YCA Research Paper

YVONNE BRAUNJULIAN PLOTTKA

EKATERINA SMIRNOVA

Recommendations to the German Government forthe Implementation of the EU-Central Asia Strategy

YOUNG CENTRAL ASIA

Research Paper

ISSN 2625-4603No 01/21

ABSTRACTThe research paper analyses the feasibility of a new youth policy dimensionin EU-Central Asia relations as a priority within the framework of the EU-Cen-tral Asia Strategy of 2019. The paper’s recommendations on how to set up theyouth policy dimension do not exclusively focus on German policy but pro-pose an EU-wide task sharing to create synergies by means of cooperation.Against the backdrop of young populations in Central Asia, the research pa-per finds that youth policy is amutually beneficial area of cooperation for theEU and its Central Asian partners, where the EU does not competewith Chinaor Russia. Creating higher prospects for younger generations is a policy forthemajority of Central Asian citizens and it is fully in linewith the EU’s object-ives for youth policy and external relations. Defining youth policy in abroader sense, the research paper emphasises the legal, political, social, andcultural integration of people aged 14 to 30 years. Based on this broad under-standing of youth policy, it analyses a total of seven challenges and reviewsa total of six policy areas relevant to youths in Central Asia.

IEP Research Paper No 01/21

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CONTENTS

I. Introduction ................................................................................... 3

II. Challenges for the Creation of Higher Prospects for the CentralAsian Youth .................................................................................... 6

a. Integrating the Growing Young Workforce into Central AsianLabour Markets ........................................................................... 6

b. Reducing Incentives for Labour Migration................................. 7c. Improving Standards of Education in Central Asia.................... 8d. Bringing Central Asian Societies Back on a Track of

Reducing Social Inequality ......................................................... 9e. Providing Reliable and Affordable Internet Access to Central

Asians ........................................................................................ 10f. Giving Citizens a Voice and Opportunities to Become

Engaged..................................................................................... 12g. Reaching Out to Central Asians in Rural Areas......................... 13

III. Youth Policy Aims of the EU-Central Asia Strategy, Germanand Other EU Member States’ Development Cooperation........ 14

a. The EU’s General Youth Policy Aims ......................................... 14b. The EU’s Youth Policy Aims in Its Relations with Central

Asia ............................................................................................ 15c. Youth Policy Aims of German Development Cooperation ...... 16d. Policy Aims of Selected EU Member States.............................. 17

IV. Policy Areas Relevant to Youth Policy in Central Asia................. 18a. Education Policy........................................................................ 18b. Digitalisation Policy .................................................................. 21c. Economic Policy ........................................................................ 23d. Social Policy .............................................................................. 27e. Gender Policy ............................................................................ 28f. Democracy Promotion.............................................................. 32

V. Recommendations....................................................................... 34

VI. Bibliography ................................................................................. 37

I. Introduction

This research paper presents recommendationsfor the implementation of the new strategy “TheEU and Central Asia: New Opportunities for aStronger Partnership” (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy 2019) in the area ofyouth policy. It was commissioned by the Ger-man Federal Foreign Office to explore the poten-tial of developing a youth policy dimension in EU-Central Asia relations. How can the EU contributeto creating high prospects for the younger CentralAsian generations? The recommendations do notexclusively focus on German policy but proposean EU-wide task sharing to create synergies bymeans of cooperation between EU-level actorsandmember state governments.The renewal of the regional strategy for CentralAsia in 2019 (Council of the EU 2019), in due timefor the negotiations of the new multiannual fin-ancial framework and the funding instrumentsfor EUdevelopment cooperation to be completedby the end of 2020, opens a window of opportun-ity to readjust the EU’s relations with the CentralAsian region. The focus is also timely with regardto the conclusions on “Youth in external action”,recently adopted by the Council of the EU (2020).However, to pursue amore effective and targetedpolicy towards the region, the EU institutions andmember state governments need to define stra-tegic priorities in the first place. The joint com-munication of the European Commission andHigh Representative sets out a broad frameworkfor action listing a large number of differentpolicy areas as possible subjects of bilateral or re-gional cooperationwith Central Asia but does notprioritise them (Böttger/Braun/Plottka 2019: 319-320).The German Federal Foreign Office’s initiative toset a priority on the cooperation in youth policyfits the broader geopolitical context of the newstrategy, which is not directly addressed in thedocument itself. The EU “cannot and indeedshould not try to compete for influence”(Sahajpal/Blockmans 2019) with China’s large-scale investment project, the Belt and Road Initi-ative (Brakman et al. 2019), or the Russian legacyof Central Asia. Being important to the CentralAsian governments by enabling them to pursuetheir multi-vector foreign policies (Nitoiu 2018) inorder to balance the influence of the dominantactors in the region, the EU has the opportunityto establish relations with Central Asia in priorityareas, which are beneficial for both sides. This isevenmore important since the US Department ofState published a revamped strategy for CentralAsia in early 2020 (US Department of State 2020).

As the Biden Administration will most likely re-turn to the Central Asian stage, the five govern-ments get back an alternative partner to balanceChinese and Russian influence, which would al-low them to put aside their European partners.Youth policy is potentially such a mutually bene-ficial area which allows the EU to spell out whatthe EUGlobal Strategy’s “principled pragmatism”(European External Action Service 2016: 8) meansexactly. Helping the Central Asian governmentsto create high prospects for their younger genera-tions is in their own interest as it increases theirlegitimacy (for details see below). In addition tostabilising the situation in Central Asia, youthpolicy has the potential to contribute to achiev-ing all of the overarching aims set out in the jointcommunication (“Partnering for Resilience”,“Partnering for Prosperity” and “Working BetterTogether”) as well as to the “Cross-cutting Prior-ity [of] Investing in Regional Cooperation”(European Commission/High Representative ofthe Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2019: 2). Moreover, complying with European val-ues while working with young citizens has a po-tentially sustainable effect on them.Youth policy also fits well the EU’s aim to “en-hance [… its] strategic communication in CentralAsia to enhance the visibility of the EU” (Councilof the EU 2009: 7). Compared to other policyareas, such as security cooperation or trade,youth policy addresses a comparatively large tar-get group within Central Asian societies. Comple-menting cooperation on youth policy with a tar-geted communication strategy will considerablyincrease the EU’s visibility in Central Asia with alasting effect as the target group’s future is lyingahead of them.While youth policy is a promising area to intensifyEuropean cooperation with the Central Asiancountries, increasing the effectiveness of the EU’sCentral Asia policy requires an agreement on theEU’s internal task sharing (Böttger/Braun/Plottka2019: 320). In their commonly defined division oflabour, member state governments and EU insti-tutions need to build on their established expert-ise and relations with Central Asia to carry for-ward the initiative in order to build synergies, in-crease the EU’s leverage in the region and achievesustainable results.

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Table 1: Population Estimates and Projections inMio. for 1960 until 2050¹

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020b), Series: Population total.

But will a European initiative in the area of youthpolicy meet the need on the Central Asian side?Compared to other countries of the post-Sovietspace, the Central Asian region shows excep-tional patterns of continuous population growth²(see table 1). For the future until 2050, projec-tions of The World Bank (2020) expect this trendto continue. One of the reasons for this develop-ment is the high fertility rate (see table 2). Al-though it has been in decline over the past sixdecades, it remains above the figure of 2.1 chil-dren per woman, which is considered the rate ne-cessary for a stable population. Following a dip in2000, the rate resumed in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz-stan, and Turkmenistan. Falling steepest inUzbekistan, the country is expected to fall belowthe rate of 2.1 not before 2035 (World Bank 2020).Declining child mortality in the region furthercontributes to population growth.

Table 2: Fertility Rate and Projections for CentralAsia from 1960 until 250

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020b), Series: Fertility rate, total (births per woman).

High rates of population growth combined withthe lowest life expectancy in the post-Sovietspace (The World Bank 2020) result in a veryyoung Central Asian population. In 2020, the me-dian age of the Central Asian population is just27.6 years. It ranges from 22.4 years in Tajikistanto 30.7 years in Kazakhstan.³ Table 3 also displays

that the median age will rise during the nextyears. However, it is estimated that the medianage will be higher than 30 just around the year2030.

Table 3: Median Age and Prospects for CentralAsia from 1960 to 2050

Source: Own table based on data from United Nations, De-partment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division(2019), Series: Median age of the total population (years).

Looking at the relative distribution of age groupsin the population of Central Asia in 2020, table 4shows that the group of people under 25 years isthe largest group in all countries. It ranges from40.9 percent in Kazakhstan, which has the oldestpopulation, to 54.5 percent in Tajikistan, which isthe country with the youngest population. Thesedata reveal that policies for the younger genera-tions in Central Asia address the majority of theCentral Asian population. Further consideringthat about 30 percent of the population (29.1 per-cent in Kazakhstan and 37.3 percent in Tajikistan)is 14 years or younger in 2020, the data makeclear what consequences the demographic de-velopments will have for the five Central Asianeconomies.However, a very young populationcan also present certain opportunities in terms ofthe “demographic dividend”. If countries with ahigh share of working-age population invest insustainable human development and education,they open a window of opportunity for economicgrowth. All five Central Asian states could reapthe benefits of their demographic transition(Cuaresma/Knerr 2014: 2-3).

¹ The latest population census in Kazakhstan was in 2009,in the Kyrgyz Republic in 2009, in Tajikistan in 2010, inTurkmenistan in 2012 and in Uzbekistan in 1989 (TheWorld Bank 2020).

² The only exception was Kazakhstan between 1992 and2002 (see table 1). Ethnic Germans and Russians were leav-ing the newly founded country after the dissolution of theSoviet Union.

³ In 2020, the median age in Germany is 45.7 years (UnitedNations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs,Population Dynamics 2019).

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Table 4: Percentage of Total Population of Cent-ral Asia by Broad Age Groups in 2020

Source: Own table based on data from United Nations, De-partment of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Dynam-ics (2019).

On the international level, the United Nationsdefine “youth” as all persons between the ages of15 and 24 (United Nations 2020), and children aspersons under the age of 15. However, the fiveCentral Asian states apply other age groups todefine youth, although the minimum age to voteis 18 in all of them. In Uzbekistan (2016), Turk-menistan (2013) and Tajikistan (2004), nationalyouth policies address those between the ages of14 and 30, whereas Kazakh law specifies the agesbetween 14 and 29 (Government of Kazakhstan2013). In Kyrgyzstan, the upper age limit is 28years (Youth policy labs 2020). In four of the coun-tries, the age of 14 marks both the minimum ageof criminal responsibility (except in Uzbekistanwhere it is 13, Uzbekistan 1994) and the end ofcompulsory education after which young peoplecan start vocational training.Following the Central Asian approach, this paperdefines youths as persons aged older than 13 andyounger than 31 for two reasons: (1) it addressesthe broader group of young people united bytheir transitional position in society due to theirlegal and professional status as well as their levelof education. (2) It corresponds to existing na-tional concepts of youth policy in the CentralAsian states and thus provides a non-Eurocentricapproach to this policy area.While it is obvious that the target group of youthpolicy is of considerable size in Central Asia, it isnecessary to precisely define the concept ofyouth policy in order to be able to judge whetheran EU initiative meets the need on the CentralAsian side. Youth policy in a narrower sense ad-dresses specific tasks in the areas of youth pro-tection and risk prevention and is concentratedon vulnerable youth and specific risks such ascrime, drug consumption and radicalisation. Thebroader concept of youth policy – as applied inthis paper – emphasises a legal, political, social,and cultural integration of young people(Hafeneger 2012: 26). It considers youth policy asan ensemble of measures, activities, and pro-

grams protecting young people against risks, andpromoting opportunities, better living conditionsand youth rights (Hornstein 1999: 411). This is alarge cross-sectoral policy area, which includeshuman rights, education, social policy, familyprotection, public health, and democracy promo-tion. Consequently, it involves a wide thematicspectrum, broad target and stakeholder group.Youth is seen as a chance for political and societaltransformation, which opens further possibilitiesfor an inclusionary youth policy especially in de-velopment cooperation.In all five Central Asian states, there are specificnational youth laws that provide general aimsand concepts for youth work. Only Kazakhstanemphasises a negative vision of youths. The na-tional legislation mentions the decline of tradi-tional values due to globalisation, consumerism,radicalisation and social marginalisation as char-acteristics of contemporary youths in Kazakhstan(Government of Kazakhstan 2013).An initiative applying this broader concept ofyouth policy for the target group of Central Asiansfrom14 to 30 years is very likely to find support byCentral Asian governments. In addition to the po-tential economic benefits, higher prospects forthe younger generations strengthen the nationalgovernments’ legitimacy. Especially Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, countries which can-not rely on revenues from trade in hydro carbons,depend on a certain degree of output legitimacyof their political systems. Furthermore, a youthpolicy dimension in EU-Central Asia relationshelps them to address existing policy challenges.Seven policy challengesmost relevant to youth inCentral Asia, including employment, education,social inequality, internet accessibility, societalengagement and the urban-rural divide, are dis-cussed in chapter II of the paper. Chapter IIIpresents an overview of youth policy objectivesof the EU, Germany and other EU member statesand discusses, how a new youth policy dimen-sion of EU-Central Asia relations fits into the ex-isting European strategies. Chapter IV assessesexisting initiatives in six relevant policy fields, in-cluding education, digitalisation, economic, andgender policy as well as democracy promotion,providing the basis for the policy recommenda-tions at the end of each section. A comprehensiveset of priority activities to establish a new youthpolicy dimension in EU-Central Asia relations isproposed in the concluding chapter V.

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II. Challenges for the Creation of Higher Pro-spects for the Central Asian Youth

This chapter discusses the challenges, whichneed to be addressed in order to create higherprospects for the Central Asians in the age group14 to 30 years. As the paper applies a widerconcept of youth policy, these are general chal-lenges faced by Central Asian countries. Theycannot be solved by youth policy alone. However,they are crucial obstacles ahead of creating newperspectives for the youth and a Central Asianyouth initiative can contribute to tackle them.These challenges include:1. integrating the growing young workforce

into Central Asian labour markets;

2. reducing incentives for labour migration,notably to Kazakhstan and Russia, but alsoto Asia and Western countries;

3. reforming the Central Asian education sec-tors to make education more demand-driven and the higher education systemsmore sustainable;

4. bringing Central Asian societies back on atrack of reducing social inequality, whichhave stalled since the global financial crisisand the Russian economic crisis;

5. providing reliable and affordable internetaccess to Central Asians, developing abroadband internet infrastructure to openperspectives for digital economy;

6. giving citizens a voice and opportunities tobecome engaged, without touching the hotstone of democratic transformation;

7. reaching out to the Central Asians in ruralareas instead of focusing only on flagshipinitiatives in the urban centres.

As shown in the following sections, the situationand trends differ considerably among the fiveCentral Asian states. Some achieved progress intackling these challenges, while others lack thepolitical will of addressing the issues at all. There-fore, youth policy towards the region needs to ad-dress the five countries in different ways. How-ever, these challenges exist to differing degrees inall five countries. Therefore, the paper presentsthem as shared challenges, which does not denythe existing differences in the region.

a. Integrating the Growing Young Workforceinto Central Asian Labour Markets

The population growth, which is expected for allfive Central Asian countries in the next 30 years –as shown in the introduction –, will put labourmarkets in the region under further pressure.Youth unemployment is already on high levels infour of the Central Asian countries (see table 5).The notable exception is Kazakhstan, for whichthe International Labor Organization estimatesthat the share of unemployed in the age group 15to 24 years was just 3.88 percent of the labourforce in 2019 (The World Bank 2020). To createprospects for the younger Central Asian genera-tions, the major challenge is to integrate theminto labour markets. If future generations do nothave the opportunity to earn their livelihood,poverty rates will grow significantly, bearing therisk of destabilisation in the Central Asian region.

Table 5: Youth Unemployment as Percentages ofthe Work Force for the Age Group 15 to 24 Yearsaccording to Estimates of the International LaborOrganization

Source: Own Table based on data from The World Bank(2020d), Series: Unemployment, youth total (% of total laborforce ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate).

A specific challenge for the Central Asian labourmarket is the integration of women, due to a highfemale youth unemployment rate compared tothat of both sexes, especially in Uzbekistan andTajikistan (see Table 6). The legal, policy and cul-tural environment restrict women’s contributionto the labour market and economic growth in-stead of allowing them to benefit from their qual-ifications.Positive economic developments have stalledsince the beginning of the global financial crisisstarting in 2008 (Martin et al. 2019). The Russianeconomic crisis caused by lower oil prices andWestern sanctions in the aftermath of Russian ag-gression in 2014 (Hanson 2017) put Central Asianeconomies under further pressure. Remaininghighly dependent on commodity exports and re-mittances, industrial production is still under-

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developed in all Central Asian countries (Martinet al. 2019). To attract foreign investments, longawaited reforms are required, most notably in-cluding the liberalisation of economic sectors,fighting corruption, guaranteeing the rule of law,closing regulatory gaps, and adapting to globaltrade standards. Despite having undertaken re-forms in macroeconomic and fiscal policy sincethe global financial crisis, the COVID-19 pan-demic revealed oncemore the five countries’ vul-nerability to external shocks. The InternationalMonetary Fund (2020: 146) projects a contractionof the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in 2020 forKyrgyzstan (12 percent) and Kazakhstan (2.6 per-cent), while the GDP is projected to increase inTurkmenistan (1.8 percent), Tajikistan (1 percent)and Uzbekistan (0.7 percent). In addition to theeconomic effects of domestic measures to con-tain the pandemic, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistanand to a certain degree Uzbekistan were hit byfalling commodity prices (Bouma/Marnie 2020:5). Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan wereaffected by the drop of remittances (Organisationfor Economic Co-operation and Development2020b: 4). Addressing these general economicchallenges and making Central Asian economiesless vulnerable to external shocks by strengthen-ing domestic consumption and diversifying theeconomies is far beyond the potential impact ofyouth policy. However, they set the broader con-text of measures required to integrate youngergenerations into the labour markets of CentralAsia. Furthermore, the innovative potential ofyoung entrepreneurs can play a key role in chan-ging the economic structures in Central Asia.

Table 6: Female Unemployment as Percentagesof theWork Force for the Age Group 15 to 24 Yearsaccording to Estimates of the International LaborOrganization

Source: Own Table based on data from The World Bank(2020d), Series: Unemployment, youth female (% of femalelabor force ages 15-24) (modeled ILO estimate).

b. Reducing Incentives for Labour Migration

The COVID-19 pandemic has also severe reper-cussions for the second challenge to be ad-dressed by a sustainable youth policy for the re-gion: For offering the youth a future perspectivein their own country. Current incentives fosteringemigration need to be addressed. Traditionally,Russia is the most important recipient of mi-grantion flows in the post-Soviet space (Ryazant-sev 2014: 10). The economic and demographicsituation in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistanmake these countries exporters of workers, whileRussia is an attractive destination due to lan-guage proficiency, common historical and cul-tural legacy and still existing infrastructure fromSoviet times (Ryazantsev 2016: 3-4). Consideringyouth policy, there is another even more import-ant push factor incentivising labour migration toRussia: it is seen “as a strategy of success in life”(Ryazantsev 2014: 13), making it desirable toleave Central Asia. In 2019, an estimated numberof 3.4 million Central Asians worked or residedpermanently in Russia (Institute for War & PeaceReporting. Central Asia 2020).Due to the Russian economic crisis from 2014 to2016 (Ryazantsev 2016: 16) and the tightening ofRussian immigration regulations (Putz 2015) mi-gration flows were redirected towards Kazakh-stan. The country suffers from a labour shortagedue to the oil driven economic development,while being a destination for Central Asian work-ers as attractive as Russia in terms of the previ-ouslymentioned factors. Furthermore, especiallyamong highly skilled workers with universityeducation, also brain-drain to Western and in-creasingly to Asian countries has become an is-sue of concern in recent years.

Table 7: Remittances as Percentage of GDP byCountry

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020d), Series: Personal remittances, received (% of GDP).

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Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan benefitfrom their migrant workers’ remittances, whichamounted to 33 percent of Kyrgyz, 29 percent ofTajik and 15 percent of the Uzbek GDP in 2018(see table 7). While remittances increase families’disposable income and have a positive effect onlocal economies, they are considered to reducepressure on home countries’ governments to pro-ceed with economic reforms (Malyuchenko 2015:13). Table 7 also displays how strong dependencyon remittancesmakes countries vulnerable to ex-ternal shocks. Caused by the global financialcrisis, the drop in annual remittances sent toTajikistan was as large as 13 percent of its GDPbetween 2008 and 2009. Caused by the Russianeconomic crisis and the devaluation of the Rus-sian Rubel, the drop between 2013 and 2016 wasequal to 16.9 percent of the country’s GDP. Cur-rent estimates foresee an even larger drop in re-mittances of 28 percent for Central Asia in 2020,caused by the economic effects of the pandemicand low oil prices (The World Bank 2020f). In ad-dition to the loss of economic gains and risks oflarge-scale work migration, it also has severe so-cial consequences for the families in the homecountries and puts migrant workers at risk, asstandards of health protection and occupationalsafety applicable to the often undeclaredworkersare insufficient (Malyuchenko 2015: 13). In orderto reduce the economic vulnerability of Kyrgyz-stan, Tajikistan and to a lesser degree Uzbekistanto external economic shocks as well as to profitfrom the “demographic dividend”, it is necessaryto increase the attractiveness of national labourmarkets for the youth in Central Asia.

c. Improving Standards of Education in CentralAsia

One crucial means to address the two previouslymentioned and some of the other challenges isreforming the education sector. Because of thehigh importance of education, the research paperconsiders the reform of the Central Asian educa-tion sectors a challenge in its own right. All Cent-ral Asian education systems are still in a processof transformation from Soviet-style systems andadaptation to international standards. Compar-ing Central Asia’s performance in the EducationIndex of the United Nations Human DevelopmentReport⁴ to the average of European and CentralAsian countries (see table 8) reveals that Kazakh-stan is the best performing Central Asian countryand the only one above the average of the com-parative group. Despite positive trends in recentyears, all other Central Asian countries remain

below the average of all European and CentralAsian countries. For all of them, the gap to thecomparative group has widened over the last 15years.

Table 8: Education Index of the Human Develop-ment Report for Europe and Central Asia

Source: Own table based on data from United Nations Devel-opment Programme (2020).

In Kazakhstan reforms are quite advanced andthe country possesses the required resources tofund further reforms. Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistanboth lack the financialmeans for fundamental re-forms and a better funding of the education sec-tor. For Uzbekistan, the positive trend acceler-ated since the current president took office in2016 (Plottka 2019: 2). Turkmenistan remains aspecial case as one of themost isolated countrieson earth, in which the teaching of totalitarianideology partly replaced education and under-mined the education system (Horak/Sir 2009: 69-80). However, all five countries are underspend-ing on education compared to standards of theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation and De-velopment (OECD, Peyrouse 2019: 3).

In all five countries, social and gender inequalitybetween rural and urban populations hamper ac-cess to education for vulnerable groups and wo-men. The Soviet legacy left a relatively good edu-cational basis in terms of gender equality acrossall five Central Asian states, where the enrolmentrate for women and men in primary and second-ary education differ only slightly. However, thegender gap in education can be aggravated byother factors. For example, girls in rural areasgenerally have fewer chances of getting goodeducation, and the same applies for ethnic andconservative religious minorities.

⁴ The index is the “geometric average of mean years ofschooling and of expected years of schooling” (Saisana2014: 1817).

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Furthermore, an inadequately educated work-force is considered a factor limiting the economicdevelopment in Central Asia (Organisation forEconomic Co-operation and Development 2018:163). Again, the situation is very different withinin the region. However, closer cooperationbetween the educational and business sector, es-pecially with regard to vocational education andtraining, is crucial to address the challenge of la-bour market integration of the young workforce.Closer cooperation between higher educationand research institutions and companies with afocus on applied sciences can provide additionalimpulses for economic development by strength-ening research and development (R&D). This willhelp to diversify the Central Asian economies. It isalso crucial for dealing with new challenges, suchenvironmental issues. Intensifying research co-operation within the region or with the EU canhelp addressing climate, water and environ-mental or other challenges more effectively.Therefore, it is necessary to reduce incentives forhighly skilled Central Asians to leave the region.The Central Asian research and higher educationsector has to become more sustainable by offer-ing attractive long-term career perspectives toyoung researchers.In sum, EU support for the education sector re-form in Central Asia has to address all levels fromprimary schools to vocational training, highereducation and research. As education is key tocreate high prospects for the younger genera-tions, equal access to education for all parts ofCentral Asian societies is crucial to reduce socialinequalities. Reforming primary and secondaryeducation with a focus on educating a skilledworkforce helps to integrate young Central Asi-ans into the labour markets. Making the researchand higher education sector more sustainablestrengthens research and development and re-duces incentives for migration.

d. Bringing Central Asian Societies Back on aTrack of Reducing Social Inequality

Reforming education and research in Central Asiaare also key to decrease social inequality in theregion, which is the fourth challenge to providingyounger generations with better perspectives forlife. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan are “uppermiddle income countries” and therefore nolonger eligible for official development aid(ODA).⁵ Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan be-long to the group of “lower middle income coun-tries” and remain eligible for ODA (OECD 2020).However, all Central Asian countries made con-siderable achievements in poverty reduction dur-

ing the last twenty years (Martin 2019: V). ForKazakhstan andKyrgyzstan,⁶ data on the percent-age of the population living on less than 5.50 US-Dollar a day at 2011 international prices dis-played in table 9 show this development. For theother three countries, The World Bank does notprovide sufficient data to show long-term trends.Table 9 also reveals that progress in poverty re-duction slowed down since the global financialcrisis.

Table 9: Poverty Headcount Ratio at 5.50 US-Dol-lar per day (2011 PPP)

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020c), Series: Poverty headcount ratio at $5.50 a day (2011PPP) (% of population).

For the cases of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and tosome degree also Uzbekistan, much of theachievements are based on remittances, makingthe poverty reduction efforts prone to externalshocks. In consequence, the current pandemichas severe effects on the poverty levels in CentralAsia. The lockdown in Russia during the firstwavein spring 2020 resulted in a sharp drop of remit-tances transferred to Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan andUzbekistan. While the effects for the secondwavein 2020 are not yet clear, The World Bank expectsan additional 1.4 million people to fall intopoverty in Central Asia (Organisation for Eco-nomic Co-operation and Development 2020b:16).⁷

Other indicators such as the provision of CentralAsian populations with basic supplies also showpositive trends during years from 2000 to 2015.⁸

⁵ The EU continues its support for both countries underregional programs.⁶ Selected data for Tajikistan in table 9 suggests a similartrend in this country.⁷ The estimate applies a threshold of 3.20 US-Dollar (inPPP) per day, which is less strict than the threshold of 5.50US-Dollar per day used in this paper. Applying the higherthreshold, evenmore people can be expected toimpoverish due to the economic effects of the COVID-19pandemic.⁸ Data for the years 2015 to 2020 are not available.

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Table 10 shows that undernourishment has con-siderably decreased in this timeframe. In four ofthe Central Asian states, less than 11 percent ofthe population were affected in 2015. The onlyexception remains Tajikistan, were about 30 per-cent of the population suffered from undernour-ishment in 2015. Tajikistan is also the outlier inCentral Asia concerning the access to water.While the provision with water has undergoneconsiderable improvement in Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan between 2000 and 2015, further effortsare needed in the latter country, which has notyet achieved the same level of water provision asthe other countries.

Table 10: Prevalence of Undernourishment (Per-centage of Population)

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020a), Series: Prevalence of undernourishment (% of popu-lation).

Table 11: Access to Water Supply (Percentage ofPopulation)

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020a), Series: Improved water source (% of population withaccess).

Concerning the distribution of income within thesociety, the results for Central Asia aremixed (seetable 12). In Kazakhstan, there is a clear positivetrend towards a more equal distribution of in-come between 2001 and 2017. For Kyrgyzstan,the progress is not as significant as for Kazakh-stan and also shows negative developments inthe early 2000s. For Tajikistan, the trend is ambi-valent: following little progress until 2009, in-equality increased afterwards. Unfortunately,there are no sufficient data available to judgewhether the trend turned in Tajikistan or the data

recorded for 2015 are an outlier from the generaltrend.

Table 12: Gini Index According to World Bank Es-timates⁹

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020c), Series: GINI index (World Bank estimate).

Considering social inequality, special attentionshould be paid to gender issues. Social and cul-tural norms in Central Asia hamper women andgirls’ access to public services. The detrimentaleffects of the gender gap in education, labourmarket and access to health services lead to thegeneral social vulnerability of women in CentralAsia, who face multiple risks, such as high mater-nal death, unemployment, and poverty. Harmfulpractices, for example, gender-based violence,child marriages and bride kidnapping limit wo-men’s ability to fulfil their aspirations and needs.To sum up, all Central Asian countries achievedconsiderable progress in poverty reduction andin increasing levels of wealth. The biggest effortsare still needed in Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan.However, the economic crises of the last ten yearsshowed that the countries’ achievements are vul-nerable to external shocks as economies are de-pendent on commodity exports or remittances.Therefore, social inequality needs to be furtherreduced and achievements need to be based on amore stable economic basis to provide youngergenerations with greater prospects in their homecountries. This also includes the reduction of in-equalities between men and women which per-sist in Central Asia in pay gaps and the low parti-cipation of women in labour force and decision-making bodies (The World Bank n.d.).

e. Providing Reliable and Affordable InternetAccess to Central Asians

In Kazakhstan, where close to 80 percent of allpeople have internet access, the level is compar-able to levels in European countries in 2018 (see

⁹ A “Gini index of 0 represents perfect equality, while anindex of 100 implies perfect inequality”. The unevendistribution of data across time results from limited dataavailability for Tajikistan. No data are available forTurkmenistan and Uzbekistan (The World Bank 2020)

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(Table 13). In Central Asia, internet is alsocheapest in this country with an average of 11.1US-Dollar per month for broadband internet (seetable 15). In all the other Central Asian countries,considerably fewer people have internet access.Uzbekistan, the richest of the three “lowermiddleincome countries” in Central Asia with secondlowest costs per month, ranks second, wheremore than half of all citizens had internet accessin 2018. Kyrgyzstan, where 38 percent of peoplehad internet access in 2017 and where prices permonths are considerably higher (28.7 US-Dollarper month), ranks third. For these threecountries, the economic performance explainsthe degree of internet access. The laggards areTajikistan (35.58 US-Dollar per month) andTurkmenistan (224.68 US-Dollar per month),where just about 20 percent of all citizens haveinternet access. In both countries, politicalreasons more likely explain digital isolation. Thefact that monthly prices for broadband internetincreased from 2019 to 2020, by 6.42 US-Dollar inTajikistan and 148.53 US-Dollar in Turkmenistanunderline that governments are not willing toprovide citizens with internet access (cable.co.uk2020).

Table 13: Internet Users per 100 People

Source: Own table based on data from The World Bank(2020a), Series: Internet users (per 100 people).

Table 14: Subscriptions to Fixed Telephone andMobile Cellular per 100 People¹⁰

Source: Own table based on data from ITU (2019). No dataavailable for Tajikistan and Turkmenistan in 2018.

Table 15: Internet Speed andCosts for BroadbandInternet in Central Asia

Source: Speedtest (2020) and cable.co.uk (2020).

Meanwhile table 14 displays that subscriptions tomobile cellular aremuch higher. There are one ormore contracts per person in all Central Asiacountries except Uzbekistan. In this country, 70contracts per 100 people were recorded in 2015.However, table 15 shows that widespread usageof mobile phones is no fix to the lack of internetaccess. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, the down-load speed of mobile internet was roughly half ofthe global average, while it was just one third ofthe global average in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan inMarch 2020. Speed of fixed broadband internet

¹⁰ Possible reasons for the drop in mobile subscriptions inKazakhstan are first, further market consolidationbetween 2015 and 2019. Second, the raise of messengerservices providing VoIP, such as WhatsApp and Viber,which are used to communicate with relatives especially inRussia, replaces Russian SIM cards. Third, between 2018and 2019 Kazakh telecom legislation changed, whichrequire mobile phone users to register their SIM cards withIMEI code and individual tax number, which could lead to afurther reduction in mobile phone contracts (Kazakhstan2.0 2019).

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was not better in global comparison, except inKazakhstan, where the download speed wasabove half of the global average. In Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, it was roughly onethird of the global average. Turkmenistan ranks176 of 176 countries in the index having the slow-est internet on earth with less than 1 percent ofthe downloadable data volume per second ofSingapore, the country which ranks No. 1. Thisunderlines that providing reliable and affordableinternet access to Central Asians is a two-foldchallenge: On the one hand, new technical infra-structure is required in all Central Asian coun-tries. This is of special importance to enableCentral Asian businesses to explore the digitaleconomy. On the other hand, the Tajik and Turk-men governments lack the political will toprovide their citizens with internet. The positiveexample is Uzbekistan, where the number of cit-izens with internet access is rising and prices arecheap.

f. Giving Citizens a Voice and Opportunities toBecome Engaged

Initial hopes of the early 1990th that the newly in-dependent states in Central Asia would demo-cratise (Fukuyama 1992) did not become reality.With the exception of Kyrgyzstan all Central Asianstates are autocratic systems.¹¹ Table 16 com-pares the performance of the five countries onthe Electoral Democracy Index of the V-Dem pro-ject with the values for Germany and theEuropean average. The index allows to classifyfour of the Central Asian states as clearly auto-cratic: A functioning electoral regime forms thecore of any democracy (Merkel et al. 2003: 50-51;Lindberg et al. 2014: 161), but does not existthere. Table 16 shows that the Kyrgyz electoral re-gime started to outperform the other four coun-tries’ electoral systems in the early 2000th.¹² As apolitical consequence, Kyrgyzstan is the onlycountry in the region where elections ever resul-ted in a change of government. Therefore, someauthors consider Kyrgyzstan to be a democraticisland in the region (Kunze 2018: 143), while oth-ers still classify the country as a hybrid regime(Lempp/Wolters 2020: 76).¹³However, the new Kyrgyz President’s aim of re-placing Kyrgyz parliamentarism by strong presid-ential systems might end the more democraticKyrgyz path in Central Asia (Putz 2020a). In Kaza-khstan, expectations were high that power trans-ition to a new president might pave the way forreforms (Pleines 2019). Instead, the InternationalElection Observation Mission to the presidentialelections in 2019 concluded that the “moment forpotential political reforms […] was tarnished by

clear violations of fundamental freedoms as wellas pressure on critical voices” (OSCE 2019). Mostlikely, the new president will follow the politicalcourse of Nursultan Nazarbayev, who remains aninfluential figure behind the scenes. It remains tobe seen, whether the president is able to build anown power base independent from his prede-cessor. New political courses were taken inTajikistan and Uzbekistan. During the last years,the elimination of the political opposition, the ac-cumulation of power and the establishment of acult of personality added up to a trend of estab-lishing a totalitarian system in Tajikistan (Schmitz2019). Since Shavkat Mirziyoyev became Uzbekpresident in 2016, he pursues a cautious liberal-isation strategy. Schieck (2017) argues that thisprocess is a transformation from old to new au-thoritarianism. In times of globalisation, author-itarian regimes cannot rely anymore on repres-sion, but require political legitimacy. However,together with Tajikistan and Turkmenistan, thecountry still belongs to the “worst of the worst”(FreedomHouse 2019) in terms of freedom rights.It is an open question how long Turkmenistanwillbe able to continue its course of isolation (Meurs2018).

Table 16: Electoral Democracy Index for CentralAsia, Europe and Germany (1990-2019)

Source: V-Dem (2020a).

¹¹ Tajikistan (Schmitz 2019) and Turkmenistan (Horak/Sir2009) might also be classified as totalitarian systems,characterised by a dominant ideology, a monistic powercentre andmass mobilization (Linz 2003).¹² The Electoral Democracy Index of V-Dem combines dataon the freedom of association, clean elections, freedom ofexpression, elected officials, and suffrage (V-Dem 2020a).¹³ The classification of the Kyrgyz political system isdisputed as a functioning democracy is not limited toelection, but requires further elements such as politicalrights, civil rights, horizontal accountability, and effectivepower to govern (Merkel et al. 2003: 51; Merkel 2007).Despite the fact that Freedom House considers the country“partly-free” (Freedom House 2019), Kyrgyzstan is not afully functioning democracy.

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While unfolding the potential of the youth aschange makers is necessary to create high pro-spects for the younger generations, the briefoverview of the democratic performance of theCentral Asian countries underlines how limitedopportunities for engagement are. Since theearly 1990th, continued efforts of external actors,including the EU, to support democratisation inCentral Asia also show limited effects. Based on aglobal review of the effectiveness of democracyaid, Lührmann, McMann and van Ham (2017: 26)argue that democracy aid is more effective, whenit does not pose a threat to regime survival. How-ever, a threat to their power is exactly the wayhow Central Asian leaders perceive democracypromotion (Boonstra 2012: 2-3). The EU’s focuson the promotion of good governance and therule of law (Warkotsch 2008) or grassroot levelactivities (Boonstra 2012: 4; Hoffmann 2010) in-stead of supporting transformation resonateswith these findings. Therefore, below thethreshold of transformation, giving citizens avoice and opportunities to become engaged re-gardless of gender, ethnicity and religion is achallenge that needs to be addressed. To addressit, support for civil society seems to be a suitable,however, not unproblematic approach.

Table 17: Participatory Democracy Index forCentral Asia (1990-2019)

Source: V-Dem (2020b).

The structures of civil society and conditions un-der which citizens can engage differ considerablyin the region (Hönig 2020). Kyrgyzstan is again thebest performing country of the region, where civilsociety organisations can work relatively free(see table 17). However, even there the govern-ment tried to limit external funding for non-gov-ernmental organisations (NGOs, Turmenbaeva2020: 130-131). In Turkmenistan and Tajikistan,citizens willing to engage face most difficulties(see table 17). In order to support active citizensin all five Central Asian countries, the major chal-lenge is to overcome the EU’s previous focus on

liberal and Western style NGOs (Axyonova/Bos-suyt 2016) and to increase cooperation with localinitiatives as well as governmental-organisedNGOs (GONGOs, Hönig 2020: 193). Cooperationwith GONGOsmight cause additional challenges,as some independent NGOs – where they exist –question the legitimacy of GONGOs, which theyconsider representatives of the government andnot part of the (independent) civil society. How-ever, without them citizens’ engagement remainslimited and biased.

g. Reaching Out to Central Asians in RuralAreas

The previously mentioned challenges affectCentral Asians living within in the same countryin different ways. The most important dividingline is the divide between urban and rural popu-lation. The economic situation in the urbancentres is better as is the provision of infrastruc-ture, most notably internet access, public ser-vices, including education, and basic needs. As aconsequence, there is a clear trend of urbanisa-tion in all Central Asian countries as shown intable 18. Especially the youths are seeking a bet-ter future in urban centres (Goble 2017). Projec-tions assume that in all countries exceptTajikistan a majority of the population will live incities in 2050 (see table 18). Urbanisation coupledwith population growth puts the infrastructure inCentral Asian cities under pressure. To solve theexpected problems for urban infrastructure,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan started building en-tirely new cities for up to 300,000 inhabitants toease the pressure on existing cities (Goble 2017).Considering that the future perspectives of mi-grant workers abroad are currently unclear, theirreturn to home countries would create additionalpressure and need for new infrastructure.

Despite the infrastructural challenge caused byurbanisation, the movement of citizens towardscities also has economic repercussions. The rel-evance of the agricultural sector in all five coun-tries has been in decline for several years (seetable 19). The ongoing urbanisation will result ina further shrinking of the agricultural sector.Against the backdrop that the Central Asian eco-nomies are highly dependent on commodity ex-ports and that the secondary sector is small, urb-anisation accelerates the existing economic prob-lems. Therefore, European youth policy for Cent-ral Asia has to create incentives for the youngergeneration to stay in the countryside. Addressingrural populations, special attention should be

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paid to vulnerable youth and rural women, forwhom access to public services, education andlabour market are greatly limited. Focusing oncities would contribute to amplifying urbanisa-tion and its negative externalities, which arecounterproductive in terms of addressing theother challengesmentionedbefore,most notablythe provision of infrastructure and integration ofyounger generations in the labour market.

Table 18: Urban and Rural Population and Projec-tions in Central Asia from 1960 to 2050

Source: Own table based on data from World Bank (2020b),Series: Urban population (% of total population), Rural pop-ulation (% of total population).

Table 19: Contribution of the Agricultural Sectorto GDP in Central Asia

Source: International Food Policy Research Institute 2019.

III. Youth Policy Aims of the EU-Central AsiaStrategy, German and Other EU MemberStates’ Development Cooperation

The following section assesses how a youthpolicy dimension of EU-Central Asia relations res-onates with the EU’s general youth policy aimsand to what degree youth policy is already in-cluded in the strategic framework of the new EU-Central Asia policy, the objectives of German de-velopment cooperation, and the policy ap-proaches of some selected EU member states.The EU’s general youth policy objectives are

defined in the “European Union Youth Strategy”(European Commission 2018c) for the years from2019 until 2027 and build on the previously adop-ted European Youth Goals. The specific youthpolicy objectives for EU external relations aredefined in the newly adopted Council conclu-sions (Council of the EU 2020). The EU-CentralAsia Strategy emphasises the role of youth forsustainable economic development and priorit-ises education cooperation as a major aim of theyouth policy in the region. Moreover, the broadpolicy framework set by the EU facilitates cooper-ation in other policy fields, which do not mentionyouth directly but have a strong impact on the fu-ture perspectives of the young generation. Theyouth policy aims of German development co-operation fully correspond with the EU-CentralAsia Strategy and give priority to international vo-cational educational cooperation and environ-mental protection. The Central Asia policies ofother member states analysed in this chapteralso widely follow the EU’s policy framework andprovide an opportunity for EU-wide task-sharing.Therefore, the existing strategic framework isspecified in this chapter to later formulate the re-commendations on youth policy approach andits implementation in Central Asian states.

a. The EU’s General Youth Policy Aims

Acknowledging considerable differences of thespecific situation of youth in Central Asia and inEurope, the overall challenges are comparable ina number of aspects. Therefore, the EU’s ap-proach to youth policy and its general objectivescan serve as an overall framework for a youthpolicy dimension in EU-Central Asia relations.This approach is outlined in the “European UnionYouth Strategy 2019-2027” (European Commis-sion 2018c), which the Council of the EU (2018)endorsed in 2018. Three of the overall objectivesof the European youth policy, as they are definedby the Council of the EU (2018: 2-3), fit the previ-ously discussed challenges for youth in CentralAsia:¹⁴• “Enable young people to be architects of their

own lives”,• Empower young people to become change

makers,• “Contribute to the eradication of youth

poverty […] and promote social inclusion”.

The European Union Youth Strategy’s focus on across-sectoral approach is in line with the broaddefinition of youth policy applied to this researchpaper (Council of the EU 2018: 3), covering a widerange of policy areas (see section IV). The parti-cipatory governance approach to youth policy, as

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outlined by the European Commission (2018c:10), fits the focus on stakeholder engagement un-der the EU-Central Asia strategy of 2019. Thestrategy also calls for increased efforts of publicdiplomacy to make the EU more visible in theCentral Asian region. In this respect, the threecore areas of the European Youth Goals (“En-gage”, “Connect”, “Empower”) could be used tomake EU youth policy activities more visible inCentral Asia.The new youth policy dimension as proposed be-low should entail measures empowering CentralAsian youth in political, social, economic, andcultural terms to support them in becoming atransformative force in their societies. To makeuse of the transformative potential of the youth,engaging the younger generations in societalaffairs is key so that they can shape the future ofCentral Asia. Therefore, the EU should contributeto achieve the third major objective of the YouthStrategy by connecting the youth in Central Asiain three dimensions: within the region, withEurope, and in the digital space.This will also allow for achieving the EuropeanYouth Goals abroad, as demanded in the Councilconclusions on youth in external action (Councilof the EU 2020). The eleven European YouthGoals,¹⁵ which were developed in a consultativeprocess involving young Europeans, however,cover too many areas of youth policy. Consider-ing the given resources for EU-Central Asia co-operation, the EU needs to prioritise activitieswithin a youth policy dimension of EU-CentralAsia relations in order to maximise its impact.Against the backdrop of the previously discussedchallenges for youth in Central Asia, the new di-mension should focus on the following sixEuropean Youth Goals. They correspond with thepolicy areas for priority activities discussed insection IV of this research paper:• Equality of All Genders (goal 2);• Inclusive Societies (goal 3);• Information & Constructive Dialogue (goal 4);• Moving Rural Youth Forward (goal 6);• Quality Employment for All (goal 7);• Quality Learning (goal 8).

b. The EU’s Youth Policy Aims in Its Relationswith Central Asia

With regard to EU external relations, the Councilrecognises general challenges for youth, such asa lack of decent work, limited access to qualityeducation, especially vocational education andtraining, and emphasises long-lasting negativeeffects of the COVID-19 pandemic on youth(Council of the EU 2020), which are in line with

the challenges discussed in chapter II. To addressthem, the Council stresses the necessity to en-sure that youth policy becomes a mainstreamingissue in EU and member states’ external policies.By proposing to establish a new youth dimensionof EU relationswith Central Asia, this research pa-per contributes to achieving the policy objectiveof the Council conclusions. Specific youth policyobjectives identified by the Council include in-vesting in youth education with attention to vo-cational training, non-formal, and distance edu-cation, enhancing cooperation with the privatesector to provide decent jobs and entrepreneur-ship opportunities for youth, addressing youth inclimate strategies, and ensuring a gender main-streaming approach throughout all EU andmem-ber state programmes and actions (Council of theEU 2020).The EU’s new Central Asia policy addresses youthas both an opportunity and a challenge for theCentral Asian states under the objective “Partner-ing for Prosperity”, whichmentions a high literacyrate and very young population as resources forsustainable economic growth, but also as a testfor the Central Asian labour market (EuropeanCommission/High Representative of the Unionfor Foreign Affairs and Security Policy 2019: 8).The aims of youth policy in the narrow sense arespecified as “Investing in Youth, Education, In-novation and Culture”, and include two mainareas of cooperation: higher education and voca-tional training focusing both on quality of educa-tion and equal access especially for rural com-munities and women (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy 2019: 13). Both priorit-ies are in linewith the challenges identified in thisresearch paper. Moreover, other strategic object-ives regarding the younger generation includeproviding employability and closing skills gapswithin the Central Asian labour market as theyaddress socio-economic issues faced by the re-gion, such as high emigration rates and low eco-nomic diversification. Therefore, challenges forthe creation of new perspectives for the CentralAsian youth identified in the previous chapter,

¹⁴ The fourth objective (“Improve policy decisions withregard to their impact on young people across all sectors,notably employment, education, health and socialinclusion”, Council of the EU 2018: 2) addresses nationalpolicies and would constitute direct interference withCentral Asia legislation and national sovereignty.¹⁵ 1. Connecting EU with Youth; 2. Equality of All Genders;3. Inclusive Societies; 4. Information & ConstructiveDialogue; 5. Mental Health & Wellbeing; 6. Moving RuralYouth Forward; 7. Quality Employment for All; 8. QualityLearning; 9. Space and Participation for All; 10. SustainableGreen Europe; 11. Youth Organisations & EuropeanProgrammes.

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and recommendations given on education andsocio-economic policy, correspond with theyouth policy aims of the EU-Central Asia Strategy.However, chapter II shows that some challengesfor Central Asian youth can only be addressedwithin a broader policy framework. Indeed, over-arching objectives listed in the EU-Central AsiaStrategy, such as providing rule of law, humanrights, and democracy under the “Partnering forResilience” pillar, and economic measures forsupporting SMEs and promoting sustainable con-nectivity under the “Partnering for Prosperity”pillar, can also exert leverage on the state of Cent-ral Asian youth, providing general conditions forsustainable human development. This researchpaper goes further and amplifies youth policyaims of other policy areas, such as digitalisation,gender equality policy, and agriculture policy,which will be shown in chapter IV.Criticism of the EU’s youth policy stems from thedistinct orientation on higher education (Laruelle2019: 6-7), which is an exclusionary approach re-garding the high rate of economic and social in-equality in Central Asian states. Higher educationand EU projects in this area only reach very lim-ited target groups – especially the metropolitanpopulation and those who belong to the politicaland economic elite (Paramonov 2018: 316; Cor-nell, Starr 2019: 67). A hidden effect of such pro-grammes is a widening opportunity gap betweenurban and rural populations in the region. Thefact that the labour market and skills gaps arementioned in the EU Central Asia Strategy is agood signal for educational cooperation. Provid-ing vocational training based on local labourmarket needs and establishing a sustainable dia-logue between authorities, business and educa-tional actors can increase the visibility of the EU’sengagement by reaching broader populationgroups. Therefore, the recommendations given inthis research paper pay attention to differentequity gaps in the region – notably, disparitiesbetween the urban and rural population, as wellas gender and social inequalities.

c. Youth Policy Aims of German DevelopmentCooperation

Since 2007, Germany has uploaded its foreignpolicy objectives for Central Asia to the EU-widestrategic framework. Hence, German develop-ment goals in Central Asia follow the Europeanstrategic framework and focus on the followingtopics: democracy promotion, sustainable eco-nomic development, cooperation in science andeducation, development cooperation and secur-ity issues (Deutscher Bundestag 2018: 7).

Moreover, German development cooperation isguided by priorities established in bilateral co-operation with the Central Asian states. For allfive countries, both public health and sustainableeconomic development are specified as majorareas (Deutscher Bundestag 2018: 14-15), whichwidely correspond to the challenge analysis ofthis research paper. Both areas of action emphas-ise the importance of sustainable human devel-opment and provide a broad framework for theapproach to youth policy in Central Asia.Further objectives are codified in area-specificdocuments such as “Green Central Asia”, whichoutlined environmental cooperation in a joint de-claration from January 2020. Addressing chal-lenges such as climate change, and economicand demographic development, this strategicframework states, among other aims, strengthen-ing inter- and intra-regional cooperation in sus-tainable development and security, and enhan-cing stability and prosperity (Joint Declaration ofIntent 2020: 1, 3), which coincide with the object-ives and recommendations of this research pa-per. In addition, “Green Central Asia” emphasisesthe role of “civil society, community-based or-ganisations, business and industry, scientific andeducational institutions […] to promote climateand environmental cooperation” (Joint Declara-tion of Intent 2020: 3), which is a chance to en-gage Central Asian youths in climate and environ-mental protection through fostering participa-tion and creating vocational training pro-grammes, while incorporating prospects of greeneconomy and technological transformation inthe region.Another area of action emphasised in Germande-velopment cooperation with Central Asia is voca-tional training. Indeed, the dual vocational train-ing system is Germany’s main educational ex-port, which can be a paragon for some EU-widemeasures. Its importance for Germany is stressedby the fact that two strategy papers outlining theaims of German international vocational trainingcooperation were adopted in 2013 and 2019.Whereas the first strategy underlines the benefitsof the German vocational training system andpursues its popularisation and disseminationworldwide (Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 6), thesecond sets holistic objectives, such as the insur-ance of political, economic and social participa-tion, creation of future prospects, andmovementtowards societal stability (Bundesregierung 2019:1-2). Both environmental and educational co-operation as priority areas of German develop-ment cooperation with Central Asia correspondto the new EU-Central Asia Strategy as well as tothe approach of this research paper.

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d. Policy Aims of Selected EUMember States

Concerning the engagement of EU memberstates in Central Asia, there are two groups ofcountries: countries with historically rooted tiesor interests in the region, such as Germany,Latvia, France, the Netherlands and Finland orcountries in which cooperation with the fiveCentral Asian states is limited to economic co-operation, notably in the energy sector and trade.For this research paper, a number of EU memberstates of the former group were selected, whosepolicies towards the region and their objectiveswill be briefly specified below: France, the Neth-erlands, Sweden, Finland, and Latvia.French interests in the region are focused on se-curity policy, due to NATO’s intervention in Afgh-anistan and the subsequent stationing of theFrench Air Force in Tajikistan. The overall object-ive of French engagement is the prevention ofstate instability in the region in connection withterrorism and organised crime. Consequently,over the last two decades, France has establisheda widespread cooperation on police training inthese priority areas (Peyrouse 2012: 3) and con-tributed to the launch of two major EU pro-grammes: The Central Asia Drug Action Pro-gramme (CADAP) and the EU Border Manage-ment Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA)(Gower 2011: 39). Another area of French engage-ment in the region is providing rule of law, hereFrance established the EURule of Law Initiative incooperation with Germany (Peyrouse 2012: 2).Security policy is a major cooperation field of theNetherlands, which also contribute to BOMCA(Hartog/Kettle 2012: 3). Similarly to France, theobjective of Dutch Central Asia engagement is re-lated to stability especially in Kazakhstan, wheresome Dutch companies made large investmentsin the energy sector. Hence, the Netherlands fundthe Security Sector Reform (SSR) with the aim “toimprove democratic governance and monitoringof Kazakhstan’s security sector by providingtraining courses for officials and civil society lead-ers” (Hartog/Kettle 2012: 3). Moreover, Dutch en-gagement in security issues uses theOSCE frame-work to contribute to border management anddrug traffic control (Hartog/Kettle 2012: 3). LikeFrance, the Netherlands see a close link betweensecurity policy, stability and sustainable eco-nomic and human development (Hartog/Kettle2012: 4), therefore, the engagement of both EUmember states could be seen as a wider frame-work of youth policy aims mentioned in the EU-Central Asia Strategy.Northern European countries, such as Swedenand Finland, emphasise democracy promotion,

human rights, and rule of law in their CentralAsian policies. Sweden was the only countrywhose engagement in Central Asia was notablyvalues-based and limited to human rights andpoverty reduction. Swedish Central AsiaStrategies (2003-2005 and 2006-2009) were fo-cused on the two resource-poor Central Asianstates: Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan (Joensson 2013:4). The cooperation ended in 2010 with a phas-ing-out strategy (SIDA 2010: 7). The objectives ofSwedish development cooperation in this periodwere “to improve opportunities for citizen parti-cipation in the development of society, and to im-prove poor people’s possibilities of earning a liv-ing and maintaining good health.” (SIDA 2010:21). Gender equality issues were addressed as across-cutting priority for all projects and policymeasures (Joensson 2013: 4). Despite politicaltensions with non-democratic regimes in CentralAsia, Sweden can still contribute to a values-based cooperation within the OSCE’s and theEU’s cooperation framework with the region(Joensson 2013: 4).Whereas Sweden reduced its development co-operation in Central Asia, Finland continues itsengagement in democracy promotion, good gov-ernance, and rule of law. In 2018, the “CountryStrategy for Development Cooperation” for bothKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan was adopted for theperiod between 2019 and 2021 (Finnish Ministryfor Foreign Affairs 2018). The target groups ofFinnish development cooperation are vulnerablepopulation groups, such as rural women, chil-dren, and people with disabilities (Lipiäinen2013: 3). The new Finnish strategy stresses “eco-nomic, social and environmental sustainability”(Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2018: 3). Ac-cording to the new strategy, the overall objectivesof Finnish Central Asia policy are: strengtheninghuman rights and rule of law by paying special at-tention to vulnerable groups and women,strengthening civil society, providing sustainableeconomic growth, and promoting environmentalprotection (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs2018: 20-24). The new aspect in the Finnishstrategy for 2019-2021 is a strong focus on cli-mate change, which is addressed as an eco-nomic, governance and environmental challenge(Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs 2018: 22-24).The Finnish Central Asia policy framework isclosely tied to the new EU-Central Asia Strategyand can be used for developing further synergieswithin a values-based approach to the region.Latvian Central Asian policy is strongly influ-enced by a shared experience of political andeconomic transformation after the decline of theSoviet Union. However, Latvian cooperation withCentral Asia is dominated by security policy andtransportation, due to the establishment of the

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Northern Distribution Network (NDN) during theAfghanistan NATO operation and to the old Sovietrailway connections between Central Asia andBaltic ports (Jēkabsone 2013: 2). Hence, both se-curity and transit cooperation are interconnectedas Latvia is interested in using its infrastructurecapacities to build up the transit of Central Asianand Chinese goods (Jēkabsone 2013: 3), but alsofaces some risks related to drug and humantraffic through its ports (Bossuyt 2017: 455).Therefore, Latvia is one of the major partners ofBOMCA. An almost overseen niche for Latvian co-operation with Central Asia is the promotion ofeconomic and democratic transformation andgood governance, as both Latvia and the fiveCentral Asian states experienced the Soviet sys-tem and its repercussions (Jēkabsone 2013: 3,Bossuyt 2017: 452). Another important area of ac-tion is higher education, where Latvia contrib-utes to the EU’s Central Asia Education Platform(CAEP) (Bossuyt 2017: 452) and constitutes an im-portant destination for academic mobility ofCentral Asian students (Bossuyt 2017: 449).

To sum up, cooperation projects of the EU mem-ber states are focused on the energy sector andeconomic cooperation with Central Asian hydro-carbon suppliers (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, andTurkmenistan) as alternatives to Russian oil andgas (Gower 2011: 44). Consequently, there is alack of interest concerning cooperation with re-source-poor countries (Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan). Human rights and democracy promo-tion as values-based dimensions of the EU’s Cent-ral Asia policy gain low interest in bilateral rela-tions of most EUmember states with Central Asia(except Finland). The pragmatic view on coopera-tion with focus on energy and in some cases se-curity policy (as in France, the Netherlands andLatvia) dominates Central Asian policies of theanalysed EU member states. The EU-wide initiat-ives and the framework of some international or-ganisations such as the OSCE play a crucial rolefor the Central Asian engagement of many EUmember states as a possibility to build synergiesand bring their expertise even if they have few re-sources for bilateral cooperation.This research paper coincides with both theyouth policy aims of the new EU-Central AsiaStrategy and of the German Federal Government,but takes a broader approach to youth policy,which includes not only traditional areas of ac-tion, such as education and socio-economic de-velopment, but also other policy areas, whichhave an indirect but strong influence on the gen-eral well-being of youth as will be shown in thenext chapter. Central Asian policies of other EUmember states analysed in this chapter reflecthistorically rooted interests and cooperation

fields, which provide a foundation for EU-widetask-sharing and building synergies between EU-level actors andmember states.

IV. Policy Areas Relevant to Youth Policy inCentral Asia

This chapter evaluates EU activities in six policyareas most relevant to creating higher prospectsfor Central Asians in the age group 14 to 30 yearsagainst the backdrop of the challenges identifiedin chapter II. This research paper chose to have acloser look at those policy areas that are highlyrelevant (1) for addressing the existing challengesas described above and thus (2) for achieving thedesired impact in youth policy. The focus ismainly put on policy areas (3) where the EU andits member states have a long-standing experi-ence. In the following, for each of the chosenpolicy areas the existing initiatives of the EU, Ger-many and the other selected EUmember states –where relevant – are presented and evaluated.The main criterion for their assessment is thecontribution that they could make so far to thecreation of new perspectives for the youth inCentral Asia. Based on the evaluation, it providesrecommendations for the German government toimplement the new EU-Central Asia Strategy.In addition to the recommendations given here,the EU and its member states should considertwo mainstreaming issues for the establishmentof a youth policy dimension of EU-Central Asia re-lations. First, investing in regional cooperationshould become a mainstreaming issue of allactivities in the youth policy dimension of EU-Central Asia relations. Second, cooperation withother international actors, such as theUNand theOSCE, should be intensified in order to improvethe effectiveness and the impact of the newly es-tablished youth policy dimension of EU-CentralAsia relations. However, the assessment of theyouth policy activities of these organisations areoutside the scope of this research paper.

a. Education Policy

Education policy is a policy area that meets allthree criteria. Per se, comprising initiatives inprimary, secondary and tertiary education, it ismainly addressed towards the younger popula-tion, that (the group of people under 25 years)makes up the largest age group in all five CentralAsian countries. A good education can help theyoung generation to integrate into the labourmarket and thus help to reduce the rate of youth

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unemployment which is already quite high in theregionwith the exception of Kazakhstan. Directedtowards highly skilled workers with universityeducation, education policy initiatives can alsohelp to prevent brain-drain to Western, but alsoAsian countries. Education policy can further-more play a role in decreasing social inequality inthe region, addressing the disparities concerningthe access to education between the big citiesand the rural areas as well as between men andwomen.

InstrumentsAlthough the current EU-Central Asia strategyaims at “increas[ing] the quality of education,higher education and vocational education andtraining” (Commission/High Representative ofthe Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2019: 13) the existing EU education policy initiat-ives in Central Asia show a clear focus on highereducation (Paramonov 2018; Cornell/Starr 2019:67). The two most important EU-funded highereducation programmes with the Central Asiancountries are:¹⁶• the TEMPUS programme (Trans-European

Mobility Programme for University Studies)which ran from 1994 to 2013: Its main goalwas to support the modernisation of thehigher education sectors (include CentralAsia) through e.g. institutional cooperation(Paramonov 2018; Gussarova/Andžāns2018a);

• Erasmus Mundus (launched in 2007) and itsfollow-up programme Erasmus+ (since 2014):The programmes mainly finance the mobilityof students, teachers and researchers, butalso contribute to the sharing of best prac-tices and support educational reforms (Para-monov 2018; Gussarova/Andžāns 2018a).Along with the Horizon 2020 Framework Pro-gramme for Research and Innovation (todayHorizon Europe), Erasmus+ today is the mainfunding instrument for higher education andresearch in Central Asia overall (Momosheva/Berenaliev 2019). Some of the various activit-ies under Erasmus+ are managed at the na-tional level by national agencies whereas oth-ers are managed at the European level by theEducation, Audiovisual and Culture ExecutiveAgency (EACEA, Gussarova/Andžāns 2018a).

Worth mentioning is also the European Educa-tion Initiative for Central Asia which was initiatedin 2007 as a platform for dialogue between the EUand Central Asia to provide support for reforms ofthe education sector in the Central Asian coun-tries to bring them closer to European standards(e.g. through the participation in the Bologna

Process). Next to political dialogues, the initiativeincludes the exchange of information (e.g. on theoccasion of joint events) as well as various pro-grammes under the framework of previouslyTempus or Erasmus Mundus (Paramonov 2018;Momosheva/Berenaliev 2019). The Central AsianEducation Platform (CAEP), which was runningunder the European Education Initiative from2012 to 2019, was an important platform for dia-logue on reforms in vocational education andtraining (VET) and higher education within Cent-ral Asia. To this end, the main activities carriedout were the exchange on various occasions suchas conferences, workshops and seminars, butalso online (e.g. by setting up their website asproject database with a mapping of activities ofthe EU, member states and other internationalactors in the area of education) (Gussarova/Andžāns 2018a).

The EU’s approach to education initiatives inCentral Asia is mainly criticised for its strong fo-cus on higher education. The critique stems fromthe fact that higher education in Central Asia andthus also those initiatives target limited groups ofthe population, especially those in urban areas.Therefore, they are regarded to be elitist andtheir reception aswell as impact for the society asa whole are considered to be rather low (Para-monov 2018; Cornell/Starr 2019: 67). Further-more, this focus does not coincidewith the needsof the local labour markets which are under in-creasing pressure to integrate the young popula-tion (Cornell/Starr 2019). Another point of criti-cism is the fact that EU support in the area of edu-cation mainly comes through comprehensive in-struments like Tempus, Erasmus Mundus orErasmus+ which barely consider existing circum-stances on the local level in Central Asia(Peyrouse 2019). Although it is well acknow-ledged that the EU’s experience in higher educa-tion and research development is substantial,some say that this experience is not transferableto Central Asia; the two regions are too differentdue to their respective histories (Gussarova/Andžāns 2019a).Contrary to the EU, German initiatives in CentralAsia in the area of education mainly focus on vo-cational training. The country promotes dual vo-cational training based on its own model(Deutscher Bundestag 2013: 6; Stehling 2015). Toa large degree, the Deutsche Gesellschaft für In-ternationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ) implements

¹⁶ The “Central Asia Research and Education Network(CAREN)” is the third major project in education policy, butthis paper adresses it under the policy area of digitalisationpolicy in chapter IV.b.

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the initiatives on behalf of the German ministryresponsible. Projects addressed towards all fiveCentral Asian countries or a group of countriesare:• the “Professional Education and Vocational

Training in Central Asia – Fostering SystemicApproaches in the Food Processing Sector”: Itis commissioned by the German Federal Min-istry for Economic Cooperation and Develop-ment (BMZ) and implemented by the GIZ. Itruns from 2019 to 2022 with a total budget of5.5 million Euro for all five countries and aimsat improving employment-oriented voca-tional training, especially in the food pro-cessing industry by promoting the dual voca-tional training system and involving compan-ies in the design of industry-relevant coursesfor vocational education and higher educa-tion (GIZ n.d.(b));

• the strategic alliance “Arbeitsmarktori-entierte berufliche Aus- und Hochschulb-ildung in Bauberufen in Kasachstan und Kir-gisistan“: Also commissioned by the BMZ, theproject seeks to establish practical-orientedvocational and higher education for buildingprofessions in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstanfrom 2019 to 2023 (Bundesinstitut für Berufs-bildung n.d.);

• the “Sparkasse partnership project for the in-troduction of dual vocational training in thefinancial sector and the introduction of basicfinancial education for young people inKyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan”:Financed by the BMZ for the period of 2014 to2020, the project aims among other goals atimproving the basic financial education of thepopulation in the three target countries (Fin-anzgruppe Sparkassenstiftung für interna-tionale Kooperation 2018: 15).

In Kazakhstan, the project “Transfer von DualenAusbildungsprogrammen in Logistik, Mechat-ronik und nachhaltiger Energieversorgung nachKasachstan (GeKaVoC)” is funded by the FederalMinistry for Education and Research (BMBF) from2017 to 2020. Its goals are to establish an inter-company education centre based on the Germanmodel and to strengthen the cooperationbetween the economy and state-run enterprises(GeKaVoC n.D.). In Kyrgyzstan, the GIZ is imple-menting on behalf of the BMZ the project “Em-ployment Promotion and Vocational Qualifica-tion”. It is directed towards young women andmen looking forwork after completing their train-ing, especially women in rural areas (GIZ n.d.(a)).For its international cooperation in vocationaleducation, the German government establishedso-called round tables to coordinate the activitiesin this area. The actors involved include German

ministries, organisations, etc. (Bundesregierung2019).Among the other selected EU member states,mainly Latvia engages in education policy initiat-ives in Central Asia. The country was active in theframework of the CAEP and coordinated coopera-tion in vocational education (Ministry of ForeignAffairs of the Republic of Latvia 2016). The num-ber of Central Asians among foreign students atLatvian universities is already quite high and thecountry is actively trying to attract evenmore stu-dents from the region in order to strengthen thecooperation between their education facilities(Bossuyt 2017; Jēkabsone 2013). Latvia’s engage-ment is generally evaluated positively, but somedoubt that it meets the local needs (Gussarova/Andžāns 2019a).RecommendationsTo allow education policy initiatives to have thedesired impact and to address the identifiedchallenges adequately, the main task is to reformthe underdeveloped education sectors in the fivecountries, where the reform process away fromthe Soviet-style system and towards interna-tional standard is ongoing and differs consider-ably between the five countries. In Uzbekistanand even more so in Turkmenistan, the majortask is the liberalisation and opening of the edu-cation sectors. Therefore, the current needs inthe higher education sector are two-fold: On theone hand, the further adaptation to internationalstandards needs support. On the other hand,some of the previous reforms need corrections.Most notably, the higher education systems needto become sustainable by becoming an attractiveemployer for Central Asian researchers and lec-turers. In parallel to reforming higher education,the Central Asian research sectors also need to bestrengthened. Especially, closer cooperationwiththe industrial sector is required to promote in-novation and create jobs for highly skilledpeople. The sector of vocational training faces asimilar challenge. Being still rooted in the Sovietsystem, education needs to adapt to employers’needs and become more labour market orientedto offer apprentices a better perspective.The EU’s focus on education in the new CentralAsia Strategy is generally seen positive, butgreater emphasis should be put on primary andsecondary education aswell as vocational educa-tion instead of tertiary education (Cornell/Starr2019) which can increase the visibility and effect-iveness of the EU’s initiatives by reaching broaderpopulation groups including those in rural areasand women. The German dual vocational train-ing system should continue to serve as a bestpractice example, which has to be adapted to thespecific situation in Central Asia. As the process

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of adaption as well as the ownership by localstakeholders in Central Asia (Euler 2019) is crucialfor long-term success, efforts should continue tobe project based instead of aiming for policy re-forms.To prevent brain-drain towards Europe, aca-demic exchange programmes should focus oncircular mobility for students, lecturers and re-searchers, like Kazakhstan’s Bolashak pro-gramme already does. Central Asian students orresearchers could be offered so-called “returngrants”. This means that scholarships for staysabroad are only granted if students or research-ers return to their home countries afterwards(Plottka/Smirnova 2019). By providing incentivesto return to research and higher education insti-tutions in the home countries, such a fundingscheme would directly contribute to improvinghigher education in Central Asia.Building on experiences from its Erasmus+ pro-gram and its predecessors, the EU, most notablythe European Commission, should help to estab-lish new intra-Central Asian exchange programsfor pupils, trainees, students, teachers, lecturers,and researchers. This could be a crucial means toaddress the previously mentioned challenge toopen the education sectors,most notably in Turk-menistan and Uzbekistan. Experiences in interna-tional exchange create lasting bonds and havethe potential to give regional cooperation a morestable basis. The focus should be on pupils andtrainees, with increased efforts to develop voca-tional training in Central Asia, as incentives forstudents to stay in other Central Asian countriesare still limited.As Latvia has a high number of students fromCentral Asia coming to the country, it would bebest suited for taking over the responsibility forthe distribution of those return grants. Transfer-ring existing European or German models toCentral Asia might not work as a mere copy pro-cess, but only if only those components are trans-ferred that fit best the Central Asian experiences,history, culture, etc. (Euler 2013). The EU shouldalso consider to intensify the cooperation withlike-minded actors like the Ukraine which re-ceives a lot of students from Central Asia (Gus-sarova/Andžāns 2019a). In general, the EU andthe member states should engage more activelywith local stakeholders in order to achieve a long-term impact of its initiatives (Peyrouse 2019). Oneexample could be to invite local stakeholders orlocal German embassies to the German roundtables in addition to the responsible actors for in-ternational cooperation in vocational educationon the national level. Only introduced so far inKazakhstan, this could be extended towards theother Central Asian countries.

b. Digitalisation Policy

It has been shown before that the major obstacleto digitalisation remains the need to further de-velop digital infrastructure, notably broadbandinternet. By aiming at the promotion “of access toaffordable, open and secure broadband con-nectivity” (European Commission/High Repres-entative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Se-curity Policy 2019: 12) the new EU-Central AsiaStrategy as well as the strategy “ConnectingEurope and Asia” (European Commission/HighRepresentative of the Union for Foreign Affairsand Security Policy 2018) recognise this chal-lenge. In addition to the technical task of buildingthe necessary infrastructure, bridging the digitaldivide in Central Asia is also a question of polit-ical will, as the examples of Tajikistan and Turk-menistan show. The new strategy’s focus on di-gital economy could be helpful in engaging themore reluctant Central Asian countries in a dia-logue on infrastructure development for the di-gital era.Like in other areas of infrastructure investment,the EU’s Central Asia activities are competingwith Chinese activities under the Belt and RoadInitiative. The Chinese company Huawei is highlyactive in implementing new 5G technology in theregion (Thomson 2020). While EU budgets ear-marked for Central Asia are far too small to com-pete with large-scale Chinese investments, theimpact of the current COVID-19 pandemic andeconomic recession on the Chinese project is un-clear. Investment activities have been in declinesince 2017 (The Economist 2020). The current re-cession troubles recipient states in paying backtheir debts to China, revealing how dependentsome states have become on China. This is trueespecially for Kyrgyzstan in terms of Chineselending and Turkmenistan in terms of gas exportcontracts. If recipient states start turning theirback on China’s Belt and Road Initiative and in-vestment activities do not resume following thecrisis, this could open a window of opportunityfor the EU to step in and support the develop-ment of the digital silk-road. It should prioritisethis area of infrastructure investments as afford-able and open internet access is important for theeconomic and societal development in CentralAsia alike.Concerning EU youth policy, European supportfor infrastructure investments provides thegeneral framework, establishing the necessarypreconditions for a successful digital dimensionof youth policy for Central Asia. This researchpaper addresses the aimof providing reliable andaffordable internet access in a more targetedapproach on Central Asian youth. While it is

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closely related to the policy area of highereducation, due to its significance and prioritystatus under the new EU Central Asia Strategy,the research paper dedicates an own chapter tothe policy area. The digital dimension ofEuropean youth policy in Central Asia shouldfocus on three elements: (1) digital infrastructurefor higher education; (2) training of digital skills inall education programmes; (3) providingopportunities to develop digital businesses.

Instruments and RecommendationsThe Central Asia Research and Education Net-work (CAREN) was funded by the EU from 2009until 2019: In the tradition of the ancient SilkRoad, CAREN aimed at facilitating the exchangeof ideas and information between academics, re-searchers and students in Eurasia and thus e.g. atestablishing a high-capacity data-communica-tions network and connected it to its Europeancounterpart. The project wasmanaged by DANTE(Delivery of Advanced Technologies to Europe)and supported by the national research and edu-cation networks in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Turkmenistan (Uzbekistan is nocurrent project member) (Gussarova/Andžāns2019a; Gussarova/Andžāns 2018a; Paramonov2018). Regarding sustainability, the project is abest practice example for EU-Central Asia rela-tions as the cooperating national networks co-operate to continue the provision of CAREN ser-vices on a permanent basis (iCAREN 2019).Against the backdrop of the considerable chal-lenges to further develop digital infrastructure atCentral Asian research and higher education in-stitutions and the current developments in facil-itating online learning, the EU should continue tosupport CAREN’s ongoing efforts. The objective ofthe continued support should not be to replaceregional funding by EU funding, but to comple-ment it to allow for further development ofCAREN activities to address new challenges.Therefore, it is necessary to take stock of whatCAREN is able to provide on a self-sustainablebasis and to evaluate in which areas further de-mands cannot be met on a self-sustained basis.Reaching out to peripheral higher education in-stitutions as well as additional activities in devel-oping online education are such areas. With re-gard to the latter, Germany can provide best prac-tice examples: Funded under the European SocialFund, the “Virtuelle Hochschule Bayern” facilit-ates the development of online learning units atall Bavarian higher education institutions and in-tegrates them in a region-wide blended learningsystem. Students from different universities cantake courses taught under this umbrella at anyBavarian higher education institution while mu-

tual recognition of awarded ECTS is guaranteed.CAREN could be developed into a virtual univer-sity of Central Asia, connecting lecturers and stu-dents from participating higher education insti-tutions alike.The digital dimension of EU policy for CentralAsian youth may not be limited to higher educa-tion, which would further accelerate the digitaldivide within Central Asian societies. Therefore,the training of digital skills should become amainstreaming element in all EU-funded educa-tion projects and those aiming at labour marketintegration. Integrating the topic of digitalisationinto other education and youth projects will alsoincrease their attractiveness in the target group.Again, the major focus of these activities shouldbe on youth outside the urban centres and onpoor youths. For example, the project “Prospectsfor Youth” (GIZ n.d.(h)) funded by the “GermanFederal Ministry for Economic Cooperation andDevelopment” (BMZ) includes training in IT com-petences.The activities within EU projects could be com-plemented by projects addressing teachers asmultipliers. Training them in didactics of digitalliteracy should be one component of the activit-ies. With regard to the youths, special emphasisshould be put on the need for data protectionand risks of online activities, such as fake news,online bullying, fraud, radicalisation and indi-vidual security. In Kyrgyzstan, digital literacy isone of the government priorities under itsstrategy “Digital Kyrgyzstan 2020-2025” (WorldBank 2016).Furthermore, the EU’s priority on the digital eco-nomy (European Commission/High Representat-ive of the Union for Foreign Affairs and SecurityPolicy 2019: 12) is an area relevant to improvingprospects for the younger generations. Kazakh-stan has already established a programme to de-velop a “creative society” under its strategy “Di-gital Kazakhstan 2020”, which created 8,000 jobsin 2019 (Yergaliyeva 2020). As Kazakhstan is notsubject to bilateral development cooperationand has sufficient own funding to support its di-gital economy, the EU could work for establishinga region-wide network on exchanging best prac-tices to support the digital economy with a spe-cial focus on the creative economy. This wouldalso facilitate the establishment for potentialcross-border joint venture. For Kyrgyzstan, whichlacks sufficient resources to develop the digitaleconomy on its own, a project incubator forpromising business concepts in the digital eco-nomy could be established with EU funding,which could provide limited risk capital as seedmoney and training in business management forstart-ups and give them access to market-based

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investors. So far, investment in digitalisation isnot yet addressed by the “Investment Facility forCentral Asia” (European Commission n.d).

c. Economic Policy

Economic policy initiatives are key to the creationof future perspectives for the young generationon the labour market, but the policy area itself istoo comprehensive for this research paper.Therefore, it focuses on project-based initiativesthat can create such opportunities for youngpeople in Central Asia and thereby already ad-dress one of the biggest challenges identified be-fore. The region’s very young population and thusthe high share of people of working age beargreat potential for economic growth, but only ifthe young workforce and especially young wo-men who suffer from a high unemployment ratespecifically in Uzbekistan and Tajikistan can beintegrated into the Central Asian labour markets.Giving young people a perspective in their homecountries, relevant initiatives can also help redu-cing incentives for labour migration, whichmakes the region highly dependent on its mi-grant workers’ remittances and thus vulnerableto external shocks. As Central Asian labour mi-grants to Russia are a welcome target of the re-cruitment efforts of the IS (Dilleen 2019), integrat-ing young people into the local labour marketscould also help reduce radicalisation trends inthe region. In a broader context of measures re-quired to create future perspectives for the younggeneration on the regional labour market, suchinitiatives can help to reduce the region’s de-pendency on commodity exports such as oil, toattract foreign investments and to prevent a fur-ther shrinking of the agricultural sector due tothe ongoing urbanisation. Here, economic policyinitiatives are closely linked to education policysince foreign investors in the region are lookingfor qualified employees (Gussarova/Andžāns2018b: 2).

InstrumentsUnder the heading “Partnering for Prosperity” ofits 2019 Central Asia Strategy, the EU stresses,also with relation to the region’s youngpopulation, the support for the transformation ofthe Central Asian economies “into diversified andcompetitive private sector-driven economieswhich can create jobs” (European Commission/High Representative of the Union for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy 2019: 8). “[T]heagricultural sector and agri-business, the

environment and water, energy, transport andsustainable tourism” are identified as“employment-generating sectors” where the EUhas expertise (European Commission/HighRepresentative of the Union for Foreign Affairsand Security Policy 2019: 8).Assistance for the development of the privatesector in Central Asia, including economicmeasures to support (the competitiveness of)Small and Medium-sized Enterprises (SMEs), is apriority of the Investment Facility for Central Asia(IFCA) and Central Asia Invest (CAI), two regionalinvestment programmes that need to behighlighted (Gussarova/Andžāns 2019b: 5). Underits fifth call, published with a total budget of 10.9million Euro in 2019, CAI is funding seven projects(European Commission 2019a):• “BOOST – Businesses and Organisations in

Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan operate sustain-ably”: The project was officially launched inearly February 2020 and its overall aim is thecreation of jobs in the Fergana Valley ofUzbekistan and the southern regions ofKyrgyzstan (BOOST 2020);

• “Expansion of Kyrgyz, Tajik and Uzbek localsmallholder organic agriculture and forest-based food products to EU Markets”: The pro-ject aims to strengthen the “competitivenessof micro, small and medium enterprises(MSMEs) in the agri-food sector of Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan and Uzbekistan through increasingthe efficiency and sustainability of produc-tion and processing of food products fromsmallholder farming and forest managementoperations” and thereby targets small-scalefarmers and forest owners, including womenand the youth (EkoMaktab 2020);

• “Regional Integration and Capacity Buildingto Boost Agribusiness MSMEs Competitive-ness and Trade Promotion in Central Asia(CANDY V)”: The project’s overall goal is tofoster Kazakhstan’s, Kyrgyzstan’s, Tajikistan’sand Uzbekistan’s integration into the globalmarket by supporting the growth and com-petitiveness of agribusiness MSMEs in thesecountries (Hilfswerk 2020);

• “Capacity building of industry associationsserving engineering companies in Kazakhstanand Uzbekistan”: By strengthening the role ofindustry associations and attracting MSMEs,the project aims at improving the skills of en-gineers in Uzbekistan and Kazakhstanthrough e.g. the exchange of European exper-ience in the management of associations(Cleantech Latvia 2020);

• “D-TEX – Digitalization of supply chains in thetextile industry in Central Asia”: By involvingSMEs in the digitalisation of supply chains,the project not onlywants to support regional

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economic integration, but also SMEs’ growthand the expansion of production and exports(UzJobs 2020);

• “Silk Road CBT Initiative: Connecting CentralAsian Community-Based Tourism andEuropean Markets”: By supporting MSMEs inthe community-based tourism sector andpromoting Central Asia as a “regionallybranded tourism destination”, the projectplans to promote investments and the devel-opment of the private sector (Acted 2020);

• “PROMHOUSE – Promoting professionalhousing management in Kazakhstan andUzbekistan”: The project’s overall aim is toempower and strengthen private companiesin the sector of housingmanagement in Kaza-khstan and Uzbekistan. In order to do so,PROMHOUSE will provide special training to“housing managers” so that they can com-pete on the market (PROMHOUSE 2020).

Under its previous calls I to III, CAI has been fund-ing 28 projects with a total budget of 14 millionEuro. Next to the desired result of improving thebusiness climate for SMEs, an additional effect ofCAI was the promotion of female entrepreneur-ship and gender equality (European Commission2015).Under the IFCA 2017-2018, four projects with atotal budget of 34.1 million Euro have been fun-ded (three national projects and one project witha regional scope). Two of the national projectswere related to the environmental sector, the re-maining national project in Turkmenistan as wellas the regional project to the private sector whichwere considered to be “an engine of economicgrowth and job creation” (European Commission2019b: 8). The latter two projects are:• “Advice for Small Businesses in Turk-

menistan”: Through business advice andtraining, the project increases the competit-iveness of SMEs in Turkmenistan by improv-ing the qualifications of employees and busi-ness management (European Commission2019b: 10);

• “The SME Finance Facility for Central Asia –Phase 2”: As the access to long-term financethrough bank loans or other non-banksources is one of the biggest challenges forSMEs in the region, the facility provides long-term financing to Central Asian SMEs to investin their growth and thus competitiveness.Companies of up to 500 employees are eli-gible for a loanwhichwill have to be repaid bythe end of 2024. At the same time, financialliteracy levels in SMEs in the region are low, sothat phase 2 of the project also providesknowledge and business advice through local

consultants and international industryavisers (European Commission 2019b: 12).

Like CAI, the IFCA stresses its projects’ focus ongender equality and the creation of economic op-portunities for the young population (EuropeanCommission 2019b: 41).

The German development cooperation mainlyfollows the “priorities of the partner country”when it comes to the support of a sustainableeconomic growth in Central Asia (DeutscherBundestag 2018: 14). The projects are mainlycommissioned by the BMZ and implemented bythe GIZ. Most of the projects are addressingKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, where the GDP and theGNI per capita are the lowest among the fivecountries (Böttger/Braun/Plottka 2019: 300).Among these projects are:• “Rural development in Southern Kyrgyzstan;

Integrated Rural Development Programme”:Running from 2018 to 2022, the project aimsat increasing the opportunities to earn an in-come in the poor and rural area of Dschalal-Abad where currently many young peoplework abroad. Such opportunities are seenparticularly for the agricultural and the tour-ism sector. Therefore, better cooperation (e.g.in producer groups, networks) within agricul-tural value chains and in tourism is envisaged.The improved availability of services in ruralareas (advisory services, transport and logist-ics, quality control, purchase of agriculturalinputs, market information and informationfor tourists) is expected to have a positive im-pact on the quality and quantity of agricul-tural and tourist products (GIZ n.d.(c));

• “Promoting Sustainable economic develop-ment”: The project has been running from2014 to 2019 in Kyrgyzstan. Considering ele-ments of green economy, it promoted sus-tainable economic development and valuechains in the areas of agro-ecotourism, cattlebreeding, fruit and berries, walnuts, andsugar beets. It also included technical andcommercial training for staff at the chambersof commerce and professional associations,for stakeholders involved in production, lo-gistics and trade, as well as for banks on thedevelopment of financial services tailored tothe needs of SMEs and agricultural producers.Achieved results so far are the training of 60farming households on how to welcome in-ternational guests and offer resource-effi-cient services, the award of a Fairtrade certi-fication to a Kyrgyz walnut supplier, the in-crease of the average yields of sugar beetgrowers from 32 to 58 tonnes per hectare, thecontracting with a sugar factory that nowmakes sugar beet cultivation a secure source

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of income, the training of 400 farmers in an-imal health and hygiene standards, the intro-duction of internationally recognised stand-ards in 30 farms so that the beef can be expor-ted (GIZ n.d.(d));

• “Promotion of Employment and VocationalQualification”: Running from 2017 to 2020,the project aims at the successful integrationof young men and women, especially womenfrom rural areas, into the Kyrgyz labour mar-ket after they finished their vocational educa-tion. To this end, it implements a cooperationmodel for career guidance and counselling aswell as new short-term vocational educationcourses of high demand. So far, six employ-ment-oriented qualification measures wereestablished at vocational schools, 1,881peoplewere trained in qualificationmeasuresand there is a 65 percent employment ratefrom the participants of those qualificationmeasures. Furthermore, 16 schools de-veloped a career guidance programme forninth grade students in which 650 studentsare participating (GIZ n.d.(a));

• “Sustainable economic development; Pro-spects for Youth”: To strengthen the eco-nomic participation of youngpeople, this pro-ject operates in 20 partner municipalities innorthern Kyrgyzstan. It promotes the ex-change in the area of youth between NGOs,the private sector as well as stakeholders onthe national and the local levels. In 2018, theNational Youth Council as a platform for co-operation between ministries and agencieson youth topics was established. On the locallevel, the municipalities are encouraged toengage in dialogue with the young peopleand consider their views when it comes to theallocation of funds for youth related services.The project also emphasises capacity build-ing of local, regional and national actors. Sofar, more than 100 youth specialists andmorethan 280 young leaders participated in train-ings and learned how to actively shape theircommunities by implementing projects withand for the local youth. The project also sup-ports local youth NGOs in implementing pro-jects that focus on job relevant skills develop-ment for the youth, career guidance, youthservices and employment opportunities foryoung people and those that focus on areasas e.g. IT and tourism that have a potential forgrowth throughout the country (GIZ n.d.(e));

• “Supporting the local economy in selectedhigh-mountain regions”: This project runningfrom 2016 to 2020 aims at boosting the com-petitiveness of MSMEs, including smallholderfarmers, in the Gorno-Badakhshan region ofTajikistan, a high-alpine region where thepoverty rate is at 51 percent and thus above

the national average and where only 7 per-cent of the land can be used for agriculture. Itsupports business stakeholders in imple-menting practice-oriented consulting ser-vices for MSMEs. In cooperation with the re-gional administration, this has already led toadvisory service formats for entrepreneursand potential business start-ups having beeninstitutionalised. The project also supportsthe microfinance organisation “Madina vaHamkoron” which has been able to providefinancing options for 100 SMEs. As the mostimmediate result, sixty promoted companieshave been able to create new jobs (GIZn.d.(f));

• “Towards Rural Inclusive Growth and Eco-nomic Resilience (TRIGGER II)”: TRIGGER II(2019-2021) mainly focuses on the agricul-tural sector in Tajikistan and wants tostrengthen the economic resilience of MSMEsincluding smallholder farmers and young en-trepreneurs, especially women. Therefore, itenhances the dialogue between private sec-tor actors and political institutions (e.g. at theannual Dushanbe Economic Meeting, one ofthe successes of the project). Furthermore,TRIGGER supports the development of inclus-ive value chains and promotes start-ups andentrepreneurship. By improving the availabil-ity of support services, potential founders areencouraged to create a start-up and the eco-nomic capability of existing companies is in-creased (GIZ 2019).

The BMZ together with the EU commissioned theproject “Sustainable economic development inselected regions of Uzbekistan”. Between 2013and 2020, the project supports the Uzbek govern-ment in implementing measures to enhance thedevelopment and economic growth of SMEs inthe disadvantaged regions Karakalpakstan,Khorezm, Surkhandarya, Jizzakh, Syrdarya andKashkadarya as well as in the three regions in theFergana Valley, Namangan, Andijan and Fergana,to improve income and employment opportunit-ies for their population. That involves the devel-opment of an environmentally sound and mar-ket-based economy which involves all citizensand the introduction of new technologies thatare environmentally friendly as well as the intro-duction of EU agricultural standards (GIZ n.d.(g)).Among the selected other member states, Fin-land is devoted to a number of economic policyinitiatives that support the private sector inKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, the Central Asian re-gion’s two poorest countries, and thus also thecreation of future perspective for the young pop-ulation in these countries. Most of these initiat-ives are implemented in the form of an interinsti-

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tutional cooperation between UN or other inter-national organisations and Finnish governmentauthorities. Examples are:• the fourth phase of the UNDP project “Aid for

Trade in Central Asia”, where the Finnish gov-ernment contributes 4.8 million Eurobetween 2018 and 2021 for Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan;

• the second phase of the International LabourOrganization’s project “From the Crisis to-wards Decent and Safe Jobs”, where Finlandcontributed 4 million Euro for both countriesbetween 2014 and 2019.

Both initiatives aim at a continued governmentsupport for reforms to promote the growth of theprivate sector, an increased income creationthrough the development of private sector finan-cing opportunities and strengthened SMEs aswell as more decent working conditions. Fin-land’s development cooperation in Kyrgyzstanand Tajikistan was evaluated in 2016 and as-sessed as highly relevant. The programmes seemto be mainly achieving the desired outputswithout major delays. (Finnish Ministry for For-eign Affairs 2018).RecommendationsTo allow economic policy initiatives to ad-equately address the identified challenge of cre-ating perspectives for the Central Asian younggeneration on the labourmarkets, they should in-creasingly focus on the support of SMEs andstart-up pioneers. When it comes to explainingthe EU trade and business regulations, the shar-ing of experiences with SMEs from the EaP coun-tries could be an advantage (Gussarova/Andžāns2019c). The cooperation of SMEs from differentcountries of the region should be increasingly ad-dressed in EU initiatives (Gussarova/Andžāns2019b). Also, the introduction of one-stop-sup-port points of the EU on any issues of SMEs or in-vestment in each Central Asian country should beconsidered as they could increase the outreachtowards a wider spectrum of businesses (Gus-sarova/Andžāns 2019c). Another aspect that EUeconomic policy initiatives should give more at-tention to is the creation of incentives for open-ing up own small businesses. Creating favourabletax policies could be such an example that wouldallow e.g. migrant workers to invest their moneyin their own businesses. This way, they would nolonger be dependent on going abroad to workand Central Asia could make use of the entre-preneurial potential of its population (Ryazant-sev 2016).A newly established Youth Fund would be ahighly visible and efficient instrument to specific-ally empower Central Asia’s young generation.Financial support for this fund should be

provided by the private sector and financial insti-tutions. The fund should use the potential ofyouth innovation to support the creation of newjobs and by incentivising to open small busi-nesses. This will be crucial to increase the com-petitiveness and diversification of the states’ eco-nomies. The fund should support SMEs as well asthe start-up sector as they provide young peoplewith jobs and create economic opportunities forgrowth. Recipients of funding should be offeredadditional support in terms of capacity buildingfor starting new businesses. This should includenetwork platforms to connect with SMEs andyoung entrepreneurs from the Eastern Partner-ship countries to exchange experiences. CentralAsians can benefit from their experiences, bestpractices and a closer cooperation. Combiningclose ties with Central Asian countries and trans-formation experiences as a post-Soviet state withhigh standards of digitalisation and experiencesin establishing an innovative start-up scene,Latvia would be ideal to take the lead for this ini-tiative. Such a network platform resembles the“Polish Challenge Fund”, which is a newly estab-lished instrument of Polish development cooper-ation for transferring Polish expertise to neigh-bouring countries. Currently, the fund is limitedto projects in Belarus and Ukraine (Governmentof Poland 2020). Furthermore, Poland as one ofthe initiators of the Eastern dimension of theEuropean Neighbourhood Policy has close tiesand continued interest in cooperating with coun-tries in the Eastern neighbourhood of the EU.Before the COVID-19 pandemic, Central Asia hasbeen gradually developing its potential in thetourism sector which made it one of the mostpromising sectors for economic growth and forcreating new jobs. However, there are still a num-ber of obstacles to a flourishing tourism industry(even before the pandemic) like the poorly de-veloped tourism infrastructure (hotels and trans-port) or the unavailability of information on tour-ist routes and attractions in English. These re-quire a significant amount of investment whichwill only bemade if there are trends of an increas-ing number of tourists and if the Central Asiancountries show their willingness to work on long-term development strategies together. Here, onecould think of creating a joint tourist programme(in English) through each of the five countries(Gussarova/Andžāns 2019a) or of the introduc-tion of a common tourist visa for all countries tofacilitate travel in the region. But of course, thestill ongoing travel restrictions under the COVID-19 pandemic are an obstacle to the further devel-opment of the tourism sector. Any initiative inthis area can only show its effect once these re-strictions have been lifted and travelling for thepurpose of tourism is possible again.

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Where it is not possible to fully put an end to thedependency on remittances through e.g. the pro-posed measures above, economic youth policyinitiatives should try to improve the protection ofyoung workers abroad, notably those working inKazakhstan.

d. Social Policy

Social inequality as an obstacle to the creation ofhigher prospects for young Central Asians can bereduced through adequate social policy initiat-ives. In particular, they can help addressing theunequal distribution of incomewithin the societyand reduce poverty. The progress in poverty re-duction in the Central Asian countries during thepast twenty years again slowed down since theglobal economic crisis and remains highly de-pendent on remittances and thus prone to ex-ternal shocks so that there is still a longway to go,especially in the two poorest countries Kyrgyz-stan and Tajikistan. As poverty can be reducedthrough the creation of decent jobs, the eco-nomic policy initiatives as presented before alsoplay a special role in this regard. Relevant policyinitiatives can further help to address the existinggender inequality (initiatives presented in thecross-cutting chapter on gender equality policy)and the divide between the urban and rural pop-ulation. The urban-rural divide illustrates the un-equal provision of the population with basic sup-plies as well as the unequal access to public ser-vices, especially – and not only since the begin-ning of the COVID-19 pandemic – health carewhich can be addressed through adequate socialpolicy measures.InstrumentsNext to educational projects, the main engage-ment of the EU in Central Asia right after the dis-solution of the Soviet Union was focussed on so-cial-oriented projects, “helping to solve a numberof social problems” (Paramonov 2018: 211). Rel-evant project activities were thus first implemen-ted under the TACIS programme (Technical Aid tothe Commonwealth of Independent States) andfrom 2007 on under the Development Coopera-tion Instrument (DCI). The specific effort that theEU puts in social policy initiatives depends to alarge degree on the situation in the differentcountries of the region so that Kyrgyzstan andTajikistan, where the socio-economic situation isthe worst among the five countries, are the maintarget of EU social protection initiatives focussingon health care, humanitarian aid or the improve-ment of the rural population’s way of life. InKyrgyzstan, social projects are mainly implemen-ted by local non-governmental organisations

(NGOs) which receive funding from the EU (Para-monov 2018). The EU stresses the role of civil so-ciety organisations (CSOs) to enhance social de-velopment. Through testing and improving theresponsiveness of social policies to the popula-tion’s needs, through contributing to the en-hancement of service quality or through provid-ing social services where public authorities lackthe capacities or recourses, CSOs could play arole in improving the population’s access to(quality) social services (European External Ac-tion Service 2014). After the civil war in Tajikistanfrom 1992 to 1997, the EU continued to invest thelargest share of its assistance (66 percent of thetotal assistance for the period between 2007 and2011) in social protection, especially health andfood security. In the country, the EU is not onlyfunding social projects, but also financially sup-porting the state budget e.g. through subsidies tothe pension fund. As part of the DCI, the EU initi-ated in Tajikistan in 2007 a sector support pro-gramme under which it subsidised the Tajikbudget with 5 million Euro (of a total amount of14million Euro) to support social spending (Para-monov 2018). Bilateral development assistancefrom 2014 to 2020 foresees 57million Euro for thehealth sector, among others for the improvementof the “availability, affordability and quality” ofhealth services (European External Action Servicen.d.: 1).EU social policy initiatives in Central Asia reachtheir limit when the underlying European valuesare misunderstood or rejected in the region(Paramonov 2018). This might be the case for ini-tiatives aiming at gender equality and thereforeat a new role of women in the society that is sup-posed to replace their role as it has been formanydecades. In addition, there is basically no publicattention or awareness of the EU’s support of so-cial policy initiatives in the region as its financialsupport often goes to NGOs that then get thecredit for the implementation of a project (Para-monv 2018).Already in 2005, the BMZ named the reduction ofpoverty as overarching aim of the German policytowards Central Asia. Corresponding measuresconcentrated inter alia on the provision of basicsocial services to the population (Klinnert 2015).Today, the German government is supporting thedevelopment of the local health care systemswhich should especially profit vulnerable groupssuch as women and girls in rural areas, LGBTIQpeople, peoplewith disabilities, sexworkers, HIV-positive persons, drug users, and migrant work-ers. In Kyrgyzstan, where the health care systemneeds substantial reform, where the hospital in-frastructure needs modernisation and where theaccess to health services is very limited for theabove mentioned groups as well as for people

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with no official registration, Germany is support-ing bilateral projects which focus on the develop-ment of a national emergency system as well as –together with The World Bank – the third healthcare reform programme of the Kyrgyz govern-ment. In Tajikistan, the German government issupporting health care reform programmes, theimprovement of the health care quality in theareas of mother-child health, sexual and repro-ductive health, aswell as food security formotherand child in the rural areas. It further assists theTajik government in developing demand-ori-ented health services as well as the rapproche-ment to international standards (Bundestag2018).¹⁷Among the other selected EUmember states, Fin-land highlights the support for “economic, socialand environmental sustainability” in its strategyfor development cooperation with Kyrgyzstanand Tajikistan (Finnish Ministry for Foreign Affairs2018: 3). Under Finland’s Wider Europe Initiative,the International Labour Organization’s project“From the Crisis towards Decent and Safe Jobs”,where the country contributed 4 million Euro forKyrgyzstan and Tajikistan between 2014 and2019, aims at the improvement of social andhealth services, the creation of social protectionfloors and thus a better social protection (Inter-national Labour Organization n.d.). Until itphased out development assistance in CentralAsia in 2010, Sweden provided a total support ofabout 280 Mio. SEK to the health/social protec-tion sector in the region between 1998 and 2010.This means that contributions to health and so-cial protection made up about one third of all itscontributions in Central Asia during that time-frame. 89 percent of the contributions to thehealth/social protection sector were dedicated tohealth activities, the largest single contributionfor the health sector reform in Kyrgyzstan. The re-maining 11 percent were for social protectionactivities (Sida 2010). Despite its withdrawal fromdevelopment assistance to the region, Swedencan still continue its values-based cooperationandwork e.g. through the OSCE (Joensson 2013).RecommendationsIn order to effectively target the above-men-tioned challenges and create perspectives espe-cially for young Central Asian women who live intraditional societal structures, adequate initiat-ives should include social policies that help themto balance work and family. If the obstacles tocombine both remain too high, women – despitetheir relatively high level of education – cannotparticipate in the labour market and the regionloses their potential for economic growth (UNFPA2014). Health services, also for sexual and repro-ductive health, must be made accessible particu-

larly for young people. Even if those services areavailable, they might not be accessible for theyouth as e.g. opening hours are limited to thetime when they are supposed to be in school oryoung people do not have the courage to seekservices, especially for sexual and reproductivehealth, at all if service providers have a negativeview about young people’s sexuality. In addition,services should be affordable for young peoplewho might still financially depend on their par-ents (UNFPA 2014). To address the inequalitybetweenmen and women not just when it comesto income, but also e.g. concerning the access toeducation, gender mainstreaming needs to beconsidered for all policy instruments in all policyfields. Overall, the current COVID-19 pandemichas aggravated the existing structural problemsso that ongoing initiatives might need adjust-ment.

e. Gender PolicyDespite some progress related to gender equalityin Central Asia since the Soviet time, women’srights remain a problematic issue due to the tra-ditionalism and conservatism that has increasedin Central Asian societies since they gained inde-pendence in the 1990s (Beyer/Finke 2019: 318),and the lack of political participation, which con-cerns not only young women, but youth as awhole (UNICEF 2016: 32). However, there arestrong disparities in the status of womenbetween the five Central Asian countries. Accord-ing to World Bank data, general women’s rightsare provided in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan,Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan: e.g., there are no bar-riers for a woman to register a bank account or afirm, or to sign a contract (World Bank 2020e).¹⁸While Kazakh and Kyrgyz women strive to closethe gender payment gap and achieve higher pos-itions in political institutions and business, Tajik,Uzbek, and Turkmen women combat harmfulpractices such as bride kidnapping and gender-related violence.However, the state of women’s rights in the fiveCentral Asian states diverge not only by country,but also between rural and urban spaces anddifferent ethnic groups (Sabzalieva 2016). For ex-ample, there are strong disparities between thestatus of urban and rural women in Kyrgyzstan:despite several regulations guaranteeing genderequality, practices such as bride abduction and

¹⁷ For EU project-based initiatives, reference is made to thechapters on economic and on gender equality policy.¹⁸ No gender related data on Turkmenistan are available.

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polygamy have become more frequent in ruralareas since the 1990s (Beyer/Finke 2019: 315).Therefore, gender inequality is only one socialimpediment for Central Asian women and girlsand vulnerability factors can overlap.

Promoting gender equality policy in Central Asiafaces an additional drawback. A common lack ofawareness for girls’ andwomen’s rights in CentralAsia results in a shortage ofmonitoring and avail-able data. Harmful practices such as child mar-riage are often only registered after the spousehas reached the age of 18 (UNFPA 2014: 11). Thewillingness of local authorities to provide somegender-related statistics and to report cases ofgender-related violence is doubtful. As a rule,Turkmenistan does not provide any gender-re-lated data on women’s access to education andpublic services. Therefore, notably regardingrural women, there is a risk that their problemsand needs are overlooked, so that evidence-based policy-making on gender issues is under-mined.

Hence, gender equality should be addressed as across-cutting policy issue including specificmeasures in the areas of education, labour mar-ket integration, socio-economic policy, and sup-port for vulnerable rural women. Therefore, themeasures required to end gender inequalityshould be a consistent part of all youth policy in-struments in all other policy areas, and theireffects should be considered by their positive ornegative impact on gender disparities.

Due to the Soviet legacy embedded in the educa-tion system, women in Central Asia have relat-ively high qualifications because they widely en-joy good access to primary and secondary educa-tion (World Bank 2020e). However, youngwomenin Central Asia are negatively impacted by thegender gap in terms of access to tertiary educa-tion. Although the share of female enrolment inhigher education is relatively high, especially inKazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, young Tajik andUzbek women continue to face a gender gap dueto traditional gender roles, according to theseyoung women are primarily perceived as goodwives and mothers, and not as well-qualifiedworkers (Sabzalieva 2016). However, investing inyoung women’s education and skills in CentralAsia bears potential because they are more likelyto stay in their local communities and can trans-mit their experience and knowledge to futuregenerations.

Hence, investments in women’s skills and educa-tion should be accomplished by increasing theiremployability and young women’s integrationinto the labour market, due to the relatively high

unemployment rate in this group, especially ineconomically weak Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan(World Bank 2020e). Female vulnerable employ-ment rates show that notably women in moreconservative Tajikistan and Uzbekistan face lim-ited access to the labour market (World Bank2020e). By contrast, these indicators in Kazakh-stan are the lowest in the region. Here, furtherfostering of female employment and addressinglabourmarket needs can help to overcome the la-bour shortage. Youngwomen in Central Asia havethe potential to contribute to economic growthand be active members of the labour market;however, they cannot unveil their potential.

Youngwomen are not a target group of labourmi-gration, because the migration rate of femaleworkers from Central Asia is very low (Rocheva/Varshaver 2017: 93). However, themost progress-ive and openKyrgyz society faces the challenge ofa feminisation of labourmigration to Russia¹⁹ be-cause Kyrgyz women obtain a good proficiencylevel in Russian and enjoy simplified conditionsfor getting working permits (Rocheva/Varshaver2017: 100). Hence, female Kyrgyzmigrants shouldbe addressed by policy measures in this area.Also, Tajik and Uzbek young women should bekept in mind due to their high unemploymentrate and, thus, growingmigration incentive. How-ever, low rates of female labour migration inCentral Asia generally make them an attractivetarget group for sustainable human developmentmeasures.

While women’s rights in Central Asia can be ad-dressed in the framework of gender mainstream-ing and cross-cutting policy areas, there is onegroup that should be addressed with specificmeasures. Due to the wide gap between urbanand rural populations, special attention shouldbe paid to rural women and girls aswell as femalemembers of ethnic and conservative Islamminorities, who are particularly worse off be-cause of harmful practices such as childmarriageand bride kidnapping (Cuaresma/Knerr 2014: 14,UNICEF 2016: 26). A lack of access to sexual andreproductive health services, including a shortage of information, hinder girls in rural areas fromobtaining a secondary school qualification, con-tinuing with tertiary education or vocationaltraining and starting their career, due to earlypregnancies and births (Cuaresma/Knerr 2014:14). In the case of vulnerable women, gender in-equality amplifies socio-economic disparities bylimiting access to commodities and public ser-vices, especially to healthcare as outlined above.

¹⁹ In 2015, 31 percent of Kyrgyz labour migrants to Russiawere women (Rocheva/Varshaver 2017: 92).

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Rural women are strongly affected by income dis-parities and the increasing risk of poverty due tothe lack of labour market integration and highpercentage of vulnerable employment as shownabove.²⁰ Thus, vulnerable women should be ad-dressed by specific policy measures, in additionto gender mainstreaming. The empowerment ofrural women can be an objective of agricultural,educational, and social policy.

InstrumentsAll European external policy frameworks followthe newEUGender Action Plan II (EuropeanCom-mission/High Representative of theUnion for For-eign Affairs and Security Policy 2015), which setsout three thematic priorities:• girls’ and women’s physical and psycholo-

gical integrity,• economic and social rights and empower-

ment, and• girls’ and women’s participation (European

Commission/High Representative of theUnion for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2015: 4).

Therefore, all European development coopera-tion instruments should widely correspond withthese strategic objectives (European Commission2018a: Annex 2: 6). Thus, striving for genderequality is a cross-cutting issue of European ex-ternal action. In this area, European normativepower must stick to a values-based policy ap-proach in development cooperation if it wants toimplement the “principled pragmatism” of theGlobal Strategy. Its limitations, especially in con-servative and traditionalist Central Asian societ-ies with significantly different norms and values(Spaiser 2018: 75-79), should be reflected by es-tablishing adapted instruments and measuresnotably at the grassroots level.The following EU-funded project can be a par-agon in this area: “Assistance to Development ofthe Potential of Culture and Leisure Centres” con-ducted by the Deutscher Volkshochschul-Verb-and International (DVV International) between2016 and 2018 in Uzbekistan shows how the EU’snormative approach on gender equality can beadapted to the Central Asian reality and used toreach local communities by investing in infra-structure for non-formal education in chosenrural areas and empowering local actors (DVV In-ternational 2018). Focusing on rural populations,notably vulnerable women and youth, DVV Inter-national addresses the rural-urban gap and highfemale unemployment, providing capacity build-ing for local actors and stakeholders on a grass-roots level by following the “train-the-trainer”model. In the second stage, culture and leisurecentres organise non-formal education courses

for rural women, giving courses on cutting, sew-ing and computer literacy fostering SMEs. Thisproject is a good example of how the EU can stickto its values-based policy and adapt it to the localreality: empowering local stakeholders, givingthem resources and providing know-how, e.g., inmethodology of adult education and social work,allows the EU to reach target groups, to which ac-cess is limited by political, geographical and cul-tural barriers.Similarly, another partly EU-funded project inUzbekistan, “SABR: Socio-economic Develop-ment Centre”, established the Capacity Develop-ment Centre for further grassroots initiatives ad-dressing social and economic challenges facedby women in the region. SABR combines two pil-lars: investments in physical infrastructure andcapacity building, and fostering public services,such as psychological, medical, and social sup-port to vulnerable women as well as micro-finan-cial instruments for SMEs (SABR n.d.). Due to along-term partnership with DVV International,SABR is the main NGO working with vulnerablewomen and providing one-stop-services forthese groups in Uzbekistan. This form of publicservice centre particularly suits the needs of ruralwomen due to the general lack of public servicesand its easily accessible unbureaucratic format.In rural areas, there are many barriers for womento go to local authorities due to shame and a lackof privacy. Establishing non-formal multitaskingcentres in Central Asian rural areas is an import-ant step to meet rural women’s needs.Similarly to the EU’s approach to gender inequal-ity, German development cooperation in CentralAsia supports female empowerment in theframework of established priorities such as voca-tional education, employment and sustainablesocio-economic development. Two major organ-isations, the Institute for International Coopera-tion of the DVV International and the GIZ, providea gender mainstreaming approach in their pro-jects. A major objective of German developmentcooperation is integration into the labour marketand providing decent work for the young popula-tion and women. Thus, there are many projectson vocational education and employability,which specify vulnerable women, particularly inrural areas, as a target group. “Promotion of Em-ployment and Vocational Qualification” is a pro-ject of the GIZ. It specifies youth and rural womenas target groups and aims to support their “pro-fessional orientation and relevant qualification

²⁰ According to World Bank data female vulnerableemployment accounts for 32.8 percent of femaleemployment in all five Central Asian states (Owncalculations based on data from The World Bank (2020)).

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for their successful integration into the Kyrgyz la-bour market” (GIZ 2020 n.d.(a)). This project is anexample of the gender mainstreaming approachfound in German development policy on CentralAsia. It achieves both concrete results, providingbetter employability chances for rural women,and overarching objectives, ensuring income forvulnerable groups, and thus contributes to redu-cing poverty and overcoming disparities betweenurban and rural areas, which is a paragon for fur-ther policy measures.Public health is another major area of Germandevelopment cooperation, which is also relatedto gender issues. Access to sexual and reproduct-ive health services is often restricted for youngwomen in rural areas. Hence, German projectssuch as “Promotion of Perinatal Health in Kyrgyz-stan” (GIZ n.d.(i)), which aims at capacity buildingfor the new National Perinatal Centre in Bishkek,can be broadened to provide high-quality peri-natal services in local communities. Strengthen-ing vocational and further education for localstaff will conflate the following long-term goals:providing employment and equal access tohealthcare and building capacities outside ofcapitals.There are few engagements in terms of genderequality from other EU member states. As shownin chapter III, apart from Germany, only Finlandcurrently promotes a values-based policy to-wards Central Asia and emphasises rural womenas a target group (Lipiäinen 2013: 3). Against thebackdrop of the European Gender Action Plan II,Finnish development cooperation in Central Asiaprimarily prioritises Kyrgyz and Tajik women inthe framework of rule of law, good governance,and civil society empowerment (Finnish Ministryfor Foreign Affairs 2018: 20-21).RecommendationsGender-related issues in Central Asia should beaddressed by paying attention to local traditionsand cultures, so that a conflict between differentvalues and norms can be avoided. Addressingwomen’s rights in Central Asia, the EU can furtherdevelop its “principled pragmatism” approach.Indeed, both EU-funded projects mentioned inthis chapter are a benchmark for balancing val-ues-based policy and adapting it to local condi-tions and needs. Their best practices are basedon “train-the-trainer” and one-stop-servicesmodels, which are essential to establish low-threshold access to sufficient education, labourand social services for vulnerable women in con-servative communities of Uzbek rural areas. Thiscan be a paragon for further EU-funded long-termprojects for rural women in Tajikistan and Kyrgyz-stan.

German development cooperation supports thegender mainstreaming approach in its CentralAsian projects. Measures aimed at women’s eco-nomic empowerment are a constant part of mostGIZ projects; women are mostly present as a tar-get group or women’s rights are addressed as ageneral framework alongside climate change andenvironmental risks. Providing better opportunit-ies for young women in the established policyareas of education and employment, and foster-ing female entrepreneurship and participation,will exert long-lasting influence on Central Asiansocieties as women can transmit their skills, ex-perience, and knowledge to future generations.This is an effective way to address general socio-economic challenges also faced by women in theregion, such as poverty, economic underdevelop-ment, and the urban-rural gap. Addressing edu-cational and socio-economic needs at a grass-roots level opens awindow of opportunity for thetransformation process. However, we recom-mend broadening the gender agenda in Germandevelopment cooperation, notably in projectsdealing with rural areas where specific measuresare needed to address overlapping challengesfaced by vulnerable women. Hence, best prac-tices established in lighthouse projects in capitalsas “Promotion of Perinatal Health in Kyrgyzstan”should include activities for the rural populationto close the urban-rural gap.An additional challenge not yet addressed byEuropean and German policy measures is femalelabourmigration. Due to a lack of reliable data onfemale labour migration (Rocheva/Varshaver2017) it is difficult to predict the prevalence ofthis phenomenon over the next decades. How-ever, the situation with female migrants shouldbe observed in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbek-istan due to high female unemployment rates.Here, local projects on human trafficking preven-tion and labour rights are helpful in raisingawareness of the risks of illegal labour migration.With respect to the brain-drain in Central Asia, in-vesting in women can enhance sustainable hu-man development in the region not only due totheir pivotal role in child-rearing, but also theirlowmigration rate.Finally, the current wave of gender-based viol-ence caused by the COVID-19 pandemic can beused as an opportunity to elevate gender debateand rethink women’s role in Central Asian societ-ies. The experience of the EU and its memberstates, especially Germany and Finland, will playa pivotal role in establishing an inter-societal dia-logue.

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f. Democracy Promotion

Initially, the EU’s democracy promotion ap-proach to Central Asia was based on FrancisFukuyama’s “The End of History” (Fukuyama1992) argument, assuming that transition tomar-ket economies in the post-Soviet space will alsoresult in transition to liberal democracies (Sasse2008). The five newly independent states in Cent-ral Asia, however, persistently remain to differingdegrees authoritarian, as shown before inchapter II. In the EU’s enlargement policy, condi-tionality proved to be the most successful instru-ment to promote and support democratic trans-formation. It was, therefore, also applied to rela-tions with third countries, where it proved to beless effective (Sasse 2008). For Central Asia thisapproach suffers from three limitations: First, theEU cannot offer membership prospects as itsbiggest incentive. Second, the EU is competingwith Russia and China for influence in the region.While Russia offers a best practice example of au-thoritarianism and a blueprint to governmentswithout democratic participation, China offersunconditioned development assistance andprovides legitimacy to (semi-)authoritarianism(Sharshenova/Crawford 2017). Third, the ongoingdevelopments of the Central Asian political sys-tems – as described in chapter II – are merelydriven by domestic factors than external influ-ence. Most notable, Central Asian rulers considerdemocracy as a threat to their power. Therefore,the EU faces a trade-off between using condition-ality to promote democracy and maintaining in-fluence in the region. This will become the litmustest for making “principled pragmatism”(European Union 2016: 8) work.Considering these circumstances for EU demo-cracy promotion in Central Asia, a three-level ap-proach seems to be suitable, which is in line withthe priorities listed in the new EU-Central AsiaStrategy (European Commission/High Represent-ative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and SecurityPolicy 2019): On the first level, the EU shouldmaintain bilateral political dialogues to promotethe “respect for human rights in compliance withinternational standards” and “democracy, therule of law and good governance” as set out in thenew EU Central Asia Strategy (European Commis-sion/High Representative of theUnion for ForeignAffairs and Security Policy 2019: 3-4) and the new“Neighbourhood, Development and Interna-tional Cooperation Instrument” (European Com-mission 2018b: 27). It is unlikely that these dia-logues will have direct effects in terms of trans-formation. However, they signal the importanceof these objectives within EU-Central Asia rela-tions. They also support the implementation of

projects on the other two levels by guaranteeingpolitical circumstances and establishing a forumto address problems as democracy promotion inthe region remains a highly sensitive topic.On the second level, the EU should continue todirectly support democratisation in areas whereit is in the interest of the Central Asian rulingelites, such as rule of law seen as a preconditionto attract foreign direct investments. In order tomeet the specific situation in each country, pro-jects should be established on a bilateral basiswhile regional exchange of best practices cancomplement the projects, as proposed in the newstrategy (European Commission/High Represent-ative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and SecurityPolicy 2019: 4). To increase the effectiveness ofprojects, efforts should focus on countries wherecircumstances are most promising. Currentlythese are Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbek-istan.On the third level, and this one should be the fo-cus for the youth policy dimension of EU-CentralAsia relations, the EU should further strengthenthe civil society in Central Asia to build “the rootsof democracy” (European Commission 2012) andactivate the youth as change makers. As pro-posed in the newEU-Central Asia Strategy specialemphasis should be put on strengthening civilsociety to empower citizens to participate in pub-lic decision-making as well as engaging in the im-plementation of EU-Central Asia relations(European Commission/High Representative ofthe Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy2019: 4, 15). Support for civil society organisa-tions is also one of the objectives of the proposednew “Neighbourhood, Development and Interna-tional Cooperation Instrument” (European Com-mission 2018b: 27), which also calls for consulta-tion of civil society prior to programming(European Commission 2018b: 27, 33). Since2014, the EU has started developing strategies forengagement with Central Asian civil societies.This endeavour needs to be continued followingthe expiration of the current roadmaps by theend of 2020. Special emphasis should be put onthe local level. Without touching on highly sensit-ive democratisation, participation of NGOs on thelocal level offers citizens the opportunity to dir-ectly influence their living conditions. Empower-ing civil society on the local level both is a meansto promote democracy in the long-term and to in-crease the effectiveness of EU support for CentralAsia, as local authorities and NGOs can be em-powered to become implementing partners.Considering the different situations, the fiveCentral Asian countries should be addressed indi-vidually. However, a regional dimension shouldnot be limited to the exchange of best practices,

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but also foster people-to-people contacts acrossborders in the region.The third level is the focus of this research paper,as it gives young citizens power to directly im-prove their own lives. By empowering them to be-come changemakers they can improve their ownperspectives in their hometown in the short- tomid-term perspective, while a vital civil societyand local participation are the fertile ground tobuild democracies in the long-term perspective.InstrumentsThe “EU-Central Asia Forum” is themajor new in-strument to strengthen the civil society dimen-sion of EU-Central Asia relations. It aims at foster-ing mutual understanding, increasing the EU’svisibility and allowing for sharing best practices(Delegation of the European Union to Tajikistan2019). While the forum is a suitable instrument toraise awareness for the new emphasis on the civilsociety dimension in EU-Central Asia relations, italso suffers from the considerable heterogeneityof civil society in Central Asia. Experiences fromthe “Eastern Partnership Civil Society Forum”show that heterogeneity is a major obstacle toeffectiveness. While the “EU-Central Asia Forum”is less institutionalised than the one for the East-ern Partnership, differences between participat-ing organisations are larger than in EasternEurope (Tsertsvadze 2017).Therefore, the Central Asia Civil Society Forumshould be turned into a continuous process by es-tablishing a working group on youth policy. Onthe Central Asian side, participation should notbe limited to highly professional non-govern-mental organisations working on youth, but re-flect the complete independent civil society,where it exists. This is necessary to reaching outto the wider civil society. In order to be able toalso address legal questions relevant to youth inCentral Asia and to facilitate cooperation withCentral Asian governments on youth issues,NGOs close to them should also be representedin the working group. Including independent andstate-sponsored civil society will, however, in-crease efforts required to moderate the workinggroup activities. To ensure EU-wide participationof European civil society, it seems to be usefulthat the responsibility for organising the workinggroup rests with the EU institutions.Considering the heterogenous membership ofthe working group, a need-assessment is re-quired to ensure effectiveness and output orient-ation of the working group. Having establishedthe group, participants should be asked whatthey expect from their participation and whatthey seek to achieve. Based on the results of the

assessment the working group can decide on itsworking mode and objectives.While heterogeneity of Central Asian civil societyactors is a challenge, hardly any independentNGOs exist in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, andthose in the other three countries are under in-creasing pressure (Tsertsvadze 2017), the EU’spolicy is biased towards a certain type of neo-lib-eral NGOs. In this context, a neo-liberal civil soci-ety organisation is officially registered, independ-ent from governments, often dealing with humanrights issues and they often receive funding fromabroad (Babajanian et al. 2005). In other words,they are highly professional and resemble West-ern NGOs. In their analysis of EU support forNGOs in Central Asia, Axyonova and Bossuyt(2016) found that NGOs of the neo-liberal type re-ceive the major share of EU funding. They alsofound a positive trend that over the years, the EUapplies more often a community-driven develop-ment approach. However, this trend needs to beintensified under the new civil society dimensionof EU-Central Asia relations. Only this will allowfor reaching out into the countryside and on thelocal level.Major obstacles are of bureaucratic nature assmaller NGOs are less professional, have feweraccess to EU funding and struggle to meet formalcriteria for managing EU funding. To addressthese challenges and to reduce the existing fund-ing bias, EU information activities about fundingschemes should reach out to the Central Asianperiphery and new capacity building instrumentsaddressing traditional and local Central Asiancivil society are required. Furthermore, the ad-ministrative burden associated with the applica-tion, implementation and accounting proceduresfor EU supported projects should be reduced andspecial support instruments for small initiativesand organisations established. As minimumstandards for administrative procedures have tobe respected, neo-liberal NGOs could function asintermediaries between the EU and traditionaland local NGOs. This is of crucial importance toincrease the participation of youth organisations,which are often less institutionalised. Further-more, the EU’s hesitant approach to cooperationwith state-led civil society should be recon-sidered in order to establish the civil society di-mension also in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan.This is in line with the EU’s own evaluation of civilsociety involvement in the Agenda 2030 activit-ies, which recommend to address “invitedspaces”, which are provided by governments andindependent spaces alike (Corella et al. 2020: 31).The approach of the project “Prospects forYouth” (GIZ n.d.(h)) funded by the “German Fed-eral Ministry for Economic Cooperation and De-

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velopment” (BMZ) and implemented by the GIZin Kyrgyzstan can serve as a good example. As afollow-up to a project running until 2019, it aimsat building capacities of local, regional and na-tional stakeholders in youth policy to establish apolicy framework for the policy area. It alsoprovides training and project funding for youthNGOs active in developing of skills needed for la-bour market integration.RecommendationsIn order to raise awareness for the EU’s intensi-fied engagement with civil society in Central Asia,the activities should be framed as an own coher-ent strand of EU-Central Asia relations and com-municated as the “civil society dimension” of EU-central Asia relations, including a youth subdi-mension (European Union 2018; European Union2014a; European Union 2014b). A bilingual web-site in English and Russian would increase trans-parency and should provide an overview of EUand member state activities.²¹ As the EuropeanExternal Action Service lacks resources to per-manently update its own websites dedicated toCentral Asia, the new website should be a com-mon endeavour of the EEAS, Commission and allmember state governments. This would also be afirst attempt to visualise the real dimension of EUengagement in Central Asia.The “Central Asia Civil Society Forum” should beturned into a sustainable long-term process,which gives European actors direct access toCentral Asian civil society. To this end, participa-tion has to reach out beyond the group of neo-lib-eral NGOs and also include traditional and localorganisations. A specific dimension for youth or-ganisations should be established and sufficientlevels of their representation should be ensured.In a demand-driven approach, the forum shoulddefine its objectives more concretely with a focuson direct impact and sustainability. As a first step,a need-assessment among the participating or-ganisations should be conducted.

In order to reach out into the periphery and con-tinue the trend of increasing cooperation withlocal civil society, a funding scheme for smallscale youth projects eligible to less professionalNGOs should be established. This needs to ac-count for lower levels of professionalisation andfind a better balance between the administrativeburden for managing the project and ensuringgood and targeted implementation. In turn, itshould be coupled with the requirement to parti-cipate in capacity building activities.

V. Recommendations

The reviewof the six policy areasmost relevant toyouth policy in Central Asia hasmost importantlyrevealed that a new youth policy dimension ofEU-Central Asia relations can build on numerousinitiatives and activities. However, these are notyet visible as a coherent policy dimension. There-fore, the first priority should be on establishingthe youth policy dimension within EU-CentralAsia relations andmaking it visible in Europe andCentral Asia.Setting up the Youth Policy Dimension in EU-Central Asia RelationsA first step to establishing a youth policy dimen-sion in EU-Central Asia relations should be a con-tinued stock-taking exercise of ongoing and pre-vious initiatives and projects relevant to youthpolicy. Information and contact details of all ex-isting EU youth policy activities in Central Asiashould be provided through abilingualwebsite inEnglish and Russian. It raises the profile of theyouth policy dimension and is the first element ofa communication strategy to intensify Europeanpublic diplomacy in Central Asia. Moreover, itcontributes to reaching out to new partners inEurope and Central Asia.Putting the objective of working better togetherinto practice, the Central Asia Civil Society Forumshould be turned into a continuous process by es-tablishing a working group on youth policy. Onthe Central Asian side, participation should notbe limited to highly professional non-govern-mental organisations working on youth, but re-flect the complete independent civil society,where it exists. This is a first step to reaching outto the wider civil society. In order to be able toalso address legal questions relevant to youth inCentral Asia and to facilitate cooperation withCentral Asian governments on youth issues,NGOs close to them should also be representedin the working group. Including independent andstate-sponsored civil society will, however, in-crease efforts required to moderate the workinggroup activities.Investing in Regional Youth CooperationWhile the EU considers Central Asia to be a regionand its strategy papers have always underlinedthe aim of facilitating regional cooperation, con-crete efforts from Central Asian governments toestablish functioning cooperation between thefive partners are relatively new. The main neces-sity in such an initial phase of cooperation is tobuild trust between the partners. Youth policy is

²¹ Cases of vulnerable civil society need to be considered.

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most likely the most effective instrument inreaching this objective in the long-term. There-fore, investing in regional cooperation should be-come amainstreaming issue of all activities in theyouth policy dimension of EU-Central Asia rela-tions.Building on experiences from the Erasmus+ pro-gramme and its predecessors, the EU should helpto establish new intra-Central Asian exchangeprogrammes for pupils, trainees, students, teach-ers, lecturers, and researchers. Experiences in in-ternational exchange create lasting bonds andhave the potential to give regional cooperation amore stable basis. The focus should be on pupilsand trainees, with increased efforts to developvocational training in Central Asia, as incentivesfor students to stay in other Central Asian coun-tries are limited. The main focus of student mo-bility is currently Russia, Asian andWestern coun-tries. Continued reforms of Central Asian highereducation sectors will make intraregional stu-dent mobility more attractive. Directly involvingthe younger generations into EU supported activ-ities is also a contribution to enhancing the EU’spublic visibility in Central Asia.Combining reform efforts in higher educationand projects in vocational training with mobilityschemes for teachers, lecturers, and researcherscontributes to exchanging best practices. To facil-itate ongoing exchange between participants, theEU should establish a virtual European Universityof Central Asia offering online courses for mul-tiple universities, organising online trainings inteaching methods and connecting researchers.Exchange should also include the business sec-tor. With a focus on SMEs and start-ups, the EUshould establish a Central Asian network of busi-ness entrepreneurs. In addition to connecting in-novative Central Asians, it should also link themto entrepreneurs from Central and EasternEurope, who can share experiences and bestpractices from starting new businesses in trans-ition countries. Paying special attention to digitaleconomy, the Central Asian network of businessentrepreneurs could combine face-to-face andonline activities.Establishing a Youth Fund for Central AsiaThe EU should initiate a new Youth Fund to em-power Central Asia’s young generation. To max-imise impact and increase efficiency, it shouldbring together international donors active inCentral Asia and also raise funds from the privatesector. Following the three key objectives of theEuropean Youth Strategy, the fund should em-power young entrepreneurs by functioning as abusiness incubator, providing seed investmentand advice. It should engage young change

makers by supporting civil society, funding small-scale projects and offering capacity building tocivil society with a special focus on initiatives inrural areas and those working with vulnerablegroups. It should connect young Central Asiansby helping to establish new youth exchange pro-grammes and making investment in regional co-operation an element of all its activities. Concen-trating EU funding in the new youth policy di-mension of EU-Central Asia relations increasesthe visibility of the EU activities and facilitates ac-cess to support for youth activities.Working Better Together in the Youth Policy Di-mensionThe previously proposed priorities for EU youthpolicy in Central Asia will give the new policy di-mension a high profile and make it more visibleto relevant stakeholders in Europe and CentralAsia as well as the youth in the region. Setting upthe structure of the youth policy dimension ofEU-Central Asia relations also serves as the basisto put the objective of working better togetherinto practice. Future priorities should be definedin consultation with relevant stakeholders in aworking group on youth policy of the Civil SocietyForum. Following up the experiences of draftingthe Central Asia Strategy of 2019, such a particip-atory approach is crucial to increase the owner-ship of stakeholders, especially of the newly in-volved actors, for the new policy dimension.The EU institutions and member states shouldalso put the principle of working better togetherinto practice. Concerning the website, the work-ing group on youth and the Youth Fund, EU-levelinstitutions should remain responsible for thecore structure of the new youth policy dimensionto ensure the widest possible participation andoutreach on the European side. For helping Cent-ral Asian countries to establish intra-CentralAsian exchange programmes, the European Com-mission is best suited to provide its expertisefrom the Erasmus+ programme. Nevertheless, forthis project it is of utmost importance that Cent-ral Asian countries bear the responsibility formanaging the exchange programme to ensurelong-term sustainability.For activities in research and higher educationthe EU should be considered as one researcharea. However, countries with established closeties to research and higher education institutionsin Central Asia, such as France, Germany, andLatvia, should take the lead to get universitiesand research institutions from all over Europe onboard. Depending on the future of research co-operation between the EU and the United King-dom, the participation of British institutionswould be an additional asset due to their globalattractiveness. Considering German experiences

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with its dual vocational training system, relevanttransfer projects and the engagement of Germanbusinesses in Central Asia, Germany should alsotake the initiative in the area of vocational train-ing and in connecting companies and higher edu-cation institutions.Activities in the area of gender and social policycomplement the recent Finnish Central Asiapolicy, which puts a special focus on support forrural women, children, people with disabilities,and other vulnerable groups. Concerning theCentral Asian network of business entrepreneursLatvia and Poland could take the lead for the ini-tiative. Having own experiences of transforma-tion in the post-Soviet space, Central Asian busi-nesses can benefit from best practise examplesfromboth countries. Latvia has already close eco-nomic relations with the Central Asian region,which has been a priority of Latvian foreign policyfor long. The Polish focus on the Eastern Neigh-bourhood of the EU and its close relations withUkraine provide a good opportunity to also in-volve businesses from the EU’s neighbouringcountries. A focus on the exchange betweenEuropean andCentral Asian entrepreneurswouldbe an expansion of the recently established Pol-ish Challenge Fund, which serves as a platform totransfer Polish expertise to Belarus and Ukraine.

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TEAMEditors:Dr. Katrin Boettger, Director IEPDr. Funda Tekin, Director IEP

Layout:Inga Kjer

Institut fuer Europaeische Politik e.V.Bundesallee 2310717 Berlin

[email protected]

Supported by:

ABOUT THE INSTITUT FUER EUROPAEISCHE POLITIK (IEP)

Since its founding in 1959, Institut fuer Europaeische Politik (IEP) has been a non-profit organizationdedicated to the study of European integration. It is one of the leading foreign and European policyresearch centres in the Federal Republic of Germany and serves as a forum for exchange betweenacademia, politics, administration and political education. IEP’s mission is to apply scholarly researchto issues of European politics and integration, propose ways forward and promote the practicalimplementation of its research findings. IEP is a founding member of the Trans-European PolicyStudies Association (TEPSA) and has been amember of the German European Movement since 1962.

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

Yvonne Braun, Research Associate, Institut fuer Europaeische Politik, Berlin

Julian Plottka, Senior Researcher, Institut fuer Europaeische Politik, Berlin

Ekaterina Smirnova, Project Assistant, Institut fuer Europaeische Politik, Berlin

ISSN 2625-4603 Published: March 2021

mailto:[email protected]

https://www.iep-berlin.de

Documents

YCA Research Paper