The Soviet Military Doctrine and its influence on the Egyptian Army while

preparing the Yom Kippur War 1973

Presented to the 8th Annual Baltic Military History Conference, hosted by the Baltic

Defenses College in Tartu, Estonia, March 2017.

By Bridger General (Res) Dr Dani Asher – Israel

The Six-Day War of 1967 inflicted a severe blow to Arab dignity and self-esteem.

During the coming six years the IDF maintained its hold on the Eastern bank of the

Suez Canal, not allowing the canal to be opened for shipping.

Egypt's president Sadat endeavored to break the stalemate and the state of stability.

Threats to renew the war on a full scale were met with hesitation on the part of the

various levels of command, as a result of the weakness, or perhaps the immaturity

of the military system.

Sadat, who had inherited from Nasser a military organization that was still

undergoing a process of reconstruction and only partly qualified to engage in a

full-scale military offensive, repeatedly reviewed options of various types.

Sadat's careful examination of the various systems finally gave rise, in late 1972, to

his later concept, based primarily on the employment of a limited-scale war as an

impetus intended to place the political process back on track.

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The consolidation of this decision necessitated the build-up of the "military

instrument", so that it may accomplish the tasks assigned to it. The Egyptian

military became a state-within-a-state, gaining the highest priority in terms of the

allocation of personnel, materiel and the president's attention.

Of this over-all strength, the Egyptians assembled their offensive task force, which

consisted of the two Field Army commands, commanding five reinforced infantry

divisions, two armored divisions, two mechanized infantry divisions and about

twenty four commando battalions.

Most crucial decision made by President Sadat was the decision to revert to the

"military option" - to activate his military forces on a massive scale. The military

operation, could, in fact, be rather limited and restricted as far as its objectives

were concerned.

While the breaking of the stalemate had been defined as the objective of the war,

President Sadat defined the contest between Egypt and Israel as “a direct

confrontation with the defense doctrine of Israel”.

The tasks of the war included: breaking the stalemate, inflicting the heaviest

possible casualties on the enemy and liberating the occupied territories stage by

stage, according to the capabilities and the opportunities.

The supreme echelon of the Egyptian Army acted according to the objective by

preparing the war plan, developing the combat doctrine required in order to

execute the plan, training and preparing the troops so that they would be able to

accomplish the tasks assigned to them.

The Israeli military superiority in such areas as domination of the skies,

maneuverability and the employment of armored elements, along with the

problems presented by the land obstacles - the Suez canal, the earth dike on its

Eastern side and the forts of the "Bar-Lev Line" - compelled the Egyptian planners

to provide effective solutions that would enable them to launch the war and

achieve such goals as to allow the political leadership to start the wheels of the

political system rolling so as to achieve Egypt's political goals.

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As of this stage, the commanders of the Egyptian military - the planners of the war

- embarked on an all-out effort to prepare their troops to accomplish their

battlefield functions and tasks.

(according to the Soviet Warfare Doctrine) Attack by a Field Army – Mission Depth

The need to come up with effective solutions to the problems facing them referred

the Egyptian planners to the Soviet theory of war. This theory had been born on the

European battlefields of World War II and became a model that was subsequently

emulated and adopted by almost 50% of the world’s militaries. These militaries

adopted relevant elements from the Soviet doctrine and adapted them to their

specific needs.

The Soviet theory had been adapted, through a carefully controlled process, to the

needs of the Egyptian Army on the eastern front. Soviet military advisors,

stationed in Egypt, played a major role in this adoption and adaptation process.

Despite the marked lack of sympathy displayed toward them by the Egyptians,

these advisors endeavored, at the various echelons, and eventually succeeded in

translating, adapting and assimilating the Soviet theory, which subsequently

provided the foundation for the operational plan of the war.

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In addition to assembling dedicated OrBat, making the necessary preparations for

the crossing of the Suez Canal and training the various units, they were also

required to plan the manner in which the forces will be employed.

IDF Defensive Deployment in the Suez Canal Theater - Translated Soviet document

In their strategic planning and particularly in their quest for solutions at the

operative and tactical levels, namely - the combat doctrines, the Egyptians had at

their disposal the Soviet military theory, which had been adopted by their military,

along with the acquisition of Eastern-bloc weapon systems, since the mid-1950's.

This doctrine, which is based on the extensive combat experience of the Red Army

and the best Soviet military philosophy, provided only a partial solution to the

unique problems faced by the Egyptian military planners.

The Soviet combat doctrine was translated and parts of it were rewritten. Its

various parameters were modified, streamlined and adjusted to the needs of the

Egyptian military on the Suez Canal front. This revised doctrine was studied and

assimilated by the commanders and troops of the Egyptian military during their

preparations for the war. The Egyptian troops acquired and assimilated its

principles and trained according to this refined doctrine.

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This doctrine also served as the basis for the preparation of the operational plan

executed by the Egyptian armed forces during the Yom-Kippur War. In coming to

devise their operational plan the Egyptian planners identified the problems

presented to them by the Israeli military system.

Apart from the problems at the strategic level, which should have been resolved

by the very act of going to war, the Egyptian planners were faced with various

operative-level problems. These problems, created by the Israeli defensive layout,

included: the air superiority enjoyed by the Israeli air force, the superior

maneuverability of the Israeli armored forces, the deliberate defensive layout with

its substantial rear-area reserves and the need to stay alert and ready to repel a

parallel Israeli counter offensive.

At the tactical level, too, the Egyptians were compelled to cope with such complex

issues as the obstacle presented by the Suez Canal, the earth dike on the eastern

bank of the canal, the liquid flame devices designed to set the canal ablaze, the

front-line forts and the superiority enjoyed by the IDF in terms of the number of

tanks, their survivability, mobility and firepower.

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The Egyptian planners addressed the primary military issues: the offensive, the

defensive, the fording of a wide water obstacle and the assembly of a massive

antitank layout.

At the operative level, the Egyptians kept their plan as simple as possible. The

main elements of this plan were the initiation of an offensive while executing a

complex operation involving the crossing of a water obstacle, destroying the Israeli

forces at the front line, establishing bridgeheads and deploying in a defensive

layout in order to repel the expected counterattacks of the Israeli forces.

In order to execute this offensive, the Egyptian land OrBat was organized in four

efforts. The two primary efforts, in the middle of the sector, consisted of the field

Army commands, which were assigned to bear the brunt of the offensive.

Based on these efforts, the Egyptian armed forces launched their attack. They

employed the majority of their infantry, commando and armored elements in a

complex operation, which began with the fording of a water obstacle (the Suez

canal) followed by the capturing and establishment of bridgehead, and culminated

in the establishment of a defensive layout reinforced by antitank weapons

concentrations, intended to repel the counterattacks launched by the IDF.

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The combat activities incorporated the Egyptian artillery, antitank and assault

engineers elements, as well as various types of logistic support elements. The

entire operation was executed in accordance with an operational plan whose roots

were deeply embedded in the Egyptian combat doctrine.

The Yom-Kippur War, or "The October War", was based primarily on the strategic

concept of an all out war limited in it’s dimentions. According to this concept,

the military operation, which constituted the first stage of a comprehensive

strategic plan, could be limited in its objectives.

The military echelon prepared the war plan, developed the combat doctrine

required for the execution thereof and trained and prepared the troops so that they

may be able to fulfill the tasks assigned to them.

The Egyptian planners faced such operative problems as the Israeli air superiority,

the superior maneuverability of the Israeli armored elements, the deliberate Israeli

defenses with strong reserve elements deployed at the rear of the front-line

fortifications, as well as the need to remain alert and ready to repel a simultaneous

Israeli counterattack.

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The continuous involvement with military theory and doctrine finally gave rise to

an extensively detailed plan in all matters pertaining to solutions at the tactical

level or even only at the techno-tactical level.

One of the most controversial issues involves the following question: "Did the

Egyptians really initiated an offensive on Yom-Kippur of 1973, or did they merely

initiate an aggressive move consisting of the fording of the canal and establishing

of bridgeheads on the Eastern bank, followed by an Egyptian defensive campaign

shifted to the Eastern side of the Suez canal?

A careful examination of the Egyptian offensive combat doctrine and a comparison

thereof with its Soviet parent, reveals an almost total similarity between the two.

The same theoretical literature used by the Egyptian planners at the general staff,

field army corps, divisional and brigade levels - was also used by the commanders

assigned to execute the plan.

Subsequently, as the Egyptian over-all operational plan for the "October war" was

being consolidated, the Egyptians mixed it into some sort of a “cocktail”. They

adjusted the theoretical and doctrinal solutions to the operational plan, whose

principles had been derive from the objectives of the war and the tasks assigned to

the commanders of the armed forces.

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The “cocktail” they concocted was not, in fact, a “net” plan of attack. The first

moves of the plan that evolved had, indeed, been derived from the offensive

theory, but they promptly evolved into defensive moves.

Only the act of crossing the canal and the initial establishment of the bridgeheads

may be regarded as purely offensive moves. As of this moment, the Egyptians

preferred – in their planning as well as in their execution – the defensive approach.

In fact, the Egyptian activity involved a sharp, rapid transition from the offensive

to the defensive, with the intention of using their defensive layout to repel the

enemy counterattacks and shatter, once and for all, the decisive superiority of the

Israeli armor.

The Egyptians strictly avoided entering into combat encounters under the

conditions sought or favored by the Israeli forces. They dictated their own terms,

as the Duke of Wellington had done in Spain - strategic offensive coupled with

tactical defensive.

The Egyptians relinquished the form of offensive preferred, theoretically and

doctrinally, by the Soviets, of “attack out of movement”. Instead, they opted for

“attack out of contact”.

But even so, they minimized the dimensions and scale of their offensive,

particularly with regard to the depth of their tasks. Each infantry division staged its

attack out of its defensive layouts, located to the west of the canal, leaped to ford

the Suez Canal and returned, as promptly as possible, to new defensive

dispositions reinforced by antitank units, layouts and reserves and heavily

defended by massive air-defense layouts, inside limited-size bridgeheads.

They employed their artillery layout to provide preparatory fire on a massive scale

and support the fording, attacking and defending elements. They incorporated their

engineering forces generally and the bridging units in particular in the fording

operation as well as in the preparatory activities and in the establishment and

consolidation of the bridgeheads. They received effective, successful backing from

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their various logistic support layouts during all of the stages of their combat

operations.

Major parts of the armored and mechanized infantry elements of the Egyptian

armed forces - out of the elements doctrinally intended to reinforce, maneuver and

advance to resume the development of the attack, were assigned, in advance, to

reinforce the infantry divisions at the bridgeheads.

As regards their remaining armored and mechanized infantry elements - the

Egyptians preferred to retain and deploy these elements to the West of the canal,

once again - possibly as reserve elements for the subsequent development of the

offensive, but first and foremost as a second Army echelon deployed in defensive

dispositions.

At the moment of truth, this "Egyptian doctrine", as it was implemented by the

Egyptian troops on the battlefield, based on the Soviet Military Doctrine, enabled

the Egyptian armed forces to crack the "foundations" of the concept consolidated

on the Israeli side and gain significant military achievements, followed, eventually,

by the political achievements accomplished by the Egyptians mainly after the war

of 1973.