Yang_Colonial Korea in Japan's Imperial Telecommunications Network

7/30/2019 Yang_Colonial Korea in Japan's Imperial Telecommunications Network

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160 SOON-WON PARKinfluential, and competlng idca3 such as natronali ! modemity,and colonialism. S()mc arc moving even further by rccovenng si-lenced voices and ignored subjects of the colonial Period, such aspeasant farmers, orainary city dwellers, vrorke$, rulal and ulbanwomen, the marginal Poor, and other forSotten PeoPles' All thesenew studies and iounternanatives will bring density, lichness, andcomplexity to research on the colonial exPerience, adding dePtlx roout _und"i"tundittg of Korea's Paths to modemity in the twentiethcentury and the modem Korean identity shaped by them.

SIXColonial Korea in lapan's lmperial

Tele c o mmuni c ati on s N e tw orkDaqing Yang

on a mid-January day in 1933, a SrouP of prominent govemment,military, and business fitures gathered in the Govemment-Generalof Korea (GGK) building in Keijd (PreEenFday Seoul). When theclock shuck half past ten, Communications Bureau Directol YamadaTadatsugu announced the long-awaited beginning of telePhonescrvice between Korea and JaPan. Hundreds of kilometers awayacross the Japan Sea, a similar cercmony transPired simultaneouslyin Osaka. In a short speech read to both gouPs by a rePresentative,Covemor-General Ugaki KazushiSe predicted that the oPening ofthe telephone connection would further strentthen the economicrnd other bonds between the colony and the home islands As if totcst the soundness of this vision, officials and business leaders in thelwo cities took tums exchanging greetings across the newly acti-vated line.lTo many historians, tlus was Probably nothing more than one ofrountless, routine, and inconsequential ceremonies in the life of co_lonial Korea. Indeed, telecorunumcations-telegraPh and telePhoneronnection by means of wire, cable, or &dio-has rarely been dis-, ussed in Englishlanguage works on colonial Korea. when the sub-iu1 does surface, it is tyPically treatd as an indicator of economicrudcrnization undcr Japanese rule.2


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'162 I)AelNC YANGThe equati(nr o[ t(,tr,.omnrunications with modernity and prog_ress in colonlrl Koron hrs dominated th numerous publication; c;_culatcd by thc J.p.rnosc, liovornmcnt. According to ihis view, Japanrapidly expanded ind modernizcd the ,,primiri;",, com-rrni.utionsfacilities in Korea aftcr the takcover in 1905, to the gieat benefit of

economic and cultural life in the peninsula. A ma;sive historicalsurvey on prewar Japanesc activities in Asia, compiled by Japan,sMinistry of Finance sho(ty after World War II, essentialy ieiterateathis.valuation r To be sure, lapan,s rate of progiess did not go un_challenged. In his pioneering 1944 work on col;nial Korea, A;drewJ. Grajdanzev pointed out that telcoqununications almost exclu_sively benefited the Japanese population.a civen thar relecornmuni_cations in colonial Korea has not been considered to merit seriousstudy, it is not surprisint no atreementexists on this issue.5ln this chaptr, I consider telecommunications development as ancs\ential parl of Japdn'" overd emprre-buitdint e ort, nor o,rjy rnlhc colonization of Korca bur al


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1& t )AQING YANGtechnicians, linki'rg S{\)ul to Pusan in 1888 As Korea set uP its owntelegraph office ncnr thc hP.ncsc one in Pusan and connected themwiti couricrs, fff rhe first time JaPan acquired an altemative route oftelegraphic linkagc lhrough Korca.lrDurhg thc Sino lapancsc War of 1894-95, advancinS JaPanesetroops nJt only took c'vor au maior telegaPh lines in Korea but alsoconstructed military telegraph lines in the south following destruc-tion of existing lincs in the Peasant uPdsing- After the war, JaPanrctained contr;l ovcr its military lines between Pusan and Seoul,which proved to b an imPortant asset in the war with Russia a de-cade la1er. Even before formal declaration of that war, iapan rT asable to outmaneuver the Russians by cuttinS off cornmunicationbetween Korea and Russia's stronghold of Port Arthur' Once warbroke out, Japanese trooPs again quickty seized control of Korea'stelegraph lines. The Russian defeat in the war signaled the end of aperiod-of relative Korean autonomy, and laPan bcame the domi-nant Power in the Pcninsula-Foi the |apanese, control of the inJormation network in Korea wasa precondition for establishmnt of Political and military domina-tion. The blueprint for postwar Korea adoPted by the ,aPanese cabi-net in May 19i04 stipulated pemanent Japanese military and navalbases on ihe penlnsula and JaPanese super'/ision of Korean foreiSnaffai$, tovemment finances, and the milway system Japan was alsoto cont;l Korea's telegraPh, telephone, and Postal systems lf JaPancould not incorporate Korea's communications systems into its ownand standardiz; facilities in both countries, it was prePaied to takover important lines and run them independently ftom the Koreansoverr;ent.rr This plan was dul) execuled aftor lhe war' when Ko'iea b..ome a Japancse Prolcctorale lkcda Jusabur6, a vetetan bu-reaucrat in charye of the Tokyo Post and Telegraph Olfice' led ateam of ]apanes-e technicians and officiats in taking ovel Korea's.o-*,rrri.ution. facilities. The Koreans fiercely resisted, but Ikedasucceeded after aPplyint considerable corcion 13,q' taoan eraduallv assumed control of Korea s lelecornrnunica-tion" syltemiit implemented several reduclions rn teletrdPh rdlesbtween JaPan and Korea to facilitate its exPanding scoPe-of activi-ties on the'peninsuta. Thsc efforts brought dramatic resultsi trafficincreased from a t{ickle of 3,800 telegrams in 1884 to some 100'000Dcr v,.Jr a d..adc Ll,r. By lq05 ..mc 41n.000 l'lcFrrm\' q8 Peri Hnl,,r -tri.h *,r, i,' J r1",n{-, 1' rv, l"cl Lolw'1n llx twn counlrir\"'

Colonial Korca ottl lilt("iunications 165Although the JaPanese made much of thcir mission of developingthe Korea; economt the inJomation inlrastructure in colonial Ko-

rea vr'as not built Primarily lor business activihs. The telecornmunr-cations network in Korea, esPecially lonS-distance telePhones, de-vetoped largely to meet JaPan s urgent politicat and military desireto consolidate control over the Korean PoPulation-'l'l first major challenge to JaPan came in July 1907, when itsforceful dissolution of what remaind of the Korean almy ignited alarge-scale "political disturbance" across the Peninsula TelegraPhani telephone lines under JaPanese control were heavily damagcdby Korean guer las, known as the "righteous soldiels." AltbouShJipan quickly repaired them at a cost of !130,000, the Seneral lack ofefficient means of communication severely handicaPPed its resPonseduring the initial staSe of the uPrisinE. One official JaPanese accountcitcs a campaign in Kangw6n Provine in which Poor telecornmunications caused a frequent lack of coordination amont JaPanesetroops and Senerated considerable conJusion.l5 SwiJt communicationbctween alttocalities in Korca was considered crucial not only forsuppressing the Korean rcsistance but also for future policing andseiJrity. Vice Resident-General Sone Arasuke ProPosed a Pemnsula-wide police telephone network, which would linl all Police stations,military ba acks, postal branches, and other Sovemment offices,.lllowint them to b reached by telegraPh or telePhone within 24hours and thus greatly strengthening control of Kofea's extensivc

Given the urgent need, this Police telePhone network had to bcronstructed as quickly as Possible. In May 1908, JaPan set uP a Policc'lclephone Construction DPartment in Korea, adding telePhonclines to some existing Postal teleSraPh lines and building new routes(lsewhere. Between June 1908 and SePtember 1910, over 4,000 kilomcters of new lines spanning some 3,000 kilometers were con-structed. A total of 41000 new telephone poles were erected, signifi-.rntly alte ng the landscaP of much of the peninsula By the cnd of1910, over 800 police telephone sets had been installed in securilytJosts and post offices at a cost of 1375,000. Although this Polic telc-t,hone network was far from soPhisticated, the si$ificance of its(1'mpletion by 1910 cannot be overestimated lT That very yrar, JaPanlorced a heaty of annexation uPon Korea, rendcring it a JaPancsc( ()lony- Conhol and subsequent expansion of Korea's teleconnnuni-, ntn)ns nctwork hnd p.rvod lhc way for anlrcxatn

I


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Coloninl Korm nt li'l()nrnt ications

Fig. 61 Telcgraphic haflic jn rhe iaPan* emPne, 1935 (sour.e Tishinsh., Dcmutyoln, DehF lnry:, jdkln ni kdrsrr! c/Ids lTokyo, I93s1, PP 6'F73).controlled by the colonial Soverrunent and desPite its original inten-tion, this information network also served economic and culturalpurposes. Th influx of JaPanese business as well as agicultural im-migrants, together with gradual conomic develoPment and urbanization in Korca, increased use of eletronic cornmunications Thesteady advancement in telecornrnunications tchnology in the Iirstdccades of th twcntieth century fu her contributed to this Process.To give just a few examples, in 1923, the army hansfened its wire-less facilities to the GGK, and the renamed Keij6 Witele5s added anew dimension to teleSraPhic scruice. The rapid develoPment ofwireless technology ushercd in the ate of radio, when station JODKbogan broadcasting in both Japanese and Korean in carly 1927, and.njoyed extraordinary Srowth in subsequent years. Automatic cx-rhang telephones were adopted during the 1920s, greatly enhanc-,'rg communication capabilities, and long-distance tlePhone seruicelvith Manchuria began in 1924. ln the same yat establishment of arcduced rate Ior press telegiams contibuted to the flourishinS ofncwspapers.2l ThrouShout the colonial period, Korea was the largestrrripient and originator of tele$aPhic tiaffic with JaPan in the em-I'ire (see Fig.6.1).P

167165 I)AQINGYANCTo complt'1,, rt\.1{rln,l (,1 K, cJ'5 lele(ommunications syslem' Ja-oan pur, il.rs, ri lln subm.t'in" crblc in lhe Korean Strail from ilsb,"iln.*^" '- Vr^ -illion lhrl same year' Bv in(lallint new tele-eraoh eouipm, nr, Jrp.rn drd.ticrlly rcduced transmission time On

i""1,'..',r'i ,i*, 'i ,".k a rele!,rath lo get irom soul {now namedr-piio;o Iolvo droopcd frnm 4 hours 42 minutes to 2 5 hours ra-ir.""', -'^t-r "i i"r.communicalions in Kored' however' did not".,aicate re'isr.rnce. The March First movement in 1919' when Kore-".lti"""a p..*"f"-"ide dcmonslration5 demandinS indePend'""." t#f f""rn uu *ch 'urprise thal it led to another wave of ur-eent erpansion ol its police communications ntwork ln addition ioioLripoine torat JapJn. e authorities with automobiles' thc new'J*"L,#a*,-*""*"r \?inu 'dhanl' Mizuno Rentaro' stressed thcn"i to in'uff tilephono connections in cvew Imal districl As. Michael Robinson reminds rJ', thc colonial Eovernment increased lnee{li.iencv and sophislicdtion of its control system

even as it sPoke ot, ^oaer'ate "culi,,.ol nute." wtthin two years' timo' over Yl million*rt r**,o *,"na the networl in 3s districl' bclween Pusan andsin,'ii;. The lhree vear\ after March lqlg witnc\sed lhe Sreatest ex-.rnsion of new relephone roules in Kored, as ncarly 2'000 kilometersi""t" "aa"a, a 40 prLenl incrcace As a rc


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16ll

Tclccommunications and Colonial ModernityIn his study of coloniai Korcn, Andrew Grajdanzev made an inter-esting obsewation about what may be termed the inJormation-intensive behavior of the colonial burcaucracy in Korea. Ihe lapa-nese govemment in Korea, he pointed out, "is a bureaucracy whichis fond of mailing circulars and sendinS telegrams," since "in 1938,2,206,779 rcle9tams ovt of a total of 11,710,575 were sent rrxlyd, i.e.without charge, becaus they were olficial telegrams,-one-fiJth ofthe total." In other words, he observed, "a handlul of bureaucratssucceeded in sendinS as many telegrarns as 4,300,000 of the popula-tion.",3 This preoccupation with communications on the part of thecolonial govenunent is also reflectd in the numerous statistics andother publications on postal and lectronic communications it com-piled and issued- Table 6.1, taken from a statistical yearbook com-piled by the CGK, was intended to demonstrate colonial Korca's fa-vorable "communication capability" \tstshinryoku) in comparisonwith other parts of the Japanese empire.A considerable gap appears to have cxisted in the availability oIconrmunications Iacilities btween metropole and peripheral areas inthe empire. Cenerally speaking, greater urbanizarion and a largerJapanese population explained the highly developed inJnstructurcofJapan proper and the KwantunS Territory. Southem Sakhalin andthe South Sa Islands, thinly populated and lackinS transportationbut of strategic importanc, relied havily on telecornmunications.Although Korea rivaled Taiwan in the cateSory of the ieleSraph, itlaggd in telephone service and usage. In fact, onc the police nt-work was completed in Korea, expansion of telecornmunications in-frastructure slowed considerably, due less to a lack of interest thanto lack of funds. The colonial government had to abandon its plan toraise public loans for telecorrununicaiions after just one year, andafter 1923 telephone users had to shoulder all installation costs. As inJapan proper telephone subscriptions in Korea became a scarcecommodity and thercfore a status symbol.?4How did telecommunications affect the Korean population? lncompa ng statistics on the iapanese and Korcan populations of co-lonial Korea, Andrew Grajdanzev noted that as of 1938 only one outof every 306 Korean families had a ielephone, compared to one outof every four lapanese families. Therefore, hc concluded, "tele-

Colonial Korci r i1 l tltcor munication. 169phones in Korea arc used almost exclusively by the Japanese.,,rtGrajdanzev was cetainly cotect that th.Japanese population in Kor(ra enjoyed the benefit of tclecommunications disproportionatety,but it would b misleading to lump all Koreans together. A closerexamination of telephone subscriptions during th entire colonialperiod suggests a somewhat different conclusion (see Fi8. 6.2). Ko-rean subscribers to telephone service increasd steadily from a ma-gcr 5 percent (a18 persons) oI all subscribers in 1910 to nearlv 30perccnt-ov{-r 17,000-thirty yearq later. Despjte Lhe high coir L,ftelephone instaliatior! many considered it indispensab[ to theirbusiness.r6In a Iimited way, those Korean subscribcrs were as privi-leged as the other 70 percent-some 40,000 Japanese-comparcd tothe overwhclming majority of their Illow Koreans.The fate of the Korean-lantuage telegram may also yield clues asto how Koreans rclated to telecommunications (see Fig. 6.3). WhenJapan took over Korea's telecornmunication administration in 1905,it irnmediately abolished ChineseJanguage relegram service and in,stituted lapaneselanguage srvice for all Korea. Both han'g l andEuropeanJanguage sewices continued, but the fomr was larglyconJined to domestic service. Th share of iar'giil telegrams in theoverall number of tlegrams sent and rcceived in Korea betwen1905 and 1940 reveals an interesting pattern. The percentage as wellas thc number of ft{n?ni telegams increased steadily for the firstfifteen years after 1905, probably due to impmvcd communicationsfacilities and selvices and the srandardization of na",8;l teleSrams.The pivotal year of l9l9 registered an all-rime high in ftan,g rcle,gram\


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r

45,00040,00035,00030,00025,00020,00015,000r 0,0005,000

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9911199399191939999Year

Fig. 5.2 Tlephone subkriptioN in (orea, 1905-41 (Sode: Taehan hinSuk.h'ae'shtnba, Chdn'8i t'oiSsin sh p'rtsinaydn-sn Isaoil, t l,p.592J.

3500000300000025000002000000r5000001000000

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Fi8. 6 3 Telegiatu *nt in Korca,19ol 4r (Source: Sour.e Taehd hin'gul ch'a*hin-b!, chdt'Ei t'ongsin sip p'rlsitty,i4-sa lseoul, 1%61, pp. ss1-52).

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172 I)AQINGYANGCCK conclu


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174 I)AQING YANGEvents on thc contincnt soon ne'essitated an exPanded telecom-

rn,rr,ications netw.,rt t,)r military, political' and economic PurPoses'oii"r'ii" "tt"oiot''"""t or vo"'t'ut."o in 1932' laPan s line of na-?"""t i"f""." vil"t .'"t"nctcd to the Manchukuo-soviet border' andii:'"';;';".;;; io srrenBthen militdry facilities in the- northMeanwhile, wiih;fforts under way lo integrate JaPan and Mantnu_'i, irto a "lapan-Manchukuo eronomic bloc"' communicahon lr (sil"t**Tl"'o"l' ""a the conlinent became d toP Pr;ority . for.ci v ilianleaders as well Having achieved the success of cross-strarl telePnone:-;;;,t ", il,IoJ#'ied as a chief agent of technological devel-;il;;]";;;""; teiecommunicatron expansion rkouthout the"-"t*. r" G:+, MOC drafled plans for a new long-dislance cable;;:l;;"i;;;; rrom rokvo thro'rth Kored to reach Mukden inil:;;i;.. ;i;.; ii; cad! was coirsiaerea a miritdry rink andI -",ii' .i*i*u *ticv, there would be no tact of funds 'i In ad-;i#";.;;ilg' the'speciat relaiionshiP betwen laPan andiir".rrrr'., "t u tiuaing i'acr engineer exPlained' a new Japan-^^ir".lr.i""."uf" -."fd iacilitate frlrtler contjnental exPansion lt*."ii *i"* i""ry to connect with the PtosPerous regions alongrh. Yanetze River in central China over a land link throuth Man';:'t; ';;;t;i";";* submarine cdble from JaPan to shanshai lnl'jit'"-. ir,'" i"iJ.Je would help connct JaPan with EuroP'li."^ii" i"J [t." was completing a trans-sibe an cable neFil""ri. iiJr'".i, ili"pan-Ko'ea-i4a"cli"kuo cable would be both al'i.hw,v and a b\.wav s""il; il;;;'.;; .able nerworl in East Asia' ba5d on JaPan s

"r.ai-".",i. i*t'".r.gy," rePresented a majorrhifl in Japan'sinteF

natloial teletommunications Po'icy During the Prevro'rs oecauesjapan had praced its hoPes for sre*'"#i""TlilJ#';ii.iltelecommumcation in the emergmg w.,^-i."a to ,"au." Uottt construrtion costs and the efforts needed toil""i'. t"ii.t "-n. rn foreign counlries Developmenl of the non-i;H."i :;; :"J;. tstem ior lons-disrance terePhone transmis-.i^" -i- "-ri".r" Sr'i"voshi and other MoC technician5 in taPanffi" *ti" r"l-Ot, ,if ,.itlie balance in tavor of cable over wireless"' t".t l"' ,-""nr., were Japan's new emPire'building require--l'l'l l" l#h;"irv iJ*oriaut"a its Political and militdry:;;;;i;; esi". "oninent' a sharp increase in telecomnunica'l1:=J;;;;;. ";;'";i"J (see Fig 6 r1 As the director or Moc's

Colonial Kores atld l clccontnunications 175

100,00050,000

-'- Japan > rciea-1- Korc. > Japan-.- Korca > Manchukuo------o-- Uan.rrutuo > Korca

$3Y.ar

Fig. 6.4 Telphone t af{ic (numtsr of c.lls) betw@n (oea and JaPe and Man'huluo,19i2-41 (sour.e: Te'shiBhd, DeMukyoku, D?nnl "'Ilar lrolvo,1941], P 393)Telecornmunication Bureau Pointed out, due to the limited numberof radio frequencies, wireless cornmunication could no longer meetthe rcquirements of a Sreater communicahons network in East AsiaIn view of its stnteSic imPotance, the JaPan_Manchukuo routealone, he told the Diet, could conceivably require over hundreds ofchannels. Thut the limited wireless Irequencies available to JaPanwould be inadequate and had to be rserved rnainly for cornmuni-cation with more distant forcitn countries in EuroPe or the Ameri-cas. Moreover, the need for secrcy had bcome Particularly acute'as military, political, and diplomatic communications among JaPan,Manchukuo, and China, now bound in a sPecial relationshiP, rc-quired tightened anti-esPionage masules. Here cable enjoyed a de-cided advantage over wircless, whose messages could easily be in-tercepted and deciphered. Finally, desPite improvements in wtelesstechnology, the problem of atmosPheric interfelence with wirelessconrmunications prsisted, A cable communications network Pro-vided not only tithter security but also the caPacity to handle thvoluminous traffic betlveen laPan and its sPhere of inlluence in ad_tacent areas. AlthouSh conshuction costs were hiSher, an under-ground cable would be more permanent, and therefole more apPro_priate, forJapan's lasting impedal enterPrise rZ


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176 DAQINGYANGA telephonc cablc lhrking )aPan and the continent Proved notonly shategically indisPensable but also highly PoPular. AJter tele-phone service bcgan in l93J between Japan and Korea, demand soon;utstripped capa;ily. Durint the first ten days after servi(e began on

;anuary15, an avcrage of close to a hundred telephone calls Per daywas placed btlveen Korea and JaPart nearly reachint the sin8le cir-cuifs maximum daily capacity of 120 * Later, some 30 telephonecalls per day were exchanged between JaPan and Manchukuo ini-tially, but the nurnber soared to about 130 in less than two years \oHer;, the potitical-mililary concems of emPire-building and busi-nesys interest in what were called "nutrition lines"-Profit-generat-ing rcutes - coincided.-Construction of the JaPan-Korea-Manchukuo cable b8an in theearly winter oI1935 in Manchukuo and in November 1936 in KoreaMC provided not orily much of the technical expertise but alsoover Yt million oI the total !11 million requked in Korea alone. Morcthan halJ a rrillion men, the majority Korear! were mobilized Aheadof schedule in SePtember 1939, construction of the m0 kilometers ofcable in Korea, bu ed one metel underSrcund along the rnainnorth-south highway, with twenty relay stations en route, was com_pleted.ao The cable from Tokyo to Mukden via Keii6 was some 2,600tlometeis in len$h, the longest underground telePhone cable in theworld at that 6m; (see MaP 6,1). The some ylo million Poured intothe project siSniJicantly strengihened communications among the*uee areas.{ Japan-Manchukuo telePhone capacity increased by 24channels and Japan-Korea by 10 with telex and facsimile sewices aswell, using equipment developed entirely by JaPan c

With anotheitechnological victory in sighL conlident technocfttsin the MOC in Tokyo drew uP Plans for unified control of the soon-to-becompletd lonS-distance telecorrmunications network in EastAsia. Not iurprisingly, they sought to iustify such an unPrecedentedextension of iuthority largely by emPhasizing the technological im-Derative.o ln conhast to the open-wire line of the Meiii Period, ai\/oC report declared, non-loaded cables were a uniquely JaPansetechnology, a step ahead of the advanced countries in the West, thusrequirinj maintenance by knowledgeable technicians to Prevent in-terrupti;ns. The frequenay of such accidenls on long-distance cables,acco;ding to MOC'S own lests, increased in ProPortion to the squareof the disiance. MOC considred cunent maintenance levels far from

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Map 6.1 Th hpan-Ko@-Manchuleo longdisi2nce cable network (so!rc: Tebhin,sh6, Komukyoku, Ni.t':Mdn rna*u denua thists, ekki k ikaku kny6 Fokyo,193Zl).


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I78 I)AQINC YANG\officicnl for J r.'bl( slr"l'hinB from Tokyo lo Mukden {and soon loiil"ir'"".i".',, .,o',"i. st.i"r'"'t' and it was necessary that ali-:tii;;;';t.l:J;; rorrow a sintre chain or corn'nand under'^illt """"*'..' Atso, further savinSs could be exPected by add-I'jli.iT" -it*"..rrwav, news' broadcast relay' and aero*utical;:ff;;il i;;;i',.t* puii;.. rn" uoc '"p"'t alcu:d th:t "r:r.t\',i"h". n,'rDos oi futurc East As;an telecornmuocatons' tecruucdrillt rl^i*"t","*"te ol the JaPan-Korea-Manchukuo cable cir-)iil'" "i^"in-L."o*ted direcrlv to rhe Moc only under its uni-;il';#i,:#;; ro Moc' could rhe lons-distance circuits"."J,ii*o;iu rurrirl ,r'I funchon of our imPortant Mriorul Policy of'"l:il;i;;;."dons artery" and rorcerr'rrrv advance laPdn s.r"*. u,ii, it{ot utiott policy in Last Asia e

Colonial Autonomy and Impedal lntegrationArd,ino lhat the history of telecornmuni(ations is not simPly a nar-LY'","" i"ti" *.r"n"i of techni'al effi'iencies' communicationslii],liliJ* n"-- suggests shiJring the focus from the instru-;;i"i.;;;;;;i. *t"il'" e";"ring g'oups PerPtuarrv netotiate;1;J ;;;;t";' ;Presentation' and knowredge with- whatever:-:-;; ,." .",itatle " ms persPctive illumindtes the history;"#";;;;-;;;;-n"nchutuo rong-aistance cabre laPan's newimDerial telecommunications networx was not simPly an ePoch--lil^-,".*"G*t achievemenl; it al5o exacerbated Political:::'"*.;;;""ft* the empire As JaPanese technotrars in Moc#;H";;t;;?;'t* liu#;"a -n"oi the imDact or the techno-#;.i:;;;;;^ ";"diated bv the new imperiil asenda' arrectedi-,i"" ul'".i"t ."t'ia" *'e home istands as well"*;'fi;;;;'";;;;;"i':."1":l-:1 j55ii";li*-i;i:#*il1cable network into the peninsula corncror"r;, oir." i" ,rt" "*pitl' The new overall Plans jaPan envisioned Jor'"T"i L-'"-*"i""r".i" the earlv 1030s neiessarily meant redefiningili.ili* "r"J..i'i rorea Aiter Minami liro arrived in Korea asl'"ilt*"-.."'"ii" it36 and Particuldrlv f;llowing th outbreak of"*::;':;;..." War in 1937, the idea of Korea as the "forward*l'#t",ffi "" "" 'Jntin*i" t'";'il' zenshin heitan kichi) sa\ned,ti".i*",l.t o"s*'tiTdkeo' a JaP"nese Professor at Keii6lmPe-"',ii^""'lit'" ".a -"ior cxPonent of the idea' erPlained' given its

Coloniol Korca a d l.leconnunicalions 179political stability, level of industrialization, and abundant cheap en-ergy and labor, Korea was the ideal supply base for Japan s furthercontinental operations, be it war against the Soviet Union or expan-sion into China. In fact, Korea would become the "second atcni[homeland]," he prcdicted, and in case of conflict with the UnitedStates, lapan could entrust its continental enterprise to Korea anddevote itself to troubles in the Pacific.G Such visions also guidedthose in the colonial goverunent. Domoto Tatsuo, a Japanese officialin GGK, took pains to dehneate the va ous interprctations of the"continental base" theory, adding thaL as Koreans incrcasingly be-came involved in Manchukuo, China, and Imer Mongolia, Japan'scontinental expansion would increasingly become a ioint Japanese-Korean enterprise.aT This implied that, after more than two decadesof Japanese rule, colonial Korea had moved closer to becoming acore area in an ever-expanding Japanes impe um in Asia.A former commander of the Kwantung Army, Govemor-GeneralMinami adopted a series of measures aimed at strengthening tieswith Manchuria under the slogan "Korea and Manchuda as one"(Man-Sen ichi'11yd).Si^ce colonial Korea was aspiring to project its in-fluence beyond its borders, it must first overcome obstacles of spaceand time by improving means of communication and hansportation.In a meeting behareen Minami and Kwantunt Army leaders, it wasdecided to construct fourteen bndSes across border rivers t'etweenthe two areas. Korea relinquished control of telecommunications fa-cilities in the prcdominantly Korean-populated Kanto 0iandao) araacross the border in Manchuria to the new Manchurian Teletraphand Telephone Company (MTT) in retum lor rate cuts betweenKantd and Korea. Moreovet conJerences Ior milway coordinationwith Manchukuo and North China were held.sIn addition to Manchukuo, Nodh Chifla was another promisingeconomic ftontier for Korea. Although still cornmanding a dominantposition, Japan's share in Korea's extemal trade began to declnesomewhat in the late 1930s. On the other hand, Manchukuo andJapanese-occupied areas in China became inceasingly importantpartners, jointly claiming 83.6 percent in 1938 and 88.2 prcent in1939 of Korea's trade with the East Asia region outside Japan'sIormal empirc.re The Koran population in China proper increasedalmost eightlold within Iive years aftet 1937,n The Korean TmdeAssociation (KTA) boldly predicted that Korea would "take the


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180 I)AQINCYANCinitiative" in tho North China trade, desPite Possible comPetitionfrom goods produccd in Japan and Manchukuo Direct sea routesfrcm iorcan-ports to North China were established. and the imPactof Korea's erowinq tr.rdc with North China on telecommunicationswas noted in Kor;d. A l'.TA iournal emphasized that the "caPitalislworld economv" was characterized by the intemational fluctuationof commodity pdces, exchange rates, and the stock market' whichmade efficient communication essential for market exPansion Theassociahon stressed the urgent need for direct communication linksbetween North China and Korea as well as low rates 5lTelecommunications became an incrasingly imPortant Priorityfo! the colonial qovernment due to industrialization at home andtrade a.tiviw ab;oad At the 1936 Conjerence on Korean Industtialand Economic Policy, business leaders from Korea and JaPan la-mented hieh leleqram rates and scarce telephone service s': Erpan-.lnn oI telC"commi..icahons in Korea be(ame a maior agenda at theconJercnce convened by the GGK in SePtember 1938 to coPe with thenew conditions in East Asia after outbreak of the Sino-JaPanese War'The colonral government admitted that inadequate telecoruNnica-tion facilihes in Korea were causint numerous delays and Poorsrvice. The conlerence recorffnended a wide rante oI exPansions oItelecommunication facilitiesr extension of telegraPh and telePhoneIines, conversion of Lrare wiles to more secure cables, adoPtion ofhigh-speed telegraphic equiPment, and imProvement of sPcialcoinmunicatiott "servLes foi aviation, weather forecasting, and sluP-Dinp. tr the meantime, control over alt forms of commu^ication byinein, of.".sotsftip and radio inlelli8ence Salhering was to bestrenethened. G;ven radio's great role in educatinS the PeoPle' uni-fvine"opinion, and stabilizintthe Public order, the CCK pointed out'droaicast facilities must b gteatly exPanded, and public radio re-ceiverc and high-power radio stations to broadcast to the SovietuJott ""i to ii't Lt" -i h Soviet broadcasts to Asia must be estab-lished.$ In resPonse to the growing business concems voiced at theconference, the GGK soon eitablished radiotelePhonic linl(s betweenP'y6ngyang, Pusan, and Keiio in Korea and Beijing, Tianiin' andShanehai in China in 1939.Al"though the "second nairhi" ProPosition, calling for industriali'zation of "Korea as well as imPrial exPansion beyond it as a "for-ward basc," qenerated much e;thusiasm among lhe IaPane5 in Ko-rca, it mct iv;ttr slept;cism out5ide thc Pcninsuld For in\tancc'

Coloniol Korcq at l 'Iclccomfiufiications 181questions arose in the Japanese Diet as to the disruptive conse-quences of an aggressively expanding Korea on existing nationalboundaries.s The KwanhrnS Army, on the other hand, averred thatthe primary purpose of a "Iorward base on the continent" was toshen#hen military preparations in Manchukuo.s Even those in Ko-rea realized that Korea mitht assume rcles other than simply being a"forward base." Given its unique geographic locatioD as ProfessorSuzuki pointed out, Korea itself could also serve as a vital strategiclinl between insular Japan-"the center of leadership" - and thevast continent of Asia-the sub(egions in the Greater East Asianeconomic zone. By the late 1930s, th peninsula itself supported theimpotant Pusan-Keijduiju-Mulden Gilway trunk line. The oceanson both sides of the peninsula leaturcd sealanes linking Japan withManchukuo and China, effectively tuming both the Japan Sea andthe Yellow Sea into "Japanese lakes." In short, Korea must also b-come the "route to the continent" (laiflft, dfo).56 The "route" theorysemed to coincide with the role of "organic linl" assigned to Koreain MOC'S discussions about the new cable network.Therefore, considerable ambituity, if not disagreement, emergedover the primary role oI colonial Korea in the new empire. By coin-ing the phrase "Korea as lhe hanamidi and, Manchuria as the stage,"thus comparing Korea to the runway in the kabuki theater thatserves as a secondary but independent state, Govemor-General Mi-nami did not clarify the matter.57 As we shall see, how to make Ko-rea function smoothly as a "route to the continent" was no simplequestion. ln {act, Japan s attempt to establish an empire-wide tele-communications network in the late 1930s made it clear that impe alintegration would not be attained as asify as technical experts inTokyo had hoped.

Telecommunications and Colonial AutonomyDuring the months bfore conskuction of the Japan-Korea-Manchu-kuo cable began, MOC officials negotiated a temporary under-standing with GGK that allowed MOC engineers into Korea for con-struction work and the use of MOC equipment. Soon tterwardtMOC beSan making aEangements for long.term maintenance of thecable network and proposed stationing MOC engineers on a perma-nent basis inside Korea. In early October 1935, shortly aJter con-struction began, MOC engineer Matsumae Shigeyoshi accompanied


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182 I) QINCYANCthe chief of tho orwly crcated JaPan-Manchukuo TelePhone Con-struction Section on .r visit to Koija to discuss the matter with GGKofficials. InterestinSly, Malsumae's repeated allusions to uniliedcontrol of lonS-distancc nctwork in advanced countries in the Westbolstered his iall Ior a unified system of control and maintenance ofthe highly technical non-loaded cable network Teclurology t'ecamean unwittint ally of MOC hegcmony sThe MOC plan for unified (rcad: cenEalized) control over thistelecommunicitions system might have made Perfect sense fromTokyo's pEPective, but Proved unaccePtable to the GGK. Arguablythe mostimportant colony in the JaPanese empire, Korca had legallyenjoyed virtual autonomy, since its governol-geneml in theory re-oorted directlv to the emperor.e Previous telecommunications issues'lnvotving theiome islands and the cotonv had been re\olved by bi-Iateral agreements btween Sovernment agencies. This Proved im-possible with the MOC ProPosal: although the colonial adminisha-tion in Korea welcomed the new network in Korea, since it wouldboost its own telecommunications infrastructure, it made no secretof its disapproval of MOC contrcl. Not Persuaded by MOC'S iustili-cations, GGK proposed that uniJied maintenance must filst be im-nlemented in ihe home islands and Manchukuo before being er-ieruled to Ko.ea. This was a slumblins block for MOC, since theKwantung Army had earlier rejected MOCS Plan of unified controland Drop;sed the new MTT be mdde responsjble lor maintenance'Thus a.rring their meetints with GGK officials, MOC bureaucralshad to downplay the siSniJicane of the Portion of the cable in Man-chukuo, since Kwantung Army opPosition made it impossible tocarry out their Plans in Manchukuo. In response to GGK insistencethat Korea be allowed to attemPt its own maintenance, Matsumaeretorted that this would be like two good neiShbors erecting hiShwalls.s Tension consequently mounted between the MOC, which,largely on technical grounds, demanded cenhalized control andmai.rtinance of the new cable, and the GGK Cornmunications Bu_reau, which saw this as an intrusion.ln the end, MoC presented to GGK a carefully worded memo-randum that noted the new cable was just "passing through Koreaand would in no way affect the jurisdiction of the CGK." To makethe deal more Palatable, MOC Promised to lase surPlus circuits torcK at favomble ntes-a major enticement, given the colonial 8ov-emment's limited funds. The GGK Bureau of Communications

Colonkt Korca a d Tetecontnunications 183relented, with the proviso that maintenance work inside Korea bentrusted to a private company.6tThe conllict between MOC and the colonial administration in Ko_rea involved more than quibblint amont petty bureaucmts. In a pri,vate meetin& Ono Rokuichi, superintendent_general in Korea, ex-pressed uneasiness at the prospct that if allowed into Korea, MOCemployees would be in direct contact with local administrations aswell as ordinary people.6, Disagrment ovet the cohmunicationsnetwork even,affected the tovemor-general himself. On an inspec_tion tour near Kaes6ng, Minami tir6 was apparently disturbed t; seeMinisry of Comnunications (TeishinshO) on signs for the Japan_Korea-Manchukuo cable then under construction. yamada Tada_tsugu, chief of the GGK Communications Bureau, proposed simplychangiry "ministry" to "bureau.,, When a MOC engineer in 'iheentourage objected, asserting that the cable belonged to the MinistryoJ Communications in Tokyo Minami was enragdd. ,,Korea is underthe jurisdiction of the Sovemor-generat directly ippointed by the em_percr. What autho ty on earth does ihe Minister of Conmunicationshave to build facilities herc?" ln the end, as a complomise, the word"ministry" was dropped from all signs, and consEuction proceeded.Only the ambiguous terrn "communications,, rcrrained.6lWhy was GGK so recalcitrant on such a seemingly Eivial matter?As one MOC bureaucrat bluntly stated to hjs colleagues in Tokyo,"extension of MOC autho ty to Korea is a probbmk invasion ofthe administrative iuiisdicriorr which has alwavs ben fearedlhere."d The coloni.l bueaucracy suspe.led that if ir gave in onteleconunurucattons, other areas under their jurisdiction, such asaviation and insurance, would be next. As a shorttem solution.MOC had to secure an imFriat ordinance in t938 ro nuke limiredMOC oFrations in Korea legal.6 As a more fundamental solution,however, the ministry had to modify its strateSy by using a semipd_vate company, the Intemational Telecommunicatiom Co"po.utiorlfor construrtion and maintenance outside rapan proper.. The problemol conflicting interests coula noi beresolved simplyby removint a clEracter on a sign, however. The tug-of_war over ih!status of Korea within the empfue continued till the ;ve of the pacificWar and moved to a different alena.By the end oI the 1930s ]apan had acquired rhe technological ca_pacity to link all telecommunications lacilities into one si+le nerwork in East Asia, promising imperial iniegration under To-'kyo. In


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184 I)AQINGYANC.edliw, howt v( t, ltt Y'Pnr'rl" ' rPcralion of telecommunication sew-i.?'ii'rlo".'. i.", '-i.lna' it*Lroru"' or


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186could only rcinn'rco tho growth of a separate identity for the Japa-nese servinS in Koren vis'i-vis Japanese in ,apan. In this context,even relativoly mundanc issues such as different pay scales mightbacome a sourcc of friction. ReferrinS to the prospct of MOC opr-ating inside Korra, a GGK official hinted that its own employeeswould be displcased to work side by side with MOC people sincethe latter's chances for promotion were better. As a bureaucrat, hewas voicinS a real albeit limited concem. Despite high-soundingrhetoric, thc governmcnts in both Tokyo and in Kijo were oftendominated by bureaucratic self-interest.

ConclusionEssentially, this chapter has explored two paradoxes. The first re-flects the character of Japan's colonial policy in Korea. Introducedand expanded primarily as a modem means of colonial control, thctelegraph and telephone under Japanese rule not only served tostrengthen the colonial adminishation but also provided new opportunities, however limited and unevnly distributed, to the nativepopulation. Few would deny that it was under Japanese rule that thetelegraph and telephone first gained widespread use in Korea. Theincoryoration of Korea into a Japan-dominated telecorununicationsnetwork helped create a pcculiar kind of modernity that can bstbe called "colonial." Although Koreans in incrcasing number couldand did send telegrams, for example, the relative decline of Korean-languaSe telegrams rcveals that colo al assirnilation under the Japa-nese was succeeding exactly because it included not just coercion but

The second paradox arises partly from the nature of a communi-cations network itself. Japan s new East Asian telecorrmunicationsnetwork was a double-ed8ed sword. Promising to collapse spaceand time within the imperium, it also threatened to upset the uneasybalance between the imperial center and the colonial periphery.Although in tmnsportation and other arcas coordination betweenTokyo and the colonial Bovemments was by no means smooth/ theconflict btween GGK and MOC over the new East Asian telecom-munication network was particularly serious, in part due to the in-stantaneous naturc of telecommurucations and thc issue of controland governance it cntailed. This phenomenon was not entirely newin the anna's of impcrial history. WritinS aboul lh. rolc of telegra

Colo iel Kon\ Ml trlrcotnnnnicatiorls 1,87phy in generating the ground ronditions for urban imperialism inthe late ninetecnth century, James Carey has noted that the cable andteleSraph, in addition to sea powcr, turned Westem colonialism intoimperialism. a system in which the center of an empirc could dictate,ftther than respond, to the mar8in.7r Thc redefinition of colonial Korea is an example o{ such a tmnsition: colonialism, in which powerand authority rested with the domestic govemor, tcame impc al-ism, in which power and authority were absorbd by the impe alcapital. Essentially, the contest over teleconrmunications, the ulti-mate medium of control, illustrates the thomy political problem oIimperial inteSration versus colonial autonomy and in tuln helpedredefine the future role of colonial Korea in the new empire.Bureaucratic inJightint notwithstandin& Korea's importance inJapan's imperial telecornmunications network waxed during the Pa-cific War. As increased communications between Japan and NorthChina occupied more and more circuits on the Japan-Manchukuocable, construction of a second cable linking Keijo with northemManchuria began, eventually rcaching W6rsan by the end of thewar. Domcstic service in Korea had to be reduced to meet the needof ttuough haffic and air defense. The Korean Strait in the sourh be-came th biggest bottleneck for telecornmunications haffic, espe-cially because a plarned cable linking Japan and cenhal China di-rectly failed to matedalize. Although a second non-loaded subma-rine cable across the strait was laid in December 1943, it soon ceasedfunctioning due to technical problems. To ensure the vital link btween Japan and th continent, an ultra-short,wave (VHF) connec-tion was established, but the rclay station in Tsushima also ceasedoperation, due to a lire. In a last minute push, the Japanese under-took construction of new direct, cross-channel facilities that neededno rclay points. Ironically, the work was completed on August 15,1945, the day of Japan's sunender.zThe colonial telecommunications infraskucture continued to playa role in postcolonial Korea, however. An Amedcan survey in thelate 1940s describd the telecommunications network in southemKorea as "small and in many respects obsolete by American stan-clards," after years of poot maintenance, but considered it "generallyadequaie to meet the existing needs." To supplement these rapidlydcterioradng lines, the Republic of Kora goverunent purchasedwireless equipment from the American electronics Siant RCA.7sIn June 1950, (iv('ycrrs aftcrJapan's cmpirc had disintcgrarcd, the

r )^QtNc YANG


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188 I )AQINC YANGKorcan peninsula wrs cnSullcd in a new conflict. Badly in need ofcommunication facilitic$, U.S. forces found the underground "Muk-den cable" running throuSh the peninsula a crucial asset. Through-out the war, Amcrican cngineers repaired Japanese cables and rc-peater stations, to maximize the cable's use as a trunk line for trooPsin Korea and as the vital link bctween General MacArthur's head-quarte$ in Tokyo and U.S. forces in the peninsula. As the treat ar-tery of communicatior! a U.S. Army officer recalled, the MukdenCable was a "God-sent &ift."76 Interestinglt Americans were not theonly ones taking advantate of Japan's imperial legacies. The samecable also se ed as a major communications lir* for North Koreaand China, which joined the war in October 1950. lacking sparcparts to repair damages to the cable between Sinrijiu and Pyong-yan& Chinese enginee$ resorted to nemoving Portions oI the non-loaded cable the Japanese had laid along the former Manchukuo-USSR frontier.z Thus, in a marurer that no one would have Pre-dic'ted, what remained of JaparlB imFrial telecommunications net-work contributed to postcolonial Korea's hansition to the new Coldwar world order.z

PART IIColonial Modernity and Identity

Documents

Yang_Colonial Korea in Japan's Imperial Telecommunications Network