WHY DID WE GO TO WAR IN IRAQ?€¦ · The Iraq War Inquiry Group consists of Australians from diverse backgrounds who are concerned that there has been no in-depth, high-level and

WHY DID WE GO

TO WAR IN IRAQ?A CALL FOR AN AUSTRALIAN INQUIRY

Call for an Iraq war inquiry 5

Foreword RtHonMalcolmFraserACCH 6

Executive summary 10

1 Why an inquiry, and why now? ProfRameshThakur 13

2 How did we get there? GarryWoodard,PaulBarrattAOandAndrewFarran 21

3 What evidence was available? RodBarton 29

4 How highly did the children rate? DrJennyGroundsandDrSueWarehamOAM 37

5 What sort of inquiry is needed? EdwardSantow 45

6 A better Westminster way to war? ProfCharlesSampford 55

7 The UK inquiries into the Iraq war ProfGerrySimpson 67

8 Never again? DrAlisonBroinowskiandProfCharlesSampford 75

Some unanswered questions 80

Contributors 82

ContentsThe Iraq War Inquiry GroupconsistsofAustraliansfromdiversebackgroundswhoareconcernedthattherehasbeennoin-depth,high-levelandindependentinquiryintohowAustraliadecidedtotakepartintheinvasionofIraqin2003.Asaconsequence,therehasbeenlittleinformedpublicdiscussionofthelessonstobelearnedandthealternativesandpotentialimprovementsintheprocessbywhichAustralianinstitutionsrespondtofutureconflicts.

Cover:IraqichildrenwhofledescalatingviolenceinsouthernIraq.Credit: Bikem Ekberzade

Above:AcoalitionsoldieronpatrolinRiyahdvillageinIraqinMarch2007.Credit: Andy Dunaway

Published in August 2012

ThechaptersinthisdocumenthavebeenwrittenbymembersoftheIraqWarInquiryGroup,anddonotnecessarilyreflecttheviewsofthegroupasawhole,oranyindividualmember,ineveryrespect.

Editor:DrAlisonBroinowskiConvenor:DrSueWarehamOAMLayout:TimWright

Website:www.iraqwarinquiry.org.auEmail:[email protected]:0431475465

Postal address:POBox1379Carlton,Victoria,3053

The2003invasionofIraqwasahumanitarian,legal,politicalandstrategicdisaster.Ithasleftatrailofdeathanddestructionandmillionsofrefugees.Ithasunderminedtheroleofinternationallawandstrengthenedterrorism.

Australia’sroleinthewarraisedveryseriousquestionsofgovernmenthonestyandaccountability.Ifwedonotlearnlessonsfromthisepisode,weareatgraveriskofengaginginequallyill-foundedwarsinthefuture.

TherearemanyunansweredquestionsinrelationtoAustralia’sdecisiontogotowar.Theyinclude:

n Whatwasthegovernment’sdecision-makingprocessandtimingthatledtoourparticipationintheinvasion?

n Whatweretheobjectives,andhowwassuccesstobedefined?

n Howdidthegovernmentreconcileconflictingintelligenceassessments?

n Howdidthegovernmentattempttosatisfyitselfofthelegalityoftheinvasion?

n WhichofthemanyNGOpredictionsofwidespreadandsevereciviliansuffering,includingbychildren,did

thegovernmentconsider?Ifnone,why?

n TowhatextentwerethestatementsmadetotheParliamentandthepublicconsistentwithalltheavailablerelevantassessments?

Australiantroopsareentrustedtohelpsafeguardoursecurity.Anysuspicionthattheirlives,andthelivesofhundredsofthousandsofcivilians,havebeenplacedinjeopardyonthebasisofanythingotherthanthemostrobustandrigorousdecision-makingprocesscannotbeignored.

BoththeUnitedKingdomandtheNetherlandshaveinitiatedofficialinquiriesintotheirowninvolvementinthewar;Australiahasnot.Nearlyadecadeafterthewarbegan,itistimewedidso.

WecallforanindependentinquiryintothedecisionsthatledtoAustraliainvadingIraq,andareviewofthewarpowersofthegovernment,todrawoutwhatlessonscanbelearnedforthefuture.

To sign this appeal, visitwww.iraqwarinquiry.org.au

Call for an Iraq war inquiry

AyoungIraqigirlwaitsoutsideherhouseduringaclearingoperationintheRasalkoorDistrictofMosulin2009.Credit: Kamaile Chan

7

HowdidAustralianarmedforcescometobeinvolvedinthe

US-ledinvasionofIraqin2003,andwhy?Whatwerethedecision-makingprocessesthatledtothatcommitment?Werethoseprocessesadequateintermsofoursystemofgovernmentasweunderstanditandforthefuture?

Itisoftenstatedwithwideapprovalthatadecisionto‘gotowar’isthemostseriousactthatcanbetakenbygovernment.Whatthisstatementbeliesishowthosedecisionsaretaken.Rhetorically,Australiawasrespondingtoanexistingstateofaffairs,inthewordsofUSPresidentGeorgeWBush,the‘waronterror’.Butwherewasthe‘terror’inIraqinthatcontext?Wasthisarmedactiononapretext,extraneoustoIraq,premeditatedonanotheragendamoretodowithalliance‘obligations’totheUS?

TheseareseriousquestionsforAustralia’sfutureforeignanddefencepolicies,andhowtheseshouldbepursuedwithinademocraticframework.Theyareraisedinthistimelypublicationtolaythebasicgroundworkforadeeperinquiry.Thepurposeoftheinquirywouldnotbetorakeoveroldcoalsbuttodevelopabetterunderstandingofhowwarfaredecisionsarereachedand

tostrengthenthegovernmentalstructuresagainstprecipitousorill-consideredactionsinfuture.

Thenatureofwarthesedayshasradicallychanged.Itplacesanunusualweightandresponsibilityonasmallnumberoftroopswhocarrythemajorburden,whilemostpeoplefeelnoconsequencesfromthatwar.Twoaspectsofitsjustificationthatmayneedreformulationaretheconceptsof‘nationalinterest’and‘self-defence’.Bothcanbeabusedorexploitedforself-servingpurposes.IsthenationalinterestsuchthatAustraliashouldseeitselfinpermanentalignmentwithagivenpower,whosedecisionsonwarandpeacebecomeourdecisions?Orshouldthetouchstoneof‘nationalinterest’inourcaserelatefirstandforemosttospecificallyAustralianconsiderationsandfollowfromthere?Isitfar-fetchedtoproclaimthatactionsaworldawayinvolveourself-defenceandhencecanbejustifiedundertheoneexceptionprovidedfortheuseofforceintheUNCharter(article51)?WhenthatexceptionwasdrafteditenvisagedthreatsandactsagainstastateofanimmediatenatureleavingnoroomfordelayorreferencetotheSecurityCouncil.TheIraqsituationhadbeenwiththeSecurityCouncil

6

Foreword formonths,andithadnotbeenimpressedenoughtosanctionarmedmeasures.

WhatthispublicationshowsisthattheinvasionofIraqwasbeingplannedsometwoyearsbefore,indeedimmediatelyafterGeorgeWBushwaselected,andwasconceivedattheinstigationoftheso-called‘neo-cons’.TherewasaterrorthreattotheUSandindeedtotheworld,butatthatstageitsbasewasessentiallyinAfghanistan.ThegroundworkfordealingwithitwasalreadywelldevelopedbutbecameacasualtyofthedistractioncausedbytheIraqdiversion.ByMarch2003theUSwaswellandtrulycommitted,withlargetroopandtankdeploymentsalreadyintheMiddleEast,whichcouldnotbrookfurtherdelayastheheatandsandstormsofthehotseasonapproached.Tohavepulledbackthenwouldhavebeenahumiliation.Itwasthisprematureover-commitmentwhichinexorablydrewtheUSanditspartnersintoaconflictwhichbothdesired;ithadnotreachedarelevantthreatlevel,andhadnotachievedtherequisitediplomaticandlegalbasis.ItlackedanirrefutablerationaleinthemindsofsignificantinfluentialBritons,AmericansandAustralians.

Inretrospect,whatwenowseewerefranticeffortstocreatetheprerequisitesbymanipulatingintelligenceassessmentstofitthe

case,withallthesophisticationthatthattaskrequired.ThegeneralpublichadbecomeconfusedastowhethertheweaponsofmassdestructionallegedlybeingdevelopedorheldbySaddamHusseinexistedandwerebeingplacedinastateofreadinesstojustifyboth‘nationalinterest’and‘self-defence’claims.Buttheextensiveworldwidepublicdemonstrationsagainsttheprospectofinvasion–exacerbatedbythepersistentdenialtotheUNweaponsinspectorofthetimeheneededtocompletehistask–suggestthataninstinctivewisdominformedthepublicperceptionwhich,haditprevailed,muchhumanlossanddestructioncouldhavebeenprevented.

Inallthis,theAustraliangovernmentmayhavethoughtithadnochoiceifitweretoretaintheconfidenceoftheUS.Butwasthisamisjudgement,confusingthenatureofourobligationsunderANZUS,whichrequiresonlyconsultationaboutthreatsinthePacificregion?DidthegovernmentreallythinkthroughtheissuesindependentlyandtheimplicationsforourstandingwithAsianneighbours?Diditreallyevaluatetheintelligencepresentedtoitandignoreitsflaws?Diditwantto?Diditreallyconsiderthelegalissuessurroundingtheproposedinvasionobjectively,orwasitnotreallyinterested?DidtheCabinet

Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CHAugust 2012

8

formallysitdownandconsideralltheissuescalmlyandclearlyandmakeadeterminationbasedonthat?DiditallowtheprimeministerasearlyasSeptember2001,followingaquickphonecalltotheforeignministerfromWashington,invokingANZUS,effectivelytopre-emptthedeliberativeprocessandcommitAustralianarmedforcestotheproposedUSactionsregardlessoftheseconsiderations?Isthishowdecisionsaboutthecommitmentofourarmedforcestoforeigncampaignsshouldbemadenowandinthefuture?Theimplicationsareprofound.

Thisstudybywell-informedandexperiencedpersonsinthepracticeandstudyofgovernmentinmattersofdefence,foreignandconstitutionalaffairsconcludeswiththeproposalthatthemannerandconsequencesofAustralia’sparticipationintheSecondGulfWarshouldbethesubjectofapublicinquiryforthebettermentandintegrityoffuturedecision-makingprocessesinthesecritical

areasofpolicy–onthelinesoftheChilcotinquiryintheUK,whichhasasimilarandoverduepurposeinthatcountry.

Morespecifically,suchaninquirycouldleadtoare-evaluationofthe‘warpowers’ofgovernmentandtheirexercise,andaddresstheroleofparliamentintheauthorisationofarmedforceabroad.Asmattersstand,parliament’sroleisexpostfacto,toapproveactionsalreadytakenundertheprerogativeatastagewherethedenialoffinancewouldineffectbetraythearmedforces.Inanagewherearmedconflictsituationsoftenlackdefinition(neitherwarnorpeace),andwheresomethingstartedhasthepotentialtocreepandevenspinoutofcontrol,thepublicinterestrequiresthattheactionsofthegovernmentofthedaybebetterregulatedandconstrainedinsituationsotherthanwherethenationmightbefacingadirectarmedattackleavingnoroomfordelayorwiderdeliberation.

FOREWORD

IraqichildrenwalkbycoalitionsoldiersonpatrolatamarketinNarhwanin2007.Credit: Timothy Kingston

decisionsweremadetogotowar,wecannotsafeguardAustraliaagainstundertakingill-foundedmilitaryactionsinthefuture.

An Australian inquiry TheprimarypurposeofthiscollectionofpapersistoengageAustraliansinaconcertedefforttopreventtheIraqwarexperiencefromrecurring.WecallforaninquiryintothedecisionsthatledtoAustraliainvadingIraq,andareviewofthewarpowersofthegovernmentwithaviewtoimprovingtheprocessesbywhichthisdemocracygoestowar.

Thisisnottoprejudgetheissue.Thosewhothinkthattheoriginaldecisionwasandremainstherightone,theprocessesadequate,andtheoutcomeonbalancegoodcanandshouldbeabletomaketheircasebeforeanindependentreview.Othersmayhavechangedtheirmindsandhavemuchtosayabouthowtheprocessesshouldbeimproved.Othersagainwhoopposeditthenmaybeasunsurprisedastheyaresaddenedbytheoutcome,andeagertopreventitsrepetition.

Questions and answersContributorshavecometogetherfromawiderangeofdisciplines,eachbringingparticularexpertisetothiscollection.Theyraiseandrespondtoaseriesofquestions.RameshThakurconsiderswhy

Australiansshouldrecallthemismatchbetweenreasonsgivenforthewarandthewayitwasconducted,andwhythisisthetimetosetupsuchaninquiry.ThesecondchapterprovidesatimelineofeventsleadingtothewarinIraq,fromJanuary2001,wellbeforetheinvasion,toMarch2003,preparedbyGarryWoodardwiththeassistanceofPaulBarrattandAndrewFarran.Intheirrespectivechapters,RodBartonevaluatestheevidencetheAustraliangovernmentreliedonbeforeinvadingIraq,andSueWarehamandJennyGroundsinvestigatewhatconsiderationitgaveinadvancetothehumanitariancostsofthewar.Proposingfivepossiblemodelsforaninquiry,EdwardSantowtakesintoaccountthepowersaninquirywouldrequire,howitwouldhandleclassifiedinformation,andthedegreeofindependenceitwouldenjoy.CharlesSampfordlooksathowWestminster-stylegovernmentshavegonetowarandsomeofthemeansforimprovingthatprocessandhowthesedecisionsshouldtakeintoaccounttheANZUSTreaty.InquiriesheldbytheUKareinvestigatedbyGerrySimpson.AlisonBroinowskiandCharlesSampfordconsidersomenextstepsforAustralia,endingwithalistofquestionswhichthecontributorshopewillstimulatefurtherresearchanddiscussion.

10 11

On19March2013,10yearswillhavepassedsinceAustralian,

BritishandUSforces(andaPolishcontingent)invadedIraq.Thereasonswedidso,andmaintainedamilitarypresencethereformostofthedecade,wereunclearthenandarenotyetsatisfactorilyexplained.TheinvasiontookplacewithouttheapprovaloftheUNSecurityCounciland,accordingtomostinternationallawyers,indefianceofinternationallaw.

CoalitionforcesoverthrewthegovernmentofIraq,andthenandintheyearsthatfollowedtheykilledandwoundedmanythousandsofIraqis,aswellassustaininggreatlossesthemselves.Prisonersundercoalitionsupervisionweretorturedandkilled,citiesweredevastatedanddegradationofthecountrysidewaswidespread.

BritishandAustralianpublicopinionwasstronglyagainstthewarbeforeitstartedand,whileUSpublicopinionwasinitiallyinfavour,thiswasatatimewhenaroundtwo-thirdsofAmericansbelievedthatSaddamHusseinwasatleastpartlyresponsiblefor9/11.ThejustificationsgivenbyUSandBritishleadersfortheinvasion,whichAustraliaaccepted,werelatershowntobebasedonfalseinformation,onwhichAustralia

apparentlyrelied.AfutureprimeministerofAustraliacouldcommitourcountrytoasimilarlydubiouswar,indefianceofpublicopinion,inbreachofinternationallaw,atevengreatercost,andwithnodemonstrablebenefittoAustralia.‘WhydidwefollowAmericawithoutquestion?’MalcolmFraseraskedinhisWhitlamOrationon6June2012.Australiansstillawaitananswerfromgovernment.

Weareaccustomedtoholdinginquiriesafternaturaldisastersandman-madeaccidentsinAustralia.Werigorouslydebateandscrutinisegovernmentadministrationandexpenditure,andwecarefullyinvestigatethecausesofdeathsandinjuries,seekingtoavoidfuturemistakesandlosses.ThedisastrousandcostlyIraqwarshouldbetreatednodifferently.

InquiriesintoithavebeenmadebyindividualsintheUnitedStatesandbygovernmentsinBritainandtheNetherlands,butinAustralia,apartfromtwoinvestigationsoftheintelligencethatinformedtheHowardgovernment’sdecision(oneheadedbyanMP,theotherbyaformerSecretaryoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade),nowide-ranging,independentinquiryhasbeenheld.Unlessweknowhow

Executive summary

CHAPTER 1

Why an inquiry, and why now?

AustraliansoldiersfromtheAlMuthannaTaskGroupcarryoutrangepracticeinIraqwith9mmBrowningpistolsin2006.Credit: US Government

dreamsandshatteredfuturesfortheirfamilies.Itcanleavefamiliesandentirevillagestraumatisedincountrieswherethefightingtakesplace.Itmaysowbitterhatredamongpeoplesandcreateforeignenemiesforgenerations.ItcaninspireactsofterroragainstAustralianpeopleandsymbols.Thisiswhywarmustalwaysbetheoptionoflastresortandmustneverbechosenlightly.

Domestically,thestateenjoysamonopolyonthelegitimateuseofviolence.Thepowerandmeanstouseviolenceisvestedinlawenforcementauthorities,includingtheauthoritytousedeadlyforcewhenwarranted.Evenso,inmostmoderndemocraticWesternsocieties,everytimethattheuseofforceinthelineofdutybyapoliceofficerresultsinadeath,afullinquiryisconductedbycompetentauthoritiesforanindependent

determinationastowhethertheactionwasjustifiedandhowsuchatragedymightbeavoidedinfuture.

Underconditionsofmoderninternationalsociety,fortheruleofinternationallawtobeentrenchedandwidelyestablished,itmaybehelpfulfortheleadingdemocraticstatestoadoptananalogouspolicywithrespecttowar.Thatis,atareasonablebutfixeddistanceintimefromwhenthedecisiontogotowarwasmade,anindependentinquirybycompetentauthoritiesshouldbeconductedtoreviewthedecisionanddrawappropriateconclusionsonjustification,preparationsandconsequences.Thisshouldbecomeanormalandroutineaspectofdemocraticaccountability.Itismeritedandwillmarkafittingculminationofthreeseparatehistoricaltrends:theincreasingrestrictionsplacedonstatestogotowarunilaterally,the

progressivetransferofauthoritytouseforceacrossborderstointernationalauthorities,andthedecliningcasualty-cum-fatalityrateswithanaccompanyingriseinthevalueplacedonindividuallives,evenofsoldiers,inmodernWesterndemocracies.

The progressivedelegitimisation of warViolenceisendemicinnatureandinhumanrelations.Warbetweenstateshasbeenanenduringfeaturesincetheemergenceofthecurrentinternationalsystemin1648,ironicallyfollowingthePeaceofWestphalia.Butitisfarfromanendearingfeatureandis,indeed,anaffronttothemoderninternationalisedhumanconscienceandsensibility.

Untilthesomewhatprematurelylabelled1914–18‘wartoendallwars’,theorganisedviolenceofwarwasanacceptedandnormalpartofthestatesystem,withdistinctiverules,normsandetiquette.InthatHobbesianworld,theonlyprotectionagainstaggressionwascountervailingpower,whichincreasedboththecostofvictoryandtheriskoffailure.ForvictorsanddefeatedalikeinEurope,warsmeantdisplacement,destruction,deprivation,privation,invasion,occupationandmassmurder.Europeanshaveasharedmemoryofwarasaterriblehuman-madecalamity:wouldFrancereallywant

torepeatits‘victories’inthetwoworldwars?

InthelateTonyJudt’swords,theUStoday‘istheonlyadvanceddemocracywherepublicfiguresglorifyandexaltthemilitary’.Britain,FranceandGermanylost1–2millionsoldierseachinWorldWarI;theUSlostfewerthan120,000.China,France,GermanyandtheSovietUnioneachlost2–11millionsoldiersinWorldWarII;theUSlostunderhalfamillion.ThetotalUSciviliandeathsfromthetwoworldwarswasunder2000,comparedwith2–16milliondeathsineachofGermany,Poland,theSovietUnionandChina.

Againstthisbackgroundoftheageoftotalwars,animportantstepinthedevelopmentoftheideathataninternationalcommunityhasboththerightandaresponsibilitytomutearmedconflictbetweenitsmemberstateswasthePactofParisof1928.Itssignatoriescondemned‘recoursetowarforthesolutionofinternationalcontroversiesandrenounce[d]itasaninstrumentofnationalpolicyinrelationswithoneanother’.Thenormativebreakthrough,thatwarwasanillegitimatemethodofdisputesettlement,wasofgreatsymbolicsignificanceevenifitfellshortofbeinganenforceablecontractualobligation.AlthoughtheLeagueofNationsfailedtopreventanotherworldwar,fromtheashesoftheSecondWorldWartheUnited

Prof Ramesh Thakur

Takingacountrytowaristhesinglemostsolemninternationalresponsibilityofanygovernment.Itrequiresoursoldierstokillcompletestrangerssolely

ontheauthorityofthegovernment.Itputstheirlivesontheline.Deathandseriousinjurytothediggerscanmeanbroken

WHY AN INQUIRY, AND WHY NOW?

1514

hadharbouredambitionstogetWMD,theIraqiprogramstobuildthemhaddecayedcompletely.UNsanctionshadhelpedtodismantlethemandUNinspectionshadgivenanaccurateassessmentofSaddam’sWMDcapability.NocredibleevidencewaseverproducedtolinkSaddamHusseintoal-Qaidaorinternationalterrorism,whiletheIraqinvasionitselfprovedapowerfulrecruitingweaponforal-QaidaamongalienatedMuslimcommunitiesaroundtheworld.

Thewarwasillegal.OnlytheUnitedNations,notindividualstates,hadtherighttodecideifIraqwasinbreachofUNresolutions.SecurityCouncilResolution1441didnotusethekeyphrase‘allnecessarymeans’toenforceit,hencetheneedforasecondUNresolutionthatnevercame.UNinspectorsunderHansBlixwerestilldoingtheirjobandIraqwasbeingcompliant.TheUSpositiononlegalitydidnotapplytoBritainandAustraliabecauseCongresshadgrantedspecialwar-makingpowerstoPresidentGeorgeWBush.InherresignationlettersubmittedontheeveoftheIraqwar,ElizabethWilmshurst,thedeputylegaladvisertotheUKForeignOffice,describedmilitaryactioninIraqas‘anunlawfuluseofforce’that‘amountstothecrimeofaggression’.

Althoughsomeadvocatesforthe

warmightstillwanttoarguethecaseforitslawfulness,mostwarsupportersinsteadaremorelikelytoarguethat,regardlessofitslegalstatus,itwasstilllegitimateinthatitridIraqandtheworldofSaddamHussein.Butinordertooustaregimebasedsolelyonmightwithfewredeemingfeaturestomakeitright,establishedinstitutionsandconventionsforensuringthatforceislegitimatelyexercisedweresetasidebyasuperpowersupremelyconfidentofitsmightandpreparedtoignorewhatisright.

Finally,itisdifficulttoseehowonecountrycanenforceUNresolutionsbydefyingtheauthorityoftheworldbodyanddenigratingitasirrelevant.

Why now?First,2013willmarkthe10thanniversaryofthelaunchoftheIraqwar.Adecadeonisagoodtimetoreflectbackonthereasons,circumstancesanddecision-makingproceduresbywhichacountrywenttoanywar,andtoconsideritsconsequences.

Second,thereisbynowwidespread,althoughnotunanimous,internationalagreementthattheIraqwarwasmorallywrong,illegal,unjustifiedandhadmanyseriouslydamagingconsequencesforWesterninterests.Theprimaryjustificationforgoingtowarwastodestroyanallegedactiveprogramofbuilding


17

Nationsresurrectedthecauseofsecuringpeace.USPresidentAbrahamLincolnmeditatedonthe‘scourgeofwar’,anaptdescriptionthatfounditswayintotheUNCharter,whosepreamblebeginswiththeclarioncall:‘WethepeoplesoftheUnitedNationsdeterminedtosavesucceedinggenerationsfromthescourgeofwar,whichtwiceinourlifetimehasbroughtuntoldsorrowtomankind.’

Since1945,theUNhasspawnedacorpusoflawtostigmatiseaggressionandcreatearobustnormagainstit.TheUNvisionreplacedtheLeague’sfutileeffortstoabolishwarwithaprovisionforstatestousemilitaryforcecollectivelyandtoabidebytherulesoftheUNCharter.Assuch,negotiationsandtheruleoflawweretoreplacetheunilateraluseofforce.OnlytheSecurityCouncilcouldtakeorauthorisemilitaryactiontorestorethepeace.Thenormativeprimacyofpeacefuloverforcefulmeans,andofthepropositionthattheinternationalcommunityhasastakeinwaravoidance,justifyingitsinvolvementinbilateraldisputesbetweenmemberstates,isfirmlyentrenched.

Ofcourse,countriesretainedtherighttousemilitaryforceinindividualorcollectiveself-defence.Thatwasnotthecasein2003.Iraqwasnotimplicatedintheterroristattacksof11September2001.ReasonsfortheUNfailuretosupportthewarincludeddeepdoubtsoverthejustificationforgoingtowarandanxietyaboutthehumantoll,uncontrollablecourse

andincalculableconsequencesofwarinavolatileandalreadyinflamedregion.

WashingtonhadfivegreatclaimsfortheIraqwar:thethreatposedbytheproliferationofweapons

ofmassdestruction(WMD)toSaddamHussein’sIraq;thethreatofinternationalterrorism;theneedtoestablishabeachheadofdemocraticfreedomsandtheruleoflawintheMiddleEast;theneedtobringSaddamHusseintojusticefortheatrocitiescommittedbyhisregime;andthedutytobetheinternationalcommunity’senforcer.Eachgoalwasbadlyunderminedbythemeanschosen,andtheircollectivedamagetoworldorderwasgreaterthanthesumoftheirseparateparts.

InOctober2004,theCIA’sIraqSurveyGroupreportedwithfinalitythatwhileSaddamHussein

CHAPTER 1

16

Since1945,theUNhasspawnedacorpusoflawtostigmatiseaggressionandcreatearobustnormagainstit.

consideringthetwoexperiencestogether,includingthedifficultquestionoftowhatextenttheIraqwarunderminedtheprospectsforsuccessinAfghanistan.

Seventh,theMiddleEastregionremainsastenseasever,withthevolatilesituationinSyriaandthestandoffwithIranoveritsnuclearprogramthreateningtodescendintointernal,regionaland/orinternationalwaratshortnotice.SomecommentatorsalsoperceiveAustraliaasbeingdrawnintoaUS-ledstrategyofcontainmentofChinainthePacific.Thistoohasconsiderablepotentialtoflareupintointer-stateconflictthatcouldentangleAustralia.Itwouldbedifficulttoconductathorough

andsatisfactoryinquiryintoapastwarinthemidstofanewwar.Itisbettertostudythelessonsnowwhenwestillcan:bothtoavoidanotherwarifwecan,andtoconductitafterduediligenceanddemocraticaccountabilityifwecannot.

Finally,Australiahasbeencampaigningforandiscautiouslyhopefulofbeingelectedtoatwo-yeartermontheUNSecurityCouncilin2013–14.Thisputsextraresponsibilityasamemberofthekeyinternationallawenforcementbodytoreaffirmitswar-makingauthorityandcompetence,andalsotomakesurethatwehavedrawnthehardlessonsfromapreviousflawedwar.


19

weaponsofmassdestruction.Thishasbeenprovendefinitivelyfalse.In2008formerUSsecretaryofstateMadeleineAlbrightsaidthattheinvasionofIraqwas‘thegreatestdisasterinAmericanforeignpolicy’,worseeventhanVietnaminitsunintendedconsequences.‘AndthebiggestunintendedconsequenceinIraqis…thatactuallyIranhas…wonthewarinIraq.’Weneedtostudythelong-termeffectsofthewaronAustralia’ssecurityinterests.

Third,theIraqwarwasinviolationofAustralia’sinternationalobligationsundertheANZUSTreaty.Article1ofthetreatyobligatesAustralia‘tosettleanyinternationaldisputesinwhichtheymaybeinvolvedbypeacefulmeansinsuchamannerthatinternationalpeaceandsecurityandjusticearenotendangeredandtorefrainintheirinternationalrelationsfromthethreatoruseofforceinanymannerinconsistentwiththepurposesoftheUnitedNations’.Asalreadyargued,thisobligationtorespecttheUNCharterwasbreachedin2003.

Fourth,theUKhashadseveralinquiriesrelatedtotheIraqwar,includingonewhichisyettoreport.Anall-encompassing

inquiryintoAustralia’sinvolvementintheIraqwarthereforewouldbefollowinginBritain’sfootsteps,notsettingaprecedent.

Fifth,since2003theinternationalcommunityhasforthefirsttimeagreedtoadefinitionofaggression.AttheconclusionoftheInternationalCriminalCourtreviewconferenceinKampala,Uganda,on12June2010,article

8bisoftheRomeStatutewasamended.The‘crimeofaggression’isdefinedtomean‘theplanning,preparation,initiationorexecution…ofan

actofaggression’inviolationoftheUNCharter.Anactofaggressionisdefinedas‘TheinvasionorattackbythearmedforcesofaStateoftheterritoryofanotherState,oranymilitaryoccupation,howevertemporary,resultingfromsuchinvasionorattack’.WemustcarefullystudytheimplicationsofthisanddrawtherightlessonsfromtheIraqwarforfuturecallstoarms.

Sixth,nextyearAustraliawillalsocommencedisengagingfrommilitarycombatoperationsinAfghanistan.BecauseofthegeographicalandchronologicalproximityofIraqandAfghanistan,aninquirycouldbenefitfrom

CHAPTER 1

18

TheIraqwarwasinviolationofAustralia’sinternationalobligationsundertheANZUSTreaty.

CHAPTER 2

How did weget there?

AustralianarmouredvehiclesinfiringpositionsduringarangepracticeinIraqin2007.Credit: Rob Nyffenegger

ThefollowingisatimelinebuiltaroundthesequenceofeventsintheUSandtheUK:

2001

JanuaryTendaysafterbecomingpresident,GeorgeWBushmeetsforthefirsttimewithhisnationalsecurityprincipals,with‘Mideastpolicy’astheadvertisedsubject.Theprincipalsubjectis‘howIraqisdestabilizingtheregion’andtheoutcomeofthatdiscussionisthatSecretaryofDefenseDonaldRumsfeldandChairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,GeneralHughShelton,areto‘examineourmilitaryoptions’and‘howitmightlook’touseUSgroundforcestochallengeSaddamHussein.

FebruaryCIADirectorGeorgeTenetpresentstoCongresstheintelligencecommunity’scomprehensiveannualstatementonworldwidethreats.ThesolementionofIraqinrelationtoweaponsproliferationisasinglesentencesayingthatIraqisprobablyconductingworkonballisticmissilesandthat,ifitreceivedforeignassistance,itcoulddevelopanintercontinentalballistic

missilecapability‘sometimeinthenextdecade’.Saddam’seconomicinfrastructureisinlong-termdecline,hisabilitytoprojectpoweroutsideIraqis‘extremelylimited’,andinternationalsanctionsarekeepinghisdiminishedmilitaryfromoperatingeffectivelyeveninsideIraq.

February—August TheUSdrawsupa‘liberationstrategy’forIraq.ThedominantthemeinadvicefromtheintelligencecommunityandtheStateDepartmenttopolicymakersduringthistimedownplaystheimmediacyorseverityofanythreatfromSaddamandspecificallyanythreatbasedonunconventionalweapons.

March 2001 through 2002TheintelligencecommunitiesproducediverseassessmentsofIraq’sWMDprogram,initiallywithparticularreferencetoaluminiumtubes.Australia’sintelligencecommunitywouldhavebeeninvolved.

AprilTheAustraliangovernmentisadvisedthatAWBLimitedisunderintensepressuretopaykickbackstotheSaddamHusseinregime.

HOW DID WE GET THERE?

2322

notaboutwhetherbuthow.Itwastakenforgrantedthattheprimeministerwasthedecision-makerandthatwhateverwastheprimeminister’sdecision,thatwouldbeit.Noministerorofficialofferedadvice,ordissent,onthisscore.IraqwasthereforeuniqueinAustralia’spost-warhistory,althoughithadmanycommonfeatureswiththepolicymakingproceduresforthepreviousmajorwarinwhichAustraliawasinvolved:Vietnam.

Therefore,aninquiryintohowAustraliawenttowarinIraqshouldconsidernotAustraliandecision-makingprocessesthemselvesbutratherthenature,adequacyandrelevancetoAustralia’snationalinterestsofreactionsbytheprimeminister

andCabinettothedecision-makingprocessesofitstwomajorallies,theUSandUK,particularlytheUS.Australiawouldnotalwayshavebeeninvolvedintheseprocesses,butitcanbetakenforgrantedthatitwascloselyinformed.Soadecisionnottoexpressaviewastheyproceededwoulditselfrepresentapolicyposition.

AninquirywouldbeexpectedtoelucidatetheextentofAustralia’sknowledge,throughministerialcommunications,diplomaticreportsandintelligenceexchanges,andofcoursethevoluminouspublicmaterialonUSandUKthinkingwhichwasavailableinthemedia.Towhatextentwasthisknowledgeproperlyevaluated,andwhatevidenceisthereforthis?

Garry Woodard with Paul Barratt and Andrew Farran

Therewasnoorderly,consecutiveprocessofdecisionmakingonwhetherAustraliashouldgotowarinIraqin2003.From9/11,in2001,PrimeMinisterJohnHoward

hadmadeuphismindtofollowUSPresidentGeorgeWBushinthewaragainstterrorism.Australiandecisionswere

TIMELINE 2001—2003

allowanuclearattackbyterrorists;theintelligencecommunityreportsthatIraqobtainedyellowcakeuraniumfromNiger(laterrejectedbyDIO);USDeputySecretaryofDefensePaulWolfowitzinGermanymakesthefirststatementaboutpre-emption.

MarchStatementsalongthesamelinesaremadebyUKPrimeMinisterTonyBlairduringavisittoLondonbyCheney;theForeignOfficeexpressesreservations.Thawley,oninstructions,issuesanultimatumtoSaddamonFoxTV.

AprilTheNewYorkerpublishesanarticleonpre-emptiontoachieveregimechangeinIraqwhichprovestobeaccurateonBushadministrationthinkingandasapredictionofwhatwouldhappen.(Ex-JointIntelligenceOrganisationdirectorGordonJockellatertellstheJullcommitteein2007thatthiswouldimmediatelyhavebeenonintelligencecommunitydesksinCanberra.)BushandBlairmeetatCrawfordandagreeonthedesirabilityofregimechangeinIraq,Blairstatingthreedesirableprerequisitesbutnotmakingthempreconditions.BlairgivesaspeechinTexas.Howard,carryingabasicbriefonIraq,holdstalkswithBlair.BushtellsBritain’sITV:‘ImadeupmymindthatSaddamneedstogo.’

MayDonaldRumsfeldtellsCongressthatterroristsareseekingtoacquireWMDfromIraq,Libya,NorthKorea,Syria,etc.AskedifhehasaplantoattackIraq,GeneralFranksreplies:‘That’sagreatquestion…mybosshasnotyetaskedmetoputtogetheraplantodothat.’

JuneHowardisinWashingtontoaddressCongress.AccompaniedbyONADirectorKimJones,heluncheswithCIADirectorGeorgeTenet.Thedoctrineofpre-emptionisproclaimed(andlatertakenupbyHoward).Toadeputyraisingdoubtsaboutwar,nationalsecurityadviserCondoleezzaRicesays:‘Saveyourbreath.Thepresidenthasalreadymadeuphismind.’

JulyMI6’sRichardDearloveadvisesUKCabinetthattheUSissetonwar,wantstoremoveSaddambymilitaryaction,andisfixingtheintelligenceandthefactsaroundthepolicy.HementionsanticipatedacquiescenceofAustralia,whichmaywellhavebeenfullyinformed.ABritishCabinetOfficepaperof21Julypredictsthat‘Australiawouldbelikelytoparticipate[intheIraqwar]onthesamebasisastheUK’.TheForeignOfficequeriesthelegalityofmilitaryaction.Rumsfeldrejectsarmyandairforcesecretaries’warningofanother


25

September10thPrimeMinisterHowardarrivesinWashington,meetswithPresidentBushandattendsanembassybarbecuewithalltheUSneo-conestablishmentfromVice-PresidentDickCheneydown.11thTerroristsattacktheUSatseverallocations(theWorldTradeCenter,thePentagon,etc).ThereisimmediateUSdiscussionofreprisalsagainstIraq.DefenseSecretaryDonaldRumsfeldadvises,‘Gomassive.Sweepitallup.Thingsrelatedandnot.’MinutestakenbyaRumsfeldaidefivehoursaftertheattackread:‘Bestinfofast.Judgewhethergoodenough[to]hitSH[SaddamHussein]@sametime.NotonlyUBL[UsamabinLaden].’(Thisbecamepubliclyknownon4September2002.)DiscussionscontinueforafewdaysuntilPresidentBushordersconcentrationonAfghanistan.Howardisbriefedbywell-informedAustralianambassadorMichaelThawley(whoseadviceonAfghanistan,IraqandthefreetradeagreementHowardisacknowledgingtojournalistTonyJonesontheABCwhenBush’sacknowledgementisstoppedbytheshoe-throwingincident).

12thHowardpledgessupport,anddecidestoinvoketheANZUSTreatyafteradiscussionwith

USAmbassadorTomSchiefferandatelephonecalltoForeignMinisterAlexanderDowner.

26thPresidentBushmakesanaddresstothenation.TheDefenceIntelligenceOrganisation(DIO)criticismofitstoneprovescontroversialinCanberra.

November21stPresidentBushdirectsDefenseSecretaryRumsfeldtoconstructinsecretafreshplanforgoingtowarinIraq.

December 28thGeneralTommyFrankspresentsafirstdraftwarplan.Furtherdevelopmentofwarplans,withAustralianparticipationthroughanAustraliancolonelatUSCentralCommand(CENTCOM).

2002

JanuaryForcesstarttobereassignedfromAfghanistan.StateoftheUnionaddress:‘AxisofEvil’labelisappliedtoIraq,IranandNorthKorea.Principalthemes:terrorismandWMD.Rogueregimes‘could’giveadvancedweaponstoterrorists.

FebruarySecretaryofStateColinPowellspeakstoCongress;Vice-PresidentCheneysaystheUSwillnever

CHAPTER 2

24

2003

January27thHansBlixfromtheUNMonitoring,VerificationandInspectionCommissionandMohammedElBaradeifromtheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgencyreporttoUN,theformermoreequivocalandaskingformoretime.Thetenorofthereportisthatalthoughtheregimehasstilltoaccountformanybannedweapons,itiscooperatingwell,andnoWMDhavebeenfound.BlairisinWashington;heandBushagreetostartawaron10March,assertingtherewillbenoseriousreligiousorsectarianstrifeaftertheinvasion(thoughaCIAassessmenthascontradictedthis).

February4thPrimeMinisterHowardcherry-picksforeignintelligence.AtthistimeandthroughFebruary,ONAstrengthensadvicethatIraqhasWMD.

5thSecretaryofStatePowelladdressestheUN;someofhisevidence–forexample,mobilefactoriestoproducebiologicalweapons–provestobeincorrect,andisqueried,notablybyFranceandGermany,whicharedismissedbytheUSas‘oldEurope’.ThereisastalemateintheUN.

10thHowardisinWashingtonfortalkswithPresidentBush.

11thHowardseesHansBlixinNewYork.

MarchEarly MarchBlixandElBaradeireportfurtherprogress,sayingnoproscribedactivitieshavebeendiscovered.

14thHowardaddressestheNationalPressClubandisqueriedonhisfailuretoproduceevidenceoflinksbetweenSaddam,al-Qaidaand9/11byLaurieOakesandonregimechangebyMichelleGrattan.

17th RJMathewsfromtheDefenceScienceandTechnologyOrganisationwritestoHowardexpressingreservationsabouttheintelligenceandnotingregimechangewillincreasethedangerofdisseminationofIraqiknow-howonWMD.

18thHowardquotes(new)BritishadvicethatwarislegalandsaystheAustralianpositionissimilar.

19thWarstarts.AustraliantroopsareinactionbeforeanyannouncementandbeforetheultimatumtoSaddamhasexpired.


27

Vietnam,saying:‘We’regoingtogetin,removeSaddamandgetout.That’sit.’GeneralFrankssecretlyrequests$700millionforwarpreparations.Bushapproves,unbeknownsttoCongress.MoneyistakenfromanappropriationforthewarinAfghanistan.

AugustPowellalsoexpressesstrongreservationstoPresidentBushandnationalsecurityadviserRice.WhiteHousechiefofstaffAndrewCardestablishestheWhiteHouseIraqGrouptoplanandcoordinatethesellingofthewar.

7th ThecompletedwarplanissubmittedtoPresidentBushbyGeneralFranks.

September TheWhiteHouseIraqGroupcoordinatesPR,includingforandwithallies.

7—8thAmediablitz–‘wedon’twantthesmokingguntobeamushroomcloud’.Cheneypresents‘newinformation’ofalinkbetweenSaddamandal-Qaida(whichislaterrejectedbyAustralia’sDIO).

12thBushaddressestheUN,leadingtoSaddam’sagreeingtore-admitUNinspectorsonthe18th.TheAustraliangovernmentmakespublicuseofanONAreport,whichusesforeignintelligence

(latercriticisedintheFloodreportandbytheJullcommittee,whichsuggestedONAwasrespondingto‘policyrunningstrong’).

OctoberAmonthofintenseactivityandextremerhetoric(introducingunmannedaerialvehicles)astheBushadministrationseeksawarresolutionfromCongress,submittingahighlycontentiousnationalintelligenceestimate.TheUKNationalIntelligenceCommitteealsoproducesa‘dodgydossier’tojustifywar.

NovemberUNSecurityCouncilresolution1441offersIraqafinalopportunitytocomplywithitsdisarmamentobligationssetoutinpreviousresolutions.

DecemberSignificanttroopdeploymentsaremadetotheMiddleEast.

2001—2

AustraliandiscussionsofIraqrelatetomodalitiesandintelligence.Officialsarenotaskedforanddonotofferadvice–firstreportedbyformerDefenceDeputySecretary(StrategyandIntelligence)HughWhite;confirmed(specificallyfortheperiodfromOctober)bythreedepartmentalheadstoPaulKellyinTheMarchofthePatriots(2009).

CHAPTER 2

26

CHAPTER 3

What evidencewas available?

TheUNSecurityCouncilmeetson14February2003tohearabriefingontheprogressoftheweaponsinspectorsinIraq.Credit: Evan Schneider

thousandinspectors,includingmorethan150Australians,combedthecountrytoensurethatthedestructioncarriedoutwasdonecomprehensivelyandcompletely.Aspartofthisprocess,thousandsofIraqiscientists,engineersandmilitarypersonnelinvolvedwithIraq’sformerWMDprogramswereinterviewedandclosetoamilliondocumentsseized.Inshort,amassivedatabaseonIraqicapabilitieswasestablished,andalthoughitwascloselyheldbytheUN,inevitablysomeofthedetailsfilteredbacktothecountriesthatprovidedtheinspectors.

FollowingOperationDesertFox,aUSandUKbombingcampaignagainstIraqifacilitiesinDecember1998,Iraqbannedfurtherweaponsinspections.However,whenthethreatofwaragainloomedinlate2002,Iraqallowedentryofnewteamsofinspectors,andinspectionscontinueduntilalmosttheoutbreakofwarinMarch2003.Duringthistime,over300siteswerevisitedtoestablishwhethertherewereanyindicationsthatweaponsprogramshadbeenresumedduringthethreeyearstheinspectorshadbeenabsent.Someofthese300siteswerethosesuggestedbycountries,includingtheUS,thatbelievedtheyhadintelligenceonwhereIraqmightbemakingWMD.

Ofcourse,afteronlythreemonthsofinspections,there

werestilldiscrepanciesanduncertainties,andasHansBlix,theheadoftheUNweaponsinspectorate,reportedtotheSecurityCouncilon14February2003,‘wedonotknoweverycaveandcorner’ofIraq.ButhealsoreportedthattherewasnothingtoindicateanyrenewedWMDactivity.Onthesameday,MohammedElBaradei,theheadoftheInternationalAtomicEnergyAgency,similarlyreportedthathisteamshad‘foundnoevidenceofongoingprohibitednuclearornuclear-relatedactivitiesinIraq’,butpointedoutthattherewere‘anumberofissues…stillunderinvestigation.’

PerhapsmoresignificantthanthelackofevidenceforWMDwasthestateofIraq’sindustriesin2003:aWMDprogramneedsfacilitiessuchassteelworksandchemical,electronicsandfabricationplants.Afteryearsofsanctions,UNinspectorsnotedthatfactorieshadfallenintodisrepairandIraq’scapacitytosupportevenabasicWMDprogramwasseverelylimited.Supportforatechnologicallysophisticatedprogram,suchasonerequiredfornuclearweapons,wasnon-existent.

ThusthelargestdatabaseonIraqicapabilities,theUNcollection,providednoevidenceofanyrenewedWMDactivity.Althoughthereweresomeuncertaintiesandissuestobe

WHAT EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE?

3130

strongintelligenceassessment’andonwhatinformationwasitbased?TwomajorAustralianinquiriesintotheintelligencethatledAustraliatowarhavebeenheld,oneinDecember2003byaparliamentaryjointcommitteeonASIO,ASISandDSDintelligenceonIraq’sweaponsofmassdestruction,andtheotherinJuly2004byPhilipFloodintoAustralianintelligenceagencies.Althoughneitherinquiryhadtermsofreferencesufficientlybroadtoanswerallthequestions,andeachhadotherfailings,muchhasnowbeenplacedinthepublicdomain.Inaddition,atotaloffiveinquirieshavebeenconductedintheUSandtheUK,withwhichAustraliahasintelligence-sharingagreements,andthesehaverevealedfurtherinformationparticularlyonthesourcesforMrHoward’s‘verystrongintelligenceassessment’.

Sources of informationUndoubtedly,andperhapssurprisinglytosome,thegreatestsourceofintelligenceforIraq’sWMDcamenotfromintelligencecollectionagenciessuchastheCIA,butfromtheUnitedNationsviaitsweaponsinspectors.AftertheFirstGulfWarin1991,IraqwasrequiredbyaSecurityCouncilresolutiontodestroyitsnuclear,chemicalandbiologicalweaponsandalsothelong-rangemissilesthatcoulddelivertheseweapons.Notonlyweretheweaponsthemselvestobeeliminated,butalsoallthesupportfacilities,materialsandequipmentthatwereusedtomakethem.Thisincludedresearchinstitutes,manufacturingplantsandtestfacilities.TosupervisethedestructionofIraq’sWMDcapabilities,theUNestablishedaninspectioncommission,andfrom1991untiltheendof1998abouta

Rod Barton

‘Istandbythefactthatbeforeweenteredthewar,wehadaverystrongintelligenceassessmentthatIraqhadaWMDcapability.’SosaidJohnHowardon20July2003

shortlyafterhehadcommittedAustraliatowartoridIraqofitsweaponsofmassdestruction.Butwhatwasthis‘very

resolved,theserelatedtopre-1991weaponsandwhetherthesehadbeencompletelyeliminated.Iraqichemicalorbiologicalweapons,iftheydidexist,wouldbeatleast12yearsoldbyearly2003andwouldthereforebeofdubiousutility.Inanycase,UNweaponsinspectorsassessedtherewouldbeonlysmallnumbersofsuchweapons;eveniftheyexisted,theywouldposelittlethreatbeyondthebordersofIraq.

IntelligenceagencieshadalsobeencollectinginformationonIraq.USSecretaryofStateColinPowellpresentedadeclassifiedversionofthistotheSecurityCouncilon5February2003.Almostallofitwasambiguousandopentootherinterpretations.Forexample,telephoneinterceptsofIraqiofficialscouldbeinterpretedasreferencestohiddenweaponsbut,equally,otherexplanationswerepossible.Similarly,satelliteimagesoftrucksallegedlycarryingchemicalweaponscouldjustaseasilyhavebeentransportingsomethingmoreinnocent.

Themostdefinitive,althoughultimatelyincorrect,pieceofinformationpossessedbytheUSrelatedtoanallegedbiologicalweaponsfactorymountedonasemi-trailer.TheUSclaimedthat‘thesourcewasaneyewitness,anIraqichemicalengineerwhosupervisedoneofthesefacilities’.Atthetime,thismighthaveseemedlikepersuasiveevidence

exceptforthefactthatthiswasasinglesourceandtherewasnoothercorroboratinginformation.ItshouldnotthereforehavebeenacceptedasevidenceofaWMDcapabilityandindeedwasnotbyAustralianintelligenceagencies.

Infact,theso-called‘source’wasanIraqirefugeeinGermany.HehadnotbeeninterviewedbyUSauthoritiesbutbyGermanintelligence,whichhadpassedonitsfindingstotheCIA.Germanintelligencehad,however,advisedtheUSthattheybelievedthesourcewasunstableandafabricator.TheGermanreservationswerewelljustifiedandthesourcehassinceadmittedthathemadeupthestorytogetavisaandworkpermittoallowhimtoliveinGermany.

Assessment of intelligenceAustraliahadlimitedcapacitytocollectitsownintelligenceonIraq,butthroughintelligence-sharingagreementsmost,althoughnotall,oftheresultsofspecialcollectioneffortsbytheUSandUKwereavailabletoAustraliananalysts.Inaddition,AustraliananalystswerewellinformedonmuchoftheinformationinthevastUNdatabase.OfthetwoAustralianintelligenceassessmentauthoritiesadvisingthegovernmentbeforethe2003Iraqwar,theDefenceIntelligenceOrganisation(DOI)wasthebetterplacedtoprovidetechnicaladviceonWMD.It

CHAPTER 3

32

MembersoftheUNSCOMteaminspectmustardagentl55-mmartilleryprojectilesinFallujah,Iraq,inAugust1991. Credit: Shankar Kunhambu

availableatthetime.Bythistest,DIO’sassessmentthatIraqhadsomeoldweaponsbutnonewprogramswasreasonable.ONA’smoreaggressiveassessmentonthelikelihoodofrenewedweaponsprogramdoesnotseemobjectivelybased.Onecanonlyspeculateonwhy,withthesamerawintelligence,itsviewsdivergedsofarfromthoseofDIO.

Was it a ‘very strong intelligence assessment’?ItisnotclearwhatbriefingJohnHowardreceivedjustpriortotheIraqwar.ONAandDIOhaddifferentviewsontheevidenceforIraq’spossessionofWMD,andreportsfrombothwouldhavebeenforwardedtohisoffice.EvenifhehadlistenedonlytowhatONAwassaying,ithardlyseemstobethe‘verystrongintelligenceassessment’thatheclaims.Forexample,althoughONAassessedIraqhad‘almostcertainlybeenworkingtoincreaseitsabilitytomakechemicalandbiologicalweapons’,itdoesnotsuggestthatstockpilesofweaponshadactuallybeenmanufactured.Therefore,it

isnotsurprisingthatPhilipFlood,whoconductedoneoftheinquiriesintoAustralianintelligence,toldanSBSintervieweron22July2004thattheevidenceonIraq’sWMDwas‘thin,ambiguousandincomplete’.Soperhapsthisiswhyon4February2003theprimeminister,inpresentinghiscasetoparliamentfordecisiveactionagainstIraq,didnotrefertoAustralianintelligencebutinsteadcitedtheaggressiveUKandUSassessments.

Inanycase,thepossessionbyIraqofWMDisnotthepoint.Beforeadecisiontogotowarin2003,thequestionthatshouldhavebeenaskedis:didIraqposeathreateithertoneighbouringcountriesortothewiderinternationalcommunity,includingAustraliaanditsallies?AgainitisnotclearwhetherthiswasaddressedbytheAustralianintelligencecommunity,althoughitseemsnot.Andmorecritically,wasthisaskedbytheHowardgovernment?Wedonotknowtheanswer,butifthisquestionwasnotasked,thenthatwasafundamentalandcatastrophicfailing.

WHAT EVIDENCE WAS AVAILABLE?

35

hasabranchstaffedwithhighlyqualifiedpersonnelwhoareexpertsinchemical,biologicalandnuclearweapons.Ontheotherhand,theOfficeofNationalAssessments(ONA)intheDepartmentofPrimeMinisterandCabinethasfewtechnicalspecialists,buthasgreaterexpertiseinthepoliticaldimensionsoftheMiddleEast.Theagenciesworkedinclosecooperation,butproducedtheirownindependentassessmentstothegovernmentinthelead-uptothewar.

IthasbecomeevidentthatuptoSeptember2002bothagencieshadsimilarassessmentsofIraq’sWMDcapabilities,butafterthatdateviewsdiverged,astheparliamentaryjointcommitteerevealedinDecember2003andtheFloodinquirylaterconfirmed.DIOmaintaineditspreviouslyheldviewthatIraqhadnotrestarteditsWMDprograms.Forexample,itstatedonbiologicalweaponsthat:‘Thereha[ve]beennoknownoffensiveresearchanddevelopmentssince1991,noknownBW[biologicalweapons]productionsince1991andnoknownBWtestingorevaluationsince1991.’Andonchemicalweapons,DIOasserted:‘ThereisnoknownCW[chemicalweapons]production.’

ONA,however,afterSeptember2002,wasmoreupbeat.Forexample,itreported:‘Iraqhas

almostcertainlybeenworkingtoincreaseitsabilitytomakechemicalandbiologicalweapons.’

BothagenciesassessedthatIraqprobablyretainedsomeoldpre-1991weaponsinlimitednumbers,butDIOaddedthatovertimetheywouldhavedegradedandhence‘thecapacityforIraqtoeffectivelyemployweaponisedCWagentsisuncertain’.

Were these assessments fair and reasonable?TheIraqSurveyGroupreportedon30September2004thatatthetimeoftheIraqwarinMarch2003,IraqhadnoWMDandnoprogramstomakethem.Thisisnowwellestablished.Therefore,bothAustralianassessmentagencieshadgotitwrong,ONAmoresothanDIO.Ontheotherhand,neitheragencyhadmadethegrosserrorsoftheirUSandUKcounterpartsthathadpresentedtheintelligenceasdefinitive,hadstatedwithcertaintythatIraqhadresumeditschemical,biologicalandnuclearweaponprograms,andthatIraqposedanimminentthreattotheinternationalcommunity.Afterthewar,BritishandAmericaninquiriesshowedthatmanyclaimsaboutIraq’sWMDwerefalse.

ThebenchmarkbywhichtheAustralianintelligenceagenciesshouldbejudgedisnotwhatisknownnow,butwhethertheyhadfairlyassessedtheevidence

CHAPTER 3

34

CHAPTER 4

How highly did the children rate?

AnIraqiboywatchesasUSsoldiersconductsitesurveysintheAlEwajregionofTikritinSeptember2009.Credit: Steven King

HansvonSponeck,successiveheadsoftheOil-for-Foodprogram,eachresignedfromthatpositioninprotestattheeffectsofthesanctions,whichcontinuedtotakeaheavytolloninnocentlives.

Againstthisbackground,reportsthatemergedin2002and2003expressedalarmatthefurthersufferingthatwouldbeinflictedbytheimpendingwar.

Pre-war warningsInNovember2002Medact,theUKaffiliateofInternationalPhysiciansforthePreventionofNuclearWar,releasedareportCollateralDamage:ThehealthandenvironmentalcostsofwaronIraq.Thereportexaminedtheshort-andlong-termeffectsofthe1991GulfWar,thesanctions,andtheno-flyzonesimposedonIraqwithcontinuedbombingbyUSandUKforces,andportrayedanation,in2002,thatwasweakenedandimpoverished.‘TheIraqipeople’smentalandphysicalhealthandwell-beingwereseriouslyharmedbythedirectimpactofthe1990–91war,’itstated.‘Theywerefurtherweakenedbytheindirecteffectsoftheconflictinavarietyofwaysthatstemfromtheconsequencesofeconomiccollapse,andfromwidespreadinfrastructuraldestructionanddamagetoservicesandfacilities.’

Thereportarguedthatevenabest-casescenario–ashortwarcomparabletothatof1991–would

haveamuchgreaterimpactontheIraqipeopleandsurroundingcountriesthanthatwardid.ItwasestimatedthatnewattacksonIraqcouldleadtouptohalfamilliondeathsonallsides,includingtheeffectsoftheinitialattack,ongoingconflictandrefugeedeaths.

TheAustralianlaunchofCollateralDamagewasatParliamentHouseinCanberraon12November2002,anditreceivedsignificantmediacoverage.ThereportwascommendedbyGeneralPeterGration,formerchiefoftheAustralianDefenceForce,whosaid,‘Thisisnotanexaggeratedtractbyabunchofzealots.Itisacoldlyfactualreportbyhealthprofessionals,whodrawonthebestevidenceavailable…erringonthesideofcaution.’

ThefindingsoftheCollateralDamagereportwerereinforcedinJanuary2003bytheCenterforEconomicandSocialRightsinNewYork,whichalsopredictedhumanitariandisasterintheeventofwar.TheCentersentateamofexpertsinfoodsecurityandnutrition,publichealthinfrastructure,publichealthcare,andemergencymedicinetoIraqtoexaminepreparednessforfurtherviolenceanddeprivation.Theirreport,TheHumanCostsofWarinIraq,statedthattheinternationalcommunity(theUNandreliefagencies)wasunpreparedforthehumanitarian

HOW HIGHLY DID THE CHILDREN RATE?

3938

Millionsofpeopleinthestreetsinover800citiesthroughouttheworld,includinginAustralia,couldseethatIraqicivilians,includingchildren,wouldpaythecostfortheactionsoftheirleaders.Whatisnotclearistheextent,ifany,towhichthepredictionsoflarge-scalehumansufferingweighedintheAustraliangovernment’sdecision-makingprocess.

Warningsofthelikelyconsequencesofthewarpresentedaconsistentmessage–thatIraqisocietywasdegradedbythe1991GulfWarandover10yearsofcripplingeconomicsanctions,andthatitwouldnotbecapableofwithstandingfurthermilitaryconflict.Theimpactofthesanctionshadbeendocumentedrepeatedlyduringthe1990s,byamultitudeofUNagenciesandnon-governmentorganisations.AsearlyasJuly1993,theFoodand

AgricultureOrganizationandtheWorldFoodProgrammereportedthattheeconomicsanctionshad‘virtuallyparalysedthewholeeconomyandgeneratedpersistentdeprivation,chronichunger,endemicunder-nutrition,massiveunemploymentandwidespreadhumansuffering’.Large-scalestarvationwasavoidedduetoaneffectivepublicrationingsystem.

TheUNOil-for-Foodprogram,implementedin1996,providedsomereliefbutnotamajorimprovementinthewell-beingofthepeople,andwidespreadmalnutritionremained.Infantmortality,whichisagoodindicatorofacountry’shealthstatusgenerally,hadfallento65per1000livebirthsjustbeforethe1991GulfWar,buthadrisenagainto103by1998,reflectingthehugedeteriorationinhealthconditionsinthatperiod.DenisHallidayand

Dr Jenny Grounds and Dr Sue Wareham OAM

TheinvasionofIraqwasahumanitariandisaster.Thiswasnottheresultofthingsunexpectedlygoingwrong.During2002and2003,manyindividualsandgroups

expressedconcernaboutthecertainharmtohumanhealth,andalsototheenvironment,ifthewarproceeded.

disasterofanotherwarinIraq.Thehealthcaresystemwasextremelyfragileandgrosslyinadequateevenbeforethewarbegan.Oneofthereport’sauthorsstatedthat‘Iraqhasbecomelikeavastrefugeecamp’.TheauthorsalsoexpressedconcernthatPentagonwarplansforIraqexplicitlythreatenedcivilianinfrastructure.

AlsoinJanuary2003,theInternationalStudyTeam,anindependentgroupofacademics,researchers,andpractitionerswhohadreportedoninfantmortalityinIraqasaresultofthe1991warandtheeconomicsanctions,publishedafurtherreport,OurCommonResponsibility:TheimpactofanewwaronIraqichildren.Thereportstatedthat:

n Iraqichildrensufferedsignificantpsychologicalharmfromthethreatofwarthatwashangingoverthem

n Iraqichildrenwerestillinasignificantlyworsestatethantheywerebeforethe1991war

n Becausemostofthe13millionIraqichildrenweredependentonfooddistributedbytheIraqigovernment,thedisruptionofthissystembywarwouldhaveadevastatingimpactonchildrenwhoalreadyhadahighrateofmalnutrition

n Theinternationalcommunityhadlittlecapacitytorespond

totheharmthatchildrenwouldsufferbyanewwar.

On25FebruarytheWorldFoodProgrammealsowarnedthattheimpendinginvasionmightdisruptthegovernmentfoodhand-outstomillionsofIraqis–asystem,itsaid,thatwasveryeffectiveindeliveringessentialrations.(Aspredicted,thedistributionoffoodrationswasdisrupted.)

Australia’sfederalparliamentar-ianswereawareofatleastsomeofthesedirepredictions,andmanyexpressedtheiroppositiontoourparticipationintheimpendingwar.Theyissuedastatementinearly2003noting:‘Civiliansarethefirstcasualtyofwar.Warwillmeanfurtherhumanitarianandenvironmentaldevastation,andafloodofnewrefugees.’

War and its effectsThewarbeganon19March,anditseffectswereapparentveryearlyon.InlateMarchUNICEFexpressedconcernatfrequentpowercuts,leadingtocutstocleanwatersupplyinBasra.InApriltheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCrossreportedthatthemedicalsysteminBaghdadhadvirtuallycollapsed.AlsoinAprilUNagenciesreportedthatlootingandlawlessnessobstructedtheiroperations.On2MayUNICEFreportedonthedangersconfrontingIraqichildren,

CHAPTER 4

40

AvehicleburnsinBaghdadin2006afterbeinghitbyamortar.Credit: Keith W. DeVinney

The violence continuesTragically,predictionsofongoinginstabilityandviolencetriggeredbythewarwereaccurate.AfurtherstudypublishedinTheLancetinOctober2006–fromrespectedresearchersusingsoundtechniques–estimatedafigureof655,000excessdeaths(deathsoverandabovethosethatwouldusuallyhaveoccurred)fromthestartofthewaruntilJuly2006,92percentofthesebeingduetodirectviolence.Whileprecisionwithsuchfiguresisnotpossible,theauthorsgaveapossiblerangefrom390,000to940,000excessdeaths.

AtthelowerendofestimatesofthedeathtollisthedatabaseIraqBodyCount,whichanalysespressandmediareportsofdeaths.Ithasdocumented107,000–117,000IraqiciviliandeathsfromviolencesincethestartofthewaruntilJuly2012.

Regardlessoftheexactnumberofdeaths,whichwewillneverknow,thetollisenormous.Fargreaterstillisthelegacyofshatteredbodiesandmindsandhumanmisery.

In2003,beforeAustraliawentto

war,DefenceMinisterRobertHillgaveassurancesthatourtroopswouldadheretointernationalhumanitarianlawandwouldnotattackciviliantargets.However,thegovernmentknew,orshouldhaveknown,thatduringthe1991Iraqwar,theattacksbyUSforcesoncivilianinfrastructurehaddestroyedmuchofIraq’selectricalgeneratingcapacity,withadisproportionateeffectonchildren’shealthfromcontaminatedwatersupplies(seeTNagy,Iraq:Thehumancostofhistory,2004).Australianswouldhavebeennaivetoassumethatinplanningandexecutingthe2003invasiontheprotectionofcivilianswouldbeourally’shighestpriority.

Nearly10yearslater,thechildren,womenandmenofIraqarepayingaheavypriceforthewar,astheywillcontinuetodoforalongtime.Theydonothavetheluxuryof‘movingon’.Ifwearetolearnanythingfromthisdisaster,wemustestablishhowitunfoldedandtherole,ifany,playedbytheamplewarningsthataccuratelypredicteditsfullhorror.

HOW HIGHLY DID THE CHILDREN RATE?

43

includinginsecuritywhichpreventedaiddelivery,infectiousillnessfromdegradedwatersupply,unexplodedmunitions,schoolclosuresandchildrenonthestreets,andenormousstressonhospitalswithinadequatesuppliesandongoingmalnutrition.Theproblemofinsecuritywassogreatthat,bySeptember2003,staffoftheInternationalCommitteeoftheRedCross,Oxfam,SavetheChildrenandMerlin(MedicalExpertsontheFrontline,aUKservicedeliveryorganisation)hadwithdrawntheirinternationalstafffromBaghdadandwerescalingdowntheiroperationsinIraq,aftertheAugustbombingoftheUNheadquartersandtheJordanianembassyinBaghdad.

Theterribleplightofthechildrencontinued.InFebruaryandMarch2004theWashingtonPost,theNewYorkTimesandTheIndependentreportedontheappallingconditionsinIraq’spaediatrichospitals,withverypoorsanitationandshortagesofessentialmedicationsandequipment.Deathsandmaimingfromunexplodedordnance,includingclusterbombs,tooka

furthertollonchildren.TheUNNewsServicereportedasearlyas17July2003thatover1000childrenhadbeenkilledorinjuredbyclusterbombsorIraqimunitions.

Refugeesfromthewarnumberinthemillions.CostsofWar,aJune2011reportfromBrownUniversity’sWatsonInstituteforInternationalStudies,statedthat‘3.5millionIraqishavefledtheir

homesandhavenotreturned’since2003.Thatnumberincludes1.7millioninternallydisplacedpersonsand1.8millionIraqiexpatriates.TheUNHighCommissionerforRefugeesputsthenumberevenhigher,estimating4.7milliondisplacedIraqis

sincetheinvasion.Despitegreatdifficultiesindata

collection,andintheabsenceofanyofficialciviliancasualtyfigures,someestimatesofthewar’sdeathtollemerged.InOctober2004themedicaljournalTheLancetreportedaclustersamplesurveywhichestimatedthatthewarhadcausedthedeathsofapproximately100,000Iraqis,withviolencebeingtheprimarycauseofdeath.Theviolencewasmainlyattributedtocoalitionforces.

CHAPTER 4

42

Ifwearetolearnanythingfromthisdisaster,wemustestablishhowitunfoldedandtherole,ifany,playedbytheamplewarningsthataccuratelypredicteditsfullhorror.

CHAPTER 5

What sort of inquiryis needed?

IraqiresidentsmustwadethroughalakeofwaterduetoamainbreakinBaghdadin2008.Credit: Charles Gill

thosewhohaveparticipatedintheinquiryprocess–mighthavemoreofastakeintheirimplementation.

Havingsaidthat,thestrictpartydisciplinewithinthemodernincarnationofAustralianWestminsterdemocracymightdiscouragethosememberswhofearpoliticalembarrassment,werethereporttocriticisepastgovernments,fromexercisingcompletecandourintheinquiryprocess.Totheextentthattheinquirymembersareinquiringintotheirownbehaviour,orthosewithwhomtheyhavestrongpoliticalallegiances,thereisariskthattherecouldbeatleastaperceptionoflessindependence.

senate inquiry

TheSenatehasthepowertoinitiateaninquiryviaitscommitteesystem.Thisinitiation,whichoccursbywayofreferral,wouldsetoutthemattersonwhichthecommitteecaninvestigateandreport.TherecanalsobereferraltoacommitteeifthereisabillbeforetheSenate.InChapter16ofOdgers,thepowersofcommitteesareoutlined.LikeRoyalCommissions,thereisapowertosendforpersonsanddocumentsbywayofsummonsandrequeststhatdocumentsbeproduced.

Thereisthepowertoholdvideo-recordedproceedings.Therecanbeadecisionbythecommitteetoholdtheproceedingsinpublicorinprivate.Proceedings

mightbeheldinprivateif,forexample,therelevantportionoftheproceedingsmightdisclosematerialthepublicationofwhichcoulddamagenationalsecurity.Thereisalsotheoptionofreleasingtheprivateevidenceofthehearinginthefuture,whentheinformationisnolongerclassifiedandissafetorelease.

Theadvantagesofthismodelofinquiry,especiallyintermsofpublicperception,includethatitcanprovideaforumforafullinvestigationofissues.However,shouldtherebeinvolvementofASIOorASIS,theSenatecommitteemightlackthepowertoreceivehighlyclassifiedinformation.SuchinformationmayonlybeabletobereleasedtotheOppositionLeaderandNationalSecurityCommitteeofCabinet.

Thismodelalsoallowsforhearingstobeasopenaspracticable,whileallowingthecommitteetohearclassifiedevidence.Theoptionofpartialpublicationseekstobalancenationalsecurityandopenness,byallowingscrutinyofclassifiedmaterialbutpreservingtheoptionofpubliclyreleasingtheclassifiedinformationatsomelaterdate.

Independenceisalsoenhancedbytheseparationoftheperson(s)conductingtheinquiryfromgovernmentbodiesthataredirectlyinvolvedinoperations,suchastheAustralianDefenceForces,ASIO

WHAT SORT OF INQUIRY IS NEEDED?

4746

withthepowersofaRoyalCommission;anadhoc(judicial)inquirywithoutRoyalCommissionpowers;aninquiryundertakenbytheAustralianLawReformCommission;oracitizens-initiatedinquirythatisinitiatedwithouttheinvolvementoftheCommonwealthGovernment.Indeterminingwhichmodelismostappropriate,themanyfactorsthatmightbetakenintoaccountinclude:

n Thepowersoftheperson(s)leadingtheinquiry(suchaspowersofcompulsionforevidencetobegiven,toforceattendanceandtoascertainclassifiedinformation)

n Howtodealwithinformationthathasbeenormaybeclassified,includinginrelationtothefinalreport

n Thelevelofindependenceoftheinquiry.

Parliamentary inquiriesOneoptionwouldbetoholdaninquirythroughthefederalparliamentarysystem.ThiscouldbeundertakenbytheSenate,bytheHouseofRepresentativesorbyajointcommitteeofbothHousesofParliament.Oneadvantageofaparliamentaryinquiryisthatsubmissionsandevidencegiventotheinquirycouldbemadepubliclyavailableandcoveredbyparliamentaryprivilege.(Section16ofthefederalParliamentaryPrivilegesAct1987providesforthisimmunity).Thiswouldprovideimmunityagainstdefamationandotherlegalliabilityinrespectofwitnesstestimony.

Anadvantageofaparliamentaryinquiryisthatitwouldbeundertakenbythelegislativearmofgovernment,withaccesstotheseniorexecutive.Ifreformsareproposed,thelegislators–atleast

Edward Santow

AssumingthereshouldbeaninquiryintothelegalityofAustralia’sinvolvementinthewarinIraq,thereareanumberofpossiblemodelsforsuchaninquiry.

Theseincludeaparliamentaryinquiry(bytheHouseofRepresentatives,theSenateorajointcommittee);aninquiry

ARoyalCommissionhasverybroadpowerstoconductinquiries.However,inestablishingacommissionofaninquiry,thegovernmentmightopttogivethecommissionlessthanthefullpowers.Thiscouldbeinrelationtoajudicialinquiry.AjudicialinquiryisalsocreatedbytheGovernor-Generalthroughissuingletterspatent.Thereisalsotheabilitytoestablishanon-statutoryformofinquiryintoparticularevents.

TheRoyalCommissionsActprovidesaRoyalCommissionorinquirywithpowersincluding:

n Tosummonwitnessesandtakeevidence

n Toapplyforsearchwarrantsn Toissueapenaltyforthe

refusaltogiveevidenceorbesworn

n Tohaveapersonarrestedforfailingtoappear

n Toinspect,retainormakecopiesofdocuments

n Toissuepenaltiesinrelationtofalseormisleadingevidence,briberyofwitnesses,fraudonwitness,destroyingdocumentsorotherthings,preventingawitnessfromattending,causinginjurytoawitness,employersdismissingemployeeswhoarewitnessesattheRoyalCommission,andcontemptoftheRoyalCommission.

WitnessesandothersgivingevidencetoaRoyalCommissionwouldhavethesamerightsasiftheyweregivingevidenceintheHighCourt.Similarly,aRoyalcommissionerwouldenjoyalloftheimmunitiesandprivilegesthataHighCourtjusticehas,andalegalpractitionerassistingthecommission,orappearingonbehalfofapersonatthecommission,wouldhavethesameprivilegesthattheywouldhaveinappearingbeforetheHighCourt.

RoyalCommissionshavespecialrulesinrelationtoprivilege.Generallyspeaking,apersoncannotrefusetoproduceadocumentonthebasisoflegalprofessionalprivilegewithoutfirsthavingtheirclaimacceptedbythecommissioner.

Thereisalsoaprovisioninrelationtotheprivilegeagainstself-incrimination.Itisnotanexcusetofailtoprovideevidenceordocumentsiftheymayincriminatetheperson.Itisonlyacceptableifit‘mighttend’toincriminatethepersoninrelationto:

n Anoffenceandthepersonhaseitherbeenchargedwiththatoffenceandproceedingsrelatingtoithavenotconcluded,or

n Apenaltyandproceedingshavecommencedinrelationtothepenaltyandhavenotbeenconcluded.


49

andASIS.However,suchaninquirywouldremainwithinthepoliticalrealm.Assuch,itisunlikelytohave–inperceptionorreality–thesamelevelofindependenceas,forexample,aRoyalCommission.

house of representatives inquiry

TheprocessbywhichtheHouseofRepresentativesmightinitiateaninquiryofthisnatureissummarisedontheParliament’swebsite.Itsays:

Theinquiryprocessmayvaryfrominquirytoinquiryascircumstancesdemandbutusuallyconsistsofthefollowingsteps:1. Referencereceivedbythe

committee.2. Referenceadvertised

throughvariousmedia,andsubmissionssoughtfromindividualsandorganisations.

3. Submissionsreceivedandauthorisedforpublication.

4. Committeeconductson-siteinspections,backgroundbriefingandseminars(whereappropriate).

5. Committeeconductspublichearingswithselectedindividualsandorganisationsrequestedtogiveoralevidence.

6. Committeeconsidersevidenceandpreparesreport.

7. ThereportispresentedtotheParliamentandmaybedebated.

8. CopiesofthereportaremadeavailablethroughvariousmeansincludingthroughthenationalandstatelibrariesandpublicationontheParliament’swebsite.

9. Governmentconsidersreport.

10. GovernmentrespondstoreportbypresentingresponseintheParliament.

ThepowersandrelativemeritsofaHouseofRepresentativesinquirywouldbeverysimilartothepowersofaSenatecommitteeinquiry.However,itshouldbenotedthat,bydefinition,thegovernmentofthedaycontrolstheHouse,andsoitislesslikelytobeabletobreakfromthestricturesofpoliticalpartydiscipline.

A Royal Commission and ad hoc inquiry without Royal Commission powersTheestablishmentandfunctioningofaRoyalCommissionisgovernedbythefederalRoyalCommissionsAct1902.TheGovernor-General,actingontheadviceofthegovernmentoftheday,institutesaRoyalCommission.Sheorheissuesletterspatent,establishingtheRoyalCommissionandsettingouttheinquiry’sremit.

CHAPTER 5

48

thedisclosureoftheidentityofparticipantsinaninquiry

n Makingordersrelatingtohowapersonshouldbeexaminedandwhatdocumentscanbeshowntotheperson

n Adaptinginquiryprocedures,forexample,implementingarrangementswithinquiryparticipantsandtheAustraliangovernmenttoenableagreementtobereachedonwhatportionsofthetranscriptshould,andshouldnot,bepublished

n Requiringinquiryparticipantstoprovidenoticepriortoreferringtonationalsecurityinformationinthecourseoftheinquiry,includinginsubmissions

n Preparingconfidentialvolumesorannexuresofthereportandplacinglimitsontheirdistribution

n MakingrecommendationstotheAustraliangovernmentregardingwhichpartsofareportshould,orshouldnot,bemadepublic

n Preparingabridgedversionsoffindingsandrecommendationssuitableforpublication

n Examiningnationalsecurityinformationandpreparingsummariesofsuchinformationforuseintheconductoftheinquiry

n Enteringintoarrangements

withAustraliangovernmentagenciesfortheprotectionofnationalsecurityinformationprovidedtotheinquiry,includinghandlingandstorage

n Makingarrangementsforpersonsaccessingnationalsecurityinformationinthecourseofaninquirytoobtainsecurityclearances.

relative merits

TheALRChasfoundthatRoyalCommissionsareperceivedbythepublictobemoreindependentandthepublicare‘morelikelytoacceptinquiryprocessesanddecisions’ofRoyalCommissions.Ithasalsocommentedthattheyare‘sometimesseentobemoreindependentthanothertypesofinquiriesbecausetheyaresupportedbystatute’.

ThereisthedisadvantagethataRoyalCommissioncannotimplementorlegislateanyofitsrecommendations.Instead,itisthelegislature’sresponsibilitytoconsiderand,ifitdeemsitappropriate,toimplementtheserecommendations.

Inquiry by the Australian Law Reform Commission TheALRCwasestablishedtoconductinquiriesondifficultquestionsoflegalandpublicpolicy.ItsinquiriescanbeinitiatedonlybytheAttorney-Generalreferringa


51

Anadhocjudicialinquiryisaninquirythatisestablishedbythegovernmentinrelationtoaparticularmatter.Itis‘judicial’inthesensethattheinquiryisledbyaformerorservingjudicialofficer.Whilethispersonwouldbeactingintheirpersonalcapacity,andsowouldnotbringwiththemtheirjudicialpowerstodeployforthepurposesoftheinquiry,theirstatusasacurrentorformermemberofthejudiciarymightlendtheinquiryagreatersenseofindependence.SuchaninquirycanresembleaRoyalCommissioninsomerespects.TheissuingofletterspatentbytheGovernor-Generalcouldbeusedtoinitiateanadhocjudicialinquiry.TheextenttowhichsuchaninquirywouldresembleaRoyalCommission,aswellasitsrelativeindependence,wouldlargelydependontheextentofthepowersprovidedtotheinquirycommissioner.

Frequently,adhocjudicialinquiriesarecommencedbywayofanenablingactofParliament.Itwoulddependonthecontentofsuchlegislationastowhetherthereisprotectionofallinvolvedintheinquirybyprivilege,andhowfarsuchprivilegeswouldextend.IfanadhocjudicialinquiryisestablishedwithsomepowersthataRoyalCommissionhas,theissuesofprivilegewouldresemblethosediscussedabove.TheAustralianLawReformCommission(ALRC)

notedin2009that‘non-statutoryinquiriesmaynotprovidelegalprotectiontoinquirymembers’.ThisindicatesprivilegemaynotattachtoallinvolvedinaninquirythatiscommencedwithoutanenablingactofParliament.

classified information

AstheALRChasexplained,RoyalCommissionshavetendedtodealwithclassifiedinformationdifferentlyfromadhocjudicialinquiries.ItappearsthatthereisnoprimafacierightforRoyalCommissionstohaveaccesstoclassifiedinformation.TheALRCnotedsomeofthedifficultiesinrelationtoclassifiedinformation.TheClarkeinquiryintothecaseofDrMohammedHaneef(anadhocjudicialinquiry)isindicativeofsomeoftheproblemsthatwouldbefacedinrelationtoclassifiedinformation.TheALRChassummarisedsomeofthewaysthatclassifiedinformationhasbeendealtwithbyRoyalCommissions:

n Holdinghearingsandexaminationsinprivate

n Withholdingmaterial,suchastranscriptsandexhibits,frompublication,ordeferringpublicationofsuchmaterial

n Makingordersprohibitingthedisclosureofparticulardocumentsorclassesofdocuments

n Makingordersprohibiting

CHAPTER 5

50

relative merits

TheALRCisanindependentstatutoryauthority,andsoismoreautonomousthanaparliamentarycommittee.However,itisonlyabletoinquireabouttheissuessetoutbytheAttorney-General.Further,thereisnoobligationonthegovernmenttofollowtheALRC’srecommendations,althoughhistoricallyahighproportionofitsrecommendationsareimplementedbygovernment.

Citizens-initiated inquiryAcitizens-initiatedinquirywouldbeaninquirythatisestablishedbyagroupofcitizenswithouttheofficialimprimaturofgovernment.Suchaninquirycouldbelaunchedbyanindividual,oneormorenot-for-profitorganisations,orabroadcoalitionofstakeholders.Acitizens-initiatedinquirywouldnotattracttheprivilegesorpowersthatareattachedtoaparliamentaryinquiry,adhocjudicialinquiry,RoyalCommissionorALRCinquiry.Thereareprivileges,suchasprivilegeagainstself-incrimination,professionallegalprivilegeandparliamentaryprivilege,whichattachtovariousothermethodsofinquirythatwouldnotoperateinthismethodofinquiry.Assuch,witnessesgivingevidencewillnotbecoveredbytheseprivileges,andmaybelessinclinedtoprovideevidence,asthiscouldexposethemtolegalaction.

Asanobviouspracticalmatter,theresourcesavailabletoacitizens-initiatedinquirywoulddependonthosestakeholderswhochoosetobackit.Whileitwouldlackthelegalpowertocompeltheproductionofevidenceortheappearanceofparticularwitnesses,itcouldusethefederalFreedomofInformationActtoobtaingovernment-heldinformationthatisnotexemptfromdisclosure.Ofcourse,however,inaninquirysuchasthis,itishighlylikelythatthegovernmentwouldrelyonthestatutoryexemptionfromdisclosureinrespectofinformationthatmightprejudicenationalsecurityorinternationalrelations.Thiswouldsignificantlyhampertheabilityofsuchaninquirytoobtainevidencenotalreadyinthepublicdomain.

relative merits

Inprinciple,acitizens-initiatedinquirycouldbeexpectedtogeneratestrongerpublicsupportgiventhatitwouldbecompletelyseparatefromgovernment,whichwouldbethemainsubjectoftheinquiry.However,inpractice,thissupportanditsrelativeindependencewouldrelyheavilyonthepeoplemostcloselyassociatedwiththeinquiry.Iftheinquirywereperceivedasbeingcloselyalignedtoaparticularpoliticalpartyorideologicalcause,itsindependencewouldbediminished.


53

mattertotheALRCandprovidingtermsofreferencethatdemarcateitsinvestigativeboundaries.

However,thecommissiontendstofocusitsinquiriesongeneralissues(suchasprivacy,seditionorgenepatenting)asdistinctfromthelegalityofaparticulardecision.InordertobringanALRC-ledinquirywithinitsstatutoryremit,thefocusoftheinquirywouldneedtobeonthelegalprocessbywhichAustraliaentersarmedconflictgenerally.ThiswouldnotprecludetheALRCfrominvestigatingthelegalityofAustraliagoingtowarinIraq,butthisprobablycouldnotbethemainfocusoftheinquiry.

UnlikejudicialinquiriesandRoyalCommissions,theALRCdoesnotwieldanycoercivepowerstorequireevidenceordocumentstobegiventotheinquiry.Assuch,itappearsthattheissuesrelatingtoprivilegebeingclaimedwhereevidenceordocumentsarecalledfor,likeinadhocjudicialinquiriesandRoyalCommissions,wouldnotarise.However,theALRCdoeshavethe‘powertodoeverythingnecessaryorconvenienttobedonefor,orinconnectionwith,theperformanceofitsfunctions.’Itsmodusoperandiistoconsultrelevantstakeholdersandundertakeresearch.ThisinformstheALRC’sthinkingandisreflectedinitsprocess,whichusuallystartswithanissuespaper(providingbackgroundcontext

andaskingaseriesofquestions),followedbyadiscussionpaper(settingoutdraftproposalsforreform)andconcludingwithafinalreportthatcontainsitsreformrecommendations.

Thefinalreportisprovidedtothegovernment,whichisobligedtotableitinParliament.ThegovernmentretainsfulldiscretionregardingwhethertoimplementtherecommendationsoftheALRCthroughlegislativechanges.

WhiletheALRCwouldlackthepowertoobtainclassifiedinformation,itdoeshaveexperienceindealingwithquestionsofnationalsecurity.Anexampleisitsinquiryintoclassifiedinformation,KeepingSecretsReport:Theprotectionofclassifiedandsecuritysensitiveinformation.Asnotedabove,theALRCdoeshaveawide-rangingpower.ThereisnostatutoryprovisionprovidedforintheALRCAct1996thatdealswiththeissueofprivilege.However,theALRCpublishedapolicyinJune2010inrelationtosubmissionsandinquirymaterial.Generally,theALRCattemptstomakeallsubmissionspublic.However,whereinformationisprovidedtoitinconfidence,itwillnotmaketheinformationpubliclyavailable.IfarequestforsuchadocumentweremadeunderthefederalFreedomofInformationAct1982,theALRChasstatedthatinmostinstancesitwouldbedeniedundersection45.

CHAPTER 5

52

CHAPTER 6

A better Westminster way to war?

AnAustraliansoldiertakespartinajointexercisewiththeUSmilitaryatShoalwaterBayinQueenslandin2011.Credit: Andrew Dakin

besatisfiedofthelegalityofthedecisiontaken.

2 The‘prerogative’exerciseddirectlybythesovereign–seenastheresidueofthesovereign’soncetheoreticallyabsolutepower.Thesewereincreasinglyexercisedonadviceandthosepowerswhichcouldbeexercisedwithoutadvicecametobecalledthe‘reservepowers’.

3 Statutorypowersgiventoministersornominatedofficialsunderlegislation.

4 Powersthatareneitherstatutorynorprerogative(suchasthepowertoentercontracts).

Mostexecutiveactivityiscarriedoutthroughthelasttwobutthemostsignificantdecisionsarecarriedoutthroughthefirsttwo.

The war power in AustraliaAtFederation,Australiadidnotgainfullindependence.Althoughsection61oftheConstitutionvestedexecutivepowerinthequeenandexercisablebythegovernor-general,thisdidnotincludethepowertodeclarewar.WhenthekingdeclaredwaractingonhisUKadvisers,Australiaautomaticallywenttowaraswell.

In1942,Australiaadoptedthe1931StatuteofWestminster,becameindependentandhencetransferredthewarpowertothe

governor-general.ActingontheadviceoftheAustraliancabinet,hedeclaredwaragainstfourbelligerents.Itwasgenerallyassumedthatthesedeclarationsweremadeundersection61oftheConstitution,whichnowincludedfullexecutivepower.

However,toputthematterbeyondanydoubt,Attorney-GeneralHVEvattarrangedforaformaldelegationofwar-makingpowerfromthekingtothegovernor-generalundersection2oftheConstitution.Asitwasinwar,soitwasinpeacewiththegovernor-generalsigningoffonpeacewithGermanyin1951.

In2003,mostconstitutionallawyersexpectedthatthepoliticaldecisionwouldbetakenbycabinetasawholeorthesecuritycabinetbutlegallyauthorisedbythegovernor-generalonadvicefromtheprimeministereitherexercisingtheprerogativeorthroughtheFederalExecutiveCouncil.

Thegovernor-general,PeterHollingworth,certainlythoughtso:‘Isawitasmydutytoaskthegovernmentofthedaywhatinstruments,ifany,wererequiredtoinvokesuchanactionortoratifythedecisionsofgovernment.’WithregardtoAfghanistan,‘thePrimeMinisterinformedmethatnoorderfromtheGovernor-Generalwasrequired.Inthatmatter,hecitedtheANZUSTreatyasthebasisforactionbythegovernment.’

A BETTER WESTMINSTER WAY TO WAR?

5756

Aslegislativeandjudicialpowerswereseparatedfromexecutivepowersandgiventoparlements/parliamentsandcourts,thepowertomakewarremainedclearlywithintheexecutivepoweroftheEnglishsovereigns.Butthispowerwasalwayssubjecttopracticallimitationsoffindingthenecessarysoldiers,armsandmoneytopayforthem.

Fromthe17thcentury,thepowerofthepurseoftheEnglishparliamentconstrainedallgovernmentactionandmeantthatmonarchsstartedtoappointministerswhocouldgetlegislation,especiallymoneybills,throughparliament.Theycametobeled,coordinatedandthennominatedbya‘prime’minister.

The‘loss’oftheAmericancoloniesledtothecrystallisationoftheparliamentarysystem.Althoughexecutivepowerlegally

remainedinthesovereign’shands,itwasincreasinglyexercisedbyministersappointedbythesovereignunderpowersconferredbylegislationorexercisedbythesovereignonthe‘advice’ofministers–advicewhichwasincreasinglytaken.Executivepowerwasdividedintofourkinds:

1 Powersgivento‘Queen-in-Council’or‘PrivyCouncil’inwhichthesovereignwouldmakedecisionsinthepresenceof,andontheadviceof,herministers.CommonwealthcountrieshadsimilarbodiescalledtheGovernor-General-in-Counciland/orFederalExecutiveCouncil.Actionscanonlybetakenonministerialadvicebutthegovernor-generalcanaskquestionsandwillgenerallywantto

Prof Charles Sampford

InMontesquieu’sfamoustripartiteseparationofpowers(executive,legislativeandjudicial),thepowertomakewarwasclearlypartoftheexecutivepower.Itwasthe

quintessentialsovereignpowerwhenthesovereignandstatewereinseparableandsupposedlyallpowerful.

oftheMinister’.ThismaynotsoundlikeadelegationofpowertothedefenceministertomakewarandthereisnohintofsuchanintentionintheTangereport,whichrecommendedthechange,orthedebatethataccompaniedit–includingassurancesthatthegovernor-general’spowerswouldbeunaffected.Theotherintriguingelementofthegovernor-general’sstatementistheundertakingbytheprimeministertotakethematterbeforetheFederalExecutiveCouncil‘fornoting’.ItisnotclearwhetherthereisaplaceinFECmeetingsfornotingdecisionsand,ifso,whetheritprecludesthegovernor-generalaskingquestionsashecanwithregardtonormalFECdecisions(includinglegalonessuchastheoneheasked).

Enhancing the processTheprocesswherebydecisionstogotowararetakenbycabinet,especiallythoseundertheeffectivecontrolofstrongprimeministers,hasbeenqueriedbymany,andseveralsuggestionshavebeenmadefortheirimprovement.MostofthesesuggestedchangeshaverootsinourorotherWestminstersystemsandtheiradoptionwouldbeincompleteaccordwiththelongstandingWestminstertraditionofprogressthroughincrementalreformincorporatinglessonslearnedininstitutionalpractice.Wewillbrieflyreviewtheminturn.

parliamentary approval

ParliamentaryapprovalinthelowerhousewassoughtandsecuredbybothTonyBlair(inadvance)andJohnHoward(retrospectively).SomehavesoughttolegislatetorequiresuchapprovalreflectingtherequirementforcongressionalapprovalundertheUSconstitution.However,itshouldberememberedthatCongressisnotinapositiontogetridofapresidentthroughano-confidencemotion–whichisamuchbroaderpowertocontrolgovernmentsincurringthedispleasureofamajorityofthelowerhouse.Ifparliamentaryapprovalisrequiredinbothhouses,apotentialcheckisimposedongovernmentsandcoalitionsthatdonotcontroltheupperhouse.GarryWoodard’ssuggestionofanationallytelevisedjointsittingisagoodonebutisconstitutionallydifficult.AvariationcouldbethatdecisionstogotowarbesupportedbyamajorityinthelowerhouseandamajorityofallMPsinbothhouses,whichwouldhavethesameeffect.

Butweshouldbecarefulofexpectingtoomuchofsuchrequirements.EvenintheUS,thisconstitutionalprovisionisalimiteddeterrenttowarsofaggression.ItdidnotstopthewarsagainstCanadain1812,Mexicoin1846,Spainin1898orIraqin2003.

Muchdependsonthequalityofinformationparliamentreceives.


59

OnIraqhewrites:

Ihadpreviouslyreadpublicstatementsmadebysomeacademicsandinternationallawyers,and,ontheadviceoftheOfficialSecretary,IsoughtclarificationfromtheAttorney-Generalastotechnicalramificationsthatcouldariseunderinternationallaw.Ihadnotrequestedit,butheimmediatelyreferredthemattertothePrimeMinisterwhometwithmetoaddresstheissuesfromavailablelegaladvice.He…informedmethatnorecommendationswereeverputtoanyofmypredecessorsinrelationtotroopdeploymentstoplacessuchasSomalia,Bougainville,Bosnia,Cambodia,Rwanda,thePersianGulf,VietnamorEastTimor.

HehadpreviouslygivenanundertakingthatinsuchcircumstanceshewouldinfuturerequesttheMinisterforDefencetorecommendtotheGovernor-GeneralinCouncilthatthedeploymentofAustralianforcesoverseasbenotedbywayofrecognitionofthepositionofGovernor-GeneralessentiallyasthetitularCommander-in-ChiefoftheAustralianDefenceForces.

WhenAustraliawenttowar,theprimeministersetoutthe

politicalprocessbywhichthedecisionhadbeenmade,citingtheprocessfollowedbyPrimeMinisterBobHawkein1991.However,itwaswidelyknownthatGovernor-GeneralBillHaydenhadcomplainedthathehadnotbeenaskedtogivehispriorapprovalandithadbeenassumedthatthiswasanerrorwhichwouldhavebeenrectified.Theclaimtoalong-standingpracticewassurprising–thoughalloftheotherconflictsHowardcitedhadinvolvedactivitiesapprovedbythesovereignpoweranddidnotinvolveawarbetweensovereignstatesthatwouldgiverisetoadeclarationofwar.

Thisdoesraisethequestionofthelegalmeansbywhichthepoliticaldecisionbycabinethadbeeneffected.Cabinethasneitherconstitutionalstatusnorlegalpower.Politicaldecisionsreachedtherearelegallyexecutedbyministers,officials,thegovernor-generalortheFederalExecutiveCouncilunderoneofthefourformsofexecutivepowersetoutinthefirstsectionofthischapter.

Itnowappearsclearthatcabinet’sdecisionwaseffectedthroughastatutorypowervestedinthedefenceministerundera1975amendmenttotheDefenceActwhichvests‘thegeneralcontrolandadministrationoftheDefenceForce’intheministerandrequiresthemilitarytoexerciseitspowers‘inaccordancewithanydirections

CHAPTER 6

58

legal advice

BlairandHowardprovidedlegaladvicetoparliament.Theadvicewasmuchcriticised,notleastforrepresentingaminorityviewamonginternationallawyersandnotrecognisingeitherthemajorityviewofthelikelyoutcomesifitwenttocourt.BlairdidnotsupplyLordGoldsmith’searlierandfulleradvicetocabinet,letalonetoparliament.Howarddidnotevenconsultthesolicitor-general.Parliamentneedsindependentadvice.

Insomejurisdictionstheattorney-generalhasadutytomakelegaldecisionsandgivelegaladviceindependentlyofcabinet–traditionallybyconventionintheUKandCommonwealthjurisdictionsandlegislatedinQueensland.IntheUK,thisincludedtheprovisionoflegaladvicetoparliamentaswellasthegovernment.However,thiscangiverisetosignificanttensionsasillustratedbyGoldsmith’ssecretandpublicadvice.Someoftheindependentpowershavebeenlargelytransferredtostatutorybodies(mostnotablythatoverprosecutions).InAustralia,theattorney-general’s‘client’isthegovernmentandnottheparliament.Understandingorderstheattorney-generalcannotbeaskedforalegalopinioninquestiontime.Theattorney-generalatthetimeoftheIraqwar,Daryl

WilliamsQC,consideredthathispositionincabinetandthefargreaterexecutiveresponsibilitiesofAustralianattorneys-generalcomparedtoBritishattorneys-generalmeantthatthesolicitor-general(anindependentstatutoryofficer)shouldbetheonetoprovidewrittenopinions.

Giventhisbackground,Westminsterparliamentsmightconsiderarangeofoptions:

n Securingalegalopinionfromthesolicitor-generalprovidedtheyaresatisfiedwiththegovernment’sbrief

n Securingindependentlegalopiniononthebasisthattheclientofthesolicitor-generalisthegovernment

n Seekinganadvisoryopinionfromtheultimateappellatecourt.Giventhegravityofgoingtowar,itwouldbenotunreasonabletorequirethecourttogivethispriority,buttheAustralianHighCourthasruleditdoesnothavetheconstitutionalpowertodoso

n Establishingastandingpanelofformerjudgesorprominentinternationallawyerstoprovideadvice.

Asproofofgoodfaith,AustraliashouldalsoconsideracceptingthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeforanyoccasiononwhichit


61

resortstoarmedforceprovidedthatthestatewhichseekstoquestionanyclaimedillegalitybyAustraliaalsoacceptsthecourt’scompulsoryjurisdictionoverbreachesofinternationallawcitedbyAustraliaasareasonfortheuseofarmedforce(whatIcallthe‘sosueme’approach).

Seekingandhearingsuchopinionscouldbegiventoaparliamentarycommitteewhichreportedtoparliament.Thiswouldgiveitthetimeandtheabilitytohandleanyconfidential,privilegedorsecretinformation.Therearemanyparliamentaryandcongressionalcommitteeswhichhandlesuchmatterswithnecessarysecurityclearances.Thepresenceofoppositionmembersisnobartotheirreceivingsuchbriefingsastheycouldbeministersfollowingthenextelection.

military and intelligence advice

Thesamecommitteethatheardlegaladvicecouldalsoreceiveconfidentialbriefingsonmilitaryandintelligenceassessments.Theseassessmentsmust,ofcourse,beprofessional,independent,frankandfearless.

the federal executive council

WhiletheIraqwarwasnotbroughtbeforetheFederalExecutiveCouncil,thereismeritindoingsoanditwouldappearprocedurallysuperiortoboththe

governor-generalactingontheprerogativealoneonadviceorthedefenceministeractingundersection8oftheDefenceAct.

Underthecabinethandbook,theattorney-generalwouldpresumablyhavetoprovideacertificate(thoughclarificationwouldneedtobemadeastowhetherthecertificatemerelydealtwiththedomesticlegalityortheinternationallegalityaswell).Thereisalsoanopportunityforthegovernor-generaltoperformtheroleWalterBagehotidentifiedforaconstitutionalmonarch–tocounsel,adviseandwarn–andtoaskquestionsaboutthelegalbasisofadecisionbeforesigningoffondocuments.

The ICC imperativeNowthatAustraliahasagreedtoextendthejurisdictionoftheInternationalCriminalCourttocrimesofaggressionandsubjectitselftothatjurisdiction,theUSprosecutor’sclosingstatementatNurembergiscomingtrue:‘LetmemakeclearthatwhilethislawisfirstappliedagainstGermanaggressors,thelawincludes,andifitistoserveausefulpurposeitmustcondemnaggressionbyanyothernations,includingthosewhichsitherenowinjudgment.’

Australiawillneedtoprovidemechanismsforevaluatingproposalsforgoingtowartoprotectministers,governors-

60

CHAPTER 6

generalandservicechiefsfromsubsequentinvestigationandprosecution.ItwillalsoneedtoestablishcredibleandindependentmeansforsuchinvestigationandprosecutionwithinAustraliatoensurethattheICCwillnotfeelitnecessaryinafutureconflict.

WhileAustraliahasfiveyearsinwhichtodothis,dothisitmust.Ifitgetsinearly,itwillprovideamodelforotherWestminsterdemocraciesandensurethatanydecisionstoenterconflictsbeforethataretakenonasoundbasisandnotruntheriskofthedamagesomanybelievetohaveoccurred.

Public and parliamentary debateWhiletheformalparliamentaryprocessesareatthenaturalcentreofdiscussion,theydonotoperateinavacuumbutinahighlychargedpublicdebate.Thequalityofdebateinparliamentwillaffectandbeaffectedbythatpublicdebate.Severalimportantprofessionsareinvolved–lawyers,soldiers,journalistsandpoliticians.

Lawyersshouldrememberthattheirprimarydutyistothelawandthesystemofjustice(inthiscaseinternationaljusticeaswellasdomesticjustice)andshouldnotusethelesserlikelihoodoflitigationtogiveclientstheadvicetheywanttohear–ortoclaimthatthelawisastheywouldlikeittoberatherthanasitislikelytobedeterminedbyacourtofcompetent

jurisdiction.Lawyersmayadvocateforlegalchangebutnotpretendthatithasalreadyhappened.

Similarlyprofessionaljournalistshaveacriticalroleintheformationofpublicopinioninademocracy–nevermoresothaninthegravestdecisionanynationcantake.

Themilitaryprofessioniscalledontorisktheultimatesacrificeduringwarandneedtoprovidetheirprofessionalopinionwhentheircivilianmastersareconsideringwhetherornottheyarecalledupontodoso.Somedonotseepoliticiansinprofessionalterms.Wecananddoandagainseethegreatestneedforthatprofessionalismwhentheyaremakingthatdecisiononbehalfofthepeopletheyserve.

ANZUSMrHoward’sreferencetoANZUSdidnotaddressDrHollingworth’squestionaboutdomesticconstitutionalprocesswithrespecttotheAfghanistanwar.Butitdidaddressanimportantissueofnationalpolicy.WedonotyetknowexactlywhatparttheUSallianceplayedintheIraqdecisionandhowthiswassquaredoffwithotherissues(legality,WMD,potentialciviliancasualties).Onesuspectsthatitloomedverylarge.

ThecaseforaninquirydoesnotdependonoppositiontoANZUSandtheUSalliance,thoughsomemayseektofalselyportrayitas


63

CHAPTER 6

62

such.Inmyview,thereisastrongcasetobemadebythose,likeme,whoarestrongsupportersofboth.

an alliance to be valued

MysupportforthatallianceisbasedonsharedvaluesonwhichthatalliancewasforgedandforwhichAustraliansandAmericansfoughtanddied.LikemanyAustralians,thisisbolsteredbypersonalandfamilyties.Amongthesharedvalueswasconcernfortheinternationalruleoflaw.Thiswasrecognisedasco-signatoriesofthe1928PactofParis,whichwasenshrinedinarticle2oftheUNCharter,theNurembergtrialsandarticle1oftheANZUSTreatyitself.PresidentDwightDEisenhowereloquentlystatedin1959acorevalueofthatalliancethatwasreflectedintheUNCharterandarticle1oftheANZUSTreaty:

Thetimehascomeformankindtomaketheruleoflawininternationalaffairsasnormalasitisnowindomesticaffairs…PlainlyonefoundationstoneofthisstructureistheInternationalCourtofJustice.ItishearteningtonotethatastrongmovementisafootinmanypartsoftheworldtoincreaseacceptanceoftheobligatoryjurisdictionofthatCourt…Onefinalthoughtonruleoflawbetweennations:wewillallhavetoremindourselvesthatunderthissystem

oflawonewillsometimesloseaswellaswin.But…ifaninternationalcontroversyleadstoarmedconflict,everyoneloses;thereisnowinner.Ifarmedconflictisavoided,therefore,everyonewins.Itisbettertoloseapointnowandtheninaninternationaltribunal,andgainaworldinwhicheveryonelivesatpeaceunderaruleoflaw.

ThisisastatementbyanAmericanpresident,aRepublicanandoneoftheUnitedStates’mostdistinguishedandsuccessfulsoldierswholed‘UnitedNations’forces(astheywerealreadycalled)inWesternEuropeatthetimeouralliancewiththeUSwasforged.Thelastcommentisparticularlypoignantcomingfromanex-soldier.ItalsoremindsusthattheUSwascommittedtotheinternationalruleoflawandthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheICJformostofthehistoryoftheUN,andlongerthanAustralia.

ThefamilyconnectionrelatestoanothergreatthemeoftheIraqwar–theuseofintelligence.Intelligencecooperationbetweenourtwocountriescommencedin1942withcode-breakingactivityandtheformationoftheCombinedOperationsIntelligenceCentreatGeneralMacarthur’sHeadquarters.MembersincludedZelman(laterSirZelman)CowenandCasparWeinberger(andotherlesswell-

knownbrightyoungvolunteersincludingLtHorrieSampford,whomtheAmericansdecoratedforhiswork).TheywereentrustedwithallthesecretsofthePacificWartoprovideintelligenceanalysis.Theanalysisprovideddidnotalwaysaccordwiththeexpectationsorviewsof‘thebrass’.Buttheyrecognisedboththetemptationandthefollyoftellingtheirsuperiorswhattheywantedtohearratherthanwhattheyneededtohear.Doingthelatterwasneitherdisloyaltynorinsubordinationbuttheirprofessionaldutyandthebestservicetheycouldrendertoouralliesandfriends.Todootherwiseriskedlives,battlesand,in1942whenthebalanceofforceswasmoreeven,thewaritself.

Supportforthealliancedoesnotmeanuncriticalsupportofanally.Allfriendshaveflaws,allnationshaveflawsandgreatnationspermitgreatflawsaswellasgreatstrengths.Weshouldunderstandratherthanjudge.Butweshouldnotofferblindsupport.AustraliawasacheerleaderfortheAmericandesiretogotowar.Wemighthaveconsidered

ourselvesloyal.Butthosewhoarecheerleadersforafriend’sfollyarenotlikelytobethankedforitwhenthefollyisrealised(andIamsadtosaythatIthoughttheterm‘folly’wasappropriateeventhen).Atruefriendwarnsagainstfollyevenattheriskofthatfriend’sdisapproval–asPrimeMinisterRobertMenziesdidinwarningPresidentEisenhowerhewouldnot

joininconflictovertheTaiwanStraits.Thiscantakecourage.In2003,wedonotappeartohavequestionedUSintelligenceforecasts.Wepubliclyendorsedtheirclaimstothelegalityofthewarthatnoothercountryaccepted(accordingtoLordGoldsmith’scontemporary

advicenotpublisheduntil2006).Weshouldrecognisethedamage

sufferedbytheUnitedStatesandtheconsequentriskstoourperceivedsecurityinterests:

n ThewarcosttheUStrillionsofdollars,weakeningtheUSasamilitaryandeconomicpower.ThisweakenedtheUSrelativetoChinaandotherpotentialrivalsandincreasedthelikelihoodthattheUS


65

CHAPTER 6

64

wouldloseitsnumber-onepositionandbringforwardthetimeatwhichthatmighthappen.AmericanweaknesschangesthebalanceofpowerinthePacificandisnotinAustralia’sstrategicinterests.

n ThehumancostfortheAmericanswassignificantbutthesufferingcausedtootherswasmanytimesthat.EvenifthatwereunimportanttoANZUSmembers,thecosttotheUSinits‘softpower’wasenormous.

n Thepotentialdamagetothevaluesweshare.

n Thebadexamplewesetforrisingpowers.

TheUScannotaffordmorefolliesofthisnature.Asagoodfriendwithaperceivedinterestintheirstrengthandprosperity,weshouldhelpthemavoidthem.Weshouldinquireintoourownapproachtowartobeamoreeffectivefriendandacountrymoresecureandmoreconfidentofourvalues.

TheUSwascommittedtotheinternationalruleoflawandthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticeformostofthehistoryoftheUN,andlongerthanAustralia.

CHAPTER 7

The UK inquiries into the Iraq war

Six-year-oldAbdullahwasinjuredduringaUKclustermunitionstrikeonBasrain2003.Credit: DanChurchAid

prosecutionsbroughtagainstUKservicemenunderBritishlaw);orahumanrightsclaimunderrelevantlegislationorunderaregionalhumanrightstreaty;orcivildisobediencecasesinwhichtheallegedcriminalityofthewarformspartofadefencetovariousmoreminorcriminalcharges.

FormerprimeministerTonyBlairhashadtoanswerquestionsbeforequasi-judicialpanelsinamannerresemblingthatofadefendantinacriminaltrial,aftertheLabourgovernmentthatheledbecameaworldleaderinestablishingadministrativeinquiriesintodifferentaspectsoftheIraqwar.Threeinquiriesweresetup,andareconsideredbelow.Themostwide-raging–andstillongoing–istheIraqInquiryitself,underitschairman,JohnChilcot.DotheseinquiriesofferusefulprecursorsormodelsforanAustralianIraqinquiry?

The Hutton inquiryOn29May2003,theBBCflagshipradioprogram‘Today’carriedareportbyoneofitsjournalists,AndrewGilligan,contendingthattheBlairgovernmentand,inparticular,itspressofficerAlistairCampbell,had‘sexedup’anintelligencedocumentonthethreatposedbytheBaathregime.Particularattentionwasgiventothegovernment’sclaimthatIraqcoulduseweaponsofmassdestruction

in45minutes.DavidKelly,anarmscontrolexpertattheMinistryofDefence,whohadbeenGilligan’ssourceforthestory,appearedattheForeignAffairsCommitteeoftheHouseofCommons,andwaslaterfounddeadinwoodsnearhishome.Asaresult,thegovernmentestablished,inJuly2003,aninquiryunderLawLordBrianHuttonintothecircumstancessurroundingthedeathofDrKelly.

Butwhatwerethesecircum-stances?Or,moreproblematically,whatwasthepermittedambitofreviewablecircumstances?Atoneextremewastheviewthatthiswassimplyaglorifiedcoroner’sreport.Butformanyothers,thiswasaninquiryintothewaritself.LordHutton’sjob,intheeyesoftheanti-warcoalitions,andinthefearsofthegovernmentitself,wastoputHerMajesty’sgovernmentontrialandperhapseventoconvictitofcriminalacts.

On24January2004,LordHuttontoldthenationthatDrKellyhadcommittedsuicide,admonishingtheBBCseverelyandtheBlairgovernmentgently(forhavingreleasedKelly’snamewithoutwarninghim,andfor‘subconsciously’influencingtheJointIntelligenceCommittee’sintelligencewarnings).LordHutton’sreportdeclaredthattheBlairgovernmenthadmadeaninnocentmistake.Butitdidnotstillthedesireforjudgement.

THE UK INQUIRIES INTO THE IRAQ WAR

6968

ofotherpossibleavenuesforjudicialorquasi-judicialreview.Attheinternationallevel,theInternationalCourtofJusticemightbecompelledtoofferajudgementonthelegalityofthewarorthesubsequentoccupation.Thiscouldoccurinoneoftwoways:eitherthroughanadvisoryopinionrequestedbyanorganoftheUnitedNations,orbecauseastatethathasitselfacceptedthejurisdictionofthecourt(aroundathirdofstateshave)bringsacaseagainsttheUnitedKingdom(or,conceivably,Australia)claimingthatithasviolatedinternationallawbyinvadingand/oroccupyingIraq.BeforetheInternationalCriminalCourt,individuals,too,mightbeheldresponsibleforbreachesofinternationallaw.Indeed,theprosecutorofthatcourtdidinitiateapreliminaryinvestigationintoallegedUKwarcrimesandcrimes

againsthumanityinIraqbutfoundthattherewasnoevidenceofthesortofsystematicabuseofinternationallawthatmightenliventhecourt’sjurisdiction.TheICCdidnothavein2003,andwillonlypossessattheearliestby2017,jurisdictionoverthecrimeofaggression(acrimeprosecutedsuccessfullyatNurembergandTokyo;andonethatsomeobserversconsidermayhavebeencommittedbymembersofthe‘coalitionofthewilling’in2003).

Atthenationallevel,thereisthepossibilityofclaimsforjudicialreviewofgovernmentdecisionstogotowar(theUKCampaignforNuclearDisarmamentbroughtjustsuchacase,unsuccessfully,againsttheBlairgovernmentin2002);criminalprosecutionsofleadersorservicepersonnelforcrimescommittedduringthewar(therehavebeencriminal

Prof Gerry Simpson

ThereareanumberofwaysinwhichthedecisiontogotowarinIraqmightbesubjecttosomesortofadministrativeorjudicialscrutiny.Thischapter

considers,aspossiblemodels,threerecentBritishinquiriesintotheIraqwar,butbeginsbyplacingtheseinthecontext

The Butler inquiryOnlydaysafterHutton’sreport,USPresidentGeorgeWBushtoosetupaninquiryintotheintelligencereceivedleadingtotheinterventioninIraq.Shortlyafterthat,on3February2004,TonyBlairentrustedaseniorcivilservant,RobinButler,todoasimilarjobfortheUK.ThisinquirytouchedonmatterstakenupatHuttonandforeshadowedthosecurrentlyunderinvestigationatChilcot,namely,thepartplayedinthedecisiontogotowarbyintelligencerelatingtoIraq’sWMDcapacity.

TheButlerinquiryhandeddownconclusionsthatweremorecriticalofthegovernmentandtheintelligencecommunitythanHutton’s,findingthattheintelligenceprovidedtothegovernmentwas‘unreliable’andassessmentsofthatintelligencewereinflated.Butlercriticisedthegovernmentalsoforrelyingtooheavilyon‘flawed’intelligencefromotherstates,forhavingtoomuchfaithinmaterialandassessmentssuppliedbynotdisinterestedIraqidissidents,andforconstructingdossiers(intendedtoconvincethepublic)fromrawintelligencematerial.Theintelligencecommunitywascriticisedforfailingtofollowvalidationproceduresinrelationtodubioushumanintelligenceandforatendencytoacceptworst-caseestimates.Themostcontentiousofthefindings

relatedtotheinfamousNigeruraniumyellowcake(PresidentBushhadreferredtoit,asevidenceofIraq’sintentions,inhis2003StateoftheUnionspeech).Butler,surprisingly,foundthattherewasevidencetosuggestthattheIraqishadtriedtoacquireuraniumfromNiger(thoughthisfindingitselfwasnotfullysubstantiated).

Intheend,though,theButlerinquiryconcludedthatnorecentintelligencehadmadethecaseforgoingtowarmorecompellingthanithadbeenin,say,July2001thanitmighthavebeeninrelationtootherstatesatthattime.Theinquiryendedbystatingitsconcernabouttheeffectofthegovernment’spolicy-makingproceduresonreducingthescopeforinformedcollectivepoliticaljudgement.

The Chilcot inquiry On15June2009,inthedyingdaysoftheBrowngovernment,theprimeministerestablishedaninquiryintoaperiodofdecision-makingbeforeandafter(2001–2009)theIraqwar,andintotheadequacyofgovernmentprocessesthathadledtothedecisiontogotowar.Therewerenolawyersonthepanel,thoughthelegalityofthewarhasabsorbedagreatdealofthepanel’sattentionandinternationallawyershavebeenaskedtosubmitlegalopinionstotheinquiry.

TheChilcotinquirybeganitshearingson24November2009.

CHAPTER 7

70AcoalitionairstrikeattheedgeofFallujah,Iraq,inNovember2004.Credit: James J. Vooris

ministersandofficials,andgovernmentrecords(someofthemclassified),anyinquirythatisestablishedwillbeunabletoconductitsworkproperly.

Second,themembershipofaninquirypanelmustbebothindependentandcapableofforensicexaminationoftheissues.(MembersshouldnothavesupportedtheIraqwarorhavepresentedthegovernment’sintelligenceinsupportofit,aswasthecaseintheButlercommittee.)

TheChilcotpanelhasimpressedinmanyrespects.Itcertainlyhasnotalloweditselftobecowedbythewitnesses,andthemixtureofhistorians,civilservantsandpoliticianshasworkedwellattimes.However,itmaybeworth

thinkingaboutappointingaformerjudgeorleadingbarristertoanyAustralianpanel,sincesomeofthequestionsengagedwillinvolvenicelegaldistinctionsandrequirefurtherpursuit.

Third,theinformationgatheredandthewitnessinterviewsmustbemadewidelyandpubliclyavailablethroughhighlyprofessionalmeansofcommunication(atChilcot,theabilitytoaccessfulltranscripts,declassifieddocumentsandvideoevidencehasbeenextraordinarilyuseful).Aninquiry,undertheseconditions,intoAustralia’sdecisiontogotowarisclearlyrequired.FurtherinvestigationofAustralia’sparticipationinthewarandengagementintheoccupationcouldbeofgreatbenefit.

THE UK INQUIRIES INTO THE IRAQ WAR

73

Ithasthepowertorequesttheappearanceofofficialsandpoliticiansoperatingatthehighestlevelsofgovernmentduringthecrisis,and,indeed,therehavebeensomeveryhigh-profileappearancesfromthegovernmentside,andfromthecivilservice.Theinquiryhasgeneratedanenormousamountofdeclassifiedmaterialonthegovernment’sdecision-makingleadinguptotheIraqwar,adocumentaryrecordthatisquiterevealing.

Itisunclearwhentheinquirywillconcludeitsreport,butitisexpectedtoexceedamillionwords,andisunlikelytobepublishedbeforelate2013.Acontroversyisbrewingaboutwhethertheinquirycanpublishclassifiedmaterialthatithasneverthelessseen(adialogueisunderwayonthisquestion).Onehundredandfiftywitnesseshaveattestedtotheirunderstandingofwhathappenedinthedecision-makingaroundtheIraqwar,morethan20witnesseshaveprovidedwrittensubmissions,andoftensofthousandsofwrittenrecords,

manyhavebeenpublishedontheinquiry’swebsite.Theinquiryhasheldseminarsonitswork.So,evenifnoreportispublishedthiswillhavebeenavaluableundertaking.

Butthereportmayleavesomequestionsunanswered.Theymayinclude:Whatroleshouldinternationallawadviceplayindecisionstouseforce?Whatpreciselyistheroleoflawofficers,

liketheattorney-general,whenprovidingadvice(advocateoradviser)?Shouldlegaladvicebeputbeforecabinet?Fulladvice?Summaryadvice?Conceptualquestionsariseaswellaboutthenatureoflawitself:whetherthelawfulnessorunlawfulnessofactscanbe

decidedbyinternationallaw,orwhetheritis‘prettyvague’(asJackStraw,Blair’sforeignminister,toldtheChilcotinquiry)andreducibletoamatterofopinion.

AustraliahasacloseinterestinthreelessonsthatmaybedrawnfromChilcot.First,itisvitallyimportantthatanyinquiryhasthefullsupportofgovernment.Withoutaccesstogovernment

CHAPTER 7

72

Itisvitallyimportantthatanyinquiryhasthefullsupportofgovernment.Withoutaccesstogovernmentministersandofficials,andgovernmentrecords,anyinquirythatisestablishedwillbeunabletoconductitsworkproperly.

CHAPTER 8

Never again?

AsandstormneartheAlAsadAirBaseinIraqinSeptember2011.Credit: Cecilio Ricardo

obligationswhichhisgovernmenthadbolsteredbyincludingajointparliamentarycommittee.AsPM,neitherHawkenorHowardwasobligedtoputtheinvasionofIraqtoavoteinparliament–bothseekingonlyretrospectiveendorsementofcabinet’sdecision.Neitherinvolvedthegovernor-general.Unfortunately,MrHowarddidnotcarrythroughwithanundertakingtohaveit‘noted’bytheFederalExecutiveCouncil–whichwouldhaveconstitutedanimprovement.AstotheendsforwhichAustraliawenttowar,hedescribedthetaskofAustralianforcesashelpingtheUnitedStatesfindanddestroyIraq’sweaponsofmassdestructiontostopthembeingpassedtoal-Qaida,orbeingusedtoattackothercountries.HedeclaredthatAustraliasupportedPresidentBush’sglobalwaronterror.HavingrepeatedlydeniedthatAustraliawascommittedto‘regimechange’inIraq,hetoldtheparliament,on4February2003,thatAustraliawouldsharetheburdenofdestroyingSaddamHussein.Hedidnotspecifywhetherthepurposeofthelong-plannedinvasionwastostopIraqdevelopingnuclearweapons,takecontrolofIraqioil,reformtheMiddleEastonecountryafteranother,orsomethingelse.HedidnottellAustralianshowlongheanticipatedourforceswouldbethere,howmuchthewarcould

cost,howwewouldknowiforwhenwehadwonorlost,orwhatAustralia’sresponsibilitieswouldbeforhumanitarianaid,rebuildingIraqorcopingwithrefugees.

EventhoughhetoldtheNationalPressClubhecouldnotjustifywarifSaddamHusseinhadnoWMD,hecontinuedtodosoevenwhennoWMDcouldbefound,nowclaimingthattheworldwassaferasaresultoftheinvasionofIraq.However,itwasnotclearthatAustraliawasasaferplace.On13March2001,MrHowardsaidhetooka‘veryproactiveviewoftheAmericanalliance’,butcouldgivenoassuranceoftheUnitedStates’reciprocalprotectionofAustralia.ItcouldbearguedthatthewarweakenedtheUnitedStatesanditsabilitytoassistus.

Finally,thedecisiontogotowarexposedAustraliatotheaccusationofhavingwagedanillegalwar(whichwouldbethefirstinourhistory).Whilehecontinuedtoinsistthatthewarwaslegal,hisgovernmenthadtakenstepswhichmadeitdifficultfortheInternationalCourtofJusticetohearsuchacase.(Beforethat,acountryattackedbyAustraliacouldtakeustotheICJ,butIraqin1991andAfghanistanin2001wouldhavebeenfoolishtodoso).HeneverseemedtorecognisethepossibilitythathisdecisiontoinvadeIraqwaswrong,nordidheestablishedageneralinquiry

NEVER AGAIN?

7776

predictableconsequenceofthedecisiontogotowar.Weneedextraordinarilygoodreasonstoengageinit.

GeoffreyBlaineyobservesthatwarsbeginwhentheleadersofcountriesonbothsidesbelievethatmorecanbegainedfromfightingthannotdoingso–pointingoutthatatleastonesidewillbewrong.Eisenhowerseesworseodds–inarmedconflict,everyoneloses.TheIraqwarisaclassicexample.

Yet,10yearsaftergoingtowarinIraq,Australiansstillhavereceivednocomprehensiveaccountfromthegovernmentaboutthereasonsfordoingsooranevaluationofitsresults.TheeventsdescribedinthechaptersaboveindicatetheabilityofanAustralianprimeministertotakeustowarforgoodorill,andthelimitedchecksandbalancesavailabletoensurethatthecausewillbejust,theendsdefined,the

prospectsforsuccessgoodandthatthekillingandsufferingislikelytobeproportionatetotheachievableends.WhateveronethinksofLabororLiberal,HawkeorHoward,thetwoPresidentsBush,orthedecisionsofeach,thevitalethical,legalandgovernancequestioniswhetherthisisthewaywewanttogotowar.ImmediatelyaftertheattacksonNewYorkandWashington,DC,inSeptember2001,MrHowardinvokedtheANZUSTreaty,unilaterallyextendingitsapplicationtosupporttheUnitedStatesanywhereinthenon-specific‘waronterror’.Itisrightandpropertoconsultanallyfollowinganattack,andoneallymayoffertoassistanotherevenifnotboundtodoso(wewouldhopetheUSwoulddothesameifourciviliansweretargetedoutsidethePacificarea).Butwehaveprocessesforconsideringtreaty

Dr Alison Broinowski and Prof Charles Sampford

Goingtowaristhemostseriousdecisionagovernmentcanmake.Warisnot‘politicscarriedonbyothermeans’.Itisaformoforganised,pre-meditatedmass

killing–deliberateinthecaseofcombatantsandinevitableinthecaseofnon-combatantswhodieandsufferasanentirely

intothewarastheBritishhavedone.ThishasnotpreventedAustralianresearchersseekingtolearnthelessonsoftheIraqwar.JohnLangmorehaspointedtothedangerofarisk-aversepublicservicethatshirksitsresponsibilitytospeaktruthtopower.HeandGarryWoodardremindusofthedangersofremovingtheboundariesbetweenpolicyandintelligence,lessonswethoughtwehadlearnt.Moresuggestionsforimprovementsinthewaywegotowarinclude:

n Requiringsupportinonehouse,bothhousesoratelevisedjointsitting

n Morecomprehensiveinformationprovidedtoparliament,includingindependentlegaladviceandfullmilitaryandintelligencebriefingsgiventoaparliamentarycommittee

n Finalsign-offinFederalExecutiveCouncilfollowingtheissueofacertificateoflegalitybytheattorney-general

n AcceptanceofcompulsoryjurisdictionoftheICJforanywarsweengagein,andprovisionfortheinvestigationandprosecutionofthecrimeofaggression(aswillbenecessaryafter2017)

n Promotionofwell-informedpublicdebate,and

governmentregardfortheviewsexpressed.

ThesechangesarebeingproposedbythosewhodonotwishAustraliatorepeatwhatmanyseeastheillegality,errorsofintelligence,lossoflife,humanitariancatastrophes,andhugewasteofmoneyandmaterialthatoccurredinIraq–alongwiththedamagetoAustralia’sinternationalstanding.Theywillnotpassivelyacceptthataninvasionis‘inthenationalinterest’,norcompliantlyagreethatcontinuingalong,costlywaris‘stayingthecourse’,‘gettingthejobdone’and‘therightthingtodo’.

Ifwedonottakethisopportunity,adecadeonfromtheinvasionofIraq,Australiaisatriskofbeingdrawnintofuturewarsthatdousmuchmoreharm.Theycouldgoasbadlyforusasforthosewefight,andwecouldmakelastingenemiesofpowerfulcountrieswhichshouldremainmajortradingpartners.

Weareobliged,therefore,todemandthattheAustraliangovernmentbedemocraticallyaccountableforfuturedecisionstogotowar,andfortheresultsofsuchdecisions.Toachievethischange,anIraqwarinquiry,longoverdue,isanecessaryfirststep.Theimplementationofrecommendedchangesinthewaydecisionsforwararemadeisanecessarysecondstep.

NEVER AGAIN?

79PrisonerabuseatAbuGhraibPrisoninIraqinNovember2003.Credit: US Government

whetherIraqposedanactualthreat?Iftherewasathreatassessment,whatdiditsay?

n PhilipFlood,whoconductedapost-warinquiryintoAustralianintelligence,describedtheevidenceonIraq’sWMDas‘thin,ambiguous,andincomplete’.HowdoesMrHowardreconcilethiswithhispresentationtoparliamenton4February2003?

Humanitarian issues

n WereanyUN,NGOorotherreportsoftheeffectsofthe1991GulfWar,theeconomicsanctionsandthelikelyeffectsofafurtherwarconsideredinthegovernment’sdecisiontogotowarin2003?Ifnot,whynot?Ifso,whichreports,andhowmuchweightwasgiventothem?

n Whatdegreeofciviliansufferingdidthegovernmentexpectfromthewar,andwhatlevelofsufferingwasconsideredacceptable?Didthegovernmentrequestestimatesofciviliancasualties?

n Wereanycontingencyplansmadebythegovernmenttohelpreduceanddealwiththepredictedenormoushumanitarianeffectsofthewar?

Legal issues

n WeretheAustralianlawyersdraftingthegovernment’sadviceincontactwiththosedraftingadvicefortheBritishandAmericangovernments,andwhichAustralianministersorministerialstaffwereinformed?Whatotherlegaladvicedidthegovernmentseek?Whatlegaladvicewasprovidedtothegovernor-general?

n WhydidtheAustraliangovernmentchangeitsacceptanceofthecompulsoryjurisdictionoftheInternationalCourtofJusticewhenitdid?Wasitsresponseinparliamentonthewarmisleading?

n WhydidtheprimeministerfailtobringthedecisiontogotowartotheFederalExecutiveCouncilashehadtoldthegovernor-generalhewould?

81

Ourgrouphasnottakenanimmutableposition,nordo

weclaimtohaveaddressedalltheconcernsthatothersmayhave.Thisisacollectionofpapers,intendedtostimulatedebateandinvitesupporttocoalescearoundoptionalcoursesofaction.Wehavegatheredsomepossibilitiestogetherunderseveralheadingstoassistdiscussion,whichwelisthereintheformofquestions.

Models for an inquiryAnumberofmodelsexistforaninquiryincludingaRoyalCommission,a‘judicial’inquiry,aparliamentaryinquiry,aninquiryundertakenbytheAustralianLawReformCommissionorothergovernmentbody,andacitizens-initiatedinquiry.n Ontherelativemerits,

whichmodelwouldbemostappropriateforourpurposes?

n Whatshouldbethescopeofthisinquiry?Thatis,whatissuesshoulditbepermittedtoconsider?

n Howshouldtheproposedinquirybeestablishedwithreferencetokeyissuesincluding:confidentialandclassifiedinformation;securingindependencefrom

governmentandotherkeystakeholders;powers,forexample,tocompelwitnessestogiveevidence;timing,reportandrecommendations.

IntelligenceAccordingtotheintelligenceinquiriesinAustraliathatfollowedthe2003Iraqwar,viewsdivergedbetweenONAandDIOconcerningthenatureoftheevidenceforthepossessionbyIraqofWMD.Weneedtoknow:

n WhatwastheAustralianintelligenceadvicegiventothegovernmentinthelead-uptothewarandhowwasthedivergenceofviewsbetweenthetwoassessmentagenciesreconciled?

n Wastheintelligenceadvicechallengedatthetimebyanymembersofthegovernment,andifsobywhom?

n Whatwasthenatureofthechallenges,whatwastheresponsebytheassessmentagenciesandhowweredoubtsresolved?

n WastheintelligencegiventothegovernmentrestrictedtoadviceonthepossessionbyIraqofWMD,orwaswideradvicealsoprovidedon

80

Some unanswered questions

theCommonwealthCommitteeofEminentPersonsin1989andChairmanoftheUNCommitteeonAfricanCommodityProblems.MrFraserisasenioradvisertotheInternationalCrisisGroup,honorarychairmanofInterActionCouncilandamemberoftheAsia-PacificLeadershipNetworkforNuclearNon-ProliferationandDisarmament.Hehaswrittentwobooks,CommonGround(2002)andMalcolmFraserthePoliticalMemoirs(withMargaretSimons,2010).MrFraserwritesarticlesforTheAge,TheConversationandProjectSyndicate.InJune2012hegavetheWhitlamOration,callingformoreindependenceandconfidenceinAustralianforeignanddefencepolicy.

Dr Jenny GroundsisPresidentoftheMedicalAssociationforPreventionofWar(Australia)andaGPinruralVictoria.ShetrainedandworkedattheRepatriationHospitalinHeidelbergandlaterincommunityhealthininnerMelbourne,workingwithrefugeesfrommanydifferentwarsituations.

Prof Charles SampfordisDirectorofTheInstituteforEthics,GovernanceandLaw(ajointinitiativeoftheUnitedNationsUniversity,Griffith,QUT,ANU,CenterforAsianIntegrityinManilaandOPJindalGlobalUniversity,Delhi),andPresident,

InternationalInstituteforPublicEthics.HeisFoundationDeanandProfessorofLawandResearch,ProfessorinEthics,GriffithUniversity,andAdjunctProfessor,QUTandYorkUniversity.Hehascompleted25booksand111articles/bookchapters.ForeignfellowshipsincludeVisitingSeniorResearchFellowatStJohn’sCollegeOxfordandaFulbrightSeniorAwardtoHarvard.In2002,hewasamemberofataskforceonthreatstodemocracyco-chairedwithSecretaryAlbright.ProfSampfordisabarristerandhasbeenconsultedbybusiness,governmentandvariousparliaments.

Edward SantowistheChiefExecutiveOfficerofthePublicInterestAdvocacyCentre,anindependent,non-profitlawandpolicyorganisation.HeisalsoaSeniorVisitingFellowattheUniversityofNewSouthWales,aboardmemberoftheNationalProBonoResourceCentreandamemberofthefederalgovernment’sInformationAdvisoryCommittee.In2009,hereceivedanAustralianLeadershipAward.HispreviousappointmentshavebeenintheUNSWLawSchoolandtheGilbert+TobinCentreofPublicLaw,theAustralianLawReformCommission,aSydneylawfirm,andasassociatetoJusticeHeydonoftheHighCourtofAustralia.StevenHampson,whocontributed

83

Paul Barratt AOspentover30yearsintheCommonwealthpublicservice.KeyappointmentsincludeSecretaryoftheDepartmentofDefence,SecretaryoftheDepartmentofPrimaryIndustriesandEnergy,DeputySecretaryoftheDepartmentofForeignAffairsandTrade,andSpecialTradeRepresentativeforNorthAsia.Heisnowanindependentconsultantinaspecialisedadvisoryfirm.

Rod BartonisaformerDirectorofStrategicTechnology,DefenceIntelligenceOrganisation.In1991hebecameaUNweaponsinspector,ajobthathewastoworkatforthenext13years,includingasaspecialadvisertoHansBlix,ExecutiveChairmanoftheUNMonitoringandVerificationCommissiononIraq.Followingthe2003Iraqwar,RodBartonwasemployedasthesenioradvisertotheCIAinthehuntforIraq’smissingweaponsbytheIraqSurveyGroup.HeistheauthorofTheWeaponsDetective:TheinsidestoryofAustralia’stopweaponsinspector(2006).

Dr Alison Broinowski,formerlyanAustraliandiplomat,isaVisitingFellowatAustralianNationalUniversityandanHonorary

ResearchAssociateattheUniversityofWollongong.Sheistheauthor/editorof11booksandmanyarticlesontheAustralia/Asiainterface,ontheUnitedNations,andonAsianAustralianfiction.ShewroteHoward’sWar(2003)andAlliedandAddicted(2007).

Andrew Farranservedasadiplomatandministerialadviserbetween1962and1971,includingasexecutiveassistanttoSirArthurTangeinDefencein1971.Hewasaseniorlecturerinconstitutionalandinternationallaw,andsub-deanofgraduatestudiesintheLawFaculty,MonashUniversity,from1972to1985.Sincethenhehasdirectedbusinessesinprofessionalpublishing,tradepolicyadvisingandsheepfarming.HewasPresidentoftheAustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairs(Victoria)from1987to1990.HeisamemberofChathamHouse(RIIA)andIISS,UK,andaregularcontributortoprintandonlinemedia.

Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CHservedasAustralia’s22ndPrimeMinisterfrom1975to1983.Sinceleavinggovernment,MrFraserhasplayedaneminentroleininternationalrelations,includingasCo-Chairmanof

82

Contributors

AyoungIraqigirlwatchescoalitiontroopsconductingatmosphericsinAlQurnainApril2010.Credit: Christopher Wellner

tothearticle,isaPracticalLegalTrainingInternatPIAC.

Prof Gerry Simpson isaProfessorofInternationalLawattheUniversityofMelbournewhereheholdstheKennethBaileyChair.HealsoisaVisitingProfessorattheLondonSchoolofEconomicswherehewasaProfessorofInternationalLawuntil2009.Gerryhaswrittenseveralbooksandnumerousarticles.Hisnextbook,TheMarginsofInternationalLaw,willbepublishedin2013.

Prof Ramesh ThakurisDirectoroftheCentreforNuclearNonproliferationandDisarmamentattheAustralianNationalUniversity,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsintheANU’sCrawfordSchoolofPublicPolicy,andAdjunctProfessorintheInstituteofEthics,GovernanceandLawatGriffithUniversity.HewasformerlySeniorViceRectoroftheUNUniversityandUNAssistantSecretary-General,ProfessorofInternationalRelationsattheUniversityofOtago,andHeadofthePeaceResearchCentreattheANU.Heistheauthor/editorofover40booksand400articlesandbookchapters,andisamemberofinternationaladvisoryboardsofinstitutesinAfrica,Asia,EuropeandNorthAmerica.

Dr Sue Wareham OAMisaVice-PresidentoftheMedicalAssociationforPreventionofWar(Australia)andamemberofthemanagementcommitteeinAustraliaoftheInternationalCampaigntoAbolishNuclearWeapons.InApril1999shetookpartinaninternationaldelegationtoIraqtoinvestigatetheimpactofeconomicsanctionsontheIraqipeople.SheisaCanberraGP.Garry WoodardisanhonorarySeniorFellowlecturingattheUniversityofMelbourneandaformerambassadortoBurma,ChinaandMalaysia,memberoftheboardoftheAustralia–JapanCouncilandtheMuseumofVictoria,memberoftheAdministrativeAppealsTribunal,nationalpresidentoftheAustralianInstituteofInternationalAffairsandpatronoftheAustralia–BurmaCouncil.HeistheauthorofAsianAlternatives:Australia’sVietnamdecisionandlessonsongoingtowar(2005)andNowWeKnowaboutGoingtoWarinIraq(2007).

84

AnIraqiwomanandherfamilysitoutsidetheirmudhutwhilecoalitionsoldiersvisittheirfarmhouseneartheSinjarmountainsinnorthernIraqtoinspectawellin2009.Credit: Carmichael Yepez

‘HowdidAustralianarmedforcescometobeinvolvedintheUS-ledinvasionofIraqin2003,andwhy?Whatwerethedecision-makingprocessesthatledtothatcommitment?Werethoseprocessesadequateintermsofoursystemofgovernmentasweunderstanditandforthefuture?’

Rt Hon Malcolm Fraser AC CH, Foreword

Documents

WHY DID WE GO TO WAR IN IRAQ?€¦ · The Iraq War Inquiry Group consists of Australians from diverse backgrounds who are concerned that there has been no in-depth, high-level and