The Obligations Built into the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC)

Lecture No. 12

1. Outline• BTWC Regime

– Slides 2-3

• Role of the Preamble and the BTWC– Slides 4-6

• Ethical Responsibilities under the BTWC– Slides 7-8

• Practicing BTWC Norms– Slides 9-14

• Ethical Norms in Specific BTWC Articles– Slides 15-18

• Scientific Background Papers– Slides 19-20

2. Regime• International law is central to a regime and

this is seen as the starting point of an international norm from which dual-use ethics in life sciences can be considered.

• Regime refers to:– “principles, norms, rules and decision making

procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue area.” (Krasner, 1982)

3. The BTWC Regime

• “given issue area”: – international prohibition against biological and

toxin weapons;• “principles, norms, rules”: – The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention

• “decision making procedures”: – Review Conferences, Intersessional Processes, and

other Meetings to sustain and develop the regime

4. Preamble: Norms of the BTWC

• Role of Preamble of a Treaty:– Preamble of a treaty addresses grand principles and norms

of the treaty enshrined in its specific mission

• Not a substantive article but an interpretive guide– Article 31(2) Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties of

1969 states:“The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes” and subsequent agreements of the Parties to the treaty [Article 31(3)]

5. Original Preamble of the BTWC

• States Parties: “Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete disarmament, … and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological (biological) weapons and their elimination, …

• …Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,” – Texts in Bold are essential elements of the

normative scope of the Convention.

6. BTWC Solemn Declaration in 2006

• States Parties solemnly declared that “terrorists must be prevented from developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining, and using under any circumstances, biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of agents or toxins, for nonpeaceful purposes…”

• Normatively, the prohibition of biological and toxin weapons are envisaged both over state and non-state levels.

7. Ethical Responsibilities of Scientists under the BTWC

• Ethical considerations of scientists can be started by considering which aspects in scientific and technological research and practice can be potentially non-peaceful in relation to:– developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise

acquiring or retaining and using* biological agents and toxins, equipment, or means of delivery of agents or toxins, under any circumstances.

8. Social Responsibilities of Non-Scientists under the BTWC

• Ethical considerations of non-scientists can be started by considering how risk-minimization about the dual-use issues can be pursued in a way not to harm the scientific freedom of scientists.

• This consideration should be made in relation to every aspects of measures to prevent and respond to developing, producing, stockpiling, or otherwise acquiring or retaining, and using of knowledge and practice in life sciences.

9. Changing Norms into Practice (i) International/Regime Level

• Substantial areas of the BTWC but difficult elements to be strengthened– Compliance; 1, Article I, II, III, IV, V, VI and VII (See lecture 7 for the role of

each Article); 2, Confidence Building Measures; and 3, Verification Protocol negotiation failed in 2001. （ See lecture 8)

– Development; “economic and social development, particularly in the developing countries” (BTWC Final Declaration 1980). It has been less developed element under the BTWC.

– Research; Difficulty in development under the BTWC regime due to: 1, difficulty to identify “real” intention of researcher; 2, Article I does not prohibit “research”; 3, no other legal constrains to prohibit research concerning BTW.

– Permanence; Prohibition enshrined in Article I is comprehensive and unlimited duration of Article XIII is secured.

10. Changing Norms into Practice (ii)State Level

• Nationalising the BTWC– Article IV: National Implementation

• “Each State Party to this Convention shall, in accordance with its constitutional processes, take any necessary measures to prohibit and prevent the development, production, stockpiling, acquisition, or retention of the agents, toxins, weapons, equipment and means of delivery specified in article I of the Convention...“

– Difficulty of implementation • Article IV itself neither instructs the specific implementation of

the Article, nor clarifies whether those measures require legislations or not.

11. Changing Norms into Practice (iii)State Level

• Guides/References for national legislation

– From the BTWC: Section of Article IV of the Final Declarations at the Review Conferences are the useful references for realising the scope of the Convention

– From States Parties: National legislations, which have been already implemented by other States Parties, could be referred as relevant models and States Parties agreed on the value of international cooperation for this specific purpose at the BTWC MSP2007

– From other sources: VERTIC: Collection of National Implementation Legislation, BTWC Model Laws

12. Changing Norms into Practice (iv) Individual Level

• Discussed topics during the Inter-Sessional Process (ISP) 2003-2005 and 2007-2010 included:– Oversight of research; Codes of conduct; Awareness

raising and Education about the dual-use issues– Active engagement of scientists to develop effective

culture in awareness raising is essential– States Parties should facilitate scientists to have

initiatives to develop such culture, since they are the forefront of cutting edge science

13. Changing Norms into Practice (v) Individual Level

• Guides/references for codes of conduct– Inter Academy Panel Statement on Biosecurity

“This statement presents principles to guide individual scientists and local scientific communities that may wish to define a code of conduct for their own use”.

– Code of Conduct for Biosecurity by Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences• “The rules laid down in the Biosecurity Code of Conduct call for

implementation and compliance at different levels. … Calls for awareness, accountability and oversight are targeted mainly at individuals: researchers, laboratory workers, managers and others.”

14. Changing Norms into Practice (vi) Individual Level

• Guides/references for awareness raising and education – Biosecurity Education Portal by Federation of

American Scientists mainly provides a set of online educational modules developed by different institutions

– Dual-Use Bioethics by Bradford Disarmament Research Centre provides ‘modifiable’ online educational module resources

15. Article I• Firstly; Ethical responsibilities of life scientists can be

discharged by firstly, considering how their own scientific research can be prevented from dual-use concern in regard to each aspect of ‘develop, produce, stockpile or otherwise acquire biological agents, toxins, weapons, equipment or means of delivery for non-peaceful purposes’.

• Secondly; considerations should be actively practiced by promoting culture of prevention against the misuse of science.

16. Article III

• The ethical responsibilities are also discharged by considering how dual-use scientific knowledge and technology can be utilized to strengthen the effort “not to transfer [prohibited material for prohibited activities in Article I] to any recipient whatsoever, directly or indirectly, and not in any way to assist, encourage, or induce any State, group of States or international organizations”.

17. Article X• Ethical responsibilities can be discharged by

considering how best dual-use science and technology can be peacefully exchanged with a view to promoting global health and social developments and securing dual-use risks.

• Ethics for security and ethics for development.– For some states or individuals ‘security’ is the first

ethical priority and ‘development’ is for others. Although both are indispensable and interconnected,

18. Article XII • No single ethics regarding dual-use issue– However, only clear point is updated knowledge about

cutting edge research in life sciences at each time is the most fundamental point to consider how responsibilities of scientists can be ethically and effectively discharged.

– In this context, Article XII is significant, since it opens a channel for States Parties to update their scientific understandings. Article XII reads that Review Conference “…shall take into account any new scientific and technological developments relevant to the Convention.”

19. Scientific Background papers (i)

• Secretariat of the Review Conference compile the updated scientific input by States Parties.

• Background papers review diverse scientific advances and assess relevance of those in relation to the scope of the BTWC.

• At the 6th Review Conference, alongside the background paper by secretariat, some 10 individual papers contributed by States Parties.

20. Scientific Background papers (ii)

• Reviewing process of increasingly advancing science only at five-yearly intervals can be slow compared to rapidly advancing life sciences, and successive input of the updating effort by States Parties to the BTWC regime is preferred. For this purpose, the engagement of individual scientists to provide their scientific knowledge to the BTWC regime is significant.

Sample Questions1. Discuss to what extent ethical responsibilities on dual-use

issues is required by to practice life sciences research.

2. Explain why non-scientists have ethical responsibilities to consider dual-use risks in scientific research.

3. Evaluate the potential roles of scientists to strengthen the BTWC to develop national legislation and to promote awareness raising.

4. Consider at which educational level, awareness raising of life scientists should be started to develop their dual-use ethics.

References(Slide 2)Krasner, S. D. (1982) Structural Causes and Regime Consequences:

Regimes as Intervening Variables. International Organization, 36 (2), 185-206.

Rosenau, J. N., and Czempiel, E.-O. (1992) Governance without Government: Order and Change in World Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

(Slide 4)Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. Reproduced in United Nations

Treaty Law Series, Vol. 1155, p. 331. Available athttp://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/1_1_1969.pdf

(Slide 5)Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

(Slide 6)United Nations (2006) “Final Report” BWC/CONF.VI/6, December 8, 2006,

Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G07/600/30/PDF/G0760030.pdf?OpenElement

(Slide 7)United Nations (1996) Final Declaration, BWC/CONF.IV/9 Part II, December

6, 1996, Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://www.opbw.org/.

Robin M. Coupland, “Modelling Armed Violence: A Tool for Humanitarian Dialogue in Disarmament and Arms Control,” in John Borrie and Vanessa M. Randin, eds.,), Alternative Approaches in Multilateral Decision Making (Geneva: UNIDIR, 2005).

Available from http://www.unidir.org/pdf/articles/pdf-art2359.pdf

(Slide 8)United Nations, (2007) Report of the Meeting of States Parties,

BWC/MSP/2007/5, 14 December, Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G08/600/09/PDF/G0860009.pdf?OpenElement

(Slide 9)Sims, Nicholas (2001) The Evolution of Biological Disarmament (SIPRI

Chemical & Biological Warfare Studies No. 19). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

(Slide 10)Dunworth, T., Mathews, R. J., and McCormack, T. L. H. (2006) National

Implementation of the Biological Weapons Convention. Journal of Conflict and Security Law, 11 (1), 93-118. Available from http://jcsl.oxfordjournals.org/cgi/content/abstract/11/1/93

(Slide 11)Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from

http://www.opbw.org/

VERTIC, (2003) VERTIC: Collection of National Implementation Legislation [Online]. Available from http://www.vertic.org/datasets/bwlegislation.html

VERTIC (2009) A Sample Act for National Implementation of the1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention and Related Requirements of UN Security Council Resolution 1540, London: VERTIC. Available from http://www.vertic.org/programmes/armscontrolanddisarmament/NIM%20Building%20capacity.asp

(Slide 12)United Nations (2005) “Report of the Meeting of States Parties”,

BWC/MSP/2005/3, 14 December 2005, Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://www.opbw.org/new_process/msp2005/BWC_MSP_2005_3_E.pdf

(Slide 13)InterAcademy Panel (2005) “Statement on Biosecurity”, Available from

http://www.google.com/url?q=http://www.interacademies.net/%3Fid%3D5405&ei=mhSQSanrE4iyjAfTpazECg&sa=X&oi=spellmeleon_result&resnum=1&ct=result&cd=1&usg=AFQjCNEcqxKn3je-MvFsCzTMsEXAjjWzog

Royal Netherlands Academy of Arts and Sciences (2008) A Code of Conduct for Biosecurity: Report by the Biosecurity Working Group, Amsterdam: KNAW. Available from http://www.knaw.nl/publicaties/pdf/20071092.pdf

(Slide 14)Federation of American Scientists (2008) Biosecurity Education Portal

[Online] Available from http://www.fas.org/programs/ssp/bio/educationportal.html

(Slide 15)Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

(Slide 16)Mathews, R. J (2004) The Development of the Australia Group Export Control

Lists of Biological Pathogens, Toxins and Dual-Use Equipment, The CBW Conventions Bulletin, December 66, 1-4. Available from http://www.sussex.ac.uk/Units/spru/hsp/pdfbulletin.html

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

(Slide 17)Sims, N. (2001) The Evolution of Biological Disarmament (SIPRI Chemical &

Biological Warfare Studies No. 19). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

Pearson, G. S. (2006) ‘ARTICLE X: Exchange of Equipment, Materials and Scientific and Technological Information’, in Nicholas A. Sims and Malcolm R. Dando (Eds.) Key Points for the Sixth Review Conference. Bradford: University of Bradford. Available from http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/key6rev/contents.htm

(Slide 18)Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and

Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Reproduced in the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention Website. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

(Slide 19)United Nations (2006) Background Information Document on New

Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention, BWC/CONF.VI/INF.4, 28 September, Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://www.opbw.org/

United Nations (2001) Background Paper on New Scientific and Technological Developments Relevant to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction, BWC/CONF.V/4 Add.1. 26 October, Geneva: United Nations. Available from http://www.opbw.org/rev_cons/5rc/docs/rev_con_docs/i_docs/V-04%20Add.1.pdf