NWC 2003D

THE UNITED STATES NAVAL WAR COLLEGE

JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT

A Primer for the Joint Enabling Capabilities Command (JECC)

by

Professor Patrick C. Sweeney

9 February 2015

This work was cleared for public release; distribution is unlimited.

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INTENTIONALLY BLANK

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Background1

One of the challenges faced by most joint task force (JTF) commanders when establishing a JTF

headquarters (HQ) during a crisis has been the need to form a cohesive and informed joint

organization that is often built upon an existing single Service HQ. The very nature of most

crisis operations demands that the JTF transition quickly from a Service-centric HQ, which

might have been completely unfocused on the emerging crisis, to a smooth running joint

organization fully prepared to participate in the combatant commander’s (CCDR) planning

effort and the deployment/employment of the joint forces under its control (see Figure 1). In

fact, a study performed by the RAND Corporation of past JTF formations found that 70 percent

of the JTFs had less than 42 days of planning time before their forces were engaged.2

As one can

imagine, this challenge has proven to be problematic. Figure 2 reflects the increasing frequency

of the requirement to form a JTF and Figure 3 offers a perspective of the performance lag

Figure 1: Time Compression to Form a JTF

experienced by most JTFs as individual augmentees—from a variety of Services and

specialties—trickle into immature HQ that are simultaneously attempting to plan for the

deployment/ employment of its joint forces.

1 A special thanks to the JECC. Much of the information in this Primer came from the JECC Command Overview

briefing. 2

Standing Up a More Capable Joint Task Force HQ (http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_briefs/RB9625.html)

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The generic force readiness model in

Figure 4 portrays the anticipated status

of any Service HQ within a combatant

command designated to be capable of

serving as a JTF. Figure 4 depicts the

performance typically associated with

forming a JTF HQ in an ad hoc

manner, compared to the projected

readiness levels and performance of a

Service HQ that is designated to

become a JTF-capable HQ and

initiates pre-crisis readiness

preparations. The model can be

tailored for each designated

Service HQ based on various

factors, such as the area of

responsibility in which the JTF-

capable HQ is formed and

existing Service force

generation cycles and materiel

fielding schedules.

Figure 2: Requirements for JTF HQ from 2001 - 2011

Figure 3. Legacy JTF Performance vs. Desired Performance

Standing Joint Task Force HQ History Historically, some geographic combatant commands (GCC) developed ad hoc teams from their

respective commands’ staffs that could temporarily join a JTF HQ as it was forming in order to

assist in the maturation process. Frequently, these subject matter experts from the theater

commander’s staff would only remain at the JTF HQ for a short time since their billets were

gapped at the combatant command (CCMD) during their absence.

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Figure 4. Force Readiness Model

During MILLENNIUM CHALLENGE 2002, a combination joint field training exercise and

experiment, U.S. Joint Forces Command (USJFCOM) experimented with a concept to mitigate

this lag in JTF performance through the employment of a small cadre of officers deployed from

the combatant command to the JTF HQ in a more formalized manner. This provisional concept

was named the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ)-Prototype. As one of the successful

outcomes of this event, the Defense Planning Guidance for Fiscal Year 2004-2009, May 2002,

directed all GCCs to establish SJFHQs no later than FY 2005. On 16 December 2003, the

Secretary of Defense (SecDef) directed the GCCs to reprogram 58 billets to establish their

SJFHQs. Later, to avoid confusion over capability, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS)

Manual 5125.01, “Baseline Organization and Functions for a Standing Joint Forces HQ

(SJFHQ)-Core Element (CE)” was published. It clarified the small element’s true capacity—an

SJFHQ-Core Element; not a full JTF HQ. The SJFHQ-CE provided the GCC with a trained, standing joint element specifically organized

to accelerate the transition of Service operational HQ to a JTF HQ.3

SJFHQ-CE personnel

provided knowledge of the combatant command HQ, as well as expertise in JTF HQ planning

and execution processes. They were trained in a joint environment. The SJFHQ-CE enabled

quick establishment of a JTF HQ, capable of increasing the core staff’s (normally a single

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The following description is an extract from U.S. Joint Forces Command, “Chapter 17. Standing Joint Force

Headquarters Core Element,” in Common Joint Task Force Headquarters Standing Operating Procedure, 12 Jan

2009 (https://jdeis.js.mil/jdeis/jel/jtfguide/sop_index.htm accessed 16/03/2009).

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Service HQ) ability to conduct joint operation planning. The SJFHQ-CE also provided a rapid

infusion of that knowledge, based on situational awareness and understanding, into the core

staff’s HQ. When appropriately augmented, an SJFHQ-CE could form a small, short-duration

JTF HQ. If the SJFHQ-CE became the core for the JTF, it already had situational awareness and

understanding of the crisis. However, regardless of the option employed, the SJFHQ-CE

personnel would remain linked to those agencies and organizations involved in pre-crisis

planning.

While the SJFHQ-CE concept appears clear-cut, its actual implementation in the field did not

result in a homogeneous organizational structure. Initially envisioned as a stand-alone

organization led by a flag officer within the combatant command HQ, each CCDR ultimately

tailored the SJFHQ-CE to meet the unique needs of the command. In some cases, the members

of the SJFHQ-CE were fully integrated among the remainder of the CCDR’s staff, while in other

cases they were found to be a semi-autonomous organization within the combatant command

HQ. With that said, SJFHQ-CEs were employed multiple times after the implementation of the

concept. Figure 5 offers a partial list of past SJFHQ-CE deployments.

Figure 5. Sampling of Previous SJFHQ-CE Deployments

Joint Enabling Capabilities Command History Before its disestablishment, USJFCOM, while not a GCC, maintained its own pair of SJFHQ-

CEs as a means for augmenting deployed SJFHQ-CEs and/or backfilling multiple JTF

requirements within a single area of responsibility (AOR). For instance, U.S. Central Command,

which never established its own SJFHQ-CE, relied heavily upon USJFCOM’s SJFHQ-CE

capabilities to establish, organize, and operate JTF HQs in Iraq and Afghanistan. Operational

experience proved that combatant commands frequently requested specific capabilities (often

found in various parts of USJFCOM) rather than SJFHQ-CE augmentation. Accordingly, in

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October 2008, USJFCOM reorganized its SJFHQ directorate into a more agile Joint Enabling

Capabilities Command (JECC), and its two SJFHQ-CEs into Joint Deployable Teams (JDTs).

The JECC provided USJFCOM the ability to tailor a JDT to meet the particular needs of a GCC

or JTF, specifically with Joint Enabling Capabilities (JECs) in four critical functional areas:

Operations, Plans, Knowledge Management (KM) / Information Superiority, and Logistics.

Demise of the SJFHQ-CE and Movement of the JECC to USTRANSCOM

The decision to disestablish USJFCOM and the pressing requirement for efficiency in DOD

provided the impetus for a review of both the SJFHQ-CEs at the GCCs and USJFCOM’s JECC.

At issue was whether DOD really needed so many SJFHQ-CEs in a resource-constrained

environment?

Following an initial Joint Staff review of actual SJFHQ-CE deployments, which determined that

seldom would more than two SJFHQ-CEs be deployed at any given time, SecDef Memorandum,

Resource Management Decisions (RMD) for the FY 2012 Budget Request, dated January 25,

2011, directed the disestablishment of the SJFHQ-CEs at the GCCs and the return of most

corresponding military billets back to the military Services. SecDef’s RMD further directed the

CJCS to establish an SJFHQ and facilitate the standup of a second SJFHQ by using the resources

that transitioned from the JECC effective 1 October 2011 (Fiscal Year 2012) due to the

disestablishment of USJFCOM.

After due consideration, SecDef approved, on 27 April 2011, the reassignment and realignment

of JECC from USJFCOM to U.S. Transportation Command (USTRANSCOM) effective July 1,

2011 and further directed that JECC be assigned to USTRANSCOM in the Forces For Unified

Commands Memorandum. JECC retained the Joint Deployable Team (JDT),4

Joint

Communications Support Element (JCSE) and Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) as

subordinate commands and assumed the mission set to support all GCCs on 1 October 2011. The JECC Today

The JECC’s Mission Statement:

The Joint Enabling Capabilities Command provides mission-tailored, joint capability

packages to Combatant Commanders in order to facilitate rapid establishment of joint

force HQ, fulfill Global Response Force (GRF) execution and bridge joint operational

requirements.

The support the JECC brings is immediate (can deploy within hours) and short-duration (not

expected to exceed 120 days unless otherwise approved). These capabilities provide unique,

mission-ready support to aid in the accelerated formation and increased effectiveness of their

HQ.

4 The term JDT is now obsolete. The JDT was renamed in 2012 as the Joint Planning Support Element to more

accurately reflect the organization’s focus on a variety of operational-level planning capabilities.

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The JECC maintains an alert-postured force, called the Ready JECC Package (RJP), to respond

to emergent operational requirements within hours (see Figure 6). Each JECC subordinate joint

command designates forces to comprise the RJP that are provided to the CCMDs for various

missions such as humanitarian assistance/disaster relief, Operation Plan execution or JTF

standup. The RJP undergoes an assumption process to prepare the unit and its personnel for

deployment. It then assumes an alert posture for a three-month period.

Figure 6: Ready JECC Package (RJP)

It is from the RJP that a Mission Tailored Package (MTP) is scaled and tailored to meet specific

mission requirements of the supported command. MTPs are characterized by speed and agility, to

help CCDRs rapidly establish joint force HQ and as available, support other validated GCC

requirements. MTPs are scalable, additive capabilities that are designed to meet the CCDRs exact

requirements. MTPs are engineered to be the best fit for the crisis or contingency at hand and may

be employed using either the Request for Forces (RFF) or GRF process, as the situation dictates.

Outside of the forces designated for MTPs, JCSE also provides Deployable Joint Command and

Control (DJC2) Forward Support Detachments and rotational forces to the CCMDs. Likewise,

JPASE serves as the Public Affairs subject matter and functional area expert for the Joint Staff J7

providing media/public affairs training support for nearly all CCMD exercises and mission

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rehearsal exercises supported by the Joint Staff J7 South.

Figure 7 offers a simplistic, visual representation of how a JECC MTP would be used in the

formation of a JTF HQ. In this example, a Service HQs – that may or may not be a JTF-Capable

HQ – is the core for a forming JTF HQ. The JECC MTP provides joint plugs to the various

Service HQ staff sections in order to enable them to function as a joint staff. Over time, the Joint

Manning Document (JMD) is sourced by the Services, and assigned personnel arrive to fill

remaining vacancies and provide sustained, longer-term manning that, in turn, allows the JECC

MTP to redeploy.

JECC personnel could be employed by a JTF HQ in ways that are different from the illustration

on this slide. Most often, MTPs will be under the operational control (OPCON) of the supported

CCDR. Therefore, the capabilities included in an MTP can be employed as needed by the CCDR to

fill the most critical gaps or solve the most important problems.

Figure 7. Employment of the JECC

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JECC Capabilities The JECC combines the capabilities of seven unique functional areas to deliver tailored, mission-

specific support: Operations, Plans, Logistics, Intelligence Support, Knowledge Management,

Communications, and Public Affairs. These capabilities are embedded in the JECC’s three

subordinate joint commands: JPSE, JCSE, and JPASE. While a standard Ready JECC Package

can include up to 74 personnel (a mixture of active component, reserve component, and civilian

personnel), the joint force commander can tailor the package to meet specific needs.

Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE) (see Figure 8) has capabilities in five critical areas

and can be deployed to assist JTF commanders in establishing new HQ for a broad range of

missions including support for both humanitarian assistance and disaster relief operations.

The Operations functional group enhances situational understanding and facilitates the

execution of current operations.

The Plans

functional

group

leverages

joint expertise

and uses

current best

practices to

ensure the

integrated

employment

of land, air,

maritime, and

information

operations.

The

Knowledge

Management

Figure 8. Joint Planning Support Element (JPSE)

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functional group develops and implements knowledge management plans and processes

to provide increased situational awareness across the command.

The Intelligence Support functional team coordinates, manages, and synchronizes

intelligence collection, analysis and dissemination.

Lastly, the Logistics functional group integrates, coordinates, and implements joint

logistics operations and planning.

These are NOT individual augments, but rather readily deployable and experienced joint

planners and operators.

Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) (see Figure 9) can provide communications

packages tailored to the specific needs of a full JTF HQ and to a joint special operations task

force (JSOTF). JCSE has the unique ability to solve communications and interoperability

problems between Services, coalitions, and host nation partners.

Figure 9. Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE)

JCSE Equipment Sets

Joint Airborne Communications Center / Command Post – En route Command Center,

supports up to 18 users, two (2) platforms, secure / non-secure network access, voice and

commercial Internet / phones.

Standard/Lite Communications Node – A modular Internet Protocol-based package

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capable of providing secure/non- secure voice, data and video services for a myriad of

operations ranging from small initial or early entry communications systems up to the

establishment of a JTF or JSOTF.

Super High Frequency Carry-on Shipboard System Joint – A mobile system designed to

provide on-the-move shipboard connectivity with the DOD Wideband Global Satellite

Systems and commercial satellite communications systems.

DJC2 –An equipment set that can support a full JTF staff. Requires two C-17 aircraft for

transport and supports up to 1500 users with classified/unclassified network access to

include secure/non-secure voice and video teleconferencing capabilities. (Note: The

DJC2 equipment sets are owned by the CCMDs. JCSE manages, operates and employs

the DJC2 systems at the CCMD via the RFF process.)

JCSE leads the DOD migration to converged networks based on Everything over Internet

Protocol technology; this technology provides significant savings in personnel and equipment

while significantly increasing the capabilities and tactical agility for joint force commanders.

Today, JCSE leverages this technology across the full spectrum of its missions – from enroute

communications to support for a full JTF HQ.

Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE) (see Figure 10).

Most public affairs organizations below the CCMD level are one or two deep and are not

postured to maintain 24/7 crisis operations. JPASE provides the best option for the U.S. military

to rapidly establish the joint public affairs capability in response any crisis or contingency

operation. It eliminates the past practice of exchanging business cards in the middle of a crisis

by providing a well-trained team that is ready on arrival to conduct full scale public affairs in any

environment.

In addition to supporting each CCMD during real world contingencies and crises, JPASE also

provides training support and public affairs functional expertise to the Joint Staff J7 supporting a

wide range of CCMD and JTF exercises.

Teams/Compositions

Defense Video Imagery Distribution System (DVIDS) – capability that facilitates live,

remote interviews from anywhere in the world, as well as the distribution of imagery

products.

Portable, self-contained communications – JPASE can also deploy with the support of a

two person communication team from JCSE which allows them to conduct public affairs

in austere environments.

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Figure 10. Joint Public Affairs Support Element (JPASE)

Requesting JECC Support

There are various ways in which CCMDS can request JECC capabilities; each with its own

benefit (see Figure 11). The following list identifies each process so that CCDRs can determine

which option may best suit their requirements.

The JECC can provide capabilities through the traditional Request For Forces (RFF)

process. Under this model, a CCMD can submit an RFF to the Joint Staff, who validates

the request for SecDef approval. Once the SecDef authorizes the request, his

authorization becomes a deployment order through a modification to the annual Global

Force Management Allocation Plan directing JECC forces to deploy. Usually this process

allows JECC forces to arrive within weeks and is traditionally used for emergent

requirements. Although the process to obtain capabilities is significantly longer, RFF

deployments allow forces to deploy for more than the 120 day limit set forth in GRF

deployments.

Global Response Force – the SecDef delegated to the CDR, USTRANSCOM the

authority to deploy JECC capabilities in accordance with the GRF Execute Order. Under

this model, the CDR, USTRANSCOM may deploy portions or all JECC capabilities

based upon a request from a CCDR; SecDef must be notified within 24 hours of

authorizing a JECC GRF deployment. CCDRs may request JECC support under GRF

authorities for an impending operational requirement, such as an imminent crisis or

natural disaster. In a GRF deployment, JECC forces can be on the ground within hours.

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However, GRF deployments are limited to 120 days.

JPASE and JCSE also provide forces to the Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

EXORD. JCSE is a pre-identified force (Category 2) for DSCA missions and JPASE is a

resource for internal use (category 3) for DSCA missions. Both Category 2 forces and

Category 3 forces are required to establish a 24-hour prepare to deploy orders (PTDO)

status. Forces may be required to maintain PTDO status for up to 7 days. PTDO status

will terminate automatically at the end of the 7-day period unless an extension is granted

by the SecDef.

JECC forces are sometimes requested to bridge joint operational requirements and these

deployments are normally funded by the CCMD. These requests are approved on a not-

to-interfere basis with JECC RFF, GRF or DSCA requests. The requesting CCMD may

use informal channels for this type of support. Requests for JECC support to bridge joint

operational requirements will be approved on a case-by-case basis by the

USTRANSCOM J3.

Each JECC subordinate command participates in priority CCMD exercises. JECC

support for joint exercise program events can be requested via the Joint Training

Information Management System Process. Requests for JECC exercise support are

approved on a case-by-case basis by the CDR, USTRANSCOM in accordance with the

CJCS exercise priorities. JECC participation in CCMD joint exercise events will be

continually assessed based on exercise schedule, CCMD demand and operational

constraints.

Figure 11. JECC Deployment Models

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Summary Proven repeatedly during numerous contingencies, the JECC provides combatant commands

with an immediate infusion of joint talent and capability. It is incumbent upon all current and

potential joint force HQ staff officers and commanders to have an appreciation of this

tremendous resource’s capabilities and employment considerations.

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Acronyms

CCDR combatant commander

CCMD combatant command

CJCS Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

DJC2 Deployable Joint Command and Control

DSCA Defense Support of Civil Authorities

EXORD Execute Order

GCC geographic combatant command

GFMAP global force management allocation plan

GRF global response force

HQ headquarters

JCSE Joint Communications Support Element

JDT Joint Deployable Team

JEC joint enabling capabilities

JECC Joint Enabling Capabilities Command

JPASE Joint Public Affairs Support Element

JPSE Joint Planning Support Element

JSOTF joint special operations task force

JTF joint task force

MTP Mission-Tailored Package

PTDO Prepare to Deploy Order

RMD Resource Management Decision

SecDef Secretary of Defense

SJFHQ-CE Standing Joint Force HHQ—Core Element

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TDY temporary duty

USJFCOM U.S. Joint Forces Command

USTRANSCOM U.S. Transportation Command