Two Birds with One Stone: Attention from the US; Conciliation from the ROK

8/14/2019 Two Birds with One Stone: Attention from the US; Conciliation from the ROK

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Wednesday, 11 February 2009

Two Birds with One Stone: Attention from the US; Conciliation from the ROK

MAJ Steve Sin, USA; and Ms. Su Goodwin, CIV

Summary: On 30 Jan, the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of Fatherland (CPRF) issued a

statement that is will nullify 1) all the agreed points concerning the issue of putting an end to the political and

military confrontation between the north and the south; and 2) the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression,

Cooperation and Exchange between the North and the South and the points on the military boundary line the

Northern Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) stipulated in its appendix. In the statement, North Korea

blasted the Republic of Korea (ROK) government and said the hard-line policies of Lee Myung-bak forced it to nullify

the accords. The 30 Jan statement is the second threatening statement North Korea has made this year that

mentioned the NLL. On 17 Jan, a spokesman of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff issued a

statement announcing that because the Lee Myung-bak government of South Korea has continued to insist on a

hostile policy toward North Korea and it will conduct "all-out confrontation" against the South. Recent series of

rhetoric and threats surrounding the NLL seems to be a set of political maneuvering on the part of North Korea. A

continuing leitmotif of North Korean regional foreign policy is its aim to establish diplomatic relations with the US while

isolating the ROK from the regional diplomatic and security forums. The statements from 17 and 30 Jan served as a

vehicle to maintain the US focus in the region and engagement with the North to bring to fruition Kim Jong-ils deep

seated desire to normalize diplomatic relations with the US. Through the same two statements, the North has

conveyed the ROK administration its mounting displeasure about the current ROK policy on North Korea.

Please direct your questions and comments to MAJ Steve Sin, Chief, USFK J2 OSINT:

DSN (315) 725-5045, Commercial +82-2-7915-5045, or Email [email protected]

Information contained in this document is entirely derived from unclassified, open source, information. This product is basedexclusively on the content and behavior of selected media and has not been coordinated with other US Government components.This report may contain copyrighted material. Copying and dissemination is prohibited without permission of the copyright owners.

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Introduction: On 30 Jan, the North Korean Committee for the Peaceful Reunification of

Fatherland (CPRF) issued a statement that is will nullify 1) all the agreed points concerning

the issue of putting an end to the political and military confrontation between the north and the

south; and 2) the Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression, Cooperation and Exchange

between the North and the South and the points on the military boundary line the Northern

Limit Line (NLL) in the West Sea (Yellow Sea) stipulated in its appendix. In the statement,

North Korea blasted the Republic of Korea (ROK) government and said the hard-line policies of

Lee Myung-bak forced it to nullify the accords. The CPRF, a body handling inter-Korean affairs

in North Korea, said in the statement that "the group of traitors has already reduced all the

agreements reached between the north and the south in the past to dead documents. Under

such situation it is self-evident that there is no need for the DPRK to remain bound to those

north-south agreements. This statement shapely raised tensions between the two Koreas and

raised the possibility of a naval clash in the West Sea. The ROK government expressed deep

regret about the statement and encouraged North Korea to agree to a dialogue with the South,

which the North has rejected.

The 30 Jan statement is the second threatening statement North Korea has made this year that

mentioned the NLL.

On 17 Jan, a spokesman of the North Korean People's Army (KPA) General Staff issued a

statement announcing that because the Lee Myung-bak government of South Korea has

continued to insist on a hostile policy toward North Korea and it will conduct "all-out

confrontation" against the South.

Though the North Korean Naval

Commandroutinely protests movements

by the ROK vessels close to the NLL in

the West Sea (Yellow Sea), it does not

complain as frequently about the ROK

vessels movement across the Norths

claimed demarcation line which is well

south of the NLL.

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Indeed, a North Korean military provocation against the South near the NLL (or other actions

that could be perceived as provocative) in the future cannot be ruled out; however, it is more

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likely that these pronouncements are intended to pressure the South to adapt more conciliatory

policies toward the North while garnering attention from the new US administration.

Recent Developments Surrounding North Korea Leading up to the 30 Jan CPRF

Statement:

Weeks prior to the US inauguration, North Korea offered to send a top diplomat to the

inauguration, which the US rejected on 12 Jan.

On 13 Jan, a spokesman for the North Korean Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement

that the US should first normalize relations with North Korea as a precondition for its

denuclearization and that it will hold onto its nuclear weapons as long as the US backs the

ROK with its own atomic arsenal. The statement also demanded that if the

denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is the issue to be settled only when the DPRK

shows nuclear weapons, then North Korea must be able to also verify the presence of

nuclear weapons in the ROK as well and that the same rule should be applied to US troops

stationed in the ROK.

On 15 Jan, the ROK government rejected the Norths demand as distorted.

On 16 Jan, North Korea issued another strong statement directed at the US about retaining

nuclear weapons. The North stated that it will boost its nuclear deterrent and maintain its

nuclear weapons as longs as it remains under a nuclear threat from the US.

On 17 Jan, North Korea escalated its saber rattling against the ROK with a threatening

statement from the KPA General Staff.

On 19 Jan, the ROKs unification minister-designate, Hyun In-taek, said he will work more

closely with the US in dealing with North Korea, as he prepared to take over the post amid

the worst inter-Korean relations in a decade. Hyun, a university professor named as the

ROKs top policymaker on North Korea, sounded tough in line with the ROK President Lee

Myung-bak's hard-line stance toward the North, a departure from his moderate predecessor

who focused on persuading North Korea to engage in talks. Unlike other major North

Korea experts, Hyun prioritizes the ROK's alliance with the US over reconciliation with North

Korea and advocates international consensus as the starting point in dealing with the North.


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On 21 Jan, the White House stated that the new Barack Obama administration will get rid of

North Korea's nuclear weapons programs "through tough and direct diplomacy." According

to a foreign policy agenda posted on the White House Web site, the administration plans to

"use tough diplomacy backed by real incentives and real pressures to prevent Iran from

acquiring nuclear weapons and to eliminate fully and verifiably North Korea's nuclear

weapons program." The Web posting came one day after President Obama said in his

inauguration ceremony on 20 Jan that "with old friends and former foes, we will work

tirelessly to lessen the nuclear threat."

On 23 Jan, Xinhua News Agency reported that Kim Jong-il said he wanted a nuclear free

Korean peninsula, declaring his willingness to work with China to push forward the six-party

process. Kim stated, The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is committed to the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and hopes to live in peace with all other sides.

We dont want to see tension emerge in the situation on the peninsula, and we are willing to

strengthen coordination and cooperation with China and push forward the six-party process

without interruption. The US and the ROK welcomed Kim Jong-ils reported commitment.

On 26 Jan, former US President Jimmy Carter said he believes North Korea would be willing

to give up its nuclear weapons for US diplomatic recognition, a peace deal with the ROK and

the US, and if it got new atomic power reactors and free fuel oil. Former President Carter

said in an interview with the Associated Pressthat "It could be worked out, in my opinion, in

half a day."

On 27 Jan, the US Secretary of State Clinton said that six-party talks are "essential" to

ending North Korea's nuclear weapons ambitions and that North Korea's nuclear

proliferation should be resolved quickly through direct diplomacy of the US if necessary.

On 30 Jan, North Koreas CPRF stated that the North is scrapping all political and military

agreements with the ROK and declared the NLL void. The ROK responded to the Norths

threat with a warning of its own, stating that any attempt by North Korea to violate the NLL

will face firm counteraction.


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North Korean Rhetoric about the NLL from Jan 99 Jan 09:

For the past 10 years, North

Korea has issued over 200

statements (rhetoric and

threats) regarding the NLL

through diplomatic channels,

KPA delegation stationed at the

Joint Security Area (JSA), as

well as its state and affiliated

media outlets. (See Graph 1)

All of the statements issued

from 1999 2008 (202

statements) have been in

response to specific past or

upcoming events rather than

precursors of North Korean

contrived events. Almost all of

the statements were in

response to major ROK-US

combined military exercises;

naval clashes between the

North and South Korean navies;

and disputes between the North

and South Korean fishing boats

during the blue crab fishing

seasons. Only North Korean

statements related to NLL that

were not in response to specific

events were issued in 2009 (five

reports the 17 Jan KPA

General Staff pronouncement

and four reports that referred to

the pronouncement). The 30 Jan CPRF statement seems to be a response to the ROKs and

the US lack of appropriateaction to the 17 Jan statement. (See Graph 2)

Graph 1 (Source: Derived from Open Source Center Document Archive)

Graph 2 (Source: Derived from Open Source Center Document Archive)

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Significance of 17 Jan Pronouncement: The KPA General Staff pronouncements have been

used to announce increased states of military readiness in the past, and only two have been

observed in the past 10 years. Both of the KPA pronouncements were issued in response to a

specific event. In Dec 98, a KPA General Staff spokesmans statement responded to third

country media reports about Operation Plan 5027 what Pyongyang describes as US-ROK

preparations for northward aggression saying although we do not want a war, we also will

not avoid a war. In Sep 99, KPA General Staff special communiqu delineated the Norths

West Sea military demarcation line (MDL) in response to a deadly Jun 99 North-South naval

clash.

The North has often adopted postures to

raise tension, but it is unusual to place the

KPA on an all-out confrontation posture.

The reference to this heightened posture

presumably correlates with a higher-state of

readiness and it should be noted that this

higher-state of readiness coincides with North

Koreas annual Winter Training Cycle (WTC)

for its armed forces.

KPA General Staff spokesman (KCTV, 17 Jan)

The announcements warning that strong

military countermeasures will follow is

more categorical than typical North Korean

military warnings. Of significance is that there is no language indicating the North intends to

start a war. The statement did not threaten the ROK islands immediately south of the NLL, nor

did it have the usual blood and guts tone of the bellicose statements designed to increase

tension across the Peninsula it focused primarily on the disputed area off the west coast.

This is not a new threat although it is more pointed and explicit.

Overall, the North made no commitment to do anything within any time frame throughout the

statement. It also did not lay out any specific requirements on the part of the ROK to take

action, or a set of actions, in order to defuse the threat.

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It seems North Korea issued the 17 Jan pronouncement fully anticipating that the ROK

government will continue its hard-line North Korean policies and largely ignore the Norths

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bluster while putting its military on a higher alert status, which will then allow the North to claim

that the ROK government has failed to respond to Pyongyangs warnings.

Another significant aspect of the 17 Jan statement is that it explicitly said it was aimed at both

the internal and external audiences. This years New Years Joint Editorial hinted that North

Korea is concerned about discipline issues in the KPA. I may be that the North Korean

leadership sees tension with the ROK as a way to help focus its armed forces and instill

discipline.

30 Jan CPRF Statement

For the US: Weeks prior to the US inauguration, North Korea offered to send a top diplomat to

the inauguration, which the US rejected on 12 Jan. Four days after the rejection (16 Jan),

North Korea issued a strong statement directed at the US about retaining nuclear weapons.

The next day (17 Jan), it escalated its saber rattling with a threatening statement against the

Republic of Korea (ROK). The sequence of these statements suggests they may be reactions

to the diplomatic snub. The quick publications of the statements against the US and the ROK

which the North sees as the proxy of the US may also signify North Korea had these in

preparation in the event of rejection (which implies it had a separate set of statements ready had

the US accepted what the North considered a gesture of conciliation).

Between 21 and 27 Jan, the US stated, via multiple channels, that it is willing to work within the

Six-Party framework, as well as through direct diplomacy with North Korea, to verify and

eliminate fully North Koreas nuclear weapons program.

On 23 Jan, Kim Jong-il stated, The Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea is committed to the

denuclearization of the Korean peninsula, and hopes to live in peace with all other sides. We

dont want to see tension emerge in the situation on the peninsula, and we are willing to

strengthen coordination and cooperation with China and push forward the six-party process

without interruption.

Given that North Korea has been attempting to maintain itself at the top of the new US

administrations international agenda for some time, the 30 Jan CPRF statement appears to be

in part political positioning designed to convey to the new US administration, in strongest terms,

that while North Korea will conduct negotiations with the US, it still is a force to be reckoned with.


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For the ROK: Since the election and inauguration of the Lee Myung-bak administration in the

South, North Koreas rhetoric and threat against the ROK have increased significantly when

compared to the previous two ROK administrations. The inter-Korean relation is at its coolest

in over ten years. The North claims the Lee government is the root cause of this chilled

relationship.

For the past two ROK administrations, North Korea has enjoyed a conciliatory relationship with

the ROK under the Sunshine Policyof Kim Dae-jung, and later the Peace and Prosperity Policy

of Roh Moo-hyun, The ROK government under the Kim and Roh administrations was sensitive

to the Norths threats and demands, and reacted appropriately in Norths view to much of its

demands.

With the launching of the Lee administration, the relationship between the two Koreas became

frosty quickly. Unlike the previous two ROK administrations, the Lee administration has

chosen to take a tough stance against the North, insisting the relationship between the two

Koreas must be based on reciprocity and North Koreas willingness to disarm its nuclear

arsenal.

In response, North Korea has been consistently releasing rhetoric and threats against the ROK

government through diplomatic channels, KPA delegation stationed at the Joint Security Area

(JSA), as well as its state and affiliated media outlets. The frequency and belligerent tone of

the North Korean rhetoric and threats have increased throughout 2008, culminating with the 24

Nov 08 announcement of five punitive measures (which was implemented on 01 Dec 08) as a

retaliation to the ROKs anti-republic and anti-unification policies.

In the face of the Norths increasingly belligerent and frequent rhetoric and threats, the ROK

government has not wavered and adheres to its hard-line policy. As expected, the ROK

government largely ignored the 17 Jan KPA pronouncement as just another series of

provocative sound-bites.

The 30 Jan CPRF statement appears to be, among other purposes, a response to the lack of

ROK reaction to the 17 Jan KPA statement, designed to elevate the pressure on the ROK to

induce a change in the Souths North Korea policy.


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Conclusion and Assessment: The use of a highly authoritative statement on 17 Jan and the

issuance of the highly provocative statement on 30 Jan certainly are intended to underscore the

gravity with which North Korea views the current inter-Korean and international political situation.

Recent series of rhetoric and threats surrounding the NLL seems to be a set of political

maneuvering on the part of North Korea. A continuing leitmotif of North Korean regional

foreign policy is its aim to establish diplomatic relations with the US while isolating the ROK from

the regional diplomatic and security forums. The statements from 17 and 30 Jan served as a

vehicle to maintain the US focus in the region and engagement with the North to bring to fruition

Kim Jong-ils deep seated desire to normalize diplomatic relations with the US. Through the

same two statements, the North has conveyed the ROK administration its mounting displeasure

about the current ROK policy on North Korea.

Politically, North Korea has more to lose than gain if there is a military clash between the North

and the South (along the NLL or anywhere else on the Korean Peninsula); however, the

possibility of provocation (real or perceived) and/or miscalculation induced clash certainly does

exist if the current trend of elevated tensions between the two Koreas continues.

Documents

Two Birds with One Stone: Attention from the US; Conciliation from the ROK