onflictransformation.epropose our ifferentaths fpotentialU

impact.We also use the five ases mentionedbovetoprovide n initial estofour heory,llowing s tospecifyurtheromeofthe onditionsnderwhich ndi-vidualpathshave a positive rnegative ffect n border onflicts.he selectionofthese ases is notbased on a distinctionf differentettingsfconflict,uch sinterstater ntrastateonflicts,uton howconflictselate o differentonstella-tions f ntegrationndassociation.tfollows hehypothesishat heEU's impactis

strongestndmost

positiven situations here heborders

fully partfthe

EU, and all partiesnvolved hereforeubjected o theforces f the ntegrationprocess.At theother nd of the pectrum,eexpect heEU's impact o be weakerinsituations fassociation,lthough e would lso argue hat hepower f nte-

grationmight otentiallye also at playin association greements.inally,wewouldexpecttheEU to have a negativempact n situations here he borderconflict oincideswith heouter orders f EU territories,s theneedto enforcethe cquis communautaire,nparticular,heSchengen greement,urtherividesratherhan ntegratesheseborder reas.

Such a comparisoncross our set of case studies an of courseonlyprovide

initial indings,hichneedto be subjected ofurtheresearchna larger umberofcases.The nature fthepaths fEU impacthatwe suggestnthis rticle eces-sitates widerange fqualitativeesearchmethods, hich resupposective nowl-

edgeoflanguage nd culturend arehighlyabor-intensive.ndividual eamsofresearchersill hereforelways e restrictedo a relativelymallnumber fcases.We thus ee this rticle irstnd foremosts a contributiono thedevelopmentfa theoryfthe mpact f ntegrationn border onflicts,heusefulnessf whichwe willdemonstraten our asestudies.Wehope hat hiswill park urtheresearch

projects longthe uggestedines.

2. See Wallensteen 2002, 33; and Cole 2001.3. More recently,however, see Noutcheva et al. 2004; Tavares 2004; and Tocci 2005.



TheEuropeanUnion nd BorderConflicts 565

To avoidmisunderstandings,e also needto stress hat urconcerns with he

impact f ntegrationndassociation, otwith heEU as a more raditionalhird

partynterveningnconflictesolution.his imits he copeofour rgument,ut

itwill alsomake t moreprecise. hequestion f theEU as a foreign olicy ctorinconflictesolutions aninterestingnd,with strengtheningftheEU's Com-mon ndForeign ecurityolicy CFSP), equally opical ndchallengingne,butitis differentrom hequestion f the mpact f ntegrationndassociation,nd

requires urthereflectionsn the iteraturen CFSP as well as on third-partyintervention,hichwe do not ake nto ccount n thefollowing iscussion.4hisdoes howevernotmean that urframeworkannotbe appliedto conflicts ithEU involvementeyond ntegrationnd association,5 utit wouldalmostcer-

tainly avetobe amended or hispurpose.

In whatfollows,we proceed n three teps.First,we definewhatwe meanby"borderonflict"ndsuccessfulor"positive") U impact. econdly,we developthe four ossiblepathsofsuch an impact.n a third tep,we discusshowthese

pathways aveoperatedwith egard o our five ase studies ndthen utline heconditionsnderwhich heres an impact,nd whetherhis mpacts positive r

negative.We will refer o our mpiricalasesthroughouthe rticle s wedevelopanddiscussourapproach.

BorderConflicts nd SuccessfulEU ImpactADiscursive efinitionfBorderConflicts

Tobegin,we needto definewhatwe considerobe a successfulrpositive mpactof ntegrationr associationn border onflictransformation,hichn turnequiresa definitionfconflict.Wefollow discursive efinitionf conflicts the rticu-lation fthe ncompatibilityfsubject ositions.Moresimplytated,we observethe xistence f a conflict hen n actor onstructsis orher dentityr nterestsinsucha waythat hese annot e madecompatible ith he dentityr nterests

of anotherctor.Conflicts thereforeiscursivelyonstructed.hismeansthat,on theonehand,we do notconsider iolence s a necessarylement fconflict;on theother and,we do notregard s conflicts hat he iteratureeferso as"latent" onflicts,nwhich n incompatibilitys deducted rom objective" re-dispositionsather han ctual ommunication.6

In a borderonflict,ctors onstructnd communicateheirdentitiesnd nter-ests nrelation o a larger roup,heoverall dentityr nterestsf which reseenas incompatibleith hat fanotherroup.n themodernociety f nation) tates,such"imaginedommunities"end o be constructeds nations rganizedn ter-

4. Forthis iterature,ee,among thers, ill 2001; Smith 998; and M. E. Smith 003.5. See Loisel 2004.6. Efinger, ittberger,ndZiurn 988.




ritoriallyounded tates, raspiringtatehood.7t theheart f a border onflictunder hese onditionss thereforehe eferenceo a territorialorder hatsunder

dispute.n thecase ofTurkeyndGreece, his nvolves rimarilyhedelineation

ofthe ontinentalhelf s well as the tatus fsomedisputedslets n the asternAegean. n Cyprus, heTurkish epublicof NorthernyprusTRNC) declareditselfndependentn 1983, lthoughhe slandwas already ivided nto wopartssince theTurkishmilitarynterventionn 1974.TheTRNC, and thereforehedefactoborder ividinghenorthernnd southernarts f the sland,has howevernotbeenrecognizedytheRepublic fCyprusRoC) and, ndeed, nyothertate

apart rom urkey.n theMiddleEast,the sraelioccupation f Palestinian erri-tories n theWestBank,EastJerusalem,nd theGaza Strip ince the Six DaysWarof1967clasheswith hePalestinianspirationor tatehoodn thisdisputed

area. This situationecomes xacerbatedy significantortionsnboth ocietiesthat im for heestablishmentf"Greatersrael" or "Greater alestine" espec-tively,hats,rejectingnyterritorialightsf theother ide n theHolyLand.8

The case ofNorthernrelanddemonstratesow a border onflictan mutatefrom conflictbout state orderbetween orthernreland s part ftheUnitedKingdom ndtheRepublic f reland) omultiple orderonflictsinthedemar-cation frepublicanndunionistpaces nBelfast,London-)Derry,nd other it-ies inNorthernreland).Meanwhile heconflictbout he ctual tate order as

greatlyiminished,lthoughthasnot ltogetherisappeared.9inally,t thenewborder etween he

nlargedU and

Russia,t s not o much he ocation f the

border othpartiesdispute, ut rather heprecisepolicyregime o govern hisborderland,tretchingrom inland, hroughhe hree altic, tates o Poland.Attheheart f thisborder onflicties the ssueof whethero establish relativelystringentordermanagement,s the EU wishes, r a moreopenandintegratedborderlandhat reventsnyform fexclusion, s advocated yRussia.0o

Onespecificmode ocaptureonflictommunicationnourborderonflictasesis securitization,hichwe define, ollowing uzan andWaever, s therepresen-tation ftheother s anexistentialhreatustifyingxtraordinaryeasures."Weobserve conflict hen ctors rticulaten ncompatibilityyreferringo another

as an existentialhreato the self. n doing o,we focus nparticularn publicdiscourse,s it s here hat order onflictsain political alience.

The case studies n whichourargumentuildshave systematicallynalyzedinstances f securitizationnparliamentaryebates, ewspaperommentariesnd

historychoolbooks hroughoutheperiodof EU involvementn each conflict.In-depthnterviews ith olicymakersn all sidesof a conflict,s wellas theEU,complementedhe merging icture,lthoughheir rimaryurposewas to recon-

7. Anderson991.8. See,for hesraeli-Palestinianonflict,essler 994.9. See, for heconflictnNorthernreland, uane and Todd 1996.

10. See, for U-Russian elations, ohnsonndRobinson 004.11. See Buzan et al. 1998,21, 24; and Buzan and Waever 003,71.



TheEuropeannionndBorder onflicts 67

structneparticular"compulsory")athwayfEU impact, hich ewill ntro-ducebelow.Wetake ur mpiricalxamplesromheseasestudies,orwhichlargerrojecteamwasresponsible.project eb ite,12ocumentshe esultsf

these tudiesn anextensiveorkingaper eries,ndwe willquote romheworkingapers ublishedheres appropriateo llustrateur omparativeind-ings. heWeb ite lsoprovides orextensiveetails fourmethodologyhanweareableto offernthe paceof such compositetudy.n additionothesourcesistedbove, ewspapereviewsnd nterviewsith electndividualsnborderegionsave lsoformedart f he mpiricalata et.

Thisapproachllowsus toassessdegrees fsecuritization,hich reto dowithhe xtentowhichndividualttemptsosecuritizeso-calledsecuritizingmoves") ain cceptanceyothermembersf he roupr ociety,he requency

withwhichecuritizingoves ccur,ndthe xtentowhich given rouprsociety erceiveshe hreatf theothers "existential." securitizationnitsstrongestormsmanifestnthe rgumenthat he1974coup nCyprus,rga-nized y he heneigningilitaryuntanAthens,epresentednexistentialhreattotheTurkishypriotsand lso,given yprus'sroximityoTurkey'southerncoastline,oTurkey),hichustifiedhe xtraordinaryeasurefmilitarynter-vention.13imilarxamplesfextremeecuritizationboundntheMiddle ast,wherehe eferencesoalleged lans fthe ther ideeithero"push heJewsinto he ea"or o ransferllPalestiniansoJordannd ther rab ountriesften

rhetoricallyustifyrasticmeasuresuch s

targetedillingsr suicide omb-

ings.'4WhilenNorthernrelandhe hreaterceptionidnotnrecentearseachsuch xistentialevels, othonflictingommunitieseverthelessontinueo ecu-ritizehe rotectionftheireligiousnd ulturalutonomy.'5

Wewould lsoseethe isputesnthe 996 mia/Kardakrisis etweenreeceandTurkeys instancesfsecuritization,ven houghhe rticulatedhreat asnot neofwipingut nentireopulation-inact,he ispute asover rocky,uninhabitedslandntheAegean. et he hreatas till een, na moreymboliclevel, s existentialor heTurkishndGreektates.16he same anbe saidforEU-Russianelationsnwhichecuritizationlsopertainso uch contained"hreat

perceptionsnbothides. sfar sthe U isconcerned,hese erceptionsddresspotentialpilloversf ocial ndpoliticalnstabilitiesrom ussia o he U,whileinRussia heres a growinguspicionhat heEU attemptso restrictussianpolitical,ultural,nd conomicnfluencenRussia'swesterneripheryhroughreinforcedorderegime.17

12. See www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk).13. Adamson 002, 170.

14.For he ersistencefdeep-seateduspicionnthesraeli-Palestinianonflict,ee Wasserstein2003.15. See alsoMitchell 006.16. For the mia/Kardakonflict,eeAthanassopoulou997.17. See, for xample, rowning003.




+ 4

Subordinationonflict034-4Identity conflict0

02Issue onflict

N. 1

Conflictpisode

- Societaleach f ecuritization

FIGURE1. Stagesofconflictas modifiedromMessmer 003)

StagesofConflictndObservationfEU Impact

Ourdiscursive efinitionf conflict llows us to conceptualizen ideal-typicalmodelof conflicttages,whichforms hebasis forouranalysisof EU impactfurtherelow.These

tagesrecharacterized

y 1)an

ncreasingntensityf secu-

ritizationa greater tress n theexistentialityf thethreat; n increased re-

quencyof securitizing oves;a greater cceptance f securitizing oves); and(2) a greaternfiltrationfsocietal ifebysecuritization.18

Conflicts at itsweakest fthe articulationf an incompatibilityccursas asingular,solated ncidencewithno referenceo an existentialhreat, hichwecall a conflictpisode.An issueconflict isplays onflict ommunicationhat slimited o a particularssue and contains o orfew ecuritizing oves. ssue con-flicts re argelybout onflictingpecificnterests.lthoughdentitiesrepartlyexpressedhroughnterests,tthe tage f ssue conflictsheparties o not xplic-

itly nvoke dentitiess suchas partof theconflict.his,however, ecomes hecase in identityonflicts, here ecuritizing oves aboundand conflict artiesarticulatexplicitlyxistentialhreatso the self."Conflictommunicationeginsto overshadowmost pheres f societal ife. n the final tageof subordinationconflicts,heconflictingartieswidely ccept heexistentialhreat osed bytheother,s wellas theneedtocounter his hreat ith xtraordinaryeasures. on-flict ommunicationominates ll aspectof societal ife, ncludinghe nterper-sonal evel.

Wewant oemphasize hat rom n empirical erspective,hesedifferenton-

flicttages re notdiscrete,utratherverlappingones on a continuumetween

18. See lsoMessmer003.




conflictpisodes ndsubordinationonflicts.hepoint f this iscussions not obe able tounambiguouslylassify conflicts being t oneor anothertage, utrather oobservemovementslongthis ontinuumvertime.Wemay rgue hat

integrationrassociation ave had a positivempactf we can observe hat heyhave contributedo themovement f a conflict rom stageofgreateronflict

intensityo stagesof ower ntensity. hen his s thecase,we mayobserve, orinstance,hat herepresentationf theother ideas an existentialhreatecomesconfinedospecificssues nbothparliamentaryebates ndnewspaperommen-taries; hatmore ctors ontestecuritizing oves nstead freadily cceptingnd

engagingnthem; r thatnew editions fschoolbooksbegin o stress ommon-alities, atherhanncompatibilities,etweenhepartiesnvolved. onversely,nte-

grationnd association an be seen to have hada negativempact f a conflict

intensifiesndmoves, or nstance, rom n issueconflicto an identityonflict.

BorderConflict ransformationshroughntegrationandAssociation

Whiletheprecise ocationof a border onflict n thiscontinuummaybe con-tested etween ifferentbservers, e find hat heres usuallywidespreadgree-ment boutthetendencyfthe movementf the overall onflict.f theres nosuchtendency,his s usuallybecause ofdivergentatternsfinteractionithin

assumed onflictarties. n llustrationutside urfive asestudiess instructive

in thisrespect: he conflictboutGibraltarmight verallbe seen as an identityconflicthat asbynowmoved o the tageofanissueconflicts far s theBrit-ish and Spanishgovernmentsre concerned, hile n the articulationsfmanyGibraltarianst comescloser o a subordinationonflict.his s notnecessarilyproblemor urresearch;trather elps ospecifywhere xactly borderonflicttransformationas taken lace,for uch a transformationaywell involve nlysomesectors fsociety, hile thers emain nchangedrmove nto heoppositedirection.ndeed, t wouldnot t all be surprisingofind hat t timesntegrationhascontradictoryffectsnborderonflicts,hichweneed o observe ndexplainas such, atherhan rtificiallyryingobringhemnto single oherenticture.

Thusourfive ase studies over range f differentonflictonstellations,ithdifferentirections fmovement etween onflicttages.While n Northernre-land the1998 Good FridayAgreementGFA) succeeded n limiting reviouslywidespreadnstances f ntercommunaliolence,which llowus todescribe heconflictrior o theGFA as a conflict fsubordination,tneverthelesseinforcedthearticulationf antagonisticnionist ndrepublicandentities.he NorthernIreland onflictas thusmoved o a lower onflicttage, et thas become lockedin" at thestageof an identityonflict.19 morepervasivemovetoward rela-

tivelyowstageofsecuritizationas been achievedntheGreek-Turkishonflict.

19. Hayward004a. ee alsoHayes ndMcAllister999.




While mportantonflictssues, uch s thedelineationf the ontinentalhelfnthe astern egeanorthe tatus f some slets emain isputedetween oth tates,theoverallpolitical, ocial,and economic elations etweenGreeceandTurkey

havereached n unprecedentedevel of d6tente ndcooperation,n whichnega-tive magesof theother,et alone recourse o militarymeans, reno longerdominantharacteristicfconflictommunicationneitherociety. onsequently,theconflictmoved from he evel of a subordinationonflict oward n issueconflict.20

Amovementnthe pposite irectionharacterizesur hree ther ase studies.In theMiddleEast,thefailedCampDavid summitfSeptember000 precededtheoutbreak f the econd ntifada nd themassive ncrease f violencebybothIsraelis ndPalestinians. ith he actualndto theOslopeaceprocess ince2000,

theMiddleEast conflict asbecome ocked nat the tage f a conflictfsubordi-nation.21While hedemise fPalestinianresidentasserArafat, heGaza disen-gagement,nd reformsfthePalestinian uthorityPA) might avethewayfor

resumptionf thisprocess, uch a developmentemains arfrom bvious,giventhemassive ppositionnboth ides toanycompromisen thevarious ontestedissuesofthis onflictsuch s borders, erusalem,efugees,ettlements).s far sEU-Russiarelations reconcerned, e observe hatnitiallyisolated" onflictiveissues rightsf Russianminoritiesnnew membertates, egree f cross-border

cooperation,tatus fKaliningrad)ecome ncreasinglyntermingledithdentity-relatednarrativesfexclusion,"hus

ndicatingmovementoward

reaterecu-

ritization, hichpredominatest thestageof an identityonflict.22n Cyprus,hardlinersaveon theonehandbeen voted utof thegovernmentn theTurkish-

Cypriot orth, hileontheother andthere s no or ittlemovementowardesssecuritizationn theGreek-Cypriotouth.The conflict hereforeemains t thestageof an identityonflict,nd even a subordinationonflictn somepartsofCypriotociety.23

Four Pathways ofEU Impact

Integrationr association re always onlyone among everalfactors hat nflu-encethedevelopmentf a border onflict,ndempiricallyt s difficultlearly o

distinguishetween hesevarious actors. hus the ransformationf border on-flictsmight lso be related o therole of other ctors for xample, heUnitedStates or theUN).24Moreover, uropean ntegrationypically oes alongwith

20. SeeVathakou003; ndRumelili004a.21. On theOsloprocess,eeLustick997.22. Prozorov005.23. Demetriou004a nd 004b.24. Tocci 005.




other,essinstitutionalizedormsf nternationalooperationfor xample,ntheNorthAtlantic reatyOrganizationNATO]), and is embeddedn a processof

globalization. inally, emocratizationrocesses for xample, nGreece)stand

in an oftenmutually einforcingelationship ithntegration.It is notpossible oclearly eparate hesefactors romntegrationn thebasis

ofour asesbecause he atterreall similarwith espectothe lternativexplan-atory ariables.ndeed, hepossibilityf states oparticipatenEuropeanntegra-tiondependson thissimilarity,speciallyafter heCopenhagenCriteria,nd

consequentlyt s difficulto find ppropriateontrol ases.However, emocrati-

zation, s a more angible actor han lobalization,s suchdoesnot eemto be asufficientonditionor order onflictransformation,s therewas noweakeningof ecuritizationnNorthernreland rGreece/Turkeyhile hey avebeendemoc-

racies. Some studies vensuggest hat heprocessofdemocratizationeads to aperiodofgreateronflict olatility.25s we willdemonstrate,ur cases suggestthatwhileprocesses uch s globalizationnddemocratizationightacilitateor-der conflict ransformationn the ongrun, ther actors re crucial o make t

happen.Ourtask s then o dentifyhe pecificontributionhatntegrationakesto such transformation.

The demonstrationfthe mpact f ntegrationndassociation,herefore,astorest n a numberf ndicatorshat mounto a plausible torycrosscases. Inthis espect,he mpact f ntegrations similar o the mpact f deas.26 n orderto tell uch

story,erely

navariety

f social sciencepproaches,

hich, atherthan eing ncompatible,lert s tothedifferentimensionsf EU impact n bor-derconflicts.

Wepropose odistinguishour ifferentossiblepathwaysf EU impactnthetransformationf border onflicts. hese pathways elateto twodimensions:

(1) whetherhe mpact s generatedither yconcrete U measures ran effectof integrationrocessesthatare not directlynfluenced y EU actors; and

(2) whetherhe mpacts onconcrete oliciesor has wider ocial mplications.n

conceptualizinghese our athwaysfEU impact,wehavemadeuseof theworkof Barnettnd Duvall on differentategories fpower n internationalolitics.27

Barnett nd Duvalldistinguishetween irectnd diffuseower, n theonehand(close to ourseconddimension),ndpower hroughhe ctions fspecific ctorsor throughocial relations,n the otherhand close to ourfirst imension).tmakes enseto use Barnett ndDuvall as a startingoint, ecause"impact" ig-nifies n effectfpower, ndbecausewe agreethat atherhan etting ifferentforms fpower gainst achother, e needtothinkfthemn a complementaryway, nd observe heirnterplay. e havealsoborrowedrom arnettndDuvalloneoftheir ategories fpower "compulsoryower")buthave otherwisearied

25. See Adamson 002; and Russett 993.26. Yee 1996.27. Barnett nd Duvall 2005.




TABLE1. Pathways ofEU impact

Approach yEU

Actor-driven Integrationrocess

Target f mpact Policy (1) Compulsorympact (2) EnablingmpactSociety (3) Connectivempact (4) Constructivempact

the abelsfor urdifferentormsf mpact oprovide betteritwith he pecificquestion hatwe areaddressing.

Path1 (compulsorympact)works hrougharrots ndsticks,ompellingctorsthroughhemechanisms f integrationnd association o changetheir oliciesvis-a'-visheother artyoward onciliatory oves, atherhandeepeningecuri-tization.28he main carrot hat heEU has at itsdisposal s membership.29nmembershipegotiations,s wellas bysettingonditionsor he pening f mem-bership egotiations,heEU insists n themplementationf ts egaland norma-tiveframework,he

acquis communautaire,ncludingheresolution f border

disputes.30hispath s obviously ependentn thedesire ftheconflictarty obecomean EU member:f such desire s lacking, heconflictingartywill notregardmemberships anincentive ochange tspolicies. f t does follow heEUcarrot,hisdoes notnecessarilymply hat thas altered ts viewsoftheotherparty r itsbeliefs bout theconflict-the hangemay simply eflecttrategicbehavior.n that ense,while he ompulsorympacts very ffectivenmember-shipnegotiations,tseffectsmaybe short-termndsuperficial.et, s Risseandcolleagueshaveshown n theirnalysis fhuman ightsnddomesticeform,uchstrategic oves an, nthe ongrun, ndprovidedhe ightontext,ead todeeper

reformshroughontinuedressurendsocialization.31n ourcase,EU member-shipcanbe considered frameworkn which othpressurend socialization relikely,hus inkingompulsorympactwithwhatwewillbelow call constructiveimpact.

In comparison ithmembership,ther U incentivesanbe regardeds rela-tivelyminornweight ndimportance. ssociation greementso notentail llthebenefitsf fullmembership,nparticularot he ymbolicmportancefbeing

28. Dorussen 001.29. Wallace 2003.30. SchimmelfennigndSedelmeier 004.31. Risse et al. 2001.




anEU member,s thedebate bout nalternativeorm fmembershiporTurkeyhas shown.32inancial rother orms f aidor free rade greements,art fthetraditionaletofdiplomaticnstrumentso influencehird arties, an be impor-

tant arrotsspecially utside hegeographical eighborhoodf theEU, buttheyareunlikely o be as sweet a carrot s membership.ikewise, heEU has fewsticks t itsdisposal.33While t can imposesanctions,tsmost mportanttickconsists n the withholdingf carrots, n particular he threat f decliningmembership.

Path2 (enabling mpact) elieson specificctorswithin onflictarties o inktheir olitical gendaswith heEU and,througheferenceo integration,ustifydesecuritizing ovesthatmayotherwise ave notbeen consideredegitimate.34In conflictituations,ivilsociety ctors n favor fa peaceful esolutionften

fallvictim omarginalizationndridicule, raccusations fbeing raitors.lter-natively,ntheheated tmospherehat haracterizesdentityndparticularlyub-ordinationonflicts,nwhich ally-around-the-flagffectsrive olicies, hepublicmaypushthegovernmentsndother olitical eaders oward urtherecuritizingmoves.35 n either ase, ifEU membershipr association s widely een as anoverarchingoal,actors anuse the egalandnormativerameworkf theEU tosubstantiateheir laims nddelegitimizereviouslyominantositions. erhapsironically,fusedby governments,hispath eliesonwhat s otherwiseeen as aproblematiceaturefEU governance,tsdemocraticeficit,nthat oliticalead-ersuse theEU frameworko

push hrougholicies gainsthe

preferencesftheir

electorate.36Path3 (connectivempact) upports ontact etween onflict arties,mainly

throughirect inancialupportfcommonctivities.uch contacts not n tselfa steptoward esecuritization.ustained ontactwithin hecontext f commonprojectsmayhowever ead to a broader ocietal ffectn theform fsocial net-works crossconflict arties,which n turn houldfacilitatedentityhangeasforeseenwithinheconstructivempact elow. Outside heEU, support or uchactivitiesargely akestheform ftraditionalrants.37t theEU's borders,swellas atmembertates orders,he nterregrogramrovides undingor uch

cross-borderooperation.Within heEU, thePEACE programn Northernrelandis also an exampleofhow structuralunds,which re notpartof the nterregprogram,an be used to support pecificallyross-bordernd cross-communalprojects.38

32. Diez2005.33. See Smith998; ndHill2001.34. Buzan,Waever,nddeWilde998, 1-42.

35. SeeAdamson002, or he aseofCyprusn1974.36. Newman996, 89;but eeMoravcsik002, 12,for he iew hat ecisionmakingtEUlevel s muchmoreightlycrutinized.

37. Stetter003.38. SeeAndersonndO'Dowd1999.




Path4 (constructivempact)s themost ndirect ut-if successful-also most

persuasivemode oftransformation,ecause t "aims" atchangingheunderlyingidentity-scriptsfconflicts,hus upporting (re-)constructionf identities hat

permanentlyustains eaceful elations etween onflictarties. hispathwaysbasedon theassumptionhat U impact anput nplacecompletelyewdiscur-siveframeworksor reating ovelwaysofconstructingndexpressingdentitieswithinonflictegions. hese new dentity-scriptsill foster esecuritizationnavirtuousircle.Ultimately,hismay eadtothe ventual esolutionf the onflict,that s, thedisappearancefarticulationsf the ncompatibilityfsubjectposi-tions.This s clearly long-termrocess, ut tsapplicabilitys corroboratedytheclaimthatwhiletheremaynot yet)be a singleEuropeandentity,Europe"hasbecome n ntegralart fthe dentity/-iesn eachofthe U's membertates.39

There retwo often-discussednfluences fintegrationn conflicthat o notseem to fit asily nto he four aths s outlined bove.The first fthese s the

essentiallyeofunctionalistogicthat onflictsanbe overcome ybringingctorstocooperate n functional atters,his rocess eading o a change npreferencesand ultimatelyn individual allegiances."40 Yet,there re in facttwomecha-nisms nwhich hisogicrests: he acilitationfcooperationyfocusingn seem-

ingly echnicalmatters,nd the ong-termhiftfsubject ositionshat hismightbringwith t.Bothmechanismsrecontainednthe onnectivendthe onstruc-tive mpact, espectively.

Thesecondpossiblegap

inour chemes thergument

hatntegration

eads toincreasedwealth nd employment,nd that hiswill takepeopleoff he streetsandalter heir referencetructureso that iolent onflicts nolonger desirable

option-an argumentften ound n theearlydiscussions nNorthernreland ntheEuropeanParliament.41'hispossible nfluencean,however, e seenas aneconomic ersion fthe onstructivempact ecause tultimatelyeads to a changeof subjectpositions hat s causedbythe ncentive tructuresithin Europeanframework,he ffectfwhich annot e controlledhroughirect U policies.

Whilewe havepresentedll paths s possiblyeading o a reductionf securi-tization,ndthereforeoa successfulmpact f ntegrationnborder onflictrans-

formation,heirnfluencean also be negative. egardinghe ompulsorympact,this s for nstance hecase whennew membertates rerequiredo implementcertain oliciesto satisfyheacquis,which ctors n neighboringtates ee as

securitizing oves: the mplementationf visa regimes n theborder f Russiaand theEU is anexample.

Likewise,ntegrationan enable ctors opursue olicies hat avethe ffect f

intensifyingonflictiscourse,uch s in the aseofCyprusfterccession,whereGreekCypriots aveadopted hediscourse f a "European olution" o insist n

39. Waever1996.40. See Haas 1958 and2001.41. Pace 2005.




the four reedoms.n thisview, he atterwouldhavebeencompromisedndertheUN-sponsorednnan lan for solutionnCyprus,whichhad thebacking fmost ther U actors. U policies anhavea disconnectiveatherhan connec-

tive mpactf new visaregimesmakecontact cross hebordermoredifficult,sis thecase notonly nRussiaandEurope'sNorth, utalso betweenGreeceand

Turkey. inally, ndinparticularn cases of conflictsetween U memberndnonmembertates,ntegrationan fosterheconstructionfa Europeandentityin opposition o theneighboringonflict arty utside heEU. Whetherr not

integrationoes have an impact n border onflicts,ndwhetherr not such an

impacts positive rnegative anthereforeotbe determinedn the bstract,utis a matterfempiricalnvestigation.urthermore,hedifferentaths onot ccurin solation romach other.nstead,weneedto observe heirnterplay,ncluding

thereinforcingffects etween hem.

The OperationofPathways nBorderConflicts

In this ectionwe specify,n thebasisof ourpathway-modelnd the foremen-tioned ase studies,whethernd underwhatconditionsntegrationndassocia-tionhavean mpact nborderonflictransformation.eargue hat n most ases

integrationnd association ontributeo a desecuritizationf border onflicts,

therebyargely onfirmingur

hypothesisf the ransformative

owerf

ntegra-tion.However,here re alsocases in which U impact asleadtoa furtherecu-ritizationf theconflict.his eadsus toestablishheconditionsfpositive nd

negative U impact.n observing hange,we do not rgue hat U impact per-ates n a simple ause-effectelationship.nstead,nmany ases integrationndassociation upportather han nitiate esecuritizing oves.

Compulsorympact

Thesuccessof the ompulsorympact f ntegrations subject o three onditions.

First,he ompulsorympact peratesmost fficientlyn situationsfpendingmem-bership egotiations,hile t looses muchof itspowerwithout ucha concreteoffer nd oncemembershipas been attained.t follows hatwe cannot onfirmour nitialhypothesishat U impacts strongestncases ofEU membershipfall parties, t least n relation o formal olicychanges.This pathway,econd,crucially epends n thecredibilityfthemembershipffer. nly f a conflict

party onsiders hecarrot fmembershipn achievable ptionwillitengage n

desecuritizingoves.Third,hepervasivenessf the ompulsorympact ependsonthe xtentowhichdomesticctorsnternalizehe egaland normativerame-

work f ntegration.BoththeRepublic f reland nd theUnitedKingdom re membersf theEUandthereforeheNorthernreland onflicts an internalonflictftheEU. Yetthecompulsorympacthas been ratherimited.We can explain hisbythefact




that uringhepreaccession eriodn 1973,the hen uropeanCommunityEC)provided o facilitatingonditions or olving heconflict. he EC oftheearly1970s was a differentnstitutionrom he EU of the 1990s,whenthe inkage

between resolution fborderonflictsndentrynto heEU had becomepart fofficial olicies. n 1973 border onflicts ereconsidered matter fnational

prerogative.42In contrast,hecompulsorympact s mostobvious nthe case of Greeceand

Turkey.inceTurkey'sU membershipandidacy,policymakershavebeen] are-ful o restrainhemselvesromurtherscalatingrises,ndworkedowardmprov-ingbilateralrelations."'43ikewise,whenGreecewas a membershipandidate,Greekpolicymakers erecareful ottoundermineheir rospect fmembershipthroughn intensificationf the onflict ith urkey.44owever,n linewith ur

setof contextualonditions,he ompulsorympact ftheEU on Greecedecreasedafterhecountryad oinedtheEC in 1981. t also remainedimitedwith egardtoTurkeyhroughoutost fthe1990s,when Turkey idnotperceive U mem-

bership s a strong ossibility."45n theseperiods, othGreek ndTurkish oli-cymakers epeatedlyesortedosecuritizing oves, t times oming o thebrinkofwar.This illustrates owin premembershiperiods,without heconstructive

impact, esecuritizationsoften tacticaloolfor chievingU membership,atherthan n intrinsicalueforpolicymakers.

A similar ffectan be observednthecase ofCypruswhere hecompulsory

impactf theEU onboth onflict

artieswas

highlynfluentialuringmember-

shipnegotiations ith heRoC from 997to2004.Yet tfailed opavethewayfor long-termesecuritizationf this onflictfterheRoC had oinedtheEU,due tothe nstrumentalpproach fGreekCypriotolicymakersnpossible on-cessions.The lukewarmpproach ytheEU, which ied"Cyprus' U accessionto thenegotiationrocess or esolutionf the onflict,utdisengagedtfromnabsolute equirementhat uch resolutione reached" idnotfosterhebelief f

Greek-Cypriotolicymakershat oncessions o theother ideshouldbe made.46Thustherejection ftheAnnan-Plan yboththesouthernypriot overnmentand thepopular eferendumnApril2004 showed he imits f thecompulsory

approach when ncentivesnd disincentivesrenot vailable t all stages ftheconflict esolutionrocess" nd when he valueof desecuritizationas notbeeninternalizedythepolitical eadershipndthe wider ociety.47n theTurkish-

Cypriot ide,thecompulsorympactwas unlikelyo set n becausethe official

governmentalosition efore 003hadrejected U membershipnder he ondi-

42. Hayward 004b,5.43. Rumelili 004a,7.

44. Pridham 991.45. Rumelili 004a,9.46. Demetriou 004b,13-14. For a critique f EU policiestoward yprus,ee also Brewin 000;

and Diez 2002.47. Demetriou 004b,16.




tions ffered.nstead,he arrot f thematerial enefitsf ntegrationas largelyaimed at society t large.48ndeed, hiswas one factor ontributingo themassdemonstrationsgainst heregime f RaufDenktash,lthoughhecrucialdevel-

opment hat parked ff hesedemonstrationsas notso muchEU membershipperse but bankingndgeneral conomic risis n2000.49

InEurope'snorth,oo, he ompulsorympact f theEU remainedimited romthe utset ecausethepotentialenefitsfmembershipnly xtended ooneside,CentralndEastern uropeanountries,hileRussiawasdeprivedfcarrotstem-

ming romnyform fcloser ntegration.he mpact fthemembershiprospectin compelling esitant overnmentsftheBaltic States o improvehestatus fRussianminoritiess well documentedn the iterature.50owever, hispartialsuccessof thecompulsorympacthas notbeen able to outweighhe ncreasing

securitizationnEU-Russianrelationshat merged incethe ate 1990sin con-nectionwith he asternnlargementftheEU and, nparticular,heEU's unilat-eralestablishmentftheSchengen order egime t its eastern xternal orderwithRussia. nprotractedegotiations,hich elatednparticularothe tatus f

Kaliningrad,he Russianpolitical eadership pposedferventlyheproposals ytheEU for strict isaregime. owever, n theEuropean idethefear fvarious

insecuritypilloversrom ussia nto he U prevailedndthus imited ll attemptstoprovide ormore ignificantntegrationetween ussia andtheEU beyond he

vagueconcept f "four pacesofcooperation," hich ffersittle n theform f acredible ommitment

ytheEU for

greaterntegration."hese

developmentsed

to the mergenceatherhan hedisappearancefa newtype fborderonflictnEurope'sNorth, conflictnwhich heEU has turnednto main onflictarty.tcan thusbe argued hat s far s Russia s concerned,hecompulsorympact ftheEU hasbeen"generativeather han meliorativef newconflictualisposi-tions"between oth ides.52

In theMiddleEast,membershipf srael or Palestinen theEU has notbeenconsiderednoption, espitesolatedvoices nbothEurope nd theMiddleEast

proposing U membershipfIsrael as a carrot or btainingsraeliconcessionstoward hePalestinians.53he compulsorympact f the EU in theregionhas

until owremainedimited othe ssociation fboth sraeland Palestinewith heEU in theframeworkf theEuro-MediterraneanartnershipEMP). However,despitetsambitious eacebuildingndregionalizationgenda, heEMP settinghas notamountedo muchmorethan strongerconomic ntegrationf IsraelandPalestinewith heEU, with nly marginalmpact n a desecuritizationf

48. Diez 2002.

49. See Demetriou004b, 25-26; Diez 2006; and Lacher ndKaymak 005.50. D. Smith 003.51. Wallace2003.52. Prozorov 005, 1.53. Schael 2002.




theMiddle East conflict.54hus theentryntoforce f new AssociationAgree-mentswith oth srael ndPalestine n the ate1990shas notbeen abletopreventthemassiveviolence hat ccurred uringhe Second ntifada2000-2004). Nor

has itbeen able toprevent growing lienation etween he sraeligovernmentand theEU officialsnthisperiod, s a result f their ivergenterceptionsftheconflictntheMiddleEast.55twould,however, e inaccurateodismiss ntirelyany ompulsorympact ftheEU on the sraeli-Palestinianonflict. hus a reportbythe sraeliprimeminister'sffice asrecentlyrgued hatt s in srael's nter-esttoseek n nternationallyccepted olution o the onflictnorder ot o endan-

ger tsrelationswith heEU, whichhavebecometoo importanto Israelto be

jeopardized.56

Enabling mpact

For a pervasivempact ftheEU on border onflictransformation,ompulsoryimpact lonedoes not uffice.n order osuccessfullyontributeo ong-termon-flicthange, he arrot f ntegrationr associationmust lso empower politicalleadershipnconflictocieties hat s able to legitimize,hrougheferenceo the

acquis,desecuritizing oveswithin heirwiderdomesticonstituency.owever,this mpact nd itsmodalities re also dependentn contextualonditions. hefirst f theserelates o theperceived egitimacyfreferenceso integrationor

desecuritizingoves nd tothebasisofthis egitimacy,hich an be limitedoanarrow olitical liteorreachout toa wider ocietalbase.The secondconditionconcernshedegree owhich ntegrationrassociation ecomeoverarchingol-icygoalsandovershadowhe owerfulecuritizationiscoursesnconflictocieties.

InNorthernreland he nablingmpact ftheEU has hada considerableffect.This was particularlyrue nthe1990s,when heSocial and Democratic abour

PartySDLP) ofJohn ume uccessfullyinked tsconflictesolutiongendawiththe ssueofEuropean ntegration.57owever, heemergencef thenationalisticSinnF6inas the argestCatholicpartyn Northernreland fter he GFA also

points othe imits f theEU'senablingmpact.58

hisdirectly

elates o one ofour onditionsormulatedbove,namely,he ocietal each fconflict-diminishingpolitical gendas. n Northernreland, "lack ofpopulardentificationith heSDLP's pro-Europeandeology ndwith heEU ingeneral"imits hepervasive-nessofthe nablingmpact.59

Inaddition,heEC/EU offeredn nstitutionalrameworkhat egularlyroughttheheadsofgovernmentfBritain nd reland ogethertEuropean ouncilmeet-

54. Stetter004.

55. PetersndDachs 004.56. TheGuardian, 4October 004,Al.57. See Hayward 004b,7; andLaffan 001.58. See also Cunningham997 for uch critique.59. Hayward 2004b, 7.



TheEuropeanUnion ndBorderConflicts 579

ings.During he1983European ouncilmeetingnBrussels, ornstance,[Irish]TaioseachFitzGerald nd British rimeMinister] hatcher eldtheir irstmeet-ing nfifteen onths," hichwas perceiveds themajor turnaroundn British-

Irish elationst this ime." 0Councilmeetingsrovidedheopportunitys wellas the egitimacyoengage n suchmeetings, hich therwise ouldhave beenmetwith argreaterontroversy.

As far s therelations etweenGreece ndTurkeyreconcerned,he iteratureonthegradual uropeanizationfGreek oreignolicy ocuments ellthe nablingimpact fEuropean ntegration.61ather han singGreece'sEU membershipsa toolagainst urkey, hichwas thedominantnstrumentalpproach hroughoutthe1980s and mostofthe1990s,Greekpolicymakersncreasinglyeganto seetheEuropeanizationfTurkeys a recipe or ustained esecuritization.hevery

existence ftheEU as a referenceoint or peaceful elations s a natural ut-come ofEuropeanization.. legitimizes,nd rendersational,hatGreece houldwork oward ringingtsmainrival nto heEuropeanUnion." 2

In a similarwaytheTurkish olitical eadership emonstrates"perceptionftheEU as a successfulecurityommunity,hichdefusesnterstateonflicts..and serves o legitimizehe ointeffortso gainmembershipn the EU andtoresolve heoutstandingisputeswithGreece." 3A keyeffect f thisgrowingel-evance of theenablingmpact n theGreek ndTurkish olitical eadershipsreflectednthe hift fbalancebetween dvocates fdesecuritizationnd securi-tization. s Millas has

arguedwith viewto the

periodfsustained

approche-ment ince1999,"[T]he talkers nd thesilent neshave changed laces.Therehavealwaysbeenbothhawks nddoves n the wocountries.efore, he nviron-mentwashospitableothehawks;now, t s more uited othedoves." 4There slittle oubt n the iteraturehat hishospitablenvironmentame aboutmainlyduetothe egitimizingffect fthe nabling mpact f ntegration.65

As we have lreadyrguedbove, decisive roblem ithhe ompulsorympactin theCyprus onflict as been the ack of internalizationfEU norms n thelevelof theGreekCypriot olitical eadership, hich, espite ong-lastingego-tiations etween 997 and2004,retained n instrumentalpproach oEuropean

integration.he situationn theTurkish orth f the slandwashowever ifferentandherewe observe considerableoleof the nabling mpactnfosteringese-curitization.his relatesnparticularothe mpowermentfan alternativeolit-ical agendaof theTurkish-Cypriotpposition,whichsuccessfullymanaged ocouple he ssuesofd6tentenrelations ith he outh,he ntryfnorthernyprusinto he U, andreplacementfthe ld Denktashovernment.hisenablingmpact

60. Ibid.

61. See loakimidis 994; andUgur1999.62. Rumelili 004b,16.63. Ibid., 17.64. Millas2004,21.65. See overview nRumelili 004a.




of theEU became visible n theparliamentarylectionsn northernyprus n

2003, nwhich hepeace-orientedpposition arty, ithtsmain lection loganbeing Europe s withinight," efeatedhenationalisticenktash overnment.66

Thepowerof theenabling mpactn northernyprus epends n thefact hatthecarrot fmemberships stillout.This fitswellwithDemetriou's bservationthat he nablingmpact as notgained sufficientocietal aseon both idesthatwould be necessaryo change hebalanceofpowerbetween talkersnd silentones" na sustainedmanner,s is the ase in theGreek-Turkishonflict.hus nnorthernyprus hefailedunificationf the slandhas "resultedn a heightenedsenseofpublicdisillusionmentbout he bility f theEU toeffectivelyndpos-itively mpact n theconflict."67urthermore,mongGreek-Cypriotsnew dis-coursehas taken oldthatnsists n thefour reedomsuaranteedn theEuropean

UnionTreaty s the"European olution,"whereas he Commission as continu-ously tressedtswillingnesso accommodate solutionven f t makes empo-rary erogationsrom he cquis necessary.68

Thesecuritizingffect f the trict orderegimenEurope'snorth etweenhe

enlarged U and Russiahas severelyimited heenablingmpact fthe EU onthisconflict.n a detailed tudy f Russianpolitical litediscourses n Europe,Prozorov howshow the pplicationf theSchengen order egime tthe asternborder f the EU has triggeredn Russia a "policyof 'self-exclusion'rom he

Europeanpolitical ndnormativepace."Thispolicyfinds trongupportersn"the ntire

pectrumf the

politicaliscoursenRussia,"

ncludingheoncepro-

Europeaniberal-democraticamp.69While onservativeolitical ctorsn Russiasee EU-policies s a confirmationf theirong-helduspicion hat urope s not

willing o acceptRussia as an equal partner,he mpact fEU-policieson the

traditionallyro-Europeaniberals s of greaternterestorourpurposes. husrather hanbecoming dvocatesof desecuritizationndgreaterntegrationith

Europe, the xclusionaryracticesftheEU have .. antagonisedhemostpro-European' orceswithin heRussian olitical ebate,everely eakeningnyfuture

impact n Russianpolitics" hroughhese ctors.70 n line with urset of contex-tual conditionsmentionedbove,EU policiestowardRussiahave contributedo

anempowermentfthose ctorsnRussiawhoadvocate more adical tance ntheconflict, hilesilencing hepolitical ctorspotentiallyavorable f greaterintegrationnddrivinghem oward elf-exclusionn theRussianpolitical ebate.

The enabling mpact f theEU has beenthemostpervasive athwayhroughwhich heEU has nfluencedhe sraeli-Palestinianonflict.his relatesnpartic-ularto thePalestinianide,whereNewman ndYacobihave dentified"social-

66. Demetriou 005,23.67. Ibid.,19.68. Ibid., 25.69. Prozorov 005, 1; see also Potemkina 003.70. Prozorov 005, 10.



TheEuropeannionndBorder onflicts 81

isationfpolicy-makers.. into 'European iscourse'taking lace.7'Theyarguehat his nablingmpactf he Uhascontributed,mongtheractors,othe stablishmentf new actornPalestinianolitics,amely,broad oalition

ofactors hattartedopush ince he ate1990s or emocraticlections,realdivisionfpowers, dual xecutivend he onstitutionalizationfthe alestin-ianpolity.72hile he mergencef thisnewmovementas notpreventedheincreasingecuritizationfthe sraeli-Palestinianonflictfter hefailed ampDavid ummitfSeptember000,thasneverthelessedto ignificanthangesnthis eriod,hichnfoldedfterhe eath fPalestinianresidentrafatnNovem-ber2004,whensraeli-Palestinianelationsautiouslymproved.monghesechanges, ewmanndYacobimentionhe nactmentfa PalestinianasicLawin2003aswell s the stablishmentf he fficef Palestinianrimeminister.

Inbothsrael ndPalestine,t has becomeommonplaceo referoEuropeanintegrations anexamplehat onflictsetweenong-timeoes anbeovercomeina cooperativeanner.73ccordingly,eace nitiatives,uch s theOsloPro-cessorthe ecent enevanitiative,re associated ith urope"venfthe Uhasnot ctivelyarticipatednthe esignf hese eaceframeworks.74owever,a centralhortcomingf he nablingmpactnthesraeli-Palestinianonflictiesyet gainntheimitedocietal each f hese iscourses.hishas odobothwitha deep-seatedkepticism,speciallyn srael,owarduropewithtshistoryndtheEU as a politicalctorn theMiddle ast, ndtheremarkablembedded-ness f

highlyecuritizediews n the onflictven

mongstoderatesnboth

societies.75

Connectivempact

Asour xamplesave lready ade lear,he uccessfulransformationfborderconflictsependsn the xtento which esecuritizationeaches utbeyondhepoliticallite ndbuilds pa wider ocietal ase.This erves s a rationaleorthe U's directupportf ontactsetweenocietal ctorsf he onflictarties.Thesuccess f these ontactsepends,irst,nthe bilityfthe U tosupportnot nly he lreadyconvinced,"ut oreach ut oactors howould ot doptadesecuritizationgenda ithouthe U'ssupport.econd,tdependsn he xtenttowhich inancialssistancef he U is acceptednconflictocietiess a legit-imate ool atherhansexternalnterferencento omesticffairs.

71. Newmannd acobi004b,3.72.Jamal001.

73.Asimilarationalenderlieshe U's pproacho ntegratesraelnd alestinentoegionalmultilateralora,uchsthe uro-Mediterraneanartnership,herebyupportingiddleasternnte-gration. ee Asseburg 003.

74. Newman nd Yacobi2004b,7.75. See, for xample,Morris 004.




The EU's connectivempacton the conflictn Northernreland s widelyacknowledged.76s Hayward rgues, heEU played "crucial ole .. shapingcommunityevelopmentn Northernreland and the border ounties of Ire-

land]."77The mainpillars fEU supportre the nterregrograms well as thePEACE program,oth fwhich perate nder heumbrellaf the tructuralundsoftheEU. Theirmpact elatesnparticularo thedevelopmentf manifoldross-border rojectsnNorthernreland ndadjacent egionsn theRepublicof Ire-land.78The two terationsfPEACE between 995and 2004 received combinedcontributionfnearly 50 million uros from heCommission,bout hree uar-ters of the overall volume,with matchedfunding romthe UK and Irishgovernments.

With othBritainnd reland eingmembersf theUnion, heEU couldmake

use ofthecross-borderomponentf theSingleMarket rograms an indirectmeans o desecuritizeheconflictn Northernreland.As a "powerful,nd neu-tral,conomic ctor r,more pecifically,aterial enefactor.. the U hasbecomea main timulatoror ommunityevelopmentn both idesoftheborder."9Whatmatters or ur nalysis,s that hismassive inancialupportf theEU inNorth-ern relandhas led,despite arious nstitutionalbstaclesntherapid mplemen-tation ffunds,o a remarkableesecuritizationf ntercommunalelations.80 hisis mostobvious t theborder etween heRepublic f reland nd Northernre-land,where tronginancialupportrom heEU hastransformedhis order rom

being protectedineofdivision nto n area characterized

ycross-borderco-

nomic ndinfrastructureevelopment. onetheless,he mpacthas been imitedin itsoverall ocietalreach.Thus,as we will arguebelowwhendiscussing heconstructivempact, he ines of division n Northernrelandhave notdisap-peared utmoved othemicro-levelfspecific oroughsr streets hich he on-nectivempact ftheEU has notyetpermeated.

Large-scale irectundingfsocietal ctors nGreece ndTurkey asonly egunafter hebilateral approchementince 1999.The connectivempact f theEUoperates hroughwo maingrant rograms,hefirst nebeing heGreek-Turkishcivicdialogue rogram, hich tartedn2002andhas a budget f8 million uros.

The secondgrant, stablished n 2004, provides 5 millionEuros of funds orcross-borderrojects etween urkeynd Greeceunder heumbrella fthe nter-regIII program.With heseprojects heEU attempts irectlyo support hose

nongovernmentalrganizationsNGOs) inthe wocountrieshat dvocate dese-curitizationgenda,butalso,throughhe nterreg rogram,o widen hesocietalbase ofsuccessfulonflictransformation.

76. SeeMeehan000.77. Hayward 004b,22.78. Bradley ndHamilton 999.79. Hayward 004b,26.80. See Teague1996.




The relativelyatetiming f the actualestablishmentf thesefunds ndicatesthat he onnectivempact as notbeenthedrivingorce fdesecuritizationntheGreek-Turkishontext. et tremains n importantnderpinningf desecuritiza-

tion.This is particularlyrueforTurkey,whereEU funding f widersocietalorganization-inthe absenceof alternativeomestic ourcesof funding-hasbecome crucial actorntheTurkish eformprocess.sl n an empiricalnalysisofEU fundingn theGreek-Turkishontext, umelili oncludes: [T]he impactof EU funding as been strongestn cases where he EU has specificallyup-portedocal andgrassrootsrganizations,uccessfullyombinedhe bjectives fGreek-TurkishooperationndTurkish ivilsociety evelopment,nd facilitatedtheformationfnewpartnershipsetweenGreek ndTurkish rganizations."2Without domesticnvironmentonducive o ntensifiedreek-Turkishoopera-

tion, hese undingffortsould isk osupportnly he lreadyconvinced" ith-outmaking largermpact n theconflict.

Through unding icommunal rojectsn theframeworkf the Civil SocietyProgram, hich he EU launchedn 2003, it aims to bring ogether reek ndTurkish ypriotndividuals ndNGOs,thusmaking se ofopportunitiesffered

bythe peningftheGreen inebytheTRNC administrationnApril 003.Before

2003,theEU supportedurkish ypriot GOs with desecuritizationgenda,n

particular,heTurkish ypriot hamber fCommerce,hemaindrivingorce nthe un-upo themassive ro-EU ndpropeace emonstrationsnnorthernyprusin

early2003. The Chamberwas

particularlywareof the

"impactf the nter-

national solation fthenorth ndthepossibilitieshat solutiontothe onflict]coupledwith ntrynto heEU couldunleash." 3

While n Europe'snorth,hecompulsorynd enablingmpact fthe EU are

severelyimitedndhavenotpreventedn ncreasingecuritizationfEU-Russianrelationss a result fthe trict order ividebetweenRussiaand theEU's east-ern xternal orders,he onnectivempact asto someextent eenableto coun-terbalance hisdevelopment. his is particularlyruefor theFinnish-Russian

borderland,nwhich heEuregioKarelia,which s partofthe nterreg rogram,provides or n institutionalrameworkfcross-borderooperationn thewider

societal evel.84n addition,he RussianRepublicofKareliahas throughouthe1990s beenone of themainrecipientsf Tacisfunds,which heEU provided orcivilsociety evelopmentntheCommonwealthf ndependenttates.

Theoverallpositive ssessmentnthe iteratureftheEU's connectivempactinEurope'sNorth ashowever ne importantaveat, henegativempact f the

Schengen orderegimeutlinedbove.85hisconcerns ot nlynstitutionalbsta-cles to a jointdevelopmentf theborder egion acedbywider ocietal ctors, ut

81. Belge2004.82. Rumelili 004b,15.83. Demetriou004b,23.84. On this egion, ee Forsberg 995,and Prozorov 004b.85. See Prozorov 004a; andCronberg003.




also thedisruptionhat henew border egime as introducedo traditionalross-border ooperationnthis egion.

Like theenabling mpact, he connectivempactof theEU in the Israeli-

Palestinianonflicts morepervasive han hecompulsoryathway.86hemeta-phor hat theEU is a payer utnoplayer"n theMiddleEast conflictllustratesthis rgument."8ndeed, heEU has in the1990sbecome hesinglemost mpor-tant inancialontributoro thepeace process ndsupporterf thePA. Part fthis

fundingncludedfinancialupport orpeace-orientedGOs in both sraelandPalestine s well as to thedevelopmentf a Palestinianivilsociety hroughhesupport f democracy rojects nd economic nd infrastructureevelopment.88Thishas sparked arsh riticism rom hehawkish ectors fsociety. o pickbutoneexample, right-wingonitorroupn sraelhas claimed hat heEU's sup-

port fpeace-orientedrojectss contributingo thepromotionfNGOs with n"extremistpost-Zionistgenda' or"radicalNGOsinthe sraeli-Arabector, hichdisseminatealse llegationsfdiscriminationnd sraelihuman ightsbuses." 9ThisdelegitimizationfEU supportmeasures s betrayinghe"national ause"canonlybe understoods stemmingrom heconcern hat he onnectivempactoftheEU mightventuallympowern alternativegenda o thedominantecu-ritizationiscourse nboth srael and Palestine.Giventhepositive onnotationsofthereferenceo the European ntegrationxperience"as opposed o"Europe"as such) ntheMiddleEast,sucha concernmaynotbe entirelynwarranted.

Yettheconnectivempact

f theEU in theMiddleEast has had its shortcom-

ings. everal uthors avereferredo thenontransparentnd slow mplementationprocedureshathamperedheoverallpervasivenessf EU fundingntheregion,thus ointingoa problemhat U fundinglso encounterednsomeof ourothercase studies.90 oreover,here ave been accusations hat hePA misused omeEU fundingo support erroristctivities uring he Second ntifada.While theEU admittedhat there ad notbeen an adequate ystemf control vertheuseofthesefunds,"hese ccusations ave had a negativempact n theEU's role ntheconflict ecausetheyunderpinned growinglykeptical ttitude oward heEU inIsraeloverthepastfewyears.91

Constructivempact

In ourprevious iscussion fpathwayswehave often tressed he rucial ole ofthe ocietaldiffusionf a desecuritizationgenda.Any ong-termransformationofconflictsrucially epends na changen dentityonstructionsnconflictoci-

86. Stetter004.

87. See, nparticular,ehrendtndHanelt 000.88. Stetter003.89. Steinberg2004, 8-9.90. Stetter003.91. Newman ndYacobi2004a,35.




eties, o theextent hat ubject ositions reno longer egardeds incompatibleand therelevance f nvoking revious onflictssues oses attraction.

In spite fthe etbacksn theNorthernreland eaceprocess fterheGFA,the

conflict asnot eachedevelsof securitizationhat haracterizedrevious ecades.This, ccordingoHayward, as todo with hefact hatntegrationas offerednalternativerame or dentityonstructionsn Northernreland ndempowered"previouslyilent ections f thepopulation,"2particularlyn themainly rotes-tant outhernorder istrictsf Northernreland.While nitiallyhese ommuni-tieswerehesitantoapply or undingnder hePEACE program,ver imemoreand moreProtestantroups id,which edtoa subtle eassessmentf dentities.93Inthisway, heEU has initiated redefinitionfpreviouslynimicaldentitiesntheborder egion.94 e do not rgue hat his dentityhangehas affectedll sec-

tors fsocietyn Northernreland, or hat thaspermanentlyhiftedhebalanceofpower nfavor fpeace-orienteddentities.et t hasmadepossiblemany fthecross-borderrojects,whichwouldhavebeenunthinkablenly decadeear-lier. urthermore,ntheNorthernreland ontextheEU became nexplicitourceof nspirationor econsideringdentitieso suchan extenthat ooperation iththeother ide,onceunthinkable,as become reality.

The significancef Greek-Turkishapprochementince1999liesnotso muchin the actualresolutionfthe variousdisputedssues,butrathern thesocietaldiffusionf a sustained esecuritizationgenda.95Whilebefore 999desecuritiz-

ingmovesbythepoliticaleadershipftenmet

public ejectionue to

widespreadnationalisticeadingsfthe onflict,his ituationascruciallyhangedfter 999.As Rumelili bserves, rior o thisperiod othGreece ndTurkey mployed ef-erences o"Europe" s a means fcastigatingheother s non-European,herebydrawing sharp ividingine between hecountries.nGreece, twas the ccep-tanceof thecountrys member f theEuro-Zonen 1999,whichpavedthewayfor "positive dentificationith heEU, whichmanifestedtselfn increased

willingnesso use theEU as a foundationor heresolutionf itsdisputeswith

Turkey ccording o EU norms." urkey's cceptance s a candidate ountryn1999 "has accelerated heprocessof nternalizationfEU normsnTurkey,nd

pavedthewayfor heperceptionf EU norms ndproceduress a neutral asistobuilda cooperative elationship ith

Greece."'96n otherwords, henormativeframeworkf the EU has become nternalizedy a growing umber f GreeksandTurks nd thisprovidedhe ocietal asisfor he forementionedhiftfbal-ance between talkers"nd"silent nes."97

92. Hayward 004b,8.

93. Ibid.,12.94. See also Meehan2000.95. Foran illustrationf this ocietaldiffusionn the ulturalector,ee Tarikayha004.96. Rumelili 004a,20.97. Rumelili 004b,26.




The constructivempact ftheEU on theCyprus onflicts manifested ost

prominentlynthe inkage etween solutiono the onflictndthe dea ofEurope,whichhasbecomeparticularlyisible n themassivepropeacedemonstrationsn

northernyprusn 2002 and2003,wheremanydemonstratorsaved EU flags.The effectwas to reshuffleolitical llegiances, s the demonstrationsestab-lished connectionetween urkish-ndGreek-Cypriotshosupportedhe amecause,evenwithouteing ble to have contactwith achother,ndthus ostereda change f dentificationfthe ivilsociety f the onflictingarties romthnic(Greek/Turkish)opoliticalprosolutionndrejectionist)."98nsouthernyprus,theconstructivempact peratedn a lesspervasivemanner.Whilethere re also

examples fa linkage etween U membershipnd a prosolutionpproach, hatdominatedn the outhwas anattempto inkEU membershipith morenation-

alistagenda.Thisbecamepossiblebecause withmembershipnlygrantedotheRoC, thenorthernart fthe sland ould be referredoas beingoutside urope.This conformsoourhypothesisf a potentiallyegativempact f ntegrationnborder onflictsttheEU external orders.

A similar ffect esulting rom strict xternal order egime s at play in

Europe'snorth. hecombinationf various onflictivessues nEU-Russian ela-tions, angingrom he tringentisaregimeo differentnterpretationsfthe1999KosovowarbyNATO or theRussianwar nChechnya, ave fostered senseofdifferenceetween othsides.Thus the aforementionedense of exclusionhas

penetratedhe

dentityimension f even

pro-Europeanectors fRussian oci-

ety.The lack ofmeaningfulntegrationetween heEU andRussia has contrib-uted oa greaterecuritizationfEU-Russian elations. ontraryothe ituation

duringheYeltsin residency,hencalls forgreater ooperationnd ntegrationbetweenheEU andRussia weremore rominent,he ubsequent earshavebeendominatedydiscourseshat dvocate n inherentifferenceetween ussiaandtheEU onthe dentityimension.99heflipsidef this s therepresentationfthenewmember tates nCentral nd Eastern urope s "more uropean" han heir

bigger eighborntheEast.100The constructivempact f the EU on the sraeli-Palestinianonflict emains

limited or woreasons.On theonehand, herelatively eak ntegrationrovidedfor ythe ssociation f srael nd Palestinewith heEU intheEMP settingon-strainshepervasivenessftheEU's constructivempact romheoutset.On theother and, rathermbivalentttitudeoward heEU on the dentityevel fur-therimits heEU's abilityobecome n uncontestedeferenceoint or recon-structionf identities nd sustained esecuritization.101his is particularlyruefor sraelwhere anti-Europeanentiments"aveproliferatedn recent ears, nd

98. Demetriou004b, 5-26.99. Prozorov 005, 17.

100. Neumann 998.101. Newman ndYacobi2004a.




wherenegativemagesof theEU have becomepartof securitizationiscours-es.102 As Peters ndDachs argue, heEU has turnednto an easy scapegoat nIsraelipublicdiscourse. hus"negativemages fEurope n the sraelimedia nd

political rena bound nd arerarely hallenged.. Themajorityf sraelis egardEuropeans s caringittle or srael's ong-termecurity."03

Thesenegativemageswithregard o the role ofthe EU in the MiddleEastconflicttand n a complex elationship ith hepositive ndorsementhat uro-pean ntegrationeceives nIsrael.Thegrowing umberfapplicationsy srae-lisfor secondpassport f one oftheEU's member tates eflecthis, ut lsotheresults fseveral pinion olls ndicatinghat 5percentf sraelis re nfavor fIsraelimembershipn theEU.104Tornbetween ttractiono andhistoricallyndpolitically haped uspicion fEurope, he ambivalentelationship"etweenhe

EU and srael imits he apacity f the onstructiveathwayobecome nenthu-siasticallyndorsed eferenceoint or long-termeconstructionf dentitiesnthis egion.'05

Conclusions

Ourempiricalnalysis llows us to derive numberfpreliminaryonclusionsabout he mpact fthefour athwaysn border onflictransformationndtheir

interplays well as theconditions orpositive rnegativempact fintegrationandassociation, hichwehopewill be tested urthernother ase studies. s faras thecompulsorympacts concerned, e haveargued hat hispathwayworksbestwithin heframeworkfa crediblemembershiperspective.fthere s suchperspectiver fnegotiationsrealready nderway, onflictarties void securi-tizingmoves norder ot oendangerhemembershiperspective.his has beenthe ase inGreece,Turkey,yprus,s well as Central ndEastern urope.How-ever,without crediblemembershiperspectiveTurkey efore1999) or oncemembershipasbeenachievedCyprus),he ompulsorympactoses much f ts

leverage,s itdoesunder he onditionftheweakformf ntegrationfferedyassociationIsrael-Palestine).These structuralimitationsfthecompulsorympact eg thequestion fthe

extento which olicymakersnconflictegions ave nternalizedhenorms ndvalues of theEU and thedegree owhich hey reable to legitimize esecuritiz-ingmoves hrougheferenceoEuropeanntegration.uranalysis as shown hatthis nablingmpact ftheEU hasplayed major ole nconflictransformation,eitherhrough long-termocializationfpolicymakersntoEuropean ormative

102. Newman ndYacobi2005, 14.103. Peters ndDachs 2004,6.104. Ibid., 8.105. Newman ndYacobi2004a.




discoursesGreece,Northernreland) r the mpowermentfalternativeesecu-ritization iscoursesTurkey, orthernyprus,Northernreland).However,wealsohave referredo nstancesnwhich eferenceo theEU has,for ifferentea-

sons, egitimizedurtherecuritization.ucha constellationecomesmore ikelyifonlyone conflictarty ecomes ntegratednto heEU, whiletheother ide s

subject oa more r ess strictxternal order egimeCyprus, urope'snorth) rifboth onflict arties emain utside he nstitutionalrameworkfintegration(Israel-Palestine).n such ases,referenceotheEU is often sed n order o rein-scribe ifferenceatherhan romoteooperation.

TheEU encouragesooperationn a wider ocietalevel nterliathroughinan-cial supportfpeace-orientedctors. hepathwayeading o a connectivempactis a key trategy,orkingitherhroughirectlyupportingeace-orientedroups

(Cyprus, reece-Turkey,srael-Palestine,urope'snorth,nparticulararelia, ndNorthernreland) rthroughommunityevelopmenthat nly ndirectlyelatestocross-borderooperation,uch s economic evelopmentn borderreas North-ern reland).We have also, however, ointed o thedisruptiveffect f a strictexternal order egime nantecedentormsf cross-borderooperation,mpededby partial ntegrationfconflict artiesntothe EU (Europe'snorth).We havefurthermoremphasizedhat heconnectivempact f theEU loses inpervasive-ness due tocomplicated unding rovisions, hich lowdown, bstructnd there-fore imitthepowerof thispathwayGreece-Turkey,urope'snorth,srael-

Palestine,Northernreland).Correspondingo our initial bservationhat onflictsre constitutedy an

incompatibilityfsubject ositions,hemostpervasive orm fconflictransfor-mation elates oovercominguch ncompatibilities-henceur rgumenthat heconstructivempacts themostpowerful,ut lso themostdemanding,athwayofEU impact. he constructivempact epends-more han ll others-ona highdegree f ntegrationnd nternalizationfEuropean orms f conflictesolutionon a wider ocietal evel.This s,at eastto someextent,he ase inthose onflictsocieties hat avefor longtimebeen ntegratednto heEU (Northernreland,Greece),orwhere t leastthecredible erspectivef ntegrationupportsuch a

gradual hangeof scripts Turkey). his impact s largelynegligible nder hecondition f associationIsrael-Palestine),hile toperatesn a conflict-enhancingmannerfcross-boundaryeasures lash with he stablishmentfa strictxter-nalborder egime Europe'sNorth), rwith articularisticnterpretationsfEuro-

pean dentityEurope'sNorth, yprus).A second onditionornegative U impact elates otheperceptionn thepart

ofconflictarties hat heEU is biased nfavor f one side of theconflict.hisreinforcesreexistentegative magesoftheEU inconflictegions. heEU canthen venbecome referenceoint or urtherecuritizationIsrael,Russia,Tur-

keybefore 999).Throughheprospectf, s well as the nstrumentsfferedy, ntegrationnd,to a much esserdegree, ssociation,heEU hasa significantmpact nthe rans-formationf border onflicts. owever, nlike hemuch-citedxample f theres-




olution of theFranco-German onflict uggests, his mpact s by no meansautomatic runidirectional.ather,s,for xample,n the ase ofEurope'snorth,thismpactan also benegativendconflictnhancing. ainly, owever,he bove

analysishas shown hat study fthe EU's influencen thetransformationfborder onflicts,nd thus f therelationshipetweenntegrationndpeace in awider ense,requires akingnto ccount varietyfpossiblepathwaysf nflu-ence thatbear on differentspectsof complex onflictonstellations. hatwehave offerednthis rticles a conceptual rameworkor tudyingU impact nthe ransformationfborderonflicts,hichwefound sefulnthefive xamplesthatwe haveexaminedndthat,wehope,willbefurtherpplied,ndsubsequentlyrefined,nother ases.

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The European Union and Border Conflicts - The Transformative Power of Integration