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Document of
The World Bank
Report No: ICR1984
IMPLEMENTATION COMPLETION AND RESULTS REPORT
(IDA-H2970)
ON A
Grant
IN THE AMOUNT OF SDR 13.7 MILLION
(US$ 20.4 MILLION EQUIVALENT)
TO THE
ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF AFGHANISTAN
FOR A
CIVIL SERVICE REFORM PROJECT
January 25, 2012
Governance and Public Sector
Afghanistan
South Asia Region
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CURRENCY EQUIVALENTS
Currency Unit = Afghani (Afn)
US$ 1.00 = Afn 48.6
FISCAL YEAR: March 20- March 21
ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARS Administrative Reform Secretariat MPW Ministry of Public Works
ARTF Afghanistan Reconstruction Trust Fund MRRD Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation
and Development
CBR Capacity Building for Results Facility MTCA Ministry of Transport and Civil
Aviation
CSMD Civil Services Management Directorate MTR Mid-Term Review
CSRP Civil Service Reform Project PAD Project Appraisal Document
GoA Government of the Islamic Republic of
Afghanistan PAR Public Administration Reform
HRM Human Resource Management PARD Public Administration Reform
Department
HRMD Human Resource Management
Directorate PCD Program Coordination
Department
I-ANDS Interim Afghanistan National
Development Strategy
P&G Pay and Grading
IARCSC Independent Administrative Reform and
Civil Service Commission PDOs Project Development Objectives
IAB Independent Appointments Board PMU Project Management Unit
ICR Implementation Completion and Results
Report
PRR Priority Reform and Restructuring
IDA International Development Association QAG Quality Assurance Group
ITA International Technical Assistants QALP-2 Second Quality Assessment of the
Lending Portfolio
MAC Ministerial Advisory Committee RIMU Reform Implementation and
Management Unit
MAIL Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and
Livestock PSC Project Steering Committee
M&E Monitoring and Evaluation SMG Senior Management Group
MCP Management Capacity Program TA Technical Assistance
MoF Ministry of Finance
Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero, SARVP
Country Director: Josephine Bassinette, SACAF
Sector Manager: Antonius Verheijen, SASGP
Project Team Leader: Satyendra Prasad, SASGP
ICR Team Leader: Vikram K. Chand, SASGP
AFGHANISTAN
Civil Service Reform Project
CONTENTS
Data Sheet
A. Basic Information
B. Key Dates
C. Ratings Summary
D. Sector and Theme Codes
E. Bank Staff
F. Results Framework Analysis
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
H. Restructuring
I. Disbursement Graph
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design ............................................... 1
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes .............................................. 6
3. Assessment of Outcomes .......................................................................................... 11
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome ......................................................... 15
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance ..................................................... 16
6. Lessons Learned ....................................................................................................... 19
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners .......... 20
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing .......................................................................... 22
Annex 2. Outputs by Component ................................................................................. 23
Annex 3. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes ............ 27
Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR ..................... 29
Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents ...................................................................... 31
MAP
A. Basic Information
Country: Afghanistan Project Name: AF: Civil Service
Reform Project
Project ID: P097030 L/C/TF Number(s): IDA-H2970
ICR Date: 01/25/2012 ICR Type: Core ICR
Lending Instrument: TAL Borrower: GOVERNMENT OF
AFGHANISTAN
Original Total
Commitment: XDR 13.50M Disbursed Amount: XDR 9.53M
Revised Amount: XDR 13.50M
Environmental Category: C
Implementing Agencies:
Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC)
Cofinanciers and Other External Partners:
B. Key Dates
Process Date Process Original Date Revised / Actual
Date(s)
Concept Review: 10/18/2005 Effectiveness: 07/11/2007 07/11/2007
Appraisal: 04/02/2007 Restructuring(s): 11/06/2009
Approval: 05/29/2007 Mid-term Review: 07/08/2010 10/14/2010
Closing: 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
C. Ratings Summary
C.1 Performance Rating by ICR
Outcomes: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Risk to Development Outcome: High
Bank Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Borrower Performance: Moderately Unsatisfactory
C.2 Detailed Ratings of Bank and Borrower Performance (by ICR)
Bank Ratings Borrower Ratings
Quality at Entry: Moderately
Unsatisfactory Government:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Quality of Supervision: Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Implementing
Agency/Agencies:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Overall Bank
Performance:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory Overall Borrower
Performance:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
C.3 Quality at Entry and Implementation Performance Indicators
Implementation
Performance Indicators
QAG Assessments
(if any) Rating
Potential Problem Project
at any time (Yes/No): No
Quality at Entry
(QEA):
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Problem Project at any
time (Yes/No): Yes
Quality of
Supervision (QSA): Moderately Satisfactory
DO rating before
Closing/Inactive status:
Moderately
Unsatisfactory
D. Sector and Theme Codes
Original Actual
Sector Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Central government administration 90 90
Sub-national government administration 10 10
Theme Code (as % of total Bank financing)
Administrative and civil service reform 100 100
E. Bank Staff
Positions At ICR At Approval
Vice President: Isabel M. Guerrero Praful C. Patel
Country Director: Anthony Cholst Alastair J. McKechnie
Sector Manager: Antonius Verheijen Ijaz Nabi
Project Team Leader: Satyendra Prasad Anne Tully
ICR Team Leader: Vikram K. Chand
ICR Primary Author: Vikram K. Chand
F. Results Framework Analysis
Project Development Objectives (from Project Appraisal Document) Across the time frame of the project, (by 2011), a significant proportion of key
ministries/agencies will be performing their functions to an acceptable level and can be
held accountable for the use of public resources
Revised Project Development Objectives (as approved by original approving authority)
Upon restructuring of the project in November 2009, the PDO was modified as follows:
Across the timeframe of the project (by July 2011) more accountable and transparent
practices in the management of civil service will be introduced in selected ministries.
(a) PDO Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target
Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : By Project Closing Date, 100 percent of civil service posts will be re-graded
according to the provisions of the Civil Servants Law & related regulations
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0% 100% 87%
Date achieved 09/01/2007 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
A total of 325,499 out of 375,000 positions re-graded. Re-gradation Major
ministries completed.
Indicator 2 : By Project Closing Date, 100 percent of civil service appointments being made
on a merit basis following the Civil Servants Law and related regulations
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
0% 100% 80%
Date achieved 09/01/2007 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Ministries/agencies refer a large portion of grade 1-2 appointments to the
Independent Appointments Board (IAB) on the basis of merit. However in many
ministries it is evident that significant numbers of grade 1-2 posts are not civil
service posts.
Indicator 3 :
By Project Closing Date, regulations and procedures for key HR actions,
including recruitment, promotion, disciplinary actions, retrenchment/severance,
and code of conduct have been adopted, in accord
Value
quantitative or
Qualitative)
Civil Servants Law has
been enacted but
preparation of key
implementing regulations
is lagging.
The regulatory
framework for
civil service
management is
complete and
consistently
applied
(confirmed by
regular HR
audits).
HR laws and
regulations in place.
Civil Servants Law
is under revision.
Performance
appraisal process
needs to be
strengthened. HR
compliance
monitoring needs to
be strengthened.
Date achieved 09/01/2007 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
(b) Intermediate Outcome Indicator(s)
Indicator Baseline Value
Original Target
Values (from
approval
documents)
Formally
Revised
Target Values
Actual Value
Achieved at
Completion or
Target Years
Indicator 1 : Number of restructured and functional HR Departments in Line Ministries.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 5 5
Date achieved 09/01/2007 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Functionality improvements evident in five ministries, MoF, MRRD, MAIL,
MoPW and MoTCA. Capacity built for P&G implementation and compliance to
HR policies and regulations.
Indicator 2 : Number of ministries that have implemented P&G reform
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
0 40 25
Date achieved 09/01/2009 07/31/2011 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
25 ministries/agencies have completed the pay and grading process, P&G in one
ministry is suspended and six are in progress. 17 ministries/agencies are yet to
start the process.
Indicator 3 : Quality and consistency of HR procedures within ministries against clearly set
standards.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
Civil Servants Law
gazetted. Preparation of
key implementing
regulations lagging.
Early compliance
monitoring
activities started.
Too early to
monitor
developments.
Date achieved 09/09/2007 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
Indicator 4 : Consistency and transparency of the recruitment process and perception of
integrity in it.
Value
(quantitative
or Qualitative)
While civil servants law
legally requires merit
based recruitment
procedures, WB
vulnerability assessment
of the IAB confirms that
recruitment and other HR
decisions continue to be
adversely affected by
entho-centric politics and
patronage.
Merit based
appointments have
increased.
Adherence to Civil
Service laws and
regulations.
However, in many
ministries/agencies
significant number
of grade 1-2 posts
are not civil service
posts and
recruitment of these
are carried out
through donor top-
ups
Date achieved 09/01/2007 07/31/2011
Comments
(incl. %
achievement)
G. Ratings of Project Performance in ISRs
No. Date ISR
Archived DO IP
Actual
Disbursements
(USD millions)
1 01/22/2008 Satisfactory Satisfactory 0.00
2 08/07/2008 Moderately Satisfactory Moderately Satisfactory 0.60
3 03/20/2009 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 1.52
4 10/30/2009 Unsatisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 3.60
5 12/15/2009 Unsatisfactory Moderately
Unsatisfactory 4.80
6 12/17/2010 Moderately
Unsatisfactory
Moderately
Unsatisfactory 11.07
H. Restructuring (if any)
Restructuring
Date(s)
Board
Approved
PDO Change
ISR Ratings at
Restructuring
Amount
Disbursed at
Restructuring
in USD
millions
Reason for Restructuring &
Key Changes Made DO IP
11/06/2009 Y U MU 3.60
The project operates in an
exceptionally challenging
environment and a number of
risks identified in the original
project document have
materialized despite efforts to
mitigate them. The restructuring
is undertaken to align the PDO
with a more feasible set of
outcomes that can be achieved
in the remaining
implementation period. There
continue to be reasonable
prospects for achieving
significant results from a more
focused, less ambitious agenda
so that suspending the project
would not be advisable.
If PDO and/or Key Outcome Targets were formally revised (approved by the original approving
body) enter ratings below:
Outcome Ratings
Against Original PDO/Targets
Against Formally Revised PDO/Targets
Overall (weighted) rating Moderately Unsatisfactory
I. Disbursement Profile
.
1
1. Project Context, Development Objectives and Design
1.1 Context at Appraisal
Building an effective state - that can provide security and services to the people, while protecting
their rights - has been at the heart of the reconstruction effort in Afghanistan. At the end of 2001,
after nearly a quarter century of wars and civil strife the political system had largely collapsed.
While many of the formal structures and some of the traditional practices of public administration
remained in place, they lacked the human, financial and physical resources to do their job,
particularly in a modem context. The new government faced enormous challenges in restoring
security, taking charge of running the country, building consensus across various political
factions and rebuilding the very limited capacity of the state.
Despite this, progress had been made in restoring institutions of governance and laying the basis
for a strong economic recovery. A new Constitution was adopted in January 2004 and Afghans
actively participated in elections for their first democratically elected President in December 2004.
Elections for the Wolesi Jirgu (lower house of the National Assembly) and for provincial councils
took place in September 2005. Female turnout in both elections was around 40 percent of the total
electorate and more than a quarter of Wolesi Jirgu members were female. The inauguration of the
National Assembly in December 2005 marked the formal conclusion of the Bonn political
transition process.
Afghanistan‟s economy had recovered strongly from a state of collapse at the end of the Taliban
rule. The real value of non-opium Gross Domestic Product (GDP) increased by 29 percent in
2002/03, 16 percent in 2003/04, 8 percent in 2004/05, and 14 percent in 2005/06. This solid
performance was supported by the government‟s sound macroeconomic policies. Afghanistan had
successfully completed all quarterly reviews under the IMF Staff-Monitored Program and the first
review of the Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility (PRGF) program. Monetary policy was
restrained, relying on fiscal discipline and a no-overdraft rule that prohibited Central Bank
financing of the deficit. Inflation was decelerating with year-on-year inflation declining to 5.2
percent in September 2006 (compared to 16 percent in 2004/05).
Despite this economic recovery and sound macroeconomic policies, progress in development
remained tenuous across the country. Security problems continued to be encountered almost
daily. Sustaining gains in development outcomes, particularly in health and education, remained a
challenge given the inability of government and donor agencies to access various communities.
The opium economy, accounting for around a quarter of total GDP, was still Afghanistan‟s
leading economic activity, and a key contributor to insecurity, promoting corruption, capture, and
violence.
1.2 Government Public Administration Reform Framework
The Government‟s Public Administration Reform (PAR) Framework, as reflected in
Afghanistan‟s Interim National Development Strategy (I-ANDS), had as its goal the
establishment of strong state institutions at the central and sub-national level, capable of
achieving improvements in the delivery of services. The PAR Framework flowed from the I-
ANDs which envisioned a well functioning and affordable administration that was small and
focused on core functions. Key elements of the framework included:
Establishing a well-performing, merit-based civil service;
2
Strengthening the structure of Government, especially line ministries and sub-national
administration
Building institutions of public accountability.
In addition under the Afghanistan Compact, the government agreed to specific benchmarks for
public administration reform including inter alia:
The rationalization and restructuring of Government to ensure a fiscally sustainable
public administration.
Strengthening the civil service commission and putting in place a transparent mechanism
for the selection of senior civil servants, members of the judiciary, and provincial
governors.
Strengthening performance management at all levels of the system
1.3 Rationale for IDA’s Involvement in Public Administration
Public administration reform was essential to rebuilding the state, institutionalizing improved
governance and combating corruption. Without a medium term strategy to build core capacities in
line ministries, Afghanistan would most certainly remain dependent on international technical
assistance and/or donor funds. The project was complemented by a program of analytical work
focusing on sub-national governance and institutions of accountability, developing an
implementation plan for civil service reform to meet compact benchmarks, and assistance
towards the formulation of an anti-corruption strategy. The Bank had extensive experience in
promoting public administration reform in Afghanistan through a series of development policy
credit/grants intended to bolster reforms.
In addition, the Management Capacity Program (MCP), an initiative funded by the Afghanistan
Reconstruction Trust Fund (ARTF) administered by the Bank supported the induction of Afghan
consultants into civil service positions. Given its experience in public administration reform –
and the importance of the area for Afghanistan – the rationale for Bank involvement was a strong.
1.4 Original Project Development Objectives (PDO) and Key Indicators (as approved)
The original development objective for this project stated that “across the time frame of the
project, (by 2011), a significant proportion of service delivery ministries will be performing their
functions to an acceptable level and can be held accountable for the use of public resources. This
will have resulted from core ministries having been reorganized according to functions and civil
servants being managed according to clear rules and procedures.”
Key indicators of the progress in meeting the development objective included at the outset:
The number of service delivery ministries reporting on progress toward achieving their
sectoral objectives, and the use of resources for those purposes.
The proportion of civil service appointments based on merit, and the rigor of the merit-
based appointments process.
The consistency of the application of the Civil Service Law and regulations to the
management of civil servants.
The extent to which Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission
(IARCSC) was able to coordinate donor support for civil service reform, as well as
3
monitor and report on progress regarding the implementation of the approved civil
service reform plan.
1.5 Revised PDO (as approved by original approving authority) and Key Indicators,
and reasons / justification
The development objective for the project was revised to state that “across the timeframe of the
project (by July 2011) more accountable and transparent practices in the management of the civil
service will be introduced in selected ministries.”
Key indicators to assess progress towards this revised PDO by the project closing date included:
100% of civil service posts will be re-graded according to the provisions of the civil
service law and related regulations
100% of civil service appointments will be made on a merit-basis following the civil
servants law and related regulations.
Regulations and procedures for key human resource (HR) actions, including recruitment,
promotion, disciplinary actions, retrenchment, severance, and code of conduct have been
adopted in accordance with the civil servants law and applied consistently across the
human resources departments of participating line ministries.
Reasons for Restructuring
The primary reason for restructuring was corrective. Government commitment at all
levels to the comprehensive public administration reform agenda originally supported by
the project had weakened since project approval. The political environment had become
more challenging with attention being absorbed by the deteriorating security and
economic situation. Many line ministries did not consider strategic planning and
organizational reform a priority. Fragmented responsibilities within Independent
Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC), and weak coordination
and communication, both internally and externally, impaired its ability to manage the
project effectively.
Consequently, progress targets for the first project year were almost entirely missed, and
only limited progress was made in the second year. Progress in the preparation and
enactment of key civil service regulations lagged. The roll out of the Pay and Grading
reform started with almost a one year delay, and the focus was largely on achieving
quantitative targets with little regard to quality. While legally required, implementation of
merit-based procedures continued to be a challenge in a public sector environment still
characterized by patronage and ethnically-based politics. While some modest changes to
the organizational structures of ministries were achieved as part of the roll out of the new
pay and grading policy, IARCSC support to line ministries with regard to strategic
planning and more substantial organizational reforms was not effective. As a result, it
became clear that the project would not achieve the impact on ministry performance and
service delivery in selected line ministries set out in the original PDO.
Restructuring was intended to recalibrate the project's development objectives to focus on
more attainable priorities, adjust the project's scope to focus on areas with stronger
government ownership; and strengthen implementation arrangements within the
IARCSC.
4
1.6 Main Beneficiaries
The main beneficiaries of the project were expected to be (i) the Government of Afghanistan and
(ii) the Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC).
(i) Government of Afghanistan: The government was expected to benefit by putting in place a
new pay and grading system designed to improve transparency, attract talent to the civil service,
and shift from a civil service that historically rewarded seniority to one that supported
performance. In addition, the project sought to improve the working of the Afghan civil service
by creating a system for merit-based recruitment, creating a universally applicable framework of
laws, rules, and regulations for the civil service as a whole, and improving the functioning of
ministries through organizational restructuring and better human resource management.
(ii) The IARCSC: The IARCSC was expected to benefit by receiving technical assistance to
improve the capacity of several of its units, particularly the Human Resource Policy Department,
the Public Administration Reform Department (PARD), and the Administrative Reform
Secretariat (ARS). In addition, the project was expected to improve the capacity of the
Independent Appointments Board to implement merit-based recruitment, particularly for senior
civil servants, and strengthen the working of the Appeals Board.
1.7 Original Components (as approved)
Component One: Organizational Reforms within Core Ministries ($8.4 million)
Activities under this component were intended to result in a number of core ministries being able
to perform their functions more effectively, and with greater transparency in the use of resources.
This rubric consisted of two sub-components: (i) Line Ministry Reorganization and (ii)
strengthening the IARCSC as a facilitating and coordinating agency for civil service reform.
Sub-component (i) was intended to provide technical assistance, training and limited equipment
support to core ministries to support their reorganization efforts. Work under this sub-component
aimed to improve the ability of line ministries to develop their own work programs; justify their
use of public resources to Cabinet and Parliament more effectively; put in place strategic plans
with clear deliverables and the ability to monitor them; continue with organizational
restructuring; apply new human resource procedures and policies across ministries including
transitioning to a new pay grade structure and merit-based recruitment; and build donor support to
address critical funding gaps. Each ministry was expected to set up a Reform Implementation
Management Unit (RIMU) to lead its restructuring. It was expected that four to five ministries
would be supported under the project based on such factors as their financial importance, role in
service delivery, and level of commitment to reform. (Estimated Cost $7.Im)
Sub-component (ii) was designed to support technical assistance and capacity building for the
IARCSC to facilitate and coordinate reforms across line ministries, and ensure consistency. The
Public Administration Reform Department of the IARCSC was the nodal point within the
IARCSC for this sub-component. (Estimated cost $1.3m)
Component Two: Implementation of Merit-based Human Resource Management Reforms in
Government ($8.7 million).
This component was designed to support the establishment and implementation of merit-based
HR policies and practices. Assistance was to be provided through three sub components: (i)
Establishing and extending HR policies and practices to line ministries: This sub-component
5
focused on preparing regulations and procedures under the civil service law and applying them
across ministries. Technical assistance was to be provided to ministries to create human resource
departments, along with training and mentoring for HR staff and mangers. Assistance was to be
provided to the Human Resources Policy Department of the IARCSC to carry out the program.
(Estimated Cost $3.5m) (ii) Strengthening appointments procedures: This involved implementing
an action plan for merit-based recruitment and better monitoring of appointments at junior levels
through the Independent Appointments Board (IAB). This sub-component also sought to
strengthen the Appeals Board to ensure effective resolution of complaints including those likely
to arise from pay and grading reforms. (Estimated Cost $1.4m) (iii) Implementing the
government’s pay and grading reform in line with fiscal parameters and ministry implementation
readiness: This sub-component was supposed to involve undertaking a sustained communications
plan to build understanding of the new reforms in pay and grading; re-grading positions onto a
new eight grade structure; and developing procedures and guidance for such re-grading as well as
monitoring its quality. (Estimated Cost $3.8m)
Component Three: Oversight and Monitoring of the Public Administration Program ($3.3
million).
This component was supposed to support the IARCSC in carrying out its stewardship role under
the Civil Service Law to “lead, regulate, formulate and implement structure policies of the public
administration system” (Article 5). As a result of support provided under the project, the
government through the IARCSC was expected to develop a fully funded, regularly monitored
and well coordinated and communicated civil service reform program.
Assistance under this rubric was divided into sub-components: (i) Program Coordination and
Management: Assistance under this sub-component was designed to enable the Program
Coordination Department (PCD) of the IARCSC to take charge of coordinating donor
investments in the area of public administration reform. PCD was expected to develop the
capacity to ensure coordination across technical assistance providers as well as adherence to grant
agreements, identify bottlenecks in implementation and suggest solutions. (Estimated Cost
$1.6m). (ii) Monitoring and Evaluation, and Communication: This sub-component aimed to
strengthen capacity to monitor the outcomes of civil service reform effort as well as improve
reporting. Assistance was to be provided to the Administrative Reform Secretariat (ARS) of the
IARCSC to periodically monitor and evaluate progress on civil service reforms, draw out lessons,
and identify areas for change. The project sought to support ARS in guiding line ministries in
establishing clear monitoring indicators. Assistance was also intended to focus developing a clear
communication strategy and outreach program to policy-makers and other stakeholders in the
area of civil service reform. (Estimated Cost $1.7m)
1.8 Revised Components
Component One: Strengthening Human Resource Management Capacity in Core Ministries
($8.73 million)
Initially, this component focused on efforts to substantially restructure selected ministries through
the creation of Reform Implementation Management Units (RIMUs) within those ministries
supported by the project. After restructuring, this component was limited to supporting human
resource management (HRM) functions in five line ministries. In addition, this component sought
to intensify training to help internalize basic foundation concepts and practices of human
resources management needed to build new human resources management units.
6
Component Two: Implementation of Merit-Based Human Resource Management Reforms in
Government ($9.54 million)
The original activities planned for this component remained viable, although some modification
was needed to accommodate actual progress being made in the development of the HRM units in
line ministries. In addition, this component now sought to focus more on developing personnel
registries and human resource information systems with the aim of better monitoring
employment, strengthening internal and external controls on payroll systems and mitigating risks
of employment-related fraud, including ghost workers and absenteeism.
Component Three: Project Management and Support Services ($2.13 million)
This component was reengineered to strengthen IARCSC governance, coordination and
management of the project, rather than supporting the communication, coordination, and
monitoring efforts for the government‟s wider PAR agenda, as envisaged originally.
2. Key Factors Affecting Implementation and Outcomes
2.1 Project Preparation, Design and Quality at Entry
The project suffered from flaws at entry. A perusal of the Project Appraisal Document (PAD)
reveals a conspicuous lack of analysis of the political economy issues that might have been
expected to influence project implementation. The restructured project also displays a lack of
attention to the political, social, and economic dynamics that could affect project performance. A
separate review of the project by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG) of the World Bank in
2010 (the Second Quality Assessment of the Lending Portfolio (QALP -2) makes the same point.
In fact, project documents reveal a highly technocratic perspective poorly adjusted to the Afghan
context. In addition, while work was done separately to cost the impact of the new pay and
grading program on wages and pensions, these find little mention in the PAD or other documents.
Nor was any assessment carried out of the capacity of the Independent Administrative Reform
and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) to oversee the project competently. Broader analytical
work on public administration reform challenges in Afghanistan was undertaken, including a
large report, but this analysis was only weakly linked to the design of the project, as reflected in
the PAD and the restructuring documents. A deeper understanding of the political economy
dynamics affecting the project‟s environment – and capacity constraints -- might have translated
into a more sober set of initial project development objectives.
The design of the project was problematic. Key counterparts claimed that the IARCSC was not
properly consulted in the initial design of the project. As a result, the project lacked ownership
within the IARCSC at the outset. On the other hand, Bank team leaders stated that they had
consulted adequately with the IARCSC, suggesting a difference of perception on the
effectiveness of consultation, such as it was. The project‟s objectives were too ambitious and
broad to be effectively implemented (or monitored) by the IARCSC. Its three major components,
and seven sub-components, were confusing in nature and overlapping in content. The original
design of the project envisaged that each component would be implemented by a different unit of
the IARCSC (i.e., the Public Administration Reform Department took charge of the pay and
grading exercise, the Human Resource Policy Department was placed in charge of framing HR
regulations, the Administrative Reform Secretariat was tasked with oversight, monitoring, and
communication). As a result, implementation of the project was splintered across these various
IARCSC units. The Project Management Unit (PMU) was vested with little real authority;
coordination responsibility was vested instead in the Program Coordination Department (PCD) of
7
the IARCSC, which had little capacity at the time. A high-level project steering committee was
supposed to exercise general oversight, but this committee quickly became moribund.
The PAD refers to key documents including the Interim-Afghanistan National Development
Strategy (I-ANDS) and the Afghanistan Compact that emphasize the importance of the civil
service reform agenda for development in the country. These documents do suggest at least some
level of political ownership for the broader goals being pursued by the project. On the other hand,
the lack of proper consultation with the IARCSC during project preparation may have
undermined ownership by the project‟s implementing agency.
The analysis of risk was superficial. The ability of the IARCSC to implement the project
satisfactorily was overestimated. The risk that policy-makers could be compelled to shift their
focus away from civil service reform to larger issues relating to the country‟s security and
economic environment was not properly understood at the time of project formulation. The
project‟s mitigation strategy for identified risks betrays some naiveté: Rules-based procedures are
seen as an antidote to weak political commitment, which in turn limits the possibility that such
rules-based procedures would succeed in the first instance.
The considerable speed with which the project was prepared given the demands of the
government and the desire of Bank management to support this area may have contributed to the
flaws in project preparation and design. A Quality Enhancement Review (QER) prior to
appraisal was held but, as the QAG report states, “its impact on important issues such institutional
capacity and project scope was minimal since none of its recommendations was taken into
consideration.”
A better project design at entry might have consisted of the following elements: a more realistic
and scaled down PDO; fewer components and sub-components; a clear point of control and
coordination in the form of an empowered PMU or other mechanism; fewer, but more salient,
monitoring indicators; and provision for intensive implementation support.
Quality of Project Design at Entry Rating by QAG: Moderately Unsatisfactory
2.2 Implementation
The project quickly became a victim of bureaucratic operational bottlenecks within the IARCSC,
which might have been avoided had the project had a single locus of control. In order to
coordinate the program across the three components, a project steering committee was created
consisting of the major players in the IARCSC. Initially the steering committee met on a
quarterly basis to resolve problems raised by consultants and gave the project a strategic thrust;
later the committee became inactive and implementation of the project became balkanized across
different units of the IARCSC, particularly those of the Civil Services Management Department
(CSMD). Communication among these units was poor, resulting in a lack of coordination, weak
monitoring, and missed opportunities for learning across components.
Meanwhile, the PMU was powerless: the processing of consultant contracts and payment
authorizations was done by the Administration and Finance Department of the IARCSC, which
was responsible for performing this function for several projects, not just the CSRP, and lacked
sufficient staff to do so efficiently. This, in turn, resulted in long delays in project
implementation. To make matters worse, the PMU was without a project manager for several
months and operated with a skeleton staff, functioning more as a post office among the units of
the IARCSC and the Finance and Administration Department.
8
This situation in turn contributed to weak contract management. The team leaders of the
consultant firms hired under the project complained that they lacked access to their counterparts
in the IARCSC, resulting in inadequate communication, feedback, and monitoring. One
consultant stated that he was left mostly unsupervised by IARCSC staff. The problem of contract
management was compounded by the fact that attracting qualified consultants to Afghanistan was
not an easy task. Several commission officials lamented the poor quality of some international
consultants and the difficulty of retaining those who were more effective for any length of time.
This rapid turnover of international consultants was particularly apparent in the Reform
Management Implementation Units (RIMUS) initially created to drive the reform process in line
ministries. Difficulties in recruiting a qualified consulting firm led to the cancelation of one
component of the original project relating to the oversight and monitoring of the government‟s
public administration reform effort. Another consulting firm, working on the development of HR
procedures and policies, was terminated during the course of the project. The hiring of consulting
firms took inordinately long time. Indeed none of the three consulting firms chosen to execute the
project were in place until a year after the project became effective on July 11, 2007.
Consequently, agreed results for the first year of the project were entirely missed and only 14.5%
of the total grant amount of $20.4 million had been disbursed at mid-term (about $2.95 million).
Disbursement did improve significantly later but the project still closed with some six million
dollars unutilized, raising serious questions about whether the absorptive capacity of the IARCSC
was properly assessed at the outset.
As the security environment in Afghanistan deteriorated, civil service reform as an issue was
displaced by larger concerns. The IARCSC thus may have felt that it lacked the political
influence to push reform across line ministries. The result was that line ministries tended to
collaborate with the reform program in areas that suited them, such as pay and grading, which
involved a significant pay hike for all civil servants, rather than organizational restructuring,
which could alienate vested interests or involve some measure of pain. Not surprisingly, the
project as a whole fared poorly with respect to serious functional re-organization, while the pay
and grading exercise encountered much less resistance from line ministries. It is not clear how
well the IARCSC was able to articulate and communicate its key objectives to line ministries.
The Bank contributed to some of these implementation difficulties: The project had no less than
four task managers in the four years of its existence, contributing to the sense of confusion,
disruption of continuity, weak accountability, and poor management that affected the project in
general. These issues will be discussed in the section on Bank performance.
The project sought to address some of these problems at the time of restructuring. The project
steering committee was reactivated; a new project manager appointed to lead a PMU with more
staff and resources at his command; and full control over the project given the Director-General
of the Civil Services Management Department to address the problem of poor coordination and
lack of accountability that had characterized project governance in the first two years of its
existence. The positive effects of these changes, however, were limited by the fact that
restructuring came too late in November 2009.
QAG Ratings: Implementation Progress (Unsatisfactory), Supervision (Moderately Satisfactory)
The QAG review noted that the even after restructuring, the project was unlikely to achieve its
scaled-down objectives given the lack of champions for civil service reform and low government
interest, as well as the operational difficulties experienced by the project. With respect to
supervision, the QAG review questioned the appropriateness of restructuring given the
9
unlikelihood that this would help realize the project‟s new development objective. It noted that
the Bank had identified problems in a timely fashion, but expressed concerns about sustainability
over the medium term.
2.3 Monitoring and Evaluation (M&E) Design, Implementation and Utilization
The monitoring and evaluation framework for the project was weak. The initial results
framework prior to restructuring had too many result indicators to be tracked effectively. Both
the initial and the revised result indicators focused entirely on quantitative measures, rather than
indicators to measure the actual quality of the initiatives implemented by the project. While a
large number of posts were re-graded and mapped onto the new eight point pay scale, there is
little evidence to actually judge the quality of the process of crafting job descriptions, evaluating
posts, and creating consistent patterns for pay and grading across ministries. This is not to say
that the quality was poor, only that we do not have any sound basis for arriving at a conclusion
about this based on the quantitative data gathered by the project.
With regard to civil service appointments, the revised results framework simply states that
“100% of civil service appointments will be made on a merit basis following the Civil Servants
Law and related regulations.” The emphasis on compliance with procedure as the criterion for
assessing whether a merit-based appointment was made can be misleading: It is possible to hew
to procedure and yet subvert the goal of making merit-based appointments. Compliance with
procedure is hard to show especially at the lower levels of the civil service (grades 3-8) for which
very little data is forthcoming. It would have been better to have a third party audit appointments
on a sample basis and use this as the key monitoring indicator for merit-based appointments.
The third key indicator relates to the adoption of regulations and procedures for key human
resource actions, particularly recruitment, promotion, disciplinary actions, retrenchment and
severance, as well as the framing of a code of conduct for civil servants. Again, it is relatively
easy to see if these were adopted or not. It is much harder to assess their quality, relevance, and
depth or the degree to which the new regulations have been internalized by civil servants in key
ministries.
The monitoring and evaluation framework for the project thus suffered from three major
limitations: (a) too many indicators hastily put together by a task team that clearly had no idea
how such data would eventually be collected, (b) a neglect of quality as a dimension that needed
to be monitored over time, and (c) a failure to create an independent mechanism for monitoring
that would have given the project a more reliable basis for tracking progress on the project‟s key
qualitative dimensions.
2.4 Safeguard and Fiduciary Compliance
Regular supervision by the Bank team reduced the risk of corruption in the project, a fact noted
by the QAG review. Operational controls were further tightened in the wake of the restructuring
of the project. The mid-term review (MTR) held in September/October, 2010 noted several
procurement-related issues, including frequent revisions in the procurement plan, delay in issuing
no-objection letters by the Bank for hiring consultants under the project, and slow contract
modification procedures. In line with the QAG review, this ICR flags the fact that even after
restructuring, it took some time to modify the contracts of the participating consulting firms
according to the revised objectives of the project, thus possibly blunting the intended impact of
the restructuring exercise.
10
The MTR noted weaknesses in the strength of the internal audit function of the project, a fact that
is not surprising given the relatively low level of capacity in the IARCSC, along with a few other
problems relating to the timely maintenance of the fixed asset register, and delayed reporting.
Overall the project Implementation Status and Results (ISR) report rates the financial
management of the project as „moderately satisfactory‟ (with an „unsatisfactory‟ for internal
audit). This suggests that the IARCSC failed to respond adequately to the concerns raised by the
Bank team regarding internal audit issues.
Procurement also does not appear to have improved much since the MTR: The final ISR rates
procurement for the project as „moderately unsatisfactory‟, citing a host of problems, such as
incomplete and deficient documentation, lack of a proper filing system, poor planning resulting in
delays in hiring key staff, inadequate contract management, and lack of updated information
regarding the status of contracts and the procurement plan in general.
The lack of disbursement was a major problem throughout the project with very little being spent
in the first year and the project closing with a large chunk of its allocation unspent.
2.5 Post-completion Operation/Next Phase
The project has set the right direction for civil service reform in Afghanistan, including the
eventual achievement of a transparent pay and grading system; a more professionally-oriented
civil service recruited on the basis of merit and operating within a framework of clear laws, rules,
and regulations; and a new emphasis on building the capacity of selected line ministries
particularly in the area of human resource management. Yet, the project itself was too small to
make a real dent on the challenges of civil service reform in the country and faced numerous
challenges, particularly a lack of political support, weak capacity in the IARCSC, a mixed
reception by line ministries, inadequate monitoring, and serious implementation problems. It is
therefore too early to say how the new practices sought to be put in place by the project will
evolve over the longer-term unless these obstacles are properly addressed.
The World Bank has approved a much larger, follow on project to improve capacity in the civil
services in Afghanistan. The new project provides some $240 million for efforts designed to
provide salary support for the hiring of senior management group positions in selected ministries
to reinforce common functions, such as human resource management, financial management, and
procurement as well as provide some salary support for technical and professional positions in the
civil service. Ministries selected for such support under the Capacity Building for Results
Facility (CBRF) will have to demonstrate progress on pay and grading, as well as functional
reorganization, among other things. The project seeks to minimize the risk of favoritism by
assigning the selection of staff hired under CBRF to an independent recruiting firm. It also
requires that proposals from ministries be independently evaluated before being presented to the
project steering committee. The project is located in the Ministry of Finance (with IARCSC as a
partner), thereby taking advantage of the power of the purse to push reform forward in line
ministries. An annual independent performance review will take place to provide an objective
assessment of progress, while performance indicators have been better chosen to focus on service
delivery outcomes in departments. The life of the project has been put at five years, instead of the
customary three, providing more time to achieve results in participating ministries. This new
project has the potential to contribute to the process of institution-building in Afghanistan,
assuming a positive enabling environment including political commitment, reasonable security,
greater ownership by line ministries, a cooperative relationship between MoF and IARCSC, and a
willingness to address implementation issues as they arise in a timely fashion.
11
It has been suggested that extending the project, rather than folding its objectives into the CBRF,
might have led to a better outcome. In this view, the restructuring simply did not have the time
given to it to show results. It is difficult to know whether this would have been the case;
therefore this ICR flags the question but does not take a position on it.
3. Assessment of Outcomes
3.1 Relevance of Objectives, Design and Implementation
The objectives of the project – focusing on the strengthening of the civil service in Afghanistan
through organizational restructuring, pay and grading reforms, merit-based appointments and
neutral procedures, and better human resource management – remain strategically relevant at the
time of writing this ICR. The challenge of state-building, with a professionally managed and
motivated civil service at its core, continues to be a pressing one, although it is not clear whether
this goal can accomplished in the context of the country‟s deteriorating security situation, and the
possibility of a draw-down of donor support over time. It is evident that decision-makers have
been compelled to divert much of their attention to addressing security concerns rather than
longer term issues, such as reforming the civil service. With regard to design, it is not apparent
that the goals of this project could have been successfully accomplished through the IARCSC
given its complex internal structure and capacity weaknesses. With regard to implementation, the
project‟s over-reliance on international technical assistants (ITAs) may have undermined the
broader objective of promoting the capacity of key line ministries since ITAs often felt compelled
to take over functions that should have been carried by ministries themselves in an attempt to
deliver results faster. A larger issue is whether one can successfully deliver a project, such as this
one, in a conflict-ridden, low capacity environment, like Afghanistan, as if it were a normal
project subject to the full complement of Bank processes and procedures. A more flexible
approach to project design and implementation, allowing for quick restructuring and calibration
of the results framework in response to shifts in the project‟s operating environment, might have
suited the context in Afghanistan better. The project thus raises questions about how the Bank
should treat projects in trying conditions, such as those prevailing in Afghanistan.
3.2 Achievement of Project Development Objectives
The initial project development objective promised that “across the time frame of the project, (by
2011), a significant proportion of service delivery ministries will be performing their functions to
an acceptable level and can be held accountable for the use of public resources. This will have
resulted from core ministries having been reorganized according to functions and civil servants
being managed according to clear rules and procedures.” This objective was too broad and
overarching to have been achieved by the project, especially given the small resource envelope
promised. In any event, none of the consulting firms that were to execute the project were on
board until almost a year after it became effective, a major delay by any standard of reckoning.
By the project‟s mid-term, only 14.5% of project funds had been disbursed: progress was
particularly weak in the area of organizational restructuring with line ministries showing little
interest, as well as in the area of oversight, monitoring, and communication of the government‟s
PAR program with the Project Coordination Department (PCD) bereft of capacity at the time and
negotiations with consulting firms to execute this component proving unsuccessful. A lack of
clear delineation of roles among different units of the IARCSCalso affected project
implementation.
As a result of this unsatisfactory progress, the project was restructured in November, 2009 with a
more limited project development objective stating the following: across the timeframe of the
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project (by July 2011) more accountable and transparent practices in the management of the civil
service will be introduced in selected ministries. The remainder of the project post-restructuring
focused primarily on strengthening merit-based human resource practices in government, mainly
pay and grading reforms and merit-based appointments, as well as bolstering human resource
directorates in five line ministries. The third restructured component seeking to direct monitoring
and coordination efforts towards the project itself, rather than the government‟s overall PAR
program never moved forward.
(i) Pay and Grading Reforms
There is no doubt that the government needed to reform its pay and grading structures in order to
introduce a measure of transparency in the management of the civil service, attract more qualified
people into its ranks, and move away from a career civil service with promotions being based on
the principle of seniority towards a position-based system more able to reward performance.
While the project closed with some 325,000 posts having been re-graded, the exercise was flawed
in several key respects. First, the pay and re-grading exercise started late: Initially slated to begin
at the start of the project, pay and re-grading was delayed by a year as it awaited the passage of a
Civil Servants Law to furnish the legal basis for such an initiative. It thus appears that the project
was not ready when it became effective in July, 2007. Second, while ministries were willing to
adopt the new pay and grading scales because this meant a hefty pay hike for civil servants, they
were much less eager to endure the pain of organizational restructuring. As a result, staffing
reviews took place without a transformation of ministry functions and internal organization. This
meant that pay and re-grading was a skin-deep exercise that left ministry structures mostly intact.
Ideally, organizational restructuring should have led to a revised staffing plan followed by pay
and grading; in reality, pay and re-grading was implemented in the absence of organizational
change of any significance. Third, it is almost impossible to judge the quality of job descriptions
and evaluations conducted under the project or their consistency across ministries; the result
indicator for the pay and re-grading exercise is entirely quantitative in nature and there is no data
on its quality.
(ii) Introducing Merit-Based Practices in Government
The project sought to facilitate the development of a uniform set of rules and guidelines affecting
the civil service relating to recruitment, performance appraisal, severance, disciplinary matters
and other issues. Not all of these were adopted directly as a result of the project. The Civil
Servants Law, which became law in June, 2008, was an initiative that fell outside the scope of the
project. It contained many of the legal foundations for HR practices, including pay and re-
grading, appointments to the civil service, performance appraisal, promotions, appeals,
retirements, and disciplinary processes. The final implementation support mission held in July,
2011 noted that recruitment, appraisal, and appeals systems had been established through CSRP
but with only “limited effectiveness” because of a check-list mentality rather than a focus on the
quality of recruitment, providing feedback on appraisals, and taken action on poor performance
reports. One commission official noted that there was a tendency for supervisors to inflate the
performance ratings of their subordinates, undermining the purpose of the exercise.
The Independent Appointments Board and the Appeals Board appear to have made progress in
streamlining their procedures. It is not clear whether this was the result of any direct support
from the CSRP project. The final implementation support mission noted that the consulting firm
hired to work with the two boards provided only “generic” support rather than “specific guidance.”
The contract of the consulting group working with the two Boards, as well as the Human
Resource Policy and Legislation Department, was in fact cancelled because of “highly
unsatisfactory” performance (this according to the final implementation support mission),
suggesting that its contribution was marginal.
13
The Independent Appointments Board (IAB) has introduced some useful reforms including
allowing third parties drawn from civil society and universities to observe selection procedures;
separating short-listing and appointing committees; recording interviews to prevent manipulation;
declaring the successful candidate on the same day as the interview; and establishing a question
bank for written examinations and interviews that is revealed to the panel just before
commencement of the process, as is the position for which the interview is being conducted.
Third party monitoring was a reform supported by the ARTF Incentive program, but not the
project. Some 120,769 civil servants have been appointed as a result of the new pay and re-
grading exercise by July, 2011. Approximately some 12,800 senior civil servants (grades one and
two) have been appointed by the IAB.
While procedures have improved in the Appointments Board, it is difficult to evaluate the extent
to which the problems of patronage, corruption, and nepotism have been tackled. First, we have
no reliable data on the question. Second, all senior appointments have to be routed through the
Council of Ministers before being passed on to the Office of the President for final approval. The
Council of Ministers can delay an appointment for long periods, resulting in frustration for the
candidate, abandonment of the application, re-advertisement, or appeal. Third, the Appointments
Board relies heavily on the criteria laid out in the job descriptions prepared by the ministries; if
these criteria are inadequate or written to favour particular types of candidates (candidates
seeking reappointment through the P&G process would benefit more from a selection criteria
emphasizing prior experience in government than a new applicant from the private sector), there
is little the Board can do about it. Fourth, most appointments are made at lower grades (3-8) by
ministries, provincial governors, and district governors under nominal oversight by the Board.
The project did not monitor whether appointment procedures were being properly followed in
these grades or the extent of political influence or family pressures exerted in the appointments
process by ministers, legislators, and local notables. In any event, the more stringent procedures
applied only to senior appointments made by the IAB. Given the large number of graduates in
Afghanistan produced every year and the lack of private sector opportunities, it is likely that
social pressures to circumvent merit-based employment procedures will remain strong in the
foreseeable future.
The Appeals Board hears complaints from civil servants; approximately seventy percent of these
complaints constitute appeals against decisions by the IAB. Data on appeals is fragmentary, but
the majority of appeals seem to come from ministries based in Kabul. Awareness of the
procedure to file an appeal remains unclear to many civil servants. Fewer reforms appear to have
taken place in the Appeals Board than the IAB and none that can clearly be said to have emerged
from the project.
(iii) Strengthening Human Resource Management in Line Ministries
Initially, the project focused on establishing Reform Implementation Support Units in five
ministries to drive the reform process, including organizational restructuring, preparation of
strategic plans, implementing pay and grading reforms, and bolstering the capacity of human
resource management directorates (HRMDs). RIMUs were overseen by a coordinator (usually an
international consultant) and supported by two or more national consultants. Initially RIMU staff
reported directly to the Deputy Minister of Administration and Finance in the line ministry; later
this was changed to include both the Deputy Minister and HRM Directors in order to make them
more responsive to the ministry HR unit. The argument in favour of using RIMUs to drive
ministry reforms stemmed from the problem of weak capacity. On the other hand, several
ministry staff and commission officials complained that the project had supported the creation of
a parallel structure in ministries that was doing little to build internal capacity and undermining it
14
by taking over core ministry functions. After restructuring, the role of RIMUs was trimmed with
the focus of the project shifting toward building the capacity of HRMDs, particularly with respect
to implementing pay and grading reforms and overseeing critical HR functions, such as
recruitment and performance appraisal. Pay and grading teams chosen by the IARCSC‟s PAR
Department worked closely with HR units in ministries to implement pay and grading reforms;
HR staff received training in a variety of HR functions; and HR units were, in turn, expected to
reach out to ministry staff to explain how the new civil service laws, rules, and guidelines would
work in practice. A decision to appoint HR Directors through the Management Capacity Program
(MCP) on a higher pay scale helped attract more talented people to lead HRMDs.
The project focused on five ministries, including MoF, the Ministry of Transport and Civil
Aviation (MTCA), the Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation, and Livestock (MAIL), the Ministry of
Rural Rehabilitation and Development (MRRD), and the Ministry of Public Works (MPW). Of
these five, the MoF appeared to have made the most progress in building up its HR capacity: the
HR unit in MoF had an excellent relationship with its RIMU. With RIMU support, the HR unit
in MoF developed some 10 human resource policies for the ministry, put in place an induction
manual for new staff, and completed pay and re-grading for 90% of its positions.
The attempt to strengthen human resource management was marked by certain weaknesses.
RIMUs, for example, were not adequately staffed in terms of numbers and quality, thus
hampering the reform effort. Even when adequately staffed, turnover was high and the continuity
necessary to drive reform was compromised. Capacity within HR directorates was low and staff
constraints significant. The consultants working with RIMUs and HR Directorates more often
than not viewed their support as a one-off exercise, rather than as part of a program of capacity-
building over time. The objectives of the reform process were not clearly communicated to HR
units and ministry staff, resulting in weak ownership and confusion. Because of low capacity in
HRMDs (and a lack of counterparts because of staffing shortages), RIMU consultants were not
able to transfer capacity effectively. Monitoring was also a problem: the project provided little
data on whether HRMDs (and ministries) were complying with new civil service guidelines in
key areas. One consulting group sought to use what it called a „staged capacity building model‟
to evaluate the ability of HRMDs to produce key outputs on their own, but the standards of
quality expected from such outputs were only weakly specified, rendering the exercise much less
meaningful.
3.3 Efficiency
Not applicable – Net Present Value/Economic Rate of Return for the project was not calculated at
the time of appraisal
3.4 Justification of Overall Outcome Rating
While the project‟s objectives were strategically relevant, it is not clear that senior Afghan
officials accorded much priority to civil service reform issues; rather they were preoccupied with
addressing security and economic considerations. The project relied too much on the IARCSC, a
fragmented body with limited capacity, to achieve its objectives. International technical
assistants tended to supplant the core functions of ministries, rather than improving their capacity.
The project lost a year before consulting contracts were put in place, while the rate of
disbursement was very slow right up to project restructuring. As result, the project failed to
achieve its initial project development objective. The initial PDO was so ambitious that even had
the project experienced a faster rate of disbursement, it is unlikely that the PDO could ever have
been achieved in the time frame and limited funds made available under the project. There was a
15
tension between the government‟s desire to achieve system-wide reforms relating to pay and
grading, for example, and the capacity of the IARCSC to implement such changes across
government as well as fiscal constraints.
The revised PDO scaled down what was to be achieved by the project; even so, what was
achieved after restructuring still left much to be desired. One missing dimension was the quality
of the initiatives undertaken by the project. We have little data on quality of the pay and re-
grading exercise, particularly that of job descriptions and evaluations and their consistency across
ministries. The project makes the highly disputable assumption that mere procedural compliance
would be sufficient to translate into a merit-based system of appointment; no serious quality audit
of appointments was carried out and the data on the matter of only procedural compliance was
scanty. The IAB did introduce some welcome reforms in the appointments process for senior
officials but this does not appear to have happened directly as a result of the project. Indeed, one
supervision mission complained about the “highly unsatisfactory” performance of the consulting
firm chosen to work with the IAB, the Appeals Board, and the Human Policy and Legislation
Department, and later cancelled the firm‟s contract. The attempt to restructure human resource
management in five ministries was also beset with problems including overlap between RIMUs
and HR Directorates, weak capacity transfer and staffing gaps, poor communication of reform
objectives by the IARCSC to HR units and within ministries, and hardly any monitoring of how
well HR units and ministries were complying with civil service regulations and guidelines.
Finally, the pay and re-grading exercise occurred without a major overhaul of ministry functions
and structures; this in turn reduced the value of pay and re-grading as a tool for administrative
reforms with new pay-scales and grades being grafted onto existing structures. Even after
restructuring, the project was never able to correct for this basic flaw in the pay and re-grading
exercise and the project closed without any major organizational changes having taken place in
ministries. Donor top-offs undermined the effectiveness of the new pay and grading scales and
contributed to high turn-over rates in RIMUS.
Overall Outcome Rating before Restructuring: Unsatisfactory
Overall Outcome Rating after Restructuring: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Weighted Overall Outcome Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
The rating of „moderately unsatisfactory‟ (MU) for the project‟s outcomes is consistent with the
final rating of MU with respect to progress towards achievement of the PDO provided in the last
Implementation Status and Results (ISR) review. It is also a notch better than the rating of
„unsatisfactory‟ with respect to the likelihood of achieving the project‟s overall development
objectives rated by the Quality Assurance Group (QAG).
4. Assessment of Risk to Development Outcome
The development of a professionally managed, merit-based civil service capable of performing
key functions depends on factors that are not easy to predict. Clearly, political ownership will be
needed if this goal is to be realized over time; the Chairman of the IARCSC does not possess
ministerial rank and lacks sustained access to top Afghan leaders. The government has recently
agreed to allow the Chairman to attend Cabinet meetings on a quarterly basis to review the
progress of the civil service agenda in line ministries in the presence of the President. Given the
deteriorating security situation in Afghanistan, however, it is unlikely that the leadership will be
able to focus effectively on the longer term agenda of institution-building in the country,
including the development of the civil service. In the absence of a push to continue reforming the
civil service from the Afghan leadership, line ministries may feel less pressure to press on with
the task of rationalizing their structures and processes. The capacity of the IARCSC (and line
16
ministries) to implement reform remains a problem, despite improvements. Corruption poses a
serious risk to the development of a merit-based civil service especially in light of the burgeoning
opium economy as well as the enormous social pressures on government as the employer of first
resort in a country where alternative private sector sources of employment are scarce. All of
these problems are magnified in provinces where the writ of the central government does not run
and the administrative apparatus, such as it exists, is weak and demoralized. Finally, as the West
whittles down its presence in Afghanistan, donors may lose interest in pumping money into the
country; this, in turn, may translate into a scarcity of resources to pursue public administration
reforms, especially given the country‟s heavy reliance on external sources of support and weak
revenue base.
Risk to Development Outcomes; High
5. Assessment of Bank and Borrower Performance
5.1 Bank Performance
(a) Bank Performance in Ensuring Quality at Entry
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
(b) Quality of Supervision
Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
(c) Overall Bank Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Quality at Entry
As noted in Section II, the project had serious weaknesses at entry. The preparation for the
project was inadequate in two respects. There was little attempt to bring political economy
insights to bear on the design of the project. It is also puzzling why the team task did not conduct
a detailed analysis of the capacity of the IARCSC to implement the project effectively beforehand.
A more serious attempt to grapple with the political economy factors affecting the project – and a
more explicit treatment of the capacity issues of the IARCSC – might have resulted in a more
realistic and achievable project development objective. Project documents suffered from a highly
technocratic perspective with inadequate attention paid to the particular context in Afghanistan.
The perception of having been consulted inadequately on the part of the IARCSC was another
problem, which undermined ownership. The project‟s initial objectives were too ambitious to be
implemented or monitored in a low capacity environment, such as the one in Afghanistan. The
structure of the project was such that it became balkanized among the IARCSC different units,
leading to a loss of coherence across the project‟s many components and sub-components. The
failure to create a strong Project Monitoring Unit (PMU) with real authority to steer the project,
along with a confusing multiplicity of result indicators and no mechanism to track them, hobbled
the project from its inception. It should be noted that the PMU was deliberately kept weak to
give the IARCSC‟s units a greater role in project implementation; however, this approach was
unlikely to succeed because of the IARCSC‟s capacity limitations. The project‟s risk framework
and mitigation measures were weak, revealing an over-confidence that was not appropriate. As
the QAG review points out, there seems to have been little attempt to follow up on the
17
recommendations of the QER “to scale down ambitious project scope and guard against the
consequences of the weak implementation capacity of IARCSC.”
On the other hand, the project was prepared in a difficult environment under pressure from both
the government and Bank management.
Quality of Supervision
The Bank team was candid in identifying problems and proactively raising them with the client.
Three key issues that may have affected the quality of supervision bear noting. First, the Bank
team had four task team leaders during the course of the project (on average one per year over the
life of the project) which disrupted the continuity necessary for effective supervision. Second,
while Bank teams were aware of the problems affecting the project as it unfolded and discussed
these with the IARCSC, the project was restructured only in November, 2009, more than two
years after it became effective. The reasons for this delay are unclear give that it would have
become apparent long before then that the project could not meet its development objective.
Indeed, the aide memoire of the supervision mission held in November, 2008 noted serious
problems with project implementation, which it attributed to a combination of a “deteriorating
security environment”, “uncertainties with regard to the authorizing environment of the IARCSC”,
and a decline in “ministry attention on real restructuring” – all of which might have been
expected to compromise timely achievement of the PDO. The Bank team was in fact considering
whether to close the project or proceed towards restructuring; in the end, the latter course was
chosen. The delay in restructuring, however, meant that the project, even in its new scaled-down
form, would have less time to show results. Third, the Bank team was slow in providing critical
no objection letters to the IARCSC to hire consultants under the project and approving contract
amendments (including changes in the terms of reference) with firm consultants pursuant to
restructuring. This meant that legally firm consultants were not obliged to follow the new terms
of reference until formally approved. IARCSC officials stated that they would have benefited
from more frequent supervision missions; the Bank practice of holding supervision missions
every six months was viewed as too infrequent given the difficulties of executing projects in
Afghanistan. They also stated that they would have preferred if supervision missions had relied
more on hard data on project performance obtained through independent monitoring as the basis
for discussion. Finally, it is worth noting that that the quality of consultation with the IARCSC
improved during the restructuring process.
5.2 Borrower Performance
(a) Government Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
(b) Implementing Agency or Agencies Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
(c) Overall Borrower Performance Rating: Moderately Unsatisfactory
Government Performance
18
The government did signal its ownership of the agenda of civil service reform at first. Both the
Interim Afghanistan National Development Strategy (I-ANDS) and the Afghanistan Compact
emphasized the importance of public administration reform in the creation of viable state. It
launched a Priority Reform and Restructuring (PRR) initiative under which certain departments
were given higher salary packages in exchange for restructuring. Several projects were
commissioned to improve the capacity of the civil service, such as the Management Capacity
Program (MCP). The government passed both a civil service and a civil servants law to create an
overarching legal framework to govern the working of the civil service. On the other hand, the
disbanding of the Ministerial Advisory Committee (MAC) on public administration reform led to
less high-level oversight of the process. The deteriorating security environment, however,
compelled political decision-makers to shift their attention away from the longer-term issues
involved in building an effective civil service to addressing the more immediate threats to the
basis of the nascent state itself. Finally, the government pursued contradictory policies:
permitting a variety of donor-funded salary top offs to officials, while, at the same time, trying to
put in place a relatively uniform pay and grading system across government.
It is hard to assess the degree to which line ministries owned the reforms promoted by the project.
As noted earlier, they embraced the pay and grading reforms, which involved a large pay increase
for civil servants, more easily than the harder organizational reforms sought to be implanted by
the project. As political attention on public administration reform issues waned, line ministries
felt less pressure to move forward on those parts of the agenda that they regarded as difficult.
The capacity of line ministries to implement the reforms supported by the project also varied,
with MoF doing better than some others.
Implementing Agency Performance
The IARCSC lacked the capacity to provide strategic direction to the project; nor was it able to
effectively coordinate and monitor the different initiatives supported by it. The project steering
committee intended to provide high-level oversight and monitoring quickly became inactive.
Responsibility for implementing the project‟s components was scattered among several different
units of the IARCSC, leading to loss of coherence and overall coordination. The Administrative
Reform Secretariat (ARS) was unable to fulfill its responsibility to monitor the project effectively,
making it harder to hold line ministries to account for their performance. The Administration and
Finance Department of the IARCSC also found it difficult to process staffing and payment
decisions in a timely fashion, functions that should normally been performed by the PMU.
Tensions within the Commission over where the locus of control over the project would lie made
it more difficult to implement its objectives successfully.
The IARCSC failed to manage its consultants well. Indeed, the mid-term review (MTR) mission
held in late 2010 noted that “too many IARCSC managers are directing the work program with
the net effect that consultants are not clear whose instructions they should follow.” Consultants
noted that they lacked sustained access to senior counterparts in the IARCSC. They added that
they would have benefited from more intensive supervision and feedback from the IARCSC,
especially senior officials.
One rationale for restructuring was to address these institutional problems. The project steering
committee was reactivated; a new project manager appointed to lead a PMU with more staff and
resources at his command; and full control given the Director-General of the Civil Services
Management Department, thus creating a clear locus of project control and coordination. The
impact of these changes was limited by the fact that restructuring took place late in November,
19
2009, as well as the legal difficulties involved in redrafting the terms of reference of the firms
already chosen to execute the project.
In terms of building ownership, the IARCSC lacked a well designed communication strategy to
convince line ministries to implement the package of reforms supported by the project effectively.
The IARCSC was also unable to create a regular channel of access to high level decision-makers
to maintain a favourable authorizing agenda for public administration reform efforts in
Afghanistan, including the project. This remains a challenge for future operations in this area.
Despite these problems, the implementing agency was able to persevere with pay and grading
reforms (not considering qualitative dimensions) and lay some basis for better human resource
policies and practices especially through the development of HRMDs. The IARCSC‟s capacity
improved over time, particularly through the hiring of more qualified staff, but continued internal
issues and a lack of strategic leadership remained problems.
6. Lessons Learned
(i) Bring political economy analysis to bear on project design: Civil service reforms involve
complex political economy dynamics that need to be understood before initiating a project in such
an area. Key questions that such an analysis should address include the sources of support and
resistance to reform; strategies for sequencing and implementing reforms through time; the
creation of institutional mechanisms to build political ownership for change; and strategies to
galvanize potential winners from the reform process (e.g., users of government services) and
reassure those opposed to change (e.g., avoiding retrenchment). The insights gleaned from such
an analysis should be brought to bear in an explicit fashion on the design of projects through the
PAD and other similar documents.
(ii) Be upfront about the risks of low capacity: It is critical that the design of such projects be
based on a realistic assessment of the capacity of implementing agencies. In the case of the
project under review, no explicit work was done on the capacity of the IARCSC or ministries to
execute its components effectively. It was assumed that such capacity either existed in some
form or could be built up quickly without harming project implementation. Had the extent of the
capacity problem been fully understood from the outset, steps could have been taken to address
the problem by scaling down the PDO, creating an empowered PMU, trimming the components,
and engaging in more intensive implementation support.
(iii) Consult closely with the client when designing a project: There was a perception that the
Bank team did not consult widely enough in the initial design of the project. It is tempting to
design a project in fragile contexts dependent on external aid based on what the team views as
best for the client; however, in practice this can translate into a project that is poorly anchored in
the realities of a country‟s context and deprive the team of the critical local knowledge needed to
structure a successful project.
(iv) Communicate the goals of reform: The project under review lacked a coherent strategy for
communicating the goals of reform to political leaders, line ministries, and other donors. It is
easy to write this off as another example of the IARCSC‟s capacity weaknesses, but there was
nothing to prevent the project for putting in place alternative mechanisms to communicate the
goals of the reform process to build ownership, soothe anxieties among those uncomfortable with
the prospect of change, and influence public discourse about reforms.
20
(v) Be targeted about monitoring: It is important to focus on a few key indicators of progress
that can be reliably tracked over time preferably by an independent means. Such indicators
should capture not just the quantitative dimensions of reform but qualitative ones as well. The
task of monitoring should be driven by the project‟s particular requirements and the feasibility of
data collection in a given setting, rather than the temptation to present an impressive results
matrix to secure easier approval of the project.
(vi) Provide for continuity in task team leadership: The project under review had as many as
four task time leaders in the space of four years, seriously affecting the thread of continuity
needed for proper project implementation and supervision. More attention needs to be given to
the challenge of assuring the continuity of task team and task team leadership in difficult
environments. There is little to be gained by lamenting the rapid turnover of government officials
and consultants when the Bank itself cannot guarantee a modicum of continuity in its own
projects especially in challenging situations.
(vii) Engage in intensive implementation support: In high-conflict countries with rapidly
shifting challenges and capacity constraints, intensive implementation support is crucial for the
success of any project. IARCSC officials noted that they would have benefited from more support
during project implementation. Such field-based support can easily be extended when the Bank
has a functioning country office in place.
(viii) A different approach for projects in difficult contexts? A broader issue is whether it is
possible to successfully deliver a project in a conflict-ridden, low capacity environment, as if it
were a normal project subject to the full array of Bank processes and procedures. A more flexible
approach to project design and implementation that gives project teams some leeway to make
changes in project objectives, components, and result indicators to address problems as they
surface on the ground may yield better outcomes. One could still hold such projects fully
accountable to the fiduciary safeguards common to all Bank projects, but they would no longer
have to operate in a straitjacket that does little to improve project performance and may even
hinder it, particularly in very difficult environments
7. Comments on Issues Raised by Borrower/Implementing Agencies/Partners
(a) Borrower/implementing agencies
We received comments from the Independent Administrative Reforms and Civil Service
Commission (IARCSC) on this ICR. The IARCSC notes that the decision to break-up the project
into three major components was based more on procurement considerations rather than project
design. It is clear that project design should not have been driven by considerations of
simplifying the procurement process but by the larger objectives of the project. The IARCSC
points out that the capacity of the Administration and Finance Department improved over time.
The ICR does note an overall improvement in the capacity of the IARCSC over the life of this
project; however capacity issues remain a problem for the effective implementation of public
administration reforms in the country. The IARCSC points out that the implementation of merit-
based recruitment has experienced difficulties because of the continuing lack of a supportive
administrative culture. This certainly is an issue but some progress has been made in improving
the work of the Independent Appointments Board despite a tough environment. We agree with
the implementing agency that the Bank may not have handled the procurement of consultants for
the oversight and monitoring component of the project well, leading the dropping of this
particular activity. The 'moderately unsatisfactory' rating for project outcomes, as noted by the
IARCSC in its response, is based on both faulty project design at entry as well as problems of
implementation and weak outcomes. We have made some editorial changes in the ICR in
21
response to the comments received by the IARCSC. We fully agree with the IARCSC that the
political, social, and legal context should have been better addressed in the design of this project.
We also agree that the project team should have commissioned a capacity assessment before
embarking on the project.
(b) Cofinanciers N/A
(c) Other partners and stakeholders N/A
22
Annex 1. Project Costs and Financing
(a) Project Cost by Component (in USD Million equivalent)
Components Appraisal Estimate
(USD millions)
Actual/Latest
Estimate (USD
millions)
Percentage of
Appraisal
Building HR Capacity and
Organizational Restructuring in
Line Ministries
8.40 8.73 104
Human Resource Management
Policies and Implementation 8.70 9.54 110
Project management and Support
Services 3.30 2.13 65
Total Baseline Cost 20.4 20.4 100
Physical Contingencies
Price Contingencies
Total Project Costs 20.4 20.4
Front-end fee PPF
Front-end fee IBRD
Total Financing Required 20.4 20.4
(b) Financing
Source of Funds Type of
Cofinancing
Appraisal
Estimate
(USD
millions)
Actual/Late
st Estimate
(USD
millions)
Percentage
of Appraisal
Borrower
IDA Grant 20.40 20.40 100
23
Annex 2. Outputs by Component
Component 1: Strengthening Human Resource Management (HRM) Capacity in Core
Ministries
This component was designed to support strengthening of human resource management functions
in selected line ministries. It was assumed that better functioning HR directorates would facilitate
the implementation of P&G reform. In addition, this component also sought to intensify training
to help internalize basic foundation concepts of practices of human resources management which
are required to build the new and improved human resources management units.
The following table provides the ratio of tashkeel strength of HR directorates to overall tashkeel
for the five ministries which were supported through CSRP. As the table shows, the approved
tashkeel strength of HR directorates after pay and grading reforms is between 1 and 2 percent of
the total tashkeel in these line ministries. This also implies that at least in the five selected
ministries, the structure of HR directorates in line ministries is standardized.
Table 1: Ratio of HR staff relative to Tashkeel
Ministry Tashkeel of HR
Directorates
Current Staff
in HR
Directorates
Total
Tashkeel
HR Tashkeel as % of
Total Tashkeel
MoPW 35 33 3378 1.03
MoF 75 73 7180 1.04
MoTCA 29 29 2104 1.38
MAIL 79 67 9299 1.00
MRRD 26 22 2129 1.22
Specific achievements under this component are summarized below:
Organizational reform interventions completed in 4 ministries including MRRD, MAIL,
MPW and MOT.
HR departments established in 5 ministries (MRRD, MAIL, MPW, MOF, and MOT).
Strategic change management plans have been implemented in 5 ministries
Five HRMDs are established and functional
One general HR training and Coaching Plan has been completed in MAIL and 2
specialized HR Training and Coaching Plans have been completed in MPW and MOT.
Capacity for auditing appointments, appraisals and appeals in 5 line ministries has been
institutionalized within the CSMD.
Specific performance management systems have been put in place and skill transfer
research has been completed.
While these achievements are generally in line with the targets set out at the start of CSRP, it
should be recognized that the emphasis has been on setting up the procedures and processes to
manage HR reforms in line ministries. CSRP, through component 1 has not managed to set up
procedures or transfer sufficient capacity to measure and assess the qualitative depth of reforms.
In addition, evidence from the five selected ministries reveals that the practices institutionalized
24
by CSRP were not effective in maintaining fully functional HR directorates until HR directors for
these ministries were hired through another Bank project, Management Capacity Program (MCP).
Component 2: Implementation of Merit-Based Human Resource Management Reforms in
Government
This component primarily aimed at the provision of technical assistance for i) development of
civil service rules and regulations derived from new Civil Servants and Civil Service Laws; ii)
strengthen the system of merit-based appointments; and, iii) implementing GoA‟s new pay and
grading policy. Subsequent to restructuring, additional effort was made in building up a single
and manageable personnel registries and human resources information system with the aim to
create a basis for monitoring employment, strengthen internal and external controls on payroll
systems and mitigate risks of employment related fraud, including ghost workers and absenteeism.
Basic procedures for recruitment and appraisals have been established through CSRP but these
need to be updated and revised regularly. More transparency and accountability mechanisms
should be included in the recruitment and appraisal procedures. Discussions with the IARCSC
have revealed that the quality of TA provided by implementing consultants (SMEC) was generic.
For the specific context of Afghanistan, it did not provide sufficient guidance on developing a
comprehensive legal framework through which civil service reform can be implemented.
Pay and Grading roll-out consists of the five main stages: (i) Reviewing Ministry/Agency
stuctures; (ii) Evaluation and regrading posts; (iii) Appointing staff (either through transfer or
merit-based appointments); (iv) Payment of salaries; and (v) Monitoring and evaluation. The
P&G teams are able to achieve quantitative targets without external technical assistance. The
original intention was a „light-touch‟ approach to P&G, particularly after it was decided to
partially de-link restructuring from merit-based appointments in 2008. Table 2 presents the status
of P&G implementation for selected ministries/agencies till July 2011. The following measures
were put in place to ensure a reasonable standard to the implementation of P&G:
Readiness Review Manual and Job Description and Job Evaluation Manual periodically
updated based on lessons learned;
Training to P&G teams and ministry HR staff;
Packs given to Ministries/Agencies which include manuals on Civil Servants Law and
Organic Law;
Assessments by Ministries/Agencies of their satisfaction with the work conducted by P&G
teams;
Assessments by HR Unit P&G trainees on the standard of training they received;
Assessments of the knowledge/understanding of the trainees of P&G implementation issues;
Assessments of sample job descriptions completed by P&G team members;
Generic tashkeels for HR Units;
Generic job descriptions;
Weekly review by international consultants of 25 job descriptions and feedback provided to
team members;
Standard formats for P&G implementation plans and final P&G proposals.
25
Table 2: Status of P&G Reform Implementation
Ministry/Agency Restructuring Total Tashkeel Tashkeel Appointed % Appointed
Ministry of Justice Complete 9,004 5,953 66.12
Ministry of Public Health Complete 16,098 3,461 21.50
Ministry of Labour, Social Affairs , Martyrs and Disabled Complete 7,235 1,570 21.70
Ministry of Agriculture, Irrigation and Livestock Complete 9,299 8,075 86.84
IARCSC Complete 473 232 49.05
Ministry of Economy Complete 950 875 92.11
Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs Complete 128 47 36.72
Ministry of Rural Rehabilitation and Development Complete 2,129 1,264 59.37
Independent Directorate of Local Governance Complete 19,971 7,695 38.53
High Officer for Oversight on Anti-Corruption Complete 502 52 10.36
Ministry of Education Complete 222,000 72,341 32.59
Ministry of Finance Complete 7,180 5,191 72.30
Ministry of Public Works Complete 3,378 1,042 30.85
Ministry of Transport Complete 2,104 1,512 71.86
Atomic Energy Commission Complete 125 19 15.20
Ministry of Energy and Water Complete 2,697 1,677 62.18
Ministry of Commerce and Industry Complete 1,168 893 76.46
Ministry of Higher Education Complete 7,100 1,135 15.99
Office of the President Suspended 3,297 66 2.00
Ministry of Urban Development In progress 600 344 57.33
Ministry of Mines In progress 2,405 159 6.61
Ministry of Information and Culture In progress 3,903 2,505 64.18
Upper House of Parliament In progress 1,087 119 10.95
Lower House of Parliament In progress 2,763 119 4.31
Supreme Court In progress 6,542 4,423 67.61
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Not started 1,299 - -
Ministry of Haj and Religious Affairs Not started 7,044 - -
Ministry of Women's Affairs Not started 874 - -
Ministry of Refugees and Repatriation Not started 1,000 - -
Attorney General's Office Not started 4,831 - -
Office of Administrative Affairs Not started 1,206 - -
Science Academy Not started 459 - -
Independent Election Commission Not started 400 - -
Disaster Preparedness Office Not started 329 - -
Central Statistics Office Not started 800 - -
Control and Audit Office Not started 315 - -
Geodesy and Cartography Office Not started 700 - -
Directorate of Nomads Not started 198 - -
National Olympic Committee Not started 360 - -
Afghan National Standards Association Not started 300 - -
Legal Training Centre Not started 27 - -
26
Component 3: Project Management and Support Services
The IARCSC‟s ability to monitor and implement CSRP was designed through the project
management and support services component. This component was reengineered in 2009 to
strengthen project governance, coordination and project management capacity of the IARCSC,
rather than supporting broad reform communication and coordination efforts envisaged under the
original design. The original project design envisaged that project administration be carried out
through a multitude of existing units in the IARCSC. While this was intended to avoid ring
fencing and therefore to provide for more sustainable implementation of the project, in practice
fragmentation of implementation responsibility in the IARCSC has impacted on overall project
performance. Specific issues regarding project management are mentioned below:
Coordination and communication across directorates: The Programme was implemented by
the IARCSC but its implementation was marred by weak and fragmented management. The
different components of the programme were managed by different directorates within the
IARCSC (CSMD, IAB, ARS). Coordination and communication linkages among these
directorates were weak which resulted in bottlenecks in the decision making processes within the
IARCSC.
Capacity: The IARCSC had substantial experience of implementing public sector reform projects
since 2002. These include the first and second Emergency Public Administration Projects (EPAP
and SEPAP) on public administration reforms and projects such as Afghanistan Expatriate
Program (AEP) and Lateral Entry Program (LEP) on civil service capacity building aspects.
However, a thorough assessment of the capacity of the IARCSC to implement CSRP was not
completed prior to the initiation of the project. Therefore a lot of issues with regard to the project
management and implementation such as procurement and financial management issues related to
the consulting firms and co-ordination issues within the IARCSC were not addressed properly.
Utilization of TA by IARCSC: Implementing partners/consultants working with the IARCSC to
implement CSRP were not expected to provide feedback on project design at the policy level and
it was assumed that they would provide technical feedback on issues related to the management
and implementation of the Programme. As a result, many issues that impacted project
performance were resolved only at a very late stage of implementation.
Capacity of the Implementing Consultants: Consultants working with Civil Service
Management Department (CSMD) have helped enhance the capacity of the CSMD in the
technical aspects of implementing P&G and HR reforms. The guidelines, procedures and similar
documents that have been prepared by the consultants are comprehensive for the CSMD staff to
execute reform interventions by themselves to an extent. However counterparts for the
consultants were not identified in a timely manner. Even when counterparts were identified, they
were not permanent positions within the tashkeel, which made it difficult to ensure continuity.
Also, given the delay in recruiting international consultants for specific issues, the CSMD staff
did not receive sufficient training on the specific issues of organizational design and quality
assurance. The consultants deployed in line ministries to support the development of HR
capacities were partially effective. One of the major problems in implementing HR reforms was
the high turnover rate of the RIMU staff and unavailability of qualified replacements for the
mandated work in the line ministries. Also, these consultants did not have the capacity to drive
the reform agenda in the initial phase of project implementation largely due to institutional
constraints that surrounded them as discussed above. It is only with the recruitment of HR
directors through MCP that capacity building concerns began to receive importance within line
ministries.
27
Annex 3. Bank Lending and Implementation Support/Supervision Processes
(a) Task Team members
Names Title Unit Responsibility/
Specialty
Lending
Anne Tully Senior Operations Officer OPCFC TTL
Nagaraju Duthaluri Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement
Nigel Peter Coulson Senior Public Sector Specialist SASGP Public Sector
Ranjana Mukherjee Senior Public Sector Specialist SASGP Public Sector
Jalpa Patel Consultant SASGP Public Sector
Hossai Mahak Aliffi Team Assistant SASPF Program Assistance
Supervision/ICR
Satyendra Prasad Senior Governance Specialist SASGP TTL
Vikram Chand Senior Public Sector Management
Specialist SASGP TTL (ICRR)
Sebastian Eckardt Economist ECSP4 Public Sector
Deepal Fernando Senior Procurement Specialist ECSO2 Procurement
Asif Ali Senior Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement
Kenneth O. Okpara Sr Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial
Management
Asha Narayan Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial
Management
Zohra Farooq Financial Management Specialist SARFM Financial
Management
Rahimullah Wardak Procurement Specialist SARPS Procurement
Maha Ahmed Consultant SASGP
Public Sector ;
Monitoring and
Evaluation
Jalpa Patel Consultant SASGP Public Sector
Mohammed Edreess Sahak Team Assistant SASEP Program Assistance
Kaushik Sarkar Consultant SASGP Public Sector
28
(b) Staff Time and Cost
Stage of Project Cycle
Staff Time and Cost (Bank Budget Only)
No. of staff weeks USD Thousands (including
travel and consultant costs)
Lending
FY06 18.4 281.84
FY07 38.7 163.06
FY08 0 0.00
Total: 444.90
Supervision/ICR
FY06 0 0.00
FY07 0 0.00
FY08 28.05 165.08
FY09 25.22 149.66
FY10 13.5 82.18
FY11 18.22 160.14
FY12 11.75 69.98
Total: 627.04
29
Annex 4. Summary of Borrower's ICR and/or Comments on Draft ICR
The Independent Administrative Reform and Civil Service Commission (IARCSC) acknowledge
the receipt of the Implementation Completion and Results Report (ICR) on the Civil Service
Reform project (CSRP). The IARCSC is appreciative of the opportunity given to provide its
feedback on the report.
Overall Comments on the ICR
According to IARCSC, this report provides good analytical findings which can be used for
further project design and implementation. This ICR is based on good consultations with all
stakeholders and provides many lessons. The report has noted weaknesses in the M&E and
Administration and Finance (A&F) departments; the project, however, failed to support these
departments. The report did not cover later decisions to address weaknesses in M&E.
The report does not explain clearly the role of the A&F Department in the IARCSC.
Consultations were carried out by the ICR team with the current project manager recruited at the
end of the project, who was not fully aware of the historical background of project
implementation especially during initial financial management of the project and procurement
process. The role of the A&F department was not clearly understood. Financial management,
accounting and contracts management was not the responsibility of the A&F department, as the
IARCSC had a decentralized program management policy. Even during restructuring of the
project, program management was the responsibility of the project manager and the Civil Service
Management Department (CSMD). It was only during the final stages of project implementation
that the A&F department was involved in financial management at length. Although the A&F
department had weaknesses at the beginning of project implementation, the capacity of the
department improved especially after the second supervision mission. This improvement can be
evidenced from the fact that the processing time of invoices fell from three months to 60 days,
and these improvements were also reflected in GRM‟s quarterly completion reports.
The observation regarding the ability of the IARCSC to implement projects satisfactorily has to
be considered in the present context in Afghanistan. The following reasons should be considered
in the context of CSRP:
A proper assessment of the IARCSC‟s capacities was not done before the design
phase.
Numbers of national technical assistants (NTA) available to the IARCSC were
inadequate for proper implementation. The knowledge transfer from the
International Consultants to the NTAs did not take place accordingly.
The report has not grasped the historical development of the project and context in which the
project was designed and implemented. The project was divided into components because of
procurement and administrative considerations rather than programmatic and design ones. This
was not acknowledged in the report. Inappropriate advice on procurement from the World Bank
was another issue, which caused the failure of the oversight and monitoring component of the
project. The World Bank‟s capacity to supervise projects effectively in circumstances such as
Afghanistan has to be enhanced. This could be considered a lesson for subsequent projects if we
want to get better project implementation results.
30
All stakeholders should be realistic in setting the goal for reform interventions as they involve not
only technical, but highly political as well as cultural change processes. Implementing agencies
need to have the right environment and internal capacity to implement these projects. Meanwhile,
the transplantation of concepts and ideas should be avoided and careful study and research on the
feasibility of the socio- political, cultural, economic and administrative potentials should be
undertaken. This project overlooked the need for a supportive political, administrative, and legal
environment for transplantation of reform ideas. The amount of learning that both the IARCSC
and the World Bank gained from this project should be used for future initiatives.
31
Annex 5. List of Supporting Documents
World Bank: Civil Service Reform Project Documents (CSRP P097030)
Implementation Status and Results, (July, 2011)
Final Implementation Support Mission (July, 2011)
Mid-term Review (September/October, 2010)
Aide-Memoire - Supervision (November 2008-March 2009)
Project Paper: Restructuring (November, 2009).
Aide Memoire: Project Supervision and Restructuring Mission (July, 2009)
Project Supervision and Aide Memoire (June-July, 2008)
Aide Memoire: Project Supervision (December, 2007)
Aide-Memoire: Project Launch (July, 2007)
Technical Annex for a Proposed Grant to the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan for a Civil
Service Reform Project (April, 2007).
Aide Memoire: Project Pre-Appraisal (February, 2007)
Consultant Reports: Civil Service Reform Project
GRM International Ltd. Component Completion Report V2: CSRP 600 (June, 2011)
GRM International Ltd. Quarterly Report 5: IARCSC/600 (September-December, 2009)
Public Administration International, Pay and Grading Component: CSRP 602 – Draft
Report (July,
2011).
Public Administration International, Pay and Grading Project: Quarterly Report
(December, 2009).
SMEC, Three Monthly Report Mizan to Qaus 1388: Civil Service Reform
Project/IARCSC 601 (2009)
Other World Bank Documents
Emergency Project Paper – Capacity Building for Results Facility (December, 2011)
(Quality Assessment Group, Quality Assessment of Lending Portfolio (QALP) – Civil
Service Reform Project, Afghanistan (May, 2010)
Afghanistan: Building an Effective State – Priorities for Public Administration Reform
(Washington DC: 2007)
Government of Afghanistan Documents Draft Amendments to Civil Servants Law (n.d.) at
http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/pdfs/laws/csl.pdf
Civil Servants Law (June 2008) at http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/pdfs/laws/csl.pdf
Civil Service Law (2005) at http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/pdfs/laws/csl.pdf
Code of Conduct for Civil Servants (n.d.) at
http://www.csmd.gov.af/images/pdfs/laws/csl.pdf
Personal Affairs Regulation at
http://www.mpil.de/shared/data/pdf/pdf/personal_affairs_regulation.pdf
Interviews Mr. Almoz, Executive Director, Appeals Board, IARCSC.
Mr. Phillip Choudhury, Team Leader, CSRP Component 600.
Mr. Mosa Kamawi, Director, Human Resources, Ministry of Finance, GoA.
32
Mr. Fawad Karmand, Civil Service Reform Project Manager.
Mr. Rahimi, Chairman Appeals Board, IARCSC.
Mr. Mir Javed Sadat, Director-General, Civil Service Management Department, IARCSC.
Mr. Allah Nawaz Safi, Executive Director, Independent Appointments Board (IAB).
Mr. A.E. Sediqi, Director, Legislation and Policies, IARCSC.
Mr. A.W. Sidiqi, Director, Human Resources, Ministry of Transport and Civil Aviation.
GoA.
Ms. Rahela Sidiqui, Senior Advisor, IARCSC.
Mr. Masoud Tokhi, Director, Public Administration Reform Department, IARCSC.
Ms. Ranjana Mukherjee, Sr. Public Sector Management Specialist, the World Bank
(Member of CSRP team).
Comments Received on Draft ICR
Sebastian Eckhardt, former TTL of CSRP
Jalpa Patel, Member of CSRP Team.
Anne Tully, former TTL of CSRP
Tirich MirTirich Mir(7690 m)(7690 m)
D a s h t - I M a r g oD a s h t - I M a r g o
Khyber PassKhyber Pass
P a r o p a m i s u s R a n g e
H i nd
u
Ku
sh
B A D G H I SB A D G H I S¯¯
H E R ATH E R AT¯ G H O RG H O R
FA R A HFA R A H¯
¯ ¯N I M R O ZN I M R O Z K A N D A H A RK A N D A H A R¯
U R U Z G A NU R U Z G A N¯
PA K T I K APA K T I K A¯ ¯
G H A Z N IG H A Z N I
NANGARHARNANGARHAR¯
KABULKABUL¯LAGHMANLAGHMAN
B A G H L A NB A G H L A N¯
KAPISAKAPISA¯ ¯ ¯
SAMANGANSAMANGAN¯
TAKHARTAKHAR BADAKHSHANBADAKHSHAN¯
KUNDUZKUNDUZ¯¯JAWZJANJAWZJAN
FA R YA BFA R YA B¯ ¯
H I L M A N DH I L M A N D
Z A B U LZ A B U L¯
B A L K HB A L K H
SARIPULSARIPUL NURISTANNURISTAN¯ ¯
Meydan ShahrMeydan Shahr¯
BamyanBamyan¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯CharıkarCharıkar
GardızGardızGhaznıGhaznı
¯ ¯TaloqanTaloqan¯KondozKondoz
¯BaghlanBaghlan¯SamanganSamangan
¯¯
Mazar-eMazar-eSharıfSharıf
¯SheberghanSheberghan
¯ChaghcharanChaghcharan¯HeratHerat
¯FarahFarah
ZaranjZaranj
¯Lashkar GahLashkar Gah¯KandaharKandahar
¯QalatQalat
¯Tarın KowtTarın Kowt
Pol-e ‘AlamPol-e ‘Alam
¯ ¯ ¯JalalabadJalalabad
¯MehtarlamMehtarlam
¯ ¯NuristanNuristan¯ ¯AsadabadAsadabad
SharanSharan
MeymanehMeymaneh
Qal‘eh-ye NowQal‘eh-ye Now
¯ ¯¯Mahmud-e RaqıMahmud-e Raqı¸
FaisabadFaisabad
KABULKABUL¯
WA R D A KWA R D A K
PARWANPARWAN¯KUNARKUNAR
LOGARLOGAR
KOWSTKOWSTKowstKowst
PAKTIAPAKTIA
PANJSH
IR
PANJSH
IRBazarakBazarak
B A D G H I S¯¯
H E R AT¯ G H O R DAY KUNDIDAY KUNDIDAY KUNDI
FA R A H¯
¯ ¯N I M R O Z K A N D A H A R¯
U R U Z G A N¯
PA K T I K A¯ ¯
PAKTIA
G H A Z N I
NANGARHAR¯
KABUL¯LAGHMAN
B A G H L A N¯
KAPISA
PANJSH
IR
¯ ¯ ¯PARWAN¯
SAMANGAN¯
TAKHAR BADAKHSHAN¯
KUNDUZ¯¯JAWZJAN
FA R YA B¯ ¯
H I L M A N D
KOWST
Z A B U L¯
LOGARWA R D A K
KUNAR
B A L K H
SARIPUL
BAMYAN¯ ¯
NURISTAN¯ ¯
Meydan Shahr¯
Bamyan¯ ¯¯ ¯ ¯Charıkar
Bazarak
GardızGhaznı
¯ ¯Taloqan¯Kunduz
¯Baghlan¯Samangan
¯¯
Mazar-eSharıf
¯Sheberghan
¯Chaghcharan
Nili
¯Herat
¯Farah
Zaranj
¯Lashkar Gah¯Kandahar
¯Qalat
¯Tarın Kowt
Pol-e ‘Alam
¯ ¯ ¯Jalalabad
¯Mehtarlam
¯ ¯Nuristan¯ ¯Asadabad
Sharan
Kowst
Meymaneh
Saripul
Qal‘eh-ye Now
¯ ¯¯Mahmud-e Raqı¸
Faisabad
KABUL¯
TURKMENISTAN
UZBEKISTANTAJIKISTAN
TAJIKISTAN
PAKISTAN
PAKISTAN IND
IA
ISLAMICREPUBLICOF IRAN
Gowd-eZereh
Helmand
Helmand
Hamun-eSaberı˛
¯ ¯¯ ¯
Harırud¯ ¯
Morghab¯¯
¯
Pamir
Pyandzh
Indu
s
MurghobAmu Darya
Khas
h¯
Farah¯
Harut
¯ ¯
Darya-y
e Qonduz
Tarnak¯
Arghandab
D a s h t - I M a r g o
Khyber Pass
P a r o p a m i s u s R a n g e
H i nd
u
Ku
sh
Tirich Mir(7690 m)
ToMashad
ToMary
ToChardzhev
ToDushanbe
ToKulob˘
ToDushanbe
To Shazud
ToChitral
ToMardan
To Peshawar
ToKohat
ToZhob
ToQuetta
ToQurghonteppa˘
30°N
30°N
35°N
60°E
35°N
75°E
60°E
65°E 70°E
65°E 70°E
AFGHANISTAN
0 50 100
0 50 100 Miles
150 Kilometers
IBRD 33358R1
OC
TOBER 2011
AFGHANISTANPROVINCE CAPITALS
NATIONAL CAPITAL
RIVERS
MAIN ROADS
RAILROADS
PROVINCE BOUNDARIES
INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES
This map was produced by the Map Design Unit of The World Bank. The boundaries, colors, denominations and any other informationshown on this map do not imply, on the part of The World BankGroup, any judgment on the legal status of any territory, or anyendorsement or acceptance of such boundaries.
