Turkey's Middle East Policy Reloaded: Rise of Pragmatism?

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    Summary: Prior to the Arab

    Spring, Turkey was admired

    as the rising star of the region

    owing to its proactive foreign

    policy agenda. But the oscilla-

    tions observed in Turkeys policy

    during the rst few months of the

    Arab Spring led some analysts

    to suggest that the countrys

    regional role was in complete

    disarray, not least because

    Ankara failed to anticipate this

    contingency. Such analyses

    proved hasty at best, misjudged

    at worst. Turkey demonstrated

    exibility in adapting to the

    rapidly evolving circumstances

    and has managed to gain a say

    in the political processes likely to

    affect the future of the regional

    transformation. As the pendulum

    swings back, Turkey is againbeing praised as an important

    regional player. Overall, Turkey

    has increasingly moved in the

    direction of putting pragmatism

    above idealism in the conduct of

    its regional policies. Yet, a corre-

    sponding change has not taken

    place in the rhetorical parlance

    of Turkish leaders who continue

    to advocate an idealist vision of

    regional order.

    Analysis

    Turkeys Middle East Policy Reloaded:

    Rise of Pragmatism?

    bySaban Kardas

    October 10, 2011

    Washington, DC Berlin Paris Brussels

    BelgraDeankara BuCharest WarsaW

    O f f i c e s

    Analysis

    Te popular uprisings sweeping

    through the Middle East have putthe dynamics o the regional orderin ux, orcing the local powers toredene their oreign policy priorities.As the revolutionary ervor subsides,o particular interest have been theimplications o recent developmentsor urkeys Middle East policies.Prior to the Arab Spring, urkey wasadmired as the rising star o the regionowing to its proactive oreign policyagenda. But the oscillations observed

    in urkeys policy during the rst ewmonths led some analysts to suggestthat the countrys regional role was incomplete disarray, not least becauseAnkara ailed to anticipate this contin-gency. Such analyses proved hastyat best, misjudgedat worst. urkeydemonstrated exibility in adaptingto the rapidly evolving circumstancesand has managed to gain a say in thepolitical processes likely to aect theuture o the regional transormation.As the pendulum swings back, urkeyis again being praised as an importantregional player.

    How has urkish oreign policy aredlately as it navigated the waves orevolution? While it might be wrongto announce the death o urkeysMiddle East policy, it would be equallyproblematic to argue that urkey has

    emerged untainted rom this experi-

    ence. Te Arab Spring has presentedsubstantial conceptual challenges tourkish oreign policy vision, whichraised serious questions as to therelevance o the idealist thinking thatundergirded urkeys regional poli-cies. Overall, during the course o theArab Spring, urkey has conductedits policy by the dictates oRealpo-litik, and pragmatically realigned itsexternal relations. Yet, a correspondingchange has not taken place in the

    rhetorical parlance o urkish leaderswho continue to advocate an idealistvision o regional order.

    Turkey as a Middle Eastern

    Regional Power

    urkeys assertive involvement inMiddle Eastern aairs has beenan outgrowth o its oreign policyactivism on a range o regional andglobal issues. As much as the struc-tural conditions creating a permissiveenvironment, Ankaras recent orienta-tion is underpinned by a strong senseo agency, and as such it reects aneort o its leaders to play leadershiproles in their regional neighborhoodsand beyond. Indeed, urkeys regionaland global ascendance has coincidedremarkably with the rise to power o anew elite, represented by the AK Party.

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    Analysis

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    Analysis

    Turkish leaders have at times

    adopted rather rigid and

    categorical foreign policy positions

    informed more by their own beliefs

    about the right course of action

    than the actual facts on the

    ground.

    Turkeys regional and global

    ascendance has coincided

    remarkably with the rise to power

    of a new elite, represented by the

    AK Party.

    Te intellectual ownership o new oreign policy is usually

    attributed to the views articulated by Ahmet Davutoluin his academic writings, where he justies activism withreerences to the geographic and historical depth. Tatsaid, Davutolu is not alone in believing that geographicand historic imperatives require Ankara to pursue a multi-dimensional oreign policy agenda, and Prime Ministerayyip Erdoan especially has been a keen advocate o thisambitious vision.

    Te discussion o the AK Partys oreign policy oenrevolved around the provocative question o the role playedby the ideational actors. Analysts have debated whetherAnkara was experiencing a shi o axis away rom its tradi-tional Western orientation, toward a more Islamist direc-tion, triggered by the ideological makeup o the ruling elite.

    What was oen less addressed, however, was the conceptualramework that undergirded urkeys new oreign policyvision. urkeys regional policy had taken largely an idealistturn, in the sense that it was based on the assumption thaturkeys national interests and the conduct o its oreignpolicy must be inormed bya priori moralistic propositionsabout urkeys identity and international role. In line withthese role perceptions, urkish leaders have laid out severalprecepts painting an ideal picture o the Middle East andother regions urkey is a part o, such as the Balkans andCaucasus and urkeys place in it. More specically, theyhave acted on the belie that they are tasked to pursue aoreign policy that upholds peace, justice and reedom bothin immediate regional neighborhoods and the global level.Tough labeling them dogmatic would be wrong, they haveat times adopted rather rigid and categorical oreign policypositions inormed more by their own belies about theright course o action than the actual acts on the ground.

    Turkeys Self-Perception as an Order-Instituting Country

    Te leading theme in regional engagements has beenthe idea that urkey could act as an order-institutingcountry. Just as other emerging powers, urkey has aspiredto assume a greater responsibility in the creation o morestable and prosperous orders in surrounding regions. InDavutolus parlance, the concept o order instituting hasa broader strategic value as he relates it to the concept ocentral-country. In this view, the extent to which urkeysucceeds in setting up a regional order will be crucial orits emergence as a central country in regional and, conse-quently, global politics.

    In addition to such Realpolitik justications, urkeys aspi-rations or order-instituting power also rested on severalinterrelated arguments, indicating the inuence o idealism.First, juxtaposing itsel to the U.S. hard power approach tointernational problems, urkey has prioritized so powerinstruments. Likewise, urkeys policy o penetrating newmarkets and initiating economic integration projects withneighbors, accompanied by the removal o visa require-ments, added a liberal touch to Ankaras recent activism.

    Echoing the Wilsonian idealism, moreover, urkey hasemphasized cooperative policies and institution-building asthe best way to advance national interests, as well as to orgea peaceul regional and international order. urkey, morespecically, has come to value diplomacy, mediation, andengagement over orce, coercion, and exclusion, believingthat the United States stood or the latter. As a corollary,

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    Analysis

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    Analysis

    Turkeys overreliance on soft

    power instruments proved

    problematic as Turkey addressed

    the contingencies in Libya and

    Syria.

    under the rubric o regional ownership, urkey has advo-

    cated or local actors assuming larger roles or the creationo a regional order, which, in eect, has increasingly under-mined the ground or coordinated action with the UnitedStates.

    Ironically, the emphasis on an order-instituting role reachedits climax on the eve o the Arab Spring. In a January 2011lecture, Davutolu called or a proactive oreign policy,meaning urkey should be able to anticipate potential crisesand develop appropriate preventive measures. More impor-tantly, a proactive oreign policy meant that urkey shouldbe in a lead role in the resolution o regional and global

    crises, abandoning the reactive policies that had character-ized the countrys international practices.

    Post-Arab Spring: Rise of Pragmatism?

    Te Arab Spring has starkly presented the limits to urkeysability to understand and shape the regional securitydynamics. First, it must have reminded urkish leaders thatthe element o uncertainty inherent in international rela-tions presents a major constraint to any attempt at devisingan ambitious grand strategy. Perhaps urkey may not becriticized or ailing to anticipate a contingency such as theArab Spring, as it caught many regional and global actors

    unprepared. Judged by the earlier grandiose rhetoric odevising proactive policies to ride regional transormation,however, it captures the eye that urkey was not in the leadposition in eorts to address the uprisings, except or theortunate intervention in Egypt where Erdoans call onMubarak to leave power earned him applauds.

    Erdoans knee-jerk rejection o the imposition o sanctionsagainst the regime o Col. Muammar Gadda, and his vocalquestioning o NAOs possible role in Libya, were drivenless by the actual acts on the ground than his belies aboutright course o action. urkey managed to avoid being side-

    lined by the pace o events only through a pragmatic changeo course, simply disregarding its categorical objections.urkey, overall, reacted to the Western agenda, ratherthan proactively determining the policy instruments andplatorms that tackled the violent uprising in Libya.

    In Libya, urkey bandwagoned with the international coali-tion, and did so only aer much bickering about UN-autho-rized sanctions and the use o orce. Despite Erdoansinitial rhetoric, which accused other powers o pursuing

    neo-imperialistic policies and described urkey as the

    only country with a morally-driven and righteous agenda,urkey soon recognized the rapidly changing circumstancesand redened its policy, which culminated in Erdoanstrip to the country. In Syria, again, Ankara lagged behindthe Western world which launched coercive measuresagainst the Baath regime and only recently moved inthat direction. What is also remarkable is that in both casesurkey moved to coordinate its policies with the UnitedStates, abandoning the early rhetoric o autonomous action.

    Similarly, urkeys overreliance on so power instruments,which almost bred aversion to the use o coercion, proved

    problematic as urkey addressed the contingencies in Libyaand Syria. On the issue o regime change, urkey basedon the idealist oreign policy vision, Davutolus earlierwritings, and the lessons learned rom Aghanistan and Iraq deended gradual transormation o existing regimes,standing against regime change through oreign interven-tion. However, urkeys so power tools were o no avail,as it sought to present an Ankara-based solution to Libyaand Syria. Syria, in particular, showcased how, aer havinginvested political capital or engaging the Assad regime,urkey ailed to turn its so power into political leverage.

    Where Goes Pragmatism?Te major principles underpinning urkeys oreign policyvision beg reconsideration, having ailed to stand the test oevents sparked by the Arab Spring. At the core o urkeyspre-Arab Spring vision was a strong belie o its leaders intheir ability to understand and shape the region aer theirown image. Its leaders imagined a urkey that can leadby example and devise policies with oresight in order toprevent regional crises. Faced with ast-evolving contingen-cies, urkey rapidly responded to new conditions, though

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    Analysis

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    Analysis

    About the Author

    Dr. aban Karda works as an assistant proessor o international rela-

    tions in the Department o International Relations at OBB University

    o Economics and echnology in Ankara.

    About GMF

    Te German Marshall Fund o the United States (GMF) is a non-par-

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    its conduct was not always in tune with the idealist rhetoric.

    Overall it was successul in adapting to a new MiddleEastern regional order in ux, but urkey was hardly theactor that proactively led the crisis management eorts inall cases.

    urkeys change o course as observed in Libya is prag-matismpar excellence, and reects the ability to ollowdictates oRealpolitik in difcult times. What is needednow is a critical sel-reection o its leaders as to how theyreconcile the gap between rhetoric and practice. So ar,they have rerained rom engaging in a deliberate attemptat conceptualizing their practice. Instead, they insist on

    the validity o the idealist vision and oer ad hoc justica-tions or their maneuvers. Erdoans presentation at the UNGeneral Assembly attests to urkish leaders belie in theirsel-righteousness and reluctance to subject the idealistvision to criticism. However, as the mismatch between therhetoric and reality becomes ever more apparent, urkeywill benet rom a more nuanced and healthy debate onthe idealist vision as the conceptual ramework guidingurkeys regional policies, since this has immense practicalimplications. At the very least, it raises questions about thegap between capabilities and expectations or sustainabilityo an idealist agenda in a uid international environment.

    Tese questions are particularly relevant at a time whenurkish leaders aspire to apply the very same ideals at theglobal level.