The transition from school to the university under restricted entry: A Greek tracer study

Higher Education 16:481-501 (1987) �9 Martinus Nijhoff Publishers (Kluwer), Dordrecht - Printed in the Netherlands 481

The transition from school to the university under restricted

entry: A Greek tracer study

GEORGE PAPAS 1 & GEORGE PSACHAROPOULOS z IAthens College, Greece; 2The Worm Bank, Washington D.C., USA

Abstract. In this paper we use data from a sample of about 500 high school seniors in 12 schools in the Athens area, followed up one year after graduation, in order to analyze the factors that determine entry into the highly restricted state university system. The analysis documents a very strong social demand for higher education, only a fraction of which is satisfied by the availability of domestic university places. As a result of the restrictions many students go to study abroad or spend at least one extra year in preparation for the highly selective entry examinations. Although attendance at public secondary schools and the domestic university system is free, families spend a sizeable por- tion of their income for the education of their children. The analysis also documents a high degree

of inequity in the distribution of university places, where the offspring of the higher occupational classes have four times the chance of entering university relative to those whose father is a manual worker. The results are discussed in the context of alternative eductional policies that would satisfy the excess demand for higher education in a more efficient and equitable way.

I. Introduction

Greece has one of the most restricted higher education systems in Europe. In recent years, only 18 percent of the relevant age group is enrolled in higher education, a statistic which is the lowest among western European countries with the exception of Portugal.1 The strong demand for higher education has found an outlet abroad. Greece has perhaps the world's record in terms of the number of students it sends abroad. According to Unesco statistics, Greek students studying abroad account for 37 percent of domestic higher education enrollment. (See Appendix Table A-4).

Traditionally, the social demand for higher education in Greece has been very strong. Even among farmers there is a high propensity to see their offspring graduating from the university - the surest way out of the farm and, perhaps, steady public sector employment (Nassiakou, 1981). Every year, there is a strug- gle among secondary school graduates for entry into higher education by means of a set of very competitive national examinations.

In 1985, for example, there were about 149,000 candidates competing for

We are grateful to Tony Halil, Harry Lambropoulos and Maureen Woodhall for useful comments on an earlier draft of this paper. The views expressed here are those of the authors and should not

be attributed to their institutions.

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52,000 places in tertiary education as a whole, which gives an apparent success ratio of 35 percent. However, nearly one half of the candidates were taking the entrance examination for the second or more time, and only one half of the en- trants would enroll in a proper university. The other half of those who succeed in the national entrance examinations would enroll in 3-year Technology Insti- tutes - a new breed of short-cycle tertiary education that was upgraded in 1984 (the former KATEE, or Centers for Higher Technological and Vocational Edu- cation). Thus, the chance that a secondary school graduate will immediately succeed in entering a proper university is 29 percent. In 1985, there were 77,912 first time applicants and 22,930 university places. (Information based on unpub- lished reports by the Greek Ministry of Education.) Statistics are not available on the type of institution really aspired to by the applicant, and on the process of self-selection involved in seeking entry into a short-cycle institution rather than being excluded from tertiary education as a whole.

In this paper we use a specially drawn sample of nearly 500 secondary school seniors, followed up one year after graduation, to analyze how aspirations are formed and what factors lead to university entry. The following section gives a description of the sample. Section III contrasts the students' plans to what they are actually doing one year after high school. Section IV models the sequence of events from family background to successful university entry. Section V examines the labor market perceptions of the students and how well they match reality. Section VI reports the true private cost of secondary and post- secondary studies, and how this is distributed among different groups in the sample population. The final section discusses the findings in terms of possible alternatives to ease the transition from school to the university.

II. Sample overview

A sample was drawn from 12 schools in the greater Athens area, stratified by selectivity of admission (prestige, non-prestige), ownership (public, private) and district (affluent, middle, poor). A baseline questionnaire was administered to the senior class just before graduation in May 1985, and a follow-up questionnaire was mailed to the same studients in early 1986. In all, 482 students complet- ed the baseline questionnaire and 366 responded to the follow-up. The response rate of 76 percent is very respectable and there is no indication that the follow-up sample is biased towards any particular socioeconomic group. For example, the mean number of father's years of schooling in the base sample is 12.6 versus 12.3 in the follow-up.

Appendix Table A-1 gives a summary of key variables in the sample. Thus 43 percent of the students belong to selective schools (Athens College, Peiramatiko and Varvakio) and 46 percent to private schools. In addition to the regular

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school, 63 percent of the students attend "frontisterio" - a cram school variety that has been a salient feature of Greek education for many years. The frontisterio prepares students for the secondary school examinations, and more im- portantly, for the nationwide university entry examinations. There is a lot of ad- verse public sentiment towards frontisterio, often referred to as "parapaideia". Yet the nature of the examination system is such that it has been accepted as a necessary evil. Students spend on average 13 hours per week in frontisterio courses, and also the equivalent of the annual fees of those who attend private schools.

Individual responses and school records permitted the construction of a series of variables for each student on school grades, for example the grade one obtained in the senior class, the various components of the university entry examinations, and the overall score of the candidate in the latter. In addition an especially designed ability test was administered to the students who were in their senior class. The test consisted of 109 items on verbal ability, numerical ability, concrete reasoning and abstract reasoning.

The baseline questionnaire collected information on the student's future plans and aspirations, especially regarding the type of post-secondary institution the graduate would attempt entry, and whether the student would have the possibility to carry out the plans. The student was also questioned on his/her attitudes towards study out of Greece. Thus 82 percent of the respondents stated they would wish to enter the university, and most of them stated they will have the possibility of doing so. The situation is very different regarding foreign studies: Forty-one percent would wish to study abroad, but only 16 percent stated they could do so. The strong propensity toward study abroad is mainly due to the push factor of the restricted domestic educational system. The self-selection towards domestic studies is due to the high cost associated with education out- side Greece. (The following contradiction should be noted at this point: according to article 16 of the Greek Constitution, higher eduction is free and the responsibility of the State. Also, private higher education is prohibited. Yet, as cited above, a substantial number of Greek students study abroad supported by their families.) But regardless of whether students will eventually stay in Greece or go abroad, they spent about one month's family income in fees to frontisterio.

The baseline questionnaire also contained a number of questions aiming at recording the student's labor market perceptions. For example students were asked to estimate the expected earnings of graduates with different hypothetical degrees and the time graduates could expect to remain unemployed after graduation, and before landing a job. Most students seemed to have realistic expectations of what they would earn if they entered the labor market with only a secondary school leaving certificate - their "expected earnings" correspond closely to the actual earnings of their classmates who already had jobs. The students expected to triple their earnings with the post-secondary degree they aspired to.

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Table 1 summarizes key student characteristics by type of secondary school, and whether the student attends frontisterio. Thus, 94 percent of the students in selective schools are males, whereas girls concentrate in non-selective schools. Males also dominate the enrollment in private schools, whereas the sex distribution in public schools is 5 0 - 50. The socioeconomic background of students in selective and private schools differs sharply from their counterparts in non- selective and private schools, e.g., the mean educational attainment of fathers of the former group is 5 years higher relative to the latter, and the ability level is significantly higher among those attending selective and private schools relative to the rest. Students in selective schools aspire three times as much to foreign studies relative to those in non-selective schools. And the incidence of the top two father occupational classes is double among those attending private relative to public schools. Beyond such socioeconomic and aspirations contrast between students in Ihe different types of schools, there is remarkable uniformity regarding the number of hours spent on homework and frontisterio courses.

Among those who responded to the follow-up, only 32 percent managed to enter a university in Greece. Eight percent gained access to 3-year Technology

Table 1. Mean student characteristics by type of school attended

Characteristic Selective Non- Private Public Frontisterio selective

Male (%) 94

Father's education (years) 15

Repeater (%) 2

Ability scorO 56

Senior high school gradO 53

University aspirant (%)2 96

Foreign study aspirant (%)2 24

Father's occupation (%) Executive/managerial 15

Professional/self-employed 58

White collar employee 21

Manual worker 3

Frontisterio hours~week Individual instruction Grouped instruction

Homework hours/day

39 77 50 61

10 15 11 13

13 8 9 7

46 53 47 50

48 52 49 51

66 88 70 84

9 25 9 11

4 12 6 9

34 60 31 48

24 18 27 24

34 6 33 16

3.9 3.7 3.9 3.7 3.8

7.0 9.9 6.3 10.1 8.8

3.2 3.5 3.3 3.4 3.6

1 Grade scores (X) are standardized to a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10, i.e., z-score = 50 + 10(X i - X)/S x.

2 An aspirant is defined as one who stated in the baseline questionnaire that university entry or foreign studies was a possibility (not just a wish).

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Institutes, which are considered inferior (Dragonas and Kostakis, 1986). Anoth- er 8 percent went to post-secondary proprietory schools which have no official university status. Seven percent went to study abroad. And 39 percent were preparing to take the university entry examinations the following year. (Given the restricted access to tertiary education it is very common for a candidate to take the entry exam two, three or even four years in succession.) Only 2 percent of the graduates entered employment directly after high school, and 5 percent classified themselves as unemployed.

The follow-up questionnaire contained again questions aimed at probing the graduates' labor market perceptions. Given the rate of inflation in the few months period between base and follow-up questionnaires, the students gave answers which were consistent with their response to the previous similar questions, i.e. they expect to triple their salaries with the post-secondary degree they will receive.

Among those who are in proprietory institutions in Greece or in foreign universities, annual fees amount to about one month's family income. The very small number of observations of those who work after secondary school precludes in what follows any statistical analysis on this group. But their mean earnings confirm the realistic expectations of the rest on how much they would earn if they were working.

III. Plans and outcomes

Eight out of ten students in the baseline questionnaire declared that they would like to continue their studies at the university. According to the follow-up information, only three out of ten succeeded in doing so. Aspirations and outcomes differ sharply according to the student's background and the type of school attended. As shown in Table 2, males aspire more to university studies and have a more than double chance of entering university than females. (cf, Polydorides, 1985). But females go in higher proportions to the Technological Institutes and non-accredited propriatory schools. (For a well documented account of the rea- sons for the aversion of technical-vocational studies in Greece, see Kassotakis (1981).) Males outweigh females by a factor of 10 regarding studies abroad. Those who attended selective or private high schools have substantially higher chances of entering a university. Frontisterio attendance also boosts university entry, although not dramatically. But perhaps the sharpest contrast arises when aspirations and outcomes are cross tabulated with parental occupation. There is a neat ranking order with the offspring of executive and managerial workers on top of the list and manual workers at the bottom. The former have much higher university aspirations and success rates in entering university, whereas the latter score much lower on both counts. It is also of interest that the highest suc-

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Table 2. Student aspirations and graduate destinations by selected characteristics (percent)

Characteristic University 1986 destination Aspirant in 19851 University Technological Propriatory Foreign

in Greece Institute school student 2

Male 87 41 7 5 10 Female 65 17 11 14 1

Selective school 96 51 6 1 14 Non-selective school 66 16 10 14 1

Private school 88 45 7 7 15 Public school 70 20 9 9 0

Attends frontisterio 84 36 10 7 5

Father's occupation Executive/managerial 90 41 0 2 15 Professional/self

employed 87 42 7 9 10 White collar employee 76 28 9 4 3 Manual worker 58 12 14 11 1

Overall 79 32 8 8 7

Notes: Numbers are probabilities multiplied by 100. E.g., among males in the baseline questionnaire, 87 percent aspired to university entry; among males who responded to the follow-up questionnaire, 41 percent are university students in Greece; and so on. 1 A student was classified as university aspirant if he/she declared that there was a possibility

of entering university after secondary school graduation. 2 Refers to Greek students studying abroad.

cess rate in the Technological Institutes is among the sons and daughters o f man-

ual workers. In fact, not a single secondary school graduate o f manageri-

al/executive father was enrolled in a Technological Institute in the follow-up.

The figures reported above are averages, i.e. they do not control for other varia-

bles students differ. Table 3 reports the results o f a model purpor t ing to isolate

the most impor tan t factors relating to university aspirations and eventually

university entry. The dependent variable in the first two regressions, university aspiration, is a d u m m y variable having a value o f 1 if the student declared in the baseline questionnaire tha t he or she has the possibility o f entering universi-

ty. Most o f the independent variables are also in 0 - 1 d u m m y form, i.e. they have

a value o f 1 if the part icular event applies to the observation, and 0 otherwise. The dependent variables in the other regressions are also probabilities, i.e. the fact that, among the follow-up respondents, the secondary school graduate has succeeded in entering a university in Greece or in a foreign country. Two sets o f regressions have been fitted for each o f the three dependent variables - with

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Table 3. Explaining university aspiration and entry: Logit Model

Variable University aspiration University entry

(1) (2) In Greece Abroad

(3) (4) (5) (6)

Age 0.047 0.057 0.041 (1.20) (1.32) (0.68)

Male 0.135"* 0.150"* 0.145 (2.57) (2.26) (1.49)

Athens born 0.049 0.027 0.187 (0.85) (0.35) (1.71)

Father ' s education 0.014" 0.019" -0.009 (2.02) (2.17) (0.68)

Mother ' s education 0.004 0.002 0.017 (0.47) (0.17) (1.13)

Repeater -0.041 -0.177 - - (0.48) (1.78)

Selective school 0.239** 0.162 0.064 (2.86) (1.72) (0.66)

Private school 0.026 -0.022 0.214"* (0.43) (0.34) (2.53)

High school grade (z) 0.010"* 0.009** 0.049** (4.14) (2.94) (7.95)

Ability score (z) - 0.007 -

(1.77)

Frontisterio - 0.110

(1.41)

Homework time 0.087** 0.107'* -0.071"* (4.61) (4.54) (2.19)

Chi 2 142.5 113.1 186.3

N 447 313 346

Mean dependent 0.81 0.83 0.33

0.069 0.678 0.698 (1.09) (1.61) (1.22)

0.074 1.750 1.607 (0.80) (0.00) (0.00)

0.165 -0.662 -0.279 (1.45) (0.81) (0.27)

-0.008 0.061 0.015 (0.59) (0.54) (0.09)

0.020 0.065 0.115 (1.35) (0.51) (0.66)

0.082 16.95 16.44 (0.83) (0.01) (0.01)

0.119 - - - - (1.42)

0.045** -0.094** -0.112" (6.66) (2.71) (2.08)

-0.002 - 0.143"* (0.48) (2.62)

0.111 -0.438 -0.268 (1.33) (0.75) (0.35)

-0.040 -0.038 0.008 (1.12) (0.18) (0.02)

130.3 80.6 64.2

243 346 342

0.35 0.07 0.07

Notes: Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios. * P < 0 . 0 5 , ** P < 0 . 0 1

Independent variable not included in the model - - Logit coefficient inestimable because independent variable is full predictor of outcome,

e.g. no repeater entered university in Greece or went abroad.

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and without the ability score as a factor affecting aspirations and university entry. The reason for the odd-numbered regressions is that the ability variable has many missing values.

The fact that the dependent variable is limited to 0 or 1 values dictates the use of a maximum likelihood estimation procedure. The results reported in Ta- ble 3 were obtained by means of a logit model, where the coefficients refer to the "marginal effect" of each independent variable on the dependent, estimated at the mean value of the predicted probability. (See Psacharopoulos and Soume- lis, 1979, p. 172).

On the plans side, the following factors are statistically significant regarding university aspiration: Male sex, father's education, attendance at a selective school, high school grade, and the amount of time spent on homework. The rela- tionship between the dependent and independent variables is not a strictly causal one, e.g., prior university aspiration may in fact result in a student attending a selective school or spending more time in homework. See following section. Focusing on the first regression, the results are interpreted as follows.

Males, other things being equal, have a 14 percentage points higher chance than females to aspire to university entry. Each year of father's education boosts the propensity to aspire to university entry by 1.4 percentage points. The school's selectivity has the largest marginal effect on university aspiration: 24 percentage points. Scoring one standard deviation higher in the secondary school examination raises university aspiration by 10 percentage points. And each extra hour of homework adds 9 percentage points to the propensity towards university studies.

The inclusion of the ability variable in regression (2) steals some of the effect of the school's selectivity, where both variables have the expected positive effect, although none is statistically significant at the 5 percent probability level.

Regressions (3) to (6) have been fitted to those who responded to the follow-up, hence the lower N's. There are only three factors that statistically relate to entry in a university in Greece: attendance at a private school, high school grade and homework time. The inclusion of the ability variable in regression (4) reduces the number of factors to two, i.e. private school attendance (with a marginal effect of 12 percentage points on the probability of successful university entry) and high school grade (with a marginal effect of 5 percentage points per one extra standard deviation).

The fact that the student's grade in the senior high school class is a factor determining university entry should not be surprising - such grade accounts for 12 percent in the total set of points in the national examinations system determining university entry. Counter to expectation, frontisterio attendance is not statistically related to university entry - probably a reflection of the fact that the frontisterio effect is being picked up by the senior high school grade. It is also of interest that among the (partly overlapping) factors of selective and private

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schools, only the latter is significantly related to university entry. Turning to the last pair of regressions in Table 3, there is one single factor ex-

~,~ainirtg who goes to study abroad: the bad performers in terms of high school e---el aae. The addition o f the ability variable in the last regression reveals that, while high school grade is still statistically significant, it is the more able who go to study abroad. This is an alarming finding, given that many of these students will never return to Greece after completion of their unversity studies.

IV. From family background to the university

The analysis presented in the last section fails to distinguish between the different steps that lead to university aspirations and eventual university entry.

The results thus far suggest that there are four main variables that ultimately determine university entry: the student's family background, the student's aspiration towards university studies, the type of secondary school attended, and the senior high school grade. Such variables operate in a temporal sequence, as depicted in Figure 1. First, the student's family background determines whether an individual aspires to university entry in the first place. It is expected that students from more educated families will have a higher propensity towards university studies relative to the rest. Second, family background and university aspirations jointly determine the type of secondary school attended. Families that have already instilled in the student university aspirations will attempt to place

Table 4. Path model equations

R 2

UNIVPOSS = 0.326 SF 0.107

(6.46)

SELECT = 0.478 SF + 0.172 UNIVPOSS 0.312

(10.18) (3.66)

ZSENGRD = 0.027 SF + 0.267 UNIVPOSS + 0.187 SELECT 0.150

(0.46) (5.02) (3.14)

UNIVSTUD = 0,034 SF + 0.027 UNIVPOSS + 0.192 SELECT + 0.494 ZSENGRD 0.364

(0.66) (0.54) (3.66) (10.64)

Notes:

Legend:

Model fitted within the sub-group of follow-up respondents (N = 352).

Regression coefficients are standardized betas.

Numbers in parenthesis are t-ratios,

UNIVPOSS = University aspirant

SF = Father's years of schooling SELECT = Selective secondary school

ZSENGRD = Senior high school class grade (z-score)

UNIVSTUD = Succeeded in entering university in Greece immediately after high school

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R 2 ~ . 364

N ~ 352

. 1 9 2

Fig. 1. The determinants of university entrance (based on Table 4).

him/her in the most suitable type of school - e.g. a selective one - in order to maximize the chances of later success in the university. The intermediate variable in this case is the student's high school grade.

The fitted equations of such a model are shown in Table 4 and the coefficients of each step in the path model appear on the arrows in Figure 1. Since these coefficients are standardized betas, a comparison of their size shows the relative strength of each antecedent variable in determining the one which follows.

Family background has been measured by the father's year of schooling. University aspiration reflects the fact that a student declared that it was possible to enter university after graduation. School type has been measured by the selectivity of the secondary school. High school grade is the senior class grade in z- score. And the eventual success variable has a value of 1 if the student has entered university in Greece after high school and 0 otherwise. (Given the aggregate nature of this analysis the functions have been fitted by means of ordinary least

squares rather than logit.) The model has of course been fitted only to the group of follow-up respondents. The results are very similar when the model is fitted to the whole group of students because, as mentioned above, the follow-up selectivity bias was minimal.

The four ultimate independent variables explain near one third of the variation in university success. There are three important paths in this sequence. Fami- ly background (as measured by father's education) very strongly influences university aspirations and the type of secondary school attended (selective school). And, as already documented in the previous section, high school grade determines university success. One very important finding in this path model

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is that family background has an indirect influence on university success via university aspirations and choice of the type of secondary school. The direct effect of family background on successful university entry is statistically insig- nificant (path coefficient of 0.034 in Figure 1). The same observation applies to the effect of family background on high school grade.

V. Labor market perceptions

All students in the baseline questionnaire were asked two hypothetical questions in order to probe their labor market perceptions. First, how much they would expect to earn if they entered the labor market immediately after graduation (Ys) and second, how much they expect they would earn if they had the post- secondary degree they aspired to (Yh). Students' answers were very consistent regarding the first question. The mean reported earnings of 34,000 drs per month roughly corresponds to what the few working students were actually paid in the follow-up. The official minimum wage in the Summer 1985 was 33,576 drs per month. For an analysis of the dim employment prospects facing someone who remains with a secondary school degree as the highest educational qualification, see Gedeon and Psacharopoulos (1982). As shown in Table 5, the greatest variation in this statistic refers to the male-female split of the sample, females expect- ing to earn significantly less than males. (For an analysis of male-female pay differentials in Greece see Kanellopoulos, 1982, and Psacharopoulos, 1983).

The greatest variation in expected earnings refers to the post-secondary degree. As shown in Table 5, females, those attending non-selective schools or public schools, and the children of manual workers expect to earn about one-half relative to males, attendees of selective or private schools, and those with fathers in the higher occupational classes. (Respondents were emphatically asked to abstract from inflation in reporting their expected future earnings).

The two variables on expected earnings, with and without a degree, along with the information on the direct cost associated with post-secondary studies, can be used to calculate a proxy of the expected private rate of return to the individual from investment in post-secondary education (rh),

(Yh - Y~) r h - -

S (Ys) + Ch'

where S refers to the normal number of years for the completion of post- secondary studies aspired to, e.g., 4 years for a first degree, and Ch to the direct cost of tertiary education. Since the latter is unknown to the student, it was as- sumed that if he or she enters the tertiary level, the private expenditure incurred in the last year of secondary school would be maintained. This is not unreasona-

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Table 5. Labor market perceptions by selected sample characteristics.

Characteristic Expected earnings

With secondary With aspired school d e g r e e post-secondary

degree

Expected rate of return (percent)

(Drs/month)

Ys Yh rh

Male 36,491 109,950 18.3 Female 30,218 52,394 8.4

Selective school 35,667 119,844 19.3 Non-selective school 33,057 65,406 11.2

Private school 35,449 115,796 18.6 Public school 33,132 66,252 11.6

Attends Frontisterio 33,773 101,538 12.3 Does not attend Frontisterio 35,017 84,513 19.8

Post-secondary aspiration Propriatory school 30,667 62,333 13.9 Technological Institute 35,000 66,429 8.6 University, B.A. 31,909 76,895 12.6 Post-graduate degree 39,095 133,266 17.8 Foreign studies 42,067 211,333 33.6

Father's occupation Executive/managerial 35,682 95,314 16.0 Pro fessional/self-ernployed 35,360 100,038 14.9 White collar employee 31,845 93,363 16.6 Manual worker 33,013 52,868 11.5

Overall 1 34,175 90,088 14.8

1 Mean earnings differ from those reported in the Appendix because of listwise missing values.

ble, in the sense that the frontisterio expense in the last year of secondary school represents a direct private cost incurred for the purpose of university entry. Of course, such an assumption leads to an underestimate of the expected returns to those who will enroll in the free domestic university system, and an overestimate for those who will study abroad. For an application of the same technique to a 1974 sample, see Psacharopoulos and Soumelis (1979).

As shown in the last column of Table 5, the expected rate of return varies wide- ly by the student's background. Thus females expect an 8 percent rate versus 18 percent for males. Those attending selective or private schools expect nearly double the rate of those in non-selective schools or public schools. Those whose father is in an executive/managerial occupation expect to realize a 16 percent

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Table 6. Total annual education-related expenditure as percent of family income.

Characteristic Baseline Follow-up

Selective school Non-selective school

Private school

Public school

Father's occupation . Executive/managerial

Professional/self-employed White collar employee Manual worker

Type o f post-secondary institution University in Greece Technology Institute Propriatory school Foreign student

Overall

18.4 16.8 18.6 17.1

20.2 18.1 17.5 15.4

18.5 17.5

17.4 15.8 19.6 - - ~ 15.6 18.6 21.3

_a 11.5 - 1 9 . 2

- 18.7 - 35.5

18.6 16.9

a Not applicable.

return, while those whose father is a manual worker expect to realize only 12 percent.

VI. How free is "free education"?

In Greece, as in many other countries, the state attempts to provide education free of charge. In fact, it is explicitly started in article 16 of the country's constitution that education at the tertiary level is the responsibility of the state.

The baseline and follow-up questionnaires raised information on all education-related expenditure by the student. (See Appendix Table A-3). Such expenditure is substantial. As shown in Table 6 it accounts for nearly one fifth of family income. Even allowing for income underreporting, attendance of a tertiary level institution in Greece is by no means free. What is worth noting, is that the educational expenditure in the follow-up sample represents a higher burden on the budget of a student from a manual worker family, relative to students with fathers in better paid occupations. Although the intention of the policymaker must have been the assistance of students from low income families, the equal treatment of students from the two kinds of origin, i.e., zero fees for both, has led to an unequal effective treatment of low income students because of the incidental costs of schooling.

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VII. Discussion

In this paper we have documented some issues surrounding the transition from

school to the university and drawn some lessons which, beyond Greece, also may be applicable to other countries.

The first point we documented is that the demand for post-secondary studies

at the university level is extremely strong. Over eighty percent of the senior high school class wish to pursue their studies at this level, and 76 percent are confident they will be able to do so.

However, the pledge to free higher education combined with the necessarily limited public finances, impose a de facto restriction to the number of students who can be admitted to domestic universities. Only 32 percent managed to do so in the cohort under study, and this is about double the success rate relative to the country as a whole (because of the urban nature of the sample).

Restricted entry has increased the stake associated with entrance to the university. Students expect on average a sizeable rate of return on their investment of four years foregone earnings plus incidental expenses related to university studies. Such a stake, along with the social prestige associated with university education, makes families willing to invest a considerable amount of resources to make sure that their offspring will succeed in the national entrance examinations. This is by means of attending a selective or private school and preparatory classes. Free education, even in public secondary schools or stateuniversities, is by no means free. A little less than one fifth of family income is on average

devoted to the education of o n e child. Those who have not succeeded on their first trial, or those who feel they may

not be able to succeed in entering a domestic university, basically have three alter-

natives. First, to spend one extra year in preparatory courses and attempt a second time the entrance examinations - nearly 40 percent of our follow-up sample did so. Second, to accept entrance at the less prestigious Technology Institutes or non-accredited private post-secondary institutions - 16 percent in our sample did so. Or go abroad and add themselves to the record number of Greek foreign students. Seven percent in our sample followed the latter route at a personal

expenditure four times higher than if they had remained in the country. Such expenditure of course drains foreign exchange.

The allocation of the highly prized university places is very inequitable and favors high income groups. Perhaps because of the greater ability to finance preparatory classes and enter selective or private schools, sons and daughters of managers, executives and professionals are four times as likely to enter the university on their first trial relative to the offspring of manual workers. The latter are mainly channelled to the low prestige Technology Institutes. The effective educational cost burden (as a proportion of family income) is higher for the offspring of manual workers than those whose fathers are professionals.

495

Perhaps the overall lesson one can draw from this case study, is that when students and their families - because of market conditions or social prestige - place a high value on a level or type of education, there is very little rationing of places can do to contain the demand. Excess demand for education will be eventually satisfied, one way or another. Artificial restrictions can only hamper the adjustment process and thus lead to inefficiencies and inequities, as those documented above.

Under such conditions, one possible policy option might be the institutional liberalization of accreditation and even the tolerance of fee paying universities in Greece. A fee paying university does not have to be a privately run institution. Even a small contribution, by students who can afford it, to the finances of a public university can enhance the efficiency and equity of the system as a whole (World Bank, 1986). As we have seen, a large number of students actually study privately or attend universities abroad, so if such a policy option were followed, the students and the foreign exchange would remain in the country (See Sideris, 1981). This would also reduce the brain drain problem - Greece has been especially subjected to this in the last decades. Another possibility might be the institution of an open university system which, hopefully, would reduce the unit social cost of university "attendance". (For a discussion of such possibility see Pa- pas, 1985).

If such liberalization were followed, the limited public finances could be better targetted to the really needy groups in the population, rather than the present system of indiscriminant subsidization. For example, students from higher income families could be asked to contribute to the cost of their education, while the sons and daughters of manual workers and farmers would receive a subsidy in order tO attend university.

Apart from the limited public finances, one argument that has been used in Greece and elsewhere for limiting university entry, is that the country would not be able to absorb additional graduates. (For an early attempt to match Greece's development prospects to the number of graduates from the educational system see Williams (1965).) Although such an argument might be valid in a closed and isolated economy (it is difficult to suggest an example), it hardly applies to to- day's world where mobility between occupations regions and countries is higher than ever before.

Greece's recent entry to the European Economic Community is expected to reinforce such movements in the future. In any case, the graduates will be produced abroad if domestic university capacity is limited. Under a more open doors regime, the stake associated with university entry will be reduced, and social demand will adjust to a new equilibrium where someone voluntarily decides whether to seek university entry or not. Such equilibrium seems to have been reached in more advanced, and open, university systems like those in Western Europe and North America.

496

Notes

1. For reviews of various aspects of the Greek higher education system see Chaniotis (1968), Gavroglou (1981), Pantelouris (1978), Psacharopoulos (1981) and (1985), Psacharopoulos and Kazamias (1980) and (1985), Soumelis (1978), Tsoukalas (1981), and Wasser (1981).

References

Chaniotis, G. (1968). "The Situation of Universities in Greece." Minerva 6 (2): 163-184. Dragonas, T. and Kostakis, A., (1986). "Defining Educational Environments: the case of the Athens

Technological Educational Institute (TEI)," Higher Education l15P: 651-665. Gavroglou, K. (1981). "Certain Features of Higher Education in Greece and the Failure of the At-

tempts to Reform it." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 8:95-108. Gedeon, S. and Psacharopoulos, G. (1982). "Unemployment, Education and Self-Selection: The

Case of a Bank Entrance Examination." European Journal of Education 17: 81-86. Kanellopoulos, C. N. (1982). "Male-female Pay Differentials in Greece." Greek Economic Review

4 (August): 222-241. Kassotakis, M. (1981). "Technical and Vocational Education in Greece and the Attitudes of Greek

Youngsters towards it." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 8: 81-93. Nassiakou, M., (1981). "The Tendency toward Learning in the Greek Countryside." Journal of the

Hellenic Diaspora 8:63 -69. Pantelouris, E. M. (1978). "Greek Orthodoxy." Nature 271 (2 February): 394-395. Papas, G., (1985). Distance Education: A Possibility for Greece. Athens, 1985 (in Greek). Polydorides, G. K. (1985). "Women's Participation in the Greek Educational System." Comparative

Education 21: 229-240. Psacharopoulos, G. (1982). "Earnings and Education in Greece, 1960-1977," European Economic

Review 17. Psacharopoulos, G. (1985). "Greece: System of Education," in Husen, T. and Postlethwaite, N. eds.,

International Encyclopedia of Education: Research and Studies. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985: 2079-2085.

Psacharopoulos, G. (1983). "Sex Discrimination in the Greek Labor Market." Modern Greek Studies 1(2) October.

Psacharopoulos, G. (1981). "The Determinants of the Social Demand for Education," in Volume in Honour of E. Papanoutsos. Athens (in Greek).

Psacharopoulos, G. and Kazamias, A. (1985). Education and Development in Greece: A Socioeco- nomic Study of Tertiary Education, Greek Center for Social Research (in Greek).

Psacharopoulos, G. and Kazamias, A. (1980). "Student Activism in Greece: A Historical and Empiri- cal Analysis." Higher Education 9: 127- 38.

Psacharopoulos, G. and Soumelis, C. (1979). "A Quantitative Analysis of the Demand for Higher Education." Higher Education 8: 159-177.

Sideris, A. (1981). "Some Information about Private Education in Greece." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 8: 55-61.

Soumelis, C. (1978). "Case Study: Greece," in K. Harnqvist, ed. Individual Demand for Education. Paris: OECD: 247-334.

Tsoukalas, C. (1981). "Some Aspects of 'Overeducation' in Modern Greece." Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora 8: 109-121.

Unesco, Statistical Yearbook 1986, Unesco.

497

Wasser, H. (1981). "A Survey of Recent Trends in Greek Higher Education." Journal of the Hellenic

Diaspora 8: 85-95. Williams, G. (1965). "Planning Models for the Calcualtion of Educational Requirements for Eco-

nomic Development: Greece," in Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, Econometric Models of Education: Some Applications. Paris: OECD: 77-93.

World Bank, (1986). The Financing of Education in Developing Countries: An Exploration of Poli- cy Issues. The World Bank.

Appendix

Appendix Table A-1. Means and standard deviations of variables in the sample.

Characteristic Mean Standard Valid deviation cases

(N)

A. BASELINE QUESTIONNAIRE (N=482)

Personal Age 18.00 0.71 (482) Male 0.62 0.48 (482) Athens born 0.85 0.35 (482) Number of siblings 1.34 0.66 (405)

Family Own house 0.78 0.41 (482) Rooms per household member 1.43 0.57 (399) Father's years of schooling 12.4 4.61 (477) Mother's years of schooling i 1.1 3.98 (479) Family income (Drs/month) 156,605 314,243 (319)

School Selective 0.43 0.50 (482) Private 0.46 0.50 (482) Attends frontisterio (cram school) 0.63 0.48 (482) Individual cram school hours/week 3.81 2.2 (148) Grouped cram school hours/week 8.83 4.0 (195) Homework hours/day) 3.33 1.5 (478) Has repeated a grade 0.09 0.28 (481)

School expenditures (Drs/year) School fees 154,155 35,067 (219) Cram school fees 134,209 118,652 (330) Other private lessons 93,182 137,173 (164)

Grades (Non-standardized) Ability test 1/ 53.4 17.7 (340) Senior high school class 2/ 16.9 1.7 (462) University entrance: Composition 2/ 12.2 3.2 (452) University entrance: Mathematics 2/ 11.6 6.2 (313) Overall university entrance score 3/ 1,662 183 (148)

498

Appendix Table A-1. Continued.

Characteristic Mean Standard deviation

Valid cases (N)

Aspirations Wishes university entrance Possibility of university entrance Wishes to study abroad Possibility of study abroad

Labor market perceptions Expected earnings with secondary degree (Drs/month) Expected earnings with aspired post-secondary degree Actual earnings if ever worked Expected job search time with secondary degree (months) Expected job search time with post-secondary degree

B. FOLLOW-UP QUESTIONNAIRE (N= 366)

Status University student in Greece Technology Institute student Private post-secondary non-university student Studying abroad Preparing for second entry trial Working Unemployed

Labor market perceptions Foregone earnings while in post-secondary studies

(Drs/month) Expected earnings with post-secondary degree Expected months search with secondary degree Expected months search with post-secondary degree

Post-secondary school expenditure Fees (Drs/year) Books (Drs/year)

Monthly salary with secondary degree (Drs) Hours worked per week Days searched to find job

0.82 0.79 0.41 0.16

36,071 92,374 33,603 7.8 8.9

0.32 0.08 0.08 0.07 0.39 0.02 0.05

35,911 95,609 4.80 7.26

167,792 14,249

32,857 31 25

0.39 0.41 0.49 0.16

15,643 98,131 28,091 9.6

11.6

0.47 0.27 0.27 0.25 0.48 0.14 0.22

10,918 58,199 5.50

10.70

186,347 16,302

19,123 12 34

(482) (482) (419) (444)

(382) (398) (179) (404) (398)

(366) (366) (366) (366) (366) (366) (366)

(180) (179) (180) (182)

(53) (181)

(14) (14) (14)

Note: 1/Max score: 109. 2/Max score: 20. 3/Max score: 2000.

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129

124,

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154,

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23

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321

229,

539

375,

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205,

983

281,

650

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348

219,

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279,

333

890,

417

288,

492

Not

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ndiv

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l ex

pend

itur

e it

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do n

ot a

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o th

e to

tal

beca

use

not

all

item

s ar

e ap

plic

able

to

all

stud

ents

.

Ap

pen

dix

Tab

le A

-4.

Edu

cati

onal

sta

tist

ics:

Sel

ecte

d E

uro

pea

n c

ount

ries

.

Cou

ntry

Y

ear

Tot

al

Dom

esti

c N

um

ber

of

For

eign

dom

esti

c te

rtia

ry

fore

ign

stud

ents

te

rtia

ry

enro

llm

ent 1

st

uden

ts 2

rati

o 3

enro

llm

ent

rati

o (p

erce

nt)

Gre

ece

1981

87

,476

18

32

,145

36

.7

Fra

nce

1982

94

2,06

9 28

11

,477

1.

2 G

erm

any

19

83

1,31

1,47

5 29

20

,195

1.

5

Ital

y 19

84

1,17

3,91

0 26

14

,403

1.

2 P

ortu

gal

1982

71

,697

12

3,

945

5.5

Spa

in

1983

59

4,24

5 26

8,

005

1.3

Sw

eden

19

84

113,

348

38

2,52

4 2.

2

U.K

. 19

82

413,

000

20

15,3

09

3.7

Sou

rce:

Bas

ed o

n U

nesc

o St

atis

tica

l Y

earb

ook,

19

86.

Not

es:

1 N

um

ber

of

Gre

ek s

tude

nts

stud

ying

in

Gre

ek U

nive

rsit

ies

as p

erce

nt o

f th

e 1

8-2

4

age

grou

p in

the

pop

ulat

ion.

2

Nat

iona

ls o

f th

e co

un

try

lis

ted

in t

he f

irst

co

lum

n o

f th

e ta

ble

stud

ying

in

anot

her

coun

try.

3

Nu

mb

er o

f na

tion

als

of

the

coun

try

list

ed i

n th

e fi

rst

colu

mn

of

the

tabl

e st

udyi

ng i

n an

othe

r co

untr

y, a

s pe

rcen

t o

f do

mes

tic

univ

ersi

ty e

nrol

lmen

t.

Documents

The transition from school to the university under restricted entry: A Greek tracer study