The Legislature and Constituency Representation in the Fourth Republic of Nigeria’s Democratic Governance

By

Samuel Oni, Ph.D

Department of Political Science & International RelationsCovenant University, Ota

Sam.oni@covenantuniversity.edu.ng, onisamuel@yahoo.com

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Abstract

Citizens’ representation embodied in the legislature is a central component and an indispensable principle of democratic governance. This is because the legislature is the primary mechanism of popular sovereignty that provides for the representation in governance, of the diverse interests in a multicultural and subnational society. Legislative institution in Nigeria however, has been viewed as underdeveloped and inexperienced, emanating from the prolonged dictatorial and authoritarian rule by the military which while it lasted, either outrightly proscribed the legislature or completely subordinated it to the executive arm of government. The return to civil rule or constitutional government from military dictatorship in 1999 is essentially the return of the legislature. Disturbingly, twelve years after the commencement of democratization in Nigeria, legislative politics in the country is yet to show clear evidences of citizens’ representation in governance. Findings revealed that the Nigeria’s national parliament though have recorded improvement in terms of legislation and oversight roles, offers a slim ray of hope in championing constituents’ interests due to certain sociopolitical and economic forces that continue to undermine the country’s legislative efficiency.

Keywords: Legislature, Representation, National Assembly, Democratic Governance

Introduction

The concept of constituent representation embodied in the legislature is an important and

indispensable principle of any democratic state (Bishin, 2009). This is because the legislature is

the primary mechanism of popular sovereignty that provides for the representation in

governance, of the diverse interests in a multicultural and subnational society. In performing the

role of representation, the legislature serves as a vital link between the government and the

governed, the elected and the electorate, the rulers and the ruled (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). In this

view, legislature is charged with the responsibility of ensuring good governance through

constituent representation in the decision making process especially in a pluralized society

characterized by differences and heterogeneity (Johnson, 2005).The legislature is thus, seen as

occupying fundamental place in democratic governance and performing crucial role of citizens’

representation for the advancement and well being of the citizenry (Anyaegbunam, 2000).

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Legislative representation, though crucial to democratic governance, findings have revealed that

the legislature in some political systems have wide powers and exercises real power while some

others have declined in power to a mere rubber stamp assembly for legitimizing the decisions

made elsewhere (Heywood, 2007; Lafenwa, 2009). Some scholars observe the abdication of

responsibility by Parliament in fulfillment of some other interests noting that published research

about legislative representation tends to be much more sanguine about the degree to which

popular sovereignty exist than the evidence seems to justify (Bishin, 2009; Saliu & Mohammad,

2010).It is therefore, imperative to ascertain the extent to which the Nigerian legislatures have

been able to perform their role of citizens’ policy representation. It is at the backdrop of this that

this paper examines the National Assembly and constituency representation in the fourth republic

of Nigeria’s democratic governance. The next section is a theoretical exploration of the subject

matter.

Legislature, Political Representation and Democracy. A Theoretical Discourse

The legislature occupies a key position in the machinery of government because it is the people’s

branch with the purpose of articulating and expressing the collective will of the people

(Heywood, 2007; Bernick & Bernick, 2008). Okoosi-Simbine (2010) in the light of this, sees the

legislature as the First Estate of the Realm, the realm of representation and the site of

sovereignty, the only expression of the will of the people. On this note, Anyaegbunam (2000)

conceptualizes the legislature in terms of making, revising, amending and repealing laws for the

advancement and well being of the citizenry that it represents. It follows from this analysis that

the authority of the legislature is derived from the people and should be exercised in accordance

with the will of the people who they represent. This is the position of Bogdanor (1991) when he

affirms that the authority of the legislature as a political institution is derived from a claim that

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the members are representative of the political community, and decisions are collectively made

according to complex procedures. Davies (2004) also noted that the establishment of the

legislature rests on the assumption that in the final analysis, political power still resides in the

people and that the people can, if they choose, delegate the exercise of their sovereignty to

elected representatives. Jewell (1997) on the other hand, identified two features that distinguish

the legislature from other branches of government. The first feature, according to him, is that the

legislature possesses formal authority to make laws, and secondly members are normally elected

to represent various elements in the population.

The legislature can thus be seen as an institution established to make laws that embodies the will

of the people who they represent. As an organ of government therefore, it is the forum for the

representation of the constituents (Miler, 2010). Lafenwa (2009) perhaps, exemplifies the

representation role of the legislature more clearly when he defines legislature as an official body,

usually chosen by election, with the power to make, change, and repeal laws; as well as powers

to represent the constituent units and control government. Loewenberg & Patterson (1975) and

Okoosi-Simbine, (2010) also concede to this important view of the legislature as the people’s

representative as they view the legislature as assemblies of elected representatives from

geographically defined constituencies, with lawmaking functions in the governmental process of

a country. Legislators are responsible for representing the differences in society. These

differences may be rooted in geography, ethnicity, religion, political identification, gender, or

other characteristics (Johnson, 2005, Miler, 2010).

The concept of representation is however, elusive with very few agreeing on any particular

definition. In fact, from the time of Plato, the subject representation remains a debate among

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political scientists (Scully & Farell (2001). Sacchett 92008)tends to depict the representation

primarily in terms of its structural key-elements, as a relationship between a principal

(representative) and an agent (represented), concerning an object (interests, opinions, etc), and

taking place in a particular setting (the political context). Accordingly, Castiglione & Warren

(2006) sees the concept of representation as having three key characteristics. Firstly, that

representation invokes a principal-agent relationship (the representatives stood for and acted on

behalf of the represented), mainly though not exclusively, on a territorial and formal basis, so

that governments could be said to be responsive to the interests and opinions of the people.

Secondly, that representation identifies a place for political power to be exercised responsibly

and with a degree of accountability, in large part by enabling citizens to have some influence

upon and exercise some control over it, and thirdly, that the right to vote for representatives

provides a simple means and measure of political equality. Loewenberg & Pattern (1979)

however, conceptualise representation in terms of relationship between the representative

(legislature) and the represented (constituents). They therefore pointed out four basic elements of

representation expressed by the legislature. According to them, the first feature is the focus of

representation expressed in terms of legislators’ perception of what make up their constituents.

The constituents can be geographical delineated area, political party or other kind of constituency

such as ethnic groups, gender, social classes or interest group. The second feature, according to

Loewenberg & Pattern (1979), is the style of representation which focuses of the way the

legislators respond to their constituents. In this view, the legislators can act on the expressed

preferences of their constituents (delegate), follow his intuition (trustee) or act according to

prevailing circumstances (polito). The third feature however, is the components of the

responsiveness, that is, the kind of expectations the legislators respond to. Thus the expected

components could be policies on certain issues, provision of some services, allocation of public

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resources or symbolic (psychological needs). (Mansbridge, 2003), on the other hand, identifies

four different forms of representation in modern democracies. The first according to her, is the

promissory representation which is the one in which the representatives focus on what they

promised their constituents before they were elected. The second form of representation is the

anticipatory representation, that is, the type in which the representatives focus on what they think

constituents will approve in the next elections. The third form is the gyroscopic representation, a

type in which the representatives look within their personal background to derive interests and

principles, without external incentives. The fourth type of representation according to

Mansbridge (2003), is the surrogative representation. In this form of representation, the

representatives tend to represent individuals, groups, party or institutions outside their particular

constituency. Example of this form of representation is the monetary surrogacy which occurs

when citizens with high income, contribute to the electoral success of representatives outside

their district or party and as a result acquire a sort of power over them (Sacchett, 2008). This type

is likened to the politics of godfatherism in Nigeria in which elected representatives tend to

satisfy the interests of their godfathers who were seen as instrumental to their electoral victory at

the detriment of the electorate. Political representation can also be defined as the articulation and

presentation of political agendas of given groups by various actors in decision-making arenas

and key social forums in democratic societies. In the view of Urbinati (2000) however, an

analysis of the concept of representation should not be limited to formal aggregation of interests

but the preservation of differences necessary for maintain liberty, procedural rules of

proportionality and equality within civil society and accountability of the representative to the

represented.

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The fact that interest aggregation, equality and liberty constitute the core of representation makes

the concept of representation a hallmark of democracy. This is because democracy is

characterized by its emphasis on the values of popular sovereignty (the idea that the majority

should rule), liberalism (the idea that all people are equal), and liberty (Bishin, 2009). That is

why Pollack, et ‘all (2009) averred that the invention of representation is purposely for the

practicability of democracy, and therefore, it is unimaginable to think of democracy outside

political representation. This position is perhaps more vividly argued by Edigheji (2006) when he

noted that a distinguishing feature of democratic governance is that the electorate chooses

leaders through regular, multiparty and competitive elections, which are seen as the primary

mechanisms for political representation. As Mohammad (2007) rightly averred, the existence of

an independent legislative institution composed of representatives of the people is a

distinguishing hallmark of democratic government. Representation is inherent in the practice of

democracy and the need for effective structures and practices of legislative representation is

central to a functioning democratic political system (Scully & Farell (2001). Representation

occurs from the very essence of legislators as ambassadors of the various communities in the

country (Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). Thus, Davies (2004) averred that representative liberal

democracy cannot exist without a healthy, lively and credible legislature. As Lafenwa (2009)

argues, the legislature is the central element of representative democracy.

The Legislature and Political Representation in Nigeria.

It has been argued that governmental institutions for making and implement policies, and settle

disputes had existed in the kingdoms and communities in Nigeria before the advent of the

colonial master (Fashagba, 2009). Modern legislature as an institution of political representation

in Nigeria is however, traceable to colonial engineering with the establishment of the Legislative

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Council in 1862 for the Colony of Lagos. The council was however, dominated by Europeans

with only two Nigerian representatives as unofficial members (Oyediran, 2007). The subsequent

constitutions promulgated for Nigeria in 1922, 1933, 1946, 1951, 1954 and 1960 by the

colonialist, further provided for the Nigerian legislative institutions (Aghalino, 2006). The

introduction of Elective Principle by the 1922 Constitution ushered in a representative

democracy because for the first time, Nigerians had the opportunity of electing their

representatives and participating in the legislative process (Anifowose, 2008). This was however

limited as only 4 representatives (one from Calabar and three from Lagos) could be elected by

few Nigerians (Oyediran, 2007). Besides, in spite of the embracive coloration of the Nigerian

Legislative Council, its jurisdiction was confined to the southern Provinces, including the colony

of Lagos. The Northern Provinces were not represented in the legislative politics of the country

(Anifowose, 2008).

The Nigerian Legislature under the colonial state could not perform legislative functions as the

most important institution of a liberal democratic state. The colonial legislatures were designed

to serve as agencies for articulation of views and ventilation of popular feelings that were not

expected to radically change the patterns and policies of the respective colonial governments

(Alabi, 2009). They were mere ratificatory assemblies for the executive directives of the

Colonial Governor (Awotokun, 1998). This orientation was to have a long lasting effect on the

performance of the legislature, not only during but even years after effective renunciation of

colonial rule. In 1963 a national daily newspaper was quoted to have referred to the Federal

Legislature as an expensive and irrelevant talking shop (Awotokun, 1998). The Report of the

Political Bureau of March 1987 revealed that up until 1979, the Nigerian legislatures were the

weakest link in the making of public policies in Nigeria (MAMSER, 1987). The second and

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aborted third Republics’ legislatures did not improve significantly in terms of their performance.

This basic institution of democratic governance remained weak and vulnerable to executive

manipulation under conditions of enormous concentration of power and resources in the

executive presidency (Ibeanu and Egwu, 2007).

The Nigerian legislative institution, though started as a deliberative organ of the colonial

government, has however, developed to become a full fledged legislative institution of law

making, representation and oversight. Paradoxically, the emerging legislature has remained

junior partners of the executive in the politics and government of Nigeria after independence.

The authoritarian legacy of colonialism destroyed the power balance of the organs of

government (Schraeder, 2000). Despite the powers, functions and privileges provided for the

legislature in most Nigerian constitutions after independence, the challenges of governance faced

by the post-independent Nigeria which either put the legislature in abeyance or subjected it to

manipulations and control of the patrimonial executive rulers, further reinforced the weaknesses

of Nigeria’s legislative institutions (Saliu & Muhammad, 2010).

The advent of independence of Nigeria from the colonial master in 1960 ushered in new dreams

and expectations as instrument of power was being handed to a democratic rule. These dreams

were however, soon shattered as government after government began to fall victims to military

dictatorship and ushered in another era in the political history of Nigeria. Military incursion in to

the political arena of Nigeria further worsened the precarious situation of the legislative body

(Okoosi-Simbine, 2010). For almost three decades under different military regimes, the National

Assembly suffered various forms of subjugation and proscription (Alabi, 2009). Each time the

legislative institution came under military assault, the legislature is abrogated, and its powers

merged with that of the executive military rulers who, through a supreme military governing

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organ, wielded both the legislative and executive (and a times, judicial) powers and exercised

legislative powers by way of promulgating Military Decrees (Fasagba & Alabi, 2009). In such a

situation, the legislatures as representative institution could not but be seriously weakened.

The Second republic which was ushered in by the promulgation of the Constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, provided for a bicameral legislature separated in functions and

personnel from the executive organ under an Executive Presidential system of government

(Anifowose, 2008). There was a Senate, with a membership strength of 95, (each of them 19

states in the country produced five Senators), and a Federal House of Representatives with a

membership strength of 450. The second republic was however, abruptly terminated by a

Military coup on December 31, 1983.When the legislature was permitted to exist under schemes

of diarchy during the aborted third republic, this organ of government remained within the

stranglehold of the military rulers who used the legislature not as representative of people’s will,

but to create some sense of legitimacy for their administrations (Awotokun, 1998).

The legislative institution of Nigeria during the decades of military administration was therefore,

denied the advantage of experience which is the cornerstone of the enviable tradition of

legislative supremacy and significance in the governance of the advanced democracies (Kaiser,

2005). Because the Nigeria’s legislatures were hardly permitted to make mistakes and learn from

lessons of the past by the military rulers who seized every opportunity of major disagreements in

parliaments to truncate democratic rule, the legislatures got weakened and remained

inexperienced compared to other arms of government as soon as a return to democratic rules

were permitted. The legislative arm is thus, the least institutionalized following this long history

of authoritarianism in Nigeria (Saliu & Muhammad, 2010).

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The return to civil rule or constitutional government from military dictatorship in 1999 is

essentially the return of the legislative representation in Nigeria. The 1999 Constitution upon

which the Fourth Republic of Nigeria anchors provided for a bicameral National Assembly with

power to check and balance those of the executive. The Senate, with three members representing

each of the three senatorial districts of each state of the federation on equal bases irrespective of

size and one for the Federal Capital Territory of Abuja, has 109 members (FGN, 2009). The

House of Assembly, the lower chamber, represents the people with the 360 members elected

from districts of roughly equal population size (McCormick, 2007). As noted by Rehfeld (2005),

the virtue of heterogeneous electoral constituencies emerges from a set of uncontroversial

principles of democratic legitimacy such as the notion that representatives should be accountable

to those who elect them. Thus the delineation of Nigeria into constituencies is justified by the

heterogeneity and multi-ethnocultural diversity of the Nigerian state. The constitutional

responsibilities of the National Assembly include making laws for the peace, progress and good

governance of the country (Nwanolue, & Ojukwu, 2012). Some responsibilities are, however,

exclusive to the Senate. These include the Screening and confirmation of both members of the

Federal Executive or Ministers, and ambassadorial nominees. There is an Exclusive Legislative

List of 68 items and a Concurrent List defining the extent of Federal and State Legislative

powers. On the account of these exclusive responsibilities, the Senate is regarded as the Upper

House of the National Assembly, and the House of Representative, the Lower. The Senate is

presided over by Senate President while the House by a Speaker (FGN, 1999).

Challenges of the Legislature and Political Representation in Nigeria’s Fourth Republic

The quality of a parliament is determined by the laws enacted and oversight functions designed

to make the country progress (Anifowose, 2008). The Nigerian parliament however, seems to

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have abdicated this primary role in pursuit of personal interests. In the first 12 years of the Fourth

Republic for instance, the parliament could passed only 134 bills, many of which were the

various appropriation bills in which the lawmakers often have vested interests or to attract more

contracts to enrich pockets of the House members without any radical approach to salvage the

economic yearnings and aspiration of the public (Nwanolue & Ojukwu, 2012, Punch Editorial,

2012).The 6th National Assembly for instance, passed only 91 Bills over its four‐year tenure

(2007‐2011) whereas the 112th U.S. Congress (2011‐2012) passed a total of 326 Bills over a two‐

year tenure (Okigbo & Oyeka, 2012). Thus while the primary assignment of the legislature is to

make laws for the good governance of the country and hold the executive accountable through

oversight, the federal lawmakers of Nigeria has been able to make very few laws, pass

ineffectual motions and engage in rampant absenteeism (Punch Editorial, 2012).

Elections remain a core concern to representative democracy because through casting of votes,

the people give their consent to their representative (Scully & Farell (2001). Election is the

medium through which the verdict of the people is converted into the membership of political

institutions, particularly, the legislature (Katz, 1997). The history of election in the independent

Nigeria has however, been characterized by election rigging and other fraudulent electoral

practices and disputes, leading often to political instability (Edigheji, 2006). This remorseful

state of affairs has been compounded by the absence of institutions of horizontal accountability,

such as independent electoral commissions with the capacity to conduct free and fair elections

and the unwillingness of political parties to play by the rule of the game. Election rigging and

other fraudulent electoral practices thus, constitute an impediment to political representation in

Nigeria particularly, the Fourth Republic (Omadia & Egwemi, 2011).

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The postcolonial Nigeria has been a victim of dualistic form of institutions of governance as

modern elected institutions of political representation continue to exist side by side with

traditional socio-political institutions as a parallel system of governance (Edigheji, 2006). While

the elite essentially imitate western political institutions, the overwhelming rural populations

often alienated from the state continue to stick principally to traditional institution of governance

(Oni & Segun, 2010). This, thus, creates a dualistic form of institutions of governance that are

positioned back-to-back, each one behind the other and facing in opposite directions. The

fragmentation of the institutions of governance continues to contribute to crisis of state-building

and governance in Nigeria. It has in some cases, also led to an ambiguity in the roles of the

former and conflicts between both institutions that see themselves as representative of their

people (Edigheji, 2006).

Legislators are responsible for representing the differences in society, and for bringing these

differences into the policy-making arena (Johnson, 2005). These differences may be among

others, gender rooted (Miler, 2010). The Nigeria’s National Assembly however, has over the

years, not been a gender sensitive parliament. The Inter‐Parliamentary Union (IPU) (2008)

defines a gender sensitive parliament as one which responds to the needs and interests of both

men and women in its structures, operations, methods and in its work as a nation’s peak

legislative institution. Nigeria’s National Assembly has not been able to provide a platform for

gender rooted differences in Nigeria as women who constitute about half of the national

population continued to be under represented in the country’s national parliament. Since this new

dispensation, women representation in the National Assembly has been less than 10% (UNDP

Report, 2005; Nigeria CEDAW NGO Coalition Shadow Report, 2008; Oni & Segun, 2011).

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The Nigerian National Assembly is seen as one of the most expensive and extravagant

parliament in the world (Sanusi, 2010). Since Nigeria’s return to democracy in 1999, the cost of

running the National Assembly has been on an upward trajectory even as the percentage of

Nigerians living in poverty continues to grow. Between 1999 and 2010, 11 years of Nigeria’s

democratic rule, the National Assembly was alleged to have drawn more than N684.6 billion

from the nation’s treasury (Ajani, Agande & Binniyat, 2010). According to Okigbo & Oyeka

(2012), the average annual spend (salary and allowances) on a Senator and a Member of the

House of Representatives is about N240 million ($1.6million) and N204 million ($1.36 million)

respectively. Sanusi (2010) once remarked that the overhead cost of running the National

Assembly is about 25.4 % of the nation’s total budget whereas 61.2% of Nigerians whose

interests the legislators purport to represent live on less than $1 per day. This investment does

not translate to results when calculated as the number of bills passed into law.

Another challenge of the Nigerian federal legislature as a representative of the people is

corruption. The legislature is seen as the accredited representatives of the people and has the

duty of protecting and controlling public treasury (Stapenhurst, Ulrich & Strohal, 2006). It has

a challenging responsibility to uphold the highest standard of ethics, transparency and

accountability, efficiency and essentially, leadership by example which would serve as a spring

board for a corruption-free and democratic society (Mohammad, 2007). The Nigeria federal

assembly’s members and its legislative process has however, not been free from perennial

allegations of corruption (Ogundolapo 1999). While the organ is expected to facilitate

accountability through scrutiny of administration, the concern of the Nigerian federal

legislature especially since 1999 when the country returned to representative democracy, has

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been on material and financial benefits it could amass using its office and power (Alabi &

Fasagba, 2009; Benjamin, 2010).

Another factor that continues to weaken the representation role of the National Assembly is the

nature of Nigerian political parties and political process (Benjamin, 2010). In most democracies

of the world, the performance of the legislature is to a great extent determined by the party

system in place (Omodia & Egwemi, 2011). Paradoxically however, party system in Nigeria is

characterized by party instability and fragmentation, lack of clear ideology, cross carpeting,

ethnic politics, poor structuring of the relationship between elected legislators and party bosses

and godfatherism (Anifowose & Akinbobola, 2005; Omotola, 2009; Omodia& Egwemi, 2011).

As a result, political parties in the country have failed to metamorphose into enduring and

sustainable democratic institutions (Muhammad, 2008). This instance of course has rubbed on

the workings of the legislators in Nigeria since independence. In many cases, member loyalties

to political parties or leaders far outweigh concerns for the legislature as an institution

(Benjamin, 2010).

Closely related to the factor above which has also weakened the legislative power in Nigeria is

the personal ambition and parochial interest and agenda of legislators. The self serving and

pathological conception of politics in Nigeria is such that control of political power is seen as a

means of perpetuating selfish interests (Muhammad, 2007). The legislature and other activity

sectors in the country is as a result saddled with persons who have more consciousness and

drive for self service rather than the concern for public service, their constituents and the

common good. Consequently, most legislators see there positions as a means of promoting

selfish and parochial interest rather than national interest (Lafenwa, 2009).

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The dysfunctional constituents in Nigeria is another factor that has affected negatively, the

effectiveness of the Nigeria legislature not just at the federal level alone but the state and local

level of government (Edigheji (2006). Many individuals and groups in civil society do not

understand the workings of the legislature, and are often unskilled in articulating their needs to

the legislature (Nwanolue, & Ojukwu, 2012). Representation involves listening to those

represented and making decisions and exercising influence on their behalf. Parliaments are the

branch of government closest to people, and need to be aware of the needs of constituents and

respond to those needs accordingly (Johnson, 2005).Many Nigerian legislators however, do not

operate constituency offices and rarely interact with their constituents, thus resulting to serious

disengagement between them (legislators) and the people they represent (Okoosi-Simbine,

2010).

The presence of amateur or underdeveloped legislators has also hampered the effectiveness of

the legislative institution in Nigeria (Omoweh, 2006). The Nigeria legislature has no space

previously to experience the value of law making derived from a representative social order

because of the prolonged dictatorial and authoritarian rule by the military (Saliu & Muhammad,

2010). Indeed, many Nigerians who have been elected into the legislative arm in the period

since 1999 know only little or even nothing about legislation and the legislative process outside

of the idea and provisions of the constitution (Alabi & Fashagba, 2009). Most of them therefore,

are often unaware of their authority, how to best organize their time and conduct their business

(Alabi, 2009).

Due to the enormity of the work of the legislature, committees are inaugurated to facilitate

efficiency in legislations and other related functions (Fasagba, 2010). According to Heywood

(2007), committees are the hub of the legislative process and the power houses of the legislature.

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Committees examine legislative measures in detail, they examine bills and carrying out the

investigative power of the legislature and also all important issues related to ministries and

oversee the financial functioning of the (Edigheji, 2006; Sanyal, 2009). The National Assembly

is replete with many of these committees. Since the restoration of democratic in 1999, the

National Assembly’s committee system has been marred with, slow passage of private members

bills and the creation of ineffectiveness to satisfy numerous interests and serious allegations of

corruption (Olumide, 2010).

Conclusion and Recommendations

The legislature is seen as occupying fundamental place in democratic governance and

performing crucial role of citizens’ representation. It serves as a vital link between the

government and the governed, the elected and the electorate, the rulers and the ruled. This

remarkable influential role is, in Nigeria, expressed in Section 4 of the 1999 Constitution of the

Federal Republic of Nigeria which elaborates the legislative power of the National Assembly.

Accordingly, the National Assembly empowered to formulate laws and express the people’s will

through legislation. This paper has attempted to ascertain how well and how far the Nigerian

federal legislature has been able to perform its role of constituents’ representative particularly,

since 1999 when Nigeria returned to representative democratic governance. This paper noted that

a parliament that is truly representative of the people is essential for achieving democratic

stability in Nigeria. While the Nigeria’s national parliament has transformed from being an

advisory body to a full law making institution and has recorded improvement in terms of

legislation and oversight roles, it however offers a slim ray of hope in championing constituents’

interests under its present scenario. It is therefore recommended as a matter of urgency that there

should be regular interaction between constituents and the Nigerian legislators. This will increase

17

the likelihood of representatives will recalling the constituents’ interests in committee

participation, floor debates, and other arenas of law-making. A viable, functional and well

staffed constituent legislative office should a mandatory requirement of all legislators in the

country. Furthermore, more opportunities for representation such as the internet should be

devised to enhance legislators-constituents interaction and thereby increase constituents’

representative presence. Nongovernmental organisations should be supported by the government

to orient the populace on civic activism and particularly their rights as constituents. On the one

hand individuals should increase there representative presence by joining advocacy groups,

organizing expertise, among others. The National Assembly should domesticate CEDAW and

the African Union Protocol of women’s rights by passing the Gender and Equal Opportunities

Bill as soon as possible. Furthermore, the Nigeria electoral processes should be reformed with

particular emphasis on the autonomy and capability of INEC to discharge their responsibilities

effectively. Finally, Nigeria should immediately implement the recommendation of the 2005

National Political Reform Conference which recommended a downsized, part‐time, bi‐cameral

legislature for Nigeria.

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