published by the Refugee Studies Centre in association with theNorwegian Refugee Council/Global IDP Project

17May 2003

NORWEGIAN REFUGEE COUNCIL

review

Plus articles on:Iraq · Mauritania · Thai-Burma border · international benchmarks

When does internaldisplacement end?

The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

Institute for the Study of International Migration

W e are extremely grateful to ErinMooney and Susan Martin forguest-editing this issue’s feature

section on ‘when does internal displace-ment end?’ – and to their organisations forproviding financial support. With this mailingyou will also receive a conference report:‘Researching Internal Displacement:State of the Art’. Its production was madepossible by funding from NTNU (NorwegianUniversity of Science and Technology) and DFID (UK Department for InternationalDevelopment), to whom we offer many thanks. This and all FMRs are available atwww.fmreview.org.

We are changing the format of one of FMR’s regular features: the RSC page. Startingwith this issue we will be presenting short thought-provoking commentaries written by aresearcher at the RSC. Agnes Hurwitz kicks off the new look with a commentary on Iraqand the international rule of law.

FMR 18 will include a feature section on humanitarian logistics (produced incollaboration with the Fritz Institute). If you would like to contribute a short report/articlerelating to logistics and/or Iraq, please contact us immediately.

The feature section of FMR 19 will focus on reproductive health for refugees.We are working with the Reproductive Health for Refugees Consortium in preparing thisissue (see p54 for conference announcement) and welcome articles on this subject.Deadline for submissions is 1 October.

With our best wishes

Marion Couldrey & Tim MorrisEditors, Forced Migration Review

from the editorsForced Migration Review

provides a forum for the regular exchange of practical experience, information and ideas between

researchers, refugees and internally displaced people,and those who work with them. It is published in

English, Spanish and Arabic by the Refugee StudiesCentre/University of Oxford in association with theGlobal IDP Project/Norwegian Refugee Council. The

Spanish translation, Revista de Migraciones Forzadas,is produced by IDEI in Guatemala.

EditorsMarion Couldrey & Dr Tim Morris

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Forced Migration ReviewRefugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House,

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Funders in 2003Brookings-SAIS Project on

Internal Displacement

Danish Refugee Council

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Fritz Institute

ISIM, Georgetown University

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Front cover photos: Returned IDP women in Angola · Nina Birkeland.

W hen does internal displacement end?"is a question frequently posed by policymakers, practitioners and researchers

engaged with the internally displaced but whichlacks a clear answer.

At the request of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally DisplacedPersons, we have been exploring this question through research as well as a series of consul-tations. Through the feature section of this FMR, we have been able to broaden this processby tapping into the thinking of an array of experts on different aspects of the subject. Theaim is to provide guidance on when displacement ends to UN and other internationalagencies, as well as governments, NGOs, researchers and, certainly, internally displacedpersons themselves.

We are extremely grateful to all of the contributors, whose enthusiasm in participating in thisproject is an indication of strong interest in the subject around the world and whose insightshave been most valuable in furthering our own thinking. Our special thanks go to the editorsof FMR for their consistent help and encouragement. We hope that FMR readers will findthis collection of articles of interest, advancing our collective thinking on this critical question.

Susan Martin, Georgetown University’s Institute for the Study of International Migration,and Erin Mooney, Brookings Institution-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

from the guest editors

“

Introduction 4by Erin Mooney

Cessation of refugee status: a guide for determining when internal displacement ends? 8by Rafael Bonoan

Displacement without end: internally displaced who can’t go home 10by Bill Frelick

A UNHCR perspective 13by Guillermo Bettocchi and Raquel Freitas

The legal dimension 15by Walter Kälin

National legislation 16by Christophe Beau

Looking beyond emergency response 19by Patricia Weiss Fagen

The role of protection in ending displacement 21by Roberta Cohen

The question not asked: when does displacement end? 24by Michael M Cernea

Burundi: out of sight, out of mind? 27by Susan Martin

Colombia: the end of displacement or the end of attention? 28by Amelia Fernández and Roberto Vidal López

Rwanda: narrowing criteria cannot solve IDP problems 30by Greta Zeender

Sierra Leone: resettlement doesn’t always end displacement 31by Claudia McGoldrick

Sri Lanka: on the edge of ending internal displacement? 33by Rupasingha A Ariyaratne

Indonesia: confusing deadlines 35by Christopher R Duncan

The southern Caucasus experience 37by Marco Borsotti

Iraq: dilemmas in contingency planning 38by Clare Graham

Domestic violence on the Thai-Burma border: international human rights implications 41by Caroline Lambert and Sharon Pickering

Benchmarks and yardsticks for humanitarian action: broadening the picture 43by Koenraad Van Brabant

Urban refugees in Mauritania 46by Channe Lindstrom

Updates: Sri Lanka · Angola · accountability 48Refugee Studies Centre 50UNHCR 51Norwegian Refugee Council 52Global IDP Project 53Conferences 54Publications 55Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement 56

FMR 17 3

General articles

Regular features

contentsWhen does internal

displacement end?

ome might query whether it istoo early to even be asking thisquestion. It is only in very recent

years, after all, that awareness andconcern have been raised of the plightof IDPs, their specific needs and vul-nerabilities, and that focused attentionhas begun to be devoted to developingeffective international and nationalresponses. However, there are a num-ber of compelling reasons foraddressing this question:

■ Because decisions that internal dis-placement has ended inevitably leadto the termination of programmesaddressing IDPs’ particular needsand indeed to IDPs effectively dis-appearing as a specific group ofconcern, it is critical to understandthe basis on which such decisionsare made and the extent to whichthey match objective realities on theground.

■ Knowing when internal displace-ment ends is also important todetermining when national as wellas international responsibility,attention and resources should shiftfrom a specific focus on the needsand vulnerabilities of IDPs to aholistic, community-wide approachof rehabilitation and development forsocieties as a whole.

■ Organisations and researchersengaged in compiling IDP statisticsneed to know when to stop count-ing. They point out that one of thereasons why it has been difficult toreach agreement on IDP figures hasbeen the lack of clarity on when anIDP should cease to be consideredas such.

■ Operational agencies, NGOs, donorsand governments require data onthe number of IDPs in order to for-mulate programmes, policies and

budgets for effectively addressingtheir needs. Yet, owing to varyinginterpretations as to when displace-ment ends, the figures they useoften differ dramatically, impedinga coordinated approach.

■ Most importantly, IDPs themselvesare entitled to know when the bene-fits and entitlements, as well as anyrestrictions and risks, that theirdesignation as such entails willcease.

Answering the question of when dis-placement ends is not simply anacademic or theoretical exercise. It canhave a tremendous impact on the livesof IDPs and respect for their rights.

A question in search ofanswers

Currently, decisions on when internaldisplacement ends are made, if at all,on an ad hoc and arbitrary basis.Moreover, the methodologies used and,consequently, the conclusions reacheddiffer among actors, often dramatical-

ly. For example, the Global IDPDatabase reports that estimates of thenumber of IDPs in Guatemala rangefrom zero to a quarter of a million. InRwanda, serious differences of opinionarose among various UN agencies andoffices, all using different criteria, onthe issue of whether the hundreds ofthousands of IDPs resettled as part ofthe ‘villagisation’ programme in thelate 1990s should still be consideredIDPs.

Appreciating that "operationaldemands … increasingly dictate theneed for a coherent response", the UNOffice for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA) hasturned to the Representative of theSecretary-General on IDPs for adviceand guidance "indicating when generi-cally an individual would not onlybecome an IDP but … should no longerbe considered under this category."Though "the question is not new,"OCHA noted, "the answer has hithertobeen quite elusive."1

The Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement (which theRepresentative co-directs), in partner-ship with Georgetown University’sInstitute for the Study of InternationalMigration, has been exploring thisissue through research and a series of

4 FMR 17

Bringing the end into sight forinternally displaced persons

by Erin Mooney

When does internal displacement end? In other words,when, in any particular situation, should internally dis-placed persons (IDPs) no longer be regarded as such?

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consultations with international agen-cies, international and local NGOs andother researchers with a view todeveloping criteria as to when internaldisplacement ends.2

Three lenses

In examining this issue, we firstlooked through three different lenses.3

1. The Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement

The Guiding Principles, which spellout the rights and guarantees pertain-ing to IDPs in all phases ofdisplacement, stipulate that "displace-ment shall last no longer thanrequired by the circumstances".4

Yet, the Principles do not contain acessation clause as to their applica-tion. This was not an oversight on thepart of the drafting team but a delib-erate decision based on the fact thatthe definition of IDPs used in thePrinciples is not declaratory butdescriptive in nature, denoting thefactual situation of being displacedwithin one’s country rather than con-ferring a legal status to be granted,much less revoked (see Kälin).

For IDPs who remain in their countryof origin, the Guiding Principles envis-age three possible solutions to theirdisplacement: (i) return to their homeareas or place of habitual residence;(ii) (re)settlement in the localitieswhere they go to once displaced;(iii) resettlement in another part ofthe country. The Principles specify aresponsibility on the part of nationalauthorities to facilitate these solu-tions and also stipulate a number ofconditions to be met:

■ return or resettlement to occur vol-untarily and in "safety anddignity"

■ non-discrimination, including theability to participate fully andequally in public affairs and toenjoy equal access to public ser-vices

■ assistance for recovery or com-pensation for property andpossessions destroyed or of whichthey were dispossessed as a resultof their displacement

These additional provisions suggestthat, from the standpoint of interna-tional law, solutions for IDPs entailmore than simply the physical move-ment of returning or resettling but

also require putting in place condi-tions to ensure the effectiveness ofthese solutions.

2. The refugee experience by analo-gy and implication

The 1951 Convention contains cessa-tion clauses stipulating when anindividual would no longer be eligiblefor refugee status and the internation-al protection it affords, in particularwhen "the circumstances in connec-tion with which [s/]he has beenrecognized as a refugee have ceasedto exist" (see Bonoan). Though directanalogies with refugee law are diffi-cult because, unlike the GuidingPrinciples, it concerns a specific legalstatus, it is nonetheless important toconsider the possible implicationsthat the cessation of refugee statuscan have on the temporal nature ofinternal displacement.

Application of the cessation clausesfor refugees may lead to an automaticassumption that internal displace-ment has ended as well. For instance,UNHCR’s decision to end refugee sta-tus for refugees from Mozambique asof 31 December 1996 was a decisivefactor in determinations that therewere no longer any IDPs in the coun-try. Yet, that same month when theRepresentative of the Secretary-General on IDPs visited the country,he found that "despite the decision bythe Government and the donor com-munity to no longer target displacedgroups, this in no way means that allinternally displaced persons havereturned." Among the reasons citedby the displaced was "a lack of confi-dence in the durability of peace,sometimes coupled with a reluctanceto return to the area where they hadexperienced terror."5 The return ofrefugees or cessation of refugee sta-tus therefore is not necessarily adetermining factor of when internaldisplacement ends.

Indeed, the cessation of refugee sta-tus may actually lead to an increase inthe number of IDPs. Refugees may becompelled to return to their countrybut be unable to return home andeven displaced anew, internally. Thiswas the case in Bosnia after theDayton Agreement. A similar phenom-enon reportedly has been occurring inAfghanistan in the context of themass refugee returns that have beentaking place over the past year.

There is a need for a comprehensiveapproach to the issue of when dis-placement ends that takes intoaccount the effects of such determina-tions for both refugees and IDPs.

3. Cases of internal displacement

Our review of numerous situations ofinternal displacement,6 including sev-eral also examined in this issue ofFMR, confirms that there is no sys-tematic approach to the issue of wheninternal displacement ends. For exam-ple, in some cases it is the capacity orwillingness of the government to pro-vide emergency humanitarianassistance, rather than the actualduration of the state of displacement,that is the deciding factor (seeFernandez and Vidal). In others, adate is announced when all IDPs in acountry, sometimes numbering morethan one million, will suddenly allcease to be considered as such (seeDuncan). In still other cases, internaldisplacement ends as a punitive mea-sure and for the most minor of actsof omission such as failure to dohousehold chores in the communalcentre where IDPs are staying (seeBeau). In many cases, the approachesused violate the rights of the internal-ly displaced. Less arbitraryapproaches to when internal displace-ment ends are needed.

Possible criteria

Having examined the issue throughthese lenses, three sets of possiblecriteria have come into focus.7

1. Cause-based criteria: One way tolook at the issue would be to focus onthe causes of internal displacementand, borrowing from the refugee anal-ogy, consider the existence of"changed circumstances" from thosethat had compelled flight in the firstplace, such as the end of a conflict ora change in government such thatthere is no longer a well-founded fearof persecution. Specific criteria couldbe developed to address situations ofdisplacement due to natural disastersand, separately, development (seeCernea).

The experience in post-conflict Bosniaand now Afghanistan, however, sug-gests that even when the immediatecausal factors of displacement ceaseto exist, a durable solution to theplight of displaced persons does not

6 Bringing the end into sight for internally displaced persons FMR 17

necessarily follow. In the reverse sce-nario, when the cause of displacementpersists indefinitely – for instancewhen displacement is due to a conflictthat appears to have no end in sight –one must ask whether it is in the bestinterests of the displaced to continueto consider them as such.Governments, after all, may find itpolitically expedient to maintain IDPs,sometimes for decades, in a state oflimbo unable to return in the absenceof a peace settlement but equallyunable to integrate into the localitieswhere they fled – such that IDPs effec-tively become hostages to this label,as in Georgia and Azerbaijan (seeBorsotti).

Basing decisions simply on cause-based criteria can end displacementprematurely or, as the original causespersist, perpetuate a state of displace-ment indefinitely and even to thedetriment of the displaced.

2. Solutions-based criteria: Anotherpossible approach emphasises theability of IDPs to either return to theirhome communities or (re)settle inanother community. For some ana-lysts, the only true solution for IDPs isreturn, as the reversal of the physicalmovement that displacement, by defi-nition, entails (see Frelick). Thepossibility of return, regardless ofwhether or not an IDP seizes theopportunity to do so, is the criterionthat has been favoured by the USCommittee for Refugees. On thisbasis, USCR deemed displacement tohave ended in Guatemala in 1998, twoyears after the conflict ended.Similarly, in mid-2002, both the gov-ernment and international agencies inSierra Leone decided after a massresettlement and return process thatthere were no longer any IDPs in thecountry (see McGoldrick). In bothcases, however, these decisions havebeen strongly challenged on groundsthat include: lack of safety in areas ofreturn; inadequate reintegration assis-tance; lack of property compensation;the problem of illegal occupation ofland; and the inability of IDPs whoreturned to vote, access public ser-vices or obtain identificationdocuments for their children.

In Rwanda, the mass resettlement ofIDPs as part of the ‘villagisation’ pro-gramme led a number of UN agencies,all using different criteria, to concludein 1999 that there were virtually no

IDPs left in the country. However,those resettled were found to sufferbasic humanitarian needs and inade-quate access to land and means ofself-sufficiency (see Zeender).Moreover, reports from both withinand outside the UN voiced seriousdoubts as to the voluntariness of theoperation, which was an issue also inSierra Leone.

These and other cases call into ques-tion whether simply the act of returnor resettlement – a mere "change ofaddress" in Beau’s words – is an ade-quate basis on which to deemdisplacement to end.

3. Needs-based criteria: A third possi-ble approach would look for when theneeds and vulnerabilities specific toIDPs no longer exist. These criteriawould apply to IDPs who are able toaccess the protection and assistanceof their national governments, nolonger have unmet needs on the basisof being displaced and therefore donot require special international pro-tection and assistance. The IDPs neednot necessarily have permanentlyresettled or returned and may still bein need (due to poverty or disabilityfor instance) but they would no longerhave specific protection, assistanceand reintegration needs, differentfrom the rest of the population, whichcan be attributed to their displace-ment and which require specialattention. The Guiding Principlespoint to needs that would be relevantin this regard, for instance in the areaof protection, lack of shelter andother deprivations resulting from dis-placement, documentation, andrecovery of or compensation for prop-erty lost as a result of displacement.

An integrated approach

These three sets of criteria are notmutually exclusive but rather includeoverlapping elements. Indeed, theemerging consensus confirms theneed for an integrated approach thatcombines solutions-based and needs-based sets of criteria to ensure thatIDPs have options – to return, resettleor integrate locally – and that the spe-cific needs and vulnerabilities createdby displacement are addressed so thatthese solutions are effective anddurable, all the while recognising thatcause-based criteria will often be anenabling factor. Exactly what "durablesolutions" mean for IDPs will need tobe spelled out by means of cause-based and especially needs-basedbenchmarks measuring, as Bettocchiand Freitas suggest, both the generalprotection climate as well as the spe-cific re-integration needs of IDPs inthree aspects: legal, social and eco-nomic. These benchmarks, which canbe derived from the rights, responsi-bilities and needs already identifiedabove and, more comprehensively,from the Guiding Principles as awhole, could then constitute the basisfor determining when, in any givensituation, IDPs no longer need to be asubject of specific international atten-tion and assistance.

It is important to recognise that thebenchmarks being developed are cer-tain to be met only gradually. Thisargues strongly against arbitraryannouncements of displacement end-ing on a specific date or as soon asreturn or resettlement occurs andinstead in favour of sustained moni-toring of the situation of IDPs oncethe solution phase begins to get

IDP children foragein refuse bins for

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underway. For IDPs even more so thanfor refugees, however, there is littleinformation and analysis on whathappens to people once they return orresettle. Susan Martin’s article onBurundi strongly underscores thispoint. Assessment of the conditionsupon return, resettlement or localintegration, for instance using thebenchmarks being developed, is there-fore critically important for verifyingthe durability of solutions and foridentifying areas where continuedsupport, especially as regards protec-tion (see Cohen) and reintegrationassistance for IDPs (see Fagan), isrequired to underpin them. As thecase study on current challenges inSri Lanka illustrates (see Ariyaratne),return or resettlement is really justthe beginning of what will be a grad-ual process of reintegration thatrequires support; for some time afterreturning or resettling, IDPs are likelystill to have distinct needs requiringparticular attention. In the longerterm, support for durable solutionswill no doubt still be required butcould switch to more generic, commu-nity-wide approaches based onvulnerability rather than whether ornot a person was once internallydisplaced.

Erin Mooney is Deputy Director,The Brookings-SAIS Project onInternal Displacement and of TheCentre for Displacement Studies,School of Advanced InternationalStudies (SAIS), John HopkinsUniversity. Email:emooney3@jhu.edu

1. Letter from the UN Deputy Emergency ReliefCoordinator to the Representative of the Secretary-General on IDPs.2. Documents, including background papers andsummary reports of consultations prepared in con-nection with this research project, are available onthe Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement website: www.brook.edu/fp/pro-jects/idp/idp.htm3. Erin Mooney, An IDP No More? Exploring theIssue of When Internal Displacement Ends (April2002). See: www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm4. Principle 6.3, Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1998/53/Add.25. UN Commission on Human Rights, Report of theRepresentative of the Secretary-General onInternally Displaced Persons. Profiles inDisplacement: Mozambique, UN Doc.E/CN.4/1997/43/Add.1, para. 26.6. See in particular, Mooney, An IDP No More?, op. cit.7. Susan Forbes Martin and Erin Mooney, Criteriafor Determining the End of Displacement: Optionsfor Consideration (September 2002). Seewww.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm

The Institute for the Study ofInternational Migration (ISIM),founded in 1998, is part of Georgetown

University’s Edmund A Walsh School of Foreign

Service, in affiliation with Georgetown

University’s Law Center. ISIM focuses on all

aspects of international and internal migration,

including the causes of and potential responses to population move-

ments, immigration and refugee law and policy, comparative

migration studies, the integration of immigrants into their host soci-

eties, and the effects of migration on social, economic, demographic,

foreign policy and national security concerns.

Additionally, ISIM offers a certificate programme for Masters level

students who have a career interest in human rights and humanit-

arian issues, with special focus on refugee crises and post-conflict

situations. The certificate programme prepares students to work in

international organisations, government and private agencies special-

ising in emergency relief, human rights and humanitarian activities.

For more information please contact:Dr Susan F Martin, Director, The Institute for the Study of InternationalMigration, 3307 M Street NW, Suite 302, Washington, DC 20007, USA.Tel: +1 202 687 2258 Fax: +1 202 687 2541 Email: isim@georgetown.eduWebsite: www.georgetown.edu/sfs/programs/isim/

The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement seeks to pro-mote more effective national, regional and international responses tothe global crisis of internal displacement. It supports the mandate ofthe Representative of the UN Secretary-General on InternallyDisplaced Persons, Francis Deng (appointed in 1992), to monitordisplacement problems worldwide; undertake fact-finding missions;dialogue with governments; develop and promote application of theGuiding Principles on Internal Displacement; and undertake researchto enhance understanding of the problem and identify strategies forresponse.

The Project organises regional and national seminars and workshopsand also works with civil society groups around the world. It preparedthe two-volume study Masses in Flight: The Global Crisis of InternalDisplacement and Forsaken People: Case Studies on Internal Displace-ment (Brookings, 1998) and has published numerous studies, reportsand practitioners’ handbooks on various aspects of internal displace-ment. Established in 1994, the Project is co-directed by Dr Deng andRoberta Cohen.

For more information, see www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm or contactGimena Sanchez: Tel. +1 (202) 797 6145. Email: gsanchez@brookings.edu

The Brookings-SAIS Project on Internal Displacement

FMR 178

Cessation of refugee status:a guide for determining when internaldisplacement ends?

by Raphael Bonoan

oreover, the potential conse-quences of withdrawingprotection prematurely or

erroneously from IDPs and refugeescan be equally harmful. Over the pastthree decades, standards and proce-dures have been developed throughextensive dialogue between UNHCRand states parties to the 1951Convention Relating to the Status ofRefugees for determining whenrefugees may no longer require inter-national protection because ofchanges in circumstances in theircountry of origin. These standardsand procedures are based on Articles1 C (5) and (6) of the Convention,which specify that a refugee shall nolonger be considered as such when"the circumstances in connection withwhich he [or she] has been recognizedas a refugee have ceased to exist".

The process of cessation of refugeestatus may, therefore, serve as a use-ful framework for determining wheninternal displacement ends by provid-ing a mechanism for ascertainingwhether changes in circumstanceshave removed the causes of displace-ment as well as safeguards against thewrongful termination of protection.

UNHCR guidelines on the interpreta-tion and implementation of the‘ceased circumstances’ provisions ofthe cessation clauses set forth twobasic standards by which develop-ments in the country of origin are tobe evaluated.1 Firstly, they must be‘fundamental’ in character, i.e. devel-opments that completely transformthe political and social structure ofthe country of origin as well as itshuman rights situation.2 These

include: democratic elections, declara-tions of amnesties, dismantlement offormer security services, the establish-ment of an independent judiciary,adherence to international humanrights and the creation of nationalinstitutions to protect human rights.Such reforms must also be evaluated"in light of the particular cause offear" to ensure that they "remove thebasis of the fear of persecution."3

The second basic standard is that ofdurability, i.e. changes in circum-stances of a ‘fundamental’ naturemust prove to be stable. UNHCR hassuggested a minimum waiting periodof 12 to 18 months to allow suchconsolidation to occur but also statedthat this period may vary dependingon the nature of the transition in thecountry of origin. In the context of apeaceful transition to democracy,changes in circumstances may consol-idate rapidly. Conversely, develop-ments that occur in a post-conflictenvironment or one of continuing vio-lence and insecurity may require moretime to become firmly established.

Many of the circumstances that lead to internal dis-placement are similar or identical to those that causeindividuals to develop a “well-founded fear of perse-cution” and seek international protection as refugees.

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Since 1973, UNHCR has appliedArticles 1 C (5) and (6) to refugee pop-ulations under its mandate on 22occasions. This process involves: a)evaluating the extent and durability ofchange in the country of origin; b)assessing the implications of cessa-tion for refugees and all countriesinvolved; and c) developing specificprocedures for implementing the‘ceased circumstances’ provisions,such as notifying and screeningrefugees, arranging for repatriationand identifying alternative durablesolutions for those who will not berepatriating.

To assess developments in a countryof origin, UNHCR not only collabo-rates with the governments ofcountries of origin and asylum butalso consults various UN agencies,international organisations, humanrights groups and other nongovern-mental partners. Detailed informationis gathered on the: development ofnew political institutions; integrity ofelectoral processes; performance oflaw enforcement agencies and judicialinstitutions; respect for freedom ofexpression, movement, association,and other human rights; treatment ofnational, ethnic, religious minorities,and returnees; perspectives ofrefugees on conditions in the countryof origin and the possibility of return;and implementation of peace accords(if applicable). By thoroughly analysingdevelopments in these areas, UNHCRcan establish whether the grounds forrefugee status have, in fact, beenremoved and international protection

can be safely withdrawn. While UNHCRrigorously evaluates conditions in acountry of origin, it implements the‘ceased circumstances’ provisionswith some flexibility. The clausesthemselves contain an exemption forthose refugees who have sufferedsuch severe persecution that they can-not be expected to repatriate. Inaddition, refugees affected by theapplication of Articles 1 C (5) and (6)are given the opportunity to requestan exemption from cessation and thecontinuation of international protec-tion. UNHCR occasionally excludesfrom the application of the ‘ceasedcircumstances’ provisions a specificgroup of refugees that, despitechanges of a ‘fundamental’ and‘durable’ nature in their country oforigin, may still face persecution uponreturn.4 UNHCR has also been knownto restrict the scope of a declarationof cessation, targeting a specific sub-group of refugees within a largerrefugee population.5 This flexibilityprovides another important safeguardagainst the withdrawal of internation-al protection from refugees whocontinue to need it.

Because the Guiding Principles do notassign IDPs a legal status to whichspecific rights are attached, defining acessation clause for IDPs analogous toArticle 1 C of the Convention may beinappropriate [see Kalin, p15].

Nevertheless, it may be useful to sug-gest in general terms the possibilityfor situations of internal displacementto come to an end because of changed

circumstances and to provide guid-ance for making such a determination.This guidance will need to address anumber of issues. How should devel-opments related to situations ofinternal displacement be evaluated?What roles should international agen-cies, states, NGOs and others play inthis process? What safeguards arenecessary to ensure that protection isnot withdrawn from IDPs who stillneed assistance? UNHCR standardsand procedures for applying Articles1 C (5) and (6) of the Convention maybe instructive in this regard. In theabsence of such guidance, however,determinations of when internal dis-placement ends will continue to be adhoc and/or inconsistent and the riskof premature or wrongful withdrawalof protection from IDPs heightened.

Rafael Bonoan is a PhD candidate,Department of Political Science,Massachusetts Institute ofTechnology. Email: rbonoan@mac.com

See Joan Fitzpatrick and RafaelBonoan, ‘Cessation of RefugeeProtection’ in Refugee Protectionin International Law: UNHCR’sGlobal Consultations onInternational Protection(Cambridge University Press,forthcoming July 2003).

1, UNHCR, Handbook on Procedures and Criteriafor Determining Refugee Status (Geneva, 1979, re-edited 1992), paras. 135-139; Executive Committeeof the High Commissioner’s Program, ConclusionNo. 69 (XLIII), 1992, UN doc. A/AC.96/804; UNHCR,"Note on the Cessation Clauses," UN doc.EC/47/SC/CRP.30, 30 May 1997; and UNHCR,

"Guidelines on the Application ofthe Cessation Clauses," UN doc.UNHCR/IOM/17/99,UNHCR/FOM/17/99, 26 April 1999.Clauses," UN doc.

UNHCR/IOM/17/99,UNHCR/FOM/17/99, 26 April 1999.2. Executive Committee of the HighCommissioner’s Program, Sub-Committee of the Whole onInternational Protection, ‘DiscussionNote on the Application of the"Ceased Circumstances" CessationClause in the 1951 Convention’, UNdoc. EC/SCP/1992/CRP.1, para. 11,20 Dec. 1991.3. UNHCR, "Note on the CessationClauses," para. 19.4. See UNHCR, "Applicability of theCessation Clauses to Refugees fromChile," UN doc. UNHCR/IOM/31/94,UNHCR/FOM/31/94, 28 March 1994,para. 5(i).5. See UNHCR, "Applicability of the‘Ceased Circumstances’ CessationClauses to pre-1991 refugees fromEthiopia," UN doc.UNHCR/IOM/91/99,UNHCR/FOM/91/99, 23 September1999.

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Displacement without end:internally displaced who can’t go home

by Bill Frelick

n contrast, the most widelyaccepted definition of an intern-ally displaced person (found in

the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement) fails to mention protec-tion and does not clearly delineatewhen a person ceases to be internallydisplaced. That definition rests funda-mentally on the notion of movement –that IDPs have been "forced or obligedto flee or to leave their home … andhave not crossed an internationallyrecognised State border." Likewise, thefinal section of the Guiding Principles– dealing with return, resettlementand reintegration – makes no mentionof the word protection but ratheremphasises return movement orresettlement.

Principle 28 calls upon competentauthorities to allow IDPs to "returnvoluntarily in safety and with dignity,to their homes or places of habitualresidence, or to resettle voluntarily inanother part of the country."Authorities are not specifically calledupon to offer protection but rather to"endeavour to facilitate the reintegra-tion of returned or resettled internallydisplaced persons." Principle 29 callsfor nondiscrimination towards IDPreturnees and their right to equalaccess to public services, and sug-gests that IDPs have a right either torecovery of their abandoned proper-ty/possessions or to compensation.It does not specifically say that IDPswho have relocated and reintegratedto another part of their country (pre-sumably re-availing themselves of theprotection of their government) haveceased to be IDPs. The GuidingPrinciples don’t say this because they

can’t. To be an IDP is not a legal sta-tus. To be a refugee is. ‘Internallydisplaced person’ is a descriptiveterm [see article by Kälin, pp. 15].‘Displacement’ as a word requires move-ment. Someone or something cannot be‘undisplaced’ unless the movement isreversed and the person or objectrestored to its original location.

The Guiding Principles acknowledgethe fundamental gap in human rightslaw between being internally dis-placed and being a refugee. In SectionTwo, the Principles relating to protec-tion from displacement speak of theright not to be "arbitrarily" displacedbut recognise that some displacement,such as for large-scale developmentprojects, may be justified by "com-pelling and overriding publicinterests" and that "measures shall betaken to minimize displacement andits adverse effects." One cannot sub-stitute the word ‘refugee’ here.Human rights law finds no justifica-tion under any circumstances formaking someone a refugee becausethe threat underlying refugee status ispersecution and the lack of protectionagainst being persecuted. IDPs, on theother hand, may be displaced for avariety of reasons not limited to per-secution.

If the cause of displacement is notnecessarily persecution or even an actprohibited by international law, and ifthe solution for an IDP is not strictlyspeaking the restoration or acquisi-tion of protection but simply returnto the previous status quo, does anIDP have a right to return? The princi-pal legal architect of the Guiding

Principles on Internal Displacement,Walter Kälin, writes, "there is no gen-eral rule in present international lawthat affirms the right of internally dis-placed persons to return to theiroriginal place of residence or to moveto another safe place of their choicewithin their home country."1

So, even though international lawdoes not support a right of IDPreturn, the descriptive reality cannotcease until such return happens.What, therefore, ought to be therights-based concern on behalf ofinternally displaced people?

The rights concern ought not to bebecause a person is internally dis-placed per se but – by analogy withthe underlying concern for refugees –because a person who is internallydisplaced lacks the protection of theirgovernment and, owing to fear of per-secution, is unable to access thatprotection. The rights concern oughtto be particularly heightened for IDPswho are prevented from seeking asy-lum from persecution in anothercountry. The human rights concernought fundamentally to focus onthose IDPs who fear persecution with-in their country and who lack theprotection of – or are threatened by –their own government. Unfortunately,myriad examples of such circum-stances exist – Angola, Burma,Chechnya, Colombia, Congo-Kinshasa,Iraq, Liberia, Sudan. The list goes on.

There are, however, millions of otherpeople who are also counted as IDPsbecause they have been displaced inone manner or another from theirplaces of origin but who have relocat-ed and reintegrated in another part oftheir country and enjoy the same civiland political rights as their fellowcitizens. If we may take the refugeeanalogy, their situation would becomparable to the refugee who haslost his/her home and possessionsand cannot return to reclaim thembut who has found protection underanother government. Such a refugeehas suffered a grievous wrong and

There is relatively little doubt about when refugeestatus ends. The 1951 Refugee Convention clearlyspells out that refugee status ends when the refugeeis no longer in need of protection. The fundamentalprinciple underlying the refugee definition is notmovement across a border but protection or the lackthereof from the government of his/her home country.

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11FMR 17 Displacement without end: internally displaced who can’t go home

usually continues to suffer hardshipas a result of those losses. But, legal-ly, the person is no longer a refugee.

Internal flight alternativeand IDPs

Human rights, at least with regard tocivil and political rights, tend towardthe minimalist, such as the rights notto be tortured and abused. Refugeerights, as conceived by the drafters ofthe Refugee Convention, are similarlymodest. The foundation stone of theRefugee Convention is the principle ofnon-refoulement, the right of a personnot to be returned to a place wheres/he would be persecuted. ‘Place’ isnot generally interpreted to mean theentirety of a refugee’s home country.Thus, asylum jurisprudence in anincreasing number of states embracesthe notion of an ‘internal flight alter-native’ or ‘internal protection’ – thenotion that refugees can be deniedasylum and returned to their countryof origin even if they cannot return totheir home or habitual place of resi-dence within that country. In effect,refugee law in a growing number ofstates allows the explicit creation ofinternally displaced persons. It recog-nises that a person has a well-founded

fear in one part of his/her countrybut that the same person could enjoythe protection of his/her governmentin another part of the country. Thekey consideration is that the threat ofpersecution does not exist outside therefugee’s original locality and that theperson’s government is willing andable to protect them.

The internal flight alternative conceptis still quite controversial, and thisauthor has been among its fiercestcritics,2 but it is less controversialwhen the feared persecutor is a localnon-governmental entity opposed bythe central government, when therefugee identifies with the majoritypopulation and embraces the ideologyof the central government, and wherethe government gives every assurancethat it extends the same rights of citi-zenship and opportunity to thereturnee as would be enjoyed byother citizens in the government-controlled part of the country whonever left.

Take as an example an ethnic Kurdand an ethnic Turk from southeasternTurkey. Both may have fled Turkeyand sought asylum in Germany.For the sake of argument, let us say

that both asylum seekers have suc-cessfully established a well-foundedfear of persecution in southeasternTurkey. The Turkish Kurd fears perse-cution at the hands of governmentforces and government proxies. Theethnic Turk fears persecution at thehands of Kurdish militants. Becauseof the involvement of the central gov-ernment, the Kurd can be said not toenjoy an internal flight alternativesince his fear of persecution cannotbe confined to the southeasternregion. For the Turk, on the otherhand, relocation and reintegration incentral or western Turkey might be aviable option if he does not feelthreatened by his government andregards the threat as entirely local; ifhis government is willing and able toprotect him and if the local non-gov-ernmental forces that would harmhim should he return to the southeastdo not have the means of carrying outsuch a threat beyond that region.However, it is indisputable that whenGermany returns the Turkish refugeeto Istanbul or Ankara, even though theperson at that moment ceases to be arefugee, he, in fact, becomes an IDP.

As already established by the termitself, he remains an IDP until he is

Displaced family inIraq, 1992.

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able to return to his place of origin.However, he does not necessarilyremain a human rights concern forthe international community. Hiswelfare now becomes the particularconcern of his own government.

Conclusion

Millions of IDPs are able to relocateand integrate in other parts of theircountry. Most commonly, they are atleast nominal members of the coun-try’s majority ethnic nationality andlinguistic group and have fled or beenexpelled by a secessionist minorityliving in an ethnic enclave. This hasbecome a particularly common phe-nomenon in Europe in the 1990s:ethnic Georgians displaced fromAbkhazia; ethnic Azeris fromNagorno-Karabakh; ethnic and linguis-tic Russians from Chechnya; ethnicSerbs from Kosovo. Their suffering isreal, their losses devastating, but gen-erally they enjoy the protection oftheir governments and are able toexercise their rights as citizens. If anyof these enclaves were to succeed intheir quest for independence, thesedisplaced persons would not qualifyfor refugee status if they were offeredand exercised their rights as citizensin their new locations.

Strictly speaking, they remain IDPs.Yet if the concern for IDPs ultimatelyrests on their similarity to refugees –the commonly stated notion that IDPsare people who would be refugees ifthey crossed an international border –then the solutions for refugees musthave some bearing on how the inter-national community regards IDPs.Without minimising the anguish orthe continuing humanitarian needs ofIDPs who enjoy the protection of theirgovernment, their plight should notbe regarded as equally compelling tothat of IDPs who are threatened bytheir country’s government.

Such IDPs are, indeed, especiallyvulnerable because they remain withinthe territory of that country.Especially in light of the deferencepaid to national sovereignty not onlyby other states but also by interna-tional humanitarian agencies of theUN and the ICRC, they should beregarded as at highest risk becausethey have the least opportunity forprotection. For such IDPs the right toseek asylum from persecution outsidetheir country ought to be paramount,

and ‘solutions’ such as ‘safe havens’inside their country or other internalflight alternatives should be lookedupon with the utmost scepticism.

Ultimately who is counted as an IDPeither rests on the most inclusivemeaning of the words ‘internally dis-placed’ or has a functional meaning.While reasonable arguments may bemade for drawing the line morebroadly to include people unable toreturn to their homes or places ofhabitual residence or to include peo-ple who have not been compensatedfor their losses, the narrower line basedon the lack of protection defines thesubset of IDPs who must be of mostcompelling concern to the rights-regarding international community.

Bill Frelick is the director theRefugee Program of AmnestyInternational USA. This article iswritten in his personal capacityand does not necessarily reflectthe position of AmnestyInternational. Email: bfrelick@aiusa.org

1. Walter Kälin Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement: Annotations, Studies inTransnational Legal Policy, No. 32, published byAmerican Society of International Law and theBrookings Institution Project on InternalDisplacement (Washington, DC, 2000) p. 69(though Kälin does point out that "[a]t least a duyof the competent authorities to allow for thereturn of internally displaced persons can, howev-er, be based on freedom of movement and theright to choose one’s residence.")

2. See Bill Frelick, ‘Down the Rabbit Hole: TheStrange Logic of Internal Flight Alternative’, WorldRefugee Survey 1999. See: http://refugees.org/

12 Displacement without end: internally displaced who can’t go home FMR 17

Clarification

FMR 16 included an articleby Pascale Ghazaleh on dis-placed Sudanese in Cairo. The article stated that "onechurch offered to help fundthe Sacred Heart school buton condition that all theMuslim students wereexpelled". It has since cometo light that no such condi-tion had been imposed.The author had acted in goodfaith on information receivedbut both she and FMR wouldlike to apologise to the JointRelief Ministry and its donorsfor any distress or inconve-nience that may have beencaused. We wish them wellwith their excellent work. Formore information on JRM,please visit: www.geocities.com/jrmcairo/aboutUs.html

Copyright and disclaimer: Material

from Forced Migration Review may be

freely reproduced but please acknowl-

edge the source. Photographs should

only be reproduced in the context of the

articles in which they appear (and cred-

ited). Materials and information

contained in Forced Migration Review

are the opinions of the authors and do

not necessarily reflect the views of the

Editors, the Refugee Studies Centre or

the Norwegian Refugee Council.

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Returned IDPs,Kelucha village,

Taskhinvali area,Georgia.

he issue at stake is to identifywhen international and nation-al responsibilities end in terms

of addressing the specific needs ofIDPs, as compared to the populationin general. What is required is consen-sus on the part of IDPs, humanitarianactors and the authorities on a strate-gy for pursuing solutions, monitoringthe extent to which IDPs have ‘re-acquired’ effective national protect-ion, and phasing out programmes.

The cessation clause in refugee lawcan hardly be applied to IDPs by anal-ogy. Internal displacement is a defacto situation and does not confer alegal status, as opposed to the casewith refugees. The refugee law analo-gy would deprive IDPs of their rightsas citizens in their own country.Further, the continued applicability ofhuman rights and humanitarian lawshould be noted, even when there areno longer special needs related to dis-placement. Legally speaking, there isthus no need to formally declare theend of displacement. In countries suchas Afghanistan or Angola, differentwaves of displacement also make thisimpractical. Additionally, in many cir-cumstances, IDPs are less vulnerablethan others who were unable to move.

Free choices

As national citizens, IDPs are entitledto freedom of movement and resi-dence. Forced displacementconstrains the exercise of this free-dom. It is only when the causes offorced displacement are removed andconditions for safe and dignifiedreturn are created that IDPs are in aposition to truly choose where to live.Creating an enabling framework forreturn will allow IDPs to makeinformed choices. Here lies the impor-

tance of considering the ‘end of dis-placement’ in consultation with thedisplaced populations themselves.Solutions to their situation have to bevoluntary, whether they stay, returnor move elsewhere.

Once this is ensured, local settlementat the place of displacement or reloca-tion to other areas will become trueoptions that would end the ‘state’, notthe ‘status’, of displacement. It is alsocrucial that options for solutionsother than return home are not at theexpense of IDPs’ other rights as wellas the rights of others (i.e. right toproperty) and that no undue push orpull factors are created.

Sustainable solutions

Ensuring the voluntary nature of thesolution is only the first step. In thespecific case of refugees, for example,UNHCR has expressed "legitimate con-cern" for the consequences of return,1

and for the promotion of comprehen-sive approaches that will ensure thesustainability and durability of returnin conditions of safety, dignity andequality with other nationals, takinginto account the specific needs of thedifferent affected populations (includ-ing IDPs). Sustainable return happenswhen returnees’ physical and materialsecurity is assured and when a con-structive relationship betweenreturnees, civil society and the state isconsolidated. These parametersshould apply to all persons affectedby displacement (internally and exter-nally) or who otherwise have sufferedthe consequences of conflict.

Returning refugees are of concern toUNHCR until they are fully (re)inte-grated into the local community,enjoy a normal livelihood in safety

and dignity and have equal access toprotection from the national authori-ties. There are, however, no fixedindicators to measure ‘full reintegration’.

Measuring solutions

Sustainability of solutions should beassessed against agreed benchmarksdrawn from applicable principles,including the Guiding Principles onInternal Displacement. Such assess-ment must involve all categories ofpersons affected, including returningrefugees, IDPs and the local popula-tions. Criteria on when displacementends (i.e. when a solution has beenattained) should be based both ongeneral and specific considerationsregarding the situation of the displaced.

The general assessment should con-tain an analysis of the politicalcontext, including peace agreements,democratic elections, reforms to thelegal structure, amnesties, generalrespect for human rights and overallsocio-economic conditions. It shouldassess: the causes of the break-downin national protection; the nature ofthe conflict and settlement (includingtheir effect on the state’s capacity fornational protection); and the likelyimpact of the solution on the processof reconstruction and reconciliation.

Regarding the specific assessment,the gradual character of the reversalof the situation makes it difficult toestablish strict criteria. The profile ofthe IDP population should be takeninto account, as should the conditionsin the areas of return, the prospectsof property restitution, job opportuni-ties, physical safety and access tobasic living standards. Indicators of‘successful’ reintegration are relativeand can best be measured by compar-ing an individual’s circumstances withthose of neighbours or members of anearby community.

Specific criteria for determining theend of internal displacement based onthe achievement and sustainability ofdurable solutions must include:

■ Legal (re)integration: land andproperty rights, or compensation;

13FMR 17

A UNHCR perspectiveby Guillermo Bettocchi with Raquel Freitas

International efforts to uphold the rights of IDPs arebearing fruit at the normative level as well as inattempts to improve the institutional arrangements.So far, however, there are no agreed criteria normechanisms to address the question of whendisplacement ends.

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protection against forcible return;non-discrimination and ability toexercise citizenship rights; free-dom of movement;

■ Social (re)integration: right to par-ticipate fully and equally in publicaffairs at all levels and have equalaccess to public services;

■ Economic (re)integration: accessto employment; self-sufficiency;capacity for achieving viablelivelihoods through agriculturalproduction, gainful employmentand/or small businesses.

Given the complexity and multi-phased nature of displacement, acomprehensive approach shouldacknowledge that reintegration is agradual process often running intandem with national reconciliationprocesses and improvements in theeconomic, social and human rightsfields as well as with measurespromoting development.

In prolonged conflict situations, theindividual’s hope to return to his/herarea of origin must be balanced witha) the prospects for security thatwould allow for a safe return and b)the individual’s condition in the areawhere he/she is currently settled.

If conditions for return are not con-ducive and the individual has anacceptable level of integration in thearea of current residence, the lattermay be considered a ‘durable solu-tion’ and a ‘phasing-out’ strategy thusdefined. This will not, though, impedethe exercise of the right to return ofthe individual, whenever s/he assess-es that the conditions to do so areconducive.

An essential precondition to enableconsolidation of peace, stabilisation,recovery and longer-term develop-ment is the removal of the rootcauses of displacement. Their elimina-tion will, eventually, lead to theapplication of the cessation clause forrefugees, implying that they are nolonger in need of international protec-tion. Returning refugees will,nonetheless, still require assistancefor their reintegration, together withIDPs. Returning refugees will be ofconcern to UNHCR until such timethat they fully enjoy the protection oftheir national authorities. Given thevolatile nature of internal displace-ment, though, a separate assessmentof the specific needs of the IDPswould be necessary, as they may havedifferent material and non-materialrequirements.

Guillermo Bettocchi was SpecialAdvisor, Office of the Director,Department of InternationalProtection, UNHCR Headquarters,Geneva. He is currently secondedto the OCHA IDP Unit. Email: bettocchi@un.org

Raquel Freitas is a researcher atthe Department of Social andPolitical Sciences, EuropeanUniversity Institute, BadiaFiesolana, Italy. Email: raquel.freitas@iue.it

1. See Conclusion No 40 of UNHCR’s ExecutiveCommittee.

2. In the repatriation to Afghanistan, monitoringin the areas of return assesses the situation of thedifferent populations, including returning refugeesand IDPs, involuntarily returned persons and thelocal populations. The aim is an integratedapproach to returnee monitoring, addressingprotection concerns of returnees and basic initialreintegration needs. Indicators relate to personalsecurity, non-discrimination, recovery of land andother immovable property and the exemption frommilitary services for one year after return.

14 A UNHCR Perspective FMR 17

Communal centre for returnee IDP women andchildren, renovated by UNHCR, Tbilisi, Georgia.

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nlike Article 1C of the 1951Convention on the revocationof refugee status, the

Principles do not contain any cessa-tion clauses that would determinewhen their application ceases.

This is not a gap in the GuidingPrinciples but a consequence of oneof the basic premises upon which theyrest; IDPs have many specific protec-tion and assistance needs by nature oftheir displacement and this is why thePrinciples spell out in detail their enti-tlements. However, like othervulnerable groups such as children,or the wounded and the sick, IDPs donot constitute a distinct legal catego-ry. Their status of being displaceddoes not need to be legally recognisedin order to get certain legal entitle-ments.1 They are already entitled tothe human rights and humanitarianlaw protection that is available tothem as to all other citizens in theircountry and they can invoke withoutany additional requirement thoseguarantees that have become particu-larly relevant to them because of theirdisplacement. In this context, arequirement of ‘displaced statusdetermination’ analogous to therefugee status determination underthe 1951 Convention would be dan-gerous as it could easily be turnedinto an instrument of denying rightsthat they already enjoy. However, iffrom an international law perspectiveIDPs do not possess a specific legalstatus, a cessation of this status simi-lar to Article 1C is unconceivable.

While the lack of a cessation clause inthe Guiding Principles is thus justi-fied, the question as to how oneshould determine when displacementends remains highly relevant. There arethree possible methodologicalapproaches to answering this question.

Cessation in internationallaw

The first approach is to look at howthe different areas of international

law upon which the Guiding Principlesare based (human rights law, humani-tarian law and refugee law by analogy)address the issue of cessation. Thisapproach helps to solve the problemdiscussed here in a limited way only.

The cessation clauses in Article 1C ofthe 1951 Convention on the Status ofRefugees are of limited relevance forIDPs. First, of all the grounds men-tioned in this provision, onlyparagraph 5 allowing for cessation if"the circumstances in connection withwhich he has been recognised as arefugee have ceased to exist" could be applied to IDPs by analogy. Theother reasons2 are intimately linked tothe concept of international protec-tion for refugees who need that kindof protection because they are abroad.Second, this ground refers to the ces-sation of a legal status, i.e. a conceptthat is alien to the law on internal dis-placement. Finally, the GuidingPrinciples themselves are not limitedto displaced persons in the strictsense of the word. They also deal withformer IDPs when mentioning the dutyof authorities to facilitate the reinte-gration of returned or resettledpersons (Principle 28) and to supportthem in efforts to regain their property(Principle 29, paragraph 2) or whenprohibiting the discrimination of for-mer IDPs (Paragraph 1 of Principle 29).

The idea of ‘cessation’ is absolutelyalien to human rights law. Humanrights remain applicable even if some-one no longer is an IDP. Thus, forexample, the rights to leave the coun-try or to seek asylum (Principle 15)are not lost because someone hasgiven up the idea of return to his orher original place of residence or isfully integrated in the location wherehe or she found refuge before leavingthe country. Likewise, the prohibitionof discrimination against returnees orresettlers as a result of their havingbeen displaced (Principle 29) remainsapplicable even if several decadeshave elapsed since the end of dis-placement, provided that the

discriminatory treatment continues.By contrast, humanitarian law guaran-tees are only applicable during anarmed conflict. Regarding the applica-bility of those principles that arebased on the Fourth GenevaConvention, Article 6, for example, isrelevant, stating that the applicationof the present Convention shall cease"on the general close of military oper-ations" and "[i]n the case of occupiedterritory ... one year after the generalclose of military operations". The pro-hibition against using IDPs "to shieldmilitary objectives from attack..." inPrinciple 10(2)(c) has no relevanceoutside situations of armed conflicteven if some remain IDPs after theend of hostilities. It is only regardingthose principles that reflect humani-tarian law that we can get someguidance from international law onthe issue of the duration of applica-tion of the Guiding Principles.

Solutions

The second approach – analogous tothe discussion of ‘solutions’ inrefugee law and policy – is to look atthe factual side of displacement. Thisis helpful as it allows us to distin-guish between the following threesituations:

i) As soon as an IDP leaves his or hercountry of origin, the GuidingPrinciples are no longer applicable.Such a person is no longer in thesituation of internal displacementbut instead becomes a refugee or amigrant as the case may be. Here,displacement ends when the personconcerned crosses the frontier ofthat country.

ii) Displaced persons are no longerIDPs in the sense of the GuidingPrinciples if they "have returned totheir homes or places of habitual resi-dence" (Principle 29) but theycontinue to enjoy the rights ofreturnees as long as they need suchprotection (Principles 28-30). Oncethey are (re)integrated, have regainedtheir property or received compensa-tion and are no longer discriminatedagainst because of their former dis-placement, the Guiding Principlescease to apply.

The legal dimensionby Walter Kälin

The Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement donot explicitly address the question of when displace-ment ends, i.e. when these principles no longer apply.

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16 The legal dimension FMR 17

uch IDP status, though notrequired under international law,nonetheless can provide people

with social, economic and legal bene-fits to safeguard rights endangered bydisplacement.

Six out of eleven European countriesaffected by conflict and internal dis-placement have adopted specific lawsdefining a special status for IDPs:Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzegovina,Croatia, Cyprus, Georgia and theRussian Federation. Elsewhere in theworld, Colombia is the most notablecase.1

Durable solutions enddisplacement

Most national laws instituting a statusfor IDPs provide for the termination ofthis status after a person has found asolution to their displacement.National legislation most in line withstandards set out in the GuidingPrinciples can be found in Bosnia andHerzegovina, where the law relating tothe status of refugees and displacedpersons, drafted in cooperation withUNHCR, refers to both return andresettlement as durable solutions end-ing the status granted to IDPs. The

Bosnian law clearly states that thesesolutions must correspond to a volun-tary choice made by the personconcerned, with return and resettle-ment implemented under conditionsof safety and dignity.

Clearly all the details of conditions tobe satisfied by the processes of returnand resettlement cannot be includedin the law but instead could be elabo-rated in decrees or administrativeinstructions. However, the law shouldat least define return and resettle-ment in a way that makes solutionsdurable and refers to the essentialstandards of safety, dignity and free-dom of choice. In practice, thesesolutions tend to be described in veryimprecise terms. In Croatia, the lawdeclares return to place of originalresidence as a sufficient condition for

iii) The same is true of former IDPswho "have resettled in another part ofthe country" (Principle 29) and are nolonger in need of protection underPrinciples 28-30. Such resettlement,for obvious reasons, must be firm andpermanent.

Mandates

A third approach is to look at themandates of humanitarian agenciesand other organisations involved inassisting and protecting IDPs. Themandate of ICRC, for example, mayterminate at the end or soon after theend of an armed conflict whereas adevelopment agency may continue tobe responsible for very long periodsof time for IDPs who cannot return.Other organisations may be mandatedto supply housing during displace-ment and not to returnees. Everyorganisation will have to determine onthe basis of its own mandate when ithas to stop to provide assistance andprotection.

Conclusions

The factual situation of displacementin most cases changes and ends gradu-ally and not abruptly. Similarly, thespecific needs of IDPs change gradually

over time. For these reasons, it is notpossible, and would be wrong to try,to define cessation clauses analogousto Article 1C of the RefugeeConvention that would fix a specificmoment when displacement is consid-ered to have ended. Rather, it isappropriate:

(a) to clearly separate the issue ofwhen the mandate of an organi-sation requires it to ceaseproviding assistance and protec-tion to IDPs (to be decidedspecifically by each organisation)from the issue of ending theapplication of the GuidingPrinciples (and the hard lawunderlying it);

(b) to focus, when deciding aboutcessation issues, on the needs ofIDPs and to provide them withassistance and protection as longas they continue to have specificneeds that are or have beencaused by their being displaced;

(c) to combine, regarding the applic-ability of the Guiding Principles,the second and the firstapproach, i.e. (i) to ask whether aparticular principle still satisfiesa continuing need of a person

arising out of the fact that he orshe was displaced and (ii) toexamine whether, in legal terms,such application is possiblebecause the underlying hard lawis protecting the person con-cerned in his or her presentsituation; and

(d) to stress that relevant humanrights and humanitarian lawguarantees contained in hard lawmay remain applicable even ifthe person concerned, due toreturn or resettlement, no longerhas special needs related to theformer displacement.

Walter Kälin is Professor ofConstitutional and InternationalLaw, University of Bern,Switzerland, and author ofAnnotations to the GuidingPrinciples on InternalDisplacement.Email: walter.kaelin@oefre.unibe.ch

1. This does not exclude that IDPs are registeredfor practical purposes.2. Article 1C paras 1 and 2 (the refugee hasregained the protection of his country), para 3 (therefugee has acquired a new nationality), para 4 (therefugee has returned to the country of origin) andpara 6 (ability of a stateless person to return to thecountry of his or her former habitual residence).

National legislationby Christophe Beau

Few states in the world have a special protectionregime for IDPs offering a specific legal status toassist victims of displacement.

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the cessation of IDPstatus, reducing thereturn process to amere change of address.In Georgia, registrationas a permanent residentin a new municipality isseen as de facto reset-tlement and sufficientgrounds to end IDP sta-tus. Colombian lawstipulates that IDP sta-tus ceases with aperson’s "social-economic consolidationand stabilization" with-out mentioning safetyas a requirement.

National laws may alsoconfer decisive weighton housing as a deter-mining factor. InAzerbaijan and theRussian Federation,resettlement is seen ascompleted once IDPscan access permanent housing.These national laws rightly highlighthousing as an essential element to thesafety of displaced persons whensearching for durable solutions butrisk diverting attention from othervital social, economic, legal andsecurity needs.

Free choice manipulated

Whereas the Guiding Principles high-light the fact that durable solutionsshould be based on a voluntary deci-sion made by displaced persons,national legislation is often designedto influence this decision. For exam-ple, legislation in Azerbaijan providesfor resettlement only when return isimpossible and after a special deci-sion made by authorities, revealingofficial preference for the solution ofreturn to original homes. Similarly, inGeorgia, the law deters IDPs fromresettling permanently elsewhere inthe country, withdrawing their specialstatus and the meagre social rightsattached to it as soon as they registeras permanent residents in a munici-pality outside their area of origin.

Although Guiding Principle 28 speci-fies that the authorities' responsibilityis to create conditions for both returnand resettlement, emphasis in somenational legislation on one solutionabove others may be legitimate if ithelps to restore real freedom ofchoice. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, thelaw specifies as an aim the creation of

conditions conducive to return (omit-ting resettlement), in order to counterlocal opposition to minority returns.There is a very fine line, however,between creating conditions forrestoring real freedom of choice andmanipulating IDPs’ intentions. The political exploitation of IDPs’ willto return is most obvious in countriesfacing challenges to their sovereigntyfrom occupation or secession. By arti-ficially prolonging IDP status in orderto keep the displacement problem asvisible as possible, countries likeGeorgia and Azerbaijan promote theirclaims over the occupied territories.By deterring displaced persons fromopting for any solution other thanreturn, as long as sovereignty has notbeen restored in the lost territory,these states maintain IDPs in precari-ous social conditions, discouragedfrom rebuilding a new life outsidetheir areas of origin.

Also demonstrating the reluctance ofthe government to consider the dis-placement crisis ended while thecountry is still divided, Cypriot lawmakes no provision to end the specialstatus granted to persons displacedfrom the Turkish-controlled part ofisland. On the contrary, the lawextends IDP status to children of maledisplaced persons, thereby artificiallyconferring the IDP status to personswho have not necessarily experienceddisplacement themselves or havealready resettled durably in the gov-ernment-held area. However, unlike

Georgia and Azerbaijan, the Cypriotstate has spared no efforts in helpingthe displaced persons to reconstruct anew life away from their homes, inparticular through an extensive hous-ing policy.

Displacement endedarbitrarily?

Various examples of national legisla-tion end IDP status based on apresumption that people have found asolution or that special assistance isno longer needed. In some cases, IDPstatus and assistance can be terminat-ed after a specified period of time. InBosnia and Herzegovina, ‘returnee’status is limited to a period of sixmonths. In the Russian Federation,‘forced migrant’ status ends after fiveyears but can be extended if a perma-nent place of residence has not beenfound. Legislation in Bosnia andHerzegovina, Colombia and Croatiacan also end IDP status if a personrefuses state assistance or a specificsolution offered. Here the state pre-sumes the displaced person hasalready found a response to theirneeds or has opted for another solu-tion. In Croatian and Georgian laws,the end of displacement is also pre-sumed when the circumstances thatcaused displacement have ceased orwhen state authorities declare this tobe the case.

Presumption-based criteria for endingIDP status bypass the express will of

17FMR 17 National legislation

IDPs in Bilasovar 5camp, AghjabediDistrict, Azerbaijan

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the displaced as they assume that allconditions for a free choice are ful-filled and that the IDPs are seeking toextend their status beyond what isnecessary. Such provisions open thedoor to many abuses, allowing a stateto prematurely discharge itself fromresponsibilities before the process ofreturn or resettlement is complete.Another risk is that authoritiesdeclare the end of displacement on adiscriminatory basis, with no guaran-tee that assessment of conditions inthe areas of return or resettlementwill be done fairly. Bosnian law pro-vides clear guidance as to limitationsof presumption in specific cases; per-sons who experienced serious traumain their areas of origin should not bepresumed to have found a solution ifthey decide not to return, even whenadequate conditions of safety and dig-nity exist in the area of origin.

Some states have discriminatoryprovisions to end displacement, inovert contradiction to the GuidingPrinciples. In Croatia, IDP status canbe ended if a displaced person fails tofulfill ‘household tasks’ in state-allo-cated shelters. Such provisions createa special regime of sanctions for IDPs,in violation of Guiding Principle 1 onnon-discrimination. In a decisionreleased on 21 November 2002, theConstitutional Court of the RussianFederation annulled a provision of the1995 ‘forced migrant’ law, accordingto which forced migrant status couldbe ended following convic-tion for a "serious"crime. The Courtargued that thewithdrawal offorcedmigrantstatuswas anaddi-

tional punishment for the same crime,thereby infringing the right of forcedmigrants to equality before law. TheCourt also noted that such withdrawalwas not provided for in criminal law.

The Guiding Principles define IDPs aspermanent residents who have notcrossed an internationally recognisedborder. IDP status can therefore bewithdrawn if the displaced personleaves the country and becomes per-manently resident in another country.This provision can be found in theGeorgian legislation and in the ‘forcedmigrant’ law of the RussianFederation. However, Georgian legisla-tion, which restricts the benefits ofIDP status to Georgian nationals andstateless persons, ends national IDPstatus when the displaced personacquires the citizenship of anothercountry, even if this person does notleave the Georgian territory.

Good practice

In the author’s view, IDP status shouldend when people no longer needspecial attention as a result of dis-placement. The end of displacementshould be defined in national law tocoincide with durable solutions asdefined in the UN Guiding Principleson Internal Displacement – voluntaryreturn, local integration or resettle-ment elsewhere in the country. Suchsolutions should always be voluntary,and carried out in conditions ofsafety and dignity.

Some states do recognise theproblems with ending IDP

status prematurely. Theconstitutional court ofColombia, in its decisionof 16 March 2001, high-lighted that in somecases the real ‘situation’

of a displaced person on the groundmay not correspond to their legal‘condition’, especially if their IDP sta-tus is arbitrarily terminated. With theGuiding Principles, states now have aninstrument to guide legal practice onending displacement based on durablesolutions and internationally recog-nised standards.

The Guiding Principles do not providedetailed or definitive answers to whenthe state can legitimately end itsassistance to IDPs. The Principles,however, do allow an assessment ofwhether state policy to end IDP statusinfringes key principles of protection,such as non-discrimination, safety andfreedom of choice. One way to ensureconsideration of the Principles is forlegislators to make specific referencesto them when preparing national lawsto end displacement.

Christophe Beau is SeniorInformation Officer at the GlobalIDP Project, Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, Geneva. Email: christophe.beau@nrc.ch

1. Legislation, and references, can be obtainedfrom the Global IDP Project: www.idpproject.org/

National legislation FMR 17

Law on Refugees fromBosnia and Herzegovina andDisplaced Persons in Bosniaand Herzegovina, OfficialGazette, 23 December 1999

Article 7

The status of a displaced personshall cease if a person:

a) voluntarily returns to his/herformer habitual residence;

b) refuses to return to his/herformer habitual residence,although voluntary return tothe place of his/her formerhabitual residence, in safetyand with dignity, is possible,and if there are no compellingreasons arising out of previouspersecution or other stronghumanitarian reasons;

c) takes up, in safety and dignity,permanent residence else-where in the place of his/hervoluntary choice;

d) and if there are other reasonsregulated by Entity laws.

[Unofficial translation]

IDP in Baku,Azerbaijan

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ather, emergency support cre-ates the conditions for survivaland security on which more

durable solutions may or may not bebuilt. This article considers thelonger-term options for war-uprootedand war-affected populations and thechallenges of reintegration effortsthrough which they can be restored toproductive citizenship.

Attempts to bring developmental ele-ments to populations still in need ofrelief remain small-scale, time-limitedand experimental. Therefore, to someextent, international agencies are still‘learning on the job’ about therequirements, contradictions andcommitments needed to addresspersistent migration crises and war-to-peace transitions generally. It istroubling, however, that even whenthe donors and international agenciesknow what needs to be done, they sooften lack the political will to act inaccordance with their own oft-repeat-ed recommendations.

Finding a place

The majority of people who have beendisplaced are all but invisible becausethey are not found in camps and set-tlements. In addition to the millionsof IDPs living in demarcated locations,there are other millions – impossibleto count – who have found their wayto villages, towns, the homes of fami-lies and friends and, especially, largecities. Although they may receive spo-radic outside assistance, theirnumbers and conditions are littleknown, much less monitored. Theseare the people who really fall throughthe cracks.

Anyone who has been to a typical IDPsettlement or camp has probably seen

conditions far worse than what wouldbe observed in a typical refugee camp.People need to be helped urgently toleave such places as soon as it is safeto do so. If ‘going home’ is not possi-ble, either integration sur place oralternative resettlement in a safe areais needed. It appears, however, thatachieving durable solutions for IDPs isnot a high priority either for therespective governments or for interna-tional agencies.

The lack of meaningful action derives,in part, from the perception that con-flict-induced displacements aretemporary phenomena that will besolved by establishing conditions forpeople to go home. It is due, in largerpart, to the fact that to seek stableand productive integration or reloca-tion elsewhere than ‘home’ is toacknowledge an undesirable politicalfait accompli. In other words, humani-tarian relief for long-term IDPs ismore easily accepted than are durablesolutions, because actions in the latterdirection can carry an unwanted polit-ical message – from governments,donor agencies and the IDPs them-selves – that significant and possiblyeven permanent changes haveoccurred in areas of origin, makingreturn in the foreseeable future seemhighly unlikely.

Re-establishing productivelives

In the most gratifying situations,crises and conflict are brought to aclose and people return to their for-mer homes to take up their formerlivelihoods. This marks the end of for-mal displacement but only thebeginning of the solution. Dependingon what has happened in the interim

period, they may find homes andcommunities destroyed or inhabitedby other residents; they may have lostpersonal documentation necessary toestablish their identity, rights andproperty ownership. Young people arelikely to have lost years of education;families are likely to have sufferedlosses and to have to cope with ill-health, trauma or disabilities. Thedirect effects of their displacementpersist until there are mechanisms inplace and resources to address suchissues. Ultimately, the viability ofreturning home depends on rebuild-ing the local economies in war-tornregions.

The less straightforward situationsare those in which the people whohave been displaced find it necessaryor desirable to remake their liveselsewhere than their places of origin,either because conflict continues orfor other reasons.1 IDPs of rural originwho have lost their own land (oraccess to land) do best if they are ableto settle in similar rural areas whereethnic affinities facilitate local incor-poration of displaced families. Areview of cases turns up few examplesin which large groups displaced fromone rural area have successfully reset-tled in another. Despite resource-fulness and sometimes astonishingsurvival strategies, rural relocationhas rarely proved to be durable.Reports indicate that even whereconflict does not disrupt local liveli-hoods, the arrival of large numbers ofdisplaced combined with generalisedpoverty in the receiving areas over-whelm absorption possibilities andeventually exacerbate tensionsbetween newcomers and local popula-tion over land and resources (e.g.Angola, Sri Lanka, Uganda,Guatemala).

Governments sometimes make publiclands available for IDP settlement,proclaiming this to be a durable solu-tion. However, in the examples thatcome to mind (Sri Lanka, Colombia,Indonesia, North India), the govern-ment-owned land comes without the

Looking beyond emergencyresponse

by Patricia Weiss Fagen

International concerns and practical attention (includingthose outlined in the Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement) have been weighted on the side ofemergency responses to displacement. No matter howeffective they are, however, emergency responses arenot solutions.

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resources needed to make settlementseconomically viable, i.e. agriculturalinputs, credits and markets. Thus,more often, the rural displaced areobliged to live in camp-like settle-ments with few opportunities forincome generation and are partially orwholly dependent on external assis-tance.

Sri Lanka illustrates the problems offinding durable solutions for a dis-placed rural population. A study ondisplacement in that country under-taken in late 2000 and mid-2001concluded: "After almost twenty yearsof conflict and internal displacement,there is a lack of integrated, system-atic and systemic analysis, planningand policy on the long-term implica-tions of internal displacement andhumanitarian intervention in the con-flict zones."2 Many of the IDPsinterviewed had been living in ruralwelfare and relocation centres for adecade or more. At best, they hadmanaged to replace flimsy shelterswith more solid ones, to find casualemployment in urban centres or tohave temporary access to small plotsof land. In Sri Lanka, fortunately, thepromising direction of the peaceprocess now seems likely to bringpositive change. It will be extremelyimportant to support post-conflict IDPreintegration if peace is to be main-tained.

Sooner or later, most war-induceddisplaced, along with other forcedmigrants, flock to cities where theyhope to find work or receive helpfrom family members. Urban growththroughout the developing world hasfar outstripped the ability of poorgovernments to provide adequate ser-vices or to control crime. Citiesexpand at accelerated rates duringperiods of conflict.

The predominantly rural IDPs are like-ly to be among the most vulnerableand least protected of urban dwellers.They are often considered as tempo-rary residents who will leave whenpeace is restored – or their arrival isbarely noticed because it seems sim-ply to be an acceleration of normalrural-urban migration patterns. Newly-arrived IDPs are likely to receiveattention – often hostile – only whenthey are seen to negatively affect ser-vices and safety for other city

dwellers. Urban improvementsthat may be put in place rarelytake into account the particular-ly dire situations faced by thosewhose presence is the result offorced migration and flightrather than choice. Programmeson behalf of displaced personsin urban areas, it appears, areuniformly weak. In Colombia at least 50% of itsIDPs end up in major cities, usu-ally after a progression of movesfurther from their places oforigin. They may register forgovernment-provided emergencyassistance soon after displace-ment. Assistance is madeavailable for a three-monthperiod but only once – no matterhow many times they are, infact, obliged to move. Followingthe three months, IDPs are con-sidered to have moved to a‘stabilisation phase’. The state,which has proved unable to pro-vide the protection needed toprevent displacement in the firstplace, has proved equally unableto provide security for urban andsemi-urban IDP settlements, eventhose outside of conflict areas. Thestate bureaucracy has largely failed toprovide the education and health careto which IDPs are entitled. A minorityof IDPs presently benefits from inter-national programmes of various kindsand these too receive only short-termfunding. In the new UN HumanitarianAction Plan for Colombia 2003,3 inter-national agencies in Colombia haveprioritised longer-term reintegrationand institutional strengthening.

The goal of reintegration

The twin assumptions that IDPs canand will return to their places of ori-gin and that advocacy should befocused solely on this solution notonly are misleading but also havereinforced the tendency to bypassopportunities for supporting integra-tion. This observation is not meant tounderestimate the importance ofadvocating the right to return and theneed to support return movements.Rather, it is intended to advocate sup-port for multiple solutions, in bothrural and urban settings, designed toabsorb and integrate IDPs in theplaces where they are and/or to helpthem to find alternative places to liveand work. Even if they may eventually

return to their places of origin, theirlives in the interim should not remainin limbo, in an unhappy holding pat-tern with few if any options.

It is possible to reach the long-termdisplaced through programmes andprojects that seek to improve condi-tions and foster integration in placeswhere war-affected populationsabound. Supporting local integrationincludes measures to provide war-uprooted people with access toschools and to national health caremechanisms, jobs and titles to theirproperty, including the temporarymakeshift homes and the bits of landthey have acquired where they areliving. International assistance isessential and could be far more effec-tively channelled than is now the case.

How international assistance is chan-nelled will strongly influence whetheror not there are durable solutions forIDPs and other war-affected popula-tions. The state has the primaryresponsibility for resolving displace-ment and for re-integrating thedisplaced but it does not necessarilyhave the wherewithal, capacity or willto do so. So long as assistance to IDPsand other vulnerable groups is limitedto direct emergency relief and

20 Looking beyond emergency response FMR 17

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administered by international agen-cies, local governments will continueto look to international humanitarianaction and funding for this purpose.National governments are more likelyto make reintegration a national prior-ity if the international communitysupports the process materially andthrough capacity building and institu-tion strengthening in areas producingand receiving displaced persons.

International support for endingdisplacement should aim at strength-ening the capabilities and the will oflocal and national government struc-tures to work with IDPs to findsolutions to their problems. It isessential to develop working relations

between international assistance anddevelopment agencies and nationaland/or local structures and actors atthe earliest possible stage. There aresituations in which this is neither pos-sible nor desirable when governmentshave harmful, even murderous, inten-tions towards IDPs and diverthumanitarian assistance for militarypurposes. Nevertheless, early effortsto overcome local distrust and hostili-ty toward the displaced and, wherenecessary, to start work in non-gov-ernment areas can bring positiveresults over time. Under the bestcircumstances, rebuilding war-tornsocieties and integrating war-affectedpopulations are long and complicatedprocesses. Despite the inevitable

tensions and diverging agendasamong the actors involved, however,international support remains criticalto rebuilding the social and economicfabric so that former IDPs will have aplace within national society.

Patricia Weiss Fagen is ResearchAssociate at the Institute forInternational Migration, Georgetown University. Email: pwf@georgetown.edu

1. The examples here do not include discussion offorced displacement such as the government-induced regroupment centres in Burundi. 2. ‘Sri Lanka Case Study Project’, Part 111, unpub-lished manuscript, MacArthur sponsored projecton Forced Migration and the Humanitarian Regime.2001. 3. UN Humanitarian Action Plan, 2002-2003, 27November 2002. See www.reliefweb.in (go toColombia and download 14.2.03 doc).

21FMR 17

iolence erupted in Tajikistanin 1993 when tens of thou-sands of IDPs and refugees

began returning to their homes. Inmany villages, newly returned peoplefound their homes occupied by othersor they became victim of physicalassaults incited by ethnic animosity.Scores of murders and disappearanceswere reported. The signing of a cease-fire agreement in 1994 did not byitself create an environment safe forreturn. There was need for the inter-national community and the localauthorities to step in to make thereturns secure and viable.

Much to its credit, UNHCR developeda human rights monitoring pro-gramme designed to take account ofthe fact that, in Tajikistan’s volatileclimate, simply transporting peopleback to their homes and distributingroofing materials to them would notbe enough to create a secure environ-ment and prevent further displace-ment. UNHCR deployed field staff inreturn areas to monitor conditionsand intercede with the authoritieswhen there were human rights abusesor risks to personal safety. UNHCRfield officers investigated complaintsof murder, disappearances, rape andharassment since many of the returneesdistrusted the local authorities andoften first reported such crimes to the

UNHCR office. They then accompaniedthe victims to local governmentaloffices to ensure that a full and fairhearing was provided. UNHCR staffalso interceded with the authorities tohelp returnees reclaim their homes.Local authorities proved receptive toUNHCR’s role and there were no inci-dents of retaliation against their staff.According to an evaluation, UNHCR’s"24-hour presence" in areas of returnand its "impartial" role exercised "astabilizing influence": new outbreaksof communal violence were discour-aged and the number of protectioncases declined.1 IDPs and refugees feltmore assured about returning homeand more confident to remain oncethey had moved back.

What happened in Tajikistan from1993 to 1996 is instructive in consid-ering the question of whendisplacement ends. It demonstratesthat even in countries where conflictsare formally over, continuing animosi-ties among individuals or groups mayjeopardise return processes andimpede an end to displacement.Indeed, societal tensions may height-en in the post-conflict phase,especially if the displaced return tofind their homes, land and personalproperty taken by others and no func-tioning judicial system in place toresolve disputes. Moreover, in coun-

tries where severe abuses of humanrights and humanitarian law havebeen perpetrated, there may be unset-tled scores in villages and townsthroughout the country, and targetingof persons who return.

The Tajikistan experience also showsthat safe and successful returns aremore likely when specific protectionand human rights duties are assignedto field staff deployed in the differentreturn areas who possess the requisiteskills. UNHCR officers were fluent inFarsi or Russian and had extensiveexperience in the former Soviet Union.Some had a legal background, whichbrought authority to their interactionswith local officials, law enforcementofficers and the courts. Others hadnegotiating skills, which contributedto relieving tensions and reducing thethreat of violence against returnees.The UNHCR team also developed agood working relationship with theUN military observer mission inTajikistan (UNMOT). Finally, the teamdid not just depart at the end of itsmission; it arranged for theOrganisation for Security andCooperation in Europe (OSCE) toassume its human rights monitoringrole, thereby maintaining continuityof protection for the population.

The role of protection inending displacement

by Roberta Cohen

V

22 The role of protection in ending displacement FMR 17

Such efforts, of course, are not alwaysequally successful. In Rwanda, forexample, in 1994-1995, 130 humanrights staff were deployed by theOffice of the High Commissioner forHuman Rights (OHCHR) to bring amodicum of safety to returning Hutuand Tutsi following the genocide. Butmany were inexperienced and had notbeen given adequate training, andthere were long delays in sendingthem from the capital to the areas ofreturn. The High Commissioner him-self described the operation as a"logistical failure". Nonetheless,OHCHR was able largely to turn itaround. An experienced staff memberwas put in charge, human rights staffwere deployed around the countryand effective partnerships were devel-oped with UNHCR and the UN’smilitary mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR).In the end, the Human Rights FieldOperation in Rwanda was able moreeffectively to monitor conditions inareas of return, advocate for the dis-placed with the local authorities, andcontribute overall to the security ofreturn areas.

Recurrent displacement

In Afghanistan today, the failure ofthe international community to createa secure environment and provideprotection to returnees has causedthe return process to founder. Farfrom ending, displacement has beenrecurring throughout the country.Large numbers of Afghan refugeesreturning from long exile abroad arenow becoming internally displacedand others are making their way backto Pakistan. Afghans already internal-ly displaced are becoming uprooted asecond or third time. About 40% ofthe two million people who have thusfar returned to Afghanistan havecrowded into Kabul, Herat and othercities because they cannot find suffi-cient security or work in their homeareas. In the case of the ethnicPashtuns, tens of thousands haverefrained from returning to the northbecause they fear localised fightingamong rival militias or retributionfrom Uzbek and other ethnic groupsbecause of their association or per-ceived association with the oustedTaliban regime.2

Although UNHCR has helped establisha commission involving the centralgovernment and local authorities tolook at claims of harassment and landconfiscation in the north, aid workers

have found it hard to assist peoplereturning to their villages and townsin different parts of the country.Between January and August 2002, theUN documented more than 70 ‘inci-dents’ of violence against aid agenciesand workers, including cases of rape,looting and firing on UN vehicles.3

Contributing to the violence is thefact that the UN-authorisedInternational Security AssistanceForce (ISAF) has been deployed onlyin the capital. The US has opposed itsexpansion, with the result that ISAF islimited to 4,500 troops and has amandate to protect only the govern-ment. Towards the end of 2002 theUS instructed its special forces andcivil affairs specialists to shift fromexclusive counter terrorism opera-tions to working with newly trainedAfghan troops to defuse local con-flicts, mitigate inter-factional fightingand help with the building of roads,schools and other development pro-jects. Nonetheless, warlords andmilitias continue to run large partsof the country.

Further impeding returns is the inor-dinately slow international responsein removing landmines and otherunexploded ordinance, which covermore than 700 square kilometres ofAfghanistan. The infestation of land-mines is hardly unique toAfghanistan. In Mozambique, mineskilled more than 10,000 displacedpersons over the course of the returnand resettlement programme.4 InAngola, mines impede the delivery ofhumanitarian aid to returnees anddelay agricultural programmes neededto make their returns more viable. In2001, 75% of the 660 killed in Angolaby exploding mines and other ordi-nance were internally displacedpersons.5 Mine clearance programmesare expensive but they are essential toenhancing security in areas of return.Mine-awareness campaigns are alsoimportant to warn returnees aboutwhere mines might be planted andhow to avoid them. At the same time,a new study has found that currentmine detecting equipment is largelyunreliable. If attention is not paid todeveloping new equipment, the studypoints out, it could take nearly half acentury to clear all the landmineslying in wait around the world.6

International responseWhile many factors will determinewhether and when displacement ends,

the greater involvement of humanrights and humanitarian field staff inthe return process is one way ofincreasing attention to protection andachieving safe returns. Overall, how-ever, there are no predictableinternational arrangements. In SriLanka, UNHCR is currently workingwith the government to identify theproblems that need to be addressedfor the safe return of hundreds ofthousands of IDPs and refugees.These include property restitution orcompensation, establishing non-discriminatory legal, administrativeand police systems in areas of return,issuing identity documents, acceler-ating clearance of landmines andundertaking special efforts to enhanceprotection for women and children,who remain vulnerable to abuseupon return.

In Angola, however, which has morethan 4 million IDPs, responsibility forthe protection of returnees is on lessfirm ground. Initially, UNHCR devel-oped a promising two-year plan,inclusive of mobile protection teamsand NGO protection networks, butdonor governments refused to fundit on the grounds that UNHCR shouldstick to refugees and that other agen-cies on the ground should be capableof undertaking these activities.7

UNHCR as a result has been helpingonly those returning IDPs who happento be intermingled with refugees. Butno other agency has the capacity tofulfill the protection responsibility forreturning IDPs. The human rightsdivision of the UN Mission in Angola,which also reports to OHCHR, haspresence only in the capital and threeprovinces and largely focuses oncapacity building for the government.The Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA),although a coordinating rather thanan operational body, has sought tomonitor conditions in all 18 provincesand to promote provincial protectioncommittees. But its field staff is limit-ed in number, must concentratemainly on coordination and has littleexperience in human rights and pro-tection work. Meanwhile, RefugeesInternational reports that IDPs findinglittle security or sustainability inhome villages or areas of resettlementhave begun to leave these areas insearch of better conditions elsewhere.8

When it comes to protection, there arefew organisations to turn to in post-conflict situations. The International

23FMR 17 The role of protection in ending displacement

Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC),the premier protection agency, isexpected to exit after the conflict, inaccordance with its mandate. Post-conflict reprisals, retribution killingsand other violence do not generallyfall under the Geneva Conventions.UNHCR, because of budgetary short-falls and a recently more restrictiveinterpretation of its mandate, hasbecome less engaged on behalf ofIDPs, and there is now great uncer-tainty about whether or not it willbecome involved in protecting IDPs inreturn programmes. OHCHR for itspart has largely avoided field opera-tions involving direct protection ofIDPs since it mounted the large-scaleoperation in Rwanda in the mid1990s. The office continues to sufferfrom severe resource limitationsand deliberate political attempts byUN member states to limit its role.

Basically, this leaves OCHA to try tobring together whatever playershappen to be on the ground toshare the protection responsibility.Its new IDP Unit has been energeti-cally promoting ‘protectioncoalitions’. While it can encourageadditional agencies to becomeinvolved or deploy its own IDPadviser, at times the result is an adhoc mix of organisations thatincludes some without any humanrights or protection experience.

One way to address this gap wouldbe for ICRC and donor governmentssupporting its work to considerwhether ICRC might assume a pro-tection role for IDPs and othercivilians during the phase of returnand reintegration. Another would beto secure more of a commitmentfrom UNHCR and from OHCHRwhose new Human RightsCommissioner, Sergio Vieira de Mello,should be encouraged to have hisoffice assume greater field engage-ment in return processes.Partnerships with NGOs should beactively promoted. Peace BrigadesInternational, for example, has direct-ly accompanied displaced personsback to their towns and villages instrife-torn Colombia. And in theRussian Federation, local NGOs havestationed staff in IDP camps inIngushetia to try to deter forcedreturns to Chechnya. Moreover, theGeneva-based Henri Dunant Centretook the initiative to organise a teamof ‘peace monitors’ in Aceh,Indonesia, to escort more than 2,500

displaced people back to their homesfollowing talks between the govern-ment and the Free Aceh Movement.Regional organisations can also beeffective partners. In Tajikistan, it wasthe OSCE that took over from UNHCRin monitoring the safety and humanrights of returning IDPs. And inBosnia, OSCE dispatched several hun-dred staff members to monitorhuman rights conditions under theDayton accords, including freedom ofmovement and the right of displacedpersons to repossess their propertyor receive compensation. The chief difficulty is that, at present,in each new humanitarian and humanrights emergency no one knows whichagency or combination thereof willbecome involved in promoting safety

during returns of the internally dis-placed. Georgetown University’sInstitute for the Study of InternationalMigration has floated the idea ofestablishing a High Commissioner forForced Migrants as a way of pluggingthe gaps in the international system.Others have proposed that a standbycorps of protection specialists be cre-ated, both for emergencies and theiraftermath, drawn from police andconstabulary units, humanitarian andhuman rights organisations and secu-rity experts, to provide technicaladvice to those on the ground andalso deploy staff to carry out protec-tion responsibilities.

Conclusion

Ending displacement will clearlyrequire greater international commit-ment to integrating human rights andprotection concerns into returnprocesses and to making sure thatorganisations on the ground have theexpertise, training and resources tocarry out such activities. It will alsorequire a commitment to providinglonger-term support for the restora-tion of civil society, electoral systems,judicial institutions that can resolveproperty and land disputes, and dueprocess procedures to safeguardhuman rights. Most welcome in thisregard is the increased recognitionbeing given to the view that post-con-flict reconstruction must include not

only the rebuilding of physical infra-structure but the restoration of aframework of governance inclusiveof democratisation, social justiceand respect for human rights. Yetprotection and human rights con-cerns are still often secondaryconcerns and their implementationlargely ad hoc. In some instances,organisational turf wars andparochial views of ‘mandates’ con-tribute to the uncertainty; so toodoes the international community’sreflexive desire to ‘play it safe’ bylimiting its activities to providingfood, medicine and shelter. Onlywhen it is realised that promotingthe physical safety and humanrights of people upon their returnhome is equally important will it bepossible to say that a solution to theproblem of ending displacement hastruly been found.

Roberta Cohen is Co-Director ofthe Brookings-SAIS Project onInternal Displacement and co-

author of Masses in Flight:The Global Crisis of InternalDisplacement (Brookings, 1998).Email: rcohen@brookings.edu

1. UNHCR, ‘Report on the Phase-Down of UNHCR’sOperations in Tajikistan’, February 1995, and‘TAJIKISTAN: An Account of Lessons Learned’, 15April 1996.2. IDP News, Global IDP Project, 12 February 2003.3. Country Profile on Afghanistan, NorwegianRefugee Council, Global IDP Database, 26.10.02.4. J. Borgen, ‘Institutional Arrangements forInternally Displaced Persons’, Norwegian RefugeeCouncil, 1995, p18.5. Human Rights Watch, Angola, World Report2003.6. Rand Corporation, J MacDonald et al,Alternatives for Landmine Detection, 2003. 7. R Cohen, ‘Weakened US Support EndangersAngola’s Internally Displaced Masses’, AfricanRefugee Network, March 2002.8. Interview with Veronica Martin, RefugeesInternational, 21 February 2003.

Drought-affectedIDPs in Maslakh,Afghanistan, receivingfood aid, 2002.

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opulation displacements differby cause, content, the way theyunfold and the way they end.

Answers about ‘end’ must varydepending on the initial cause ofinvoluntary displacement – which maybe war, a natural calamity or a neces-sary development project. This articlerefers to the end of one type of dis-placements – those caused by publicsector projects that install new infra-structure, build plants, constructhighways or accomplish other neededdevelopments.

Because such displacements are delib-erate and planned in advance, their‘end’ would logically have to bedefined also in advance, and underthe same plan. Paradoxically, however,these plans define only the start ofdisplacement but not its time-boundend. Why this inconsistency?

Resettlement Action Plans (RAPs) areimportant instruments and containmany provisions indispensable forprotecting those displaced. InstitutingRAPs as mandatory safeguardingtools in development projects markeda major progress compared to theunregulated approaches of the pre-1980 period. Surprisingly, however,despite the great detail prescribed fordesigning such RAPs, they indicateonly a time-bound beginning but not atime-bound end to displacement. Inshort, the question about the time-bound completion of the state ofdisplacement is not asked. And ananswer is not given. Yet this is a fun-damental question. It must be asked.It must also be included in planning.And it must be answered.

However, before asking about the end,there is also another tricky question

that needs clarification: when doesdisplacement begin?

It is commonly assumed that dis-placement ‘begins’ when people areforced to physically leave their habi-tat. This is correct only in the case ofdisplacement by natural disaster orby war, when the onset of populationdisplacement is sudden and peoplemust flee immediately. However, indisplacements caused by developmentprojects, the ‘displacement’ oftenbegins long before the actual physi-cal removal of people, as the onset ofthe economic effects of expropriationvery often precedes physical relocation.

Indeed, in projects that expropriatelarge areas for ‘right-of-way’ – such asdams and reservoirs, highways, stripmining, etc – the decision about theforthcoming land take is made longbefore actual population removal. Thelegal principle of ‘eminent domain’ isapplied and the new category ofdevelopment-displaced people is cre-ated as a legal category, the result ofimplementing the expropriation deci-sion. This decision leads to legalpublic notification of area boundariesand entails a ‘cut-off’ date and legalprohibition of new constructions andof new investments in the condemnedareas, to avoid increases in compensa-tion costs. This in turn inducesdepression – causing drops in landprices, halt in housing and enterpriseconstruction, freezing of publicinvestments for public servicesexpansion, etc. The ‘to-be-displaced’inhabitants begin to suffer adverseeconomic consequences long beforebeing physically displaced. This periodof pre-project ‘condemnation’ maylast many years, until the project

actually starts. These are years whenthe ugly manifestation of relativeimpoverishment begins.

This is why recognising the real‘beginning’ of development-induceddisplacement is no less valid thanasking about its ‘end’. In light ofempirical observations and socialanalysis, the conventional wisdomabout the ‘beginning’ of displacementmust be amended. The displacementclock starts earlier than is commonlyassumed.

Criteria for defining the endof displacement: policyobjectives

Let us return now to the initial ques-tion and examine our finding thatResettlement Action Plans generallytend to avoid this explicit questionand its answer. RAPs fail to explicitly‘plan’ a target end-date of displace-ment, although projects have to planfor all their other components.Information available for RAPs isplenty – on project conditions, areacharacteristics, inputs, options, pro-jected outcomes, etc. RAPs are in aposition to set a time-bound bench-mark as a goal, within the projectperiod or slightly after it, but thisdoes not happen in the current for-mat of RAPs. Let us therefore examinetwo elements: the criteria for definingthe end of the state of displacementand the measurements to ascertainthat criteria are met.

Consensus is growing among IDPresearchers about the need forspecific criteria on determining whendisplacement ends for various IDPgroups. The criteria would clearlydiffer by the cause, content and typeof displacement for different sub-categories of IDPs. For refugees,explicit ‘cessation criteria’ determin-ing when their state as refugee comesto an end have been already longdefined, as early as in the 1951Refugee Convention. In the case ofsome IDP sub-categories (resultingfrom conflicts, for instance) the prob-lems are complex and under review,

The question not asked:when does displacement end?

by Michael M Cernea

"A drop reflects the ocean", the old saying goes. Thissimple question – "When does displacement end?" –similarly reflects an ocean: the ocean of displacementissues. This question sounds simple but it isn’t.In fact, it probes the depth and length of the entireinvoluntary displacement-resettlement continuum.

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25FMR 17 The question not asked: when does displacement end?

with different view points expressed,but for the category of development-displaced people the criteria may beeasier to outline.

I advance for discussion two proposi-tions about how we could define theend of displacement for the large sub-category of development-displacedpopulations:

First, the criterion for determining theend of displacement must derivefrom the policy that defines theobjective of development-inducedinvoluntary resettlement. If displace-ment results from deliberate policy,and is legally induced, displacement’send must be equally policy-inducedand determined.

Second, in light of this criterion, dis-placement would end when the policyobjective is reached – namely, whenthe displaced people achieve a liveli-hood level improved over theirpre-displacement levels or (as a con-troversial minimal caveat still allowsunder some current policies) whenthey are restored at a level equal totheir pre-project level (plus ‘without-project’ growth). Current resettlementpolicies of major development aidagencies, bilateral and multilateral,clearly define the basic objective oftheir involuntary resettlement policiesas "improving, or at least restoring"livelihoods.

These two propositions, as answer tothe legitimate question about ‘whendoes displacement end?’, imply alsoan intimate link between criteria and

measurements. Criteria which are notmeasurable would be useless.Conversely, if measurements are notundertaken, theoretical criteria alonewould be of little use.

Practice versus policy

What does current practice tell us?Time-wise, the displacement-resettle-ment continuum unfolds throughthree essential phases: 1) expropria-tion/displacement; 2) transfer processfrom old location to new site; and 3)resettlement and reconstruction oflivelihood. The process initiated withthe identification of land for expro-priation and the physical displace-ment does not end at phase two. Ittruly ends only when the third phase– resettlement-reconstruction as perthe policy requirement – is complet-ed. This explains why confusing theend of displacement with the end ofthe physical transfer phase is a griev-ous mistake. Unfortunately, manygovernment officials, planners andproject managers are still making thisconfusion.

As a result, many people are dis-placed and relocated but remain notrehabilitated for years: for them, dis-placement has not ended. While intheory the first two phases of thecontinuum must be followed immedi-ately by the third phase, in practicethis very often does not happen, andthose displaced do not advancethrough the third phase. Those affect-ed are not sustainably reestablished,displacement is not ended, and they

remain displaced and impoverished,left chronically behind those un-affected by the project.

As long as RAPs avoid setting abenchmark end-date (even a flexibleone), there is no ‘planned’ milestonein a given project against which tomeasure performance and instituteaccountability. Leaving the end of dis-placement open-ended rather thanplanned in a time-bound fashionleaves those displaced in limbo andundercuts the safeguards principle.

One of the most telling statistics inthis respect was provided by Indianresearchers, who concluded that outof about 20 million people displacedin India over a 40 year period, 75%,that is 15 million, were relocated butnot rehabilitated, emerging from thetransfer phase worse off than theywere before the projects and displace-ment started.1

Necessary remedies

What would be the practical and oper-ational implications of definingdisplacement’s end correctly, in lightof basic policy objectives?

Empirical findings from researchcarried out by many anthropologists,geographers and sociologists led meto the formulation of theImpoverishment Risks andReconstruction (IRR) model, whichposits that overcoming the risks ofdecapitalising resettlers and impover-ishing them is the core task inresettlement.2 The basic poverty risksidentified in the IRR model are: land-lessness, joblessness, homelessness,marginalisation, food insecurity,increased morbidity, education loss,loss of access to common propertyresources and social disarticulation.If displacement is wrongly defined asending with physical transfer, beforereconstruction begins, those dis-placed are abandoned to fight ontheir own the risks imposed on them.Compensation for expropriated assetsis not the full solution by far and haslong been proven to be an insufficientremedy against impoverishment. Toavoid such situations, I suggest threepoints.

First, a correct definition of what isthe ‘end’ of development-induced dis-placement would need to be includedin every project’s RAP as an objectiveconsistent with policy.

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26 The question not asked: when does displacement end? FMR 17

Second, the very content of the RAPshould be tailored towards achievingthis end, in a measurable way andwith time-bound accountability foreach project. This, again, is usuallynot happening now, perhaps with theexception of some internationallyassisted projects subject to monitoredsafeguard policies. Pressure to reachthe policy-defined end will forceimprovements in the entire precedingresettlement work. Projects guided bysafeguard policies have indeed madegreat progress towards transparentlyaccounting for the number of peopleto be displaced, mitigating manyadverse impacts. But many such pro-jects do not transparently account forhow many of these displaced peopleend their displacement with theirlivelihoods improved by the project’send, and how many do not. To thecredit of some agencies, a demand forsome assessments was incorporatedin the OECD and World Bank guide-lines on involuntary resettlement. Yet,these assessments are not explicitlylinked to reaching ‘closure’ and anend of displacement.

To achieve clear awareness of results,RAPs would have to schedule andcarry out a sample survey study aspart of the project completion reportto determine a) whether, and howmany, of those displaced have endedtheir displacement in substantiveterms, recovering and improving theirlivelihoods and b) how many have notended it during the project’s limitedduration and therefore must be stillseen as needing assistance. Withoutsuch a study the safeguarding dis-course cannot really concludewhether projects have succeeded inachieving the basic objective of theresettlement policy or whether theseprojects leave the process unfinished.

The recently revised World Bank poli-cy on resettlement states that "uponcompletion of the project, the borrow-er undertakes an assessment todetermine whether the objectives ofthe resettlement instrument havebeen achieved".3 This positive proposi-tion is a step in the right direction,yet it is more descriptive than pre-scriptive and is rarely carried out.The OECD guidelines prescribe that"all resettlement plans… shouldinclude a target date when the antici-pated benefits to resettlers and hostsare expected to be achieved".4 Butunfortunately it is widely known thatkey bilateral aid agencies of OECD

countries onlyweakly, if at all,implement theirresettlement guide-lines, and thecorrect concept ofa ‘target-date’ isforgotten andabsent.

My third and lastpoint responds tothe possibility thatsuch a surveywould find thatmany of those dis-placed have not‘ended’ their dis-placement.Resettlers must beprovided withresources andopportunities toshare in the pro-ject’s benefits andtruly recover.Project agenciesshould designfollow-up measuresto pursue assis-tance until thepolicy goal isaccomplished.There are numer-ous operationalways in which thiscan be done mea-surably. Otherwise, exposing peopleto added risks and discontinuingreconstruction assistance before theireconomic displacement ends wouldonly mean swelling the ranks of thepoor with newly impoverished people.

I started this article by saying thatthis simple question – when doesdisplacement end? – reflects the vastocean of displacement problems.Indeed, it led us to examine in turnthe beginning of displacement, itsrisks, the phases of the process, itsimpoverishment effects, the policythat would counteract the risks, crite-ria and measurements – all this inorder to understand what its end isand ought to be. Thus, it is a difficultbut very worthwhile question. Thequestion about ‘end’ precipitatesclarity. This key question must beasked in every single instance of dis-placement, in every RAP. And – mostimportantly – the question is not ariddle: it does have a clear answer.Current practice must be improved toaccomplish the policy-required anddefined answer.

Michael M. Cernea is ResearchProfessor of Anthropology andInternational Affairs, GeorgeWashington University, inWashington DC, and SeniorAdviser-Consultant of theWorld Bank. Email: mcernea@worldbank.org

1. Fernandes Walter, ‘Development-InducedDisplacement in Eastern India’ in Dube S C (ed)Antiquity to Modernity in Tribal India, vol 1, 1998,Inter-India Publications: New Delhi; Singh, Shenkarand Banerji P (eds) Large Dams in India, 2002, NewDelhi: IIPA. (Fernandes quotes the economist VijayParanjpye who estimates the dam-displaced peoplein India at over 21.6 million.)

2. Cernea Michael M The Risks and ReconstructionModel for Resettling Displaced Populations, 1997,World Development 25:10:1569-87; Cernea MichaelM ‘Risks, Safeguards and Reconstruction: A Modelfor Population Displacement and Resettlement’ inM Cernea and C McDowell (eds) Risks andReconstruction: Resettlers' and Refugees'Experiences, 2000, Washington: World Bank.

3. World Bank, Operational Policy 4.12 :Involuntary Resettlement, 2001,Washington DC

4. OECD-DAC, Guidelines for Aid Agencies onInvoluntary Displacement in Development Projects,1992, Paris.

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here are approximately639,000 Burundian refugees inneighbouring countries, plus a

further 200,000 living in Tanzaniansettlements since 1972.1 As ofNovember 2002, there were approxi-mately 380,000 IDPs living in campsfor IDPs and an unknown number ofmen, women, adolescents and chil-dren who are otherwise dispersed inBurundi. The UN Office for theCoordination of Humanitarian Affairsestimates that the current conflictmay be generating as many as 100,000new displacements each month.2

In 1998, negotiations for peace wereinitiated. In August 2000, a PeaceAgreement was signed by most, butsignificantly not all, of the parties tothe conflict.3 No cease-fire was agreedupon although negotiations for acease-fire continue. The peace agree-ment remains fragile and couldcollapse at any time. Civilians contin-ue to be caught in the middle and thenumber of deaths continues to rise.Both rebel forces and extremists with-in the Burundi military are implicatedin attacks against civilians and humani-tarian aid organisations. Regionalinstability and conflict also complicateprospects for peace in Burundi.

Broadly, three categories of IDPs, withsome movement between the cate-gories, are referred to in Burundi: thedisplaced in IDP camps, the regroupedin regroupment or former regroup-ment camps (camps established whenthe military removed the local popula-tion to facilitate their militaryoperations) and the dispersed who donot live in camps but in the forestsand marshes or with relatives orfriends. In addition, some refugeereturnees have subsequently becomeinternally displaced. Urban street chil-dren and other homeless populationshave grown in size because of theconflict although they tend not beconsidered IDPs.

The situation of theregrouped best illustratesthe challenges in Burundi ofdetermining when displace-ment ends. Regroupmenthas been a tool of theBurundian government since1996 when about 300,000persons, mainly Hutu, wereforced into camps, ostensi-bly for their own protection.Most of these camps closedin 1998 but the last quarterof 1999 saw the creationagain of regroupmentcamps, officially termed‘protection sites’. Conditionsinside the camps were forthe most part appalling andsome of the camps were inaccessibleto humanitarian agencies.4 Womenand children were especially vulnera-ble when food was short; at fooddistributions they were often side-lined, sometimes despite efforts ofdistribution agencies.5 There were alsoreports of the rape and sexual abuseof women and young girls in thecamps.6

There was almost universal condem-nation of the camps and extensivecalls for their closure. Most were dis-mantled in the third quarter of 2000following pressure from NelsonMandela, the international communityand local organisations.7 The finalpressure came from the rebel groupswho made closure of the camps a pre-condition for joining the peacenegotiations. The camp closuresoccurred within a very short periodand with no preparation for the safereturn of the regrouped. Some campswere closed very quickly, eitherbecause the authorities wanted thememptied as fast as possible but moreoften because as soon as the camppopulation was allowed to leave theydid, despite the risks and conditionsthey then faced.

When the regrouped population leftthe camps, many faced serious risk.Fighting continued or even intensifiedin many areas to which the regroupedreturned. While the international com-munity rightly demanded the closureof the camps, neither they nor thegovernment made adequate prepara-tions for this contingency. Thelocation of most of the formerlyregrouped population remains vague.Many appear to have gone home butothers are believed to still be living inor near regroupment camps. Still oth-ers are likely to have moved toBujumbura or other parts of the coun-try. No statistics are available on therelative size of each group.

For those who were able to returnhome, life has been far from secure.The homes and livestock of manyhave been looted or destroyed inwhole or in part. In some areas thewater system has been destroyed.Insecurity due to rebel and/or militaryactivity remains a real threat both forthose previously regrouped and thosewishing to assist them. It is commonlyreported that formerly regroupedIDPs return home only to be forced toflee from their homes to escapeattacks from one or the other side of

Burundi: out of sight, out of mind?by Susan Martin

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Since the early 1970s, conflict in Burundi hascaused more than 200,000 Burundians to losetheir lives, many to flee abroad and manymore to be displaced, some temporarily andsome more long term.

the conflict. The humanitarian agen-cies that provided the minimalassistance allowed in the regroupmentcamps generally were unable to accom-pany the regrouped to their homesbecause of the unsafe conditions.

Security is the principal constraint onassistance and protection to IDPs inBurundi. As the peace process hasprogressed, the fighting has in factincreased and continues to this day.Since aid operations have been direct-ly targeted, it has been particularlydifficult to reach vulnerable popula-tions. A further impediment toeffective humanitarian assistance toIDPs and other war-affected popula-tions has been the weakness of theUN in Burundi, particularly after themurders of several senior UN staff in1999.

The deterioration in the security situ-ation inside the country and the

inability to forecast when peace willbe established and what will happenin the meantime have made operatingconditions for humanitarian aid agen-cies particularly difficult. Too often,aid agencies are unable to reach dis-placed populations because of thesecurity barriers, effectively endingassistance and protection though notthe displacement itself. Burundi epito-mises the worst way in whichdisplacement as an issue of interna-tional concern comes to end – whenthe internally displaced are out ofsight and hence out of mind of inter-national actors.

Susan Martin is Visiting Professorand Director of the Institute forthe Study of InternationalMigration, School of ForeignService, Georgetown University. Email: martinsf@georgetown.edu

1. UN OCHA, Consolidated Inter-Agency Appealfor Burundi 2003, November 2002.www.reliefweb.int/appeals/2003/files/bur03.pdf2. Norwegian Refugee Council, Burundians FleeRaging Conflict, 12 February 2003 (www.idppro-ject.org/)3. Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement forBurundi, Arusha, 28 August 2000, referred to asthe Peace Agreement in this article. 4. Refugees International, Burundian RegroupmentCamps: A Man-made Humanitarian Emergency, anImpediment to Peace, 20 January 2000, andConditions in Burundian Camps RapidlyDeteriorating, 1 March 2000; Human Rights Watch, Emptying the Hills,Regroupment in Burundi, Human Rights Watch,New York, July 2000 (www.hrw.org/reports/2000/burundi2/).5. Women’s Commission for Refugee Women andChildren, ‘Out of Sight, Out of Mind: Conflict andDisplacement in Burundi’, October 2000(www.womenscommission.org/pdf/bi.pdf)6. Human Rights Watch, Emptying the Hills,Regroupment in Burundi, Human Rights Watch,New York, July 2000, pp18-20.7. See, for example, Forced Relocation in Burundi,Report of the Representative of the Secretary-General on Internally Displaced Persons, UNCHR,Doc. E/CN.4/2001/5/Add.1 (5 March 2000)

28 Burundi: out of sight, out of mind? FMR 17

he development of policies forpeople internally displaced bythe violence in Colombia is

characterised by a tension betweenthe approach of the government,which is predominantly operational,1

and that of the Constitutional Court,which has championed a focus onhuman rights by way of jurispru-dence.2

The growing intensification of internalarmed conflict almost entirely limitsthe option of return. The state is notable to guarantee the civilian popula-tion's safety, especially when theyhave been directly threatened byarmed actors who remain in the areasfrom which people have fled. At pre-sent, there is no real reintegration ofdisplaced people in Colombia.Solutions for the displaced populationtherefore currently depend on thepossibilities for urban resettlement.The government, however, has placedemphasis on return programmes forvarious reasons: i) the cost of resettle-ment of people from rural areas inurban areas is higher than that ofreturn, according to the government's

calculations; ii) local governmentauthorities are reluctant to receive thedisplaced, as they associate them witharmed groups and with increasedsocial insecurity and urban marginali-sation; iii) return is seen as a possibleway of consolidating the government’scontrol over disputed territories.

Within the governmental system ofsupport for the displaced, an informa-tion mechanism has been established

whereby the population must registerin order to access state services.Although the Constitutional Court hasdetermined that displacement is anobjective fact and that the registerhas simply a declarative function, theregistration of the displaced consti-tutes a necessary condition foraccessing government support.Consequently, displacement ends,officially at least, upon exclusion fromthe state register.

Colombia: the end of displacementor the end of attention?

by Amelia Fernández and Roberto Vidal

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Another reason for the end of assis-tance concerns vague criteria such asdisplaced people’s "lack of coopera-tion" or "repeated renunciation" ofstate politics, according to govern-ment assistance services. This hascreated justified fears of the possibili-ty of setting up some sort of politicalcontrol over the displaced and theirorganisations. Governmental sourcesshow that there have been cases ofexclusion from the register.3 Some ofthese cases, according to displacedpeople’s organisations, have beenleaders of the displaced who havedemonstrated against governmentpolicy. Exclusion or threats of exclu-sion seem to be used as means ofpolitical pressure.

The government’s system of assis-tance is highly formalised. Forexample, people can only be regis-tered if they were displaced duringthe previous year; humanitarian assis-tance is only given for three months(extendable to three more months inspecial cases); and actual support issubject to the availability of funds.The government is studying the possi-bility of using criteria for the"cessation of the condition of beingdisplaced" based on the provision ofservices, which would mean thatthose displaced who have receivedassistance under the limited terms

established by the government wouldbe excluded from the register.

The result of using these formalisedcriteria has been long periods ofneglect of the displaced who then dis-appear from the official registers oncethey have received short-term assis-tance. There is fear that formalisedcriteria that meet the priorities of thestate but not the necessities of thedisplaced population will be imposedon those excluded from the registerfor the displaced, which would resultin a total lack of protection.

The ending of the status of being dis-placed should not lead to a totalabsence of support; displacementassistance should instead be graduallyreplaced by programmes of more gen-eral assistance that would nonethelessmeet the same standards as for dis-placement assistance, in a lasting anddignified way.5

The notion of an end of displacementraises many fears among displacedpopulations insofar as it entails theend of support, the availability ofwhich is already precarious. Whatseems particularly risky is the analogybetween the politics of the displacedand that of refugees (i.e. use of thecessation clause), especially if indoing so there is an attempt to

transfer the restrictions that statesimpose on asylum seekers andrefugees onto the relationship thatexists between a state and its internal-ly displaced citizens, which entailsobligations relating to their humanrights. Ultimately, the necessities of thevery operational approach to the issuetaken in Colombia ends up restrictingthe rights of internally displaced peo-ple.

Amelia Fernández is AssociateProfessor, Faculty of Medicine,Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,Bogotá, Colombia. Email: afernand@javeriana.edu.co

Roberto Vidal López is AssociateProfessor, Faculty of Law,Pontificia Universidad Javeriana,Bogotá, Colombia. Email: vidal@javeriana.edu.co

1, The Colombian government has created a com-plex group of institutions and norms that areformulated in the National System of Care andPrevention of the Displaced Population.

2. The Constitutional Court is the court of appealsin the Colombian judiciary system. Since 1994 theColombian Constitutional Court has producedmore than 60 pronouncements related to forceddisplacement due to violence. Even so, these corre-spond to a tiny fraction of the country’s caseswhich have been discussed through the judicialsystem.

29FMR 17 Colombia: the end of displacement or the end of attention?U

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During the ‘Day ofDocumentation’ inCuidad Bolivar,UNHCR’s MobileRegistration Unit willhelp local IDPsapply for identifica-tion cards.

t the heart of the problem isthe UN agencies’ and NGOs’struggle to agree on whether

Rwandans relocated into new villagesshould be considered permanentlyresettled or still displaced.

Over the last decade, Rwandansexperienced repeated waves of dis-placement, the latest in 1998 whenseveral hundred thousand people inthe northwest were moved into super-vised camps. The governmentjustified this action as a protectionmeasure against insurgent actions butmany observers saw it primarily as away to deprive opponents of support.At the end of that year, the govern-ment ordered these camps to bedismantled and the displaced to berelocated to new villages.

The UN Office for the Coordination ofHumanitarian Affairs (OCHA), UNHCR,the UN Special Coordinator onInternal Displacement and the USCommittee for Refugees (USCR) useddifferent criteria to decide when dis-placement ends. Differences centeredon whether resettlement was perma-nent, if basic humanitarian needswere met and how voluntary anddurable the solutions were.

Changing criteria

Some agencies, by changing their cri-teria, appeared to write off thousandsof IDPs. In mid-1999, OCHA countedsome 500,000 IDPs previously dis-placed in northwestern camps andthen resettled in villages. That year,OCHA narrowed its criteria and count-ed only 150,000 people who receiveddirect humanitarian assistance in theresettlement villages. In mid-2000,OCHA adopted an even more restric-tive approach, excluding the newlyrelocated people on the grounds that

they had all been moved to their finallocation: either to former homes ornew villages. OCHA then used theterm ‘newly relocated’ instead of‘resettled’, noting that "a number ofsites are lacking basic infrastructureand a large number of families areunder plastic sheeting."1

At the end of 1999, UNHCR talkedabout an intermediate category –some 625,000 returned IDPs – callingthem ‘people of concern’ to theagency. In fact, rather than having‘returned’, the majority of RwandanIDPs had been resettled. The followingyear, IDPs in Rwanda ceased to appearas a category of concern to UNHCR.2

Thus in UNHCR’s eyes resettlementseemed to have ended displacement.

By 2001, OCHA announced that therewere no more displaced people inRwanda. OCHA’s Senior Adviser onIDPs, in December 2000, undertook amission to Rwanda at the request ofthe UN Special Coordinator onInternal Displacement. He estimatedthat the resettlement was permanentand that durable solutions had beenfound for the IDPs. "While conditionsof return and resettlement are oftenyet inadequate, governmental andinternational efforts to stabilise thesituation through durable solutionshave advanced beyond the thresholdof what still could be called internaldisplacement," he concluded. TheAdviser also looked at whether theprocess of resettlement was volun-tary, deciding "there is no evidencetoday that [the resettlement policy]is implemented with a degree of com-pulsion which would warrant the labelof ‘forced displacement’."3 His criteriafor ending displacement seem to be:permanent resettlement, a durablesolution and a reasonable degree ofvoluntariness.

The UN Special Coordinator onInternal Displacement disagreed. Hesaid that it was politically problematicto say that there were no more IDPs inRwanda when, in Burundi, people whohad been resettled for decades werestill counted as IDPs, although theylived in acceptable conditions. At thispoint, both turned to theRepresentative of the UN SecretaryGeneral on Internally DisplacedPersons for guidance.

A leading NGO meanwhile consideredhumanitarian needs and permanentlocation to be criteria for the end ofdisplacement. USCR concluded thatabout 150,000 Rwandans were inter-nally displaced at the end of 2000,primarily people at villagisation siteswithout proper shelter or land alloca-tions. USCR reasoned that peoplelacking essentials such as proper shel-ter and farming opportunities atgovernment-designated sites couldnot be considered permanently reset-tled. The following year, however, itcounted no Rwandans as internallydisplaced, noting only that unknowndisplacement might still exist due tothe government’s resettlement policy.4

Resettlement should bevoluntary and durable

Permanent resettlement was the onlycriterion that all actors viewed as nec-essary to end displacement. Someorganisations considered other crite-ria as necessary but came to differentconclusions on whether they had beenfulfilled. It was only in 1999 forOCHA and end of 2000 for USCR thatfulfilling basic needs became anexplicit criterion to end displacement.

The forced nature of resettlement,however, was widely overlooked.Despite numerous UN and NGOreports of coercion during the reset-tlement process, none of the relevantorganisations viewed the forcedaspect of resettlement as seriousenough to continue to consider theresettled people as displaced people.

30 FMR 17

Narrowing criteria cannotsolve IDP problems

by Greta Zeender

The case of Rwanda demonstrates significant differ-ences among leading agencies and policy makersworking with displaced people in their understandingof displacement and resettlement concepts.

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Also, the durability of solutions wasgenerally not seen as a decisive factorin ending displacement. The need fordurable solutions is derived from theUN Guiding Principles on InternalDisplacement 28 and 29, which statethat competent authorities shallendeavour to facilitate the reintegra-tion of resettled IDPs and assist themto recover their property or appropri-ate compensation. But only OCHA’sSenior Adviser on IDPs stated thatefforts to stabilise the situationthrough durable solutions hadadvanced beyond what could still becalled internal displacement.Complicating matters, durability is

highly debatable in a country whereclose to one million people still live ininadequate shelters lacking basic ser-vices, three-quarters of them in thenorthwest.5

The case of Rwanda shows the impor-tance of agreeing on whendisplacement ends, and to considerhow voluntary and durable resettle-ment has been. Narrowing definitionsis no way to make the problems ofdisplaced persons disappear.

Greta Zeender is InformationOfficer at the Global IDP Project,Norwegian Refugee Council,

Geneva. Email: greta.zeender@nrc.ch

1. OCHA 19 August 1999, and 24 December 1999.Affected populations in the Great Lakes region(displaced - refugees); August 2000, Update onIDPs in Rwanda

2. UNHCR, June 2000, Global Report 1999, p.96;June 2001, Global Report 2000, p.111

3. UNOCHA, 18 December 2000, ‘Mission Report:Displacement and Resettlement in Rwanda’.

4. USCR, June 2001, World Refugee Survey 2001,p.99; June 2002, World Refugee Survey 2002, p.90

5. Brookings Initiative in Rwanda, November 2001,Land and Human Settlements, 2.3.1

31FMR 17 Narrowing criteria cannot solve IDP problems

success story, in which thewishes of internally displacedpeople themselves prevailed,

said some observers. Not so, insistedothers, pointing to numerous flawsand problems along the way.

So was the resettlement processreally the final chapter in SierraLeone’s displacement story?Arguably not, at least with respectto durability of return and resettle-ment as required by the UNGuiding Principles.

From relief to recovery

Since April 2001 there has been aconcerted effort to resettle largenumbers of Sierra Leonean IDPs –as well as returning refugees – andto phase out IDP camps. At thattime, the UN shifted its IDP assis-tance efforts from protractedprovision of humanitarian relief tosupport of resettlement and recov-ery efforts, confident of advancesbeing made in the peace processand increasing stability throughout

the country. This confidence appearedwell-founded: by the end of 2001 theworld’s largest UN peacekeeping mis-sion was deployed across the countryand a disarmament programme wascompleted. In January 2002, PresidentAhmad Tejan Kabbah declared an

official end to the 11-year civil war,which had killed an estimated 50,000people and displaced up to half of thecountry’s 4.5 million population.

Displaced Sierra Leoneans were reset-tled in accordance with the nationalgovernment’s Resettlement Strategy,which applies to IDPs as well asrefugees and ex-combatants with theirdependants, and states that it will"only facilitate resettlement into anarea when it is deemed that the areain question is sufficiently safe toallow for the return of displaced

Sierra Leone: resettlementdoesn’t always end displacement

by Claudia McGoldrick

Almost one quarter of a million displaced SierraLeoneans were resettled in their areas of origin by theend of 2002, officially ending the internal displacementcrisis in the country and further consolidating recoveryafter more than a decade of devastating civil war.

AIDPs andreturnees, amputeecamp, Freetown,Sierra Leone

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people in safety and dignity".1 UNHCRwas one of numerous agencies thathelped to plan and implement thestrategy, aiming to harmonise theresettlement of refugees and IDPs.Both groups were offered resettle-ment packages, which included a two-month food ration, household utensils,plastic sheeting and, in some cases,transportation. According to OCHA, atotal of some 220,000 registered IDPswere resettled in five phases betweenApril 2001 and October 2002. Manymore returned home spontaneously.Officially at least, this left no moreIDPs in Sierra Leone.

Displacement continues

Not surprisingly, the resettlementprocess raised some thorny issues.Firstly, what is the real number ofIDPs in the country? Nobody can besure, since over the past decade ofconflict there have always been largenumbers of unregistered IDPs. This isimportant because only registeredIDPs have been eligible for assistancein the camps, and for resettlementpackages. With registration itselfoften unreliable, there may still be anunknown number of IDPs who are notrecognised and will not be assisted toreturn home.

Secondly, there are also many IDPswho do not wish to be resettled. Theirreasons vary: some are traumatised,some have security fears related totheir areas of origin, some have losttheir coping mechanisms and havebecome dependent on camp life, whileothers are still unwilling to return toareas where they know there is a lackof infrastructure and basic services.Many have become urbanised in thecapital, Freetown, and in the words ofone aid agency, "will strictly not beIDPs in the ‘assistance’ sense of theword". Since one of the principles ofthe government’s resettlement strategyis to discourage dependency onhumanitarian aid and prolonged dis-placement when areas of return havebeen declared safe, there is little if anyassistance available for ‘residual’ IDPs.

Another contentious issue is thatsome IDPs may have been resettled tounsafe areas. The declaration of areasas ‘safe for resettlement’ – the mainfactor in effectively ending displace-ment – is based on a number ofcriteria spelled out in the govern-ment’s resettlement strategy. Thesecriteria include the complete absence

of hostilities, unhindered and safeaccess of humanitarian workers andsizeable spontaneous return move-ments. Virtually the entire countryhas been officially declared safe forresettlement. But concern has beenexpressed in some cases that certainareas were prematurely classified assafe, or that established criteria werenot properly applied, especially inlight of the volatile situation in Liberiathat has already resulted in cross-border raids and abductions of SierraLeonean civilians. The downsizing andeventual withdrawal of the UN peace-keeping force, UNAMSIL, has heightenedanxieties for some. Allegations havealso been made that insufficient or evenmisleading information was given todisplaced people about conditions intheir areas of origin.

A further cause for concern is thatinadequate resettlement packages,combined with a chronic lack of shel-ter and basic services in areas ofreturn, have caused many resettlers todrift back to urban areas. Plans forcommunity rehabilitation programmeshave in many cases not yet beendeveloped, partly due to insufficientdonor funding.

Resettlement or eviction?

Many of these problems have beenhighlighted by NGOs such as MSF andRefugees International. According toMSF, the "process … more closelyresemble[d] eviction than resettlement… due to a lack of respect for thebasic rights of the people to be ableto choose their fate, and to be treatedwith dignity at each stage of theirreturn."2 In some cases, reported MSF,people were being resettled to areasconsidered by the UN as too danger-ous for its own staff. While the UNacknowledged that numerous chal-lenges had arisen during theresettlement process, which neededto be urgentlyaddressed, italso said thatthe MSFreport tosome extentfocused onspecificissues out ofcontext,thereby mis-representingthe full reali-ty of thesituation.

The resettlement process in SierraLeone has suffered lack of agreementon even the most basic definitions.The absence of reliable statistics hasmeant that it was unclear who was anIDP to begin with, so naturally itremains unclear as to when IDP statusends. While some people maintainthat displacement cannot end withoutfulfilment of the UN GuidingPrinciples – requiring safe, dignifiedand durable return and resettlement –others insist that the majority of IDPsin Sierra Leone returned even wheninformed of the real situation in theirhome areas and that ultimately thewill of IDPs themselves to end theirdisplacement prevailed. For thoseIDPs not wishing to return for variousreasons, the government decided theyshould no longer be considered IDPs.The prevailing lack of consensus overthese fundamental issues has, at thevery least, shown that there must bemore to the label ‘IDP’ than simply aformal status granted or removed bythe authorities without full regard toconditions on the ground and thatthere can, in some cases, be a fine linebetween voluntary and forced return.

Lessons must be learned from thisexperience and future mistakes avoid-ed. Sadly, the cycle of war anddisplacement that has plagued SierraLeone, Liberia, Guinea and, morerecently, Côte d’Ivoire will ensure thatthese issues are kept very much alive.

Claudia McGoldrick is Informa-tion Officer at the Global IDPProject, Geneva. Email: claudia.mcgoldrick@nrc.ch

1. National Commission for Reconstruction,Resettlement and Rehabilitation, ‘Sierra LeoneResettlement Strategy’, Revised October 2001, p42. MSF, ‘Populations Affected by War in the ManoRiver Region of West Africa: Issues of Protection’,May 2002, p2:www.msf.org/countries/page.cfm?articleid=EB07B3BF-3442-4FDE-A1D6E36464BB6EA9

32 Sierra Leone: resettlement doesn’t always end displacement FMR 17

Destroyed school, Eastern Province, Sierra Leone.

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efore Sri Lanka’s twenty-year-old civil war ground to a haltfollowing the February 2002

ceasefire between the government andthe rebel Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE), approximately 70,000people were killed, over 750,000 wereinternally displaced and another700,000 or so fled the country. In theabsence of appreciable progress onthe political front, a pall of scepticismovershadows the prospect of effectingspeedy resettlement of those dis-placed during the armed conflict. Theinitial alacrity with which the dis-placed communities greeted the peaceprocess is beginning to give way tomore cautious optimism.

Over 230,000 IDPs have headed homein the north since the cease-fire. Thismeans that, barring those who do notintend to return, another 500,000remain to be resettled. The mostdaunting task is to resettle nearly

125,000 non-Tamil IDPs displacedfrom LTTE-controlled areas and some50,000 Tamils from the military-heldHigh Security Zones. By the end ofJune 2002, only 600 Sri Lankanrefugees living in India hadapproached UNHCR for permission tobe repatriated. There is even less inter-est shown by the Sri Lankan Tamildiaspora in the possibilities of return.

There are formidable obstacles toresettlement, requiring joint effort onthe part of the international commu-nity and the national authorities:

■ Absence of tangible proof ofdurable peaceThough unfamiliar with the finerpoints of peace agreements, thedisplaced receive constant feed-back on the state of the war andthe cease-fire from sources such asthe LTTE undercover operatives inthe south, military personnel

placed at the security posts nearthe relief centres, NGO workersand civilians, particularly those inthe northeastern border villages.Resulting fears of conditions inareas of return need to be allayedbefore the post-cease-fire trickle ofreturnees can become a sustainedflow.

■ Lack of mechanism to guaranteesecurity, both en route and at thedestinationPhysical security is vital to humanexistence, yet the IDPs’ perceptionsof security vary, depending on thenature of the causes of their flight.For instance, a person displaced asa result of being caught up in thecross-fire may settle for clear signsof an end to military hostilities asthe minimum indicator of securityneeded to return, whereas the vic-tims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ wouldadditionally look for the convinc-ing signs of a change in behaviouron the part of their former ‘tor-mentors’ as a precondition toreturn. The post-battle nervous-ness permeating the cadres ofsoldiers on the ground, reinforcedby numerous ‘grey’ areas ofresponsibility for physical security,makes it even more hazardous forIDPs moving around the country.

■ Dispute over the issue of disman-tling the military High SecurityZones (HSZ)The LTTE demands the disman-tling of HSZs in the Jaffnapeninsula – a move rebuffed bythe government on securitygrounds. Although the number ofIDPs displaced from the currentHSZs is relatively small (about50,000), the issue of the HSZs hasbecome a major stumbling blockfor implementing resettlementplans in general; IDPs know frompast experience that even a minortussle between the two main par-ties to the conflict may trigger amajor conflagration. Both sideshave apparently thought it prudentto sidestep the problem and haveinformally agreed on resettlingpeople outside the security zones.

■ Inadequate protection from therisk of landmines and unex-ploded ordinance Demining must be prioritised asan essential precondition forimplementing resettlementschemes. Reportedly, about onemillion landmines have been laid

33FMR 17

Sri Lanka: on theedge of ending internaldisplacement?by Rupasingha A Ariyaratne

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in the former war-zones, and only10% of them were removed in2002. IDP community leaders saythat an international body likeUNHCR or UNICEF ought to takeresponsibility for monitoring demi-ning, with powers to declare anyarea which is not cleared of land-mines unsuitable for resettlement.

■ Lack of convincing evidence ofsustainable conditions to supportdurable return and resettlementA combination of minimum infra-structural facilities, such asshelter, water and sanitation and amodest income, is needed to sus-tain a decent lifestyle. Anambitious plan is already under-way to build new housing unitsand to repair/reconstruct damagedhouses in the former war-affectedareas. However, these wouldaccommodate less than 25% of theexisting IDP population. The pack-age of resettlement cash allowanceand dry food rations provided toresettling families is hardly ade-quate to persuade IDPs to leavethe relief centres.

Even once physical resettlementoccurs, IDPs would still be left tograpple with a number of issues:

■ Land and propertyIDPs are naturally keen to obtainrestitution or compensation inrespect of lost land and property.Property disputes, however, areknown to take an inordinately longtime to solve and therefore IDPs

do not usually make land andproperty settlement a preconditionfor returning home. Propertyissues, however, can be even moredifficult to resolve at that stage.

■ Political volatility In the absence of a political settle-ment, and because of uncertaintiesof political legitimacy, disputesrelated to the conflict occur almostdaily, sometimes provoking violentreactions from both sides. The fall-out from such squabbles invariablytends to dampen what little enthu-siasm that IDPs feel on returninghome and may upset the resettle-ment process.

■ Disinclination to returnEven under the best of conditions,and especially after a protractedperiod of displacement, some IDPstend not to want to return. These‘stayees’ are drawn from highlydisparate groups, such as thosewho are fully or partially integrat-ed with the host societies; havefound employment opportunities;did not have land/property in theareas they fled from; have boughtland/property in the south; haveyounger family members who havesettled into city life; or are trauma-tised as victims of ‘ethniccleansing’ practices.

■ Reintegration supportReintegration usually marks thelongest and, for all intents andpurposes, the final stage in the

process of ending displacement.Judging by the Sri Lankan experi-ence, the phenomenon ofsocio-economic integration is ascomplex as the causes of displace-ment. It requires internationalsupport, particularly in advocacyprogrammes and monitoringinstances of human rights viola-tions.

The spectre of displacement will ceaseto haunt the returnees as well asthose who choose not to return onlywhen the whole range of these issuesis adequately dealt with through sus-tained national and internationaleffort. While the international commu-nity has a vitally importantcontribution to make to overcome theobstacles outlined earlier, it shouldplay only a peripheral role in dealingwith the latter issues; the onus oftheir practical realisation should restwith the national authorities.However, it is not possible to fix aspecific timeframe for ending interna-tional protection and turningresponsibility entirely over to thenational authorities, because the twosets of issues are inextricably inter-twined and need to be addressed intandem and in overlapping stages.

Professor Rupasingha AAriyaratne is Senior ResearchFellow, Regional Centre forStrategic Studies, Colombo, SriLanka. Email: ari@rcss.org

34 Sri Lanka: on the edge of ending internal displacement? FMR 17

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he government’s plan con-tained no details on how thiswas going to be accomplished

other than providing three options forIDPs: i) returning them to their placeof origin, ii) empowering them in theircurrent location (i.e. integration) or iii)relocation. This new policy was greet-ed with confusion by many IDPsbecause it was announced at a timewhen people were still being dis-placed by ongoing violence in variousparts of the archipelago. The docu-ment also announced that allgovernment aid to the displacedwould cease on 31 December 2001.This led some IDPs to speculate thatit was aimed at mollifying host com-munities, many of whom werebeginning to wonder when the IDPswere going to stop receiving aid andgo home or integrate into the localcommunity.

The ethnic, religious and politicalconflicts that followed the fall of theSuharto government in 1998 havedisplaced over 1.3 million people inIndonesia. Approximately half weredisplaced as a result of the ethnic andreligious unrest in the easternIndonesian provinces of Maluku andNorth Maluku. Although many of theconflicts have stopped, many IDPshave yet to go home. The return orintegration of these IDPs remains ofparamount importance to theIndonesian government as there havebeen reports of conflicts betweenthem and host communities. Since itwas conflicts between indigenouscommunities and migrants that creat-ed many of these IDP situations, theirreturn or integration must be dealtwith properly, or regional govern-

ments will simply be sowing the seedsof future conflicts.

The halt of government support at theend of 2001 affected IDPs in differingways. A large majority were able toget by on their wages and the smallamounts of aid they received fromchurch groups or NGOs. Most IDPshad learned to cope without govern-ment aid, as corruption andmismanagement had depleted it sig-nificantly. However, those from morerural areas who lacked marketable jobskills and older IDPs unable to do themanual labour jobs available wereharder hit. Thus the policy did hastenthe return of a small percentage ofIDPs or, if they did not feel safe goinghome, simply displaced them to new,more rural communities.

Officials seemed to have a completedisregard for the situation on theground, often urging people to returnto places at the same time as newIDPs were arriving from those locales,fleeing renewed hostilities. As anincentive, the government promisedIDPs that the North Maluku govern-ment and the armed forces wouldguarantee their safety – not reassur-ing when it was the failures of thesetwo bodies that led to the their dis-placement in the first place. IDPs werealso mistrustful of their former neigh-bours who had often turned on themduring the conflict. Officials rarelytook IDP trauma into account whendiscussing their return.

The deadline has come and gone andthere are still hundreds of thousandsof IDPs in Indonesia.

Suggestions for improvingthe resolution of IDPsituations:

1. Do not address the needs of vic-tims of social conflict as though theyare victims of a natural disaster.While flood or earthquake victims canusually go back home as soon as thewater subsides or the tremors stop,IDPs from social conflict cannot. Bydemanding that IDPs go home, offi-cials contribute to the deterioration ofrelations between IDPs and host com-munities as the latter begin to thinkthat the IDPs are simply staying toexploit aid.

2. Teach regional officials and NGOworkers the basics about the socialconflict that created the IDPs withwhom they are working. Lack ofknowledge about the conflicts affectsthe ability of civil servants and NGOsto work with IDPs, particularly whentrying to assist them to return home;it also intensifies feelings of mistrustbetween IDPs, officials and NGO work-ers.

3. Encourage/require internally dis-placed civil servants to move out ofIDP camps. Their presence within IDPcamps caused a large amount ofresentment among both host commu-nities and IDPs. Research showed, thatalthough internally displaced civilservants living in the camps did facenumerous difficulties (occasionallytheir salaries were not paid), theywere generally better off than otherIDPs. Their removal from the camps,only after they have obtained paidpositions within the local government,would have been a step towardsimproving relations and freeing upaid for IDPs in greater need.

4. Set up an office to coordinate thereturn of civil servants to their origi-nal provinces. A major problem inrebuilding conflict regions has beenthe flight of civil servants, includingschool teachers. In North Sulawesimany civil servants from NorthMaluku wanted to return when the

Confusing deadlines:IDPs in Indonesia

by Christopher R Duncan

When does an IDP stop being an IDP? In Indonesiathe answer was supposed to be: on 31 December2002. This was the deadline announced in late 2001when the government released its plan describing howit would solve the ‘problem’ of the more than onemillion IDPs spread across the country.1

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fighting had stopped but were hin-dered by their need to find jobs andarrange the complicated paperwork.A coordinating office could facilitatethese transfers. District heads fromrecovering regions would submit listsof their personnel needs, to be postedin IDP camps and government offices.

5. When building resettlement sitesfor IDPs, include homes for needysegments from the host communityand provide clear and rigid guide-lines concerning eligibility. (This isalready standard policy for transmi-gration projects.) In building newhousing, the government mustprovide guidelines concern-ing who is eligible for thefree housing and the sta-tus of the housing(whether the IDPs takeownership or have‘use’ rights); thesemust be enforcedin a consistentand transparentmanner.

6. Ensure greatercoordinationbetween provincialgovernments. In theNorth Sulawesi case,there was initially onlylimited coordina-

tion between provincial governments –and chaos ensued. Boatloads ofreturning IDPs arrived in NorthMaluku without any warning, forcinglocal communities, already dealingwith thousands of IDPs, to find hous-ing and aid for more.

7. Do not focus on IDPs living incamps to the exclusion of those liv-ing outside. Government offices andNGOs (both local and international)

erroneously believedthat people

living outside camps did so becausethey were better off financially. Theyfailed to take into account the roleplayed by IDPs’ arrival dates. The firstgroups of IDPs from North Malukuwere from urban areas, consistinglargely of civil servants, merchants,and skilled labourers, most of whomfound employment in North Sulawesi.Wealthy merchants and high level offi-cials did not live in camps but someof those who could afford to live out-side the camps instead chose toremain in the camps in order toexploit the low costs of living andaccess to aid. In contrast, the finalgroups of IDPs were often from ruralareas and thus less able to find

employment. They arrived after thecamps were full; they had to renthomes and received less aidbecause they lived outside thecamps.

8. Provide IDPs with reliablesources of information. IDPs

need up-to-date informationregarding the current situation intheir former places of residence, thecurrent government programmesaimed at them and their rights asIDPs. Local NGOs should fulfill thisneed.

Christopher R Duncan, PhD, is theRAI Visiting Research Fellow inUrgent Anthropology atGoldsmiths College.

This article is based on 18 monthsof anthropological fieldwork(2001-2002) among IDPs fromNorth Maluku living in NorthSulawesi.

1. This document, titled National Policies on theHandling of Internally Displaced Persons/Refugeesin Indonesia, was released by the Minister of SocialAffairs, Yusuf Kalla.

36 Confusing deadlines: IDPs in Indonesia FMR 17C

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fter gaining independence fol-lowing the Soviet Union’sdissolution, the southern

Caucasus republics of Azerbaijan andGeorgia saw a difficult period of tran-sition characterised by internal andexternal inter-ethnic conflicts1 thatforced more than 1.44 million peopleto abandon their homes.2 The majorityof those affected became internallydisplaced, while some becamerefugees by crossing internationallyrecognised borders. By 1994 almostall the fighting had come to an end inthese conflicts, with the exception ofsporadic violations of cease-fire agree-ments and, on two occasions, briefresumption of hostilities betweenmilitias. The conflicts resulted indestruction of infrastructure, loss oflives and displacement of the majorityof the resident population in thoseparts of the countries affected by warwho were forced to abandon theirhomes due to their ethnicity. Effortsmade with assistance of the interna-tional community to find durablesolutions and bring peace have so farbeen unsuccessful.

There are some important considera-tions that are common to all of theseconflicts. Governments in both coun-tries have been supportive of their IDPpopulations, providing them assis-tance in cash and in kind. However,this support, even if it represents aburden for their state budgets, is stillinsufficient to provide dignified livingconditions for IDPs. Return of IDPs totheir place of origin is a key elementin peace negotiations since the rightto return has been sanctioned by theinternational community as one of theprinciples in finding a solution to theconflicts. However, peaceful settle-ments to these conflicts remainelusive and there is no internationalpolitical consent to use force, if neces-sary, as there was in the case ofKosovo to guarantee the right toreturn and enforce Security Councilresolutions. Prospects for early returnare difficult to assess but seem poorin the short term. As a consequence,IDPs are in a sense hostages of theirsituation since their political leadersconsider them instrumental for peacenegotiations. Furthermore, IDPs can-not benefit from the same rights as

other citizens, such as the right tovote in local elections.

In both countries, the majority of thepopulation is living below the povertyline. Independent surveys have foundthat IDPs are not significantly morevulnerable to poverty than the rest ofthe local population. However, as aresult of limitations on the exercise oftheir rights, for instance as regardsaccess to cultivable land and access tocredit, poverty alleviation is particu-larly difficult for IDPs. The govern-ments, with the support of the inter-national community, are in variousstages of preparation of integratedstrategies to promote economic devel-opment to halve poverty.

In Azerbaijan and Georgia, effortshave been made to convert IDPs froma ‘burden’ on the state budget intodevelopment actors. Without renounc-ing their right to return, they shouldnot be denied the opportunity to buildfor themselves a comfortable and dig-nified life in their place ofdisplacement. The key for develop-ment is promotion of economicself-sufficiency by giving IDPs accessto jobs, land, proper shelter, health,education, credit and infrastructure.It is necessary to recognise that IDPshave the same rights and thereforeshould enjoy the same opportunitiesavailable to all other citizens. Both inBaku and Tbilisi, this idea was promot-ed by UNHCR, UNDP and the WorldBank, and has gained the governments’agreement and donors’ support. Trustfunds were established to financeinitiatives originating from the IDPsthemselves for innovative projectsdesigned to generate employment,improve living conditions and helpIDPs escape hardship. These projectsshould also facilitate IDPs’ integrationin host communities and benefit thesecommunities as a whole.

In both countries, these approachesare already integrated into govern-ment programmes to promoteeconomic development as part ofcomprehensive strategies that recog-nise IDPs’ needs and their potentialcontribution to the national economy.It is recognised that the more self-reliant IDPs become, the less they will

represent a burden both while dis-placed and when finally able to returnto their original homes. Meanwhile,the IDPs’ contribution to the develop-ment of their country will emergefrom the underground economy,where it is mostly relegated, to findrecognition and support.

This process in Azerbaijan andGeorgia has had its difficulties buthas already demonstrated that analternative exists to treating IDPssolely as recipients of humanitarianassistance. In fact, if a lesson could belearned, humanitarian programmesshould have been phased out earlierin order to assist IDPs to participatefully and on an equal in the economicdevelopment of their countries, all thewhile ensuring assistance for thosewho still need it. Less dependencywould have been created and govern-ment subsidies and donor aid couldhave been utilised more effectivelyand transparently. In both countries,the process of designing povertyreduction strategies is offering govern-ments an opportunity to consider IDPs’development as an integral part ofefforts to improve living conditions forall citizens. International efforts todefend IDP rights, particularly theGuiding Principles, have oriented thegovernments’ and donors’ thinkingtoward the same approach.

The southern Caucasus experienceindicates that when large-scale dis-placement occurs, the internationalcommunity and governments shouldnot only provide emergency assistancebut also immediately begin to integrateassistance to IDPs within existing andfuture development plans. In this way,dependence will be minimised andIDPs will have better opportunities tocope with their trauma with greaterself-sufficiency and in a more dignifiedand sustainable manner.

Marco Borsotti is currently UNResident Coordinator and UNDPResident Representative inAzerbaijan; he had the same posi-tion in Georgia 1996-2001. Email: Marco.Borsotti@undp.org

1. In Azerbaijan the conflict was for control ofNagorno Karabakh, while in Georgia the conflictswere for control of Abkhazia and Tskhinvali.2. See Global IDP Database at www.idpproject.org

The southern Caucasusexperience

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Iraq: dilemmas in contingencyplanning

by Clare Graham

his article asks: if contingencyplanning is both standardpractice and an intrinsic duty

of humanitarian agencies, what werethe sources of tension over preparingfor an Iraqi crisis and what are theimplications for any effectiveresponse?

Participation in a controver-sial crisis?

Although contingency planningshould be an integral part of the workof any humanitarian agency, the pri-mary issue to confront planners forIraq was the pressure not to engageovertly. In contrast to the war onAfghanistan, there was little supportfor a pre-emptive US-led militaryattack and appeals to the UN resultedin bitter international disputes. As wellas wishing to maintain the faith of theinternational community in weaponinspections and its Security Council, itwas imperative for the UN to maintaindialogue with the Iraqi governmentand to avoid fuelling any speculationthat it was resigned to war.

UN humanitarian programmes had towork within these confines.Additional constraints stemmed fromthe presence of on-going operationsin Iraq and the surrounding region.The Kuwaiti government, for example,was worried that talk of preparationswould act as a pull factor for poten-tial refugees. Aid agencies withinKuwait were consequently reluctant todisclose details of their own plans forfear of upsetting the authorities.Whilst the fear of sparking refugeemovements may stem from a misun-derstanding of contingency planning,the UK-based Iraqi Refugee AidCouncil reported rumours of suppliesat the Kuwaiti border to be an indica-tion of the direction in which peoplewould move. The political questionwas therefore how to ensure that anyplanning, locally or elsewhere, would

not be misconstrued as aprediction of an emer-gency. As rumoursspiralled, the UN was keento stress that contingencyplanning was standard –not exceptional – practiceand that no predictionscould be drawn fromeither the content or thetiming of its governmen-tal briefings.

Every humanitarian organ-isation has a duty to plan.With a long lead-in timefor pre-positioning sup-plies and physicalpreparations on theground, the requirementto plan came also from practical con-siderations. This is a lesson learntfrom bitter experience. In the 1991Gulf War, the numbers of refugeesfleeing the US-led air campaign weremuch smaller than predicted but no-one foresaw the mass exodusfollowing the subsequent crushing ofinsurgencies within Iraq. During theSpring of 1991, more than 500 Iraqisa day died from exposure, hunger andillness in the remote border regionsof Turkey and Iran – a consequence ofweather conditions, difficulties ingaining access and the unprepared-ness of agencies, authorities anddonors. Mindful that the internationalcommunity is unforgiving to thosewho are taken by surprise, the UNbegan contingency planning for Iraqas early as February 2002 and pre-positioning of supplies towards theend of the year.

Planning in uncertainty

The events which forced the currentcrisis – and the added complicationsof the Kurdish issue, the alleged pres-ence of nuclear, chemical andbiological weapons, and the effect ofsustained economic sanctions – led to

an unprecedented state of uncertain-ty. Iraq’s prolonged pariah status andthe limited NGO presence within Iraqadded to the speculation, which ispart of any contingency planning, asagencies proposed varying scenariosand attempted to put appropriateresponse systems in place. Theabsence of insight from local NGOsand the political limitations of plan-ning in country both hindered plans.The information available pointed toserious concerns surrounding theeffect of conflict on an extremely vul-nerable population already affectedby a decade of war and 12 years ofsanctions and largely dependent onfood rations under the Oil for Foodprogramme.

In contrast, the variations in displace-ment scenarios were informative onlyas an expression of all the imponder-ables involved. In mid-February, theUnder-Secretary-General forHumanitarian Affairs cited a ‘mediumcase’ scenario, under which 2 millionpeople could become internally dis-placed with a potential exodus of600,000 to 1.45 million people. At theoutset of war it was widely assumedthat most of Iraq’s 25 million peoplehad at least six weeks of rations and

The crisis in Iraq exemplifies the dilemmasinherent in contingency planning that facetoday’s humanitarian community.

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39FMR 17 Iraq: dilemmas in contingency planning

would sit tight, security permitting. Planning for displacement is compli-cated by more than the questions of‘how many?’, ‘where to?’ and ‘howfast?’. Even days after the militarycampaign was underway, it was stillnot known who the lead agency forinternal displacement would be.Furthermore, accurate assessments ofthe scale of need in internally dis-placed situations cannot take place ifconflict makes access hazardous.Once borders are crossed, displace-ment becomes more visible yet morepolitical. UNHCR took the lower num-ber of potential refugees as itsworking figure and preparations inneighbouring countries proceeded onthat basis. UNHCR’s main concern isalways to keep borders open. Theneed for this in terms of security,shelter and assistance is well docu-mented. When nearly 400,000 KosovarAlbanians fled during the first twoweeks of the NATO bombing cam-paign in 1999, Macedonia wasseverely criticised for barring refugeeentry and aid agency access. In oneincident 70,000 people waiting at theborder were reported missing, raisingconcerns of their use as humanshields.

Upholding the fundamental principlesof non-refoulement and access to ter-ritory is always anunrelenting diplo-matic challenge.AmongstIraq’s neigh-

bours, Iran is the only full signatoryto the 1951 Convention. However,Syria was the first and, for a while,only country to publicly announcethat it would accept refugees. InFebruary, Iran rejected the option ofsheltering refugees, preferring transitcamps or camps within Iraqi territory.It promised to open its borders butonly on a very limited basis, restrict-ing access to those in ‘physicaldanger’. Jordan also relented inFebruary but remained ambivalent. Itcommitted itself to keeping its bor-ders open. However at the same timeit also announced it was turning backthousands of ‘ordinary’ Iraqis andonly welcoming better-off Iraqis com-ing for business or investment.

The primary responsibility forrefugees falls to the governments ofhost countries but Iraq’s neighboursare still coping with the political andeconomical aftermath of the 1991Gulf War. Iran received 1.3 millionrefugees, 200,000 of whom stillremain in the country in addition tomore than 2 million Afghans – eachcosting an estimated $674 a year toaccommodate, with only $6 of thatcoming from international aid.Persuading Iraq’s neighbours to offer

effective protection requires thepromise of wider support by the inter-national community. In the event ofmassive outflows and a prolongedconflict this could require resettle-ment programmes as well as funds.Turkey, though a signatory to the1951 Refugee Convention, is the onlycountry in the world to maintain itsso-called ‘geographical limitation’ tocover European asylum seekers only.This means Iraqis in Turkey canreceive only temporary protection andmust be resettled. Yet in Kuwait thereare already over 3,000 Iraqi refugeesfrom the previous conflict still seek-ing this very option. The situationfaced by local humanitarian agencieswas summed up by the head of theKuwait Red Crescent Society: to leaverefugees in camps is inhumane – tolet refugees live amongst the localpopulation is “dangerous”.

One thing that planners could safelyassume was that the main determi-nant of any humanitarian emergencywould be the duration and intensityof war. Once again, however, thespecifics of the Iraq crisis exacerbatedpotential perils. There are several sce-narios in which aid agencies, bothinter- and non-governmental, statedthey could not operate and would beforced to withdraw international staff.Given the ethnic divisions within Iraqand the Kurdish issue in particular,internal disorder resulting from a mil-itary attack could destabilise theentire region. Aid agencies have alsostated that they are not equipped tooperate in the event of

Displaced IraqiKurds return home –in 1991 – after thefirst war with Iraq.

UN

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chemical and biological warfare.

Since the gassing of Kurdish civiliansin Halabja in 1988, the Kurdish popu-lation and the internationalhumanitarian community have madesome preparations against futureattacks but neither have had theresources to go beyond simple train-ing, stockpiling, makeshift sealing ofbuildings and snatched vaccinationprogrammes. Either developmentwould introduce a further set ofunknowns which might lead to a sce-

nario where humanitarian agenciesfelt unable to operate.

Planning in an increasinglypoliticised humanitarianspace

Following the passing of Resolution1441, calls for greater openness in UNand governmental planning intensi-fied. The difference in opinion on howopen the dialogue has been andshould be reflects the divide betweenthose for and those against war, withthe UN caught in between. Supportersof secrecy point to military necessi-ties. Their opponents are fearful oflimitations to effective inter-agencyresponse and a greater freedom beingafforded the military in humanitarianassistance.

While the possibility of UN-sanctionedforce still existed, NGOs remainedunsure of their role and the accept-ability and timing of engagement. Asplanning developed from contingencyto post-conflict, the uncertainty of therole of humanitarians increased. InFebruary it was reported that the USmilitary planned to handle initialhumanitarian relief efforts and thengradually hand over responsibilities tothe UN and other aid organisations.The US NGO network, Interaction,expressed its concerns over the lead-ership role designated to the military.Pointing to their own principles ofneutrality, impartiality and indepen-dence, UK NGOs indicated theirunwillingness to operate where theauthorities of an occupying powerwere not accepted by the population.

It is clear that the Iraq crisis reflectsyet another shift in the trend towardsa blurring of humanitarian and mili-

tary space. From providing purelylogistical support and security in theaftermath of the 1991 Gulf War, thearmed forces’ role in humanitarianoperations has since increased signifi-cantly. NATO’s lead in refugeeprotection in Kosovo brought militaryand humanitarian action to a politicalcrossroads. The path since has seenthe controversial emergence ofDisaster Assistance Response Teams‘embedded’ in the US military alreadyoperational in Afghanistan andplanned for Iraq.

Ashumani-tarianaction

becomes increasingly politicised, thehumanitarian community is demand-ing greater UN leadership. Thechallenges of this changing worldorder are diverse and require discus-sion in their own right. Theimplications for contingency planningfor Iraq may be reflected in levels ofpreparedness. At the outset of con-flict USAID was apparently ready. TheNGO community repeated that itlacked the resources or information toprepare for anything but the widely-held and optimistic scenario of aquick campaign. As the military cam-paign did not come under UNauspices, this modified the appeals ofthe NGO community. The DisastersEmergency Committee, representing12 UK-based NGOs, announced that itwould fundraise and operate onlyunder the banner of the UN.

However, the UN itself remainedunder-funded. In February an appealfor $123 million was made to fundthe preparedness of nine agencies,including $60 million for UNHCR tocover plans in the region for an initialmonth. A week after war had startedand with few reported refugees,UNHCR had received only $25 million.The US was the first country to pub-licly announce funding for UNHCRcontingency plans. Donor countriesoutside the coalition were only everlikely to respond when conflict hadbegun and an emergency was uponthem. Opponents to war were reluc-tant to fund at all. Germany andFrance opposed EU funding for ahumanitarian situation they perceivedas the responsibility of occupyingpowers.

For the humanitarian community,effective response demands availabili-

ty of standby resources and there arevery real worries that agencies willhave to divert funds from emergen-cies elsewhere in order to achieve aminimal level of preparedness. UNagencies may have to borrow frominternal reserves, divert funds fromother emergencies or simply wait forfunding. NGOs face similar fundingdifficulties, also knowing that themoney may not be available from anysource until the emergency hasalready started.

Implications for an effectiveresponse

The threat of conflict in Iraq present-ed many unknowns for contingencyplanners. The only certainty was thatconflict would deepen an alreadyexisting humanitarian emergency.The ability to prepare thoroughlywas impeded by a lack of information,coordination and funds as well as thethreat of chemical and biological war-fare. All compounded the potentialeffectiveness of a humanitarianresponse. However, the greatestconstraint was the web of politicaltensions surrounding Iraq.

Now, as everyone watches the crisisin Iraq unfold to find out who hasguessed best, less is being learnedfrom – and less support given to –emergencies elsewhere. Although anyfuture emergency will present adifferent set of uncertainties andconstraints, the nature of both theconflict in Iraq and the humanitarianresponse may well warn contingencyplanners of the changing role theiragencies will be expected to play infuture emergencies. Whether plannersfeel this role will allow them torespond effectively is another matter.

Clare Graham is PublicInformation Assistant atUNHCR, London. Email: GRAHAM@unhcr.ch

The views expressed here are herown and the discussion is basedsolely on publicly available infor-mation.

1. House of Commons International DevelopmentCommittee Preparing for the HumanitarianConsequences of Possible Military Action AgainstIraq, Fourth Report for Session 2002-03 Vol 1, p.8;UNHCR The Iraq Emergency – An Uncertain Crisiswww.unhcr.ch

40 Iraq: dilemmas in contingency planning FMR 17

the Iraq crisis reflects yet another shift in the trendtowards a blurring of humanitarian and military space.

41FMR 17

omen from Burma who livein the camps along the Thai-Burma border are

increasingly coming into contact withthe concept and practice of women’shuman rights. For many women,learning about rights is a significantpart in the process of recognisingexperiences of injustice and accessingremedies or protection. While levelsof awareness are increasing, however,the effects of such change are limitedto the women themselves. Indeed,among the women we spoke with,there was a recognition that adoptinga human rights framework could bedetrimental to women, placing themat risk of family and community dis-approval. In addition, as the womenare without legal status in relation tothe Thai state, the primary depen-dence of human rights mechanismson the nation state for the realisationof human rights further diminishestheir usefulness as a means of reme-dy or protection.

Domestic violence in camps

Many of the women we spoke withidentified domestic violence againstwomen in the camps as an issue ofserious concern.1 As women’s organi-sations have become more establishedand a greater number of women havebecome involved in activism withinthe camp communities, they havesought to create a multi-faceted seriesof interventions to address domesticviolence, involving the individuals andthe camp committees.

At the level of the individual, many ofthe women we spoke with discussedthe ways in which learning and talk-ing about human rights increased

their confidence to speak out aboutbehaviour they considered unfair orunjust:

It tells you what is wrong and thenwhat is not right, and then you alsoknow that you can express what’sright, that your rights were beingviolated.

Learning about human rights andrecognising that women have humanrights challenged the way women andmen in camps thought about domes-tic violence:

[F]or example, in the camp we havesome case, it is domestic violence. …at the beginning we think the womenare not good. So yes, the husbandshould beat, like that. Now we changethe opinion.

As awareness of the incidence ofdomestic violence increased andwomen’s organisations brought theissue into the open, other strategiesbecame possible, including establish-ing huts in the camp that womencould go to when they needed toescape violence. In particular, womenstressed the importance of women’sorganisations having a physical pres-ence in the camps and being availableto help women talk with their hus-bands about why their behaviour iswrong:

So also they, they call both husbandand wife and they explain them aboutnot hitting like this. We are humanbeing, the same human being and notto hurt each other.

Moreover, women’s organisationshave begun to demand more compre-hensive responses from the section

leaders or camp committees, includ-ing the involvement of women indecision-making structures. Onewoman noted that even if the govern-ment failed to implement humanrights treaty obligations, the fact thatwomen know about them has changedthe way they interact with their localcommunities:

We can also compare what the leadersshould do or they should not do, so itmakes more understanding of whatthe state should do to the women...

Identifying domestic violence as ahuman rights violation empowersboth individual and collective actionand contributes to the eradication ofthe practice. It is no longer dependenton individual women taking isolatedaction.

Domestic violence in inter-national law

Domestic violence has had a fractiousrelationship with international humanrights law. While throughout the1990s women’s human rights activistsloudly proclaimed that violenceagainst women is a human rights vio-lation, the political players at the UNwere less convinced. The 1993Declaration on the Elimination ofViolence Against Women deliberatelydid not name violence against womenas a human rights violation, choosingrather to elaborate a series of rightswhich were detrimentally affected bysuch violence.2 More recently, theBeijing Plus Five outcomes documentcharacterises violence against womenas a human rights issue, recognisingthat violence against women perpe-trated by state actors is a humanrights violation.3 However, the nego-tiators resisted the argument thatthere is a state responsibility toensure the human rights of all indi-viduals in their territory. This notion –‘due diligence’ – requires that statestake concrete steps to respect, protectand fulfil all human rights obligations.

Domestic violence on the Thai-Burma border: international humanrights implications

by Caroline Lambert and Sharon Pickering

This article focuses on domestic violence against womenliving in camps, highlighting both the potential and thelimitations of human rights standards in bringingchange to women’s lives.

W

Any act of violence against women,including domestic violence, thereforeconstitutes a violation of humanrights if a state has failed to imple-ment programmes and legislationwhich work towards the eradication ofdomestic violence in their community.

The central point of contention is thedifferent status accorded to acts per-petrated by state and non-state actorswithin human rights law. Humanrights law is predicated on theaccountability of the state: realisationof rights and remedies for violationsare mediated through state mecha-nisms. So while the gendereddimensions of state-sponsored vio-lence against women have beenrecognised (for example in the recog-nition of rape as a war crime withininternational humanitarian law), theissue of violence perpetrated by non-state actors remains contested. At alegal level the Committee on theElimination of Discrimination AgainstWomen (CEDAW) has clearly elaborat-ed the nature of states parties’ legalobligations with respect to the eradi-cation of violence against women; theCommittee recognises that violenceagainst women is a form of discrimi-nation and that states parties toCEDAW have therefore an obligationto eliminate violence against womenas part of their legal duties owedunder the treaty.

Limitations

The state-centric focus remains asignificant impediment to the use ofhuman rights, particularly in relationto domestic violence for women inmany locations around the world.This issue is compounded for womenliving along the Thai-Burma border.Around the world domestic violenceis perpetrated by an individual withvarying levels of censure by the com-munity and by the state. Within ahuman rights framework, however, theonly entity with clear account- abilityfor human rights violations is thestate. Therefore, while women mayexperience a level of personal empow-erment, they remain dependent uponbroader community acceptance ofequality between men and women andtheir equal entitlement to the realisa-tion of human rights.

Even when women are able to raiseissues of human rights with their hus-bands, if their husband rejects themthere is very little recourse for the

women, particularly if they are fright-ened of further violence or economichardship or community disapproba-tion:

Probably with some of the womenleaders they are quite assertive andthey can discuss these things with theirhusbands, but only telling them. But toreally do something against it, I stillcannot see.

The challenge for women remains thatthe views of their husbands very oftenreflect the dominant views of thecommunity that domestic violence is aprivate issue between family mem-bers. While the requirement to takesteps to change such attitudes is anobligation under CEDAW and thePlatform for Action, for women livingalong the Thai-Burma border it is verydifficult to identify the state whichbears responsibility. Both Burma andThailand have signed CEDAW, whichrequires that states parties take mea-sures to eradicate all forms ofdiscrimination against women, includ-ing violence. But it is almostimpossible to hold the authorities inBurma accountable – and most of thewomen activists along the border donot recognise the military junta inBurma as a legitimate government.The Thai government imposes strictrestrictions on individuals living inrefugee camps and local police offi-cials have an antagonistic relationshipwith those living in the camp. Womenfrom camps and migrant workershave reported violence perpetratedagainst them by Thai law enforcementofficers and the Women’s League ofBurma has argued that such violenceis often treated with impunity.4 Sowhile the provisions of CEDAWshould extend to all those living in aterritory, in practice women faceextreme difficulty in accessing themechanisms of the Thai state.

In place of the formal apparatus ofthe state, the camp committees takeon a de facto state role – notably inthe distribution of food and healthcare and the provision of education.Many women noted that the CampCommittee, often dominated by men,fails to take the issue of domestic vio-lence seriously. While women may goto the camp committee to discusswomen’s human rights, the formallegal mechanisms of the UN humanrights treaty system again fall short inaddressing the most influential organ-isational entity in women’s lives. In

preparing their Shadow Report5 forthe CEDAW Committee, women fromBurma stressed their frustration overthe inability to address the actions orinaction of the camp committees.

UNHCR has observer status in the 14camps along the border. An importantnext step for our research is to exam-ine the ways in which UNHCR isengaging with such issues. Onewoman who lived in a camp and wasinvolved in women’s organising dis-cussed with us the difficulties womenface in bringing the issue of domesticviolence to the attention of externalagencies, including UNHCR. She talkedabout the practice of UNHCR andNGOs coming into the camp and talk-ing to the camp committees but nottalking to women.

Conclusion

Discussion of international humanrights has brought a number of gainsfor women living in the camps on theThai-Burma border, particularly relat-ing to increasing women’s individualand shared empowerment. However,these gains are significantly chal-lenged by the lack of state responsib-ility. There is a need for NGOs and UNagencies to take a stronger and clearerrole in relation to issues of domesticviolence, and be made more account-able for both the camps and the levelsof domestic violence in the camps.

Caroline Lambert works in theDepartment of Criminology,University of Melbourne,Australia. Email:cmlambert@optus net.com.au.

Sharon Pickering is Lecturer,Criminal Justice and Criminology,Monash University, Australia.Email: sharon.pickering@arts.monash.edu.au.

1. They also referred to sexual violence perpetrat-ed by agents of the SLORC/SPDC and violenceagainst undocumented women living and workingin Thailand.2. Declaration on the Elimination of ViolenceAgainst Women, UN Document A/Res/48/104,February 23, 1994.3. Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Wholeof the 23rd Special Session of the GeneralAssembly 2000, UN Document A/S-23/10/Rev.1,paragraph 13.4. Ibid, 30.5. A Shadow Report is an alternative account of acountry's performance under CEDAW submitted byNGOs.

42 Domestic violence on the Thai-Burma border: international human rights implications FMR 17

43FMR 17

he focus of this debate hasbeen the ‘minimum standards’of the Sphere project but that

debate is now expanding to one on‘quality assurance’ of relief/humani-tarian action.1 One of the questionsbeing asked is whether the Spherestandards are indeed a central tool indetermining whether humanitarianaid has achieved ‘quality’.

This debate on standards follows anearlier one on principles which goesback to the formulation of the 1994Code of Conduct for the Red Crossand NGOs in disaster relief. This Codeof Conduct in particular has beenmost influential in international NGOcircles, inspiring a number of fieldlevel codes of conduct, notably theJoint Policy of Operations in Liberia,the Sierra Leone Code of Conduct andthe Principles of Engagement forEmergency Humanitarian Assistancein the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Thanks to dissemination, advocacy,training and follow up among and byinternational NGOs, the Sphere stan-dards and the Red Cross and NGOCode of Conduct have achieved centrestage position in the awareness ofmany organisations, includingWestern donor administrations andsome UN agencies.

Supporting roles: interna-tional legal instruments

Although staff and associates of theSphere project emphasise that theSphere Charter is as important as the‘minimum standards’, the reality isthat the technical delivery minimumstandards are better known and moreactively used by aid workers than theCharter with its very brief referencesto the Refugee Convention, HumanRights Law and InternationalHumanitarian Law. While the RefugeeConvention may be a daily reference

for UNHCR, for example, it is neitherwell known nor regularly used byinternational NGOs (often the opera-tional partners of UNHCR) – hence thecreation of the Reach Out project tofamiliarise aid workers across theglobe with the Refugee Convention.2

The Convention on the Rights of theChild (CRC) is a daily reference for anorganisation such as UNICEF andsome child-focused NGOs such as theSave the Children Alliance. It has alsobeen actively used to inspire the‘ground rules’ that Operation LifelineSudan in 1995-96 negotiated with thefactions in southern Sudan. But theCRC is certainly not as actively advo-cated, used or referred to in NGO anddonor circles as Sphere and the Codeof Conduct.

The situation therefore seems to beone whereby legal instruments, rati-fied by many if not most states in theworld, seem to have less prominencein NGO circles than two yardsticksdeveloped by NGOs but with no legalstatus.

Broadening our perspective

There is a much wider range of rele-vant yardsticks or benchmarks thatcan – and sometimes must – be usedto plan, review or ‘judge’ the qualityof a performance and to hold agenciesto account. These yardsticks have dif-ferent status. The challenge formanagers, monitors, reviewers andevaluators is to more consciously con-sider the range of possible bench-marks, including those that are oblig-atory because of their legal status,and to choose those that seem mostrelevant in a given context.

The numbered table overleaf shows therange of benchmarks and indicatessome of the organisations or inter-agency projects that have developedthe instrument or actively guard and/or

promote it. Note that the variousreferences have a different status.Some are inscribed in law while mostare not. An organisation is not obligedto accept an inter-agency benchmarkand some are of the view that they areonly bound by legal references andtheir own internal yardsticks.

1. International and national legalreferences: These spell outrights and obligations. Of partic-ular relevance here is theconstitution of a country. Whiletypically little known to the over-whelming majority of people, aconstitution spells out rights andobligations within the nationalframework. In certain circum-stances, it can possibly be amore powerful tool for advocacyand accountability in the countrywhere humanitarian action takesplace than an international con-vention or an interagency ‘code’.

2. National policy framework:National policy may be perceivedby some as inappropriate in cer-tain crisis situations, or evencounter-productive, but it ispreferable that aid agenciesargue their case with the nationalauthorities rather than simplybypass them. The latter practiceundermines the credibility oflocal authorities and also con-tributes to the perceivedconfusion of roles and responsi-bilities that aid agencies thensubsequently lament.

3. Inter-agency references: Somerefer to rights and principles.As such they have no formallegal status but are fairly widelyaccepted. They can be given amore authoritative status by thenational authorities. Some coun-tries, like Colombia, haveincorporated the GuidingPrinciples on InternalDisplacement into national law.Uganda has used them to devel-op a National Policy Frameworkon Internal Displacement.

Benchmarks and yardsticks forhumanitarian action: broadening the picture

by Koenraad Van Brabant

A serious debate has developed in recent years withregard to ‘standards’ for humanitarian action.

T

44 Benchmarks and yardsticks for humanitarian action: broadening the picture FMR 17

4. A series of other guidelines, devel-oped on an inter-agency basis,refer more to good practices.

5. Each organisation also has aseries of internal references,ranging from mission and valuesstatements to policy statementsand practical manuals, which ithas developed internally andagainst which it can plan, moni-tor and review its performance.

6. Finally, there are situationalreferences that can be used asyardsticks: project agreements(with donors but also withintended beneficiaries), opera-tional plans, etc.

Responding to the earth-quake in Gujarat, India

As with previous evaluations, the UK’sDisasters Emergency Committee eval-uated the response of British NGOs tothe earthquake in Gujarat in terms ofthe Red Cross and NGO Code ofConduct and the Sphere standards.3

When the ACT network4 evaluated itsIndian members’ response to thesame disaster, it asked them whichreferences and benchmarks theythought were most relevant. Althoughaware of the Code and the Spherestandards, they first pointed to legal-political benchmarks such as theIndian constitution, the Panchayat RajAct, the Juvenile Justice Act, the LandAcquisition Act and the Disability Act.Secondly, they drew attention to poli-cy frameworks. Of great significancewere the various policies developed bythe Gujarat state authorities withregard to compensation to disastervictims and the adoption of villagesrequiring reconstruction. Also relevantwas the Indian Relief Code. Drawn upin the 19th century, it is widely seenas outdated and, because of its focuson drought and famine, inappropriatefor cyclone or earthquake risk anddisaster management – but it is stillan active reference for the Indian pub-lic administration in the managementof any disaster. So far, lobbyingefforts for it to be updated have nothad any impact. Thirdly, for technicalstandards, they would consult not theSphere handbook but the IndiaStandards Code Book, which includes,for example, specifications on earth-quake-resistant building.

In short, for these Indian actors oper-ating in an environment where thereis a functioning state that has accept-ed its responsibility for disastermanagement, it is much more relevantto work with, and try to improve,national and/or state laws, policiesand standards than to refer to vaguerinternational ones which have nolegal clout.

Resettlement and rehabilita-tion in Sierra Leone

A key benchmark, first developed in1997 and recognised by internationalNGOs, was the Code of Conduct forHumanitarian Agencies in SierraLeone. This was inspired by thePrinciples and Protocols forHumanitarian Operations developedin 1995 in Liberia and can be seen asone of the field-level translations ofthe 1994 Red Cross and NGO Code ofConduct. Various respondents in aninter-agency survey conducted for theHumanitarian Accountability Projectreferred to it as an active benchmarkfor their organisational conduct.5

However, by January 2002, itappeared that many newly arrivedinternational NGOs seemed to havelost interest in the Code.6 This wassurprising given that there had recent-ly been intensive dissemination of theCode, albeit targeted at armed groupssuch as the army and policy and theUN peace keepers rather than at aidorganisations. Sphere standards werealso fairly well known and usedamong the international NGOs inSierra Leone. But while internationalhuman rights organisations such asHuman Rights Watch in Sierra Leoneactively refer (in their reports and lob-bying) to international human rightslaw and national legislation, and evensometimes to international humanitar-ian law, the focus on a Code mainlydeveloped by international NGOs andon the Sphere standards preventedrecognition by aid agencies of otherhighly relevant standards.

One of these might be the Constitut-ion of Sierra Leone7 which spells outthe rights of citizens and the respon-sibilities of the state. Another one,highly relevant in the Sierra Leonecontext, would have been the GuidingPrinciples on Internal Displacement,which few agencies actively seemed towork with. A policy document such asthe Resettlement Strategy of the

National Commission forReconstruction, Resettlement andRehabilitation (October 2001) shouldhave been a central reference. Internalagency benchmarks could also beapplicable. Some of these would begeneric, such as the agency’s missionand value statement, while otherswould be context-bound. Examples ofcontext-bound references that canserve as yardsticks would have beenUNHCR’s ‘Plan of Operation:Repatriation and Reintegration ofSierra Leonean Refugees’ (September2001) or a written project agreementbetween an aid organisation and itsintended beneficiaries.

Interestingly enough, a major aspectof the reaction of the aid organisa-tions in Sierra Leone to the ‘sexualabuse’ report of UNHCR/SC-UK hasbeen to develop another benchmark:Standards of Accountability to theCommunity and Beneficiaries for allHumanitarian and DevelopmentWorkers in Sierra Leone. But this isagain an inter-agency product with nolegal status and does not make anyreference to legal obligations in thehome country where agencies are reg-istered or in the host country.

Crisis-affected people themselves mayalso hold benchmarks, perhaps moreimplicit than explicit. Conversations inSierra Leone show that affected peo-ple value an agency that ‘keeps itsword’, that acts with transparency,with whom there can be sufficientlyregular contact and whose staff arenot arrogant but ready to listen and totreat people with dignity.

One significant problem is that theaffected people are often not – or notwell enough – informed about bench-marks so cannot themselves act asmonitors or watchdogs. As organisa-tions in Sierra Leone not only want toprovide material relief and rehabilita-tion assistance but also promote goodgovernance, which includes greateraccountability, it seems they are miss-ing here an opportunity to lead byexample. That point seems to havebeen understood in the wake of theUNHCR/SC-UK report, as it is report-edly the intention to widelydisseminate the Standards ofAccountability for aid personnelbehaviour among the Sierra Leoneanpeople. Yet few agencies have anyprogrammes to inform ordinary SierraLeonean citizens about their constitu-tional rights and their rights under

international and national law, and totrain local people in basic legal aid.

In – provisional – conclusion

Because the Red Cross and NGO codeand the Sphere project have received somuch attention, at least from interna-tional NGOs, there is a real risk thatother standard-setting benchmarks oryardsticks come to be seen as lessimportant. That would not only be amethodological mistake; it would alsobe a strategic political mistake becauseit gives the impression that (internation-al) ‘NGO products’ are more importantthan state-developed legal standards.Moreover, NGOs have generally beenvery reluctant to allow any authority toexercise oversight over their adherenceto certain principles and codes of con-duct.8 So, in practice, the unintendedeffect is to replace ‘hard law’ with weak-er instruments. This undermines ratherthan strengthens the rule of law.

Mainstreaming the use of benchmarksin humanitarian action and relief workis a task of management. They may beencouraged to do so if monitors, evalu-ators and authorities exercisingoversight start using a wider variety ofbenchmarks, not simply referring auto-matically to some well-propagated onesbut choosing those that are actuallymandatory and/or relevant. It would berefreshing to see programmes evaluat-ed, for example, against the CRC, theGuiding Principles on InternalDisplacement and even an agency’s val-ues. This could only increase theagency’s credibility, legitimacy andaccountability.

Koenraad Van Brabant is aResearch Fellow at the DisasterStudies Programme, University ofWageningen, Netherlands. Email: koenraadvan@yahoo.co.uk

1. See for example ‘Enhancing the Quality ofHumanitarian Action. Conference proceedings’, TheHague, Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs: (www.hap-geneva.org/pdf/La%20Hague%20conference%20Proceedings.pdf) 2. See www.reachout.ch/3. See www.dec.org.uk4. See www.act-intl.org5. See Van Brabant ‘Promoting Transparency andAccountability. The Humanitarian AccountabilityProject fieldwork in Sierra Leone (November 2001-May 2002)’, 2002, Geneva, HAP (www.hapgeneva.org)6. Interview with member of Code of Conduct com-mittee.7. See www.sierra-leone.org/documents.html.8. The inter-agency Code of Conduct committee inSierra Leone, e.g. only had an advocacy and advisoryrole. Donors were represented on it but reportedlydid not make adherence to the Code a criterion infunding decisions. The rejecting of any effectiveauthority for the Committee even went so far that nomeeting minutes were produced.

45FMR 17 Benchmarks and yardsticks for humanitarian action: broadening the picture

■ International Human rights Law

■ International Humanitarian Law

■ 1951 Refugee Convention

■ Convention on the Rights of the Child

■ Laws of Country of Association

■ Constitution of country of operation

■ Laws of country of operation

■ Disaster policy and management framework

■ Sectoral policies

■ Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement

■ Red Cross and NGO Code of Conduct

■ People-In-Aid Code

■ Guidelines for the Protection of Refugee Women

■ Guidelines on Older People in Disasters

and Humanitarian Crises

■ Good Practice Reviews

■ Sphere sectoral standards

■ Local Capacities for Peace

■ Coordination on protocol

■ Values and principles

■ Policies and procedures

■ Code of personal conduct

■ Sectoral manuals

■ Operational plans

■ Project agreements

1. LEGAL OBLIGATIONS

UNHCHRICRCUNHCR (Reach Out)Sphere CharterUNICEF

2. NATIONAL POLICY FRAMEWORK

3. INTER-AGENCY REFERENCES ON RIGHTS & PRINCIPLES

Global IDP ProjectDEC (UK)

4. INTER-AGENCY GUIDELINES FOR GOOD PRACTICE

PIA

UNHCR

HelpAge

HPN

Sphere

LCP Project

Interaction

5. INTERNAL REFERENCES

6. SITUATIONAL REFERENCES

46 FMR 17

s such, it covers a culturaltransitional area with the pop-ulation divided between

Arab-Berbers to the north and blackAfricans to the south. Mauritania isone of the least developed nations inthe world. Legal and social infrastruc-ture remains rudimentary. Politicalpower and economic wealth is concen-trated in the hands of a few. WhileMauritania only recently has come tobe regarded as a stable country for itsown nationals, it has now becomehost to a relatively significant numberof refugees from a variety of sub-Saharan countries.

The majority of urban refugees inNouakchott, the Mauritanian capital,are from Sierra Leone. They began toarrive in 1997 at a time when UNHCRwas about to close its office followingthe conclusion of its voluntary repa-triation scheme for Malian refugees.Since then, the refugee population hasbeen steadily increasing with 50-100new arrivals each year. The majorityare between 18 and 59 years of age(20% are under 18 years of age) while43% of the total population arefemale.

UNHCR status determination

Despite the fact that Mauritania hasacceded to the 1951 GenevaConvention Relating to the Status ofRefugees and its associated 1969 NewYork Protocol as well as the 1969Organisation for African UnityConvention Governing the SpecificAspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,Mauritania has yet to adopt a nationallaw regarding the status of refugees,nor has it established a national eligi-bility procedure for the granting ofasylum. In view of the absence of insti-tutional structures to protect anduphold the rights of refugees, UNHCRin Nouakchott examines all requestsfor asylum.

The only official paper issued byUNHCR to validate an individual’srefugee status is a renewable ‘attesta-tion’ valid for between three and six

months. The attestation is only a doc-ument of protection; it does notnecessarily grant refugees the right toresettlement or financial assistance.Moreover, this paper is not alwaysrespected by the law-enforcementauthorities.

Assistance to refugees

When an individual’s application forasylum is pending, no material orfinancial assistance is granted to therefugee. Many refugees turn to themosques and churches as well as theMauritanian Red Crescent who pro-vide blankets, food and some financialassistance to anyone deemed in des-perate need. Many refugees concedethat begging is a common practice.

"We have no means of providing for ourselves; we are just receivers. I havesurrendered myself to the UNHCR."(Refugee in Nouakchott)

A partnership between UNHCR andthe Lutheran World Federation (LWF) –the only implementing partner ofUNHCR in Mauritania – was initiatedin April 1999. LWF administers andimplements the programme ofEmergency Assistance to IndividualUrban Refugees in Nouakchott but hasinsufficient resources to meet thehigh demand for services. UNHCR hasreduced its funding and the resourcesat LWF’s disposal have consequentlysuffered.

Refugees are assisted by LWF throughthe distribution of food, clothing andblankets; payment of medical billsand costs of shelter and education;a refugee school; and micro-creditschemes. Equal amounts of assistanceare given to each family – a relativelynew policy instigated by the UNHCRProtection Officer to prevent conflictswithin the refugee community andavoid allegations of favouritism.

Access to employment

Although Mauritania is obliged underArticle 17 of the 1951 GenevaConvention to grant recognised

refugees the right to work, not onerefugee interviewed had been granteda work permit nor heard of any otherswho had obtained such a permit. Mostrefugees do not believe, however, thata work permit is necessary for themto carry out labour in those informalsectors of the economy where theyhave found work; due to weak admin-istrative infrastructure and a lack ofenforcement resources, the govern-ment has adopted a laissez-faireapproach.

The majority of urban refugees inNouakchott support themselves bycasual labour in the largest market inNouakchott while others work as bar-bers, hairdressers, carpenters,plumbers, electricians, constructionworkers and fishmongers. The majori-ty, however, are self-employed intailoring. LWF micro-credit schemeshave been set up in order to createand sustain incentives for entrepre-neurial activities.

Access to education andhealthcare

Unlike the right to work, access to therights of education and healthcare donot require permits. As a signatory tothe 1951 Convention, Mauritania isrequired to accord refugees the sametreatment as nationals with respect toelementary education and the sametreatment as ‘aliens’ with respect tosecondary and further education.Refugees must also be accorded thesame level of healthcare treatment asnationals. However, as Mauritania pro-vides its citizens with neither freeelementary education nor healthcare,access to both depends almost entire-ly on whether one can afford thecosts. (The only health care facilityprovided free of charge is child vacci-nations.) The difficulties encounteredin attaining employment generallymean that refugees find it difficult toafford these services. LWF has nomedical facilities but in a medicalemergency a refugee is taken to hospi-tal by the refugee representativeresponsible for medical assistance –and the treatment is paid for.Reimbursement of minor medicalexpenses is usually delayed for up toa month, a practice which places sickand vulnerable individuals under con-siderable strain.

Urban refugees in Mauritaniaby Channe Lindstrom

A largely desert country, the Islamic Republic ofMauritania forms a link between the Arab Maghreband western sub-Saharan Africa.

A

UNHCR is reportedly negotiating withthe Mauritanian authorities to recog-nise the primary school qualificationsof refugee children. Uprooted andgenerally English-speaking, these chil-dren need a curriculum that isadapted to their needs and allowsthem to learn Arabic and French inorder to integrate into the Maurit-anian educational system. Two volun-teer teachers give free courses at fourprimary school levels for 75 children.The Canadian Fund for LocalInitiatives in Mauritania providesequipment and school supplies. Evenso, refugees reported that there was asevere shortage not only of teachersbut also of books and other educa-tional materials.

Prevalence of discrimination,detention and deportation

Regardless of their nationality, mostrefugees interviewed assert thatracism and cultural intolerancetowards foreigners are prevalentamong the Mauritanians. UNHCR’s‘attestations’ are issued to regulariseresidence and provide protection forthe refugee population. However, itwas widely reported that these are notrespected by the law-enforcementauthorities who have had no trainingin refugee issues. The threat of deten-tion is real, despite the possession ofa UNHCR attestation. Refugees are

often arrested in the hope of extract-ing a bribe. Although the entirepopulation is arbitrarily harassed bypolice officers asking for bribes,refugees are a particularly vulnerableand targeted group. If one is not ableto pay bribes, refugees report havingbeen detained at the local police sta-tion for up to one week before beingreleased. The Mauritanian Associationfor Human Rights reports substantialabuses in detention committed bypolice forces against refugees. Severalcases of deportations have beenreported.

Administrative weakness in the formof a lack of understanding at themunicipal level (e.g. policemen notrecognising a refugee card) andnational level (e.g. deportation ofrefugees, thereby violating the princi-ple of non-refoulement) leads tounjust treatment of refugees.Ironically, however, it is the country’sadministrative weakness and underde-veloped economy that simultaneouslyprevent the commitment of greaterinjustice because these characteristicsreduce the government’s capability toeffectively conduct mass detentionsand deportations.

Conclusion

The Mauritanian government hasfailed to translate its international

obligations towards the protection ofrefugees’ rights into national policy.Although it nominally accepts thegranting of refugee status determinedby UNHCR, it does not issue any for-mal recognition. UNHCR Mauritaniacontinues to offer local integration asits primary – if not only – ‘durablesolution’. This should not be consid-ered as ‘durable’ until, at a minimum,national laws are put in place toensure the protection of refugees.Mauritania’s inability to fulfil its inter-national obligations is due to acombination of factors. Being anunderdeveloped country, it finds itselfshort of the resources which ensurerespect for refugee rights;Mauritania’s weak and un-harmonisedadministrative structures hinder thedevelopment of a transparent andcoordinated refugee policy.

Channe Lindstrom is a formergraduate student of the Universityof Oxford Refugee Studies Centre. Email: mail@channe.net

This is a summary of a reportcommissioned by the ForcedMigration and Refugee StudiesProgramme, American University,Cairo. The full report, whichdetails the situation of otherrefugee groups in Mauritania aswell, is available atwww.aucegypt.edu/academic/fmrs (under reports).

47FMR 17 Urban refugees in Mauritania

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Sri Lanka’s fragile peace

by Nicholas Van Hear

In February 2003 Sri Lankans markeda year since the cease-fire betweenGovernment of Sri Lanka armed forcesand the Liberation Tigers of TamilEelam (LTTE). While tensions haveremained, the peace process that hasbeen in motion since early 2002 hastransformed the atmosphere in thecountry and lifted the oppressivefatalistic fear that has blighted muchof Sri Lanka’s population of around19 million for nearly 20 years of con-flict. People in the conflict areas ofthe north and east are now able to goabout their daily lives with a muchgreater degree of normality than for along time, not least because of theremoval of ubiquitous checkpointsand the much greater mobility thathas become possible as a result.

What the agencies have inelegantlylabelled the ‘post-conflict, pre-peace’phase has raised the prospect of thereturn of IDPs and eventually of thosewho have sought refuge abroad. Basedon local government records, itappears that some 240,000 displacedpeople have returned to their districtsof origin (though not necessarily theirhomes) since the peace process gotunder way. This figure does not cap-ture the substantial number of peoplewho have maintained registration (andreceipt of government rations) in theirplace of displacement but havereturned to their places of origin tosee if they can reclaim their housesand land and re-establish a life there.Many people, displaced and refugees,are adopting a ‘wait and see’ attitudebefore they commit themselves topermanent return. Until peace is morefirmly established and conditions athome are more secure, UNHCR is notencouraging return of refugees fromTamil Nadu in south India, where theynumber around 100-120,000, abouttwo thirds of whom live in some 100camps in the state. A few thousandhave nevertheless returned, mainly toMannar and Jaffna districts.

These return movements have notbeen without problems. In particular,

property issues are boiling up asreturnees try to reclaim land andhouses which are occupied by otherdisplaced people who have nowhereto go – because their own land orhouses are damaged or destroyed,occupied by others, in areas heavilymined, or occupied by the army. Inresponse to the new situation, UNHCRand other agencies have beefed uptheir operations to assist the dis-placed. While there is still much roomfor improvement, the organisationalstructures of the humanitarianregime, including the governmentwhich operates an imperfect rationsystem for the displaced, functionfairly well in Sri Lanka. With luck,these efforts will be backed by donorfunding to secure lasting peace in thecoming years – though the lessonsfrom elsewhere, notably Afghanistan,are not encouraging in this respect,not to mention the implications ofwar with Iraq. A major donors confer-ence is planned for June in Japan.

The real challenges lie not in organi-sational change – more ‘coordination’– but in the local, regional and inter-national political economy. As theyhave done elsewhere in post-conflictsocieties, the World Bank and otheragencies and donors will attempt toco-opt the humanitarian agencies toshape post-conflict Sri Lanka in a neo-liberal mould. Donor assistance forimmediate reconstruction needs isalready being made conditional onsuch moulding – through reform ofthe legal and property rights systems,for example. The leverage donors willhave as a result of Sri Lanka’s bur-geoning debt (largely military) incoming years will also be substantial.While some such ‘adjustment’ may bewarranted, humanitarians will need tobe wary of co-optation and be readyto contest the excesses of such lever-age if the transition to peace is to beconsolidated and the refugees anddisplaced are to be enabled to recon-struct their lives.

Nicholas Van Hear is a SeniorResearcher at the Institute forInternational Studies,Copenhagen.Email: nvh@cdr.dk

Angola: from plans toaction?

by Cecilie Winther, DanChurchAid,and Nina M Birkeland, Nord Trøndelag

University College

In FMR 16, in her article on IDP pro-tection in Angola, Kamia Carvalhoconcludes: "Despite a good start,Angola still has a long way to go" asregards implementation of theGuiding Principles. Since then the offi-cial number of IDPs has fallen from4.1 million to 2.8 million . Immediatelyafter peace accords were signed inApril 2002, people started to moveaway from their places of refuge.However, simultaneously, people whohad not been able to flee from occu-pied areas migrated into areas – oftenthe provincial capitals – where theyhoped to receive assistance, therebyadding to the IDP statistics. And it isquestionable whether the 1.3 millionwho were formerly counted in theofficial statistics have indeed estab-lished livelihoods at home or in newplaces of residence in accordance withtheir rights as described in theGuiding Principles.

Angolan authorities claim that muchof the reduction in IDP numbers is aresult of spontaneous return.However, information from the fieldsuggests that not all ‘spontaneous’return was voluntary. And in areaswhere return has indeed largely beenvoluntary, returning IDPs find thatthere is no basic infrastructure, signif-icant numbers of landmines are stillin place and there are no resourcesavailable to meet their basic needs.

The Angolan government has writtenthe Guiding Principles into nationallegislation and on 5 January 2001adopted the national Normas forResettlement of DisplacedPopulations. The Normas shouldensure minimum standards for safe,voluntary and sustainable return. TheProvincial Plans of Emergency Actionfor Resettlement and Return weredrafted in accordance with theNormas in June 2002 by the govern-ment and the humanitariancommunity. These were comprehen-sive plans outlining relief,

48 FMR 17

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rehabilitation and reconstructionneeds which have served as guidelinesfor humanitarian actors in the coun-try. In reality, the government hasconcentrated its limited funding onrehabilitation of infrastructure ratherthan social services and immediateassistance. Once again the humanit-arian community has been chargedwith the enormous task of providingfor the basic survival of the displaced.With the continued lack of funding,the humanitarian actors have obviouslynot been able to cover all needs butforced to prioritise among acutelyvulnerable populations. Despite goodintentions, the Normas still have notworked their way from paper to reali-ty. The Angolan authorities are goodat producing plans and writing docu-ments fulfilling the requirements ofinternational donors and the UN butimplementation and use thereof areless than exemplary.

1. Global IDP Project: www.idpproject.org

Humanitarian accountability

by Asmita Naik

A new organisation regulating theactivities of humanitarian organisa-tions was launched at a conference on‘Accountability and humanitarianoperations: present and future direc-tions’ held in Copenhagen in February2003 and convened by DANIDA, theDanish International DevelopmentAssistance office, and the Humanit-arian Accountability Project, HAP.

The debate about humanitarianaccountability was set in motion bythe humanitarian intervention follow-ing the genocide in Rwanda. Anevaluation of the aid effort criticisedit for "poor coordination" and "regret-table rivalry", resulting in "duplicationand wasted resources" and even"unnecessary loss of lives". Inter-vention in Kosovo was similarlycriticised. More recently, last year’sscandal of sexual exploitation ofrefugees by aid workers and peace-keepers in West Africa was awatershed for the humanitarianaccountability debate. According to

Agnes Callamard, HAP Director, "WestAfrica … brought the issue to every-one’s attention. Before that, someorganisations felt accountability tocrisis-affected populations as of littlepriority … the heightened mediascrutiny made agencies realise theimportance of being able to hold eachother to account."

After the Rwanda crisis, the idea of ahumanitarian ombudsman – as animpartial monitor and investigator –was mooted. A variety of initiativeswere developed, including HAP,People in Aid, ALNAP (the ActiveLearning Network for Accountabilityand Performance in humanitarianaction) and the Sphere project. HAP’srecently concluded two-year researchprogramme found "evidence of a lackof accountability, even more evidenceof a lack of understanding of account-ability, but … a real commitment towant to do things better".

The new organisation – intended as asuccessor to HAP – will be a self-regu-latory body with a mandate to providetechnical support. While this is a wel-come development, some questionwhether this goes far enough.

Questions were asked about howaccountability is going to be translat-ed into a reality at the national leveland what will be the mechanisms forthis. As membership of the neworganisation is voluntary, the vastmajority of NGOs, UN agencies andgovernment action will remain unreg-ulated. "Donors need to use the powerof the purse for greater beneficiaryaccountability," says Ken Guinta fromInteraction, a network of 160 USNGOs. Vincent Cochetel of UNHCRpointed out that "the principal gapwhich remains is for effective com-plaints mechanisms. Even after theWest Africa experience such mecha-nisms have only been instituted in afew countries. Fear of retaliation andlack of confidentiality are preventingpeople from speaking up." The needfor transparency in the new organisa-tion was highlighted. BrendonGormley of the Disasters EmergencyCommittee asked, "how open andhonest are we prepared to be..? Thediscussions about accountability at

DEC only became real when we agreedthat evaluations would be indepen-dent and public…."

Humanitarian organisations are notalways the best ones to speak onbehalf of the victims. As one observerconcluded, "few organisations spokeup for the victims of the West Africascandal. Even those that did speak didnot do so as stridently as the victimswould have done themselves. Theclear gap remains for a truly indepen-dent watchdog to monitor and hold toaccount all humanitarian actors."

For full text of presentations made at the Febrary2003 conference, see: www.hapgeneva.org/conf-prestns.htm

49FMR 17 Update

FMR EditorialAdvisory Board

Although the EAB members’ institutionalaffiliations are listed below, they serve in

an individual capacity and do not necessarily represent their institutions.

Sanjib BaisyaDFID

Jon BennettOxford Development Consultants

Stephen CastlesRefugee Studies Centre

B S ChimniJawaharlal Nehru University

Maurice HersonOxfam GB

Michael Kingsley-NyinahUNHCR

Andrew LawdayGlobal IDP Project

Erin MooneyBrookings-SAIS Project on

Internal Displacement

Bonaventure RutinwaUniversity of Dar es Salaam

Dan SeymourUNICEF

Marit SorheimNorwegian Refugee Council

Laurence WhiteheadUniversity of Oxford

Richard WilliamsRefugee Council, UK

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he decision to go to war in Iraqhas challenged the most funda-mental principles of the

current international system. Since theend of WWII, states have agreed toprohibit the use of force in their inter-national relations. Two exceptions aregranted under the UN Charter: theexercise of the right to self-defence orthe authorisation of the SecurityCouncil under Chapter VII. The US andthe UK failed to receive the explicitendorsement of the Security Councilbefore sending troops into Iraq. Withregard to the former exception, thedoctrine of pre-emptive strike advo-cated by the US administrationbroadens the concept of self-defencein a manner which is inconsistent withthe Charter.

While the conflict seems to be reach-ing its conclusion, many of thepost-war discussions will be taintedby the controversy surrounding thelawfulness of intervention. One ofthese issues concerns the involvementof the UN in the reconstruction ofIraq. The UN has had extensive experi-ence in peace building and in theestablishment of transitional civiladministrations, such as in Kosovoand East Timor. Although the UN hasfaced difficulties in exercising wideadministrative responsibilities,1 it iscurrently the only organisation able tolead this type of operation withoutraising concerns of so-called ‘imperial-istic colonialism’.

International legality is of fundamen-tal importance for the legitimacy ofpost-war operations. The major pow-ers represented in the SecurityCouncil will have to find an acceptablecompromise regarding the role of theUN. For France, Germany and Russia,which opposed the war, the objectiveis to entrust to the greatest extentpossible the reconstruction of Iraq to

the UN. The US-led coalition is, on theother hand, faced with a dilemma. TheUS administration wants to be incharge of the post-war reconstruction.It plans to create an ‘Office of recon-struction and humanitarianassistance’ and will appoint the mem-bers of an Iraqi interim authority. Ithas reluctantly accepted a limited rolefor the UN, consisting for the mostpart in the provision of humanitarianaid. However, it would in any caseneed the adoption of a UN SecurityCouncil Resolution if it wants tosecure both political and financialsupport from the rest of the interna-tional community. The President ofthe World Bank has declared that,since the Bank only deals with recog-nised governments, it would need aUN mandate before implementing itsprogrammes.2

As long as the US and the UK occupyIraq – that is, exercise actual authorityover the territory – they remain boundby the relevant provisions of the 1907Hague Convention IV Respecting theLaws and Customs of War on Landand the 1949 Geneva Convention IVRelative to the Protection of CivilianPersons in Time of War. ShashiTharoor, UN Under-Secretary General,noted that "occupying powers have norights under the Geneva Conventionto transform the society or the polityor to exploit its economic resources oranything of that sort."3 In addition, itis debatable whether the repatriationof more than half a million Iraqirefugees can take place if the occupa-tion continues. According to UNHCRstandards, return should be condition-al upon guarantees of physical,material and legal safety for thereturnees: in other words, the restora-tion of full national protection. Sinceoccupation cannot be regarded as con-ferring state authority upon theoccupying power, it might be argued

that the recognition by the interna-tional community of an independentIraqi government capable of exercisingfull control over its territory shouldbe a minimum prerequisite to therepatriation of refugees.

The latest developments of the Iraqicrisis show the essential role that thelaw must play in the conduct of inter-national relations. The US and the UKhave been able to win a war that clear-ly violated the law of nations; theymight not win the peace unless theycomply with fundamental rules ofinternational law. It is to be hopedthat in light of the post-war situationthe US-led coalition will come to redis-cover the eminence of theinternational rule of law.

1, See the Comprehensive Review of the WholeQuestion of Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc.A/5/305, 21 August 2000.2. ‘US to press World Bank to play role in Iraq’Financial Times, 9 April 2003, p5.3. ‘US and UK focus on legitimacy of interim rule’Financial Times, 9 April 2003, p4; see also ICRCReport, ‘General Problems in implementing theFourth Geneva Convention’, 27 October 1998, p8.

See also ‘Iraq: resources’ listed onp55.

50 Refugee Studies Centre FMR 17

www.rsc.ox.ac.uk

Refugee Studies Centre, Queen Elizabeth House,

21 St Giles, Oxford OX1 3LA, UK.Tel: +44 (0)1865 270722.Fax: +44 (0)1865 270721.

Email: rsc@qeh.ox.ac.uk

For details of RSC courses/events, please visitwww.rsc.ox.ac.uk

International Summer Schoolin Forced Migration 20037-25 July: Oxford, UK

Southeast Asia RegionalSchool in Forced Migration8-18 December 2003: Bangkok,Thailand

Forced Migration Online

www.forcedmigration.org

International rule of law:comment on Iraq

by Dr Agnes Hurwitz, Ford Foundation Research Fellow at the Refugee Studies Centre

T

he downward trend in fund-ing and staffing of thecommunity services function

has reached the point where it hasbeen rendered incapable of achievingits mandate or purpose within theorganization… Without a strongfinancial and intellectual investmentin community services as a core func-tion of UNHCR, there is hardly anypoint in continuing with it at all."That is the stark conclusion of anindependent evaluation of UNHCR’scommunity services function, under-taken by a multidisciplinaryfive-person team engaged by CASAConsulting of Montreal, Canada.

Based on extensive interviews withUNHCR staff members in Geneva, aglobal questionnaire survey and visitsto numerous field locations in Africa,Asia and Eastern Europe, the evalua-tion argues that the communityservices function has a significant role

to play in relation to UNHCR’s centralprotection mandate, particularly theprotection of refugee children andwomen.

Community services are also key toidentifying and addressing field-levelproblems before they erupt into inter-national scandals such as thatwitnessed in relation to the sexualexploitation of refugees by humanitar-ian and other international personnelin West Africa. And yet the functionhas been seriously weakened over thepast decade.

"When we speak of weakness," saysCASA Consulting, "we refer to thedeclining numbers of community ser-vices staff in the field, the wide rangeof responsibilities they are assigned,and the low level of authority and sta-tus of current community servicesstaff." "Many community servicesstaff," the evaluation continues, "have

little control over their daily workprogrammes and do not have theprofile, skills or resources requiredto carry out independent monitor-ing of UNHCR’s implementingpartners."

To address this disturbing situa-tion, the evaluation presents awide-ranging set of recommenda-tions. According to CASAConsulting, UNHCR senior manage-ment must redress the neglect anddecline of the community servicesfunction. Greater recognition mustbe given to the role that communi-ty services plays in addressing thesocial and community aspects ofrefugee protection. And UNHCR’sefforts on behalf of refugee chil-dren and women should be bettercoordinated with – and even inte-grated in – its community servicesactivities.

Finally, the evaluation calls uponUNHCR to carry out regular

‘situation analyses’ in the field, sothat the organisation can better iden-tify and address any threats to thewell-being of refugees. "Professionalcommunity services staff with socialscience backgrounds and training insocial and participatory research tech-niques are best placed to facilitatesituation analysis… For the rationalefor situation analysis is directly relat-ed to that of the community servicesfunction itself: to ensure that allgroups and segments of the refugeepopulation have access to appropriateprotection, assistance and services."

Recent resources on commu-nity services

The following reports can be accessedon-line at www.unhcr.ch.epau/

The community services function inUNHCR: an independent evaluation byCASA Consulting

Review of CORD community servicesfor Congolese refugees in KigomaRegion, Tanzania by Shelly Dick

Review of CORD community servicesfor Angolan refugees in Zambia byOliver Bakewell

Community services in refugee aidprogrammes: a critical analysis, ‘NewIssues in Refugee Research’, Workingpaper no. 82, by Oliver Bakewell

51FMR 17 UNHCR

Community services at a cross-roadsby Jeff Crisp

Head, Evaluation and Policy Analysis Unit

This is a regular page of news

and debate from UNHCR’s

Evaluation and Policy Analysis

Unit (EPAU). For further

information, or suggestions

regarding this feature, contact

Jeff Crisp, head of EPAU.

Email CRISP@unhcr.ch

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Returnees fromMexico in northernGuatemala.

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ore than ten years havepassed since the cessation ofactive hostilities and many

IDPs have already found durable solu-tions through return, local integrationor emigration. Yet their plight in gen-eral has been largely unaddressed andthere is a general lack of knowledgeof the scope of the issue and the con-ditions facing conflict-induced IDPs.

When the Special Representative ofthe UN Secretary for InternallyDisplaced Persons, Dr Francis Deng,visited Armenia in 2000, his first rec-ommendation was for acomprehensive survey and needsassessment. The idea of ‘mapping’conflict-induced IDPs was endorsed bythe Department of Migration andRefugees in the Armenian governmentand by those international organisa-tions active in the area of forceddisplacement: UNHCR, OSCE, UNDP,IOM and the Norwegian RefugeeCouncil. The Norwegian Ministry ofForeign Affairs is financing the pilotstudy.

Gaining an accurate picture of thenumbers, living conditions and needsof IDPs in the country is a prerequi-site for designing programmes toaddress their needs. The informationto be gathered during the mappingsurvey includes:■ number and composition (by age,

gender, household composition, etc)■ present location■ place of original residence■ desire to return to their original

place of residence based on a freeand informed choice regarding theconditions in their place ofresidence

■ needs in their present location inorder to promote integration plusneeds upon return to their originalplace of residence, includingrights to compensation in relationto lost property and occupancy

■ legal status and documentation

Beyond providing a picture of theimmediate situation of the displacedpopulation, the mapping activityshould be one step towards the cre-ation of a nationwide mechanism tomonitor the evolution of conditionsand needs of conflict-induced IDPs.The survey is also intended to con-tribute to the internationalcommunity’s efforts to develop amodel for international standards inaddressing the needs of the internallydisplaced. In addition, it will con-tribute to international research oncriteria for determining the level ofintegration of the displaced, the tran-sition from humanitarian todevelopment needs and the termina-tion of the displacement process. Thisis therefore a very relevant exercise inlight of the ongoing international dis-cussion of when internal displacement ends.

The mapping surveyis being conductedin two phases. First,180 conflict-affect-ed villages are beingmapped using a setof questionnaires.The first set is com-pleted by the villagemayors, who aregiven trainingbeforehand. The information

provided will indicate how many indi-viduals there were in the villagebefore the conflict, how many haveleft, how many have returned, whenand for what reason villagers left,what property they owned andwhether their land is farmable, wherethose that left can be reached, etc.This phase was conducted during theautumn of 2002 and the informationgathered is now being processed. Inthe second phase of the survey, thefocus will be on those families whohave left the villages. The families willbe interviewed in their current loca-tion, answering many of the samequestions that appear in the firstquestionnaire but also discussingtheir desire and ability to returnhome. A third, smaller survey willmap the current condition of schools,roads, electrical and water lines andother infrastructure facilities in eachconflict-affected village. This surveywill be undertaken by the governmentand will contribute to the planningprocess for rehabilitation of thoseconflict-damaged villages that showthe greatest potential to host a sus-tainable IDP return.

The entire survey should be com-pleted by late 2003.

For further information on NRC’s work in Armenia,please contact the Armenia programme coord-inator, Marit Maehlum. Email: marit.mehlum@nrc.no.

52 Norwegian Refugee Council FMR 17

Pilot IDP mapping surveyin ArmeniaThe Government of Armenia estimates that around70,000 people are internally displaced as a result ofthe conflict with Azerbaijan over the territory ofNagorno-Karabakh.

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nless the international com-munity can agree whendisplacement ends, displaced

people risk being pressed home tounsafe areas by authorities and agen-cies swearing that all is well. An endto displacement like this is a type offorced displacement.

Lack of clarity on when displacementends leaves considerable room forpolitical manipulation. National gov-ernments, who have primeresponsibility to care for displacedpeople, frequently impose a prema-ture end to displacement. In Russia,the government is trying to pressChechens home to obviously unsafeareas. And in Angola, the governmentis pushing large numbers of peoplehome to areas where there is no foodand no livelihoods. In Sierra Leone(see p31), the government imposed anend to displacement that excluded

significant numbers of displaced peo-ple from assistance. In Rwanda (seep30), the government and authoritieschanged the criteria to arbitrarily enddisplacement for thousands.

Elsewhere, governments artificiallyprolong the problem. In Azerbaijanand Georgia, in an attempt to empha-sise their sovereign rights oversecessionist regions, authorities havenot supported local integration. Evenin states that legally recognise dis-placed people, governments canarbitrarily end that recognition (seep16). IDP status can be withdrawn inCroatia and Georgia simply because aperson changes their address – inAzerbaijan and Russia when they findpermanent housing. In Bosnia,Colombia and Croatia, IDP status canend when an IDP refuses a state-givensolution. In Bosnia and Russia, it endsafter a set period of time followingreturn or resettlement.

Without procedures to judge whendisplacement really ends, agenciesmay not be able to resist going alongwith arbitrary government policies,even when those authorities displacedpeople in the first place and showedobvious disregard for their well-being.

When displacement ends also mattersto information agencies like theGlobal IDP Project. Monitoring IDPcrises in 50 conflict countries, wemust decide when displacementcomes to an end and when to stopmonitoring.

Overall, agencies have much to gainfrom clear criteria for when displace-ment ends. Realising that an end todisplacement is rarely clear-cut, policymakers are wisely developing criteriato reflect how displacement gradually

comes to an end. But any agreementon when displacement ends mustemphasise safety, freedom of choiceand IDP participation. Unless safeconditions have been established anddisplaced people choose a solutionvoluntarily, solutions cannot be con-sidered durable.

Safety must be seen in a broad sense.Obviously, it means the threats thatforced people to flee in the first placehave been removed. But it also meansensuring that there is adequate pro-tection from threats such as physicalattacks, rights abuses and landmines,as well as provision of adequatehumanitarian aid and support foressential needs over time.

IDPs must be able to choose solutionsto their problems. Ideally, IDPs shouldbe able to choose between return,resettlement or local integration onthe basis of impartial information andassured assistance. Return cannot bevoluntary, for example, if the govern-ment cuts off aid to encourage IDPsto return, as in Russia. Sometimes,safe return to home areas under hos-tile authorities may have to beenforced by the international commu-nity, as in Bosnia.

Finally, IDPs should be involved in alldecisions to end their displacement.It is worrying that the voice of dis-placed people themselves has so farbeen absent in the internationaldebate about the end of displacement.

Andrew Lawday is advocacy co-ordinator at the Global IDPProject.

53FMR 17 Global IDP Project

Displacement only ends withsafety and choice

by Andrew Lawday

The Global IDP Project is an interna-tional non-profit organisation that

monitors internal displacement causedby conflicts.

The IDP Database (www.idpproject.org)provides public information about

internal displacement in 50 countries.

The Project is part of the NorwegianRefugee Council (NRC), an organisation

that works to provide assistance andprotection to refugees and displacedpeople in Africa, Asia, Europe and the

Americas. NRC was founded in1946 in Oslo.

The Global IDP ProjectChemin Moïse-Duboule 59

CH 1209 Geneva, SwitzerlandTel: +41 22 799 0700Fax: +41 22 799 0701

Email: idpproject@nrc.ch

IDP newsIDP news is a weekly summary of

news on IDPs in conflicts. It iscompiled by the Global IDP Project,

based on public information.Subscribe by email to:idpproject@nrc.ch or

visit our website www.idpproject.org.

When displacement ends is a practical concern foragencies charged with helping IDPs. But who canreally say when displacement ends? Neither the UNnor governments have been able to agree yet.

U

FMR 1754

conferencesReports

Breaking new ground: therole of judges in protectingrefugees in the Arab WorldJanuary 2003 : Cairo

Apart from Palestinian issues, little isknown about refugees in the countriesof the Arab League. Only now is activeresearch being undertaken to fill inthe gaps in knowledge about displace-ment in the region.

In January 2003 the first event tookplace to encourage critical discussionof refugee issues, legislation and atti-tudes. A Seminar for Judges andLawyers from Arab League Countrieson Refugee and Human Rights washeld at the American University inCairo, co-organised by the ForcedMigration and Refugee StudiesProgramme (FMRS) at AUC (www.auce-gypt.edu/academic/fmrs), the ArabCentre for the Independence of theJudiciary and Legal Profession (ACI-JLP), and the International Associationof Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ)(www.iarlj.nl).

Most Arab countries have constitu-tional guarantees of the right toasylum and many include protectionagainst refoulement and/or extradi-tion. Most, however, have not becomeparties to either the 1951 UN Conven-tion on Refugees nor the 1967Protocol.

Only Algeria, Djibouti, Iraq, Morocco,Somalia, Sudan and Yemen haveenacted domestic legislation to regu-late the refugee status determinationprocess. Provisions relating to asylumin domestic law in Lebanon haveexisted since 1962 but implementa-tion has been frozen since 1975. Withthe exception of Algeria, Sudan, Syria,Iraq and Morocco, local or regionaloffices of UNHCR conduct refugee sta-tus determination on behalf of thegovernments. Generally in Arab statesrefugees lack access to the courts orany other independent mechanism forappeal and judicial review of proce-dures.

The seminar brought together over 75judges and lawyers from 16 of the 22

Arab League member states.Presentations from the InternationalAssociation of Refugee Law Judgesprovided an opportunity for judgesand lawyers to increase their knowl-edge of refugee law and refugeeissues and to share experiences. Mostparticipants admitted their lack ofknowledge about the refugee situationin their own countries. They wereshocked to learn the extent of dis-crimination faced by Palestinianrefugees in Egypt and Jordan.

The conference called on Arab Leaguestates to:■ assume their international respon-

sibilities with regard to theprotection of refugees

■ sign international instrumentsdealing with the protection ofrefugees and enact nationallegislation

■ abide by their obligations underthe 1965 Casablanca Protocol toguarantee Palestinians the samerights as nationals

■ recognise Palestinian refugees’right of return and provide fullhuman rights to these refugees intheir host countries until they areable to do so

A follow-up seminar and in-countrytraining sessions are planned in orderto sustain momentum. For more infor-mation and presentations from theseminar, see: www.aucegypt.edu/acad-emic/fmrs.

1st Forced Migration StudentConference22 February 2003 : Oxford

Over 100 students from the UK,Europe and US attended this one-dayconference in Oxford. Conceivedthrough a partnership between theRefugee Studies Centre, University ofWarwick-CRER, ICAR, University ofEast London and UNHCR, the confer-ence provided a forum for currentstudents to share their research andexperience with their peers. The daywas structured around four panel dis-cussions, with 13 postgraduatespresenting their work. The panelthemes were: i) emerging asylum poli-cy: European and global perspectives,

ii) debating different faces of the inte-gration process, iii) representingrefugees: creating the ‘other’ and iv)exploring the landscape of refugeewomen’s experience. It is hoped thatthis conference will become an annualevent. The organisers would like tothank the Oppenheimer Fund (Oxford)and DFID (CHAD) for their generousfinancial assistance.

Forthcoming

Reproductive Health fromDisaster to Development7-8 October 2003 : Brussels

This conference will focus on appliedresearch, programme findings and useof data to improve reproductivehealth programmes serving popula-tions in crisis throughout the world.Organised by the Reproductive Healthfor Refugees Consortium with UNFPAand UNHCR.

Conference topics:■ Applied research and programme

findings on family planning,STI/HIV/AIDS, gender-based vio-lence and safe motherhood amongwomen, men and adolescentsaffected by armed conflict.

■ Evidence of successful models ofservice delivery in the emergencyphase, in stable settings and inpost-conflict re-developmentefforts.

■ Collection and use of data forneeds assessments, programmemonitoring/evaluation andprogramme management.

Registration fee: $150. A limited num-ber of scholarships may be available.Updates are available at www.rhrc.org

Contact: info@rhrc.org or RHRC,HDPFH, Columbia University, 60Haven Avenue, B2, New York, NY10032, USA.

If you would like to publicise one ofyour organisation’s publications or ifyou would like to recommend a pub-lication for our publications sction,please send us full details – and,preferably, a copy or cover scan.

55FMR 17

Taking Refugees for a Ride?The Politics of RefugeeReturn to Afghanistanby David Turton and Peter Marsden.Afghanistan Research and EvaluationUnit. 2003. Free and online atwww.areu.org.pk/

The authors question the internation-al donor-driven policy of facilitatingthe massive return of Afghan refugeesto a country still in the grips of a dev-astating drought, political instabilityand weak government institutionsunable to cope with the returnees.The report urges donors to help slowdown the pace of repatriation byincreasing support to refugee pro-grammes in neighbouring Pakistanand Iran and by increasing supportfor UNHCR’s protection work in thesecountries. The authors also call for anexpansion of the InternationalSecurity Assistance Force to allregions of Afghanistan and for anincrease in the amount of reconstruc-tion and emergency aid pledged anddelivered to the country. Withoutincreased security and the ability toearn a living in Afghanistan, theauthors argue, most refugees wouldbe better off staying in neighbouringcountries for the time being.

Contact AREU at: Prime Minister’sCompound (next to AACA), Kabul,Afghanistan.Tel: +93 (0)70 277635. Website: www.areu.org.pk. Email: areu@areu.org.pk

Seminar report: InternalDisplacement in SouthernSudanThe Brookings Institution-SAIS Projecton Internal Displacement. Feb 2003.

A seminar was held in November2002 in Rumbek to promote greaterattention to the needs of an estimated2 million IDPs living in areas con-trolled by the Sudan People’sLiberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A)and the Sudan People’s DemocraticFront (SPDF) – and to increase theaccountability of non-state actors.At the seminar, Elijah Malok,Executive Director of the Sudan Reliefand Rehabilitation Association, therelief wing of the SPLM/A, presented adraft policy to address the needs ofIDPs in areas under their control. MrMalok undertook to promote the for-mal adoption of this policy by theSPLM/A leadership. The report con-tains current information on thesituation of IDPs in southern Sudan,the full text of the SPLM/A draft poli-cy, and statements by Mr Malok andother participants.

Contact: Gimena Sanchez-Garzoli,Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement, Brookings-SAIS Projecton Internal Displacement, TheBrookings Institution,1775 Massachusetts AveNW, Washington DC 20036,USA. Tel: +1 202 797 6145. Email: gsanchez@brookings.edu.

The report is also available atwww.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm

The Elephant, the Squirreland the Eagleby Danesh Jayatilaka. £5.00/$7.00.

This is a storybook about displace-ment and conflict resolution, focusingon an animal community confrontingconflict and displacement and thesteps they take to resolve theirpredicament. The book touches upona range of issues and subjectsdeemed critical at times of war-relat-ed violence. The reader is encouragedto digest the essence of the story,then reflect and relate them to reallife events. Easy reading with colourillustrations. The author was theProject Coordinating Officer for theSri Lanka IDP Protection andAssistance Guiding Principles onInternal Displacement Programme. Hewrote the story for use as a trainingtool but has published it personally.

Contact: Danesh Jayatilaka, Number27, Wickramaratne Avenue, Kohuwala,Sri Lanka. Tel: +94 1 821939. Fax: + 94 1 590489. Email: daneshj@hotmail.com

publications

Iraq: resources

UNHCR news and updates: www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/iraq?page=home

Human Rights Watch documents: www.hrw.org/campaigns/iraq/

ODI’s Humanitarian Policy Group briefing note on keyhumanitarian policy issues in the context of the war inIraq:www.odi.org.uk/hpg/papers/briefing_note_april2003.pdf

Harvard Program on Humanitarian Policy and ConflictResearch briefing paper on the application ofInternational Humanitarian Law in Iraq: www.ihlresearch.org/portal/ihli/10.pdf

Amnesty International on the responsibilities of occupyingpowers: http://web.amnesty.org/library/index/eng-mde140892003

See also www.fmreview.org/4DIraq.htm for FMR’s extensive list of links relating to Iraq.

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Displaced childrenoutside Nasariyahin a temporaryhousing camp, Iraq,March 2003.

indings from my country missionsaround the world, in my capacityas Representative of the UN

Secretary-General on InternallyDisplaced Persons, underscore thedegree to which the expectation of inter-nal protection by states for IDPs is, forthe most part, a myth. The crises ofnational identity that are often at theroot of the causes of displacement alsoaffect the response of governments andrelevant non-state actors to the humani-tarian consequences of displacement,frequently resulting in vacuums ofresponsibility in the exercise of statesovereignty.

During missions, I normally ask the dis-placed persons I visit what messagesthey would want me to take back totheir leaders. In one Latin Americancountry, the response I got was: "Thoseare not our leaders. In fact, to them, weare criminals and our only crime is thatwe are poor." In a Central Asian country,the response was: "We have no leadersthere. None of our people is there." In anAfrican country, a senior UN officialexplained to the Prime Minister thattheir resource capacity to assist refugeesin the country was constrained by theneed to assist "your people", the inter-nally displaced and other war-affectedcommunities. The Prime Minister’sresponse was, "Those are not my people.In fact, the food you give those people iskilling my soldiers."

While not all governments view their dis-placed populations in the same way, it istrue that the opposite is a rare excep-

tion, sometimes dictated by the natureof the displacement and the degree towhich the government identifies with itsdisplaced population. Even then, lack ofcapacity and other political considera-tions may affect the delivery ofprotection and assistance.

The core principle that has guided thework of the Representative has been torecognise the inherent nature of theproblem of displacement as internal andtherefore falling under state sovereigntyand to postulate sovereignty positively,as entailing the responsibility to protectand assist citizens in need. This stipula-tion of sovereignty, which has gainedincreasing support in the internationalcommunity, has proven to be a construc-tive and effective basis for dialogue withgovernments. The real question, howev-er, is whether governments, inpartnership with the international com-munity, are effectively addressing thecrisis of internal displacement and meet-ing the needs of the affectedpopulations.

The international community and thegovernments concerned have indeedmade significant progress in respondingto the crisis. It is, however, tragicallyobvious that the problem remains acutein magnitude and scope. The challengethat the normative principle of sover-eignty as responsibility poses for theinternational community is that itimplies accountability. Obviously, theinternally displaced themselves – mar-ginalised, excluded, often persecuted –have limited or no capacity to hold their

national authorities accountable. Onlythe international community has theleverage and clout to persuade govern-ments and other concerned actors todischarge their responsibility or other-wise fill the vacuum of irresponsivesovereignty.

Dr Francis M Deng is theRepresentative of the UN Secretary-General on Internally DisplacedPersons and Co-Director of theBrookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement.

Brookings-SAIS Project on InternalDisplacement, The BrookingsInstitution, 1775 Massachusetts AveNW, Washington DC 20036, USA.Website: www.brook.edu/fp/projects/idp/idp.htm Email: gsanchez@brookings.edu Tel: +1 202 797 6145. Fax: +1 202 797 6003.

In the vacuum of sovereignty: the international challenge of internal displacement

by Francis M Deng

The differences between the 12 million refugees and theestimated 25 million internally displaced persons (IDPs)around the world, as far as the international community isconcerned, is that the former have crossed internationalborders while the latter have remained within their countries.

F

The Brookings-SAIS Projecton Internal Displacement