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132 THE MODERN LAW REVIEW VOL. 28of the original text has
already disappeared. Further changes are promisedfor, "with all the
changes that have been made, the present edition stillreflects only
partially the transition that is taking place in internationallaw"
(p. xi).I t has obviously oeen one of the editor's main aims to
retain the characterof Brierly as an elementary guide. Opinions
must di1fer on where, inpursuance of such a policy, to draw the
line with regard to dtation ofliterature and discussion of
particular problems. I t seems to the reviewerthat having raised
the question of Austria's membership of the United
NatioMImmediately after explaining Switzerland's reason for
refusing to join (p. 131)the editor ought to have explained
Austria's view of its obligations or atleast cited the relevant
literature. Again, should not some reference have beenmade to
Professor Johnson's article on "Prescription" (British Yea,.book
ofInternational Law, 1960, p. 332) in the course of the editor's
rewrittten sectionon that topic (pp. 167-171)? Would a reference in
the section on the equalityof states to Professor Boutros Ghali's
lectures in (1960) 9 Recueil del cou,."be out of place?
No more than the original author can the present editor be
accused of beln@:an idealist, unaware of the realities of the
political situation. He is notafraid to say that the methods of
government and economic standards ofstatcs critical of the colonial
system" fan below those of the colonial regimeswhich they
criticise" (p. 179). Elsewhere he writes of states which "try
toavoid responsibilities for corrupt or incompetent administration
by exaggeratedemphasis on the rights supposed to be inherent in
their independent status"(p . 278). But does not realism compel the
admission that Russia is not theonly state to use the veto? The
action of Britain and France at the time ofthe Suez incident is
mentioned in the chapter on international disputes butnowhere
referred to in the discussion of the Security Council in Chapter
Three.Obviously of particular interest are the views of Sir
Humphrey on thelegality of the resort to force in modern
international law. I t is a littledisappointing that in discussing
the law relating to treaties the editor statesmerely that duress
does not invalidate consent and does not consider thl"possibility
that treaties resulting from an unlawful resort to force may
bevoid. (This point is discussed, with extensive references to the
relevantIiteratul'e, by Brownlie, International Law ancl the Ulle
of Force by State",p. 404.) Equally disappointing is the avoidance
of the question of thecompatibility of NATO with the United Nations
Charter; .. there has beensome controversy" (p. 394). The reader is
not given the necessary referencesto track down the controversy for
himself. The main problems discussed ,'itsome length are the
continuing legality of self help, the meaning of Article Inand the
effect of the Corfu ChanneZ judgment. Sir Humphrey Waldock
arguesconvincingly that self defence remains an independent right
rooted in generalinternational law; after discussing the problem of
defming armed attack andthe possibility of an anticipatory resort
to force he concludes that the Charterhas left the scope of the
right to resort to self defence in some uncertainty.The Corfu
Channel case is explained as l a ~ i n g down the rule that a state
mayforcibly affirm it s legal rights against an unlawful attempt to
prevent theirexercise provided that the other party was unwilling
to resort to pacificmeans of settlement. Both points may fairly be
considered open to argument:nonetheless in the present state of
international law it s e e m ~ difficult to denythe force of the
learned editor's "iews. PAUJ. JACKSON.THE TRIAL 0]," MARIE BESNARD.
'fold by herself. Translated by
DENISE FOLUOT. With a preface by SYBILLE BEDFORD.rLondon:
Heinemann, 1968. 222 pp. 25s. net.]Two years ago, in her book The
Faces of Justice, Mrs. Sybille Bedfordwrote of the ponderous and
harsh formalism which had struck her so
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.JAN. 1965 REVIEWS 133un favourably in the procedure before the
French Assize Courts and filledher with misgivings. Marie Desnard's
own story of her twelve years' strugglefor life against the
seemingly inhuman machinery of (what can only withan effort be
described as) justice, which she introduces with great sympathyand
insight, has seen her worst fears confirmed. Accused of poisoning
noJess than thirteen people, including her mother and her two
husbands, thiscountry woman from the Poitou saw herself faced with
a spate of rumour,hearsay and prejudice which might well have
overwhelmed a less sturdy soul.Even if the worst was ultimately
avoided, this "near-miscarriage of justice"as Mrs. Bedford calls it
was already a grave miscarriage of justice, sincethe i1mocent
victim was fifty-seven months in prison and in jeopardy of herlife
for more than a dozen years. I t is a classic instance where all
the knownweaknesses of French trials: the endlcss delays and
adjournments, theundue reliance on expert witnesses and not least
the terrible urge to obtainconfessions were all combined with
devastating effect. The public indignationaroused by this cwuae
celebre and Marie Besnard's artless account of herexperience will,
it is hoped, preserve France from a repetition of such ashameful
spectacle. H. A. l-1AMl>lELMANN.
ENTSCHEIDUNGEN DES BUNDESVERFASSUNGSGERICHTS. Edited bythe
Judges of the Bundesverfassungsgericht. [Tiibingen:T. C. B. Mohr
(Paul Siebeck). Vol. 10, 1960. viii and 441 pp.;Vol. II, 1961. viii
and 485 pp.; Vol. 12, 1962. xi and 456 pp.;Vol. 13, 1968. ix and
456 pp.;. Vol. 14, 1963. viii and 384 pp.]
THE last five volumes of decisions of the Federal German
Constitutional Courtillustrate the growing importance of the
court's work for the economic lifeof the country and the increasing
tendency on the part of practitioners whos('original field of work
does not readily lead them into the sphere of constitutional
arguments to apply to the Constitutional Court for redress
againstunusual hardships resulting from ill-considered legislative
provisions. Thusthe Feldmtihle-Vrteil (Volume a, p. 263 et. seq.)
contains a well justifiedcriticism of the Act on Changes in the
Structure of Stock Companies ofNovember 12, 1956. This Act enables
a sharellolder who owns more than75 per cent. of the capital of a
company to reorganise the company hy passinga resolution to the
effect that the entire assets of the company may be transferred to
the majority shareholder subject to certain rights of
compensationfor the expropriated minorities. These rules apply by
analogy where themajority shareholder is a partnership. The
Feldmiihle Aktiengesellschaft wasformed in November 1959. From the
beginning two of its shareholders heldapproximately 58 per cent.
and 22 per cent. of the capital, respectively. Thesetwo majority
shareholders then formed a new company which, of course, nowowned
about 79 per cent. of the capital of the Feldmiihle A.G. and
promptly.i.e., no more than five weeks after the formation of
Feldmiihle A.G., decidedto transfer the capital to thc new company.
The minority shareholders wereto receive a compensation which
amounted to no more than 90 per cent. ofthe current price of the
shares at the stock exchange. The Local Court atDiisseldorf, to
which an application had been made for the registration of
th"change in the Commercial Register, submitted the matter to the
CnnstitutionalCourt in order to enable the Court to consider
whether the Act of 1956 wascompatible with the basic constitutional
guarantee of property rights andequality before the law. The
Constitutional Court held that the objectionswhich could be raised
against the Act of 1956 were not sufficiently grave tojustify
holding the Act to be unconstitutional but recommcnded some of
theprovisions in the Act for urgent reconsideration by the
legislature. Unfortunately judicia.l recommendations are, as
experience in this country shows.frequently disrejl.'arded l1y
those to whom they nr(' addressee'!. Invest()rs at
