Third Baltic–German Dialogue · The meeting today is taking place at a crucial crossroads for the EU and NATO, the two bedrocks of European security that the Baltic states will

Third Baltic–German Dialogue Riga, February 21 and 22, 2004

August 2004 Berlin

SWP

Friedrich Ebert Foundation, Riga/Bonn

Estonian Foreign Policy Institute, Tallinn Institute of International Affairs, Riga

Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius

Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik

German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Berlin

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SWP

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Politik

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Internationale Politik und

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Inhalt

5 Introduction Dr. Christoph Bertram

7 Welcome Dr. sc.pol. h.c. Atis Lejins

10 More Challenges for Europe Dr. Elmar Römpczyk

12 The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Heinz Kramer

15 The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Aap Neljas

17 The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Andris Piebalgs

21 The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas

24 The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Klaudijus Maniokas

26 NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Volker Heise

30 NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Ilgvars Klava

34 NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Kestutis Jankauskas

36 Russia and the European Union: Worlds Apart? Dr. Hannes Adomeit

40 Wider Europe – Direct Neighbourhood, Including Russia Thomas Urban

43 Wider Europe – New Neighbours Rihards Mucin

47 On European Neighbourhood Policy Mindaugas Kacerauskis

52 Program

54 List of Participants

Dr. Christoph Bertram

SWP-Berlin Third Baltic–German Dialogue August 2004

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Introduction Dr. Christoph Bertram Director SWP

Four years ago, when we started the dialogue of three Baltic and one German institute for international affairs with the help of Friedrich Ebert Foundation, we all felt that the road to a common Europe would be much longer, the hurdles of the past higher. As we went down this road together, all of us have been impressed by the speed with which our respective countries have come to regard as perfectly normal what once seemed extraordinary: shaping our new Europe together.

The meeting held in Riga in early 2004 bears this out, as the con-tributions to the conference published in this volume demonstrate. As governments within the Union and those ready to join it on May 1 prepared for enlargement, as the Convention debated a new EU Con-stitution, the Iraq conflict severely tested political cohesion, frayed tempers and raised emotions. Yet neither the old members nor the can-didates were deflected by this from their common goal of enlarging and strengthening what is now their common club. It is no longer between insiders and outsiders that the great debates over Europe’s future take place.

Common goals do not imply automatic consensus over how to reach them, a banality that the public debate and the positions that various governments occupy in it underline. Our meetings would have been fairly negligible if all they offered was merely a duplication of that debate and those positions. Foreign policy institutes such as ours define their com-petitive advantage not through echoing official statements but through exploring the mindsets and concerns that shape them and discussing them against the background of international events and their accom-panying challenges. Now that these challenges have become common to all members in the enlarged EU, the value of assessing them together cannot be exaggerated.

Two important lessons stand out from our deliberations in Riga, new for us and our readers this time but banal perhaps within a few years. The first is that, as the Union extends its borders, it gains not only new members but also new neighbours which are not likely to become members. Since most of the debate about enlargement in our countries has focused on the implications and repercussions within our nations and societies, the foreign policy consequences have largely been overlooked. They used to be minimal in the old days when a NATO-protected handful of West European states joined markets and institutions. Now however, every enlargement pushes the Union’s borders towards more problematic regions and neigh-bours and demands what its members have largely preferred to neglect: a common foreign policy that is more than a collection of desirabilities. The

Introduction

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new members will play a major role in formulating this policy precisely because they care especially about the neighbours they bring into the Union.

The second lesson: a mindset that opposes the bigger to the smaller member countries will be fatal for the Union. Neither can this extra-ordinary creation be run by the big nations nor can a consensus be hold unless large populations feel represented in it. To make it work will require from the bigger countries that rare combination of humility and leadership – and from the smaller ones an as yet similarly rare com-bination of national self-confidence and confidence in Europe.

Dr. sc.pol. h.c. Atis Lejins


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Welcome Dr. sc.pol. h.c. Atis Lejins Director, Latvian Institute of International Affairs

I am pleased to welcome you to Riga and the Third Baltic–German dia-logue. I hope that our discussions will be fruitful. We meet for the first time after the war in Iraq, which badly split Europe and – formally – put us Balts and Germans at different ends of the table. I think many of us regret this and, while recovering from this shock, are drawing on how to prevent divisiveness on fundamental questions of war and peace in the future.

A measure in how the atmosphere has improved since then is the silent acknowledgement by the Blair government that it did wrong in backing the “letter of eight.” The criticism directed at it by the Center for European Reform, the Laborite research institute based in London, immediately after the signing of the letter, was, eventually, heard by Tony Blair.

This, by the way, is a good example of foreign policy institutes helping foreign policy makers in very difficult times. Needless to say, it did take some courage on the part of the institute to criticize its Blair when the bugle had already sounded for the charge to begin.

I must add, however, that today the issue is not who was right and who was wrong before the war; today the issue is that reconstruction must be a success not only because the Baltics have soldiers there, but because a failure would mean a catastrophe for the region. Needless to say, the effects would be felt very quickly in Europe itself.

The meeting today is taking place at a crucial crossroads for the EU and NATO, the two bedrocks of European security that the Baltic states will finally join in a few months. If earlier in Berlin and Tallinn we discussed the leading issues of the day, they, nevertheless, were not existential questions for the future of both institutions.

It seems to me that the force of events, to paraphrase the late British Prime Minister Harold McMillan who, when asked – what possibly could make things go wrong – replied – “events, my dear boy, events” – have made at least the first two issues, i.e. the future of EU-25 and the IGC, and relations with the USA existential for both the EU and NATO. Perhaps not only for Europe but also for the USA as it begins to realize the limits of its great power.

In Berlin, our first meeting, the issues were rather straight forward as it was pretty well certain that – all three together – the Baltic states would join NATO and the EU. In Tallinn, where we met for the second time, we already started to focus on internal issues of the EU and NATO, i.e. policy questions with regard to the Schengen border, NATO–Russia relations, and the “Baltic input into the European convention,” but the collapse of the IGC was still ahead of us as well as the rather dramatic announcement by

Welcome


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France and Germany that they would establish together with Belgium and Luxemburg what was perceived by many as a separate European defence capability with its own military planning headquarters in the Brussels suburb of Tervuren.

Remember, this was done in the middle of the Iraqi war in April 2003 and to remind you of the drama then unfolding the USA ambassador to NATO called this “Tervuren initiative” the “most serious threat to the future of NATO” or, according to another version of his statement, “one of the greatest dangers to the Transatlantic Alliance.”

Now Britain has joined “the gang of four” and the Baltic states should think very hard and quick if they should not also follow suit. Can the Baltics afford to stay on the periphery?

The existential question is how do you administer a EU of 25 states, and can you enlarge anymore if, at 25, you already have run into an impasse on how to govern this huge, modern “empire” of 450 million people. Have we reached the defining moment faced by Theodosius I when in 395 he divided the Roman empire into an eastern and western part to be ruled by his two incompetent and inexperience sons because he no longer could govern such a vast domain? We know what happened afterwards.

The greatest threat to the Baltic states is a fragmentation of Europe – a return to the 1930’s would be a nightmare – which it should also be for everybody else, including the Poles. Yet, people like Jacques Delors say that there is a 50 per cent chance that this can happen.

The feeling in Latvia was that Nice was not a good treaty to die for. But is there a hidden agenda been played out that we do not understand?

Finally, Russia has decided not to play according to the EU rules. It seems that quite independently of one another both the USA and the EU suddenly realized that Russia is not interested in integrating with the West, but rather aims to build an empire on its own terms. It is a tragedy that Putin is guiding Russia back into the East European syndrome of never ending cycles of oppression and liberation struggles. But what does this mean for the “ring of friends” that is supposed to surround the EU as opposed to Russia’s “near abroad,” countries, which Russia needs to gather again in order to, to quote Sergei Karaganov in 1992, “partially restore the empire.”

We see this happening next door in Belarus. We recently had an inter-national conference in Riga on Belarus where leading Belarusian demo-cratic activists participated together with a high-level American dele-gation, which included Senator McCaine, Richard Holbrooke, and the New York Times columnist William Safire. Ukraine is key for the region, but what about Moldova? Are we prepared to forge another Yalta? Georgia exists thanks only to direct USA military and political aid. In this vital country the EU exists only as an aid-dispensing organization. But the Baltic states, with their experience of escaping from the “former republic of the Soviet Union” ghetto label, and Germany, actively support the USA in reforming the country.

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What is the future of EU–Russian talks? Russia has demanded “dramatic changes” in the naturalization laws of Estonia and Latvia, which goes back to the same idea proposed by Karaganov in 1992, mainly, the zero naturali-zation option. And, just before we are about to join the EU, some groups in Latvia have suddenly emerged demanding a two-community Latvian state, which is the first step in the direction of back to the Russian empire.

But is this an existential question for the EU? It certainly is for Estonia and Latvia.

I am very grateful to the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung and the SWP for making possible these Baltic–German seminars. Perhaps we should expand them or initiate joint research projects that can be useful to our govern-ments in addressing the great issues challenging the biggest peace and security project in European history – the EU.

More Challenges for Europe


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More Challenges for Europe Dr. Elmar Römpczyk Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Riga

Seven governments of East-European countries were celebrated by Presi-dent Bush in Washington as a vivid example of effective and lucky resistance to “tyranny, still a fresh memory” when NATO was enlarged at the end of March. They were welcomed by the Bush administration as sup-porters of America’s Afghanistan and Iraq wars and, in between the lines, as trusty allies against Old Europe. Also, in between lines, you have the challenge a Europe of 25 nations has to face during at least the next gener-ation, independent from or against the Washington perception: building a Europe conscious of its common potentials in culture and ecological diversity, in social organization and in economic sustainability. Europe at 25 has had its respective experience during the centuries with e.g. Malta as a Europe in a nutshell during the crusades; or with the Hansa association binding together the Baltic countries to organize far-reaching communi-cations into the heart of the European continent. There was strength not granted by an extra-European power, but organized instead by the dif-ferent and differing members of the associations.

The challenge of Europe at 25 consists in having the will and showing the capability for the political management of a very complex association of societies, which regained their recent sovereignty by a “singing revo-lution,” with societies which still find themselves in civil wars like Ireland and Spain, and a big question mark about of what might come out of the Balkans’ tensions, with societies in very costly and complex restructuring processes like Germany, and others with a very complicated governing structure like Italy, or with quite well-balanced Social Dialogues like the Netherlands and Denmark. The Bush administration is less a reference point for Europe at 25. Europe only has to analyse itself correctly and accept its own true challenges.

It depends on our ability to gain harmony by managing diversity under a common European vision. In that perspective the actual rush with very compulsory dates for completing the enlargement like the first of May or somewhere in the summer of 2004 for the approval of a European Con-stitution has its advantages, but also augments the challenges. I see three management principles lying behind this European approach as decisive for the Gestalt of Europe at 25:

adaptation of institutions and procedures to achieve a leaner European bureaucracy and more transparent decision making processes;

strive for a complementary, synergetic economic cooperation among the member states and agreement upon principles of social security and the respect for human rights in all of the member nations;

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balance the principle of the states’ responsibility for social security on the one hand with the private responsibilities of the citizens on the other hand. The logic up till now of European integration never has been a military

one, it was an historic rapprochement between an increasing number of nations. Military power is a decisive element for regional and hemispheric stability; but in the longer run it’s the management capacity of the 25 as a system that decides on whether it survives or not. Fighting terrorism is neither a military problem. Europe should not follow the American short-sighted logic. Understanding the strive for new religious identifications as a defence mechanism against a totally overmaterialized world is as im-portant as leaving behind the parameters of neoliberalism that splits society of each of the 25 member states (and far beyond).

The enlarged Europe, hence, is now its own main challenge. It’s a chal-lenge with very many and differing layers if you look at the inside of the new community but it also has to meet the challenge of the soon-to-be second biggest political and economic player in the world with all the responsibilities this means also for Europe’s outside world.

The Baltic–German-Dialogue does not have the final answers to these various challenges. It is nevertheless what we need now very urgently: a forum, a platform of political European thinkers, from the academia and the political system; and it has a process character that should help to bridge differing perceptions in western and eastern European societies on the premise to form the new European community. The rotation of the dia-logue’s venues in itself is a constructive element of that process that will guide also the forthcoming events after Berlin, Tallinn and Riga in Vilnius.

The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference


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The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Heinz Kramer SWP

The EU and its member states only belatedly realize the full meaning of its coming enlargement to 25 member states. At a first glance, the main tasks facing the enlarged Union are: (a) reform of institutions and procedures by adopting the constitutional treaty, (b) revival of economic momentum to keep the Union competitive on a global scale, (c) design of a financial system that enables the Union to proceed with a policy of intra-Union solidarity among richer and poorer members, and (d) launching a sub-stantial common foreign and security policy that is able to transform the words of the Solana strategy paper into convincing political measures. These points constitute an ambitious agenda the successful managing of which can by no means be taken for granted.

However, beneath this surface looms a much larger challenge: the preservation of the established mode of integration or a managed change to another mode that may better suit the requirements of a European Union of 25 and more member states. What is the concrete meaning of creating “An ever closer Union of the people of Europe” under the con-ditions of enlargement? In the past, integration was led by “upgrading the common interest” in a complex process in which each member state sought to follow its national interests without harming the common goal.

Changes that will be triggered by enlargement may lead to a consider-ably different Union from the one we have been used to know. The change will not primarily occur with respect to policies and institutions but with regard to the rationale of policy-making within the Union. For the first time in its existence, there is the possibility that EU politics may turn from a common endeavour in integration to a post-modern type of European balance-of-power politics. I term this “post-modern” because its actual con-duct would not be characterized by a 19th century-style game between sovereign nation-states but would take place within the legal and insti-tutional framework of the EU. Nevertheless, the basic rationale of member state behaviour would be striving for domination and/or influence by building coalitions for political purposes and no longer the definition of national positions with the aim of upgrading the common interest. Such mode of policy-making is not akin to the existing Union but it has not been the prevalent mode of political behaviour.

In the enlarged EU, the necessity will grow to departementalize the policy-making process at all levels and in all institutions because it is hardly imaginable to have a European Commission with 25 members work as a college of equals. The same will apply to the Council and its numerous working groups where decisions will hardly be found in a process of free deliberation between member states. And how realistic is it to assume that

Dr. Heinz Kramer


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the presidency will any longer be able to hold the reins of the decision-making process by methods such as hearing out all member states for the proposition of a compromise formula? Everybody tends to agree that in the larger Union the ad-hoc or even quasi-permanent establishment of informal groupings is inevitable, in which decisions will be pre-deter-mined or at least pre-negotiated.

The actual discussion in the context of the intergovernmental con-ference about “small” versus “large” states can be seen as an indicator for the likely transformation of the EU policy-making process into the direc-tion of a continuous intergovernmental conference with a high degree of selective informal groupings. Fears of the creation of a “directorate” or talks about the necessity of the creation of a two-speed EU or a “core union” are indicators that such a possibility is more than mere fancy. Ideas such as the creation of a “foreign minister” of the EU or of a “super-com-missioner for economic reform and modernization” would support such a development because they tend to undermine the fairly well-balanced con-struction of the European Commission. Such posts, once established would further member states’ desire to “occupy” them by a national represen-tative or at least to gain a decisive influence on the process of nomination to these posts. All this will tend to enhance a climate of unrestrained political competition among member states for influence within the EU and its policy-making process.

Another factor that could become a facilitator for such a development is the fact that the pursuit of solidarity politics will become more difficult in the enlarged Union. This is a result of the growing number of member states that have a below-average income per capita. In a larger but relatively poorer EU it will become more difficult to sustain the actual level of redistributive policies without raising the level of resistance in those member states who have to pay the bill. However, severe cuts in EU funds may further undermine the support for the Union in many new member states the population of which does expect a considerable financial support from Brussels. This will clearly be realized during the upcoming negotiations about the next mid-term financial framework of the EU-25 (“Agenda 2007”). A growing feeling, however, that the Union will be ever more divided between “haves” and “haves-not” will not inspire the drive for upgrading the common good if this common good is increasingly realized in quite different ways by different member states. And there can be no doubt that the enlarged EU is quickly reaching the limits of its financial capacity for large-scale redistribution of wealth unless it reforms its financial basis and mechanisms.

Another complicating factor will be the necessity of the parallel develop-ment of a politically meaningful and functioning common foreign and security policy under the strains of a slow but constant erosion of the Atlantic alliance. As far as debates about controversial common security policy measures and about the issue of how and how far the alliance should be repaired tend to dominate the public political discussion among EU member states there will be the constant danger of a public over-



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emphasis of diverging attitudes and positions. This would also tend to further the impression of divergence and battle for influence among mem-ber states and, as a result of this, a metamorphosis of the rationale of EU policy-making into the direction of post-modern balance-of-power politics.

Under such auspices, the continuous political challenge for all member governments will be to organize the almost inevitable change in the mode of integration politics in such a manner as not to jeopardize the overriding aim of all of them: to cooperate in order to successfully meet together those challenges that can no longer be met single-handedly by any Euro-pean state under the circumstances of global developments in the fields of economy and security.

In this respect, much will depend on the perception of EU politics in the member states’ political class. If this field is mainly regarded as an issue of national foreign policy the tendency will grow to develop modes of behaviour that are typical for international arenas. The outcome of EU policy making will ever more be interpreted in terms of zero-sum games and no longer in terms of win-win situations. Only as far as EU politics will be perceived as a transposition of domestic policy-making into a wider arena the actual mode of integration can be kept. This will be the only way to build a Political Union of 25 and more member states.

For this to happen, it is important that the outcome of the Intergovern-mental Conference on the constitutional treaty will, in the longer term, strengthen the “integrationist” elements of the EU at the cost of its “inter-governmental” elements. In this respect, clauses that tend to accentuate the equality of member states in numerical terms (number of commis-sioners, weighting of votes, number of seats in parliament etc.) should be linked to a revision clause to enable a more “integrationist” construction in the future. Overemphasising equality in terms of national demands is the best way to transform the mode of integration to a game of power politics. As a result, the EU would, at best, block itself as an effective method for intra-European compromise and as a meaningful international political actor, at worst, start the process of disintegration.

Aap Neljas


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The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Aap Neljas Policy Planning Department, Estonian MFA

I do believe that an EU of 25 members will be a considerably enhanced entity. The political and economic implications of the enlargement are obvious – 25 European countries acting as one in the international arena is a force with considerably more clout than the sum total of 25 individual countries. The 10 new countries will bring with them, to the EU, new and useful experiences with reforming their societies, and with the rebuilding of democracy and a market economy. This will be important within the context of the EU’s new initiative of extending cooperation to the New Neighbours beyond the EU’s enlarged borders, and also within the context of the new global economic climate. Both demand a more competitive approach to the solving of problems connected with the speeding up of economic growth in the single EU market.

I believe, we all agree that the IGC should be concluded as early as possible. But for any solution to be lasting, it should be acceptable for all members of the enlarged Union. The present problems constitute, I think, just one of those crises that the EU has to go through before its Member States achieve the desired level of integration. I find encouraging the fact, that 90–95% of the Convention’s draft Treaty is acceptable to all present and future members. One great step forward, which was agreed upon in the Convention, and was supported by the governments at the Inter-governmental Conference, is the public nature that the legislative work of the Council will acquire in future

In spite of the considerable progress achieved during the Italian Presidency at the Intergovernmental Conference, there are a few big issues – the scope of qualified majority voting (QMV) in particular – and several smaller ones, that still need to be settled. Recent developments give hope, that reaching a consensus is possible, and that the IGC can be completed during the Irish Presidency. Estonia strongly believes that we should carry on with the talks, taking into account the results achieved so far, and being as flexible as possible in our positions. Estonia was quite satisfied with the results of the Naples conclave, which showed a broad consensus on some questions of great importance to Estonia – having one Commis-sioner per member state, and retaining five seats as a minimum in the European Parliament. I find, that the full representation of all small and big countries at the Commission, where new European legislation is proposed and drafted, offers the only real possibility for injecting new ideas into the system. One should also remember, that during the IGC, the European Commission itself supported the idea, that all member states should be fully represented in the Commission.

The Baltic Input into the European Convention. Where Do We Want to Go?


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As for the voting system, although Estonia has been content with the Nice solution, we can also support the double majority system, provided there is parity between the Member States criterion and the population criterion – for example, a 55:55 or 60:60 parity in the counting of votes in the Council. One innovative solution proposed during the Intergovern-mental Conference, for example, is the establishment, in the future, of the team presidency system. This will make it possible to involve more than one country in the everyday governing of the EU and to maintain effective decision-making at the same time.

Among the most important endeavours of the European integration process are the increased efficiency and competitiveness of a European economy with a strong internal market. Efficiency and increased com-petitiveness are the core of the Lisbon strategy, and Estonian priorities coincide, to a large extent, with the measures that the Irish Presidency is undertaking to implement the strategy. Estonia’s successful experiences with reform have led us to support the maintaining of unanimity in taxation, which, we find, is essential for the conducting of an effective and competitive economic policy.

Regarding the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP), Estonia would agree in principle with increasing the Union’s capabilities. We support the EU and NATO agreement – Berlin Plus – which enables the European Union, within the framework of the so-called Petersberg Tasks, to also carry out military operations. The further development of the ESDP, however, should by no means cause a weakening of the transatlantic link, or duplicate NATO. Therefore we do not currently see any reason for creating a European security and defence union (ESDU) and an autono-mous operational staff headquarters.

Andris Piebalgs


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The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Andris Piebalgs Under Secretary of State, Responsible for EU Affairs, Latvian MFA

European integration provides a unique and highly successful model of co-operation that other regions of the world would like to follow. We are proud of this and we do not hesitate much to teach other people how things should be done. Moreover, we sincerely believe that Europe can make life better for the whole of humanity and make a difference when it comes to international conflicts and crises.

Of course, Europe is in position to do so on the basis of its achievements. So far, regardless of minor problems, the Union has been able to proceed with deeper integration, enlarge itself to embrace 25 nations and draft a new Constitutional Treaty that could serve as the foundation for further development of the Union over the next couple of decades.

Today I will try to concentrate on three main issues that have direct implications for the success of the enlarged EU on the international scene. These are the following:

solidarity among 25 member states; the risks created by the concept of two-speed Europe; early resumption of IGC. One should acknowledge that the credibility of the European model

depends on the unity of European states and nations. We know that Europe is built upon something more than just shared or overlapping interests. We have European values beneath our policies and European ways of reaching compromise on all possible issues. Solidarity is the key concept that makes Europe function. I am convinced that building solidarity among the 25 nations is the paramount challenge that the Union is facing today.

Much concern has been voiced about the current difficulties in the work of the Intergovernmental Conference. No doubt, it would be sad to waste the creative energy already put into the European Convention and the IGC by so many outstanding minds. However, the utmost negative con-sequence of failure at the IGC would be the development of a two-speed Europe.

Of course, enlargement is an important challenge for everyone. We know that negotiations at 25 have proven to be more difficult than co-operation at 6 or 15. But the most important lesson of the December summit is that the fault lines do not lie between the “old” and the “new” members.

We should recognise the fact that closer co-operation between a smaller number of Member States could be beneficial for Europe as a whole, that Franco-German special relations have provided an impetus for further inte-gration at certain point, that the founding members of the Union may



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have a better understanding of the méthode communautaire than the new-comers. Nevertheless, it would be a serious mistake to believe that a two-speed Europe might be the right answer to the present difficulties at the IGC and in the Union as a whole. Such a mistake can seriously harm the Union internally and externally.

In acceding countries the eurosceptics of all sorts have been trying to exploit the sensitivities of people about being perfectly equal with their fellow-Europeans in the older Member States. Even now, when all ten countries have passed successful referenda, these sensitivities remain alive and important for large mass of citizens.

Hence, the question: What is more important, a Europe of solidarity that provides a firm foundation for further development or an integrated core that alienates the new fellow citizens? Latvia’s choice is clearly a Europe that exemplifies solidarity.

A two-speed Europe is the anti-thesis of solidarity. If up to now the strong EU countries were able to help strengthen the weak countries, then a two-speed Europe means the abandonment of the weak countries so that the strong countries can go ahead. This is a dangerous scenario for the development of Europe. It is no less dangerous for the world and im-mediate surroundings of the Union.

The very concept of a two-speed Union reminds me of Europe of the past – a continent divided into several blocks of countries. Three different groupings can emerge if the European countries loose the sense of soli-darity and shared values:

a Core Europe comprising the EU founding members and possibly some other countries;

a group of second-speed countries looking for leadership to the U.S.; Russia and its satellites.

One can contemplate the consequences of such a development. Several serious questions arise:

Firstly, will the Union keep building an efficient and coherent CFSP/ ESDP or should it become an exclusive domain for the members of the Core Europe?

Secondly, can a Europe of two classes play a global role at all? Thirdly, how could a divided Union become an equal partner of the U.S.? Fourthly, what could be the situation of our New Neighbours (first of all Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova) if such a scenario comes true?

My answers to these questions are all negative:

CFSP and ESDP at 25 will become nonsense if a group of countries pro-ceeds with deeper integration in foreign policy and defence in order to form a closed club. The core countries themselves might reach more coherence, but they will alienate the second-speed countries.

The development of the two-speed model will inevitably weaken the EU as a global player. Such a development will certainly promote more uni-lateralist policies on the international scene and weaken the multi-

Andris Piebalgs


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lateral institutions as the second-speed countries will find themselves exposed to the differences between the Core Europe and other global heavy-weights.

Obviously, a divided Union by no means can become an equal partner of the United States. The development of a two-speed scenario may result in a number of individual (and asymmetrical) partnerships between the USA and the new members of the Union. This will not make Europe stronger.

No doubt, the new neighbours will be discouraged to proceed with their pro-European reforms. Consequently, they could gravitate towards other centres of power (Moscow being one of the most important among them). That may put the whole concept of association with third coun-tries into question. We can only guess what impact that could have on such regions as the Western Balkans. Even more, there is a ground for speculations whether the New Neighbours will still constitute the periphery of the Union or should the second-speed countries become the periphery of the Core Countries? On this basis I have to conclude that the creation of a core or an avant-

garde Europe can only be justified when the purpose of the front-runners is to develop the European Union as inclusive structure, rather than abandon the weaker members or punish the disobedient members.

It would be much better to relate the further development of European integration to the concept of enhanced cooperation. This approach does not contradict the principle of equality of member states. It permits more efficient cooperation in many fields.

The Draft Constitutional Treaty contains several important provisions for more efficient external policies of the EU. The Foreign minister and European External Service could play a very significant role in developing a more effective CFSP. These innovations could rectify the shortcomings of the present CFSP arrangements, making the CFSP more consistent and reducing the ability of third countries to capitalise on internal differences between the EU Member States.

For this purpose Latvia would like to see a quick resumption of the Inter-governmental Conference in order to seek agreement on the few issues in the Draft Constitutional Treaty where an accord could not be reached during the Italian Presidency. Latvia believes that the enlarged Union must demonstrate its ability to function successfully at 25 and maintain the current dynamics of integration on the basis of solidarity. Fortunately enough, the prospects for resumption of the IGC and fast progress under the Irish presidency are good.

To sum up, solidarity seems to be the most significant pre-condition for external efficiency of the Union. The enlarged EU of 25 members can play an increasingly important role on the international scene. However, there are risks of failure that should be kept in mind, two-speed Europe being the most conspicuous among them.

As the Commission has rightly observed, the Union is not a state, but coherent external relations can increase its influence far beyond what



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Member States can achieve separately or even along parallel lines of action. To this one can be added that retreating from active engagement with the rest of the world would inevitably result in re-nationalisation of foreign and security policy agenda in the EU itself and its neighbourhood. This certainly would cost us much more in the long term than we could save by lowering the expenditure level.

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The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas Associate Professor, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

My remarks will be about the interests of new members in the enlarged European Union. I should start with two comments regarding this topic itself. When I talk about members’ interests, first of all, I want to say that after the enlargement the EU will be a very heterogeneous club, and there-fore it is obvious that national interests coexist and often prevail over European interests. And that is why we can and should talk about states’ interests in the European Union, which is the union of Europeans as well as of European countries. At the same time, I want to stress that I do not see new members continuously having a united coalition against old members. I think it is very obvious that after the enlargement there will be single issue-based coalitions which will unite some members from the recently joined group of countries and some old members, and we could already see this during the IGC: Poland together with Spain are taking the same side on the same issue.

Those were my two initial remarks, and before I move on to my com-ments on the future of Europe and issues which were discussed in the IGC, I would like to draw attention to three challenges. Some of them were already mentioned. It is obvious that accession is taking part together in parallel with the reforms of the European Union and NATO and, moreover, it is one of the main reasons why these organizations are changing. There are also important shifts in the international environment that took place in recent years which are also causing debates and changes in these organi-zations.

But I would like to stress that there is some kind of vacuum in the acceding countries. I am talking here more concretely about the Baltic States. There is some kind of vacuum of national priorities in face of enlargement and accession to the European Union. I see that for the last one or two years there has been research going on in the political parties, political elites in these countries on what should be the new national priorities after we become members of these organizations. The goals that have united most of our political, economic, and other elites were instru-ments for achieving prosperity, security defined in a broad sense, or some-thing else; they are now too broad to unite parties and people in these countries. I see this as continuous challenge, in particular in the Baltic States, and I think that the whole debate on the future of Europe should help to some extent to define priorities of these countries as well.

Now several remarks about economic issues, which are quite closely con-nected to institutional reforms that have been at the centre of attention in the IGC. I agree with those who said that continuing economic growth and competitiveness in the European Union are probably the priority goals of



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all members – new and old included. In this sense the situation is rather different: new members are dynamically growing countries. The Baltic States have been rapidly growing, probably, they have been among the fastest growing countries in the world if we do not count China and a couple of other countries. At the same time, it is obvious that their level of economic development is quite different from most of the current EU member states. Taking into account these two characteristics of the current situation, let me list some important issues. First of all, the removal of the remaining restrictions to the four freedoms, including free movement of labour has to be mentioned. It is a real pity to see some of the member states who have been claiming for several years that they will not apply any restrictions on the movement of labour – I mean Denmark, the Netherlands, Sweden – which, in particular Denmark, have recently introduced a number of restrictions. This, paradoxically, might mean that the movement of labour might become more difficult after the enlarge-ment for those that try to work legally in these countries than it used to be before the enlargement. It shows a lack of political will in these countries, and in some other EU members, to go ahead with what they continuously repeat within the framework of the Lisbon agenda: creating jobs, reforming labour markets and other areas which should help to espouse economic dynamism.

There is another very important issue which is particularly linked to different levels of economic development and also to the nature of the European Union, which is, first of all, a regulatory organization. Flexible regulatory methods are necessary to take into account different capa-bilities of different countries. Otherwise, these new strict regulations which are on the agenda of the European Commission, mostly related to environmental norms, can become an important barrier for the increased and continuous growth and competitiveness of companies in new member states because they are disproportionately expensive for these companies as compared to German or, let’s say, Danish and other companies, which are more modernized. It is usually these countries that try to export their own regulatory norms to other member states via the EU.

Effective use of EU funding is more a matter of our governments in the Baltic States and other new members states, since what is happening now and which causes certain concern is a development of huge expectations related to European Union funding, in particular structural funds. There are a lot of unrealistic expectations linked to this, and therefore it will be a big challenge to use these funds for those areas which are really creating public goods rather than for measures that tend to distort market moti-vations.

Again, another challenge for the Baltic States, and other new members rather than the whole EU, is to focus attention on areas where the Euro-pean Union does not play an important role. These areas are, however, very important for our population, including areas like education and health protection. This is not where the European Union plays an im-

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portant role, and therefore there has been a lack of attention, to these fields, but these are the least reformed areas in our countries.

The final important economic issue is reducing discriminatory aspects of trade with third countries, some of which are our traditional trading partners, some of which are farther away, like the United States. This is also very important if we want continuous economic growth in the Euro-pean Union.

Briefly about institutional reforms of the EU: A very important issue, which should remain the main issue in the European Union and Com-munity method, is equality of representation. I am not going to talk more about this. I think it is quite clear. Another issue which is more contro-versial for most new members, obviously for the Baltic States and in particular for Poland, is the Nice model of voting in the Council of Minis-ters. It is a matter of simple arithmetic, and in this sense, these countries are going to lose certain voting power if the double majority system is adopted. I am not sure if this is a good thing or not, but again it is a chal-lenge. Of course, it is a matter of compromise on how to deal with it.

Another important issue is preserving veto rights in certain areas, in particular taxation and social policy. If this is not preserved there could be a longer term development, which again might be harmful for the com-petitiveness of the whole European Union and in particular of new member states.

Finally, another important issue is enhanced cooperation. In my opinion, enhanced cooperation could be a useful tool. The European Union consists of heterogeneous interests, where different groups of coun-tries might have more in common than the rest, or might want to pursue certain projects. Hence these should have the option of enhanced cooper-ation. But, then, it is very important that it should really be based on varying national preferences rather than on an intention to prevent others to join. Enhanced cooperation should be open to everyone that would like to join later in the future.

In political and security issues balancing between the preferences of transatlantic partners is a delicate matter for the Baltic States and for Poland as well. To a large degree, transatlantic relations will depend on the relations between Germany, France, Britain on the one hand, and the United States on the other. Here, small new members states are really doing the balancing and trying to find a certain compromise when the preferences of the United States and European countries differ. Still, it is crucial to preserve U.S. interests in Europe, probably by having NATO still involved here. For the Baltic States this is very important, taking into account the role that the United States played throughout the period of occupation and with regards to the “big three.” I repeat what I said about enhanced cooperation: there will be cases in the enlarged European Union when enhanced cooperation will be useful, and in this sense the “big three” can play a useful role. On the other hand, when it contradicts the principle of equality of all member states, it might create challenges for new members in the EU.



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The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Dr. Klaudijus Maniokas Policy Analyst, Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

Basically, we are talking about the question of how to manage the enlarged and more heterogeneous EU. The question is indeed whether the EU constitution is a good solution to this question. I think it is not.

Everybody agrees that the EU needs more flexibility. At the same time, solutions proposed in the constitution, specially on voting rights, which is the core issue in the constitution, reduces this flexibility in the European Union. It introduces a new decision-making mode in the European Union, which is quite common to the so-called unitary majoritarian states, but which moves us even further away from the consensus principle organiz-ing heterogeneous organizations or societies. The constitutional formula for qualified majority voting could mean a shift in the decision-making culture of the EU and it contradicts the needs of the more heterogeneous European Union.

In order to provide arguments for this thesis, a few points of a very elegant and old theory are necessary. This is really a theory which is well-known to the political scientists and was developed by Arendt Lijphart in the early 70’s. It’s about consociation and consociationalism – in fact, a theory about the governance of heterogeneous societies. It was developed for the Netherlands, for Switzerland and other countries. These hetero-geneous societies are characterized by four features. The first feature is the dominance of elites. Secondly, it is veto rights of these elites. The third feature is a consensus-seeking culture. Fourthly, there should be an agree-ment on the necessity to continue the system, which is paramount for the very existence of it.

Decision-making in these systems is not a competition, as in the U.S. or British politics. Politics consists of constant negotiation between parties, considered worthwhile by all interested elites representing different segments of the society. Otherwise there could be quite violent conflicts in these heterogeneous commonwealths.

The regime developed by the EU has many features in common with this consociational decision-making mode. I think that the Constitutional Treaty – the draft Constitutional Treaty prepared by the Convention – largely ignores this, especially by introducing a new double majority principle. I think that double majority should be resisted by all interested in the prosperity and further functioning of the European Union. But it is not enough to say that the majoritarian method of governing the hetero-geneous European Union is not adequate. Alternatives should be offered that show that they are better than just simply centralising the decision-making process in order to make it more efficient.

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One alternative, indeed, is more flexible regulation, which is, in fact, a new tendency in the European Union and well-known by different names, for example, “open method of coordination.” It is quite obvious that the EU needs more flexibility, which is not always legally anchored in regu-latory instruments. This can be dangerous since European law and suprem-acy of European law is a cornerstone of the European Union. What I mean is that there could be possibilities to make certain regulatory principles more adapted to the different needs. This approach has been followed and had been proposed also by the European Commission in its White Paper on Governance of 2001. One of its major topics was the introduction of more framework decisions, framework directives, framework regulations and by doing so create more flexibility. It is a pity that all these proposals which were solutions to the problems of managing heterogeneity, have been largely ignored by the Convention. The Convention decided to review the balance of power in the European Union instead of looking for new regu-latory instruments to tackle these problems. I think, this was a mistake.

A second alternative to the centralised, majoritarian decision-making process in the European Union is, of course, enhanced cooperation. I don’t see any danger in it, or at least big danger on condition that it is limited to certain areas. In any case, the European Union has really its base – the internal market. The Union, therefore, should certainly go back to its basics in understanding that its first and foremost successful instrument, its first successful idea, was to create an internal market and to generate wealth in the European Union. All the other ideas, which are now emerging, and which are presented as a new mission for the European Union, including the development of a common foreign and security policy, put forward especially by the French are quite controversial. But I do not see any difficulties in letting some countries experiment on con-dition that the solid base of the internal market is preserved.

I will end by saying that indeed a bigger and more heterogeneous EU needs a better balance of available instruments to tackle increased diversity. Decision-making methods characteristic to majoritarian democ-racies can be used only in homogeneous societies. They could be a conse-quence of real convergence in the EU and not an instrument in achieving it. We see confusion between the ends and means in the ongoing con-stitutional debate. It can still be corrected to avoid persistent problems of isolation of certain countries and exclusion of them from decision-making in the EU.

NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA


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NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Volker Heise SWP, Research Unit “EU External Relations”

Sometimes a reader of international newspapers might get the impression that the USA, NATO, and EU are actors on the global scene, separated by opposing or competing attitudes, mistrust, or just negligence. In par-ticular at the outbreak of the war in Iraq, the relevance of international organisations in general has been put into question vis-à-vis a determined superpower which has unique military means at its disposal.

NATO’s continued role as a provider of security and stability in and around Europe has not been questioned so far. In fact, even if not chal-lenged, NATO’s security guarantee is most attractive for forthcoming and aspiring members. NATO’s importance for stability in the Balkans has been acknowledged everywhere.

Not least as a result of the September events, NATO has given up its traditional Euro-centric view. By developing NATO Response Forces, the Alliance is acquiring a global crisis-intervention capability. At present, NATO has taken the lead function of ISAF in Afghanistan and conducts sea-surveillance at the Horn of Africa.

Stabilisation, state- and nation-building is a rather lengthy process which may last for many years, as experiences on the Balkans demonstrate. Hence, the Alliance’s taking over the ISAF lead in Afghanistan was neces-sary, as no single nation or coalition of nations had been able to provide for the lead function over an extended period of time, in particular due to nations’ limited command and control capabilities.

Showing NATO’s flag in quite different parts of the world will, however, always be a rather sensitive political issue, as it may stir up a range of concerns, in particular fears of new lines of confrontation in the region. Therefore, it has been important that NATO acted in Afghanistan on the basis of the UN mandate and has been invited by the elected Afghan government. Stabilisation of Afghanistan, and hence NATO’s assistance in this process is also in the interest of most countries in the region.

A possible role of NATO in Iraq, for obvious reasons, is an even more sensitive issue. Any self-imposed activity of the Alliance in this particular region could stir up a more general confrontation including cultural and religious aspects. Therefore, NATO’s current approach to make an UN mandate and an invitation by an elected government a prerequisite is more than sensible. It will also be of fundamental importance to take the views of the other countries in the region into account (some of which would probably be most grateful to have the Iraq-problem solved), and to invite as much as possible Arab and Muslim countries to participate.

NATO’s changing role from an Euro-centric to a global actor also needs to be founded on a sound strategy. The Alliance’s strategic concept dates

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back from the Washington Summit in 1999. Since then, NATO has pro-duced concepts on anti-terrorism and counter-proliferation. However, a more general strategy on how NATO intends to pursue and implement its global role needs still to be discussed and developed.

Such discussion at the EU resulted rather swiftly in the European Security Strategy (ESS). It portrays the EU’s comprehensive approach to security and stability which goes far beyond mere military means, com-prising the wide range of political, economic and other resources at the disposal of the Union. Agreeing to such a basic concept, however, is the more easy part of the debate. The follow-up work on how to implement this strategy will be more challenging. So far, the Council provided in January 2004 a remit for drawing up particular concepts on:

effective multilateralism with the UN at its core (which may be a response to the discussion on U.S. attitudes towards the UN at the brink of the war on Iraq);

the fight against terrorism; a strategy towards the region of the Middle East, and a comprehensive policy towards Bosnia and Herzegovina. This remit focuses primarily on policy concepts and allows us to expect

a more detailed and comprehensive approach to the various issues along the principles laid down in the ESS. The remit, however, does not include the important issue of developing and adapting EU’s civil and military means necessary to implement the strategy. Although such developments are pursued under the European Headline Goal within the European Capabilities Action Plan (ECAP) and the specific goals for civil means, the planning assumptions underlying these goals and plans have been formulated at an early stage of ESDP and are centred around Europe. Hence, for being able to assume the role as global actor, these goals and resulting capability requirements have still to be adapted.

Deficiencies in EU member countries’ military means are well known. Most prominent among these are shortcomings in the field of strategic transport, strategic intelligence and command and control capabilities. However, there are also other areas where additional effort is necessary. Still, these deficiencies are measured against the requirements derived from the 1999 Helsinki Headline Goal. The adaptation to current require-ments will certainly necessitate additional endeavours.

Deficiencies in nations’ defence expenditures are also well known, and prospects for increase of these are rather poor. Hence, it will be inevitable that nations seek for new approaches and better co-operation in devel-oping their military means in order to make maximum use of their existing resources. Encouragement for doing so has been part of every ECAP progress report. So far, there have been only very few promising approaches, e.g. Netherlands and Belgium having joined their maritime headquarters. However, there are still too many capabilities and costly structures in parallel. Cost effective approaches like pooling of capabilities have been undertaken in some cases, e.g. through the European Airtrans-port Co-ordination Cell. More demanding and cost-saving ways like



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specialisation and role sharing have been proposed by various documents at EU and NATO. However, major nations seem to be wary of undertaking such approaches, as it means becoming dependent on other nations’ capabilities if they would wish to act on their own, i.e. outside EU or NATO. Smaller nations apparently prefer to be seen in the first line of combat forces instead of concentrating on those areas, where requirements are obvious, e.g. in the field of combat-support or combat-service-support forces, for which there is always a requirement. Allowing for mutual dependence would not only save costs but would and should also give further impetus to the process of European integration. Nations should be more courageous to go this way. The forthcoming European Defence Agency should also provide assistance in better co-ordination and co-operation of defence efforts. As such co-operation will realistically work best in smaller groups and not at 25, a structured co-operation, as foreseen in the draft conventional treaty, could provide the appropriate framework inside the EU.

EU’s operational record shows first civil and military crisis-management operations – albeit on a less demanding scale – having been conducted successfully, both with and without recourse to NATO assets and capa-bilities. More challenging will be the forthcoming take-over of NATO’s current operation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Hence, careful preparation will be necessary in close co-operation with NATO and the U.S. in particular. As NATO will continue its presence on the Balkans, in particular in Kosovo, ef-fective co-ordination between all operations in this area will be in-dispensable whilst making maximum use of the Berlin-plus arrangements.

In general, co-operation with NATO under the Berlin-plus agreement will always be essential for any major EU-operation. NATO provides for the required military and in particular operational planning capacity in its collective command structure, whereas EU autonomously can only rely on national headquarters made available on an ad-hoc basis. Non-duplication of NATO’s command structure has always been a fundamental principle, as such duplication would create not only tremendous financial, but also sub-stantial political costs. For smaller and time-urgent operations, however, a limited operational planning capacity at the EU would facilitate the work, if recourse to NATO were not necessary or possible. The row stirred up by the initiative of ‘Four’ last April to establish an autonomous planning cell for the conduct of operations was unnecessary. Compared to the planning capacity within NATO command structure headquarters with more than 12,000 officers, the now envisaged planning cell at the EU will consist of some 20 persons. In addition, liaison teams will facilitate co-operation and information exchange between the military staffs of the two organisations.

Relations with the United States, although still far from being good, are seemingly getting better. The major question is, have all sides learned their lessons? Does the U.S. administration understand that unilateral action (by-passing multilateral organisations) with ad-hoc coalitions will not suffice for solving burning problems, which go far beyond Iraq, ter-rorism and proliferation? Did Europeans learn that self-fragmentation or

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beauty-contests will not help the European voice or voices being taken seriously or even heard? Will both sides understand, that joining their resources is indispensable for coping with current and future challenges? Sometimes, understanding is also based on the language used. There is much room for improvement.



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NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Ilgvars Klava Director, Security Policy Department, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Latvia

Let me start with saying that it is a little bit easier for me to talk on this subject now – in fact much easier than three, six or twelve months ago.

Because recently there have been some positive signals indicating that there is a chance that European–U.S. relations will move in the positive direction, in the direction of bridging gaps, decreasing differences of opinion, and in the end keeping both sides of the Atlantic together. Germany plays a key role here.

The first thing that comes to my mind, of course, is the recent Munich Conference on Security Policy and NATO defence ministers meeting where the atmosphere was so different compared to the same event a year ago – a year ago everybody was just preparing for war in Iraq to start.

Many things have changed since then – Saddam Husein is gone and Iraq has been liberated and is now struggling to overcome its past linking it to the existence of a non-democratic totalitarian regime: she is trying to build democracy. The coalition stays there to insure stability and transition to the self-government of the Iraqi people.

Interestingly enough, it is possible that NATO will take over some responsibilities in Iraq. The German foreign minister Mr. Fischer in his speech at the Munich conference said that, “we are in agreement that the coalition’s efforts must be successful, failure would have equally damaging consequences for us all, for Europe as for America, and adding that regarding the direct involvement of NATO in Iraq. The Government of Germany will not stand in the way of a consensus, even if it will not deploy any German troops in Iraq.” Remarkable words and who would have imagined that being said a year ago. Definitely a positive signal and we in Latvia are indeed pleased to hear it.

If we look back a little bit – what has been happening in Europe in 2003 – then we see major developments under way: the current wave of two enlargement processes – NATO and European Union – is being completed; there was a major political debate in Europe on several strategic political issues and it is having an effect on how we Europeans see the world and our own future.

The one part of this debate refers to and was triggered by positions of individual European countries towards the war in Iraq. There was a major split of opinions among the European Countries – a division into “Old Europe” and “New Europe,” there were difference of opinions between some European countries and the U.S.

But the outcome of that debate definitely was a good one and most likely it will have a lasting effect for years to come. Namely, there should be a clear understanding among the European nations – big ones and

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small ones – that any attempt to build the future of Europe or to try to unify Europe on an anti-American note is doomed to failure. We clearly saw it in the background of the Iraqi war.

On the American side, we can pick up as a positive element the growing understanding that America needs allies. In fact, she needs everyone who can stand up against a common threat because not only combat fighting is involved but also a process of political stabilization afterwards.

The other part of the great political debate dealt with the European Con-stitution. The first attempt was a failure. But this failure should be seen as a small thing, small element only in that grand project which is called “unification of Europe.” We can be sure that there will be ways found how to deal with the issue of counting how many votes and how big a say each nation will have. More important is to understand that Europe consists not only of one, two or three nations, but of many more nations – and each of them has legitimate rights and a voice to be heard. No single nation in Europe has exclusive copyrights on what it means to be a true European. Europe can exist and function effectively only as a compromise. And this compromise should be demonstrated by all – by big European nations and by small ones as well. The failure of the Intergovernmental Conference regarding the finalization of the European Constitution in December last year shows that lessons of compromise should be equally learned on both sides – in the “Old Europe” and the “New Europe” as well.

With regard to the ESDP in the Constitutional Draft, we in Latvia were generally satisfied with the manner how it was tackled and, especially, that the notion of mutual defence had been removed from the final text. We cannot afford the luxury of duplicating NATO’s Art. 5 guarantees.

At the same time there was the ongoing debate on the European Security Strategy that was successfully finalized in December as well. This document with the title “A Secure Europe in a Better World” is a good starting point for a security vision of Europe, which as we see, is not that different from that of the United States.

The key threats for Europe highlighted are terrorism, proliferation of WMD, regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime. There is agree-ment that such threats need to be addressed with resolve and, given the dynamic nature of today’s threats, the notion of preventive engagement should play a significant role and be exercised at the earliest possible stage. More important, there is an indication of the important role that the transatlantic relationship is playing in achieving a safer and better world. This very fact of adopting the common European Security Strategy should be seen as a very positive thing indeed.

With regard to the Transatlantic relationship, we hope that there will be lessons learned from mistakes of the past months and that there will be many positive developments in the future in that relationship. In fact Europe and America, the EU and NATO, simply have no other choice but to act together if we want to succeed in the tasks that lie ahead of us.



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These are ambitious tasks indeed: There is an ongoing operation in the Balkans. Discussions are under way for the European Union to take over from NATO the mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina. During the initial stage there will be a requirement of at least some 5,000 to 7,000 troops. And, by the way, this operation may play a positive role. This will be the first real large scale operation (it’s not the Congo) and all the practical aspects of that operation surely will keep people in Brussels (also in the capital cities) busy and hopefully bring about a sense of realism, less paper pushing and empty theoretical exercises.

There is an ongoing operation in Afghanistan where NATO took over leadership in August 2003. Now there are plans to expand that oper-ation. More troops will be needed. Germany has a major commitment there already – around 7250 troops. There is no doubt that NATO will have to stay in Afghanistan for years to come. The operation in Iraq is ongoing as is the discussion about NATO taking

over some responsibilities there. This means more troops will be needed for years to come.

This is not to mention proposals about NATO’s possible role in the Middle East. Again, if it happens, most likely, more troops will be needed.

Where will they come from? The obvious answer is: from our own coun-tries and most likely more troops from Europe. Because, if we look per-centage-wise, European countries currently are deploying a lesser share than the U.S. Latvia is deploying currently 248 soldiers, I was told, that is around 10 per cent of its Land Forces.

There is no doubt that Europe should bolster its military and civil capabilities to engage more effectively in crisis management operations. This requires increased and improved defence spending and strong poli-tical will. This is also the way Europe will become a more credible partner for the U.S. The U.S. today is far better prepared in this field and often shares the bigger part of the burden in international crisis operations.

We should approach cautiously and on a very rational basis the issue of increasing European military capabilities and ESDP:

There should be no political rivalry and no duplication with NATO in terms of functions; simply we have no resources for that; double-hatted troops, the same troops designated for NATO and EU operations, is a com-mon practice in all European countries.

careful, rational spending of resources – not so much on HQs, but on real military capabilities;

All European nations have a right to participate in common under-takings – in structured cooperation; in build-up of rapid reaction forces, battle groups etc. No exclusive clubs and organizational frameworks. Everyone, big or small, counts. We in Latvia definitely are taking such an approach. And there are

valuable things we can offer. If we are able to participate together with Americans and other allies in the operation in Iraq – practically a real war

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situation – then there definitely are things/assets we can offer to the Euro-pean Union.

Moreover, small countries can very effectively contribute to security needs by specializing in distinct military and civil capabilities. For example, on its way to NATO, Latvia has specialized in training in munitions demolition, military policemen, medics, etc. They have been in great demand in ongoing crisis management operations. Small countries can also cooperate with each other to provide substantial contributions to capabilities. The Baltic States have set a good example of how cooperation in security matters can yield effective results (BALTBAT, BALTRON, BALTDEFCOL).

The idea of “two speed Europe” was raised. Initially, it seemed to be the so-called “gang of four,” now it looks more like three big leading countries, France, Germany and U.K., joining forces. There are several important aspects to note:

The biggest risk is that we might eventually come to a more fragmented Europe which is in no one’s interest;

What matters is substance. Let’s take defence and security issues as an example: Bringing more modern military capabilities together and eventually pulling the rest of Europe forward is a good thing, no doubt. But it requires more investments, more money to be put in defence. Do we see that happening? Not that much.

The very fact of the U.K. joining France and Germany and taking the lead in itself might be a good thing – it might provide some guarantees that whatever comes out of that cooperation there will be a lesser risk of creating something that will compete with or turn against the trans-atlantic relationship. The transatlantic relationship is one of the essential elements of Latvian foreign policy – as is EU integration.



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NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Kestutis Jankauskas Director, Security Policy Department, MFA, Lithuania

It is true that we are in a process of elaboration of new foreign and security policy priorities. We learned to lobby for accession, to implement and adapt to the acquis. We cared a little less how both enlarged organizations would operate. Now we should learn to operate from within.

It is true that we already have achieved a lot through accession. No surprise, it leaves a natural desire for more. And it probably is right that we do not want to rest on the achievements and want to take an active part in the shaping of the organizations – both NATO and the EU – that from now on will to a large extent determine our future.

Looking from the security policy angle – only a few years ago we were fighting to get any security guarantees. And only Russia was offering them. Today we are offered three Article 5s: NATO, WEU Brussels treaty, which is still around, and the one that is in the new Draft Constitution of the EU. And we are unhappy for some reason. Why? I will try to go briefly through our priorities:

First, it is in our interests that both of these organizations stay strong, viable and effective.

Second, you can call us provincial nationalists, but we consider NATO to be the best collective defence organization and we want to rely on it to ensure our security and to counter potential new global threats.

Third, we have to play a constructive role in transatlantic relations trying to keep both sides of the Atlantic together. Last year we have witnessed many tensions in the transatlantic rela-

tions, which led some to proclaim irreparable damage to the Alliance, and the need for Europe to have its own collective defence arrangements. They spoke about maturity of the EU, that “emancipation doesn’t mean divorce” and so on. Meanwhile, others have fought hard to keep the contested structures.

We are on the side of the conservatives. For the time being, NATO remains the primary choice for European collective defence. What hap-pened is that NATO went global because threats are outside Europe, and we went global with it. Germany went global. This left some vacuum in Europe.

We all started speaking about scarce resources. That’s why this has naturally led us during the IGC to oppose the proposal of some EU member states to include a so called “mutual defence clause” in the new EU Constitutional Treaty. This, in our view, would have created unneces-sary confusion and duplication. We do not have two defence budgets and two armies.

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Therefore, we are pleased with the strengthened reference to NATO in the text of the EU Constitution, which is mentioned not only as “the basis of the collective defence” for the states who are its members, but as “the instrument for its implementation” as well.

At the same time, while being very conservative about collective defence arrangements, we do not fail to notice that European security and defence policy is gaining momentum. The EU definitely has a considerable role in crisis management. As a future EU member we seek both to safeguard the transatlantic dimension in ESDP and at the same time to contribute to the strengthening of this European policy.

In our view, a stronger and more capable Europe, being able to conduct military and civil operations, where NATO is not willing or able to go, is in the interests of all transatlantic partners. Last year was especially fruitful for the EU with regard to ESDP matters. The Brussels European Council in December was a failure as far as the whole European Constitution is con-cerned but was positive in its results on the ESDP part of the new Treaty and on the planning capabilities of the EU.

If and when the new Constitutional Treaty will come into force, the most ambitious EU member states will have an opportunity to form strengthened cooperation in the military field, the so-called “structured co-operation.” We still have many questions about it. For example, what will happen to the present ESDP, what will be its relation to the EU Rapid Response Force, what will be the financial arrangements, etc? Never-theless, we note with satisfaction that there is an agreement that closer co-operation in the defence field has to be based on principles of openness and inclusiveness, and that any willing member state should not be rejected. For us it is important that the size of a country should not become an obstacle for participation. Will to contribute should be given due consideration. Our basic position on these questions is:

Find a credible, simple way for EU and NATO to decide early on who does what in anticipation of a potential crisis. Lack of this mechanism unnecessarily creates an impression of competition.

ESDP and its structured cooperation should not become another wheel in a vehicle of two-speed Europe. It should be flexible and inclusive. We don’t want to be Baltic brakes in a Franco-German engine. It should rather be a joint engine where small countries add to the engine’s power.

We should answer the question how do we beef up our wish to be a part in structured cooperation and how can we play a role in the develop-ment of the engine rather than trying passively to catch up with events. We should figure out what forces can we contribute so that we honour both our commitments to NATO’s NRF and EU’s Rapid Response Force concept and without having to choose between the two.

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Russia and the European Union: Worlds Apart? Dr. Hannes Adomeit SWP, Research Unit “Russian Federation/CIS”

In Europe after President Putin’s first term in office, questions are again being asked as to who is Mr. Putin. There is today yet again a heightened sense of concern about internal and foreign policy developments in Russia. This is clearly reflected in three European Union reports on the state of affairs and new approaches to be taken to EU–Russia relations by the Com-mittee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, and Common Security and Defence Policy of the European Parliament (the most far-reaching in its negative assessment), the Commission, and the General Secretariat of the Council.

The reports, completed and circulated in February of this year, agree on several main points: The EU and Russia have agreed on many ambitious political declarations. But despite common interests, growing economic interdependence, and certain steps forward, there has been insufficient progress on substance. Moscow is being reminded that the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) is based on common values. However, the reports discern a weakening of the rule of law and democracy in Russia, as evident, for instance, in the arrest and imprisonment of Mikhail Khodor-kovsky in October of last year; the December elections to the State Duma preceded by an election campaign marked by extensive use of adminis-trative resources with the aim of favouring government-friendly parties; erosion of checks and balances among the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government; and severe restrictions of the freedom of the media. Chechnya, too, figures prominently in the reassessment. The farce of the March 2003 constitutional referendum and the “election” of Ahmed Kadyrov as president are mentioned as well as continuing mass violations of human rights.

Furthermore, the reports draw a link between Russian domestic politics and foreign policy. Concern is being expressed that a new wave of national-ism, authoritarian tendencies, and recentralization of decision-making are being extended to the foreign policy realm. The most important indi-cations of this linkage are seen as lying in a new tough approach to the newly independent states on post-Soviet territory. Specifically, Russia’s atti-tudes and policies towards the Baltic States are being mentioned, but also vis-à-vis Moldova (Transnistria), Georgia (Abkhazia), Ukraine, and Belarus.

Finally, these tendencies are being regarded as having a negative impact on the future of EU–Russia relations. The reason for this, according to the reports, lie in the EU’s enlargement, with the Baltic countries and several Central and East European countries to become full members of the Union as of May 1 with the borders of the EU being extended either to Russia directly or to members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS).

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The reports culminate in the policy recommendations to the effect that it was now appropriate to arrive at a common EU position and to take a tougher line vis-à-vis Russia in negotiations.

It would be difficult to argue that the reassessments and the policy recommendations on their basis had thus far led to much soul-searching in Moscow. Officially, there has thus far been no reaction. Yet in inter-national conferences prominent members of Moscow’s foreign-policy and international security establishment have shrugged off the negative por-trayal as unfounded and laid the blame squarely at the EU’s doorstep. Several of them have argued that the West was adopting double standards: While paying lip service to the struggle against terrorism and separatism, it engaged in the luxury of attacking Russia for what needed to be done in Chechnya and failed to notice on-going processes of normalization there. While it had agreed to a far-reaching autonomy status for the Albanians in Macedonia, it was closing its eyes to mass violations of human rights in Estonia and Latvia.

Furthermore, the argument continues, Russia had made enough con-cessions to the West, to the United States and NATO. It had, for instance accepted in good grace and contrary to better judgment the American cancellation of the 1972 ABM treaty and two rounds of the eastward expansion of NATO. Despite its reservations on NATO, in the Balkans it had participated actively with its troops in the stabilization of Bosnia (SFOR) and Kosovo (KFOR) and agreed to a new NATO-Russia Council. And it had consented to the stationing of American troops in Central Asia and in Georgia. Now, the line of reasoning continues, it were appropriate to stop the series of concessions and retreats. But if the EU were really taking its rhetoric seriously and tried to bring pressure on Russia, this would merely be counterproductive. Any serious business would become impossible. And, domestically, external pressure would merely strengthen the hand of the nationalists.

But is the concern expressed by Western observers, including those who have compiled the European Union reports and recommendations, really founded? There may be exaggeration for effect on some issues, but, in essence, it is.

First of all, Russian policy more than that of the West is rife with double standards. While making the rights of the Russian speaking minorities in Estonia and Latvia a matter of central concern and exerting severe pres-sures on these two countries and on the European Union to revise its policies, in April 2003 it concluded a deal with autocrat Niazov of Turk-menistan, providing for the delivery of two thousand billion (two trillion) cubic meters of natural gas to Gazprom over the next twenty-five years at a preferential price. When shortly after the agreement Turkmenistan began to expel those members of the 300,000 strong Russian speaking minority who did not want to take Turkmen citizenship, Moscow initially closed both eyes and only later began to pay lip service to their rights.

Second, while rejecting concern of the international community over the behaviour of the Russian military and security service in Chechnya as

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unwarranted interference in Russia’s internal affairs, it is itself interfering in the internal affairs of neighbouring countries. Thus, it is exerting severe pressure on the Baltic governments, with deputy Duma chairman Dmitry Rogozin accusing the Latvian government as “Nazis” and calling it a country of “rogues” and “pariahs.” Russia refuses to ratify the already negotiated border agreements with Estonia and Latvia. In Lithuania, its diplomats have been proven to have engaged in activities incompatible with their status, and its security services appear to have forged ties to organized crime in the country and the president in violation of the law.

Third, while processing, as Putin did in an interview in October last year, that “We firmly stand on the path of development of democracy and of a market economy,” Russia is wedded to Belarus in a Union. It is thus helping to maintain the only dictatorship remaining in Europe and a country that is far from developing a market economy with fair com-petition. Whereas economic pressures are being brought to bear spo-radically on one or the other of the Baltic states in order to gain political concessions, such pressure on Belarus has nothing to do with intended regime change.

Fourth, while taking the position that separatism as in Chechnya is anathema to the interests of Russia and the international community, Moscow is actively supporting separatism elsewhere. This applies, for instance, to Moldova, where Moscow still maintains parts of the 14th army and military equipment contrary to international obligations. It also sup-ports separatists regimes in Georgia, notably in Abkhazia, but also in South Ossetia, Adzharia, and Djavakheti, still clinging to its military presence there in the form of “peacekeeping” forces (Abkhazia) and two military bases (Batumi in Adzharia and Akhalkalaki in Djavakheti).

Fifth, while emphasizing the necessity of adhering to international law, the importance of constructively working with international institutions, and criticizing the United States for unilateralism, it is not living up to such approaches itself. Thus, while ostensibly having made its peace with NATO and having committed itself to constructive cooperation with NATO, it still resents membership of the Baltic states in NATO and the extension of NATO’s military infrastructure, including its air defence system, to these states. Russia, as presidential advisor Sergey Yastrzhembsky wrote in the Financial Times, rejected the notion of NATO stationing either troops or equipment in the Baltic states, in fact, any “footprint” of NATO there, no matter how big. This includes AWACS reconnaissance flight over the Baltic area. In order to drive home the point, a spokesman of the defence ministry announced that Russia, within the framework of the unified Russia–Belarus air defence system, would hand over to Belarus S-300 sur-face-to-air missiles to be stationed at its neighbour’s western border.

Further on the issue of internationalism, in violation of any govern-ment’s obligation to see to it that the treaties it signs are also being ratified and carried out, Russia has failed to ratify the Kyoto protocol which it signed in 1997, thus preventing the treaty from entering into force; the Energy Charter Treaty, ready for ratification since 1994 and

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ratified by more than 50 countries thus far; and the Adapted Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe, which it signed at the Istanbul OSCE sum-mit in November 1999.

Concerning internationalism and treaty relations with the European Union, Russia signed the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement in 1994 and ratified it in 1997. Now, however, it is opposing extension of the PCA to the new members of Central and Eastern Europe. In March 2004 it handed a list of fourteen demands to the new Irish presidency of the Euro-pean Union. Most of these pertain to economic issues. But they also include issues unrelated to trade, such as the demand for further con-cessions by Lithuania on the transit problem, the lifting of conditions for naturalization for ethnic Russians in the Baltic states, the use of Russian as an official language where Russian-speakers live, and the lifting of visa requirements for Russians entering the new member countries.

What, then, drives the downturn in Russian-EU relations? Undoubtedly, part of the explanation lies in the more assertive line taken by Putin. There is a greater degree of self-confidence based on better performance of the economy and political stability. And there are stronger nationalist currents in the country which not only run unopposed by the president and his administration but which are being encouraged.

Yet the problems go back to fundamentally different approaches to integration in Europe. These are manifest in the European Union’s “Com-mon Strategy” of June 1999 and Russia’s response, the “Medium-term Strategy” of October 1999. In its approach, the EU proceeded from the assumption that democracy and a market economy with fair competition governed by the rule of law with an independent judiciary are yet to be built and that, if Russia wanted to integrate into Europe, the EU could and should be instrumental in that endeavour.

The Russian response, in contrast, was based on the notion that democ-racy, a free market, and the rule of law were already an established fact in the country and needed no outside assistance. It clarified that the Euro-pean concept of voluntary surrender of sovereignty to supranational insti-tutions is anathema to Moscow. “Russia,” the document asserted, had to “retain its freedom to determine and implement its domestic and foreign policies” and its “independence of position and activities in international organizations.” It rejected the notion of integration as a model for rela-tions with the EU, accepted it only “with a view to consolidating and devel-oping integration processes in the Commonwealth of Independent States.” The CIS received precedence in what amounted to a claim of the area being a special sphere of Russian influence. The EU was warned to tread carefully so as not to violate Russian interests or “hamper economic integration” in the CIS. It welcomed the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) but only with a view to limit “the United States and NATO and their domi-nance on the continent” and “to counterbalance NATO-centrism in Europe.” The trouble is that hardly anything of this approach has changed since then.

Wider Europe – Direct Neighbourhood, Including Russia


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Wider Europe – Direct Neighbourhood, Including Russia Thomas Urban Eastern European correspondent of the daily “Süddeutsche Zeitung”

I have travelled to the border since 1991 when I first visited Narva and Ivangorod. Last autumn I walked over the bridge from Narva to Ivangorod, where I spent a couple of hours and then walked back. I don’t know who from Tallinn has recently visited Ivangorod. I learned that it is very rare that Tallinn people visit Narva and even more rare that people from Narva visit Ivangorod. Narva, of course, is developing in a very good direction and Ivangorod is a provincial town. In Ivangorod it looks as if people are still living in the Soviet times, or even in Russia of the 19th century. It leaves a very sad impression.

Generally speaking, I completely agree with Toomas Ilves regarding what he said about Moscow’s aggressive and hostile attitude to the Baltic States. I also agree that there were moments when it was not like this. In January of 1991, I was an eyewitness to the events in Vilnius. A couple of days later, I was sitting in Landsbergis’s office. Everybody thought that all the communication lines had broken down, but suddenly the fax machine went on and out came a fax from Boris Yeltsin in Tallinn. In the fax he declared his support for the independence movements in the three Baltic States. He tried to come to Vilnius and to Riga but this was not possible. He only managed to get to Tallinn.

I have more questions than answers. I will focus on the question regarding what can be the contribution of the three Baltic States in formulating policy toward Russia and the other states on the Eastern side of the future European Union border.

The European Union has no consequent policy toward Russia

I completely agree with Hannes Adomeit’s analysis: The process of demo-cratisation in Russia has stopped. The Kremlin administration took control of the mass media. The opposition is being repressed or controlled, and elections are manipulated. It comes as a shock to me to observe these facts and I imagine it is similar for the analysts in the Baltic States and in Poland (where I have lived for many years). After the last Duma elections, German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder talked about a very good step in the direction of democratisation and as democrats we have to accept such results. Chirac and Berlusconi also gave similar comments. This means that something is going wrong with the perception of the leading politicians concerning analysis of developments in Russia. I know from some German diplomats that they are getting frustrated that their papers concerning German policy towards Moscow are completely ignored. The

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question is, how can the Baltic States contribute to the European Union governments regarding their policy towards Russia?

Lack of a political conception of the European Union towards Ukraine

Ukraine is probably on the way to becoming a failing state. During recent years the Kuchma administration is trying to copy Putin’s administrative methods. There is one big difference however: European governments accept or do not openly criticise Putin, but they criticise Kuchma for copying the same methods. This incoherent policy is not accepted, if not understood, by the administration in Kiev. When we ask directors of the Foreign Ministry in Kiev about the situation of the free press or the repression of the political opposition in Ukrainia they say: “But you accept this with Moscow. Why don’t you accept this with Kiev?” I have no answer to this question. We have to acknowledge that there is no consequent policy of the European Union towards Kiev. I completely agree with Toomas Ilves that there cannot be any question of Ukraine being a member of the European Union in this generation.

The famous value gap also applies to Ukraine. But there is another important point: As a correspondent I have been responsible for Ukraine for the past 14 years. I love comparing Ivangorod to Narva and I always try to compare the eastern part of Ukraine with the Lviv region. A good example which illustrates the social and psychological changes occurred to me last autumn when I visited Narva: the Vice Chairman of the local parliament told me: “You see, our people are beginning to become real Europeans because they stop before pedestrians on the street. Russians in Ivangorod would never do this.”

This cultural value gap exists also between Lviv and Dniepropetrovsk or Kharkiv. You have civil society in Lviv and you don’t have a civil society in Kharkiv or in Dniepropetrovsk or in Donetsk. You have a very energetic political opposition in Lviv which is also energetically oppressed by the tax police. I have interesting information – from six directors of the tax district of Lviv five are former KGB officers, but only a few people in the Western countries pay attention to this kind of oppressive system because it is working very well. All the Western organisations demand a healthy, intensive, good-structured tax system as the base of democracy, and the political leadership in Moscow or in Kiev can say: “Of course, we have a very good tax system,” and nobody will criticise this. That means that we have this very strong value gap between the Western Ukraine based on religion and traditions, and Eastern Ukraine.

Problem of the “minor states”

The EU has no conception of how to react to the demands of “minor” former Soviet republics becoming EU members, especially in the case of Moldova and Georgia. What will happen with Moldova? Is it a failing state?

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Like Georgia, Moldova also is a state partially occupied by Russian troops (called peacekeepers by Moscow), and these troops are regarded as occu-pants by the local politicians. I have the impression that Moldova and Georgia, though they are very small states, are completely neglected by Brussels and by the European institutions.

Russians in the Baltic States

Opinion polls show that the Russian population in Estonia and Latvia has very concrete expectations from Brussels: The Baltic Russians hope that the European Union will press on Tallinn and Riga to improve their political and social status. For example, change the language laws or introduce European passports and citizenship. Probably these hopes will be betrayed. Anyway, I would underline one fact which in my opinion is neglected by the leaderships in Tallinn and in Riga: The Russian population in both these states is very well-observed from the other side of the border, and the economical and social success of the Russian population in the Baltic States will have very strong implications for political discussions inside Russia (in Lithuania this aspect is not very important). For specialists of the European Union in Brussels, the problem of the existence of a major number of Russians in this region is neglected. Should there be special integration programs for the “Eurorussians” financed by the EU?

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Wider Europe – New Neighbours Rihards Mucinš Counsellor, Policy Planning Unit, MFA Latvia

The 2003 EU Commission’s Communication on “Wider Europe – Neigh-bourhood” is an excellent, yet a little overdue beginning of a process that is bound to take a lot of work and quite a few years of time to develop. It is highly positive that the Communication defines certain universal principles and values – freedom, democracy, functioning market economy as important principles of the EU’s policy in all parts of the Wider Europe – the East of Europe, the South and the Mediterranean. However, a more difficult task still lies ahead: to tailor the general ideas on the ways and means of achieving the defined goals in each separate region or country. It has failed in the past. The most important part of the initiative – prepa-ration of the action plans for each separate country should come around soon and we wish to contribute to this. The quality and depth of the plans remain an issue as well. As well as clear ideas of implementation. One indeed needs a robust policy in the New Neighbourhood and needs it as soon as possible, since developments in that part of the world –Eastern Europe, which I wish to focus on, demand a high degree of urgency.

One should stress that policies towards countries of Eastern Europe cannot be discussed solely in terms of the EU agendas. This is not necessarily where the fate of those countries lie but, needless to stress, should depend on nobody else but themselves. There is a very strong Euro-Atlantic dimension and the primary question for both sides of the Atlantic is – do we see the New Neighbours as part of a wider and more secure Europe or do we see them as annoyance for the enlarging EU and NATO that have to do a lot to absorb the current expansion, particularly, in the light of the new international challenges that ask for all sorts of new domestic agendas as well. In this context, I wish to stress the role of NATO as a centre of gravity for wide ranging reforms that took place in NATO candidate countries during the past decade. The results speak for themselves. This is particularly important, since the next ten years, at least for some, may turn out to be crucial for providing a clearer perspective in terms of Euro-Atlantic security and integration

The countries in the new neighbourhood are at different stages in their development and in varied relationship and perspectives as far as Euro-Atlantic institutions are concerned. Most of them have a long way to go and it would not be necessary to state here and today where we see the borders of the “institutionalized Europe.” The universal principles stated above would already be a huge step in the right direction and should be a result of political engagement, incentives and appropriate benchmarking/ conditionality. One thing should be clear though – Euro-centric internal and external policies of these countries are in the longterm stability inter-

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ests of Europe and for that interest we should not be looking for “alter-natives” like other centres of gravity. At least for no other reason than lack of them in the foreseeable future.

Russia

Russia is a unique case. It is and at the same time is not part of the wider Europe. It is part of it because it is physically in the neighbourhood and a potential partner, particularly as far as the Union’s economic interests are concerned and the main principles of the initiative fully applicable to it.

It is not a “classic” neighbour because Russia sees itself as a value in itself and does not want to be considered “one of them,” it does not accept the centrality of the EU in Europe; it perceives itself as a special case, like it does not seriously consider joining EU at least in a near to medium future nor is it acceptable in the EU given the realities of its present day develop-ment. In addition, some of Russia’s policies and debates inside Russia in respect to the other new neighbours that once constituted the USSR depict some tendencies that lead to the conclusion that EU and Russia’s interests in respect to the new neighbours are not necessarily identical.

Certainly there deserves to be a partnership or at least a quality dialogue between the EU and Russia. The problem in the past and partially today is that there has never been one. Instead there have been multiple and way too often contradictory bilateral dialogues that did not give an impression that the EU had a single policy or a vision of what kind of relationship it expects or what kind of future for Russia itself it aspires to work for. It is necessary for the Union or for the larger Euro-Atlantic community in general to speak with one voice – to demonstrate that the Euro-Atlantic institutions (and both of them, NATO and the EU) are strong and relevant. Equally, values should regain their rightful place together with interests in terms of the Euro-Atlantic agenda with Russia. We cannot be slaves of interests, since our values present our interests in a much longer run.

A few remarks on the internal situation in Russia. If “managed democ-racy” seems to satisfy the emotional, if not social or economic, needs of its own people it is just one side of the story. It is a much different story when “managed democracy” affects normal trade relations, practices unneces-sary protectionism, provides less confidence in its investment climate or puts obstacles to a wide range of sound bilateral co-operation with its neighbours that would help the development of mutually beneficial projects. This other side of the coin should be taken into account when developing overall policies.

The primary interest of the EU in Russia should be projecting its values, voice and power. It is particularly true for those who wish to see the Union as a power in itself. This is not the time of political trade-offs, tit-for-tats, since it would work against the long-term EU interest or indeed against the interest of true Russian democracy. President Putin deserves all the help he needs and we in Latvia are behind him in what good he aspires for Russia and its people. But we should always be weary of the means and

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question whether the means really lead to their declared end. The global pattern is certainly shifting and a need for a deep-rooted, yet critical dialogue is more than necessary. The EU should be open and friendly to whatever positive changes happen in Russia, yet equally assertive against any aberrations in that process.

Other neighbours

First, another generalisation applicable to all we really wish to embrace as new European democracies: work with the Eastern neighbours cannot be left solely in the hands of experts or paper-friendly strategies. The im-portance of a high level political signal, a necessity for the political visibility of the EU and NATO in these countries, is there as it was never before. In fact, the lack of it or mistakes in their projection may have con-tributed to some of the political decay that happened in some countries over the past 5 years. Despite what some in the EU think about its capabilities to absorb a wide range of countries in the future, there should be a clear and substantiated message: Your fate is not indifferent to us and we shall do everything possible to see you as independent democracies sharing our values and security interests. Over the past few years, some countries have been suffering a lack of public political attention that would help them motivate for further reforms. Countries like Latvia can easily associate this situation with themselves. Up until mid 1990’s the road to the Baltic States, at least for some, lead through Moscow. Moscow of the early 1990’s. Looking back at that period – was it really worth a look or a choice? The truth is: these countries deserve our attention in their own right, since any changes can be much more easily brought about in a smaller and, more importantly, a committed community rather than in a scope of larger and somewhat outdated geopolitical constructs.

There is a transatlantic dimension to all this process as well. If Europe and America are truly seeking ways for a common, post-Iraq war agenda, it is much easier to imagine it coming in the East of Europe than, at least in the short run, in the Greater Middle East or in equal capacities to fight international terror.

The means

The role of signals and high level political dialogue cannot be under-estimated.

Providing of asymmetrical trade benefits for those who perform better, not just assistance. Despite national interests of particular countries, I share the belief of those arguing for a wider range of open trade in the interests of Europe at large;

Stimulation of sub-regional co-operation is absolutely necessary where possible but the current failure of the GUUAM makes it a difficult pre-cedent. Thus, no artificial constructs are to be encouraged.

Friends of the Balts experience. Yes, we had it in mostly the military area

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in the mid-1990’s, but it should be applicable to other issues as well. This means, countries with shared goals coming together and devel-oping common strategies for the most needed issues. It is worth con-sideration, since it is hard to imagine all EU countries being interested in the same issues. This would provide a positive differentiation.

Belarus. This is a special case which needs special medicine. The overall goals may take many years, but there is a possibility that the parlia-mentary elections scheduled for this fall may trigger a process that leads to something good. Benchmarks have not worked because totalitarian regimes do not differentiate between sticks and carrots. A carrot equals a stick for this kind of regime, since it leads to its dismantlement. More con-centration on democratic regime change and civic society is necessary. Compliments to what Poland and Lithuania have done over the past years and we wish to join the process for the good of Belarus’ future as an inde-pendent and prosperous state. We should not miss the opportunity to pay attention to those events and subsequent Presidential elections. The Riga Conference has given a signal and it will be followed up. Ukraine. Nobody can afford it to become a failed state. I believe it is an exaggeration. Some say that Ukraine is one election away from making or breaking it. I tend to disagree. Yes, it may be one step from making or braking it to the NATO MAP, yet it does not take anything away from the necessity for much stronger EU policies in order to uphold its European aspirations. The democracy of the next presidential elections may indeed pave the way to long-term structural reforms that could take a generation to implement and have to be undertaken anyway to bring Ukraine closer to the EU. Again, a greater degree of political commitment is necessary. In this respect the ongoing democracy conference with broad U.S. and Euro-pean participation is a good step in this direction. Moldova. Nobody can deny its rights to be European. The baggage is huge, but only part of it belongs to Moldova itself. Commitment of Russia to its CFE obligations in Istanbul will remain crucial and the EU should have a voice in that. The major issues beside troop withdrawal are administrative capacities, strengthening of Moldovan statehood and a wide range of technical assistance. The Southern Caucasus are yet to become and should become part of the Wider Europe as soon as possible. The issue of Turkey is about to be solved and thus should not become an obstacle in this respect. Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan constitute a strategic region from the point of view of Euro-pean security and stability. The region is not homogeneous at all and any regional co-operation patterns are highly unlikely, taking into account some of the frozen conflicts, yet each of the three countries deserves individual attention and help. Today, Georgia in particular needs involve-ment as never before.

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On European Neighbourhood Policy Mindaugas Kacerauskis Head, Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine Division, MFA, Lithuania

General remarks

Lithuania has successfully completed accession negotiations almost a year ago and will become a fully-fledged EU member on 1 May, 2004. Having completed this historic endeavour, we are very much eager to focus our attention to our eastern neighbours in various aspects.

Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova will be de facto coming very close to the EU as a consequence of enlargement very soon. Once inside we should try to attract more attention to the eastern neighbours. On the one hand, there is a very fast process of rapprochement between the EU and Russia. But then the issue is what happens with the zone in-between. That is why we are working on the European Neighbourhood Policy.

The drive for EU membership is part of a new identity of Eastern Euro-pean countries. I disagree with the notion that certain countries should be excluded from being offered membership in the EU. We see the indepen-dence of our eastern neighbours as a key test, and therefore we should encourage their sovereignty and the ability to define their integration policies, preferably including membership in the EU and/or NATO.

Let me stress the key points. The European Neighbourhood Policy could serve as an instrument for integration into the EU if the country con-cerned makes this choice. The current debate on “Wider Europe” should not prejudice the question of the future EU border. We maintain that certain incentives should be introduced for the best progressing eastern neighbours. A new neighbourhood instrument should be established, providing opportunities of an enhanced, wider and more flexible assis-tance than presently exists.

Priorities of European Neighbourhood Policy for 2004

Action Plan for Ukraine; Inclusion of South Caucasus countries into European Neighbourhood Policy;

Balancing between the Eastern and Southern dimensions of the Euro-pean Neighbourhood Policy.

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Ukraine

We consider preparation of the Action Plan for Ukraine as a priority objective of the European Neighbourhood policy. The main ideas in respect of Ukraine’s European integration are as follows:

We have to keep the doors open for all possible suggestions in the future;

It is necessary to evaluate and take into account the real commitments that Ukraine is ready to undertake;

Since there are certain demands on Ukraine, there should be concrete incentives and ways how to help the country.

As far as the Action Plan for Ukraine is concerned:

It should contain a list of assistance projects within the Neighbourhood Instrument;

It is essential to agree on the timetable of the economic reforms, including the PCA implementation and admission to the WTO that could open the door for the negotiations on a free trade agreement;

The Action Plan could contribute to the strengthening of political co-operation with Ukraine, aiming at Ukraine’s compliance with the Copenhagen criteria. The political co-operation should be oriented to the stimulation of economic reforms and development of civil society in Ukraine.

Southern Caucasus

We maintain that the decision should be made this year as to the inclusion of the three South Caucasian states into the European Neighbourhood Policy. In our view, the inclusion of these countries would allow to delineate the guidelines for their co-operation with the European Union, setting realistic objectives and consistently working towards their achieve-ment. The Southern Caucasus countries have emphasised their decision to continue political and economic reforms and search for solutions of on-going conflicts in this region and even to seek the membership of the EU in future.

Why should the Southern Caucasus countries be included in European Neighbourhood Policy?

Relations with the EU and integration into the European structures are among the main priorities of the Southern Caucasus states.

Creating a strong pro-European motivation in the region and thus accelerating the democratic process, strengthening respect for human rights and freedoms, and speeding up of market reforms

Strong impetus for creation of a positive agenda in the region. An extension of the initiative over the coming years to embrace the Southern Caucasus could be considered as EU relations with neigh-bouring countries develop, especially with Turkey’s closer integration with the EU. The Southern Caucasus region borders Turkey, the EU can-



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didate state and member of the EU Customs Union, and Georgia has a sea border with Romania and Bulgaria, the EU candidate states, to become members in 2007.

At the same time, being aware of the problems that Southern Caucasus countries are facing, we would like to draw attention to the interest of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia in closer cooperation with the acceding countries, in particular the Baltic States, as these are ready to bring to the Southern Caucasus their experience of consolidation of civil society, political and economic reforms, administrative capacity building and creation of grassroots regional cooperation.

An agenda of co-operation could create a much more positive environ-ment for resolution and prevention of conflicts in the Southern Caucasus. The perspective of closer relationship with the EU would be a significant incentive for changes. It would also generate political will and public support for reforms.

It should be noted that the European Neighbourhood Policy is virtually the only goal that is common to all the three Southern Caucasus coun-tries. We are satisfied that the stance of the European Union began to change

sooner than we expected. Besides the active position of Lithuania and other partners, there were several other important factors that influenced the EU countries to modify the approach towards the countries of this region. Firstly, the EU appointed a Special Representative for the Southern Caucasus, who is enabled to assist the EU Council on the drafting of EU policies towards the region. Secondly, after the November 2003 events in Georgia a new administration came to power determined to execute decisive reforms in the country. Both due to the active involvement of the Special Representative Heikki Talvitie (his performance significantly im-proved the knowledge of the region in the EU) as well as due to the positive changes that took place in Georgia, the interest of the EU with respect to the Southern Caucasus increased. The EU and acceding countries are much more eager to support the initiatives of the EU in the region including the suggestions of developing the dialogue in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. We fully support the decision by the GAERC as of January 26, 2004 to examine the issue of the inclusion of the Southern Caucasus countries into the European Neighbourhood Policy until the end of Irish Presidency. We welcome this tendency and are ready to be further engaged in co-operation with the countries of the region so that they occupy an appropriate place in the Eastern Dimension of the EU policies.

Moldova

Moldova’s European integration should be executed in the framework of the European Neighbourhood Policy. Other methods of European inte-gration proposed by the authorities of Moldova should not be accepted. In this regard an Action Plan for Moldova could be elaborated in the first wave.

On European Neighbourhood Policy


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Belarus

Belarus should not be left out of the scope of the present discussions on Wider Europe. On the basis of the Council Conclusions of June 16, 2003, an Action Plan for this country should be elaborated, and made available for public discussion in Belarus.

There is a need to assist and consolidate Belarus opposition and increase EU visibility in Belarus affairs.

Consequently, it is crucial to cultivate within Belorussian society a belief in the positive disposition of the European Union to engage in co-operation with Belarus and its readiness to engage even further after the regime is changed.

The policy of “benchmarks approach” should be maintained as the basis for dialogue between Belarus and the EU. At the same time, real change in this country should be considered in a long-term perspective. Therefore, besides the “benchmarks approach,” there is a need for other means of dia-logue that would be relevant to the present circumstances and would cor-respond to the entire EU interests as well as to the interests of member states bordering Belarus.

It is important to send positive messages indicating the possibilities existing for co-operation with the EU under conditions for fulfilling clearly outlined standards expected of democratic states.

Special attention should be paid to the issue of the independence of Belarus and to the efforts of strengthening the identity of the Belorussian people. Consequently, it is necessary to develop a long-term program aimed at facilitating the development of civil society.

Russia and Wider Europe

Lithuania is of the position that closer co-operation with Russia on Wider Europe is an opportunity for EU–Russia strategic relations. The Wider Europe initiative shall not replace the EU–Russia partnership, but should be a contribution to it.

The principles and instruments of European Neighbourhood Policy could be used for co-operation with North-West Russia which will have a common border with the EU. The New Neighbourhood Program is one of the possibilities for co-operation in respect of the Kaliningrad region. We voice the need to elaborate the EU–Russia joint strategy on Kaliningrad development.

New Neighbourhood Instrument

It would be important to find a balance between existing funding resources for co-operation with the Easter European, Western Balkan and Eastern and Southern Mediterranean neighbours.



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Lithuania in principle adheres itself to the ideas expressed in the Com-mission’s Communication “Paving the Way for the New Neighbourhood Instrument (NNI).” We support the Commission’s proposal to create a single new Neighbourhood Instrument allowing funds to be used on both sides of external borders and capable to support cross-border and trans-regional (regional) co-operation. The New Neighbourhood Instrument starting from 2007 should correspond to the objectives of the Action Plans for all NNI countries concerned and provide resources for implementation of these plans.

We suggest that the major part of the fund should be distributed to the border regions and be used for economic co-operation, cross-border activities, and projects of environmental protection and border manage-ment. Another part of the fund could be used for the general objectives including support for New Neighbours in the development of democracy, strengthening civil society, implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, in order to increase awareness of the benefits of EU enlargement, aiming to encourage them to move closer to the European Union.

Program


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Program

Third Baltic–German Dialogue, Riga, February 21–22, 2004

Saturday, February 21

9:30 h Opening Mr. Atis Lejins Dr. Elmar Römpczyk

9:45 h EU Perspectives in View of Enlargement Dr. Eckhart Lübkemeier

10:00 h The Future of EU-25 and the Intergovernmental Conference Chair: Mr. Atis Lejins, Director, LIIA Dr. Heinz Kramer Mr. Aap Neljas Mr. Andris Piebalgs Dr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas Dr. Klaudijus Maniokas

11:30 h NATO, ESDP, and Relations with the USA Chair: Dr. Christoph Bertram, Director, SWP Mr. Volker Heise Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves Mr. Ilgvars Klava Mr. Kestutis Jankauskas

14:30 h Foreign Policy and Foreign Policy Institutes Chair: Dr. Andres Kasekamp, Director, Estonian Foreign Policy Institute Dr. Christoph Bertram Dr. Andres Kasekamp Mr. Atis Lejins Dr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas Dr. Klaudijus Maniokas

16:15 h Discussion

17:00 h End of session Press Conference

Program


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Sunday, February 22

10:00 h Wider Europe – Direct Neighbourhood, Including Russia Chair: Dr. Heinz Kramer, SWP Dr. Hannes Adomeit Mr. Thomas Urban Mr. Rihards Mucinš Mr. Mindaugas Kacerauskis

11:30 h Discussion

13:00 h End of Conference

List of Participants


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Mr. Guntis Berzins Member of Latvian Parliament

Dr. Dzintra Bungs Senior Research Fellow Latvian Institute of International Affairs

Mr. Toomas Hendrik Ilves Member of Parliament, Estonia

Mr. Kestutis Jankauskas Director Security Policy Department, Lithuanian MFA

Mr. Mindaugas Kacerauskis Head Belarus, Moldova and Ukraine Division, MFA, Lithuania

Dr. Andres Kasekamp Director Estonian Foreign Policy Institute

Mr. Oskars Kastens Member of Latvian Parliament

Mr. Ilgvars Klava Director Security Policy Department, Latvian MFA

Mr. Atis Lejins Director Latvian Institute of international Affairs

Dr. Klaudijus Maniokas Policy Analyst Institute of International Relations and Political Science, Vilnius University

Mr. Rihards Mucinš Counsellor Policy Planning Group, Latvian MFA

Mr. Aap Neljas Policy Planning Department, Estonian MFA

Mr. Raimonds Olsevskis Head Riga’s Office, Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Mr. Andris Piebalgs Under Secretary of State Responsible for EU Affairs, Latvian MFA

Mr. Rihards Piks Member of Latvian Parliament

Mr. Pauls Raudseps Editor Editorial Page, Newspaper “Diena”

Mr. Andris Razans Counsellor Policy Planning Group, Latvian MFA

Dr. Ramunas Vilpisauskas Associate Professor Institute of International Relations and PoliticalScience, Vilnius University

Mr. Andzejs Vilumsons Director Defence Policy and Planning Department, Latvian MoD



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Mr. Darius Žeruolis Lecturer Institute of International Relations and Political Science, University of Vilnius Director Department of the EU Policy Analysis and Inter-Institutional Co-ordination at the Office of Prime Minister

German Participants

Dr. Hannes Adomeit Member of Research Unit “Russian Federation/CIS,” SWP

Dr. Christoph Bertram Director SWP

Mr. Robert Ernecker Bundestag, SPD, Research Consultant

Mr. Volker Heise Member of Research Unit “EU External Relations,” SWP

H.E. Mr. Eckart Herold Ambassador Embassy of Germany

Dr. Heinz Kramer Head Research Unit “EU External Relations,” SWP

Dr. Eckhart Lübkemeier Deputy Director General for European Affairs Office of the Chancellery, Berlin

Dr. Elmar Römpczyk Representative in Baltic States Friedrich Ebert Foundation

Mr. Thomas Urban Correspondent for Central and East Europe, “Süddeutsche Zeitung”

Documents

Third Baltic–German Dialogue · The meeting today is taking place at a crucial crossroads for the EU and NATO, the two bedrocks of European security that the Baltic states will