The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model ......The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model 75 Figure 1 Competitiveness ranking of some Asian countries, years 2008–2015

Int. J. Technology, Policy and Management, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2018 73

Copyright © 2018 Inderscience Enterprises Ltd.

The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model: comparative cases of Singapore and Thailand

Jarunee Wonglimpiyarat College of Innovation, Thammasat University, Anekprasong 3 Bldg., Prachan Rd., Bangkok 10200, Thailand Fax: (662) 623 5060 Email: [email protected]

Abstract: This paper explores the government dimension of Porter’s Diamond model. In particular, the study analyses the role of government to support economics of innovation in the cases of Singapore and Thailand. The paper examines the government policies including major tax policies and research and development tax incentives in promoting the high-tech industries in Singapore and Thailand. The analyses of findings offer the policy learning of using tax policy as part of the science and technology policy instruments to foster technological innovations. The study gives insightful lessons which would be useful for readers and policy makers to understand linkages between the government role, innovation politics and major government policies to support innovation system development.

Keywords: government policies; innovation politics; Porter’s Diamond model; tax policies; technology commercialisation.

Reference to this paper should be made as follows: Wonglimpiyarat, J. (2018) ‘The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model: comparative cases of Singapore and Thailand’, Int. J. Technology, Policy and Management, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp.73–88.

Biographical note: Jarunee Wonglimpiyarat, PhD, ACCA, CPA, CIA, CFE, CGAP, CFSA, CISA, CISM, CLP, RTTP is a member of the College of Innovation, Thammasat University, Thailand. She holds a PhD in Technology Management from Manchester Business School, University of Manchester, UK and has post-doctoral fellowships at Boston University and Harvard University, USA. She has worked at PricewaterhouseCoopers, Standard Chartered Bank, Citibank N A, Sussex Innovation Centre, Boston University Technology Commercialization Institute and the US Securities and Exchange Commission. She has won many awards for her research contributions including the Elsevier Scopus Young Scientist Award, an award designed by Elsevier, the World’s leading research publisher of scientific information. She has been awarded for having the highest publications in international journals with the highest impact factors.

74 J. Wonglimpiyarat

1 Introduction

The government policies play an important role in supporting the development of high-tech industries. The analyses in this study are based on the theses of government policies and financial economics of innovations. Many countries have used tax policies as one of the policy measures to induce innovations. Singapore and Thailand represent the two Asian countries that use tax policies to drive economic growth. The analyses in this study attempt to understand the innovation politics and economics of innovation by answering the research question: to what extent the tax policies have helped support the process of technology commercialisation in the country cases of Singapore and Thailand? The study attempts to fill the gap in the existing literature with regard to policy studies on high-tech entrepreneurship.

Table 1 provides an overview of economies of Singapore and Thailand. The gross domestic product (GDP) growth and competitiveness ranking of Singapore are much better than Thailand despite the country’s fewer natural resources. Figure 1 compares the competitiveness ranking of Singapore and Thailand among other Asian countries during the years 2008–2015. According to the International Institute for Management Development World competitiveness Yearbook 2015, Singapore was ranked on the third place while Thailand was ranked in the 30th position.

Table 1 Overview of economies - Singapore and Thailand

Indicator Year Singapore Thailand

Population (million) 2015 5.6 67.9

Gross domestic product (GDP) growth (%) 2013 4.4 2.9

2014 2.8 0.7

International Institute for Management Development (IMD) world competitiveness ranking

2015 3 30

Ranking in scientific infrastructure 2015 16 47

Ranking in technological infrastructure 2015 2 44

Knowledge economy index (KEI) ranking 2012 23 66

KEI index 2012 8.26 5.21

Source: The author’s design, based on the world competitiveness scoreboard (various years) by International Institute for Management Development (IMD), World Bank

The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model 75

Figure 1 Competitiveness ranking of some Asian countries, years 2008–2015 (see online version for colours)

Source: The author’s design, based on the world competitiveness scoreboard

(various years) by International Institute for Management Development (IMD) (see online version for colours)

This study analyses the innovation politics and economics of innovation with particular emphasis on the countries of Singapore and Thailand. The reasons to choose the two case countries are that Singapore is the most advanced economy among the ASEAN countries, while Thailand is the second largest economy of the ASEAN countries. The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical framework on research and development (R&D) investments and government policies to support innovations as well as Porter’s Diamond Model regarding the determinants of national innovative capacity. Section 3 explains the methodological framework. Section 4 presents the analyses of findings focused on tax policies and R&D tax incentives to foster high-tech start-ups in commercialising their innovations. Policy lessons and implications to support high-tech entrepreneurship as well as conclusions are drawn in Section 5.

2 Theoretical framework

2.1 R&D investments and government policies to support innovations

Innovation can be seen as a process that has linkages and feedbacks with and connects all the elements of the Schumpeterian triad - invention, innovation and diffusion (Lundvall, 1992, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2003; Nelson, 1993; Viotti, 2002). R&D can be seen as a necessary cost of business, since investments in R&D usually have an implication of building firms’ competitiveness. The diffusion of innovation depends largely on R&D. Importantly, R&D would enable the firms to pursue numerous options which could turn out to be strategic in the future. That is to say, capital investment is essential for translating technologies into commercialised innovations. Without R&D investments (investments in technology as a capital investment), there would have been no innovative capacity, and consequently no new profits from it.

The government plays an important role in building the national innovative capacity. The public policy measures such as R&D tax incentives, research grants, loans, public


venture capital can have effects on the entrepreneurial, venture and economic development (Mani, 2004). Innovation policies are among the key operational priorities in developing countries to support investment by local firms, especially small- and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) and transnational corporations investing in these countries (David et al., 2000; Hyytinen and Toivanen, 2005). Public policy intervention generally aims at raising R&D investments particularly in developing countries. However, the degree of state intervention depends largely on the potential of the private sector in developing an economy based on knowledge-based innovations (Mani, 2004).

Cluster policies are among important mechanisms for improving the effectiveness of the national innovation system (Lundvall, 1992, 1993, 1998, 1999, 2003; Porter, 1985, 1990, 2001). They have been recognised as an important innovation policy instrument to facilitate innovation and support transdisciplinary research networks among academics and entrepreneurs, which would thereby improve the capacity of nations. Clusters have drawn substantial attention from policy makers, since clusters provide a framework for catalysing economic transformation. The cluster policies derive from the successful technology cluster development at Silicon Valley and Boston Route 128 in the US (Saxenian, 1994, 2007). The mechanisms driving the development of Silicon Valley high-tech clusters are the management of networked region: networks among entrepreneurs, venture capitalists, researchers and others to translate ideas into new commercial innovations. The elements of Porter’s cluster model to build national innovative capacity will be discussed in the next section.

2.2 Porter’s Diamond model - determinants of national innovative capacity

The rise of high-technology clusters started with Michael Porter’s ‘Competitive Advantage’ in 1985 (Porter, 1985). Porter, the most influential management analyst of Harvard Business School, who is frequently cited in a conceptual thinking of ‘competitive advantage’, argues that the cluster of collaborating businesses helps in the rapid dissemination of innovations. The cluster is a geographically proximate group of interconnected companies and associated institutions in a particular field, linked by commonalities and complementarities (Porter, 1990, 2001). The concept of ‘clusters’ promotes collaboration among institutions to facilitate the exchange of information and technology.

Porter’s Diamond model emphasises the role of government in creating an environment conducive to national competitive advantage. Porter argued that the interactions between the various agents of the nation help achieve considerable synergy. The underlying benefits of clusters also include collective learning and knowledge spillovers among participating institutions. Porter’s Diamond model (Figure 2) provides a framework for understanding collaboration/networking between the government and industry sectors in the form of clusters (Porter, 1990, 2001). The four attributes:

1 Factor conditions

2 Demand conditions

3 Context for firm strategy and rivalry

4 Related and supporting industries are self-reinforcing and catalyse the process of continuous innovations.


The model focuses upon the conditions that drive national innovative capacity (Porter, 1985, 1990, 1998, 2001). Figure 2 Diamond model - the model of cluster determinants

Source: Porter (1990, 2001)

Saxenian (1990, 1994, 2007) coined a similar concept of regional advantage to promote the clusters/regional networks for creating network-based industrial system. Taking into account the role of cluster in the economics of innovations, clusters drive innovation and innovation drives productivity which in turn have influences on economic development and national competitiveness (Porter, 1985, 1990, 1998, 2001; Lai et al., 2014; Broekel et al., 2015).

3 Research methodology

There is a wealth of literature on the economics of innovation and entrepreneurship. However, to date only limited research has been carried out to explore the aspects of innovation politics and government policies in regards to technology commercialisation (Mani, 2004). Therefore, it seems reasonable to explore the government policies with particular focus on tax policies and government R&D tax incentives governing the national innovation system. According to the survey concerning SME financing gap by the Office of Small and Medium Enterprises Promotion (OSMEP) of Thailand, the issue of tax incentives is one of the major obstacles to SME growth and development. This suggests that the area of tax policies to support high-tech entrepreneurship needs further empirical investigation.

This study aims to fill a gap in existing research of innovation politics and government policies in supporting high-tech entrepreneurship. The empirical research


results can help bridge the tax policy approach to innovation system development. The analyses in this study attempt to understand the innovation politics and economics of innovation by answering the research question: To what extent the tax policies have helped support the process of technology commercialisation in the country cases of Singapore and Thailand?

The research framework is outlined in Figure 3 to show the connections between the theoretical framework and case study analyses. The comparative analyses of Singapore and Thailand would provide important insights and lessons on innovation politics and the role of government in shaping the direction of the national innovation system – the use of tax policies to support technology commercialisation and innovation system development. This research employed a case study methodology and involved 30 interviews. The interviews were carried out with the tax authorities, government agencies and companies having experiences of government services. The interview data were supported by an examination of secondary data in order to provide a cross-check on the validity of research (Yin, 2013). The conduct and analyses of comparative case studies enable the development of conclusions and policy recommendations for the research. The research findings provide evidence-based lessons and experiences that can be applied to other developing economies under varying implementation environments.

Figure 3 Research framework

Source: The author’s design

4 Tax policies and R&D tax incentives to promote high-tech start-ups

Singapore and Thailand represent the two Asian countries that use tax policies to drive economic growth and innovation. Both countries pursue a developmental state role in fostering the economics of innovation. Based on the cluster model (Porter, 1990, 2001), Figures 4 and 5 provide an analysis of the determinants of national innovative capacity in


the country cases of Singapore and Thailand, respectively. The government of Singapore has been successful in supporting high-tech start-ups through effective policies to enhance the landscape of the country. This includes adopting the US model and making appropriate changes to suit the economy of Singapore. In the case of Thailand, although the country has far more resources than Singapore, Thailand suffers from lack of effective policies to support early stage start-ups and chronic political unrest apart from poor linkages among various actors in the innovation system.

Figure 4 Determinants of national innovative capacity - Singapore

Source: The author’s design, based on the framework by Porter (1990, 2001)

Figure 5 Determinants of national innovative capacity - Thailand

Source: The author’s design, based on the framework by Porter (1990, 2001)


Figures 6 and 7 investigate further the government dimension of Porter’s Diamond Model. They provide detailed analysis of the major government policies affecting technology commercialisation and influencing the innovation system development in the country cases of Singapore and Thailand, respectively. By mapping national political leadership to each phase of economic development, the figures reflect the impacts of innovation politics on the functioning of their innovation systems. Figure 6 Innovation politics and major government policies to support innovation system

development in Singapore

Source: The author’s design (adapted from Wong, 2011; Wong et al., 2007)

Figure 7 Innovation politics and major government policies to support innovation system development in Thailand

Source: The author’s design

In the case of Singapore, the government policy in an early stage of industrial take-off (1960s) was highly dependent on technology transfer from foreign multinational companies. Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s development strategy after independence in 1963 was mainly focused on foreign investments. The Economic Development Board (EDB) was specifically established to attract foreign investors to locate their operations in Singapore. In the 1970s–1980s, the policy emphasis was on local technological deepening - encouraging domestic firms to absorb foreign technology with the aim of deepening and


upgrading technological base. The government policies during this period were focused on attracting foreign direct investments (from multinational companies). The government launched various financing schemes and policy measures to encourage and assist local enterprises in upgrading, strengthening and expanding their operations. Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong’s strategy in the 1990s was focused on innovation and creative research. The Agency for Science, Technology and Research (A*STAR) was established to oversee the development of Singapore’s R&D capabilities. The government policies emphasised the establishment of public R&D institutions as well as encouraged co-funding mechanisms to attract R&D investments in areas of economic importance to Singapore. At present, Singapore is gearing towards knowledge-based economy. The government policies under Prime Minister Lee Hsien Loong are focused on technology commercialisation and high-tech entrepreneurship.

In the case of Thailand, the government policies were strategically focused on import-substitution industrialisation in the 1960s and export-oriented industrialisation in the 1970s–1990s. The Thaksinomics policy was a major policy framework promoting the development of SMEs and entrepreneurship from 2000s onwards. At present, the government policies are aimed at enabling Thailand to transition from a middle-income trap to the high-income economy. Compared to Singapore which has a stable political environment, Thailand suffers from chronic political instability. Singapore has only 3 political leaders running the country from 1960s to present. Nevertheless, Thailand has 28 political leaders and 7 coups over the same period. The frequent changes of government result in unstable economic environment and fragmented policies. Thailand’s economic landscape was hard hit by the two major financial crises (the Asian financial crisis in 1997 and the global financial crisis during 2007–2009). The economic growth of Thailand was stagnant again by Bangkok Shutdown protests in 2014 whereby the military had staged a coup to end political unrest. The unstable political economy of Thailand thereby results in incoherent and passive industrial policies to support high-tech entrepreneurship.

Taking into account the government policies to support high-tech start-ups, the governments of two countries have enacted tax policies and offered R&D tax incentives to promote high-tech start-ups (Table 2). In the case of Singapore, the government uses tax policy as part of its science and technology (S&T) policy instruments to foster technological innovations. A wide range of investment tax incentives including tax credits, tax holidays, tax allowances, accelerated depreciation scheme, concessionary tax rates are offered to support high-tech SMEs. Tax incentives are given particularly to foreign multinational companies in order to facilitate the transfer of manufacturing technologies embodied in foreign direct investments (FDI) to domestic Singaporean firms (FDI knowledge spillover). The country also has a higher level of flexibility and policy coordination than Thailand’s from competent program management of Economic Development Board (EDB). At present, the Singaporean government offers competitive tax regime in attempts to promote high-tech entrepreneurship and drive the country towards the goal of biomedical hub.


Table 2 Major tax policies and R&D tax incentives to support high-tech industry in Singapore and Thailand

Country Types of programs/activities Details of tax policies and R&D tax incentives programs

Singapore R&D incentive for start-up enterprises (RISE)

The program supports the needs of R&D-intensive start-ups by allowing them to convert tax losses to cash grants during their early years of product development

Tax incentives for venture capital funds and venture capital (VC) fund management companies

The program provides tax exemption for approved venture capital funds regarding capital gains. The capital loss from VC investments can be expensed (100% maximum write-off). The scheme also gives tax exemption for management fees and performance bonuses that VC firms’ executives received for a period of 10 years. The government plans to give a 5% concessionary tax rate to approved VC corporations managing section 13H funds on qualifying income

Pioneer incentive Full corporate tax exemption on qualifying profits for up to 15 years

Development & expansion incentive (DEI)

The incentive program offered by EDB aims at encouraging companies to move into high value-added business activities by reducing tax rate from 5 to 15% on incremental income from qualifying activities

Productivity and innovation credit (IRAS)

IRAS gives tax credits up to SGD 400,000 of their expenditure per year for a range of innovation activities including not just acquisition of automation equipment and training, but also design expenditure, R&D and registration and acquisition of intellectual property (IP)

Approved foreign loan (AFL)

The AFL incentive of EDB provides a reduced tax rate of 0, 5 or 10% on interest payments on loans taken to purchase productive equipment

Investment allowance (IA)

The IA program encourages investments in equipment that contributes to greater efficiency in resource utilisation or introduces new technology to the industry by giving tax deduction up to 5 years, or up to 8 years for purchase of qualifying equipment on hire purchase

Approved royalties incentive (ARI)

The ARI tax incentive scheme offers reduced withholding tax on royalty payments to access advanced technology and know-how

S19B writing-down allowances

S19B gives an automatic 5-years write-down for IP acquisition

Double tax deduction (DTD) for market development, master franchising and master intellectual property licensing

The DTD program provides 200% tax deduction on eligible expenses to promote their products and services in overseas markets


Table 2 Major tax policies and R&D tax incentives to support high-tech industry in Singapore and Thailand (continued)


Productivity and innovation credit (PIC) and PIC + schemes

The schemes provide allowance of 400% on up to SGD 4,00,000 of qualifying expenditure incurred per year for the activities involving intellectual property (IP) management such as acquisition and leasing of PIC information technology and automation equipment, intellectual property (IP) licensing of rights, investments in approved design projects

Approved royalties incentive (ARI)

The program offers reduced or nil withholding tax rate on royalty payments to access advanced technology and know-how

Transport technology innovation development scheme (TIDES)

The program provides specific tax exemptions to support the automobile industry. TIDES supports EDB’s efforts in attracting automobile companies to undertake knowledge-based manufacturing, R&D activities and testing of vehicles in Singapore

Tax exemption for start-ups

The program offers tax exemption for the first SGD 1,00,000 of chargeable income (excluding Singapore franked dividends) for any of the first 3 years of tax assessment. A further 50% exemption is given on the next SGD 2,00,000 of the normal chargeable income

Angel investors tax deduction scheme (AITD)

The program administered by SPRING encourages angel investors to invest in start-ups by offering a 50% tax deduction

Thailand Skills, technology & innovation program (STI)

The program is offered by the board of investment (BOI). STI aims to improve international competitiveness of Thailand in terms of attracting foreign investors and promoting exports. The qualifying company will be given an additional 1-year corporate income tax exemption provided total exemption period does not exceed 8 years (corporate income tax exemptions, exemption of import duties and removal of corporate income tax exemption cap)

Tax incentives for venture capital industry

The government offers tax exemption for capital gains of VC corporations investing in SMEs. Dividend income and gains from the transfer of shares in SMEs are also exempted from corporate income tax up to 10 years provided that certain requirements are met. The investors co-investing with VC funds are exempted from personal income tax. VC corporations that will be eligible for tax exemptions must invest in technologies of 10 industries: food and agriculture; energy saving and clean energy; textiles; advanced materials; biotechnology; health and medical; tourism and creativity; automobiles and auto parts; electronics and computer software; and research and innovation. However, the government does not allow write-off of the VC investments in case of failure


Table 2 Major tax policies and R&D tax incentives to support high-tech industry in Singapore and Thailand (continued)


300% tax incentive for R&D expenditure

The program allows 300% deduction for depreciation of machinery and equipment used in R&D activities. The program is jointly managed by the Research and Development Certification Committee Secretariat (RDC) of the National Science and Technology Development Agency (NSTDA) (under the Ministry of Science and Technology) and the Revenue Department (under the Ministry of Finance) to encourage SMEs undertaking R&D activities

Accelerated depreciation rate for R&D equipment

The incentive program offers 40% depreciation on machines, equipment and apparels used in R&D. The investors can enjoy the benefits of accelerated depreciation in the first year of investment

Tax concessions for SMEs

SME companies are exempt on the first THB 300,000 of net profits. They are required to pay a reduced rate of 15% corporate income tax on net profits exceeding THB 300,000 up to THB 1 million and 20% on net profits exceeding THB 1 million in 2014 and 2015

Tax loss carry forward The government allows tax loss carry forward for the period of 5 years

Tax exemption for innovative companies

The government gives exemption of corporate income tax for a period of 5 years for innovative companies registered during 1 October 2015–31 December 2016

Board of investment (BOI) tax incentive scheme

BOI offers tax benefits to foreign companies investing in Thailand. The normal BOI package gives exemption of import duty on machinery, equipment, raw materials and exemption of corporate income tax up to 8 years depending on investment zones

Tax incentives for university-industry research collaboration

The incentive program encourages companies to conduct R&D activities in collaboration with the research institutions or universities approved by BOI. The program offers exemption of import duty on machinery, equipment, raw materials as well as exemption of corporate income tax for 70% of R&D expenditure for 3 years (not exceeding THB 10 million)

Special incentives for special innovation zones (SIZ)

The SIZ program offers 10-years corporate income tax exemption without cap. The program expert’s income is exempted from personal income tax for the first 5 years and will be taxable at 10% flat rate after 5 years

Source: The author’s design, based on Deloitte (2014, 2015) and Wong (2011)

Unlike Singapore, the tax policies and R&D tax incentive programs of Thailand (Table 2) still lag behind in terms of varieties and effectiveness. In the case of Thailand, the policy design to encourage R&D investments is in the form of income tax allowances (R&D expenditures are fully deductible from taxable income in the year they are incurred) and investment tax credits (tax credits allow the deduction of a certain percentage of R&D expenditures against the firm’s tax liability). The government offers R&D tax incentives


targeted to specific industrial sectors in order to enhance competitiveness of industries. The tax instruments are used to encourage firms to invest more in R&D which would help improve the level of technological development. The tax incentives would benefit the firms in terms of income tax exemption. Currently, the Thai government sees the upcoming ASEAN economic integration (AEC) as a market opportunity and tries to encourage firms to conduct more R&D undertakings in order to increase employment and improve GDP growth.

From empirical analyses and interviews, large companies in Thailand generally integrate their R&D strategies as a key element of their corporate strategies. They seem to enjoy tax benefits more than small firms due to their close connections with the government agencies. Most interviewees viewed that the 200% R&D Tax Relief program in the past did not much incentivise the private sectors to undertake R&D.1 They complained about the steps in the application process for the Research and Development Certification Committee Secretariat (RDC) program that took so long in getting project approval by the Revenue Department (under the Ministry of Finance) and the National Science and Technology Development Agency (under the Ministry of Science and Technology). The interviewees suggested that the targeted industries for R&D tax schemes should not be sector specific. They argued that by supporting the companies to succeed at an early stage of development no matter in what industry they are, this would help raise awareness of the RDC program to the public. They also complained about the publicity of the RDC program and its activities, since the industry and the private sectors were not well informed of the program.

Taking into account the effectiveness of the tax programs, the interviewees viewed that the attitudes of the Revenue Department, which focus on tax investigations to collect more tax revenues, seem to be a barrier to building trust with the taxpayers who claim the tax incentives. The management of companies argued that the decisions on R&D investments to some degree were not made because of tax incentives. If they regarded that R&D spending was essential to their businesses, they would undertake R&D regardless of whether the government gave such incentives or not. Many companies viewed that the Revenue Department was not sincere in providing tax benefits to the public. If there were mistakes with regards to tax rules or regulations, they would be penalised.

It is argued that the consideration for giving tax relief or credits to businesses on a project-by-project basis in Thailand should be abandoned. Instead, the tax benefits consideration should be based on the intended impacts - the extent of sales volume, increased employment and net taxes that would be paid to the government. To support innovative start-ups making losses from R&D investments in their early years of development, the government should allow them to carry forward R&D tax credits or relief for the next 3 years or enable them to convert tax losses into grants. Moreover, the government should consider expanding the definition of R&D activities eligible for tax incentives to include informal R&D activities, industrial design, product engineering and R&D commercialisation efforts such as marketing and branding of new product development.


5 Policy implications and conclusion

This paper is concerned with the role of government to support economics of innovation in the two Asian countries of Singapore and Thailand. The analyses in this research focus on the government dimension of Porter’s Diamond model. The research contributes to filling a gap in existing research of innovation politics and government policies in supporting high-tech entrepreneurship. The major empirical findings are as follows:

First, the study has shown that the Singaporean government uses tax policy as part of its S&T policy instruments to foster technological innovations. The government of Singapore offers a wide range of investment tax incentives including tax credits, tax holidays, tax allowances, accelerated depreciation scheme, concessionary tax rates to support high-tech SMEs. In the case of Thailand, the Thai government has used tax policies and R&D tax incentives targeted to specific industrial sectors as part of its clustering policies. Such policy measures aim at encouraging Thai firms to invest more in R&D so as to improve the level of technological development.

Second, from the innovation politics perspective, Singapore has three political leaders running the country from 1960s up to present, while Thailand has 28 political leaders and 7 coups over the same period. The comparative case analyses have shown that Singapore has a stable political environment, which helps support the government role in guiding S&T capacity. Nevertheless, Thailand provides a contrary case. The analyses have shown that Thailand suffers from chronic political instability. The frequent changes of government result in unstable economic environment and fragmented government policies which thereby hinder foreign direct investments.

Third, from the S&T policy perspective, the study has shown that tax policies and R&D tax incentives can help encourage businesses to invest more in future R&D projects. However, they are not enough to induce effective technology commercialisation. It is argued that effective tax policies as part of the S&T program need to be coupled with tax proficiencies, government trust, complementary institutional settings (such as the establishment of capital market for technology-based firms, business angel networks, venture capital funds, technology incubators, reduced government bureaucracy) to support high-tech entrepreneurship.

Acknowledgements

The author would like to thank Mr. Mark Billington (Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales (ICAEW) South East Asia), Mr. Suthep Pongpitak (Revenue Department of Thailand) and Mr. Suriya Teerawattanasarn (Tax Auditor Association of Thailand) for all professional advice and support. The author is grateful for insightful comments and helpful advice from the interviewees.

Funding

This research was supported by the research funding from the College of Innovation, Thammasat University.


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Note 1 In 2015, the Thai Cabinet approved an increased tax incentive for expenses incurred for

qualifying research and development (R&D) expenses. The tax deduction increased from 200 to 300% (tax deduction of up to 3 times or 300%) to improve the capacity of Thai industries in competing with Singapore. The incentive is effective for eligible R&D expenditures incurred from 1 January 2015 to 31 December 2019.

Documents

The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model ......The role of government in Porter’s Diamond model 75 Figure 1 Competitiveness ranking of some Asian countries, years 2008–2015