The Asia-Pacific Journal | Japan Focus Volume 7 | Issue 47 | Number 4 | Nov 16, 2009

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The Origins and Evolution of Ethnocracy in Malaysia

Geoff Wade

The Origins and Evolution ofEthnocracy in Malaysia

Geoff Wade

1. Introduction

How is it that today in the diverse, multi-ethnicpolity of Malaysia (where government figuresgive a populat ion breakdown of 65%Bumiputra, 26% Chinese and 8% Indian), asingle ethnic group completely controls - andoccupies virtually all positions in - the judiciary,public administrative organs, the police, thearmed forces and increasingly the universities?While Malays constitute a majority of thepopulation of this nation, their presence in allthese spheres of power far exceeds their ratiowithin the general population. How did thissituation emerge and how has it evolved?

It will be argued below that the injusticescurrently observed in Malaysia together withthe ethnic streaming derive essentially from the1948 Constitution which was created by theBritish in alliance with UMNO following thebreakdown of the 1946 Malayan Unionstructure. The Constitutionally-mandatedspecial place for the Malays provided for in the1948 Constitution and subsequently in the

1957 Constitution has been used as a basis forall manner of exclusionist and discriminatorypolicies which have become increasinglysocially encompassing, producing a situationwhere non-Malay members of Malaysiansociety feel themselves excluded and therebyignored in terms of access to “public” facilities,funds and opportunities. The March 2008election results were in part a reflection ofsentiments over this socially inequitablesituation.

2 . The H is tory o f E thnocracy inMalaya/Malaysia from 1942

Let us begin the account with 1942, andproceed to earlier times later in the paper.Even from the beginning of the Japaneseinvasion and occupation of Malaya andSingapore over the period 1941-45, it wasobvious to the British and others that therewould need to be a real reassessment of theBritish role in the peninsula and Borneo post-war. Planning for the post-war period ofreoccupation and readjustment began almostas soon as the Japanese occupation had begun.

The British interests and powers in thepeninsula pre-war lay in: 1) The Britishterritories of the Straits Settlements. 2) Ninepeninsular states where British power wasnominally subordinate to the power of sultansby treaty, but which were essential lyadministered from Singapore. The British sawthese states as appendages of their globalempire, and that they had an almost divineobligation to exploit them and provide theadministrations necessary to facilitate this. In a1940s overview of the role of Britain in thereg ion , i t was noted : “Owing to the

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development by foreign capital (British,Chinese, American etc.) of the valuable naturalresources of the states, it has fallen to theBritish to develop the local administrativesystems to build up the social services and toensure law and order.” [1] Essentially, allfunctions of a state were fulfilled by the Britishthroughout the peninsula, with the ColonialOffice noting of their efforts in the 1930s: “Ourpolicy has been to maintain the sovereignty ofthe Malay Rulers, and to make it continuallymore real in those States where it had tendedto become overlaid by our own directAdministration under the pressure of economicdevelopment (e.g. the decentralisation policy inthe Federated Malay States). Our declaredpolicy has also been to promote the well-beingand efficiency of the Malay peoples and theireducational fitness to fill the official services intheir own territories. The continued andlegitimate fear of the Malays has been that theywould be swamped by the more efficient andnumerous Chinese and to a lesser extent theIndians.” [2] British political intentions post-war were also being set down in the earlyPacific war years. “It may be necessary afterthe war to take steps to achieve some form ofcloser union of the Malay states (probably notonly with each other but involving the StraitsSettlements also) with a view to ensuring acommon policy in matters of concern to Malayagenerally.”

We thus see, in August 1942, the expression ina joint British Colonial Office-Foreign Officepolicy paper of a “legitimate fear of theMalays” vis-à-vis other peoples in thepeninsula, in combination with a Britishintention post-war to integrate the variouspolitical components into a political union. Inrespect of the Borneo territories, it wasintended that: “Sarawak and Brunei wouldcontinue to be independent states under HisMajesty’s protection by treaty, but if some formof Malayan union was developed, it would beappropriate that Brunei at least and possiblySarawak should be associated with that union.”

Regarding North Borneo: “An opportunity willarise for proposing the direct assumption bythe British government of administrativeresponsibility for North Borneo…and the stateof North Borneo might also be associated withthe Malayan Union.” [3]

Soon thereafter, however, even before the endof 1942, the British, concerned aboutmaintaining their post-war power in Asia,decided that Singapore should not be includedin the post-War union. In a report by Sir W.Battershill, G.E.J. Gent and W.L. Rolleston onlessons from Hong Kong and Malaya, it wasnoted: “It is therefore suggested that the island[Singapore] should be excluded from anyfederation and/or customs union that may beestablished in the rest of the peninsula.” [4]

At the same time, the political ramifications ofthe proposed union were being discussed inwar-time Whitehall. There was concern that inthe Malay states it had not been possible to“establish the status of Chinese born in a MalayState as British protected persons.” This wasimportant as “the Malay rulers have never beenready to recognise Chinese, however longestablished in their states, as being nationals ofthose states. It is desirable, even at this stage,that the formal status of ‘British protectedpersons’ should be given to those Chinese whoare domiciled in the Malay States.” [5] How todeal with the sultans was a key issue discussed.Lord Hailey who headed the Colonial researchCommittee tasked with investigating post-wararrangements in British colonies averred: “Thetreatment of the rest of Malaya is our mostdifficult problem. There is, on the one hand, theobligation of honour to replace the sultans inthe position which our Treaties have assignedto them; there is, on the other hand, the needto take account of our announced policy ofpromoting self-governance in the colonies. It isobvious that there are many advantages in theexisting system which is practically one ofdirect official rule, under the façade of ‘advice’to the Malayan rulers!” [6] The dilemma was

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expressed by Lord Hailey thus: “Actually, thegreater part of the administration is carriedout, in the Federated Malay States at allevents, by officers or departments acting underdirect orders of the Governor. Sooner or laterwe will have to face squarely the questionwhether we are to allow the façade of Sultan-rule to persist, with all the difficulties which itwhich it presents to the attainment of any formof self-government, or to build up a constitutionon the basis of realities.” [7] While exploringthis, he saw that Britain “shall be obliged toface two questions, first, whether the system iscapable of being adjusted to the promotion ofself-governing institutions, and secondlywhether it will enable a suitable status to begiven to those Chinese and Indian immigrantswho may acquire a permanent interest in thecountry.” [8] His major concern was “autocraticrule in the hands of the sultans and their Malayadvisers.”

By May 1943, the Colonial Office was stressingthe ethnicity variable in any possible post-wararrangements: While opposing any rule byautocratic sultans, “at the other extreme it wasimportant to ensure that self-government didnot rest on the numerical counting of headswhich would mean the swamping of thepermanent resident communities (especiallythe Malays) by immigrants without a lastinginterest in the country.” [9] The declaration ofour purpose in carrying through the policy (theimplementation of which would have to bestudied on the spot) would be that Malayinterests must be recognised as paramount incarrying through such a scheme, but that othercommunities with permanent interests in thecountry must be given their due opportunity toshare in an advance towards self-government.”[10]

Here is a very clear statement by ColonialOffice officials in 1943 that “Malay interestsmust be recognised as paramount” and that theidea of all individuals within Malaya having theright to equal representation would be a threat

to such aim. No basis for such aspirations wasopenly stated. In the same year a MalayanPlanning Unit was established to makearrangements for post-war Malaya, headed by amilitary official Major-General H.R. Hone, whoopined that “One can see at once that from thepoint of view of administrative economy andconvenience there can be no question but thatwe should establish a single protectorate overthe whole of the mainland of the Malaypeninsula, and set up a single government forit.” [11] By 1944, it was becoming increasinglyclear that the British wished to retain absolutecontrol over Singapore, and in a Colonial Officememo to the War Cabinet Committee onMalaya and Borneo, the following outline forthe other parts of Malaya was set down:

“Our constitutional scheme should be designed,first and foremost, to provide for a union of allthe Malay states and the settlements of Penangand Malacca. A central authority representingthese States and Settlements should be createdand at its head should be a Governor with anExecutive and Legislative Council. The seat ofGovernment of this Malayan Union would beconveniently at or near Kuala Lumpur.” [12]

As the Pacific War turned in the interests of theAllies through 1944, the War Cabinet was alsoinvolved in planning of the post-war Malaya,general ly fo l lowing Colonia l Of f icerecommendations. In the appendices to theWar Cabinet memorandum on Policy in Regardto Malaya and Borneo, presented on 18 May1944 to Clement Atlee, it was noted that: “Therestoration of the pre-war constitutional andadministrative system will be undesirable in theinterests of efficiency and security and of ourdeclared purpose of promoting self-governmentin Colonial territories. The first of theseinterests requires a closer union of territoriescomprising the relatively small area of theMalay Peninsula; and the second requires thatself-government should not merely developtowards a system of autocratic rule by theMalay Rulers, but should provide for a growing

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participation in the Government by the peopleof all communities in Malaya, subject to aspecial recognition of the political, economicand social interests of the Malay race.” [13]

However, into these smooth Colonial Officepreparations for a Malay-dominated post-warUnion in Malaya stepped a problem. Lord LouisMountbatten, Supreme Commander of AlliedForces in the South East Asia, based in Ceylon,began to engage himself in post-war planning.In terms of overall political power, heexpressed opposition to the reinstatement ofthe Sultans: “I am not in favour of reinstatingthe Sultans even as constitutional rulers andcertainly not as autocratic rulers…But we mustbe careful not to abol ish the Sultansruthlessly.” [14] He urged some sort of UpperHouse position for them in a future legislature.

Louis Mountbatten (centre), 1941.

But it was in respect of the Colonial Office’sdesire to assign a special position to the Malaysin the post-war administrative structure thatdrew most of his ire. In July 1944, respondingto the Colonial Office memo to the War Office,Mountbatten was to note: “My second pointrefers to the sentence in Para 1 of the Directivewhich reads that ‘Participation in theGovernment by all the communities in Malayais to be promoted, subject to a specialrecognition of the political, economic and socialinterests of the Malay race.’ I cannot helpfeeling that in the long run nothing could

perhaps do more to perpetuate sectionalantagonisms, to the risk of which you pointedlyrefer in your letter, than the giving of specialrecognition to one race.” “I feel that ourobjectives should be to break down racialsectionalism in every way open to us,politically, economically and socially, and toendeavour to substitute for it the idea ofMalayan citizenship.” [15]

The Colonial Office mandarins obviously feltthat Mountbatten did not really understand theexigencies of the situation in Malaya, and MrStanley of that office responded to the SupremeCommander’s concerns, informing him of thesituation as their officers perceived it: “TheMalays are, by general consent, not at presentcapable of competing on equal termseconomically and educationally with the‘immigrant races’ – Chinese and Indian. Fromthe beginning of our relations with the Stateswe have pursued in the Malay States the policyof taking positive measures to prevent thesubmergence of the Malays in the publicservices and in the ownership of land by themore energetic, competent and resourcefulChinese. The most damaging criticism of ournew policy will be precisely on these grounds,since we are endeavouring to admit non-Malaycommunities to a political equality with theMalays in the State territories. We shall makecertain of estranging the Malays unless we canassure them of measures not only in thepolitical and social field, which will preventsuch ‘equality’ inevitably resulting in theirsubmergence, but also in such matters as thereservation of Malay lands, which otherwisewill certainly pass into the hands of theubiquitous Indian money-lender. Even TanCheng Lock, a leading Chinese of Malacca,admits this himself to a large extent.” [16] Theletter concluded that: “..The social basis ofMalayan society for some time to come cannotbe expected to be other than communal, seeingthat inter-marriage is virtually non-existent,and religion, language and domestic customsmust be potent factors in maintaining the

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present distinctions.” Mountbatten washowever unimpressed:

I fully appreciate that the socialbasis of Malayan society cannot fors o m e t i m e b e o t h e r t h a ncommunal, and that the fosteringof the three peoples of Malaya ofthe conception that they are in factMalayans, wi l l be an uphi l lbusiness. …Since I wrote to you, Ihave received from the War Officecopies of the Directives on Chinesepolicy, and on the Creation ofMalayan Union Citizenship. It isessential that the Chinese andIndian elements should be legallyassimilated, and should be made tof e e l c o m m i t t e d t o l o c a lresponsibility, instead of beingmerely a group of exploiters, or asource of cheap labour.…

I am sorry to see from your letterthat the Malays should by generalconsent be found incapable ofcompet ing on equal terms,‘economically and educationally’,with the Chinese and Indians. Ihave no reason to suppose that thisopinion is not fully borne out; but itseems to me that indigenouspeoples sometimes appear lazy andunambitious, largely because theyare unwilling to compete withlower standards of living and wagecond i t ions es tab l i shed byimmigrants, who are without rootsin the country, and cannot affordto turn down a standard of wageswhich those who have homes andrelations on the spot are not forcedto sink to. I do not suggest that theMalayan is at the mercy of cheapcoolie labour from China; but it is

so easy to give a dog a bad namethat one is inclined to fear that anopinion of the natives’ qualitiesmay become an idée fixe, whichwill militate against a properappreciation of their potentialitiesunder improved conditions. [17]

Thus, by August 1944, the lines were clearlydrawn. On the one side was the Colonial Officearguing for a special protected position for theMalays, and on the other Admiral Mountbattenurging a general Malayan citizenship with allhaving equal rights and responsibilities.

The Malayan Union (1946) and theFederation of Malaya

Meanwhile, with the Japanese surrender inA u g u s t 1 9 4 5 , t h e u r g e n c y o f n e wadministrative and constitutional arrangementsincreased and in preparation for the new Unionproposed by the British, which involved thesending of Sir Harold MacMichael to Malaya tomeet with the various sultans. He was taskedwith gaining their signatures on documentswhich would see their vestigial power beingturned over to the British crown, as aprecondition for the establishment of theMalayan Union. [18] Under the Malayan Unionproposals, the Sultans were relegated toCouncil of Sultans who would discuss Islamicmatters. Each state to have a Malay AdvisoryCouncil, consisting of the Sultan and otherMuslims appointed by the sultan, just to advisesultan on matters of religion. In matters ofcitizenship, any person born in Malayan Unionor Singapore, and any person who had residedin the Malayan Union or Singapore for tenyears would be citizens as would persons bornof fathers who were citizens of the MalayanUnion. [19] This Union, which in many ways,followed the ideas of Mountbatten, wasimplemented in April 1946. The idea of socialequality among the various ethnic groups wasnot, however, to have a long life-span. CheahBoon Kheng notes that: “Under the plan, the

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British had intended to end Malay sovereignty,impose direct rule in Malaya and create anequal citizenship for both Malays and non-Ma lays . I f t h i s p l an had been fu l l yimplemented, Malaya would have become moreof a ‘Malayan’ nation-state than a ‘Malay’nation-state” [20]

The Malayan Union was to last but two yearsand during this period it was subject to aremarkable turnaround on the part of theBritish. Through 1946 and 1947, there was a180- degree turn from a proposed polity withequal citizenship to one where Malays weredominant, privileged and power-brokers. Someof this story has been detailed by Albert Lau inhis account of the Malayan Union, [21] butmany documents remain unreleased by theBritish. The full story of this reversal and thehuge effects this had on the subsequentdevelopment of Malaysia remains to be written.

However, a major element was the creation of aMalay political party during this period – theUnited Malays National Organisation (UMNO),which was led by the Johor political elite andheaded by Onn Jaafar. A key element of itscreation was the intent to oppose the MalayanUnion arrangements.

Opposition to Malayan Union, 1946

By July 1946, the British responded to Malayconcerns about the Malayan Union by creating

a 12-man “Political Working Committee”comprising six government representatives,f o u r r o y a l d e l e g a t e s , a n d 2 U M N Orepresentatives to consider and recommend anew constitutional framework for the MalayanUnion. The question remains as to why it wasdecided that only Malay representatives wereto negotiate the future of Malaya with theBritish. Was it simply the Colonial Officeofficials reasserting their paternalistic concernfor Malay people, or was it an awareness of thegrowing power of the Left, representedpredominantly by Chinese persons, whichsparked this remarkable change? Regardless ofthe reasons, this decision must be seen as themost fateful and harmful decision in the Britishdecolonization of Malaya.

This Committee, in a remarkably rapid sixmonths, concluded its deliberations inDecember 1946 and recommended:

1. A Federation of Malaya toreplace the Malayan Union. Tocomprise nine peninsular statestogether with Penang and Malacca2 . I t p r o p o s e d a c e n t r a lgovernment comprising a HighCommissioner, a Federal ExecutiveCouncil and a Federal LegislativeCouncil3 . In each Malay s ta te theGovernment shall comprise theruler assisted by a state ExecutiveCouncil and a Council of State withlegislative powers. In each of theStraits Settlements, there will be aSettlement Council with legislativepowers.4. There will be a Conference ofRulers to consult with each otherand with the High Commissioneron state and federal issues.5. Defence and external matterswill be under British control.6. Rulers would undertake to

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accept the advice of the HighCommissioner in all mattersrelating to government, but wouldexclude matters relating to Islamand Malay customs.7. Proposed that the LegislativeCounci l comprise the HighCommissioner, three ex-officiomembers, 11official members, 34unofficial members includingheads of government in the ninestates and two settlements and 23seats for representatives ofindustries etc8. UMNO and Sultans would agreeto this only following the scrappingof the MacMichael treaties.

A key element of the proposals was thatrelating to citizenship. A new Malayancitizenship –which was not to be a nationality –was proposed in the Federation plan. This wasan addition to nationality and the committeeexplained it as a possible qualification forelectoral rights, membership of Council orother privileges and obligations. Federalcitizenship would be acquired by: 1. Anysubject of the ruler of any state. This includedall Malays and excluded all non-Malays. 2)British subjects born locally. 3) Children offathers who were federal citizens.

Shortly thereafter a Consultative Committeeunder Harold Cheeseman, Director ofEducation Malaya, was convened to collectviews offered by “all interested individuals andgroups”. The Constitution was obviouslydrafted by the Colonial Office in London. Whilethe Governor General and the Colonial Officeboth declared that there would be no finaldecision on the Constitution without wide-ranging public consultation, it was obvious thatall previous proposals of an egalitarian societyhad been scrapped, the feudal rulers were tobe maintained to bolster Malay claims topower, the Legislative Council was to be

powerfully weighted towards the Malays and allother communities were to be essentiallysidelined. The Constitution was thus a blueprintfor Malay ethnocracy.

The Australian Commissioner in Singapore wascertainly observing the events closely for, whenhe reported to Canberra in the same month, headvised: “There has not yet been time to gaugereactions to the Federation scheme, but it cansafely be assumed that it will be the object ofbitter attack from the non-Malay communitieswho have lately shown resentment of the factthat negotiations have proceeded so far withouttheir being consulted. In particular they arebound to object to the citizenship proposalswhich are rather more exclusive than they hadhoped for.” [22]

Reactions to the Federation of MalayaProposals 1946-1948

On the same day as the new Constitutionalproposals were released – 14 December 1946--a Council of Joint Action was established inSingapore to oppose the proposed Constitution.The initial meeting was attended by 75delegates, including representatives of theMalay Nationalist Party, [23] the MalayanDemocratic Union and various trade unions.Tan Cheng Lock was elected as chairman. TheCouncil adopted three principles to guide theiropposition: 1) A united Malaya inclusive ofSingapore; 2) Responsible self-governmentthrough a fully elected Central legislature; 3)Equal citizenship rights for all who makeMalaya their home.

The first principle violated everything theBritish were working toward with the newproposals. By including Singapore in the newMalayan polity, the ethnic proportion of Malayswould fall below that of Chinese, which wouldnullify the alleged validity of the proposals. [24]In addition, the British were unwilling to giveup the security and economic benefits ofretaining Singapore as a Crown Colony. Britainwas at this time heavily involved with deciding

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on how to deal with larger problems – India andBurma, and a decision was taken in February1947 that Britain would withdraw from India byJune 1948, a date which Mountbatten laterchanged to August 1947. [25] The importanceof retaining Singapore was stressed early in1947 by the British Foreign Minister Bevin whonoted: “Our imminent withdrawal from Indiaand Burma makes South East Asia the maincentre of British interest and influence.” [26]

The year 1947 was to prove a year of politicalwrangling, and one where UMNO was toattempt to consolidate the foothold which theColonial Office had provided them. In Januaryof that year, at the opening of the UMNOGeneral Assembly in Kedah, the Sultan ofKedah urged that “the Malay rulers and UMNOmust jo in hands in carry ing out theconstitutional proposals for the benefit of theMalays,” while Dato Onn emphasized that thepeninsula was the home of the Malays and “weshall preserve it as the home of the Malays.”[27]

Meanwhile, both Malayan Left and Rightcombined in opposition to the proposals. On 12January 1947, the Malayan Communist Party[28] issued a statement condemning theConstitutional proposals and announcingsupport for the Council of Joint Action. On 26January, the Pan-Malayan Council of JointAction (PMCJA) held a meeting in KualaLumpur, passing resolutions calling formembers of the Consultative Committee andAdvisory Council to resign. The Penang ChineseConsultative Committee also rejected theConstitutional proposals on the grounds thatthey were “a direct violation of the UnitedNations declaration regarding non-self-governing territories.” [29] On 24 February1947, the Pan-Malayan Chinese Chamber ofCommerce passed a resolution at KualaLumpur rejecting the constitutional proposalsand urging that a Royal Commission beestablished to examine the possibility of givingMalaya full dominion status.

In response, Edward Gent, Governor of theMalayan Union, publicly responded only to TanCheng Lock, Chairman of the Pan-MalayanCouncil of Joint Action, advising that thegovernment could not recognize the Council ofJoint Action as the sole body with which toconduct negotiations on Constitutional issues.[30]

But the opposition crowds grew larger, and at agathering of 4,000 persons on 18 February1947 in Malacca, Tan Cheng Lock denouncedthe federation proposals because of thedifficulties of acquiring citizenship they wouldentail: “We demand for Malaya a constitutionbased on democratic and liberal principleswhich will guarantee the fundamental rightsand l ibert ies o f i ts c i t izens who arepermanently settled here and who are preparedto give Malaya their undivided loyalty, with theproviso that the stronger members of theMalayan community must extend a helpinghand to the weaker ones particularly our Malaybrothers who must be uplifted to the economiclevel of the other inhabitants of this land.”

On February 22, 1947, a new coalition of Malaypolitical and cultural organisations called PusatTenaga Rakyat (PUTERA) was organised to actas a counter weight to UMNO. A total of 29organisations including PKMM, Barisan TaniSe-Malaya (Peasant's Union or BATAS) andHizbul Muslimin were part of this coalition. Thefollowing month PUTERA formed an alliancewith PMCJA to coordinate their efforts againstthe draft Federation Constitution. The PMCJA-PUTERA alliance then decided in May to drafttheir own proposed constitution and acommittee was formed for that purpose. [31] Inthat month a huge rally was organised againstthe constitutional proposals by PMCJA-PUTERA. Again they urged: 1) A united Malayaincluding Singapore 2) Elected central, stateand settlement legislatures 3) Equal rights fora l l who made Ma laya the i r home 4 )Constitutional sultans who governed throughdemocratic state councils 5) Special measures

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for the uplift and advancement of the Malaypeople. [32]

Despite the widespread opposition to theproposals from members of al l ethniccommunities of both Left and Right, theCheeseman Consultative Committee report wascompleted and published by 19 April 1947–again a remarkably swi f t per iod of“consultation” on such a key issue, underliningthat the Colonial Office did not want to seetheir plans upset. As expected, the Cheesemanreport did not recommend radical changes–only: 1) Seven instead of five unofficialmembers to be appointed to the FederalExecutive Committee; 2) Legco to be comprisedof 52 instead of 34 unofficial members and 23instead of 14 official members. 3) Residencequalifications to be five out of previous tenyears.

Meeting of British colonial administrators,sultans and UMNO representatives, 1947

Within four days, on 23-24 April 1947, MalcolmMacDonald met in Kuala Lumpur the membersof the Governor-General’s Advisory Committee,compr i s ing on ly the Ma lay Ru lers ,representatives of the United Malay NationalistOrganisation and government officials, in orderto discuss the Cheeseman report. On 24 July1 9 4 7 t h e S u m m a r y o f t h e R e v i s e dConstitutional Proposals was published. Thisincluded a provision for a Malay majority in the

proposed Malayan legislature, a provision notendorsed by the Cheeseman Committee whichpreferred an equal balance between Malay andnon-Malay interests. Again we see the ColonialOffice and Malcolm MacDonald joining withDato Onn in laying down the basis for Malayethnocracy in the new Malaya. These proposalswere then submi t ted to the Br i t i shGovernment. [33] The speed with which thiswas done and the fact that no Malayans othersthan Malays were engaged in the deliberationsshows that the Colonial Office would brook noopposition to its policies.

In a very detailed report on the constitutionalproposals by the Australian Commissioner inSingapore to the Minister for External Affairsin Canberra, some of the deficiencies of theplan were pointed out: He noted the oppositionto the proposals mainly from PMCJA inSingapore and the Chinese Chambers ofCommerce, which was ignored by the ColonialOffice. He also noted that the citizenshipproposals seem unreasonably exclusive, andwere too restrictive in terms of residence andthat requiring people to speak English or Malayexcluded many Indians and Chinese. Hisconclusion was indeed prescient. “It wouldappear, however, that the need to protect theMalays is politically more important than tosatisfy the aspirations of the other domiciledcommunities.” The commissioner was likewiseastute on his views for Singapore’s exclusionfrom the scheme. “Singapore’s exclusion,therefore, would seem to be due to politicalconsiderations arising from her predominantlyChinese population and the strategicimportance in the defence plans of the BritishCommonwealth.” [34]

As noted, key to Malay aspirations to powerand concerns by the other communities werethe citizenship provisions of the proposedfederal Constitution. It provided for Federalcitizenship for:

1. Any subject, wherever born, of

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His Highness the Ruler of anyState.2. Any British subject born at anytime in the settlements and hasresided there for 15 years3. Any British subject born in theterritories of the federation andhas resided there for 15 years4. “Any person born at any time inany of the territories now to becomprised in the Federation, whohabitually speaks the Malaylanguage and conforms to Malaycustom.”

The first and fourth categories included every“Malay” [35] person in the peninsula,regardless of length of residence there, whilethe other provisions imposed residentialrequirements on persons of other communities.Again we see a concerted effort to exclude non-Malay persons from the polity and furtherefforts toward Malay ethnocracy.

The Colonial Office validated this as follows:“The present scheme is designed to include in acommon citizenship all those, whether Malaysor non-Malays, who can fairly be regarded ashaving Malaya for their true home. The Malays,however, are peculiarly the people of thecountry. They have no other homeland, noother loyalty. They thus have a special andjustifiable interest in immigration policy, whichit would be inequitable to refuse them.” [36]The refusal to acknowledge that the “Malays”had migrated to the peninsula from many otherplaces in the archipelago was convenientlyignored in this disingenuous effort at validatingMalay supremacy. Control over immigrationwas thus ceded to the sultans. “Holding thatthe Malays have a special and justifiableinterest in immigration policy which it would beinequitable to refuse them, the BritishGovernment has agreed that it shall be theparticular duty of the High Commissioner toconsult the Conference of Rulers from time to

time on the immigration policy of theGovernment, and in particular when any majorchange in such policy is contemplated by theFederal Government.” [37]

A Leftist cartoon of 1947 depicting theFederation of Malaya steamrolling theLeftist and Centrist parties with UMNO

tar. (Courtesy of Fahmi Reza's blog(http://10tahun.blogspot.com/2008/02/kartun-p

olitik-federation-of-malaya.html).)

Local press reaction (excluding the StraitsTimes, which was the mouthpiece of theColonial Office and Malayan government) wasscathing. The editorial of Singapore’s TheMorning Tribune pulled no punches when itnoted: “The final Constitutional proposals,which were published in a White Paperyesterday, are bitterly disappointing. Theyconstitute capitulation to pressure from theMalays.” [38] The Times of London laid out theofficial government policy and reasons for theinstitution of this ethnocracy: “It is clear fromthe White Paper just published that the earliermistakes which alienated the attachment of theMalay Sultans and drove the Malay communityto the verge of violent action have beensatisfactorily corrected…..An important featureof the new proposals is the recognition by theCabinet that the Malays form an absolutemajority among those who regard Malaya astheir permanent home and the sole object oftheir loyalty. This principle governs the futureimmigration policy, the Malay community’s

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position in the projected constitution, thestatus accorded to the Sultans, and thequalifications for Malayan citizenship.” [39]

The claim that “the Malays form an absolutemajority among those who regard Malaya astheir permanent home and the sole object oftheir loyalty” was neither validated norsupported, but it was an effective hook onwhich to hang British Colonial Office policy.Over the following months, the GovernorGeneral Malcolm MacDonald made repeatedradio broadcasts stressing the bases for thenew Constitution. On 5 October 1947,MacDonald broadcast as follows: “To beginwith, let this be remembered. The negotiationsleading up to the Constitution ended a period ofsharp political unrest and agitation whichstirred to their depths the feelings of the entireMalay population. Eighteen months ago apeaceful and orderly, but unanimous andpassionate Malay opposition to the MalayanUnion cast a dark shadow across the oncesunlit and placid political scene in Malaya.Virtually the whole people of the majority racein the country had lost confidence in theGovernment.” [40] Again in January 1948, hetold listeners that “Malay Kingdoms ruled byMalay princes date back many hundreds ofyears. They are the truest sons and daughtersof the Malayan soil.” [41]

However, the British seemed quite content toignore the other communities who wereactively expressing their loss of confidence inthe government, and had been in the peninsulain many cases far longer than recent “Malay”immigrants from Sumatra, Java, the MiddleEast, and Sulawesi. Hartals [42] were held inMalacca, Perak, and in Singapore throughoutOctober. Shops were closed, plantation workceased and commerce was absent during thesedays of protest. Opposition came from the Left– the Pan-Malayan Federation of Trade Unions,All-Malaya Council of Action, Association ofProgressive Malay Political Parties (Putera), aswell as the Right -- the Chinese Chamber of

Commerce. An entire alternative Constitutionalproposal was in fact put forward by Putera andAMCJA. [43] The Associated Chambers ofCommerce of Malaya held a meeting on 18January 1948 and agreed to boycott the FederalLegislative Council and the various StateCouncils under the new constitution.

Pan-Malaya hartal, October 1947

The Malaya Tribune in an editorial on 24January set down the overall objections to theprocedures. “For reasons best known tothemselves, the British Government has seen fitto completely ignore Chinese representationson the constitutional issue. The originalproposals for a broader based legislature andthe creation of a national status came fromGreat Britain, only for the last named to bewithdrawn immediately on protests from theright-wing Malays whose boycott immediatelybrought the British Government to heel and allconduct of affairs since has been at the virtualdictation of the Malays….. the facts considered,it is hardly surprising that Chinese opinion isnot prepared to see its leaders enter into thefarce of serving upon the Malay-dominatedCouncil and thus giving the appearance ofseriously accepting the constitution as areasonable stepping-stone towards politicaladvancement.” [44]

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But the plans of the Colonial Office wouldbrook no delay and on 21 January 1948, stateand Federation Treaties were signed byMalayan Union Governor Sir Edward Gent andeight of the Malay Rulers. On 1 February 1948,a Malay-dominated Federation of Malaya wasinitiated.

The 1948-1957 Period

In the middle of 1948, the Malayan CommunistParty launched armed rebellion against thenew state and the British state which controlledit. The degree to which British failure toinclude Chinese aspirations in the 1948Constitutional arrangements precipitated therebellion or encouraged the assistance it was toreceive from the Chinese communities and theLeft from all communities remains an issue forfurther study.

But it also provided a further avenue by whichUMNO could dominate the political firmamentof the Federation and further exclude Chineseparticipation. The Colonial Office politicalreport for November 1948 noted: “TheEmergency has g iven the Malays anopportunity to improve their political positionwhich they have not been slow to take. Theypoint to the leading part which the Malaycommunity is taking in the fight againstterrorism, through the Malay regiment, theregular police and the special and auxiliarypolice. They contrast this with the behaviour ofthe Chinese.” [45] The Colonial Office waslikewise coming to recognize some of the abusewhich they Constitutional arrangements theyhad created were leading to: “There is no doubtthat U.M.N.O. is a iming at a form ofgovernment in which non-Malays will have littleshare and in this they are influenced in thehope of ‘rapprochement’ with the M.N.P.. Thelatter party has been lying low since theemergency and Dato Onn is known to hold theview that the two parties much work togetherat this stage and sink their differences at leastuntil the Malays have gained a more secure

foothold in the Federal Government.” [46]

At the same time, an anti-Chinese attitudebecame manifest among many of the Britishadministrators. A letter from Gimson, theGovernor of Singapore to J.O. Higham on 15October 1948 included a report by an unnamedperson relating to revision of the Register ofElectors. The report included the following: “Iam convinced the attitude of 90 percent of theChinese is this: 1. Singapore and Malayabelong to them, virtually at present, factually indue course; 2.The British are weak andgrowing weaker. Japan walked in seven yearsago with ease. The Chinese are already in; theyare merely biding their time; 3. In one respect,they are all agreed whether they be KMT orCommunist, they are anti-British.” The report,which Gimson chose to circulate, noted that theGovernment had to strike immediately andstrike hard at all Chinese movements.

Given how the British government had treatedthe non-Malays in Malaya since 1946, suchChinese sentiments if they existed would havebeen fully comprehensible. However, thisdemonization of the entirety of the MalayanChinese population validated, in the eyes ofmany, their exclusion from the Malayanpolitical process. It was further endorsementand strengthening of the burgeoning Malayethnocracy.

While demonizing the potential opposition, theBritish needed to also strengthen theiranointed successors. In MacDonald’s view,Dato Onn had to be regarded as the acceptedleader of the Malays, so that he would be in aposition to make his views prevail with them. InDecember 1948, Dato Onn travelled to Britainto discuss self-rule in Malaya. Again the Britishaccepted that this individual representedMalaya, yet still found his request for a grant of10 million pounds a little difficult to accept.Paskin of the Colonial Office reported on thevisit and discussions as follows: “Another topicwhich provoked some bitter remarks was his

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suggestion that H.M.G should now make agrant of £10,000,000 for expenditure on objectsof benefit to the Malays.” This has two grounds:a) As a means of improving the competitiveposition of the Malays vis-à-vis the Chinese. B)As a gesture to reassure the Malays that H.M.Gis mindful of their special position in their owncountry” He also requested that a Malay beappointed as Deputy High Commissioner. [47]

Dato Onn Jaafar

The year of 1951 was to be another crucial yearfor the peninsula. The founding leader ofUMNO Dato Onn Jaafar, who had had been sodogmatic in championing the rights of theMalays left the party in that year to set up theIndependence for Malaya Party (IMP) inSeptember following UMNO’s refusal to openits membership to non-Malays.. However, whenthe party suffered a devastating defeat in the1952 Kuala Lumpur municipal elections to anUMNO-MCA coalition, Onn Jaafar abandonedhis multiethnic platform and formed PartiNegara that eventually became an avowedly

pro-Malay party. He was replaced as head ofUMNO by Tunku Abdul Rahman. This was anopportunity for non-ethnicized politics whichwas completely bypassed by Malayans. Againthis missed opportunity must be in partassigned to the earlier activities of Dato Onnhimself but equally to the policies of the Britishin terms of their absolute enthusiasm forMalay-dominated ethnicized politics in thepeninsula.

The year also saw the effective containment ofthe MCP rebellion which had been launched in1948. The MCP shifted its strategy following itsOctober Resolution of 1951, and the armedstruggle was relegated to second priority. Theyear also saw the introduction of localelections. The George Town elections were heldin 1951 and the Kuala Lumpur elections inFebruary 1952.

In January 1952, an “alliance” was entered intoby UMNO and the Malayan Chinese Association(MCA) to contest the Kuala Lumpur elections,to face off against Dato Onn’s IMP. The non-communal nature of the IMP was to prove itsdownfall, and the UMNO-MCA Allianceemerged elect orally supreme by 1953, whileIMP still held their seats on the FederalLegislative Council. UMNO calls for electionsto 44 of 75 Federal Legislative Council seatsthus ensued. Joseph Fernando has argued thatthe events of this year can be seen as key in themovement towards Independence. In response,the colonial administration announced in July1953 plans to establish a committee to examinethe issue of federal elections. The resultantrecommendation, announced in February 1954,was for less that half of the members beelected. High Commissioner Gerald Templerurged a higher figure, but insufficient to meetAlliance demands. In response, the Alliancesent a delegation to London to raise the issuedirectly with the Secretary of State for ColonialAffairs Oliver Lyttelton, who rejected theirproposals.

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In 1954, state elections were held and in theseelections, the Alliance won 226 of the 268 seatsnationwide. On June 13, 1954, the colonialgovernment published its White Paper onfederal elections providing for a small majorityof elected seats. In response, the Alliancewithdrew its members from the legislatures,municipal and town councils and organisednationwide demonstrations, resulting innegot ia t ions w i th the Br i t i sh H ighCommissioner Donald MacGillivray, agreeing toan acceptable compromise on seats. The firstfederal elections were held in July 1955 on thebasis of this arrangement, and the now UMNO-MCA-MIC Alliance won 51 of the 52 seatsavailable, and thus was able to form the firstMalayan government, with Tunku AbdulRahman as Chief Minister. [48]

A London conference with Secretary of Statefor the Colonies Alan Lennox-Boyd to discusseventual independence was then held inJanuary 1956. As a result of the discussions,the British government agreed to grant Malayaindependence on 31 August 1957.

Constitutional discussions between Britainand Federation of Malaya, London, 1956

In preparation, a commission was establishedunder Lord Wi l l iam Reid to dev ise aconstitution for the future Federation ofMalaya. The Reid Commission met on over 100

occasions in 1956 and submitted its draftConstitution to a Working Committee inFebruary 1957. This Working Committeeconsisted of four representatives from theMalay rulers, another four from the Alliancegovernment, the British High Commissioner,the Chief Secretary, and the Attorney General,ensuring that it was essentially the interests ofthe Malays which were being represented.Tunku Abdul Rahman was to write in hismemoirs that he prodded his colleagues toagree to the terms by arguing that they couldbe amended later on — after independence: “Itwas, of course, not a perfect constitution … Butwe knew we were going to be in power with anoverwhelming majority and if any changesappeared necessary we would amend theconstitution. ... So why waste haggling over itat that stage? I just told my colleagues toaccept everything that was proposed” [49] TheConstitution took effect on 15 August and on 31August the Federation of Malaya became anindependent country.

Merdeka: (From left) Tunku AbdulRahman, first Yang di-Pertuan Agong

Tuanku Abdul Rahman and MacGillivraystanding outside King’s House in Kuala

Lumpur after signing the MerdekaAgreement on Aug 5, 1957.

1957-1969 – Ethnocracy Consolidated

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Under the new Federation of Malaya, UMNObecame increasingly assertive in promotingMalay dominance, an assertiveness notmatched by the Malayan Chinese Associationpresident Tan Cheng Lock in promoting theinterests of his constituency. It was partly thisattitude which saw Lim Chong Eu and hissupporters – mainly Chinese-educated -- seizepower in the MCA and Lim becoming thesecond MCA President in 1958. The feistynewcomers clashed swiftly with UMNO inasserting the interests of the Chinese andseeking political equality as well as Chineselanguage and cultural rights. Matters came to ahead with the 1959 election. The MCA felt thatthe 1957 Constitution provided insufficientsafeguards for the Chinese community, andthat in order to prevent a two-thirds majority ofparliamentary seats going to UMNO (allowingthem to change the Constitution at will), soughtfrom Tunku Abdul Rahman an increase inallocated seats from 28 to 40 (out of a total104). If MCA could contest and likely win one-third of the seats for the Alliance, no ethnicgroup would have absolute control ofParliament. The Tunku rejected this and Limand his supporters resigned from the MCA, [50]allowing Tan Cheng Lock and his son Tan SiewSin to return to the leadership. The seats wereeventually allocated as follows: UMNO 69,MCA 32 and MIC 4. The Alliance coalition wasto go on and win 74 out of 104 seats, allowing atwo-thirds majority, sufficient to amend theConstitution at will. Cheah Boon Kheng notes ofthis election: But this was probably the lastgeneral election in which [the Alliance] wouldallow for this free play of democratic forces.Thereafter, it would resort to constitutionalgerrymandering of constituencies to ensurecommunal representation. An amendment of1962 to the Constitution provided for ruralweightage in the determination of electoraldistricts. As the majority of the rural populationwas Malay, this provision ensured a highrepresentation of Malays in Parliament. [51]

Creation of Malaysia (1963)

The win in the 1959 elections, in alliance withan emasculated MCA, gave the Tunkuconfidence, but before he could begin to fullypursue and promote preferential policies forthe Malays, another major political opportunitypresented itself. The British-instigated plan toestablish a new state of Malaysia, [52] asexpressed in the late 1950s and early 1960s,and made public as a proposal in speeches bythe Tunku in 1961, [53] was in part a Cold Warstrategy by which to prevent Singapore and theBorneo Territories from becoming Communistbases, and ensure that the British couldmaintain bases in the region by which topursue their own global strategies. The anti-Communism which drove this agenda was oftenmanifested as anti-Chinese sentiments bothamong the British and the Malays. The Tunkueventually advised that he was amenable to thenew arrangements if, in addition to Malaya andSingapore, the new state definitely includedSabah, Sarawak and Brunei. The aim was toensure that the Chinese did not constitute amajority in Malaysia. It was in the negotiationsleading up to this new state that a newConstitution was enacted, in which the Malayspecial rights were also made available to the“natives” of Sabah and Sarawak, and on 31August 1963, Malaysia (excluding Brunei) cameinto being.

With a new mandate in a new state, anincreased “Bumiputra” population, Britishsupport, broad anti-Communist sentiments andthe Chinese community divided between Leftand Right, the Tunku began further reforms inpursuing a Malay-dominated state. Pushed byTun Abdul Razak and Dr Ismail, the Tunkuapproved the creation or expansion of Malay-targeted institutions – Majlis Amanah Rakyat(MARA), the Federal Agricultural MarketingAuthority (FAMA), the Rubber IndustrySmallholders Development Authority (RISDA),and Bank Bumiputra. These were mainly aimedat improving the lives of Malay farmers. Morebroadly, however, there were cultural movesafoot, with both the semi-governmental

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institution Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka (DBP),led by Syed Nasir Ismail, and the NationalLanguage Action Front (NLAF) formed in 1964in reaction to Chinese opposition to the Talibreport on education, strongly urged theadoption of Malay as the national language.

But it was Singapore, led by Lee Kuan Yew,which was to be the most actively engaged inactions which were aimed at working againstthe emergence of an ethnocracy in Malaysia. Itwas during the two years when Singapore wasa part of Malaysia that Lee Kuan Yew led theMalaysian Solidarity Convention (MSC) — acoalition of political parties which called for a"Malaysian Malaysia" as opposed to one withBumiputra privileges. The MSC declared:

A Malaysian Malaysia means thatthe nation and the state is notidentified with the supremacy,well-being and the interests of anyone particular community or race.…The special and legitimate rightsof different communities must besecured and promoted within theframework of the collective rights,interests and responsibilities of allraces. The people of Malaysia didnot vote for a Malaysia assuringhegemony to one community. Stillless would they be prepared tofight for the preservation of someaningless a Malaysia. [54]

Lee Kuan Yew (R)

After two years of struggle, riots, and graduallywidening views on the future directions of thecountry, Singapore was ousted from Malaysiaon 9 August 1965. The departure of Singaporeand its largely Chinese population fromMalaysia allowed UMNO to further consolidatethe ethnocracy which now clearly markedfederal and state politics. The increasedreliance of Malay in government affairs and theconsequent downplaying of English was a partof this. In opposition to the increasingprivileges and separateness of the Malays, theDemocratic Action Party (DAP), which hadevolved out of the Malaysian branch of thePeople’s Action Party continued calling for a"Malaysian Malaysia", urging the adoption ofMandarin as one of the official languages, andnoting that Bumiputra "special rights" had onlybenefited the Malay elite and done nothing forthe rural poor.

Within the Alliance, the MCA was increasinglyplaying second-fiddle to UMNO, and when the1967 National Language Bill was passed byparliament, much of the Chinese communitybecome disenchanted with the MCA’s capacity

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to pursue and protect the interests of theChinese. Even when Chinese associations andeducationists proposed the establishment of aChinese-medium tertiary institution -- MerdekaUniversity -- in 1968, the MCA expressedopposition to the idea. It was such attitudeswhich led to its disastrous showing in the 1969elect ions. The DAP and the People’sProgressive Party (PPP) [55] also gainedsupport from the disenchanted English-educated members of the MCA. By 1968,another opposition party -- Parti GerakanRakyat Malaysia (Gerakan) -- had been createdand, led by Lim Chong Eu, it also adoptedopposition to Bumiputra rights as one of its keypolicies.

Lim Chong Eu (L), 1969

With in UMNO, the Tunku was be ingincreasingly seen as being too soft on theChinese and this was perceived as costing theparty support. By early 1969, the voices againsthim had grown vociferous.

The third Malaysian general election, held on10 May 1969, was to reveal starkly the depthsto which the communalization and ethnocraticrule of the country had led. The Alliance wasreturned to power, but with a reduced majority.Both the new Gerakan party and the DAP hadcampaigned against the Malay privilegesprovided by the Constitution and made major

gains, with the non-Malay opposition partiesincreasing their seats from eight to 25. Whilethe Alliance won 66 out of 104 Parliamentaryseats, the MCA was a major loser. Theopposition won in a major way at state level,with the Allliance holding only 14 out of 24seats in Selangor and 19 out of 40 in Perak.The Alliance lost power in Kelantan, Perak andPenang.

The violence which ensued on 13 May 1969,which is sa id by some contemporarycommentators as having been planned andinitiated by Deputy Prime Minister Tun AbdulRazak and Harun Idris, the Selangor MentriBesar, resulted in hundreds dead, theParliament suspended and a nationalemergency declared. A National OperationsCouncil (NOC, which comprised 7 Malays, oneChinese and one Indian), led by Tun AbdulRazak took over Government. An obsceneinterpretation of the violence of 1969 that haspersistently been used as one of the validationsof the New Economic Policy was that it wasthat the violence was due to economicinequalities.

Aftermath of the violence of May 13, 1969

It was during this period of ongoing unrest thatlittle-known UMNO backbencher Mahathir binMohamad -- who had lost his Parliamentaryseat in the election -- publicly criticized theTunku for having given "the Chinese what theydemand...you have given them too much face.The responsibility for the deaths of this people,

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Muslims and infidels, must be shouldered by[you]." Mahathir organized a campaign callingfor the ouster of the Tunku and demandedimposition of an UMNO autocracy without anelected Parliament. Even for the UMNO elite,this was beyond the pale and, following morerioting in June, Mahathir and his colleagueMusa Hitam were expelled from the party.

In an attempt to further consolidate the Malayethnocracy, in addition to having two years toact at will, with no parliamentary oversight, theUMNO-led NOC put forward proposed makingillegal (even among members of Parliament)discussion of the topic of abolition of thoseprovisions of the Constitution dealing withMalay rights, When the parliament waseventually reconvened in 1971, the amendedSedition Act including these provisions waspassed.

1970 Onwards -- The New Economic Policy

It was in 1970 that Tun Razak, head of theNOC, succeeded the Tunku as prime minister,and immediately began asserting even greaterMalay dominance in the Alliance. The only postin his Cabinet held by a non-Malay was that ofthe MCA president Tan Siew Sin, who wasappointed as Finance Minister. In 1972, Razakreadmitted to the party Mahathir Mohamad,who in the interim had authored The MalayDilemma, which claimed that “the Malay race”is the indigenous people of Malaysia, and thatthey had been subjugated in their own land byother races with the assistance of the British.Many of these claims by Dr Mahathir becamestandard rhetoric throughout Malaysia in lateryears when Mahathir became prime minister.

The New Economic Policy (NEP) was alsoannounced as a key Malaysian Governmentpolicy in 1971. Its stated goal was to"eventually eradicate poverty... irrespective ofrace" through a "rapidly expanding economy."Further details of the policies pursued underthis policy will be provided below when lookingat the specific manifestations of ethnocracy in

Malaysia. Much of the rationale behind theNEP was reasonable and just, but this, likemany other elements described below, hasbeen hijacked over the last 35 years as afurther vehicle in consolidating Malayethnocracy.

A further tool used in this “ethnocratizing” ofMalaysia has been dividing the non-Malaycomponents of the Alliance, particularly thosewithin the Barisan Nasional (or National Front,as the Alliance formally became in 1974, priorto the general election). Following thedefection of Lim Keng Yaik from the MCA toGerakan in 1973, Tun Razak took Gerakan intothe Barisan, effectively dividing Chineseinterests in the Barisan. He also took in theSarawak National Party under its new leaderLeo Moggie. Then through the gerrymanderingwhich resulted from turning Kuala Lumpur intoa Federal territory rather than a part ofSelangor, he greatly damaged the DAP whichhad strong support among the urbanpopulation. These were all contributory factorsin the Barisan winning 135 of 154 seats in theParliamentary elections of 1974.

Hussein Onn (Prime Minister 1976-1981)

With the death on Tun Razak in 1976, theconservative and cautious Hussein Onn, son ofthe nationalist Onn Jaafar came to power. Theongoing insurgency by the Malayan CommunistParty allowed Hussein to use various legalmethods to curb dissent. The passing of theSocieties (Amendment) Act 1981 “attempted tocurb political comment by any society ongovernment policies and activities unless itregistered itself as a ‘political society’.” [56]His actions against the Bar also saw the BarCouncil adopting a resolution accusing theHussein Onn government of “the clear andunworthy intention of muzzling the Bar.”

Control over the non-Malay parts of the Barisanincreased under Hussein Onn. When the MCA,still weak after the 1969 debacle, joined withvarious groups within the Chinese community,

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including DAP, to form a “Chinese UnityMovement” between 1971 and 1973 to pursueChinese rights as a parallel concept toBumiputra rights, it was eventually forced byUMNO to withdraw. Chinese interests werefurther damaged in 1978 by the EducationMinistry’s rejection of the proposed Chinese-language Merdeka University

Hussein pursued further NEP targets throughthe Industrial Co-Ordination Act 1975, toextend the ethnic employment quota system,requiring manufacturing firms to employMalays as 30 percent of their workforce.Foreign and non-Malay businesses were alsorequired to divest 30 percent of theirownership to Malay shareholders. The Acteventually had to be amended due to domesticand foreign objections.

The 1978 election, called 18 months beforethey were due, saw the Barisan winning 130seats of the total 154, with DAP gaining afurther 8 seats to the 9 they had heldpreviously. It was obvious that the DAP was atthis time seen as the party which representedChinese interests, despite its avowedly multi-ethnic charter.

In February 1981, Hussein Onn retired fromoffice after a heart bypass.

Mahathir Mohamed (Prime Minister1981-2003)

Prime Minister Mahathir is perhaps the best-known advocate of Malay r ights anddominance. He built the economy andinternational stature of Malaysia over 20 years,side-stepping the efforts of Tengku RazaleighHamzah’s Team B to unseat him in 1987,overseeing mass arrests in Operation Lallang inthe same year, dealing with a Barisan Alternatifand attracting global attention through sackingand vilifying the deputy premier AnwarIbrahim, Mahathir probably did more thananyone else in Malaysia’s history to strengthenand enforce the divisions between Malaysia’s

ethnic groups. While producing a richerMalaysia, with the "privatisation of profits andsocialisation of losses," he gave rise to apossibly eternally fractured society. It was hispremiership which allowed the Deputy PrimeMinister and then UMNO Youth Chief NajibRazak to threaten, during an UMNO Youthcongress in 1987, to bathe a keris (dagger)with Chinese blood. It was during his period inoffice that anti-Chinese sentiments wereencouraged and exacerbated, and it was duringhis period in power that most of the abuses ofMalay ethnocracy noted below came to pass.His creation of a solely Malay capital atPutrajaya reflects excellently his attitudes tohow he wanted this multi-ethnic nation todevelop. There are sufficient good books onMahathir’s period of rule to obviate the needhere for even an overview of his period inpower. [57] Various aspects of ethnocracyduring the Mahathir years will be examinedbelow.

Mahathir Mohamad (L) and AbdullahBadawi (R)

Abdullah Ahmad Badawi ( Prime Minister2003- 2009)

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Mahathir’s handover of power to AbdullahAhmad Badawi in 2003 is something that thegood doctor has apparently come to regret, butAbdullah did manage a landslide victory in2004, almost re-capturing Kelantan which hasbeen ruled by the Opposition PAS since 1990.This win was the biggest since Merdeka in1957.

Under Abdullah, UMNO has seen variouscrises, most notably repeated attacks on thepremier and the party by former PrimeMinister Mahathir, repeated protests againstthe government, claiming corruption andracism, and a stunning defection of manyvoters away from the Barisan in the March2008 elections. Ethnic divisions have beenexacerbated with UMNO Youth ChiefHishammuddin Hussein (son of former PrimeMinister Hussein Onn, and grandson of OnnJaafar) brandishing a keris at the UMNOAnnual General Meeting in 2005 whiledenigrating critics of Article 153 and the“social contract”. The 2006 UMNO AnnualGeneral Assembly was also remarked upon as a"return to the atmosphere of the 1980s, whenthere was a 'strong anti-Chinese sentiment'".Several controversial statements were made atthe assembly, such as "UMNO is willing to risklives and bathe in blood to defend the race andreligion. Don't play with fire. If they (non-Malays) mess with our rights, we will mess withtheirs.” These were certainly contributoryelements to the massive flood of votes awayfrom the Barisan parties in March 2008.

3. Manifestations of Ethnocracy inMalaysia

The above background is intended to provide ahistorical context for the growth of ethnocracywithin the Malayan (and then Malaysian) polityover the last 50 years. It shows that there wasno “natural” condition of Malay dominance andhegemony, but rather a process of verytargeted human agency intended to create astructure where Malays dominate the political

and almost monopolize the administrative lifeof the country. The nature of this hegemony orethnocracy will be examined in this secondsection of the paper. The avenues andmeasures by which ethnocracy is implementedwill be discussed first.

a. Constitutional Provisions

There are a number of provisions under theMalaysian Constitution which mandate aspecial position for Malays. Article 160 definesa Malay as follows:

“Malay” means a person who professes thereligion of Islam, habitually speaks the Malaylanguage, conforms to Malay custom and –(a) was before Merdeka Day born in theFederation or in Singapore or born of parentsone of whom was born in the Federation or inSingapore, or is on that day domiciled in theFederation or in Singapore; or(b) is the issue of such a person;

The best-known of these Constitutionalprovisions is perhaps Article 153 whichprovides:

(1) It shall be the responsibility of the Yang di-Pertuan Agong to safeguard the specialposition of the Malays and natives of any of theStates of Sabah and Sarawak and thelegitimate interests of other communities inaccordance with the provisions of this Article.

The Article then proceeds to list the variousaspects of society (public service positions,scholarships, permits, licenses, etc) which theking may assign to the “the Malays and nativesof any of the States of Sabah and Sarawak.”

However, this provision was intended only as atransitional measure. The Reid Commission in1956 saw the danger in one community in thecountry enjoying preferential treatment intothe indefinite future. Although the Commissionreported it did not find opposition to thecontinuance of the existing privileges for a

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certain length of time, it stated that "there wasgreat opposition in some quarters to anyincrease of the present preferences and to theirbeing continued for any prolonged period." TheCommission recommended that the existingprivileges should be continued as the "Malayswould be at a serious and unfair disadvantagecompared with other communities if they weresuddenly withdrawn." However, "in due coursethe present preferences should be reduced andshould ultimately cease." The Commissionsuggested that these provisions be revisited in15 years, and that a report should be presentedto the appropriate legislature. The "legislatureshould then determine either to retain or toreduce any quota or to discontinue it entirely.”

Although Article 153 would have been up forreview in 1972, fifteen years after Malaysia'sindependence in 1957, it remained unreviewed.In 1970, a Cabinet member declared hat Malayspecial rights would remain for "hundreds ofyears to come,” while in 2007 Deputy PrimeMinister Najib Tun Razak said that there wouldbe no time limit for the expiration of the “MalayAgenda”.

b. Land Reservations

The earliest legislation on Malay reservationland seems to be the Selangor Land Code of1891 introduced by the then Resident ofSelangor, W.E. Maxwell, where land wasreserved for the use of ‘Mohameddans’.

Article 89 of the Federal Constitution providesfor the continuance of Malay reservation landwhich existed before Merdeka and definesreserved land as follows:

“In this Article ‘Malay Reservation’means land reserved for alienationto Malays or to natives of the statein which it l ies: and ‘Malay’includes any person who, underthe law of the state in which he isresident, is treated as a Malay for

the purposes of the reservation ofthe land.”

It is estimated that today approximately 4.5million hectares of land are under Malayreservation, which usually precludes their useby other Malaysians. [58]

c. New Economic Policy

The New Economic Policy (NEP) is a socio-economic restructuring program launched bythe Malaysian government in 1971 under TunAbdul Razak. The NEP was renamed 1990 asthe National Development Policy (NDP) in1991, which appears to have been targeted ate n c o u r a g i n g a n d g r o o m i n g M a l a yentrepreneurs and business tycoons.. The NEPuses economic and administrative affirmativeaction policies to improve the participation ofthe Malays in the economy. It targeted a 30 percent Malay share of the economy by 1990,which would have, it was anticipated, led to a"just society" Quotas in education and the civilservice were expanded under the NEP, as wasgovernment intervention in the private sector.Specific measures include:

• Publicly-listed companies mustset as ide 30% of equity forBumiputras and 30% of all sharesin initial public offerings will bedisbursed by the government toselected Bumiputras at substantialdiscounts.• Virtually all real estate is sold tothe Bumiputra discounted at ratesranging from 5% to 15%, and setpercentages of new housinge s t a t e s a r e s e t a s i d e f o rBumiputras.• Companies submitting bids forgovernment projects need to beBumiputra-owned or at least havemajor participation by Bumiputras.• A range of government-run (and

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profit guaranteed) mutual fundscalled the Amanah Saham Nasionalare available for purchase byBumiputra buyers only. Thisp r o v i d e s r e t u r n r a t e sapproximately 3 to 5 times that oflocal commercial banks.• Approved Permits (APs) forautomobiles preferentially allowBumiputra to import vehicles.

While these measures have been instrumentalin the creation of a Malay middle-class, there isgreat debate as to what percentage of equityMalays now own. The Government claims thatthe targeted 30 percent has not yet beenreached, while a study by economists at ASLIsuggested a figure of 45 percent, based onownership of 1,000 publicly-listed companies.After government complaints, the claim waswithdrawn and lead economist Lim Teck Gheeresigned in protest.

In a recent development, some UMNOmembers have called for the Malay equitytarget to be increased to 70%, in line with the“Malay Agenda”.

d. Education

As a component of the projects to expandMalay participation in the economy and society,a range of education agenda are being pursued.These include:

• Quotas on Malay acceptance intoUn ive r s i t i e s . These wereintroduced under Mahathir. In1998, then Education MinisterNajib Razak stated that withoutquotas, only 5% of undergraduatesin public universities would beMalays. Najib argued this justifiedthe need for the continuance ofquotas. In 2004, Dr. Shafie Salleh,the newly appointed Higher

Education Minister, stated that he"will ensure the quota of Malaystudents' entry into universities isalways higher."• Simplified avenues and lowerentry standards for Malay entryinto University• Access to scholarships for studydomestically and abroad. Over 90%of government scholarships forstudying abroad are awarded toMalays.• Some public universities, such asUniversit i Teknologi MARAadmitting only Bumiputra students.• Many organisations in Malaysiasuch as Bank Negara, Petronas,Telekom and Tenaga Nasional,provides overseas scholarshipsonly or mainly to Malays.• Pre fe rence to Ma lays inappointment as univers i tylecturers. Malay appointments asuniversity lecturers have increasedfrom 30 percent to 95 percent.

e. The Position of Islam

The Malaysian Constitution defines Malays asMuslims, and it has been a major element inUMNO (and PAS) policy to invoke Islam in asmany aspects of daily life as possible. Islam isalso defined in the Constitution (Article 8 ofAppendix 1, Article 8) as the official religion ofthe Federation. The Alliance’s memorandum tothe Reid Commission during the drafting of theConstitution did not propose to include Islam asthe official religion in the Constitution andneither was it suggested in the DraftConstitution. However, it was suggested byAbdul Hamid, the Pakistani representative inthe Reid Commission, in his separate memoattached to the Draf t Const i tut ion .Subsequently, in the Working Party whichdeliberated on the Constitution, the UMNOelites successfully argued for its inclusion in

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the Constitution. [59]

This role of Islam is manifested in variousrespects:

• There is, from various sources,full funding for mosques and otherIslamic places of worship.• It is official government policy to"infuse Islamic values" into theadministration of the country.• Government funds support anIslamic religious establishment.• Muslim children receive extraeducation through enrichmentprograms funded through theReligious Affairs Departmentwhich receives the zakat tax fromMuslims.• Property developers must includea mosque or surau in every newdevelopment. No such provisionfor houses of worship of otherreligions. It is estimated that some3000 mosques have been builtthroughout the country since 1970.

In September 2001, the then Prime Minister,Mahathir Mohamad declared that the countrywas an Islamic state (negara Islam). Theopposition leader at the time, Lim Kit Siang,actively sought support to declare Mahathir'smove as unconstitutional by repeatedlyclarifying that Malaysia is a secular state withIslam as its official religion as enshrined in theConstitution.

f. Public service and administration

Over the last 20 years, there have been effortsto almost completely replace non-Malay civilservants with Malays. In the 1950s, the ReidCommission reported the practice of “not morethan one-quarter of new entrants [to aparticular service] should be non-Malays."

However, over the last 40 years, this has beeneffectively disregarded and since 1969, wellover 90% of new employees of the variousgovernment departments have been Malay.This is particularly so of the police and armedforces, where the figure exceeds 96%. Suchhir ing pract ices are a lso pursued ingovernment-linked or owned companies suchas Petronas, Tenaga Nasional and so on.

From the official website of the Ministry ofForeign Affairs at Wisma Putra, [60] one is ableto ascertain the ethnicity of officials assigned toforeign missions by the Malaysian government.Through a survey of 100 Malaysian overseasmissions listed on this website, one finds thatdiplomatic staff (including military attachesand a few Malaysian Tourism Promotion Boardstaff had an ethnic breakdown as follows:

Malay: 654 (91.7%) Other: 59 (8.3%) Total 713(100%)

The Malaysian government has 28 federalministries. If one examines, for example, thestaff of the Ministry of Culture, Arts andHeritage (Kementerian Kebudayaan, Keseniandan Warisan) as provided on the MalaysianGovernment official portal website, [61] onearrives with the following figures for officers(pegawai);

Malay: 351 (96%) Other: 14 (4%) Total: 365(100%)

The Minister of Defence (KementrianPertahanan) administration officers website[62] details staff of the Ministry (excludingarmed forces staff). Of the 692 persons listed,670 or 96.8 percent of the total are Malay.

The Malay-ization of the entire public serviceand defence forces was apparently the aim ofthe Mahathir government, as complete controlover the public administration is an importantaspect in achieving and maintaining Malayethnocracy.

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Mahathir went further than this. He strove tocreate a completely Malay capital, by movinggovernment departments to the administrativecapital at Putrajaya, where today only civilservants (Malay) and their servicing economicpartners (mainly Malay) live and work. It istoday an essentially Malay city.

4. Effects of Ethnocratic Administration inMalaysia

a. Subordination of the Interests of otherEthnic Groups

The 50-year dominance of UMNO as supremepower in Malaysia has seen it pursue policiesaimed at empowering the Malays and creatingan ethnocracy where Malay interests areprime. This has, by definition meant that theinterests of other ethnic groups in the countryhave had to be subordinated. This is manifestedin an almost inf inite variety of forms–politically, economically, culturally, andsocially, some of which are detailed in otherareas of this paper. Even at national level,UMNO’s dominance has relegated other rulingcoalition parties representing minorityinterests to insignificance, fuelling discontentover ethnic , re l ig ious and economicmarginalisation. Here we need only examinethe recent HINDRAF events to see how thissubordination is manifested.

The Indian community in Malaysia constitutesperhaps 8 percent of the population and haslong been associated with some of the mostm e n i a l e c o n o m i c p o s i t i o n s i n t h ecountry—plantation workers, labourers andstreet-sweepers. The changes in the plantationindustry have seen some of these personsforced into urban slums where they areprecluded from decent housing, education oropportunity. Their interests are supposedlyrepresented at national level by the MalaysianIndian Congress, a component party of theBarisan, but it is more than apparent that thenational MIC has been less than competent inrepresenting the interests of Indians of the

lower socioeconomic strata. As powerlesssquatters, they are often easy prey for thosewho wish to oppress or exploit them.

The situation came to boiling point in 2007,when the Hindu Rights Action Force, acoalition of 30 Hindu non-governmentalorganizations committed to the preservation ofHindu community rights and heritage, began toprotest about the tearing down of Hindutemples by local government agents. SomeHINDRAF members were arrested under theSedition Act but later released for lack ofevidence. In August 2007, a class action onbehalf of Malaysian Indians was filed at TheRoyal Courts of Justice in London to sue the UKGovernment for US$4 trillion for bringingIndians as indentured laborers into Malaya,"exploiting them for 150 years" and thereafterfailing to protect the minority Indians' rights inthe Federal Constitution when independencewas granted. [Unable to afford to pursue theclaims, a petition was circulated in Malaysia,and on 25 November 2007, HINDRAForganised a rally to present it to the BritishHigh Commission in Kuala Lumpur. In one ofthe largest protests against ethnocracy seen inthe country, more than 10,000 peopleparticipated in the protests which were subjectto tear gas and water cannons. Five of theleaders have been detained indefinitely underthe Internal Security Act.

According to the Centre for Public PolicyStudies, Indians have the lowest life expectancyamongst the major ethnic groups; according toHindraf, Indians have the highest suicide rateamongst the major ethnic groups; whileaccording to government statistics, Indiansmake up 40% of convicted criminals. But thiscommunity is excluded from the manyadvantages available to those the governmentclaims are the marginalized Malays.

b. Religious Autocracy

Establishing Islam as the “official religion” ofthe state and ensuring that the government

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departments and agencies are run by Muslimshas had major social repercussions throughoutthe country. These range from complaints fromfollowers of other religions that they are unableto obtain permission or land to erect houses ofworship, to the targeting and destruction oftemples. From 2002-2007, 15 Hindu templeswere demolished in the Klang Valley by statecontractors or agents, and 31 others have beenthreatened with demolition. The construction ofa 36 metre-high Chinese "Goddess of the Sea"statue has also been suspended by the stategovernment in the north Borneo state of Sabah.At the level of the individual, persons havebeen precluded from having the religion oftheir choice noted on their identification cards(the Lina Joy case), and non-Malay parentshave complained about powerful Islamizationtrends within the schools their children attend.The same trend is manifested in Kelantanwhere imams are offered $10,000, a RangeRover, free accommodation and other perks ifthey agree to marry (and thereby convert) anorang asli woman.

c. Educational Woes

The policies which have been implemented inthe educational realm over the last 20 yearshave produced much anger both over thediscrimination practised against non-Malaystudents and the huge declines in educationalquality at both secondary and tertiary levels asa result of staffing schools and universities withessentially members of only one ethnic group.

• Regardless of the quality ofresults of school examinations,non-Malays will be generallyranked behind Malays• Non-Malays are often precludedfrom scholarship allocation.• Non-Malays are v irtual lyprecluded from teaching positionsat the tertiary level. On theUniversity of Malaya’s “ExpertP a g e ” w h i c h d e t a i l s t h e

r e s e a r c h e r s a n d t h e r e b yessentially the academic staff ofthe University, [63] of 1240persons listed, only 20 Chinesenames are included, 8 of whomalso have Islamic names, as well as46 Indian names (both Tamil andNorthern), and 30 names whichare obviously foreign or otherwisecannot be classified. Thus, of the1240 UM academic researcherslisted on the University’s website,less than 100 are, under the ethnicdivisions as used in Malaysia, “non-Malay”.• There can be no political activityon Universities. Section 15 ofMalaysia's Universities andUniversity Colleges Act states thatno student shall be a member of orin any manner associate with anysociety, political party, trade unionor any other organisation, body orgroup of people whatsoever, be itin or outside Malaysia, unless it isapproved in advance and in writingby the vice-chancellor.• Schools are run with Islamicreligious aspects throughout givingparents the feeling that non-Muslim children do not exist or donot matter.• The cava l i e r a t t i tude toeducation demonstrated throughsuch schemes and policies hasresulted in very marked reductionsin the qual i ty of Malaysianeducation. As a single example, theGeneral Medical Council of GreatBritain withdrew recognition ofUniversity of Malaya medicaldegrees because of the decline inthe standards of medical educationat the University.• There has also been a freefall inthe grad ings o f Malays ianuniversities in the international

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assessment exercises for tertiaryinstitutions. The University ofMalaya fell from 89th in 2004 to192nd in 2006 and now has fallenout of the top 200 list.

d. Judicial Problems

There has been a gradual process ofreplacement over the last 50 years of theethnically diverse judiciary with a majority ofMalays. Today, the Chief Justice of the FederalCourt, the President of the Court of Appeal, andthe Chief Judge of the High Court are all Malay.The Chief Judge for Sabah and SarawakRichard Malanjum is a KadazanDusun fromSabah. Five of the six judges of the FederalCourt are Malay. When the incumbents of anyposition—public or private are appointed froma restricted pool, quality will by definitionsuffer.

In addition to the limiting of the ethnic poolfrom which judges are drawn, UMNO has alsodramatically politicized the judiciary. UMNOhas long been inured to both amending theConstitution and amending judges when theydo not act as required. A key replacement wasMahathir’s sacking of the Lord President, TunSalleh Abas and replacement by the morepliant Tun Hamid Omar, a schoolmate ofMahathir and Daim Zainuddin, during the 1988Constitutional crisis. The appointment of TunHamid Omar triggered the collapse of theintegrity and the independence of the judiciary.

More recent events, such as the Lingam videocase show that the Malaysian judiciary todaycommands almost no respect. Many foreigncompanies investing in Malaysia now demandthat disputes between the contracting partnersbe head in courts, or by adjudicators, outsideMalaysia, because of the country’s taintedjudiciary. Claims that Malaysian judges demandpercentages from damages awarded in courtcannot be confirmed.

Daim Zainuddin, the country's former financeminister, is reported to have noted that judgesin Malaysia were a bunch of idiots. “Of coursewe want them to be biased”, he noted, “but notthat biased.” The affiliation of the taintedjudiciary with the process of establishing Malayethnocracy is intimate

e. Police

The ethnic unification of the police force hasresulted in enormous attitudinal changes to theforce among the population, and particularlyamong non-Malays. From the obvious increasein payments to police officers to avoidprosecution, to faked witness statements, andfrom increased deaths in police custody toassault on the deputy prime minister by thecommissioner of police, there has been awidespread lack of confidence in the police.Most non-Malays will today not approach apolice officer or a police station unless underduress.

The Royal Malaysian Police have quitenaturally objected to the creation of anIndependent Police Complaints and MisconductCommission, despite a royal commission's mainrecommendation that it be established. Again,having only one ethnic group comprise thepolice force provides a greater platform forcorruption and abuse than would be the casewith a multi-ethnic force.

f. Corruption

The disillusionment with the police force is buta small fraction of the public’s dismay overcorruption and abuse of power in the majorinstitutions of government. The corruption andnepotism which marked the latter years of theMahathir reign appear to have established newlevels for these activities. When FinanceMinister Daim persuaded Mahathir to give theEconomic Planning Unit and Treasury fullpower in implementing the privatisation policy,it became no longer necessary to call fortenders for government projects. Instead, the

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projects were awarded directly to favouredcompanies. Thus were opened many doors forpotential corruption. But this was true at everylevel of a society where economic interestswere being restructured, where licenses werebeing awarded, where commissions became parfor the course, and where ethnicity was itself avaluable asset.

In a single example, in 1983 Rais Saniman wasone of four Bumiputra Malaysia Finance (BMF)Limited officials who, together with George Tanof the Carrian Group, were convicted forconspiracy to defraud BMF in what was thenthe biggest financial scandal to rock thecountry and which cost the Government anestimated M$2.5 billion in lost monies. ThePerwaja Steel debacle, Bank Islam losses, anddefence procurement scandals all involvedaspects which have been classified as“corruption”. These are but a few of the caseswhich have been brought to public attention.Many have not.

There is no real need to continue discussinghere the potential or disadvantages ofcorruption but it can be stated categoricallythat having one ethnic group controllingpermissions and allocations of governmentcontracts contributes hugely to the potentialsfor and severity of corrupt acts.

g. Migration and Citizenship Issues

Migration and citizenship issues have been atthe heart of Malay ethnocracy for 50 years.Under the 1948 Federation of MalayaConstitution, sultans were given control overmigration and issues of citizenship engaged allthe non-Malay inhabitants of the peninsula.

Today, as Malay ethnocracy is pursued, effortsare being made to ensure that the ratio of non-Malay peoples in the population continues tofall. The Chinese percentage of the populationhas declined from 45% in 1957 to 26% today.How is this being achieved?

• Firstly, by making life difficultand opportunities few for the non-Malays. This is a great inducementto migration for those who havethe financial capacity. According toAbdul Rahman Ibrahim, the homeministry's parliamentary secretary,some 14,316 Chinese surrenderedtheir citizenship on migrationbetween 2000 and 2006, comparedto 1,098 Malays, 822 Indians, and238 others.• Secondly, by encouraging in-migrat ion of Musl ims fromIndonesia and the southernPhilippines. These persons canimmediately become “bumiputra”and enjoy the benefits of suchstatus in Malaysia. Statistics onsuch in-migration are not madepublic. Ethnic statistics are someof the most closely guarded secretsin the Malaysian statisticalfirmament, and one has no ideahow the statistics are compiled oradjusted. As such, the publishedfigures must be considered withsome caution.

5. Modes Employed in Validating MalayEthnocracy

a. Indigeneity of Malays

Malay rule was validated by the British in 1947,as Malay ethnocracy is validated by theMalaysian state today, on the premise on theindigeneity of the Malays in the peninsula. Howvalid is this claim?

The original inhabitants of the peninsulaappear to have been the people genericallyreferred to today as “orang asli.” Thesespeakers of Austroasiatic (Aslian) languagesnumber somewhere in the region of 100,000persons, usually live in rural or jungle settings,are often poverty-stricken, and are generally

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not Muslims. The Federal Constitution does notconsider the Orang Asli as bumiputera

The earliest evidence we have for outsidersarriving in the peninsula are the persons wholeft the Sanskrit inscriptions when visiting orresiding in what is today Kedah from the fourthcentury CE. The earliest evidence of any Malayinhabitants or visitors to the peninsula is theTerengganu Stone of the 14th century, aninscription written in the Malay language inJawi script which suggests some sort ofmissionary activity. The first evidence of anyknown Malay figure arriving in the peninsula isthe entourage of Parameswara when he fledfrom Palembang to the Peninsula in the late14th century. It appears that it was from thisperiod that Malay colonization began inearnest. Most of the “Malay” inhabitants of thepeninsula today can trace an ancestor frombeyond the peninsula within three generations.Let us examine a few prominent Malays oftoday and observe their ethnic origins withinthe last two or three generations

•Dato' Syed Ja'afar Albar - -Hadhrami Arab who came toMalaya from Java pre-war. His son,Syed Hamid Albar now HomeMinister•Khir Toyo, former mentri besar ofSelangor -- Javanese• M a h a t h i r M o h a m e d - -Grandfather was from south India•Abdullah Badawi -- Mother isCham descendant from Hainan.•Tunku Abdul Rahman -- half Thai.•Onn Jaafar -- Turkish background,shared with Ungku Aziz and SyedHussein Alatas•Hussein Onn, HishammuddinHussein -- ditto•Khairy Jamaluddin -- Javanese•Puteh Maria, first head of WanitaUMNO -- Tamil Muslim from SriLanka

•Najib Razak -- Bugis descent

Such a list can be continued almost adinfinitum. Large areas of Johor are populatedby descendants of Javanese who moved to thepeninsula in the 20th century. Most westerncoastal states have large populations of personswho still identify themselves as Minang, Rawaand Maindailing. If persons from all theseplaces are to be considered “Malay” then theidea of Malay indigeneity has no meaning, andcertainly cannot be used to exclude from socialparticipation persons whose ancestors camefrom other areas. It should be noted in passingit has usually been recent arrivals who havebeen the main defenders of the idea of Malayindigeneity. Syed Ja’afar Albar, newly arrivedfrom Java, was adamant that the Chinese werekaum pendatang or pendatang asing(immigrants) or lodgers (orang tumpangan).

In a recent blog, Marina Mahathir wrote:

“I'd like to ask everyone, especially thosecategorised as 'Malays', to list their familyhistories. And see how many of us can really goback further than three generations born inthis land. I know I can't.” [64]

b. Supremacy of Malays

UMNO sees itself as the "protector andchampion of ketuanan Melayu" (Malaysupremacy), which has within it the idea thatthat Malays are the rulers of Malaysia or"masters of this land", as stated by formerUMNO Youth Information Chief Azimi Daim in2003. The UMNO Youth wing in particular isknown for what some call radical and extremistdefense of ketuanan Melayu. But it not solelythe youthful ultras who express such thoughts.In early 2008, Tengku Faris Petra, the KelantanCrown Prince, while delivering a keynotespeech at a forum titled “Malay unity is thecore of national unity”, declared that as theMalays had agreed in granting non-Malayscitizenship, the latter should therefore not seek

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equality or special treatment. The supremacy ofthe Malays was implicit in this statement.

c. The Sultans

The Sultans of the various states are seen as orat least portrayed as symbols of Malayness, andtherefore indigeneity and legitimacy. It is theywho signed the Merdeka and Constitutionalagreements with the British and thereforeunderwrite the right of Malay ethnocracy.

Yet, if we examine the history of the respectiveroyal houses, we observe again migrants to thepeninsula within the last few hundred years.None of the royal houses of Malaysia can tracetheir lines of descent back to the Malaccanruling house.

We need only take a few examples todemonstrate what is being suggested.

Selangor

Raja Lumu who became Sultan Sallehuddin ofSelangor (1742 – 1780) was the son of DaengCellak, second Yamtuan Muda of Riau(1728-1745) who is turn was son of DaengRilaka of Sulawesi. He can thus be considered aBugis, 2000 kilometres from home.

Johor

The Johor sultans trace their origins to 'Aidarusof Aceh, a Sayyid from the Hadramaut inSouthern Arabia. And to Bugis ancestors.

Kelantan

In 1760, a certain Kubang Labu succeeded inunifying the disparate territories into a singlestate, but was overthrown four years later.Long Muhammad, younger son of Long Yunus,declared himself Sultan in 1800.

Negri Sembilan

The first sultan of Negri Sembilan was aMinangkabau person appointed by the Johor

sultan in the early 18th century.

We thus see that many of the Malaysian royalfamilies are of fairly recent origin and in manycases, derived from recent immigrants. It isvery difficult to validate ethnocracy throughsultanates of this nature.

d. Claims of a “social contract”

The term “social contract”: was first used in theMalaysian context by Abdullah Ahmad, anUMNO MP at the time, in 1986. He noted:

“The political system of Malaydominance was born out of thesacrosanct social contract whichpreceded national independence.Let us never forget that in theMalaysian political system theMalay position must be preservedand that Malay expectations mustbe met. There have been moves toquestion, to set aside and to violatethis contract, that have threatenedthe stability of the system.”

When one examines the process by which theMalays were literally handed power by theBritish, with the other communities protestingnoisily about the lack of consultation withthem, this reference to a ‘social contract”appears to lack any historical basis. However,since 1986, the term “social contract” hasbecome a part of the vocabulary of variouspolitical players, often with the meaning of asocial contract entered into at Merdekawhereby the Indians and Chinese wereprovided with citizenship in exchange for theMalays being able to enjoy special rights orketuanan Melayu. The fiction within theseclaims can be demonstrated by any reading ofMalaysian history of the 1940s and 1950s.

6. Measures Used to Maintain MalayEthnocracy

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Given the often specious claims made tovalidate the aspirations to special status,indigeneity and other aspects of the MalayAgenda , how has UMNO gone aboutmaintaining the claims and avoiding orquashing opposition to them?

a. Legislation

One of the key methods of quashing those whowish to question or argue against the specialprivileges enjoyed under Malay ethnocracy is tolegislate. Article 10.4 of the Constitution allowsParliament to prohibit the questioning of any“matter, right, position, privilege, sovereigntyor prerogative”, including of course Article 153of the Constitution.

(10.4) In imposing restrictions inthe interest of the security of theFederation or any part thereof orpublic order under Clause (2) (a),P a r l i a m e n t m a y p a s s l a wprohibiting the questioning of anymatter, right, status, position,p r i v i l ege , sovere ign ty o rprerogative establ ished orprotected by the provisions of PartI I I , art ic le 152, 153 or 181otherwise than in relation to theimplementation thereof as may bespecified in such law.

The Internal Security Act, which effectivelyallows the government to detain anyone it seesas a threat to national security for an indefiniteperiod, provides another excellent tool forstifling dissent on any matter. In 1987 underOperation Lalang, several leaders of the DAP,including Lim Kit Siang and Karpal Singh, wereheld under the ISA. It is widely believed thiswas due to their calling for the NEP and otherMalay privileges to be reviewed. Today, variousof the HINDRAF leaders are being held underISA for their calls for a more just socialstructure

The Sedition Act was passed in 1971 and thisalso provides draconian punishments foractions which the state (a.k.a UMNO)considers, or at least depicts, as beingseditious. This includes questioning Malayrights.

In 1975, to stem student dissent of governmentpolicies, amendments were made to theUniversities and University Colleges Act(UUCA) which banned students fromexpressing support of or holding positions inany political party or trade union withoutwritten consent from the university's ViceChancellor. The new Act also banned politicaldemonstrations from being held on universitycampuses.

And to stop dangerous ideas being spread toowide l y , the Print ing Presses andPublications Act 1984 is a piece of legislationthat requires all print media in the country toobtain a licence and abide by its strictregulations. The license or permit must berenewed annually. The Act has evolved out ofthe Printing Ordinance of 1948, introduced bythe British. The powers are vested in the HomeAffairs Minister who can grant or deny anypermit. The minister can also restrict or banoutright publications that are likely toendanger national security interest or createsocial unrest.

b. Failure to ratify UN conventions

Malaysia has failed to ratify a range ofinternational covenants and conventions, whichhave been signed by the majority of UNmembers. These include:

• the International Covenant onEconomic, Social and CulturalR igh t s (CESCR) , wh i ch i smonitored by the Committee onEconomic, Social and CulturalRights;• the International Covenant on

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Civil and Political Rights (CCPR),which is monitored by the HumanRights Committee;• the International Convention onthe Elimination of All Forms ofRacial Discrimination (CERD),wh ich i s mon i tored by theCommittee on the Elimination ofRacial Discrimination;• the Convention against Tortureand Other Cruel, Inhuman orD e g r a d i n g T r e a t m e n t o rPunishment (CAT), which ismonitored by the Committeeagainst Torture;• the International Convention onthe Protection of the Rights of AllMigrant Workers and Members ofTheir Families (MWC). [65]

The signing of these conventions would meanthat Malaysia’s domestic social and particularlyethnic policies would be subject to muchgreater attention and supervision from aroundthe globe. Various of the policies of ethnicdiscrimination as practiced in Malaysia wouldbe illegal under the CERD. Failure to sign theconventions costs them only minor reputation.

c. Electoral control

Parliamentary democracy is premised onelections and if UMNO is to continue to winelections and maintain its ethnocracy, there isa need to have methods by which to, if notensure, at least encourage, this outcome. Themost effective weapon in the arsenal is controlof the Election Commission. The ElectionCommission (EC) is seen as one of the primaryinstruments through which the BN hasmanipulated the election process for its ownpolitical gain. The Government appoints allmembers of the EC, and all recommendationsmade by the EC must pass through theGovernment in order to take effect. The BN hasbeen able to hastily push through delimitationproposals whereby seat boundaries are

changed, without serious debate in Parliament.The EC proposal to use indelible ink to markthe hands of voters in the March 2008 electionwas withdrawn following UMNO opposition.

The EC is also the main vector through anotherk e y w e a p o n – t h e g e r r y m a n d e r — i simplemented. Gerrymandering is the drawingof constituency boundaries for partisanadvantage. This can be observed in Malaysianelectorates where generally rural voters(predominantly Malay) have a higher votevalue. The average number of voters per seat inthe Malay dominant state of Perlis is about40,000, while in Chinese-dominated Selangor itis 71,000, [66] giving the Perlis voters almosttwice the value for their vote. The original 1957Constitution contained a provision limiting thesize discrepancy between any two districts tono more than 15%. This restriction, however,was eliminated by constitutional amendmentsin 1962 and 1973.

The Barisan Nasional also relies duringelections on government resources such aspersonnel, funds and facilities to aid theirelection campaigns. They also control themedia which disseminate electoral news.

d. Control of media

When trying to convince the populace ofparticular views or preventing uncomfortablenews being disseminated, control of the mediais a boon. UMNO controls Bernama, the statenewsagency, six state-owned radio stations andtwo television stations under nationalbroadcaster Radio Television Malaysia, theUtusan Group and is also closely allied tomedia conglomerate Media Prima Bhd.

The MCA, through its investment arm Huaren,owns Star Publications, which owns the Englishnewspaper, "The Star", various magazines, andradio stations FM 988 and Red FM. It nowholds a 20 percent stake in Nanyang Press,which publishes Chinese newspapers "NanyangSiang Pau" and "China Press".

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The ruling Indian party, MIC, has closeaffiliations with owners of major Tamilnewspapers "Tamil Nesan" and "MalaysianNanban".

Thus, rather than having to shut downnewspapers as Dr Mahathir did in 1987, thenewspapers now do not need to be shut downas they print no stories which reflect poorly onthe government.

e. History Writing

When trying to ensure that the populace issympathetic to a particular point of view,starting inculcation young is a useful tactic. Invarious ways, UMNO is using school historytextbooks to push its view of Malayan andMalaysian history. There has been a gradualprocess of ethnic cleansing in Malaysian historybooks over the last 25 years. A anonymoustextbook entitled Sejarah Menengah Malaysia,(Tingkatan Tiga), published by Dewan Bahasadan Pustaka in under the Ministry of Educationin 1971 had much space devoted to the Britishrole in Malayan history, and included a chapteron the Chinese in the peninsula until 1874. By1998, a textbook entitled Kurikulum BersepaduSekolah Menegah Sejarah Tingkatan 1, alsopublished by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka andcompiled by Dato’ Dr Abdul Shukor binAbdullah and his 17 Malay collaborators,depicts a peninsula whose history begins withthe Melaka Sultanate, when it appears that thepopulation of Malaya was entirely Malay, andcontinues on into the Johor period of Malayanhistory. The cultural aspects are entirely Malayand it is as if half the country has disappeared.A 2003 textbook entitled Kurikulum BersepaduSekolah Menengah Sejarah Tingkatan 5,published by Dewan Bahasa dan Pustaka andcompiled by Ramlah bte Adam and her 7 Malaycollaborators, concentrates on finding Malaynational heroes, almost one for each state. Itportrays immigration as something which onlyhappened in the 19th century and only involvedpeople from India and China. The 1930s is

written of only through vignettes of Malayfigures, while the Malayan Union andFederation depicted as though only Malays andthe British existed. One Chinese and two Tamilpersons are pictured, with the remainder being

The state/UMNO-endorsed and sponsoredtextbooks are increasingly depicting the historyof Malaya’s past as almost solely a Malayhistory and are gradually excising the roles ofChinese and Indian figures from nationalhistory.

f. Threats

And when legislation, distorted history andelectoral and media controls fail to convinceothers of the necessity and validity of Malayethnocracy, there are always threats ofviolence available.

At the 2005 UMNO annual meet ing ,Hishammuddin Hussein brandished thetraditional Malay dagger, the keris, whilewarning the non-Malays not to attack orquestion Malay rights and "ketuanan Melayu."His action was applauded by the UMNOdelegates. Again in 2006, when Hishammuddinagain brandished the keris at the assembly,Hashim Suboh asked Hishammuddin when hewould "use" the keris.

Hishammuddin Hussein with kris at UMNOconclave

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7. Opponents of Ethnocracy

The Non-Malay communities had in generalbeen opposed to their disenfranchisement asfull citizens since the reversals of 1946. Whilethe line of argument in this paper may suggestthat all of UMNO and all Malays support andendorse the ethnocracy now being practiced inMalaysia, this is far from being the case. Thereare opponents of the various systems andpractices among all communities at all levels.

The organizers of Bersih - - GabunganPilihanraya Bersih dan Adil / Coalition for Cleanand Fair Elections -- engage with one aspect ofthe abuses, while the HINDRAF organisersmore specifically target the ethnocraticstructures under which the non-Malaycommunities they have been discriminatedagainst.

HINDRAF demonstration, Kuala Lumpur,2007

There has been increasing attention paid byforeigners to the effects of ethnocratic policiesin Malaysia. European Union ambassador toMalaysia, Thierry Rommel criticisingMalaysia’s New Economic Policy (NEP) asbeing detrimental to the country. He suggestedthat Malaysia’s attractiveness to foreigninvestors had weakened as a result of theaffirmative action policies for the Malays.“Protectionism in public procurement is rising.That protectionism is expanding and the scope

for competition and efficiency is narrowing …Malaysia is marginalising itself,” he toldreporters.

But most importantly, the voters of Malaysiaare expressing their views through the ballotbox. In the March 2008 Elections, the BarisanNasional were roundly chastised for manyaspects, resulting in the loss of 58 seats and itstwo-thirds majority in parliament.

Leaders in Penang, which now has a non-Barisan government, have announced that itwill not be following Bumiputera policies instate sector employment, while Anwar Ibrahimhas declared his opposition to aspects of Malayethnocracy and is busily preparing himself toserve as head of a Pakatan Rakyat which willpossibly unseat the long-standing BN coalitionand form a new federal government. How anysuch coalition will in fact act when in powerremains a great unknown.

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Street protests, Kuala Lumpur, 2007

8. Ethnocracy as Apartheid

I have characterized the ethnocratic policiespursued by the UMNO-led coalition over thelast close to 50 years as “apartheid”. Someexplanation of this is in order. The term,meaning separation or separateness, is fromAfrikaans, and it was used in South Africa torefer to the policies of the Afrikaner NationalParty government between 1948 and 1990. TheApartheid regime classified people into racialgroups and then implemented differentiatedpolicies towards these various groups. Thesepolicies affected where people lived, the qualityof education people received, what activitiespeople could engage in and their opportunitiesfor the future. In many ways, Malaysiane thnocracy , th rough the e f f ec t i vedisenfranchisement of non-Malay peoples andrestricted opportunities in commerce,education, and employment through theirexclusion from the mainstream reflects someaspects of the South African Apartheid system.Like the Apartheid system, Malaysia’sethnocracy vindicates a hierarchy of rightsalong ethnic lines.

9. Malaysia and Israel

Can one then pursue a democracy wherecitizens are supposedly equal in their rights,and yet at the same time constitutionally

mandate the special position of a certain groupwithin that country. In this respect, theMalaysian state as created by UMNO shares aproblem with Israel.

Israel has no Constitution, despite formallycommitted to the adoption of a writtenConstitution since 1948.. Many of the moreorthodox Jews hold that the only realconstitution for a Jewish state is the Torah andthe Jewish law (halakhah) that flows from it.They not only see no need for a modern secularconstitution. But there is a Declaration ofIndependence which sets down aspects of thestate.

“The Declaration of Independence determinedthat the State of Israel will be open for Jewishimmigration and for the Ingathering of theExiles; it will foster the development of thecountry for the benefit of all its inhabitants; itwill be based on freedom, justice and peace asenvisaged by the prophets of Israel; it willensure complete equality of social and politicalrights to all its inhabitants irrespective ofreligion, race or sex; it will guarantee freedomof religion, conscience, language, educationand culture; and it will safeguard the HolyPlaces of all religions.”

However, in the country’s Basic Law: HumanDignity and Liberty, [67] there is no provisionon equality of freedom of religion. Rather itnotes in Article 1: “The purpose of this BasicLaw is to protect human dignity and liberty, inorder to establish in a Basic Law the values ofthe S ta te o f I s rae l as a Jewish anddemocratic state.”

Here then we have the conundrum faced. Israelwants to develop a modern democratic state,one which gives a specially-mandated place toJewish people, but at the same time, treats allcitizens fairly as equals. As the Malaysianethnocracy demonstrates, the contradictions ofsuch an arrangement will always raise theirheads.

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A religion or ethnicity which is detailed in abasic legal document as an essential element ofthe state necessarily makes believers in otherreligions, or persons of other ethnic groups,second-rate citizens, and precludes an equalityof citizenship.

Conclusion

Article 8 of the Malaysian Constitution (clause2) states: 'Except as expressly authorised byth is Const i tut ion , there sha l l be nodiscrimination against citizens on the groundonly of religion, race, descent or place of birthin any law or in the appointment to any officeor employment under a public authority or inthe administration of any law relating to theacquisition, holding or disposition of propertyor the establishing or carrying on of any trade,business, profession, vocation or employment.'

However, through other Articles, all thesediscriminations are actually mandated by theMalaysian Constitution, and UMNO has usedthese provision to consolidate Malay powerthrough control of all state institutions.

The ethnocracy which has been slowlydeveloped in Malaysia particularly since 1957has excluded from full participation in thecountry the non-Malay peoples of the land.Through economic and social policies, non-Malay people have been deprived of education,employment, political and other opportunitiesas a cost of the development and consolidationof Malay supremacy and the economic aspectsof the NEP.

The question of how the power of UMNO is tobe called to account and how the increasingfragmentation of Malaysian society is to bereversed may already have begun to beanswered by the March 2008 election. In anycase, in any major re-examination orreconsideration of the various privilegingpolicies and ethnocratic structures which havebeen created in Malaysia, an essential elementneeds to be a recognition that these structures

have as their root the British-UMNO alliance of1946-57, which pursued the interests of thesetwo groups , and exc luded f rom fa i rparticipation in the political process the non-elite and non-Malay members of society.

Geoff Wade is a Senior Research Fellow at theInstitute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singaporeand the editor of the six volume work Chinaa n d S o u t h e a s t A s i a(http://www.amazon.com/dp/0415367522/?tag=theasipacjo0b-20). An earlier version of thispaper was Asia Research Institute WorkingPaper Series No. 112.

Recommended citation: Geoff Wade, "TheOrigins and Evolution of Ethnocracy inMalaysia," The Asia-Pacific Journal, 47-4-09,November 23, 2009.

Notes

[1] Joint Colonial Office-Foreign Office memoon post-war settlement in the Far East: needfor definite policy” (CO 825/35/4 No. 52)(August 1942) in A. J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya(3 parts), British Documents on the End ofEmpire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 23.[2] CO 825/35/4 No. 52, Stockwell, Malaya,Part I, p. 24.[3] CO 825/35/4 No. 52, Stockwell, Malaya,Part I, p. 24-5.[4] CO 877/25/7/27265/7 No. 1 (4 Dec 1942)Stockwell Document 11, Vol. 1, p. 42.[5] CO 877/25/7/27265/7 No. 1 (4 Dec 1942)Stockwell Document 11, Vol. 1, p. 43.[6] A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts),British Documents on the End of Empire,London HMSO, 1995, Part I, pp 47-48. 48.[7] A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts),British Documents on the End of Empire,London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 49.[8] A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts),British Documents on the End of Empire,London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 48.[9] CO 825/35/6 No. 4 (14 May 1943), A.J.

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Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts), BritishDocuments on the End of Empire, LondonHMSO, 1995, Part I, pp. 50-51.[10] CO 825/35/6 No. 4 (14 May 1943), A.J.Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts), BritishDocuments on the End of Empire, LondonHMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 51.[11] Hone memo on post-war constitutionalarrangements for mainland of Malaya: CO825/35/6 No. 14 (28 July 1943), A.J. Stockwell(ed.), Malaya (3 parts), British Documents onthe End of Empire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I,p. 55.[12] Mr Stanley of Colonial Office to WarCabinet Committee on Malaya and Borneo,CAB 98/41 CMB (44) 3 (14 Jan 1944), A.J.Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts), BritishDocuments on the End of Empire, LondonHMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 68.13] Policy in Regard to Malaya and Borneo’:War Cabinet memorandum to Mr Atlee.Appendices: I Draft Directive ion policy inMalaya’ and II ‘Draft Directive on policy–Borneo’, CAB 66/50, WP (44) 258, A.J.Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts), BritishDocuments on the End of Empire[14] Letter from Admiral Mountbatten SupremeAllied Commander to Maj. Gen Hone, 4 Feb1944, “Letter on publicity for post-war policy”,A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya (3 parts), BritishDocuments on the End of Empire, LondonHMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 72.[15] Mountbatten to Stanley, CO 825/42/3 No.25 (29 July 1944), A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya(3 parts), British Documents on the End ofEmpire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 83.[16] Stanley to Mountbatten CO 825/42/3 No.27 (21 Aug 1944), A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya(3 parts), British Documents on the End ofEmpire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 84.[17] Mountbatten to Stanley CO 825/42/3 No.28 (6 Sept 1944), A.J. Stockwell (ed.), Malaya(3 parts), British Documents on the End ofEmpire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 86.[18] Cabinet meeting CAB 128/1 CM 27 (45)3(3 Sept 1945) Conclusions authorizing theMacMichael Mission, A.J. Stockwell (ed.),

Malaya (3 parts), British Documents on the Endof Empire, London HMSO, 1995, Part I, p. 122.[19] A1838 413/2/1/4 Part 1 BTSEA [BritishTerritories in South East Asia]- MalayanConstitutional Reforms (National AustralianArchives).[20] Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: The Makingof a Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 2002, p.[21] Albert Lau, The Malayan UnionExperiment, Kuala Lumpur, Oxford UniversityPress,[22] Australian Commissioner in Singapore C.Massey to H.V. Evatt, Minister of State forExternal Affairs, Canberra, 24 December 1946.A1838 413/2/1/4 Part 1 : BTSEA [BritishTerritories in South East Asia]- MalayanConstitutional Reforms.[23] Parti Kebangsaan Melayu Malaya (PKMM),which was a Leftist party opposed to UMNOand also opposed to continuing the role ofsultans.[24] The 1947 census showed a total populationof Malaya including Singapore of 5.8 million.Chinese numbered 2.6 milllion and Malays 2.4million. This was the first time the Chineseoutnumbered the Malays. See Minute of 17August 1948 NAA A1838 410/1/1 Part 1 :BTSEA [British Territories in South East Asia]-General Information.[25] Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and theOnset of the Cold War, p. 187.[26] Tarling, Britain, Southeast Asia and theOnset of the Cold War, p. 188.[27] Straits Times, 10 January 1947.[28] Still a legal party at this time.[29] Straits Budget, 13 February 1947.[30] Straits Times, 16 January 1947.[31] Original copy contained within Nowreprinted as: PUTERA-AMCJA, The People'sConstitutional Proposals For Malaya 1947,Kuala Lumpur: Ban Ah Kam, 2005.[32] Malaya Tribune, 31 March 1947.[33] W Garrett, Official Secretary, Office of theHigh Commissioner for the United Kingdom,Canberra to Prime Minister’s Department,Canberra 5 May 1947: NAA A1838 413/2/1/4Part 1, BTSEA – Malayan Constitutional

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Reforms.[34] Australian Commissioner in Singapore C.Massey to H.V. Evatt, Minister of State forExternal Affairs, Canberra, 9 May 1947. A1838413/2/1/4 Part 1 : BTSEA [British Territories inSouth East Asia]- Malayan ConstitutionalReforms.[35] The Constitution proposal noted: “Theword ‘Malay’ here means a person who: i)habitually speaks the Malay language; and ii)professes the Muslim religion; and iii) conformsto Malay custom.”[36] United Kingdom Colonial Office,Federation of Malaya: Summary of RevisedConstitutional Proposals, presented by theSecretary of State for the Colonies toParliament by Command of His Majesty, July1947. p. 8, Item 18.[37] “Immigration Policy Change: ‘SpecialInterest for Malays’” Straits Times 25 July 1947[38] The Morning Tribune, Friday 25 July,1947, p. 4.[39] “Early Errors Corrected” Straits Times, 26July 1947 reprinted from The Times[40] NAA A1838 413/2/1/4 Part 1, BTSEA –Malayan Constitutional Reforms.[41] Broadcast Speech by the Governor-General, 4 January 1948. NAA A1838 413/2/1/4Part 1, BTSEA – Malayan ConstitutionalReforms.[42] A Gujarati terms used in reference to theclosing of shops and business activity inprotest. Derived from Gandhi’s use of hartals inanti-British activities in India. These hartals in1947 are the subject of a film Sepuluh tahunsebelum Merdeka by Fahmi Reza. Link(http://10tahun.blogspot.com/ )[43] These have recently been republished.[44] Editorial, Malaya Tribune, 24 January1948. NAA, A1838 413/2/1/4 Part 1 : BTSEA[British Territories in South East Asia]-Malayan Constitutional Reforms.[45] CO 537/3746 Federation of Malaya -Political Developments (1948), f. 28.[46] CO 537/3746 Federation of Malaya -Political Developments (1948), f. 28.[47] To Malaya from Paskin on Onn’s visit to

Britain. Dated 22 Dec 1948, f. 60.[48] In the 1955 election, Malay voters madeup about 80% of the total electorate. Althoughthe Chinese made up close to 50% of thepopulation, they constituted only about 20% ofthe total electorate because the stringentcriteria in the1948 Federation Agreement,albeit modified slightly in the early 1950s,meant that only a minority of Chinese wereeligible for Malayan citizenship.[49] Lee Hock Guan, Political Parties and thePolitics of Citizenship in Peninsular Malay(si)a1957-68, Singapore, ISEAS, p. 31, note 4. Thetext quoted was originally in the Tunku’s As aMatter of Interest (1981).[50] Lim subsequently established a short-livedparty named the United Democratic Party, andlater was involved in establishing the GerakanParty. He later became the longest-servingChief Minister of Penang.[51] Cheah Boon Kheng, Malaysia: the Makingof a Nation, Singapore, ISEAS, 2004.[52] The “Grand Design” for integration ofBritish territories in Southeast Asia had been apart of British decolonization policies since the1950s. “On 18 April 1961, the question of theGrand Design was considered at a meeting ofthe Colonial Policy Committee, during which itwas decided …the development of a politicalassociation between Malaya, Singapore and thethree Borneo territories as ‘an ultimate aim ofpolicy’.” “In pursuing this policy, it was clearthat politics and security were foremostconsiderations. Only through a greaterMalaysia were the British confident of grantingself-government status to the BorneoTerritories and Singapore.” See Tan Tai Yong,Creating Greater Malaysia: Decolonization andthe Politics of Merger, Singapore, ISEAS, 2008,pp. 20-25.[53] Tan Tai Yong suggests that the Malayanswere the least enthusiastic about the idea of anexpanded polity such as Malaysia. See Tan,Creating Greater Malaysia pp. 20-21.[54] Tan, Creating Greater Malaysia, p. 196.[55] Founded in 1953 by D.R. Seenivasagamand his brother S. Seenivasagam as an

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opposition party to the Aliance. In 1969, it wasa lmost ab le to form the Perak StateGovernment, but after joining the BarisanNational in 1973 lost most of its support in the1974 election.[56] Cheah, Malaysia: The Making of a Nation,p. 161.[57] See, for example, Khoo Boo Teik’sParadoxes of Mahathirism (Kuala Lumpur:Oxford University Press, 1995) and his BeyondMahathir : Malaysian polit ics and itsdiscontents, (London: Zed 2003).[58] Shaikh Mohd Nor Alam Sheikh Husseina n d B a s i r a n B e g u m(http://www.econ.upm.edu.my/~peta/shaikh/shaikh.html), Malay Reservations: Meeting theChallenges of the Millenium.[59] For fuller details, see Joseph M. Fernando,“The Position of Islam in the Constitution ofMalaysia”, Journal of Southeast Asian Studies,

Vol. 37, 2006, pp. 249-66.[ 6 0 ] L i n k(http://www.kln.gov.my/?page=mission)[ 6 1 ] L i n k(http://www.heritage.gov.my/kekkwa/viewdirektoripegawai.php?idbahagian_kementerian=1)[ 6 2 ] L i n k(http://www.mod.gov.my/index.php?option=com_contact&Itemid=17)[63] Link (http://umfacts.um.edu.my/umexpert/)[ 6 4 ] M a r i n a M a h a t i r(http://rantingsbymm.blogspot.com/search/label/race), “Rantings by MM”, Sep 9 2008.[65] Link (http://www.unhchr.ch/pdf/report.pdf)[ 6 6 ] L i n k(http://malaysiawatch3.blogspot.com/2008/02/gerrymandering-art-or-science-in.html)[67] Passed by the Knesset on the 12th AdarBet, 5752 (17th March, 1992) under primeministership of Yitzhak Shamir

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