Yates, JS. The scalar politics of governing adaptation to climate change in Nepal. Global Causeway working paper

8/12/2019 Yates, JS. The scalar politics of governing adaptation to climate change in Nepal. Global Causeway working paper

1/29

Working Paper Series

2010-3

Institutional Complexity in Governing the Scalar Politics

of Adaptation to Climate Change in Rural Nepal

Julian S. Yates

(December 2010)

This is an early draft of a paper published in Global EnvironmentalChange:

Yates, J. S. (2012). Uneven Interventions and the scalar politics ofgoverning livelihood adaptation in rural Nepal. Global Environmental

Change, 22(2), 537-546.doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2012.01.007

About Global CausewayGlobal Causeway is an international initiative that builds bridges between development projects and

practitioners working to empower marginalised individuals, groups, and communities. The Global

Causeway initiative is a coalition of people and organisations that envision a more equal global

system based on equal access to decision-making.

www.globalcauseway.org | [email protected] 26 Church Hill, Stretton on Dunsmore, Rugby, Warwickshire, CV23 9NA, UK


2/29

Institutional Complexity in Governing the Scalar Politics of Adaptation to Climate

Change in Rural Nepal

By

Julian S. Yates

Department of Geography, University of British Columbia, 1984 West Mall,

Vancouver, BC, V6T 1Z2. Canada.

Phone: 1 (604) 822-2663

Fax: 1 (604) 822-6150

[email protected]

Abstract:Accounts that address the governance of adaptation are increasingly exploring the

ways in which the institutional context can both enable and constrain adaptive capacity. This

paper contributes to such a growing field by providing empirical evidence derived from

participatory field research, which was carried out in the districts of Chitwan and

Nawalparasi in Nepal during the spring of 2010. The results support previous arguments thatemphasise the need to address the multi-scalar context of adaptation as a governance issue

associated with individual and collective deliberative action (or inaction). Institution analysis

identifies the ways in which networks of powerful and well-connected key players are able to

control adaptation projects, flows of knowledge and information, and the ways in which local

institutions and organisations respond to livelihood needs. This control is under-pinned by a

scalar politics that constructs and reproduces particular local adaptation needs at multiple

governance scales at once. Many existing tools and frameworks for assessing the institutional

elements of adaptation are unable to grapple with these factors systematically. Thus, the

paper concludes with a call for further attention to forms of scalar politics in the governanceof adaptation so that we might be able to more effectively theorise up from local complexity

without glossing over inherent power relations and institutional constraints.

Keywords: Adaptation, institutions, governance, power, networks, scalar politics,

livelihoods, Nepal.


3/29

Governing adaptation Nepal Julian S. Yates

GCWP: 2010-3 (December) 1

1 Introduction: Uncertainty in adaptive capacityExploring adaptation to climate change has been described as a science of explaining how

social and natural systems learn through experimentation (Adger, 2006, p. 269). However,

this science of adaptation has become characterised by the same promise of prediction

that underpins the inherent uncertainty of climate projections (Demeritt, 2001). Uncertainty

in adaptive capacity stems from uncertain climate models, unreliable aggregate

measurements of adaptive capacity, the unknown effects of adaptive practices, the inability to

predict the ways in which adaptive capacity is transformed into adaptive action, and contested

underlying theories of behaviour, politics, and risk (Adger et al., 2003; Adger and Vincent,

2005; Ensor and Berger, 2009). In this paper, I call attention to such uncertainty by pointing

to our current inability to grapple with the complexity of the institutional arrangements that

both enable and constrain adaptation.

Current frameworks for understanding the role of institutions in adaptation aggregate

local complexity into regional and global models, which quantify and map vulnerability for

comparative purposes. This approach places vulnerability and adaptation within public policy

debates around climate change, whereby climate change impacts are a threat to nation

statesThis framing crowds out, subverts and constrains framing in terms of human-well

being (Adger, 2010). Demand for such an approach has been stimulated by supposed policy

relevance, but Barnett et al. (2008) argue that these frameworks cannot be relied upon to

communicate complexities, and should not be used for the comparison of vulnerability as a

context-specific problem. Engle and Lemos (2010) attempt at quantification, for example,

fails to adhere to the complex web of qualitative relations that they argue characterises the

adaptive capacity of water governance institutions in Brazil. Although some have tried to

overcome such limitations through the use of participatory methods (Fazey et al., 2010),

frameworks such as Gupta et al.s (2010) adaptive capacity wheel subjectively measure the


4/29



concept according to 22 criteria that are decided upon by Western scientists carrying pre-

determined yet unstated assumptions and belief systems (Hulme and Dessai, 2008). Such

attempts to govern adaptation compound uncertainty: not only is it difficult to project

scenarios of governance into the future or to predict their change, but the very notion of

governance indicators is problematic (Adger and Vincent, 2005, p. 403). In contrast to such

accounts, the approach taken here assumes that there are no measurable or generalisable a

priori factors, processes or functional relationships between exposure, sensitivity and

adaptive capacitythey are distinctive to particular places and times (Smit and Wandel,

2006, p. 286).

In general agreement with Adger et al.(2009), I maintain that the institutional

constraints to adaptation and the limits to our current frameworks for assessing such

constraints are not immutable. Assuming so runs the risk of yielding to broader and

supposedly hegemonic structural constraints. Rather than dwelling on unavoidable or

already-existing futures of climate change, we need to open up the governance of adaptation

to alternative and desirable futures and cast humans as agents of change rather than as

passive recipients of apocalyptic scenarios (O'Brien, Forthcoming). Such a didactic

futurology (Brace and Geoghegan, Forthcoming), may reveal that dynamic anticipatory

action is already helping to construct the future in the present. In this context, governing

adaptation begins from an open set of endless possibilities, rather than the predictable

outcome of present trends or past occurrences (Anderson, Forthcoming, p. 17). To explore

this notion, I follow a description of the research context with a critical reading of normative

governance frameworks, which aim to enhance knowledge, affiliation, representation, and

responsivenessin institutions. Such a reading points to forms of authority and expertise that

enable certain futures to appear, gain, and retain presence (Anderson, Forthcoming, p. 12). I

then turn to an analysis of the institutional context of adaptation in Nepal by drawing


5/29



attention to institutional differentiation and a critical reading of governance mechanisms.

Such an analysis points to the role that a scalar politics plays in producing (uneven)

possibilities for adapting to what Anderson calls the presence of the future. I conclude by

reflecting on how we might incorporate such a scalar politics into further research on the

governance of adaptation.

2 Researching adaptive capacity in NepalAt the time of writing, the National Climate Change Policy of Nepal and the National

Adaptation Programme of Action (NAPA) the lynchpin of adaptation policy within the

United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) both remain under

construction. Different scales of government are working with non-governmental

organisations (NGOs) to generate data and information on climate change related impacts and

to raise awareness among local people. The research presented here was carried out in

collaboration with Practical Action Nepal, an NGO that is leading an Asian Development

Bank-funded project to assess and map vulnerability to climate change across Nepal in order

to inform the NAPA drafting process. A participatory vulnerability assessment (PVA) is

being conducted across the country to explore exposure, sensitivity, and adaptive capacity to

climate change, the results of which will feed in to the development of Nepals NAPA. The

research presented here was carried out along-side the implementation of the PVA in the

districts of Chitwan and Nawalparasi, which lie in South-central Nepal and are divided by the

topography of the Narayani River.

The research was conducted in the villages of Laukhari and Swargadwari in Chitwan,

and the villages of Kadampur and Kirtipur in Nawalparasi. In Chitwan, the two villages fall

under the management of Meghauli village development committee (VDC) and they both

face bio-physical challenges from the same two rivers (Rapti and Narayani). In Nawalparasi,


6/29



the villages are linked by a watershed that is defined by the valley that drains into the

Baulaha River; Kirtipur is in thesiwalik(200 to 1,000 metres above sea level) upstream area

of the watershed in the VDC of Devchuli, and is linked by a tributary of the Baulaha River to

the downstream community of Kadampur, located in the terai(0 200 m.a.s.l) of Divyapuri

VDC. In all research locations, agriculture is the primary livelihood activity and currently

revolves around the production of rice, maize (corn), and wheat. Crop production is

supplemented by livestock rearing, often just for subsistence, and in Meghauli by fishing.

Incomes are supplemented by wage labour in nearby towns, seasonal migration, remittances

from family members who have migrated to India, and more recently by the production of

alternative fruit and vegetable crops such as watermelon, bananas, lemon, and mangos.

In each village, qualitative and participatory research methods were carried out,

including in-depth semi-structured interviews with a key informants and participatory

workshops/focus group discussions. The workshops included the application of participatory

tools such as community resource and hazard mapping, seasonal calendars, historical

timelines, hazard ranking, resource and livelihood impact ranking, scenario development,

capacity assessments, and Venn diagramming. The workshops benefited from the embedded

knowledge of Practical Action Nepal and their local partner organisation Sahamati, both of

which have been working in the region for over a decade on vulnerability-reduction projects.

The interviews and dialogue from focus groups were recorded and transcribed verbatiminto

the qualitative analysis software QSR NVivo 8, which was used to code and analyse the

content according to relevant themes. While the PVA included a static livelihoods analysis

for assessing adaptive capacity, the research also addressed more dynamic aspects of

livelihood adaptation through institution and political network analysis, the results of which

point to the need for a more nuanced approach to investigating the institutional context of

adaptation.


7/29



3 Unpacking complexity in governing adaptation3.1 Deconstructing normative governance frameworksA growing body of work is paying attention to the relational elements of governing

adaptation through a focus on social capital and social networks (Adger, 2003), the role of

cultural values and ethics (Adger et al., 2009), and the power and politics of decision-making

(Eakin et al., 2010; Moser, 2009). Questions of power and politics in decision-making are

increasingly being broached through institutional analyses, an area that remains under-

developed in adaptation research: there is relatively little empirical research uncovering how

institutions affect the current state of adaptabilityan understanding of institutions, and the

way they fit, integrate and interact with each other is crucial (Eakin and Lemos, 2010, p. 2).

In this context, institutions are defined as systems of rules, decision-making procedures, and

programs that give rise to social practices, assign roles to the participants in these practices,

and guide interactions among the occupants of the relevant roles (Gupta et al., 2010, p. 460).

While institutions may be formalised into organisations in the public, civic, and private

sectors, the two are not synonymous (Agrawal and Perrin, 2009).

As institutional approaches gained prominence within adaptation research, they

polarised into two camps: those exploring how institutional responsiveness can support

adaptive practices; and those that address the inherent adaptability of the institutional

response itself. Arguments for the former stress the need for rigidity within the institutional

structures that act as a fulcrum for the levers of economic resources, technology, information

and skills, and infrastructure all of which can be put to the task of raising adaptive capacity

(Agrawal and Perrin, 2009; Moser, 2009). Arguments for the latter emphasise the flexibility

and diversity of governance systems that are necessary to match the complexity of the

external world (Duit et al., 2010; Pahl-Wostl, 2009). These approaches seek to improve our

understanding of how complex and decentralised systems can given certain conditions


8/29



respond flexibly and effectively to abrupt as well as incremental change (Underdal, 2010, p.

390). For Ostrom (2010a, b) addressing such complexity points to a need for polycentric

governance systems, which are characterised by multiple governing authorities that link

together dynamic collective action through diverse information networks. This approach

positions decision-making within a dialectical tension between the institutional structures and

the agency decision-makers that are embedded in particular institutional, normative, and

political contexts at the centre of governance (Moser, 2009, p. 315). The responsivenessof

governance institutions, in this context, is underpinned by the ways in which knowledgeand

information flows through networks of affiliation to determine the representativeness of

decision-making mechanisms.

Normative governance frameworks often presume a linear causal link between

knowledgeavailability and the degree of adaptive capacity, and as such address the barriers to

acquiring, processing, utilising, and disseminating knowledge (Inderberg and Eikeland,

2009). Anderson (Forthcoming), however, has drawn attention to the complex ways in which

institutional styles produce forms of knowledge that support the adaptation logics of

precaution, pre-emption, and preparedness. In this context, attention has turned to strategies

that build on local and traditional sources of knowledge in order to anticipate, plan, and

strengthen capacity in order to build more accountable communities of practice in adaptation

(Valdivia et al., 2010). As a result, there have been related calls for the decentralisation of

governance and increased attention to the emergence of new institutions at a variety of scales

(Brockhaus and Kambir, 2009; Hulme, 2010). Questions of how knowledge is used in

decision-making arenas are therefore essential (Moser, 2009), as useful knowledge comes

into being through particular social and political orderings and under particular institutional

arrangements (Hulme, 2010).


9/29



This focus on how knowledge is used conceives adaptation as a dynamic process

determined by the nature of individual and collective social capital, or affiliation, within

social networks (Adger, 2003; Pelling et al., 2008). Adaptation depends on a particular web

of relationships that determine power, resource, and information distribution in any situation

involving multiple stakeholders (Ensor and Berger, 2009, p. 21). Affiliation, then, is about

the extent, strength, and position of various individual and collective stakeholders within

socio-political networks that are built on trust and reciprocity. In this context, focus has

turned to the importance of networked key players in stimulating positive adaptation

decisions (Moser, 2009; Pralle, 2006). However, dominant political players and institutions

can also reinforce existing power relations. Manuel-Navarrete et al. (Forthcoming), for

example, have shown how hegemonic development visions in Mexico have reinforced the

status quo to the detriment of long-term adaptive capacity. The supposedly impartial work of

non-governmental organisations (NGOs) is also implicated: NGO interventions are placed-

based and contextualised, while simultaneously connected to broader flows of knowledge,

resources, ideas, values, and power. While NGO interventions instil new forms of

connectivity that can help overcome geographies of poverty, they also rework places and

livelihoods by imposing external notions of viability (Bebbington, 2004). Thus, adaptation is

not something that can be done to a community, but relies upon the ways in which local

networks internalise external influences and rules (Ostrom, 2010a). In this context, there is

a danger that the very possibility of adaptation can be used by powerful actors to achieve

other political or economic gains (Adger and Barnett, 2009).

The ways in which knowledge flows through networks of affiliation raises questions

of representation in adaptation decisions. In the best case, according to Ensor and Berger

(2009, pp. 21-22), a communitys network will yield a productive, open, and democratic

relationship promoting both policy and social learningand the flow of non-material


10/29



resources along network linkages. However, this relationship is one that may be constructed

to discipline adaptation through a form of environmentality, often enacted by the state

(Dowling, 2010). Nonetheless, a trade-off between high levels of representation and the

effectiveness of decision-making has led some to conclude that powerful institutions such as

the state should have control over adaptation decision-making (Engle and Lemos, 2010).

Others, however, have focussed on the detriments of an invisibility of local knowledge in

decision-making (Jennings, 2009). Drawing on a case of adaptation to flood risk in Mexico,

Eakin et al. (2010) illustrate how unequal power and inadequate representation in decision-

making produces inaction, institutional paralysis, and clientelism. Such unequal

representation is exacerbated by the assumption that economic growth leads to greater

adaptive capacity, as capitalisms tendency to deepen inequalities of wealth and power makes

it difficult to build coalitions around which adaptive capacity can emerge (Adger and

Vincent, 2005; Wainwright, 2010).

3.2 Introducing a scalar politicsInstitutional approaches to adaptation often seem incapable of moving beyond the

fetishisation of scale, as the ways in which knowledge, affiliation, and representation

underpin institutional responsiveness is assumed to occur at a particular scale frame. Sikor et

al.s (2010) call for attention to nested scales, for example, assumes scales to be distinct

entities that can be conveniently packaged within each other. In Osbahr et al.s (2008)

analysis of cross-scale adaptation at the local scale, the term cross-scale is often used as a

euphemism for horizontal social networks within the spatial ordering frame of the local.

Similarly, in Adger et al.s (2005) account of adaptation across scales, a rigorous scalar

analysis is forsaken in favour of a discussion of the efficiency of institutions at particular

scales. This followed Adgers (2001) earlier argument that adaptation is inherently local and

not global. Thus, adaptation research has been either unable to avoid the sin of


11/29



particularism, which prioritises the role of the individual vis--vis broader society (Head,

2010), or has succumbed a globalising instinct that conceives adaptation as a universal

phenomenon capable of being reproduced at the global, national, and local scales (Hulme,

2010).

There is a need for a more effective cross-scalar approach that takes account of the

political production of scale (Adger et al., 2005). In this context, Lesley Head proposes a

more dynamic and relational approach, and she makes passing reference to the processes of

scale-crossing and scale-jumping. Scale jumping refers to the ability of certain social groups

and organisations to shift between levels of activity in pursuit of their interests (MacKinnon,

2010), and as such relates to the similar notion of venue shopping (Pralle, 2006). Heads

call for greater attention to such practices is supported by Benson (2010), who argues that

scale fixity should be brought back into the debate, and that scale jumping is a useful way of

viewing the practices of actors seeking to influence practical outcomes in environmental

policy. For OBrien (Forthcoming, p. 4), the solution is a new science of global change that

questions the existing spatial biases that pay significant attention to levels of analysis, yet

little to the spatial disjunction between the causes and consequences of environmental change

and the implications for equity and justice.

There remains, therefore, an apparent inability to effectively theorise out (rather

than aggregate) from local complexity; as Head (2010, p. 239) has put it, there remains

insufficient attention given to questions of power and scaling up. In general agreement with

MacKinnon (2010), I argue that by paying attention to scalar politics we can begin to unravel

the strategic deployment of scale by actors, organisations, and movements seeking to

implement adaptive action. A scalar politics involves both scale jumping and scale bending

a related practice whereby social groups and individuals challenge and undermine the

existing arrangements that tie particular social activities to certain scales (MacKinnon, 2010).


12/29



Importantly, therefore, research into a scalar politics must address processes both within and

across scales, while seeking not to arbitrarily combine hierarchical and horizontal

perspectives (Reed and Bruyneel, 2010). In this way, a scalar politics may help reveal the

ways in which individuals and institutions can affect decision-making at multiple scales at

once. There is also a need, however, to account for the emergence of new institutions and

decision-making realms in order to trace new scalar arrangements that facilitate participation

in multiple scales. Thus, there are four components to a scalar politics: scale is a dimension of

political activity rather than the prime focus of analysis (scale emerges as a dimension of

contentious politics according to empirical significance); scale is strategically deployed by

actors; pre-existing scalar structures have an influence and effect on current and future scalar

politics; and, new scalar arrangements and configurations are created as a result (MacKinnon,

2010).

4 Institutions and the scalar politics of adaptation in Chitwan and Nawalparasi4.1 Institutional differentiationAdministratively, Nepal is divided into development regions and administrative zones, within

which activities are co-ordinated by District Development Committees (DDCs) and carried

out by Village Development Committee (VDCs). Since the promulgation of the Local Self-

Governance Act (LSGA) in 1999, which provides the framework for decentralised

governance in Nepal, local levels of government have become increasingly autonomous

(Bhattacharya and Basnyat, 2005). However, the formal political structure remains founded

upon a feudal panchayatsystem, and questions of land reform, democracy, federalism, and

political-economic ideology remain to be fully resolved (Amin, 2009). In Chitwan, for

example, the de facto land system whereby temporary land-use rights are granted to

villages to make use of neglected public land remains a constraint upon agricultural

adaptability, as the poorest farmers lack security of tenure or access to productive agricultural


13/29



land. Village development committees, therefore, have been perceived as largely ineffective,

bureaucratic, cumbersome, and slow to respond. Although many VDC projects are linked to

other scales of government through funding (federal funding is distributed by DDCs to

VDCs), there is a lack of co-ordination between VDC and DDC activities. In all research

locations, there was consensus that the DDC appeared to have no bearing over local

development initiatives, and that any DDC activity was channelled through the district

agriculture office, which is itself too distant to be effective.

As a result, support for rural livelihoods has emerged through a network of non-

government institutions that are more responsive to adaptation needs. The institutions

identified by the research communities as most prevalent in supporting adaptation are

presented in table 1. Differentiation among these institutions has emerged according to

different types of property rights (clear/diffuse) and different productive processes

(extraction/cultivation). The community forestry programme (CFP), for example, emerged in

the mid-1970s as an innovative move in the participatory governance of extracted forest

resources (Ojha et al., 2009). The central mechanism of the CFP is the locally elected

community forest user group (CFUG), which makes democratic decisions on forest

management (Acharya and Gentle, 2006). Members of the CFUG elect an executive

committee to voice the groups interests and participate in decision-making forums with

government. Within this decision-making structure, interest-based sub-groups (e.g. fuelwood

sellers), tole (hamlet-based) decision-making structures, and women-specific groups have

emerged to articulate different interests (Ojha et al., 2009). Thus, a strong people-centred

politics has supposedly emerged, and the programme has been described as a platform for

democratic exercise at [the] local level (Paudel and Ojha, 2007, p. 41).


14/29



Table 1 Differentiation within the local institutional context of livelihood adaptation

Clear property rights Diffuse property rights

Extractive

resources

Co-management institutions

Community forestry programme (CFP):

community-forest user groups (CFUGs);

community-forest management committees.

User committees

Water User and Sanitation Committees (WUSCs)

Water User Associations (WUAs)

Disaster Management Committees (DMCs)

Cultivated

resources

Co-operative economic institutions

Agricultural and dairy co-operatives and

associations

Collective management

Community seed-saving initiatives, supported by

agrivets (agricultural and veterinary services)

(Adjusted from: Bakker, Forthcoming, p. 11.)

Meanwhile, a web of local agriculture and dairy co-operatives has developed in a

bottom-up process of building capacity for adaptation around cultivated resources. The co-

operatives are locally formed and locally run, meaning that the community members retain

ownership over management and activities. The co-operatives improve links to markets, and

also offer small-scale loans and savings schemes in order to build community capital

reserves. The co-operatives are helping to overcome the low levels of commercialisation that

result from insufficient land holdings and semi-feudal ground rent, which reduce farmers

income and their capacity to reinvest in improved inputs (Sugden, 2009).

Where property rights are diffuse (i.e. less tangible), user committees and collective

management institutions have emerged. The National Water Plan (NWP) of Nepal increased

emphasis on Water User and Sanitation Committees (WUSCs) and Water User Associations

(WUAs). In response, District Irrigation Offices (DOIs) and an Irrigation User Committee

Federation (IUCF) have been established to help support local water and irrigation

committees. Disaster management committees (DMCs), meanwhile, have been established as

a collaborative venture between local and international NGOs, local government, and local

residents, in order to reduce vulnerability to the increasingly erratic flows of the Rapti and

Narayani rivers.

Finally, a network of community seed-saving initiatives has emerged for the self-

management of seed production systems. The seed-saving initiatives have been supported by

agricultural and veterinary services (locally known as agrivets), which improve access to


15/29



necessary agricultural inputs and technical support (seeds, fertilisers, antibiotics, etc.).

Agrivetsare usually quasi-government institutions linked to the District Agriculture Office or

private sector initiatives of entrepreneurs attempting to establish themselves as market

intermediaries.

4.2 Institutional mechanisms and adaptation4.2.1KnowledgeA normative analysis of the above institutions points to their benefits for enhancing access to

and the usability of knowledge for effective adaptation around particular resource needs and

property regimes. The community forestry programme, in particular, was frequently

identified for its active role in raising awareness on issues of forest conservation,

biodiversity, and ecosystem management. It has also proved to be a rich source of technical

knowledge on issues such as alternative fuel technologies (biogas and briquettes), agricultural

diversification (cultivating jatropha), flood management (plantations), and alternative

technology development (recycling cattle manure and urine for the production of natural

fertilisers and pesticides). Similarly, co-operatives are also playing an important role in

expanding knowledge of agricultural alternatives, both in terms of cultivation and financial

insurance mechanisms, which provide the security required for farmers to experiment with

new ideas and practices. Social security has also been provided by the seed saving initiatives

and the added information flows stimulated by agrivets, which has allowed farmers the room

to experiment with alternatives.

The growing network of international and domestic NGOs is also working with local

and district governments and community-based organisations to supplement local knowledge

with technical and scientific expertise. Practical Action, for example, has been the driving

force behind: agricultural diversification (diverse permaculture); technical developments

(irrigation, wildlife protection fences, gravity rope-ways across river valleys, etc.); enhanced


16/29



climate knowledge (through the establishment of climate stations); and, disaster risk-

reduction strategies (raising awareness on how to prevent erosion, how to build small dams,

etc.).

However, the role that NGOs play raises the recurring debate alluded to by

Bebbington (2004): that of balancing traditional practices (experimentation) with modern

scientific knowledge (technical support). This debate resurfaced in three particular ways.

First, changes that are based on technical knowledge derived from different contexts may not

always yield positive results. This was illustrated by the failure of a bamboo plantation that

was implemented to supposedly rejuvenate riparian vegetation, thereby reducing flood

frequencies, improving water storage in the soil, and enhancing socio-economic livelihoods

through the sale of non-timber forest products. The death of most of the bamboo plants means

that the initiative has had little effect on watershed dynamics or local livelihoods. Second,

external intervention can have widespread and long-term effects on local norms and

practices, such as the abandonment of traditional seed varieties. This was particularly evident

in Kadampur, where it has lead to the loss of genetic resources, reduced biodiversity (and

therefore ecosystem adaptive capacity), reduced local capacity to develop alternatives, and an

increased reliance on external technical assistance.

Third, in some instances local knowledge has proved more appropriate than the de-

contextualised Western counter-part. This was illustrated by the planting of banana trees as a

flood-response strategy in Swargadwari. Banana trees float and can be felled rapidly to

provide a form of raft, while the fruits provide added livelihood and food-security benefits.

While local residents conceived of this system, Practical Action was busy advocating bee

farming, a practice that has no direct impact on the ability to adapt to extreme events.

Similarly, while farmers in Kadampur are calling for external knowledge to solve their

problem of crop failure in maize, farmers in up-stream Kirtipur are aware that yams provide a


17/29



viable alternative in times of water shortage knowledge that was passed down from

previous generations. The point here is not that internal or external knowledge is

somehow true, or even that a binary opposition exists between the two. Rather, knowledge

is contextual and continuously re-shaped by a politics of technical expertise. It must,

therefore, be applied in its hybrid form to develop a nuanced approach for transforming it into

adaptive action.

4.2.2AffiliationThe contextual nature of knowledge means that networks of affiliation mediate its multiple

flows its distribution, adoption, and implementation. Development assistance flows from a

network of NGOs, government, and community organisations and institutions. Institutions

perceived to be inherently local also rely upon flows of information through multi-scalar

networks. The wealth of knowledge now possessed within the community forestry

programme, for example, has been supported by information flows among user group

networks, which are connected by the Federation of Community Forestry Users Nepal

(FECOFUN). These flows touch-down in particular places to interact with cultural norms

and values in the process of co-constituting an adaptation environment that makes useful

knowledge accessible. Disaster management committees, for example, have emerged from

networked interactions between various scales of government, international and domestic

NGOs, local NGOs and community organisations, and local residents.

The benefits of networks, however, are not always equally derived. Irrigation

facilities, such as shallow tube wells, water reservoirs, and irrigation canals, have been

developed in the research locations to enhance resilience to changing water dynamics.

However, access to these facilities is becoming increasingly determined by private networks:

while lower income, spatially marginalised farmers remain dependant on rain-fed irrigation,

local elites have developed private tubs wells and are experimenting with deep bore wells in


18/29



order to cope with decreasing reservoir levels. In Kadampur, having failed to reach water at

80 metres the effectiveness and efficiency of the deep well experiment remain unknown, as

do the conditions of access that will prevail should it be successful.

Moreover, the fact that experimentation is being driven by the previous experience of

a local private enterprise, with which a key local political actor has a vested interest, reflects

Mosers (2009) points that key individuals play an important role in determining the

effectiveness and equality of decision-making frameworks. The bureaucracy involved in

pursuing projects through traditional VDC channels was recognised by the key player in

Kadampur, who has experience within local and district government and the community

forestry programme. This individual was able to use such links to drive forward adaptation

projects through the relatively fast and efficient decision-making processes of the community

forestry programme. However, the relatively vibrant adaptation environment of technical

experimentation has largely been led by an economic enterprise that is simultaneously

engaged in stone mining activities in the bed of the Baulaha River. These activities have

diverted the natural river course and have exposed the river bed to rapid water absorption,

thereby reducing flows of water to the depleting local reservoirs. It was such depletion that

prompted the initial interest in experimenting with deep bore drilling. With a stake in the

enterprise in question, the individual stands to gain from both the mining activities and the

subsequent drilling. Despite these questionable economic interests, the individual has been

able to exert influence in political networks to ensure that local economic interests are

prioritised over watershed management and that the blame for water shortages is placed on

the upstream community despite its limited invasive activities (a small irrigation canal from a

tributary of the Baulaha River). Such complex political-economic performances are often

overlooked in institutional approaches to adaptation.


19/29



4.2.3RepresentationNominally, the institutional context in rural Chitwan and Nawalparasi appears to be directly

representative of local adaptation needs. The community forestry programme is predicated

upon local user groups that actively voice their concerns to an elected committee, which

participates in broader decision-making scenarios with local government. In theory, water

committees act in a similar fashion, though in reality they are currently dormant. Co-

operatives, meanwhile, are founded on the basis of equal stakes, while the rationale of

collective management mechanisms implies a degree of collective decision-making around a

shared resource problem.

As the previous section indicated, however, the ways in which power flows through

networks of affiliation does not always yield equal, fair, or desirable results. To continue with

the example of the Baulaha River, the dispute over watershed dynamics begs the question of

scales of representation. As residents Kirtipur identified, a resource governance mechanism is

required at the watershed level in order to span the particular interests of individuals, private-

sector actors, and communities. The current weak status of WUAs means that they are poorly

equipped to rise to such a challenge, allowing the powerful actor in Kadampur to manipulate

development. At the other end of the Baulaha River conflict, meanwhile, residents in Kirtipur

are struggling to have their voices heard due to a problem of poor and unequal

communication between the VDC and its jurisdictions. Even when participation in decision-

making scenarios is possible, it is restricted to symbolic rather than substantive participation;

participation does not affect the outcome of decisions or the development plans that emerge.

Local farmers, for example, are aware that yam cultivation offers a solution to the decreasing

availability of irrigated farmland, yet they are unable to capitalise on this knowledge as yams

are difficult to transport to the closest markets (over 3 hours away by foot, descending

approximately a kilometre in altitude). Residents have called for improved road


20/29



developments, but despite the governments mandate to improve access to rural and

mountainous areas, the route to Kirtipur remains a treacherous path frequented by landslides.

4.2.4Responsiveness

In the research locations, it was assumed by many residents that the VDC should be the most

responsive formal institution. VDCs have played a role in previous incidences of adaptation,

including the development of flood defences (e.g. small dams), warning systems (viewing

towers), and response plans (evacuation routes; temporary shelters). However, traditional

VDC channels are often ineffective and, in some cases, have been circumnavigated. Thus,

adaptive responses also flow through a network of non-government institutions and

organisations. However, these networks do not necessarily produce equal or fair results,

meaning that the institutional response is not always good, sustainable, or even legal.

In the communities of Chitwan that border the Rapti River, the demand for grasses

(used as animal fodder, insulation, and fuel) has outstripped supply in a community forest

increasingly frequented by rhinos in search of the same grasses. While the rhinos previously

continued through the village to feed elsewhere, they are now blocked by an electric fence

that was erected as part of a multi-stakeholder initiative to prevent wildlife intrusion. With

the rhinos squeezed from both sides, the community forest is struggling to supply for all. In

response, villagers have begun crossing the Rapti River to retrieve grasses from Chitwan

National Park; it is illegal to enter the park without a permit and illegal to forage for plants. It

is also a dangerous practice, since in monsoon the river is prone to violent floods. This case

illustrates two points: 1) adaptation may not conform to broader social rules or even laws; 2)

adaptation may have negative consequences, forcing re-adaptation in this case, the erection

of an electric fence has negatively affected the availability of grasses in the forest, forcing

villagers to adapt by illegally crossing the Rapti River into the national park.


21/29



The responsive process of a network of institutions touching down to affect the

adaptation environment also points to questions of sustainability. Practical Action, for

example, has helped build technical and technological capacity, raise awareness of

agricultural alternatives and ecosystem management practices, build organisational capacity,

and provide links to other service providers. Although Practical Action has a long history as

an organisation, the projects are funded on a limited term basis with no guarantee of

longevity. While the community will be left with enhanced capacity in some areas, the

withdrawal of a key organisation due to funding decisions may leave a hole that hampers

future adaptation. This short-termism is exacerbated by the emphasis placed by many

institutional actors (including Practical Action and VDCs) on disaster risk-reduction (DRR)

activities, which prioritise short-term coping strategies rather than long-term transformation

and adaptation. As Manuel-Navarrete et al. (Forthcoming) point out, where DRR perspectives

combine with an emphasis on economic recovery and/or growth, the result can be increased

social inequalities, degraded ecosystems, and amplified overall exposure to extreme events.

The current response environment in Chitwan is characteristic of this problem, as decision-

makers in local government emphasise the provision of temporary shelters and bridges for

evacuation, while calling for improved road surfacing to increase tourism revenues. At the

same time, there is overall neglect of issues such as poor access to water for sanitation or

irrigation, the lack of adequate education facilities, and the insecurity of land tenure that

seriously undermines livelihood security.

4.3 The scalar politics of adaptationIn the above sections, the discussion of a scalar politics has been left largely implicit:

networks of international and domestic NGOs work with multiple scales of government and a

proliferating body of local institutions to govern adaptive decision-making and practices.

Within this context, institutions are inherently multi-scalar the community forestry


22/29



programme, for example, is constituted by CFUGs that interact with local and district

government, and form into CFUG networks within FECOFUN. Likewise, Practical Action

embodies a diverse network of relations with local NGOs and community organisations,

which produces a two-way flow of knowledge and information. This discussion, then, is

evocative of previous analyses of the interaction between community associations, NGOs,

and government bodies (Osbahr et al., 2008).

However, of importance here is not only the ways in which NGOs, for example,

touch-down in place to produce material outcomes of multi-scalar networks and flows.

Attention also needs to turn to how decision-making structures are co-determined at multiple

scales by a scalar politics. In this context, key players are able to jump scales to participate in

decision-making scenarios at a variety of scales and reap the benefits locally (as illustrated by

the Kadampur example). However, the power of key players is derived from horizontal

connections between a variety of government and non-government institutions and

organisations. Their powerful position in such networks enables them to pull down

institutional mechanisms: side-stepping traditional VDC channels to draw DDC development

funds and project approval directly to the local level through the community forestry

programme is a good case-in-point. This process simultaneously allows powerful players and

institutions to transgress scales of decision-making and so participate in broader processes of

governing vulnerability and adaptation: their influence is pushed up and pushed out to

multiple scales of decision-making.

Thus, as multiple scales of governance coalesce at the local level, such as in the

assessments of vulnerability to climate change that will inform the drafting of national

adaptation policies (e.g. NAPAs), powerful players and institutions are able to construct the

adaptation needs of communities. Politically connected individuals, therefore, affect

perceptions of local vulnerability and of knowledge and resource needs; a scalar politics


23/29



reproduces this perceived vulnerability at multiple scales at once. Vulnerability, in this

context, becomes less about an aggregated score, and more about a scalar politics of affecting

multiple and heterogeneous governance mechanisms. The eventual content of the NAPA, for

example, is likely to be as much a product of scalar politics as it is about material

vulnerabilities. A scalar politics, then, produces a local space of adaptation that represents the

interests of powerful local and translocal actors (NGOs, government structures, etc.), while

simultaneously pushing up selective local adaptation needs to broader scales of governance

(DDC, NGOs, NAPAs).

5 ConclusionThe above analysis indicates that the institutional context, which constitutes the structures of

governance around adaptation in Chitwan and Nawalparasi, is differentiated and complex.

The complex multi-scalar web of institutional mechanisms identified above touches-down in

place, and as such interacts with values and norms to co-constitute the adaptation

environment of knowledge, affiliation, representation, and institutional responsiveness. As a

consequence, the influence of differentiated formal and informal institutions over adaptive

capacity often extends beyond their strict remit or the practices with which they are often

associated.

Reading such a governance context through the lens of normative frameworks would

point to the emergence of a dynamic portfolio of livelihood assets, which can be drawn upon

and enhanced by a facilitative institutional context in order to build adaptive capacity. Yet,

this process remains constrained by barriers such as: legal issues, biophysical limitations,

reliance on (external) technical support and investment, loss of traditional practices,

resources, and lifeways, elite capture, existing social inequalities, and the need to effectively

balance the trade-offs between different and often competing adaptation paths. Moreover, the


24/29



mutually constitutive interaction between the institutional context and multiple livelihood

adaptation paths is not uniform. Differentiation among formal institutions emerges according

to property regimes and use-rights (strong or diffuse) and differing productive processes

(extraction and cultivation). Where strong property rights exist, community-based institutions

have proven to be rigid, resilient, and responsive to adaptation needs. Where week property

rights exist, dormant water user associations have been accompanied by diffuse collective

management initiatives, such as ad hocseed savings programmes. Theorising differentiation

in this way enables us to see patterns of governance and the ways in which a scalar politics

flows between various institutional mechanisms to produce spaces of adaptation.

A critical reading, therefore, explores the ways in which the portfolio of assets is put

to work, paying attention to values and norms, networks of power and affiliation, questions of

representation, and the effectiveness, sustainability, and equality of institutional responses.

Thus, the set of endless possibilities for adaptation, to which Anderson (Forthcoming)

alludes, are not entirely open. Rather, institutional responsiveness is underpinned by

multiple forms of contested knowledge, forms that are produced across time and space and

which flow through multi-scalar networks of affiliation. These networks are often dominated

by politically powerful individuals, who can be champions of local needs and demands at

broader scales. However, they can also colonise scales of governance with the effect of

circumcising representation in decision-making processes, thereby reinforcing unequal power

relations and unequal results. Therefore, the ways in which vulnerability and adaptive

capacity are constructed within institutional contexts is in part determined by a scalar politics

that is implemented by a network of powerful actors, and which can be both enabling and

debilitating.

Finally, the above conclusions and the limits to this research point to potential areas

of future research. First, not addressed here as the political issue of caste, which in Nepal is


25/29



extremely important in constructing and perpetuating certain values and norms, and which

can enable but more often constrain (equal and effective) adaptation. Caste is also tied to

gender, as was evident in a correlation between cast and gender representation in focus

groups discussions. These insights point to an area of future research: contextualised norms

of socio-political hierarchy and institutionalised gender relations should not be ignored in

explorations of the limits to adaptation. Second, a full social network (or actor-network)

analysis was not carried out. To follow actors around their networks as they influence

decisions and actions at multiple scales is a complex undertaking that was beyond the scope

of this research project. This limit to the research reflects a broader problem: while in

academia we might be able to carry out such in-depth analyses of adaptation networks, it is

simply not feasible to incorporate the complexities of actor-network theory into temporally

constrained research processes such as participatory vulnerability assessments. As a

consequence, networks of power and decision-making are likely to go undetected in the

drafting of adaptation policy (NAPAs), thereby further opening the door to the scalar politics

of powerful actors capable of politically constructing vulnerability. Critical attention to such

a scalar politics is required if we are to avoid adaptation being colonised as a new realm of

imperial development assistance.


26/29



6 ReferencesAcharya, K.P., Gentle, P., (2006) Improving the Effectiveness of Collective Action: Sharing

Experiences from Community Forestry in Nepal. International Food Policy Research

Institute, Washington, D. C.,.

Adger, W.N. (2001) Scales of governance and environmental justice for adaptation and

mitigation of climate change. Journal of International Development 13, 921-931.

Adger, W.N. (2003) Social capital, collective action, and adaptation to climate change.

Economic Geography 79, 387-404.

Adger, W.N. (2006) Vulnerability. Global Environmental Change 16, 268-281.

Adger, W.N. (2010) Climate Change, Human Well-Being and Insecurity. New Political

Economy 15, 275 - 292.

Adger, W.N., Arnell, N.W., Tompkins, E.L. (2005) Successful adaptation to climate change

across scales. Global Environmental Change 15, 77-86.

Adger, W.N., Barnett, J. (2009) Four reasons for concern about adaptation to climate change.

Environment and Planning A 41, 2800-2805.

Adger, W.N., Dessai, S., Goulden, M., Hulme, M., Lorenzoni, I., Nelson, D., Naess, L.,Wolf, J., Wreford, A. (2009) Are there social limits to adaptation to climate change? Climatic

Change 93, 335-354.

Adger, W.N., Huq, S., Brown, K., Conway, D., Hulme, M. (2003) Adaptation to climatechange in the developing world. Progress in Development Studies 3, 179-195.

Adger, W.N., Vincent, K. (2005) Uncertainty in adaptive capacity. Comptes Rendus

Geosciences 337, 399-410.

Agrawal, A., Perrin, N., (2009) Climate adaptation, local institutions and rural livelihoods, in:

Adger, N.W., Lorenzoni, I., O'Brien, K. (Eds.), Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds,

Values, Governance. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, pp. 313 - 334.

Amin, S. (2009) Nepal, a Promising Revolutionary Advance. Monthly Review: An

Independent Socialist Magazine 60, 12-17.

Anderson, B. (Forthcoming) Preemption, precaution, preparedness: Anticipatory action andfuture geographies. Progress in Human Geography In press.

Bakker, K. (Forthcoming) Debating green neoliberalism: The limits of "neoliberal natures".Progress in Human Geography In press.

Barnett, J., Lambert, S., Fry, I. (2008) The Hazards of Indicators: Insights from the

Environmental Vulnerability Index. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 98,

102-119.

Bebbington, A. (2004) NGOs and uneven development: geographies of development

intervention. Progress in Human Geography 28, 725-745.


27/29



Benson, M.H. (2010) Regional Initiatives: Scaling the Climate Response and Responding toConceptions of Scale. Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100, 1025 - 1035.

Bhattacharya, A.K., Basnyat, B. (2005) Decentralisation and Community Forestry

Programmes in Nepal: Issues and Challenges. International Forestry Review 7, 147-155.

Brace, C., Geoghegan, H. (Forthcoming) Human geographies of climate change: Landscape,

temporality, and lay knowledges. Progress in Human Geography In press.

Brockhaus, M., Kambir, H., (2009) Decentralization: a window of opportunity for

successful adaptation to climate change?, in: Adger, N.W., Lorenzoni, I., O'Brien, K. (Eds.),

Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance. University of Cambridge

Press, Cambridge, pp. 399 - 416.

Demeritt, D. (2001) The construction of global warming and the politics of science. Annalsof the Association of American Geographers 91, 307 - 337.

Dowling, R. (2010) Geographies of identity: climate change, governmentality and activism.Progress in Human Geography 34, 488-495.

Duit, A., Galaz, V., Eckerberg, K., Ebbesson, J. (2010) Governance, complexity, and

resilience. Global Environmental Change 20, 363-368.

Eakin, H., Lemos, M.C. (2010) Institutions and change: The challenge of building adaptive

capacity in Latin America. Global Environmental Change 20, 1-3.

Eakin, H., Lerner, A.M., Murtinho, F. (2010) Adaptive capacity in evolving peri-urban

spaces: Responses to flood risk in the Upper Lerma River Valley, Mexico. Global

Environmental Change 20, 14-22.

Engle, N.L., Lemos, M.C. (2010) Unpacking governance: Building adaptive capacity to

climate change of river basins in Brazil. Global Environmental Change 20, 4-13.

Ensor, J., Berger, R. (2009) Understanding Climate Change Adaptation. Practical Action

Publishing, Rugby.

Fazey, I., Kesby, M., Evely, A., Latham, I., Wagatora, D., Hagasua, J.-E., Reed, M.S.,

Christie, M. (2010) A three-tiered approach to participatory vulnerability assessment in the

Solomon Islands. Global Environmental Change In Press, Corrected Proof.

Gupta, J., Termeer, C., Klostermann, J., Meijerink, S., van den Brink, M., Jong, P.,

Nooteboom, S., Bergsma, E. (2010) The Adaptive Capacity Wheel: a method to assess the

inherent characteristics of institutions to enable the adaptive capacity of society.

Environmental Science & Policy 13, 459-471.

Head, L. (2010) Cultural ecology: adaptation - retrofitting a concept? Progress in Human

Geography 34, 234-242.

Hulme, M. (2010) Problems with making and governing global kinds of knowledge. GlobalEnvironmental Change 20, 558-564.


28/29



Hulme, M., Dessai, S. (2008) Negotiating future climates for public policy: a criticalassessment of the development of climate scenarios for the UK. Environmental Science &

Policy 11, 54-70.

Inderberg, T.H., Eikeland, P.Q., (2009) Limits to adaptation: analysing institutional

constraints, in: Adger, N.W., Lorenzoni, I., O'Brien, K. (Eds.), Adapting to Climate Change:Thresholds, Values, Governance. University of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, pp. 433 - 447.

Jennings, T.L., (2009) Exploring the invisibility of local knowledge in decision-making: the

Boscastle Harbour flood disaster, in: Adger, N.W., Lorenzoni, I., O'Brien, K. (Eds.),

Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance. University of Cambridge

Press, Cambridge, pp. 240 - 254.

MacKinnon, D. (2010) Reconstructing scale: Towards a new scalar politics. Progress inHuman Geography In press.

Manuel-Navarrete, D., Pelling, M., Redclift, M. (Forthcoming) Critical adaptation tohurricanes in the Mexican Caribbean: Development visions, governance structures, and

coping strategies. Global Environmental Change In Press.

Moser, S.C., (2009) Whether our levers are long enough and the fulcrum strong? Exploring

the soft underbelly of adaptation decisions and actions, in: Adger, N.W., Lorenzoni, I.,

O'Brien, K. (Eds.), Adapting to Climate Change: Thresholds, Values, Governance. University

of Cambridge Press, Cambridge, pp. 313 - 334.

O'Brien, K. (Forthcoming) Responding to environmental change: A new age for human

geography? Progress in Human Geography In press.

Ojha, H.R., Persha, L., Chhatre, A., (2009) Community Forestry in Nepal: A policy

innovation for local livelihoods and food security. International Forestry Resources andInstitutions Program, Ann Arbor, MI.

Osbahr, H., Twyman, C., Adger, W.N., Thomas, D.S.G. (2008) Effective livelihood

adaptation to climate change disturbance: Scale dimensions of practice in Mozambique.

Geoforum 39, 1951-1964.

Ostrom, E. (2010a) Analyzing collective action. Agricultural Economics 41, 155-166.

Ostrom, E. (2010b) Polycentric systems for coping with collective action and global

environmental change. Global Environmental Change 20, 550-557.

Pahl-Wostl, C. (2009) A conceptual framework for analysing adaptive capacity and multi-

level learning processes in resource governance regimes. Global Environmental Change 19,

354-365.

Paudel, K.P., Ojha, H.R., (2007) Contested knowledge and reconciliation in Nepal's

communtiy forestry: A case of forest inventory policy, in: Ojha, H.R., Timsina, N.P., Chhetri,R.B., Paudel, K.P. (Eds.), Knowledge Systems and Natural Resources: Management, Policy,

and Institutions in Nepal. International Development Research Centre/Foundation Books,

Ottawa/Delhi, pp. 40-59.


29/29


Pelling, M., High, C., Dearing, J., Smith, D. (2008) Shadow spaces for social learning: arelational understanding of adaptive capacity to climate change within organisations.

Environment and Planning A 40, 867-884.

Pralle, S. (2006) Branching Out, Digging In: Environmental Advocacy and Agenda-Setting.

Georgetown University Press, Washington, DC.

Reed, M.G., Bruyneel, S. (2010) Rescaling environmental governance, rethinking the state: A

three-dimensional review. Progress in Human Geography 34, 646-653.

Sikor, T., Stahl, J., Enters, T., Ribot, J.C., Singh, N., Sunderlin, W.D., Wollenberg, L. (2010)

REDD-plus, forest people's rights and nested climate governance. Global Environmental

Change 20, 423-425.

Smit, B., Wandel, J. (2006) Adaptation, adaptive capacity and vulnerability. GlobalEnvironmental Change 16, 282-292.

Sugden, F. (2009) Neo-liberalism, markets and class structures on the Nepali lowlands: Thepolitical economy of agrarian change. Geoforum 40, 634-644.

Underdal, A. (2010) Complexity and challenges of long-term environmental governance.

Global Environmental Change 20, 386-393.

Valdivia, C., Seth, A., Gilles, J.L., Garca, M., Jimnez, E., Cusicanqui, J., Navia, F., Yucra,

E. (2010) Adapting to Climate Change in Andean Ecosystems: Landscapes, Capitals, and

Perceptions Shaping Rural Livelihood Strategies and Linking Knowledge Systems. Annals of

the Association of American Geographers 100, 818 - 834.

Wainwright, J. (2010) Climate change, capitalism, and the challenge of transdisciplinarity.

Annals of the Association of American Geographers 100, 983 - 991.

Documents

Yates, JS. The scalar politics of governing adaptation to climate change in Nepal. Global Causeway working paper