NapoleonPart 2

session viVölkerschlacht

NapoleonPart 2

session viVölkerschlacht

La Resistancede

1814

My star was fading. I felt the reins slipping out of my grasp, and could do nothing to stop it.

--Napoleon

major topics for this session

I. Rise of German Nationalism

II.Leipzig, The Battle of the Nations (Volkerschlacht)

III. Invasion of France

IV. Abdication

1813 CampaignLeipzig

16-19 October

1814 Campaign

Rise of German Nationalism

Rise of German Nationalism

The 19th century statue of Arminius,the Hermannsdenkmal

‘In the beginning was Napoleon' -- with these words the late and much-lamented Thomas Nipperday began his masterly account of the history of Germany in the nineteenth century (recently translated as From Napoleon to Bismarck). Like most lapidary phrases, it begs as many questions as it answers. Many of the forces which turned Germany into the greatest power on the European continent went back far into the eighteenth century and beyond. But, as we shall see, there is certainly a great deal to be said for taking Napoleon as the starting point.

Tim Blanning,”Napoleon and German Identity: How Napoleon Laid Up Trouble for Future Generations of Frenchmen by Kick-Starting Prussian and German Domination of Eastern Europe” History Today, vol. 48, April 1998

What are the Germans? enquired Friedrich von Moser in 1766 replying to his question as follows: ‘What we are, then, we have been for centuries; that is, a puzzle of a political constitution, a prey of our neighbors, an object of their scorn, … disunited among ourselves, weak from our divisions, strong enough to harm ourselves, powerless to save ourselves, insensitive to the honour of our name, … a great but also a despised people….”

Hagen Schulze, The Course of German Nationalism from Frederick the Great to Bismarck, 1763-1867, p.43

The End of the Ancien Régime in Central Europe

✦ 1801-the Treaty of Luneville, which ended Austria’s part in the war of the Second Coalition, gave the German states of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) located on the west bank of the Rhine to France

The LowerRhine

Thus began the break-up of this

medieval institution

These GermanRhinelanders

were the first to taste the reforms

of the French Revolution

The End of the Ancien Régime in Central Europe

✦ 1801-the Treaty of Luneville, which ended Austria’s part in the war of the Second Coalition, gave the German states of the Holy Roman Empire (HRE) located on the west bank of the Rhine to France

✦ there was a great political division among the German political classes between the admirers and the opponents of the French Revolution

✦ a famous example was Beethoven who originally dedicated his Third Symphony to Napoleon only to change it in ...

✦ 1805-after the defeat of Austria for the third time, the Treaty of Pressburg continued the demise of the HRE

✦ July 1806- the Rheinbundachte created a 16 state confederation of German states under Bonaparte’s protection. Austria dissolved the HRE that August

✦ over the next seven years, 23 more German states, composed from the remains of the former HRE, would ally with Napoleon

The Rise of German Nationalismor The German Princes vs das deutsche Völk oder die deutsche Nation

✦ as many Prussian patriots were girding to fight the French and redeem the military humiliations of Jena-Auerstedt in1806, most of the princes hesitated

✦ many princes had personally benefitted from Napoleon’s destruction of the 306 feudal states of the Holy Roman Empire

✦ they had gained the lands and taxes of the former church properties, “free cities” and “free knights of the empire”

✦ most princes in the central, southern and, especially western and Catholic, Germanies, preferred to sit on the sidelines and wait to see who won the struggle

✦ this infuriated the emerging group of pan-German nationalists. They came to believe that all the princely divisions needed to be swept away as Medieval relics and be replaced by a German Nation under either Habsburg (Groß) or Hohenzollern (Klein) (Greater or Smaller German) leadership

✦ this German Question would be answered in 1866-1871

Prussia; A Special Case

✦ 1806-the Prussian civilian population had stood aside politely while the French emperor struck a mortal blow at their own king’s army. Even if the Prussians did not openly approve of the coming of the French, they certainly regarded them with open interest

✦ It took them no more than a couple of years to realize that their country had become just another cow to be milked by Napoleon. Their king, Frederick William III, had been no Frederick the Great. If they had felt themselves bound to the idea of Prussia, it had been to the state and its institutions, not to the king

✦ 1812-the Prussian nation had done an about-face. The king had become a partner in his people’s suffering. While Napoleon had not incurred the enmity of the Prussian nation by waging war against its king, it had become hostile when he became its master by remote control….

✦ 1813-the rising of the Prussian nation was something Frederick William could have never accomplished by decree. Only Napoleon could take credit for that

Richard Riehn, Napoleon’s Russian Campaign, pp. 68-69

Prussia’s Special Spur to Military Reform

✦ 1807-the Treaty of Tilsit deeply humiliated Prussia, reducing her territory and imposing economic terms which threatened her with ruin

✦ ministers Stein and Hardenberg were able to pressure King Frederick William III to adopt a famous series of reforms:

✦ 1807-Edict of Emancipation-ended serfdom and class distinctions based on occupation. It also ended separate conditions of land tenure under the law, e.g., nobles’ estates, peasants lands

✦ next the cabinet system was strengthened on British lines, as against monarchial absolutism

✦ 1808-municipal reform-local self-government for towns and villages greater than 800 inhabitants

✦ they also promoted the military reforms of Chief of the Prussian General Staff, General Gerhard von Scharnhorst:

✦ 1813-compulsory universal service was the crowning reform

✦ promotion by merit, creation of the Landwehr (reserve system) was begun

✦ military administration was simplified and rationalized

The aristocracy and middle-classes were in the grip of a surge of patriotic feeling, and many banded themselves together into volunteer Jäeger formations. In a similar fashion, Freicorps came into existence---mainly consisting of foreigners [i.e., non-Prussian Germans]. By April 1813 there were over 80,000 men under arms, and the net result of all these measures was the creation, by the end of the June-August armistice, of an army of 228,000 infantry, 31,100 cavalry and 13,000 gunners and sappers, with 376 cannon at their disposal.

Chandler, p.873

! Feb 1813-founded as the Royal Prussian Free Corps von Lützow, after its founder

! alleged to have consisted mostly of students and academics from all over Germany; actually, these amounted to no more than 12%, most were laborers

! average corps size, 1,200 infantry, 600 cavalry and 120 artillery. Operating first in the rear of the French forces, then with regular Allied units

! Despite its small size the corps became famous after the war, as it was the only unit in the army consisting of people from all over Germany. Also, it contained academics, writers and other well known people such as Karl Körner and Friedrich Jahn. The educator Friedrich Fröbel who later developed the concept of the kindergarten also belonged to the corps.

! In addition, two women, Eleonore Prochaska and Anna Lühring, had managed to join in disguise.

Lützow’sches Freikorps

their black-red-gold uniform color scheme became associated with republican ideals

n Eleonore's father was an officer in the Prussian guards, on a low income. She grew up poor and was sent by her father to the military orphanage in Potsdam when her mother died

n she disguised herself as a man and registered for 1 Jägerbataillon of the Lützow Free Corps under the name August Renz, serving first as a drummer, then later as an infantryman

“Potsdam’s Joan of Arc”

Eleonore Prochaska 1785 - 5 October 1813

n Eleonore's father was an officer in the Prussian guards, on a low income. She grew up poor and was sent by her father to the military orphanage in Potsdam when her mother died

n she disguised herself as a man and registered for 1 Jägerbataillon of the Lützow Free Corps under the name August Renz, serving first as a drummer, then later as an infantryman

n She was severely wounded and field-surgeons, rushing to treat her wounds, discovered she was a woman and took her to Dannenberg, where she succumbed to her wounds three weeks later

n In retrospect, she was strongly idealized as a chaste heroine and honored as "die Potsdamer Jeanne d'Arc". Various plays and poems were written on her life , whilst Ludwig van Beethoven began a "Bühnenmusik" (WoO 96) on her, with a libretto entitled "Eleonore Prochaska" written by the Prussian royal private-secretary Friedrich Duncker

“Potsdam’s Joan of Arc”

Eleonore Prochaska 1785 - 5 October 1813

n Eleonore's father was an officer in the Prussian guards, on a low income. She grew up poor and was sent by her father to the military orphanage in Potsdam when her mother died

n she disguised herself as a man and registered for 1 Jägerbataillon of the Lützow Free Corps under the name August Renz, serving first as a drummer, then later as an infantryman

n She was severely wounded and field-surgeons, rushing to treat her wounds, discovered she was a woman and took her to Dannenberg, where she succumbed to her wounds three weeks later

n In retrospect, she was strongly idealized as a chaste heroine and honored as "die Potsdamer Jeanne d'Arc". Various plays and poems were written on her life , whilst Ludwig van Beethoven began a "Bühnenmusik" (WoO 96) on her, with a libretto entitled "Eleonore Prochaska" written by the Prussian royal private-secretary Friedrich Duncker

“Potsdam’s Joan of Arc”

Eleonore Prochaska 1785 - 5 October 1813

Karl Theodor Körner (1791 – 26 August 1813) was a German poet and soldier. After some time in Vienna, where he wrote some light comedies and other works, he became a soldier [at age 21] and joined the German uprising against Napoleon. During these times, he displayed personal courage in many fights, and encouraged his comrades by fiery patriotic lyrics he composed, one of these being “Schwertlied" (Sword Song), composed during a lull in fighting only a few hours before his death and set to music by Franz Schubert.

Friedrich Ludwig Jahn (1778 – 1852) He studied theology and philology from 1796 to 1802 at Halle, Göttingen and the University of Greifswald. After the Battle of Jena-Auerstedt in 1806 he joined the Prussian army. In 1809 he went to Berlin, where he became a teacher at the Gymnasium. Brooding upon what he saw as the humiliation of his native land by Napoleon, Jahn conceived the idea of restoring the spirits of his countrymen by the development of their physical and moral powers through the practice of gymnastics. The first Turnplatz, or open-air gymnasium, was opened by Jahn in Berlin in 1811, and the Turnverein (gymnastics association) movement spread rapidly. Young gymnasts were taught to regard themselves as members of a kind of guild for the emancipation of their fatherland. This nationalistic spirit was nourished in no small degree by the writings of Jahn.

Early in 1813 [at age 35] Jahn took an active part in the formation of the famous Lützow Free Corps, a volunteer force in the Prussian army fighting Napoleon. He commanded a battalion of the corps, though he was often employed in the secret service during the same period.

During the short one-and-a-half years of the War of Liberation, the volunteer bands felt themselves to be ‘the nation in arms’. The political aims of the youths and burghers who gathered together in the Freikorps appear obvious, when one looks at the prevalent programatic lyrics…‘What is the German’s Fatherland?’ asked Ernst Moritz Arndt in 1813:

It must be--Germany is presented as will and idea, in a purely optative form. Arndt’s Song of the Fatherland employs felicitous couplets to run through provinces and countries...and then concludes:

Schulze, p. 54

Is it Prussia? Is it Swabia?Is it along the Rhine where the vine resides?Is it along the Belt where the seagull glides?Oh no! No! No!His Fatherland must be greater still!

As far as the German tongue ringsAnd to God in Heaven Lieder singsThat’s where it should be!That, bold German, pertains to thee!

II. Leipzig, The Battle of the Nations(Völkerschlacht)

II. Leipzig, The Battle of the Nations(Völkerschlacht)

It was high time for Napoleon to reconsider his strategy….He might mass the bulk of his forces for a drive against Prague, hoping to complete the defeat of [Schwarzenberg]; if this was successful this might drive Austria out of the war. Or, alternatively, he might renew the advance against Berlin. Once again, the old lure of his April “master plan” won the day. It offered palpable advantages. To the northward the countryside was still relatively unravaged and could be therefore be expected to yield considerable supplies. The French would also be able to assume a more central position in the face of the three Allied armies. And even if Schwarzenberg did decide to double back...and head for Dresden once more, ...a new offensive over the Bohemian mountains would take a considerable period, by which time the French could be in Berlin and on their way to the relief of Stettin. Such a threat must surely draw the Prussians and Russians north, leaving Austria precariously isolated. A sudden move south would then place Napoleon in a commanding position, with power to end the war in a blaze of glory.

Chandler, pp. 912-913

Situation Evening of 30 April 1813 AfterVandamme’s defeat at Kulm

BERLIN

PRAGUE

Situation Evening of 30 April 1813 AfterVandamme’s defeat at Kulm

MACDONALD

Macdonald, “already a beaten man” (Chandler) was pleading for help. Napoleon marched east on 2 September with the Guard, Latour-Maubourg and Marmont, gendarmes were sent ahead to deal with Macdonald’s stragglers and deserters. He also ordered Poniatowski to be ready to fall on Blücher’s left flank. Macdonald was told to get his army concentrated so that the Emperor could inspect it in a half hour.

BERLIN

PRAGUE

Situation Evening of 30 April 1813 AfterVandamme’s defeat at Kulm

MACDONALD

BERLIN

PRAGUE

Undoubtedly, Napoleon hoped to deal with Blücher as he had with Schwarzenberg, but the sight of Macdonald’s demoralized command drove him into an unusual fit of public fury. Riding on to Hochkirch, he saw Blücher’s advance guard approaching, and ordered the nearest French units against it. Revitalized by his presence, these whipped men turned on the Prussians with such enthusiasm that Blücher rapidly guessed its cause and at once retreated [in accordance with the Trachtenberg Plan]. Esposito & Elting, MAP 138

d

c

a

Situation 9 OctoberSituation 19 September

Recognizing that Blücher had no intention of fighting (Map a, above), on 5 September, Napoleon ordered Macdonald to drive Blücher east of the Queiss River. His plans to advance on Berlin were interrupted by the report that Schwarzenberg had recrossed the Elbe with 60,000 Austrians. Barclay, with the rest of the Army of Bohemia was threatening Dresden. That same day he learned that Ney had aggressively blundered into a trap that Bernadotte had set for him. The French were almost saved by Renier’s skill and the fury with which the French came on. But Ney managed to lose the battle and retreated to Torgau in great disorder, having lost some 10,000 men to the Allies’ 7,000.

d

c

aReturning to Dresden, Napoleon advanced on 8 September (map b) through Fürstenwalde aiming at Teplitz. Barclay fell back through Peterswalde; Schwarzenberg hastily recrossed the Elbe. On 10 September Napoleon came over the mountains just west of Kulm. In 1796 Napoleon would have attacked. Now, his artillery was unable to get into action over the ruined roads, and he would not risk his conscripts without it. Increasingly bad weather made further movements almost impossible. His problems were further complicated by Macdonald’s tendency to withdraw every time Blücher stirred.

Situation 9 OctoberSituation 19 September

d

c

a

After considering a variety of plans, Napoleon abruptly decided to retire west of the Elbe (map c) retaining strong bridgeheads at Königstein, Pillnitz, Dresden, Meissen, Torgau, Wittenberg and Magdeburg. This done, he would clear up his rear area [of Cossacks and Freikorps], reorganize his communications and wait for the Allies to come and be killed. This withdrawal began on the 24th. The Allies developed a new plan: once Bennigsen arrived, Blücher would march north to join Bernadotte; Schwarzenberg would advance on Leipzig via Chemnitz. (There is no trace of any plan to coordinate their operations.) Blücher marched on the 25th…. Napoleon had already decided that Dresden was too close to the Bohemian mountains (behind which the beaten enemy could always take refuge) to be a satisfactory central position. Leipzig appeared to be a better one. Blücher’s maneuvers left him suspicious but uncertain until 4 October, when Marmont warned him that Blücher had forced the Elbe at Wartenburg the day before, driving Bertrand off after a hard fight (map d).

Situation 9 OctoberSituation 19 September

d

c

a

Situation 9 OctoberSituation 19 September

Bernadotte now began breaking out of Rosslau and Barby. Napoleon now rearranged his troops according to a plan to cross the Elbe at either Torgau or Wittenberg, cutting communications between Bernadotte and Blücher. Murat would delay Schwarzenberg, keeping between him and Leipzig. Learning on 8 October that Bernadotte and Blücher had come close together west of the Elbe, Napoleon changed his orders. Ney was to join him and move north to attack the Allies. Weakened by short rations and bad weather, the French marched more slowly than usual. Blücher and Bernadotte, having lost contact with Ney, were angrily disputing the wisdom of moving further. Suddenly confronted by Napoleon’s converging columns, they chose (apparently on Blücher’s initiative) to retire westward across the Salle, rather than recross the Elbe. A frantic scramble got Blücher clear, though Sebastiani cut up his rearguard and captured his supply trains.

Esposito & Elting, MAP 139

Although healthy reinforcements were steadily reaching the enemy, the French were not so fortunate. Napoleon’s only immediate assets were Augereau’s corps coming from Würzburg and the Bavarian army, vapid at best, loitering on the Bavarian frontiers but at least holding one Austrian army in check. Eugene’s army in northern Italy was facing another Austrian army and would go nowhere. Davout’s divisions were stumbling around the countryside south of Hamburg and would soon retire inside its walls….Garrisons in Danzig, Stettin and Küstrin fortresses might as well have been on the moon. The combat troops were generally exhausted, hungry, their uniforms in tatters, many lacking shoes.

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN Situation the Evening of 13 Octoberand Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Leipzig

Napoleon must have been on the verge of exhaustion. For weeks he had been almost constantly on the move, fighting a dozen battles often in miserable weather, all in futile pursuit of that “decisive battle.” Why then did he persist in his discredited strategy? The short answer is that he did not believe that it was discredited. We are dealing here with disparate and complex factors working on a strange amalgam of past and present caught in the fearful coils of the arrogance of ignorance, trapped in his belief of enemy impotence and cowardice, failing to recognize that his once omnipotent and beautiful army had weakened and withered into halting old age….

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN Situation the Evening of 13 Octoberand Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Leipzig

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN Situation the Evening of 13 Octoberand Concentrations Prior to the Battle of Leipzig

Professionally, he was failing to respect the interplay of quantitative and qualitative factors that govern the battlefield, the basis of the formula which when applied to his immense strategic and tactical skills explained his former military mastery. That was the real key to his disjointed actions and spurious decisions and it is at once terribly sad, yet in another sense strangely noble--a defeated man refusing to accept defeat.

Asprey, pp. 326-327

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

Leipzig offered several advantages for a resourceful commander. The five rivers that converged there split the surrounding terrain into as many separate sectors. Holding Leipzig and its bridges, Napoleon could shift troops from one sector to another far more rapidly than could the Allies. (And to compound their troubles, he had destroyed most of the nearby bridges over the Elster and Pleisse rivers,)

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

Two sectors--that between the Luppe and the Elster, and the one between the Elster and the Pleisse--were so cut up by marshes, ditches and gardens that they were impassable for formed bodies of troops. Between the Pleisse and the Parthe, the countryside was marked by a series of low concentric ridges, dotted with solidly built villages, but open enough for massed cavalry. The dominating features were the Galgenberg and the nearby Kolm Berg. Napoleon and several of his subordinates had thoroughly reconnoitered this entire area.

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe RiverLeipzig proper had a decayed city wall, but its gates were still in fair repair. The outer edges of its suburbs (as at Dresden) had been organized for defense, and there was a small f o r t i fi e d b r i d g e h e a d a t Lindenau .Between Leipzig and Lindenau, the road was a potential bottleneck--a built up causeway, a mile and a half long, cut by several bridges. Southwestward, this road continued on to Lützen, Erfurt, and to France. Since Napoleon at this time considered himself based on the Torgau-Wittenberg-Magdeburg fortress complex, he regarded this Erfurt road only as an alternate line of communication. Consequently, he did not order extra bridges constructed between Leipzig and Lindenau. (Because of the swampy terrain, this would have been a major engineering project, for which he had neither the time nor material.)

ERFURT ROAD

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

The night of the 14th-15th, Napoleon, as usual, studied the enemy’s campfires for indications of their dispositions. This time they roundly deceived him. Noting a large cluster near Markrandstädt he concluded that Bernadotte and Blücher had moved south from Halle to cut his communication with Erfurt and link up with Schwarzenberg’s left flank. Actually, Bernadotte was still north of Halle; Blücher, marching on Schkeuditz. The campfires were Gyulai’s…. Though outnumbered, Napoleon planned to take the offensive between the Pleisse and the Parthe Rivers….

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

The night of the 14th-15th, Napoleon, as usual, studied the enemy’s campfires for indications of their dispositions. This time they roundly deceived him. Noting a large cluster near Markrandstädt he concluded that Bernadotte and Blücher had moved south from Halle to cut his communication with Erfurt and link up with Schwarzenberg’s left flank. Actually, Bernadotte was still north of Halle; Blücher, marching on Schkeuditz. The campfires were Gyulai’s…. Though outnumbered, Napoleon planned to take the offensive between the Pleisse and the Parthe Rivers….

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

Schwarzenberg’s original plan called for a secondary attack on Lindenau by Blücher and Gyulai, and a main attack astride the Pleisse River….This plan had the unusual virtue of being so bad that e v e r y o n e p r o t e s t e d . A l e x a n d e r, “surprised beyond measure at this unanimi ty among h is genera ls , ” intervened, forcing Schwarzenberg to develop a new plan that was largely designed to let everyone do as they pleased.

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

To sum up, Napoleon massed approximately 121,700 out of 177,500 available men in the decisive sector; the Allies managed 77,500 (plus 24,000 in reserve) out of more than 200,000…. On the Allied side, Barclay entrusted the organization of the main attack to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein thoroughly scrambled the available units, then spred them out on a six-mile front, too far apart to maintain visual contact across that rolling terrain. The morning was rainy and fog-bound, delaying the Allied attack to 0800, but also slowing Macdonald’s approach march.

LEIPZIG CAMPAIGN BATTLE OF LEIPZIG

Situation Early 16 October 1813

SCALE OF MILES

1 0 1 2

Elster River

Elster River

Pleisse River

Luppe River

Parthe River

Situation 1100, 16 Oct, Just Prior to Napoleon’s Counterattack

Situation 1100, 16 Oct, Just Prior to Napoleon’s Counterattack

Richard Woodville Caton, Poniatowski’s Last Charge, 1912

...it appeared that Napoleon was on the point of bringing off a model combined evacuation and river crossing in the face of the enemy fit to rival the celebrated passage of the Berezina in 1812. Unfortunately, however, Napoleon delegated responsibility [authority, a commander can delegate authority, but never responsibility, jbp] for preparing the causeway for demolition to an unreliable general officer of the Guard named Dulaloy. He in turn passed on the task to a Colonel Montfort, who soon decided that the whistle of musketballs was coming uncomfortably close and quitted the scene, leaving one miserable corporal in charge of the demolition. This unfortunate individual panicked at one o’clock and without the least need blew the bridge in spite of the fact that it was crowded with French troops. This criminal mistake turned a successful withdrawal operation into a disaster, for the rear guard was trapped in Leipzig with no means of making good their escape. Oudinot managed to swim his way over the Elster, but Poniatowski, handicapped by his wounds was drowned attempting the same feat--a mere twelve hours after being appointed a marshal.

Chandler, pp. 935-936

January Suchodolski, Death of Poniatowski, before 1830

Over the four-day period the Allies probably lost 54,00 killed and wounded…. As for the French, their battle casualties were probably in excess of 38,000, but a further 30,000 fell into Allied hands on the 19th. Additionally, 5,000 German troops defected to the enemy during the battle. The French losses included six general officers killed, a further twelve wounded, and no less than thirty-six fell into Allied hands as prisoners of war, a fate also shared by the King of Saxony. In terms of materiel, Napoleon abandoned at least 325 cannon, most of his trains and transport stores and large quantities of military stores. The long battle was the severest of the Napoleonic Wars save only for Borodino; over 200,000 rounds of artillery ammunition were discharged, and by the 19th the French stocks were down to a mere 20,000. The ultimate result was to destroy what was left of the French empire east of the Rhine…. Militarily, Leipzig dealt a heavy blow to Napoleon’s martial reputation, and eventually destroyed over two thirds of France’s hard-found forces outside Spain. Politically, it marked the emergence of Prussia as a leading power in Germany once more, and prepared the way for the birth of modern Europe.

Chandler, p. 936

Napoleon, indeed, was guilty of several severe political and military miscalculations which between them underlay his failure. He tended to despise his opponents…. He never expected that his father-in-law, the Emperor of Austria, would turn fully against him, he never appreciated how sick were the German states of the French yoke…. He left thousands of invaluable fighting men and several of his best generals south of the Pyrenees. But worst of all, he never realized that there was a new spirit abroad in Europe; he still believed that he was dealing with the old feudal monarchies which in fact his earlier victories had largely swept away. France was no longer the only country to be imbued with a genuine national inspiration or equipped with a truly national army. France’s foes had at last learned valuable lessons from their earlier defeats, both political and military, and were now learning to employ their new-found strength against a rapidly tiring opponent. In the words of General Fuller, for Napoleon the battle of Leipzig was “a second Trafalgar, this time on land; his initiative was gone.”

Chandler, pp. 940-941

III.Invasion of France

III.Invasion of France

Against greatly superior forces it is possible to win a battle, but hardly a war--NAPOLEON

A people who have been brought up on victories often do not know how to accept defeat.

--Napoleon

A people who have been brought up on victories often do not know how to accept defeat.

--Napoleon

La Résistance de 1814

Would the war continue or would there be peace? The negotiating waters rising from a slimy bottom composed of ambition, greed, fear, arrogance and deceit, remained deep and dark….

In mid November, Napoleon ordered Marshal Marmont to discuss terms of capitulation of the beseiged fortresses, including Dresden… and to request the traditional “honorable surrender” which would allow the troops to march home with arms and equipment. Prior to this...Metternich had summoned the French...to peace talks at Frankfurt…. Such was the Allied altruism that France would only have to return to its “natural” frontiers--the Rhine, the Alps and the Pyrenees….

...Metternich wrote General Caulaincourt: “...France will never sign a more fortunate peace than that which the Powers will make today.”

Asprey, pp. 337-338

Baron de Marbot writes, "No previous general had ever shown such talent, or achieved so much with such feeble resources. With a few thousand men, most of whom were inexperienced conscripts, one saw him face the armies of Europe, turning up everywhere with these troops, which he led from one point to another with marvellous rapidity. ... he hurried from the Austrians to the Russians, and from the Russians to the Prussians, ... sometimes beaten by them, but much more often the victor. He hoped, for a time, that he might drive the foreigners, disheartened by frequent defeats, from French soil and back across the Rhine. All that was required was a new effort by the nation; but there was general war-weariness..."

http://napoleonistyka.atspace.com/La_Rothiere_battle.htm

! mid-December 1813-he expected that the main Allied offensive would strike directly across the lower Rhine (map a)

! if finally forced back by superior numbers, the marshals must cover Paris

! Augereau would form a new army at Lyons for an advance to the northeast across Schwarzenberg’s line of communications

! (map b) eastern France was quickly overrun, the open cities surrendering to handfuls of cavalry

! the demoralizing behavior of several marshals contributed to the civilians’ servile behavior

! only Mortier did his duty, fighting an aggressive, 18 day delaying action from Langres back to Bar-sur-Aube

! 26 Jan-Napoleon takes command--E&E, MAP 145

a

b

Situation Early 26 January

Châlons-sur-Marne

MORTIER

The drafts from Italy fail to materialize

Maria Annunziata Carolina Murat (née Bonaparte) (1782 – 1839), better known as Caroline Bonaparte, was the seventh surviving child and third surviving daughter of Carlo Buonaparte and Letizia Ramolino

Joachim Murat, King of Naples

The chief reason for this was the defection of Murat, Napoleon’s brother-in-law, on January 11th. “The conduct of the King of Naples is infamous,” stormed the Emperor to Fouché on February 13th, “and that of the Queen quite unspeakable. I hope to live long enough to avenge for myself and for France such an outrage and such horrible ingratitude.” This desertion ultimately strengthened the Allies in North Italy by a further 30,000 Neapolitan troops; this inevitably rendered Eugène’s position more difficult. Then on 14 January, the King of Denmark also signed an agreement with the Allies….

Chandler, p. 950

Caroline Murat and daughter in 1807. The painting is by Élisabeth Vigée-Lebrun

Against Overwhelming Odds, Still Not Admitting Defeat

✦ Nov-Jan 1814-a flurry of diplomatic exchanges produce no acceptable peace

✦ 26 January-traveling from Paris, Napoleon reaches Imperial headquarters at Châlons-sur-Marne to take command

✦ although his own strength was not slight, it was dangerously dispersed

✦ many of his best veterans were besieged to the north and east

✦ Soult and Suchet had to protect the south

✦ Eugene had to face the Austrians in Italy, soon to be joined by the turncoat Murat’s Neapolitans

✦ Napoleon’s troops lacked food, clothing and shoes

✦ volunteers were many, but he had few and often no arms for them--Asprey, pp. 344-345

A bleak picture, yes, but not without some merits. The allies had not marched all this way without some losses of their own. They had suffered heavily in Saxony, they were forced to leave substantial garrisons and siege forces in Germany, Holland, Belgium and northern France, their ponderous supply lines were uncomfortably stretched and they were not agreed as to a strategic objective. Czar Alexander, strongly influenced by his militant advisors who were Napoleon’s old nemeses, the Prussian Stein and the Corsican Pozzo di Borgo, and King Frederick William, influenced by Alexander and by his own General Gneisenau, wanted to march straight on Paris. Prince Schwarzenberg commanding the large Austrian force was reluctant to do so. Although Napoleon dangerously minimized allied strengths he was correct in writing to one of his marshals that the enemy “are scattered in all directions.”

Napoleon also held the decided advantage of fighting on interior lines.

Asprey, p. 345

So skilled a soldier as the Emperor knew how much advantage could be obtained from this river- and road-dominated terrain in mounting a defensive campaign...employing the smaller petites places as food and ammunition depots, Napoleon considered that he could dispense with long, slow-moving convoys and thus be able to prosecute operations of lightning speed against heavily encumbered opponents. Every effort must be made to keep the foe from fully uniting his forces, but a full-scale battle must be avoided….A war of subtlety and fast maneuver, of engagements with isolated enemy detachments on adventageous French terms, of slim forces manning the river lines to hold off the hostile masses….”It is necessary to fall well concentrated on some corps of the enemy and destroy it,” wrote Napoleon to some officer on his staff (january 23). The rapier of 1796 was to replace the bludgeon of 1812.

After a slow start and despite the disastrous outcome, this was to be one of Napoleon’s finest campaigns. His powers of generalship took on a new lease of life and inspiration; unfortunately few of the generals and none of the politicians rose to the occasion--although the “Marie-Louise” conscripts were to perform wonders under Napoleon’s leadership.

Chandler, p. 955

At Châlons, Napoleon learned that Blücher was approaching St. Dizier; Schwarzenberg, Bar-sur-Aube. Both armies were considerably weakened by detachments left to blockade various fortified towns., but they were very close to establishing contact. If Napoleon was to catch either one separately, he must strike promptly. Blücher, advancing with the apparent intention of reaching Paris ahead of Schwarzenberg, was the nearer and weaker target.

Esposito & Elting, Commentary on MAP 145

ST DIZIER

BAR-SUR-AUBE

! (large map a) 26 Jan-Blücher takes St. Dizier & pushes on to Brienne, Napoleon cuts his LOC

! 29 Jan-Blücher intercepts a copy of Napoleon’s orders and is able to escape the trap (losses: Fr=3,000 Prussian=4,000)

! 30 Jan-Napoleon forces Blücher out of La Rothiere

! the Allies concentrated haphazardly as Blücher’s men mixed with Schwarzenberg’s advance

! (map a-insert)1 Feb-Blücher overpowers Napoleon at La Rothiere with superior numbers (both lose 6,000, Fr also abandon 50 guns)

! Inflated with overconfidence at having defeated Napoleon on French soil, and certain he was no longer dangerous, the Allies decided to march immediately on Paris (map b)

! 3 Feb-Napoleon reaches Troyes, reorganizes his army weakened by 4,000 desertions

Esposito & Elting, MAP 146

NAPOLEON (40,000)

BLUCHER (53,000)

! Napoleon sent Mortier southeast on a major reconnaissance in force, which thoroughly mauled Schwarzenberg’s outposts, who strengthened his left

! Blücher’s only reaction to this was “the joyful idea that Napoleon would be too hard-pressed to oppose his Army of Silesia”

! 6 Feb- Blücher’s army was in four separate groups--all out of mutually supporting distance--plunging headlong across Napoleon’s front in an attempt to destroy Macdonald

! Napoleon had considered attacking Schwarzenberg. Blücher, however, was beginning to threaten Paris and was the easier and nearer target

! 5-7 Feb- Napoleon concentrated at Nogent-sur-Seine

! the newly created VII Corps (largely veterans from Spain), which was forming at Nogent, was mistakenly entrusted to Oudinot

Esposito & Elting, MAP 146 b

7 February-to Marie Louise,

“Your letter grieves me deeply; it tells me you are discouraged. Those who are with you have lost their heads. I am quite well and hope my affairs will take a turn for the better, but I do beg you to cheer up and take care of yourself… You know how much I love you.” Joseph was to ensure that the empress, her son, and the royal family would be evacuated from Paris, but only as an emergency measure: “We must not shut our eyes to the fact that the consternation and despair of the populace might have disastrous and tragic results.”

Asprey, pp. 347-348

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At Nogent, Napoleon was caught in a blizzard of ill tidings. Northward Bülow had entered Brussels; Antwerp was cut off. Paris was clutched by a mounting panic, with Joseph one of the worst affected. Murat had joined the Allies…. Napoleon kept his head and nerve.

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Schwarzenberg had occupied Troyes, where he halted to ponder his next move. Finally, concluding that Napoleon meant to offer a decisive battle at Nogent, he asked Blücher for Kleist’s corps. Blücher was at Champaubert when he received (9 Feb) Schwarzenberg’s request. He at once issued orders for Kleist, Kapzevitsch and Olssufiev to march on Sezanne the next morning.

TROYES

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That night (9-10 Feb), Blücher somehow learned that Napoleon was in Sezanne. Knowing little of the strength and disposition of the French forces, he was unable to make any estimate of Napoleon’s possible courses of action. However, since La Rothiere, he considered Napoleon little better than a fugitive from justice. Consequently, though he did take the precaution of personally going back to join Kleist and Kapzevitsch, he left Olssufiev very much alone at Champaubert, and authorized Sacken to continue the pursuit of Macdonald.

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TROYES

Pushing northward along roads “six feet deep in mud,” Napoleon got considerable help from the local inhabitants, who, having enjoyed a brief acquaintanceship with Allied “liberation,” turned out to help drag his guns along. Early on the 10th, French cavalry developed the isolated position of Olssufiev’s weak corps (inset map). Olssufiev had been threatened with court-martial for poor performance at Brienne and La Rothiere; thoroughly sore-headed, he tried to fight and was squashed. Meanwhile, Blücher marched Kleist and Kapzevitsch toward Sezanne, placidly ignoring the sound of battle to the west. About dusk...he finally learned of Olssufiev’s disaster, and countermarched...sending off an urgent order recalling Sacken to Montmirail.

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TROYES

MONTMIRAIL

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MONTMIRAIL

Olssufiev having been disposed of, Napoleon swung westward to deal with Sacken and Yorck…. {He ordered his other commanders that] if Napoleon fought his expected battle near Montmirail, they were to march to the sound of the guns…. Encountering Napoleon west of Montmirail the next morning, Sacken attempted to bull his way through, but was outmaneuvered and outfought by Napoleon’s slightly smaller force. Yorck reached the field at about 1530, with part of his corps, to find Sacken on the point of collapse…. His arrival saved Sacken from destruction, but he was himself promptly driven back …. During the night, Sacken’s shattered corps groped along woods to join Yorck

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TROYES

MONTMIRAIL

On 12 Feb, Napoleon renewed his attack, Ney leading. Yorck and Sacken barely escaped across the Marne, with over-all losses of 7,000 men, more than 20 guns, and most of their trains. French losses, 2,500

20 200SCALE OF MILES

20 200SCALE OF MILES

Learning of Schwarzenberg’s offensive during the 13th, Napoleon began planning a concentration around Montereau. However, that night, Marmont reported Blücher again moving west. Blücher had concluded that Napoleon would be countermarching to meet Schwarzenberg and planned to attasck the Emperor’s rear. Too weak to oppose this force, Marmont was skillfully fighting a delaying action back from Etoges.

20 200SCALE OF MILES

Resolved to teach Blücher a lesson, Napoleon ordered Marmont to draw the Prussian on to Montmirail, where he concentrated his available forces. During the early morning of the 14th, Marmont retired from Fromentiers (inset map)to a strong position west of Vauchamps. Advancing carelessly, Blücher’s advance guard attacked him there, but was trapped and largely destroyed as Grouchy burst in on his right flank… Blücher quickly ordered a retreat...Had Grouchy’s horse artillery been able to keep up with him through the deep clay mud, Blücher’s destruction would have been certain.

During 12 February, Schwarzenberg had got across the Seine River…. An unidentified [French] officer hastily ordered the army’s trains toward Paris, fanning the panic in that unstable city. A long ripple of Allied cavalry and Cossacks now fanned out across the countryside...their outriders even penetrating to Fontainebleau. A new factor now permeated the campaign. Allied claims of “coming as friends and liberators” and of maintaining strict discipline had been deliberate falsehoods from the start. Advancing out of the devastated Rhineland, with long miles of ruined roads between them and their bases, the Allies could not feed their troops from their own countries. (The Russians had never had a supply system worth mentioning; in Germany, they had foraged on ally, neutral, and enemy with equal informality.) From the first, the Allies had lived off the country--Schwarzenberg generally by requisition, Blücher by cruder methods. All were as demanding and hard-handed as the French had been in Germany and Austria, but the Prussians and Cossacks were outstanding for misbehavior and brutality--the latter by habit, the former in the name of “vengeance.” Looting and burning as they advanced, the Allied forces became increasingly savage after their first defeats.

E & E, commentary on the preceding map, MAP 148

Exasperated civilians began to waylay stragglers and small detachments. The Vosges Mountain passes became especially dangerous; heavy escorts soon were necessary for couriers and convoys. This irregular warfare was just beginning to make itself felt by the end of the campaign. “Had the Emperor been as well served in Paris as he was in [eastern France],” 1814 might have seen his greatest victories.

E & E, commentary on the preceding map, MAP 148

News that Blücher had been thoroughly defeated, losing a third of his army, dazed the Allied high command. Its first reaction (based on the supposition that Napoleon was pursuing Blücher toward Chalons) was to send Wittgenstein and Wrede north through Sezanne to attack him from the rear. Then came word that Napoleon had broken contact with the Army of Silesia (Blücher). Apprehensive but uncertain, the Army of Bohemia (Schwarzenberg) ended by milling in place “to await developments” during most of 15-16 February. On the 17th, Wittgenstein and Wrede were ordered to fall back gradually through Bray. Barclay would mass the Russian-Prussian guards and reserves at Nogent.

Elsewhere, Seslawin’s Cossacks were wandering towards Orleans; more important, Bülow was moving south out of Belgium, having been relieved there by the newly organized corps of the Duke of Weimar.

Napoleon’s original plans were to follow up and finish off Blücher, then to move south through Vitry into Schwarzenberg’s rear.This probably would have been decisive. Blücher and his subordinates were the toughest, if not the brightest, of the Allied commanders. With them gone, the Allied sovereigns would not have lingered to risk their own necks. But Schwarzenberg’s fumbling advance on Paris tripped Napoleon up in full career: Paris was still unfortified, Joseph was butter-hearted; Victor, Oudinot and Macdonald plainly were not equal to gaining their Emperor the three or four days he would need. Hastily regrouping, Napoleon came southwestward by forced marches, reaching Guignes on the 16th.

Mortier and Marmont were left to maintain pressure on Blücher and Winzingerode…. On the 17th and 18th Napoleon inflicted heavy losses on Schwarzenberg’s forces, clearing the north bank of the Seine.

On the 17th February, Schwarzenberg had already sent Berthier a sniveling and lying m e s s a g e s t a t i n g t h a t - - s i n c e t h e preliminaries of a peace treaty on Napoleon’s terms had been signed at Chatillon (in fact, the Allies had broken off negotiations on the 10th)--he had halted “offensive movement against the French armies,” and must request that Napoleon return the courtesy. He then ordered a headlong retreat to Troyes to Be covered by Wrede. Seslawin was recalled, and Blücher instructed to join Wittgenstein at Mery-sur-Seine by the 21st.

The Allies were not going to leave France, there would be no armistice. Napoleon was not going to have peace with honor. Despite the dramatic series of French victories, despite continuing quarrels between the Russian and Austrian emperors and their marshals and generals, the allies with the possible exception of Austria seemed no more inclined to peace than ever. Soon after negotiations reopened at Châtillon, Lord Castlereagh knocked petulant heads together to bring about a declaration of renewed solidarity among the four allies, and it soon became clear that they and not Napoleon were negotiating from strength.

Allied generals had good reason for their belief. Ever since the invasion Napoleon had been reacting rather than acting. If he knocked out one corps here another popped up there--a repeat of allied strategy and tactics in Saxony: muscle over mind, quantity over quality. Napoleon had dealt no knockout blow.

Asprey, p. 350

19 February-to Marie Louise,

“I was so tired last night,”...one of the rare times when he did not claim the best of health, “that I slept eight hours on end.”

Asprey, p. 350

He had hurt Blücher and Schwarzenberg but each had been reinforced and soon returned to the offensive. He had also hurt himself because replacements were not easy to come by and good commanders were becoming increasingly rare. He was also paying a price--ill on occasion, sometimes exhausted:

Lacking a bridge train [on the 21st], Napoleon had to funnel his advance through Montereau until Macdonald restored the bridge at Bray. This delay, plus the haste in which Schwarzenberg retreated, resulted in the French largely losing contact with the Allies for two days.

Schwarzenberg needed the respite. In addition to the excited yammerings of his three sovereign commanders and their polyglot personal staffs, he was afflicted by highly exaggerated reports of Augereau’s activities--which, so far, actually had amounted to nothing more than continuous complaints and excuses. The Troyes area, relatively unproductive in normal times, already had been eaten up by both armies. Disease, hunger, bad weather, and recent defeats had left the Army of Bohemia shaky. Soldiers and commanders alike had little appetite for a stand-up fight against Napoleon; especially since recent intelligence reports had grossly overestimated the strength of his army. Schwarzenberg knew he could lose the war in a few hours; defeat would mean a retreat through a vindictively hostile countryside, with Augereau advancing into his rear. Also, he personally commanded the last army that Austria would be able to put into the field, and had no intention of sacrificing it for the sake of temporary allies, whose known postwar aims were inimical to Austrian expansion...by the evening of 21 February he had made up his mind to continue his retreat.

E & E, commentary to MAP 150

To screen his retreat--from Napoleon, Alexander and the King of Prussia alike--Schwarzenberg ordered a heavy reconnaissance in force all across his front. Moving forward at about noon on the 22nd, this reconnaissance promptly collided with Napoleon’s cavalry screen, and was everywhere beaten and driven in.

Following up, Oudinot’s advance guard rushed the Allies out of the Mery suburb on the west bank of the Seine. It then forced its way across the ruined bridge and stormed into Mery itself, but had to withdraw when the Allies fired the town. (Blücher, still clamoring for an advance on Paris, had joined Wittgenstein here on the 21st.) Reaching the front, Napoleon quickly assessed the situation: Blücher and Wittgenstein were on the east bank of the flooded Seine; Schwarzenberg was west of that river, in front of Troyes; it was too late to attack that evening, especially since his own army had not closed up. He would leave a part of Oudinot’s veterans to watch Blücher and Wittgenstein...With the rest of his army, he would attack Schwarzenberg the next morning. The odds would be heavy--some 70,000 French, mostly green conscripts and national guardsmen, against more than 100,000 veteran Allies--but he was confident, and his troops wild with enthusiasm.

Schwarzenberg likewise saw the situation clearly. In quiet defiance of the Czar and the King of Prussia, he continued his withdrawal, sending the Prince of Lichtenstein to beg Napoleon for an armistice. Though inglorious, these measures probably saved his army.

Schwarzenberg likewise saw the situation clearly. In quiet defiance of the Czar and the King of Prussia, he continued his withdrawal, sending the Prince of Lichtenstein to beg Napoleon for an armistice. Though inglorious, these measures probably saved his army.

Napoleon entered Troyes about 0600 on the 24th, and this time he received a roaring welcome, one of the most heartfelt in his career. During the 24th, Gerard, Oudinot, and Macdonald, supported by Ney, energetically followed up the Army of Bohemia’s disorderly withdrawal. To climax Schwarzenberg’s perplexities, Augereau finally (and reluctantly) had bestirred himself. Responding to Schwarzenberg’s plea for an armistice, Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp to negotiate on the basis of the Allies’ first proposals--the natural borders of France. Hostilities would continue until the armistice was signed.

25 Feb-Alexander, Francis, Frederick Wm and Castlereagh held a council at Bar-sur-Aube. Agreeing that Augereau menaced their rear, they dispatched Hesse-Homburg with two Austrian corps to deal with him. After much brawling, they agreed to retreat to Langres, there to fight a defensive battle if Napoleon pursued them, or to resume their offensive if he turned on Blücher. Authorizing Blücher to operate as he saw fit, they transferred Bülow’s and Winzingerode’s corps to his command. Blücher once more marched on Paris with his augmented command. Hoping to stimulate Schwarzenberg, he sent the latter a purposely false report (25 Feb) that Napoleon was already pursuing the Army of Silesia (Blücher).

Napoleon was slow to believe that Blücher was again deliberately asking to be knocked on the head. 27 Feb-finally certain that Blücher was marching on Paris, he sent Ney (with Victor) in pursuit, and marched from Troyes with the remainder of his Guard. Augereau was to concentrate his troops and join the main army via Dijon.

Marmont and Mortier bloodied Blücher at the river crossing at Meaux on the 27th and 28th. Napoleon reached La Ferte on 1 March, but could only snatch Blücher’s last wagons and stragglers before the Marne bridges were cut. Once again, Napoleon’s lack of bridge train balked him; it took sixteen hours to repair the damaged La Ferte bridge. Early on the 3rd, however, Napoleon’s advance guard was north of Rocourt. Just to the north,

Blücher was leaving Oulchy-le-Chateau, still ignorant of Bülow’s and Winzingerode’s whereabouts. His army had had three night marches and three defeats in the last seventy-two hours, and had no supplies for a week, beyond what could be seized from the countryside. Certain only that Bülow had been at Laon, Blücher decided to retire in that direction. Ahead of him was the flooded Aisne River. Blücher had a good bridge train, but would need almost a day to bridge the Aisne and get his whole army across. He decided to give his troops twelve hours rest; send his trains to build a pontoon bridge three miles east of Soissons.

26 Feb-on receipt of Blücher’s deceptive report, A l e x a n d e r a n d F r e d e r i c k W m b u l l i e d Schwarzenberg into counterattacking towards Bar-sur-Aube, where Oudinot occupied an awkward position astride the river. Refusing to heed repeated warnings, Oudinot even ignored a premature, unsuccessful attack by Wrede on the 26th. Attacked by Wittgenstein the next day, he threw away the battle. That night Oudinot retired, his disheartened troops accusing him of treason. His withdrawal uncovered Macdonald, but the latter’s advance guard managed to bluff Würtemberg into halting.

BAR-SUR-AUBE

020 20

1 0 1 2

020 20

1 0 1 2

SOISSONS

0700 3 March-Blücher received a message from Winzingerode, reporting that he had failed to storm Soissons and he was planning to withdraw. At 1200, a second message ended Blücher’s profane rage. Soissons had capitulated!

020 20

1 0 1 2

SOISSONS

General Moreau, the commandant of Soissons, was lazy and a braggart. Though he had repulsed Winzingerode’s assault, had plenty of supplies, and could hear Marmont‘s and Mortier’s cannon, he allowed the Prussian emissaries to bully him into capitulating. To crown his incompetence, he failed to blow up the Soissons bridge. Using it, Blücher and Winzingerode escaped across the Aisne

020 20

1 0 1 2

SOISSONS

RHEIMS

BERRY

Napoleon drove north on the 4th; that night, a brigade of his cavalry surprised and captured Rheims. Informed of Moreau’s capitulation, he continued his advance, hoping that Blücher would attempt to defend the line of the Aisne. (He knew that Winzingerode had joined Blücher, but believed that Bülow was still north of Laon.) Blücher did try to hold the Aisne, but mistakenly massed opposite Soissons; leaving Berry lightly defended. Grouchy’s cavalry discovered the weakness; Nansouty galloped through Berry and seized the bridge intact; and Napoleon turned northwest, attempting to cut Blücher off from Laon.

020 20

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SOISSONS

RHEIMS

BERRY

Blücher marched to intercept Napoleon at Craonne. His plan was to station Woronzow (Winzingerode’s second-in-command) and Sacken on the dominating Craonne plateau to fix Napoleon; Winzingerode, with 11,000 cavalry and Kleist’s corps, would then attack Napoleon’s right rear. Napoleon came up faster than expected, Ney seizing a foothold on the plateau late on the 6th. Sacken was correspondingly slow. With Marmont and Mortier still well to his rear, Napoleon could not risk pushing ahead toward Laon while a strong Allied force held the Craonne plateau. After studying the terrain, he planned a double envelopment to trap Woronzow, but his attack on 7 March went awry when Ney advanced prematurely. Woronzow retired in good order, covered by Sacken’s cavalry. Meanwhile, poor staff work and stupid execution so entangled Winzingerode’s cavalry and Kleist’s corps that even Blücher’s expert professional blasphemy only increased the confusion. (Napoleon had been prepared to trap Winzingerode’s enveloping movement had it taken place.) French losses in the Battle of Craonne were 5,400; Allied, 5,000. Blücher now ordered a concentration at Laon (inset map).

CRAONNE

020 20

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SOISSONS

RHEIMS

BERRYCRAONNE

Napoleon believed that Craonne had been a rear-guard battle, designed to cover either a retreat into Belgium or an advance on Paris along the west bank of the Oise River. While Blücher’s army was now obviously too strong for him to destroy, he might be able to trap its rear guard and force Blücher far enough away from Paris to permit him to again turn on Schwarzenberg. At the same time, he would pick up the garrisons of the minor fortified towns in northeastern France. A Russian rear guard checked him late on 8 March at the Etouvelles defile, but was enveloped that night by a small detachment moving along back trails and largely destroyed. The French pushed rapidly forward, hoping to rush Laon.

ETOUVELLES

020 20

1 0 1 2

8 March-Tired of running, Blücher had decided to stand there--an immensely strong position along a high, steep ridge, which concealed much of his army. Believing that Napoleon had 90,000 men, he feared some enveloping maneuver; Marmont’s tardy appearance confirmed this worry. Finding Laon strongly held, Napoleon made several limited attacks to develop the enemy position. Winzingerode probed his left flank, but was easily discouraged. Darkness ended the fighting Marmont had turned sulky, twice refusing to leave Berry on the 8th. Advancing timidly the next morning, he finally took Athies. There he halted haphazardly, sending a detachment to seek contact with Napoleon, and quartering himself in a chateau two miles from his troops. His weary subordinates neglected their local security. By dark, Blücher had a good idea of Napoleon’s relative weakness and Marmont’s exposed position. Yorck--supported by Kleist, Sacken, Langeron, and the Prussian cavalry--surprised Marmont’s command and chased it toward Festieux (off inset map, three miles east of Bruyeres). Kleist maneuvered to block the Rheims road, while cavalry galloped deeper to seize Festieux. Fighting his way through to Festieux, Marmont found that defile held by 125 Old Guard infantry--the escort of a supply train that had halted there for the night! Thus saved, Marmont reorganized at Corbeny. (off map). Elated, Blücher ordered Yorck and Kleist to pursue Marmont to Berry; Winzingerode and Bülow would attack Napoleon frontally; Langeron and Sacken would advance through Bruyeres to cut the Soissons road behind Napoleon at L’Ange-Gardien. At 0500 10 March, two fugitives from Marmont’s column reached Napoleon. A hasty reconnaissance having confirmed their story, Napoleon decided to remain before Laon. If only a strong rear guard held Laon, he still should be able to defeat it. If Blücher’s whole army faced him, an aggressive front would take pressure off Marmont. Yorck and Kleist were already at Festieux; Sacken and Langeron had reached Bruyeres. But Blücher, sick and exhausted, suddenly collapsed.

Awed by Napoleon’s threatening maneuvers, Gneisenau (Blücher’s chief of staff) recalled these four corps. The day passed in minor attacks and counterattacks. (French casualties for the two days were approximately 6,000; Allied, 4,000)

Napoleon withdrew after sundown, 10 March. There was no pursuit until the 11th; then, Ney’s first ambush cowed it.

E & E, COMMENTARY ON MAP 152

As the French fell back towards Soissons, however, there was no disguising the unpalatable fact that another of the Emperor’s schemes had ended in complete failure….proportionally, the French losses in men, materiel and morale were far greater than those of their opponents. Napoleon wrote to Joseph on the 11th:

The final sentence of this letter is even more revealing of the gravity that the Emperor read into the general situation: “Orders must be given for the construction of redoubts at Montmartre.” The capital’s peril was very real

Chandler, p.991

I have reconnoitered the enemy’s position at Laon. It is too strong to permit an attack without heavy loss. I have therefore given the word to fall back on Soissons. It is probable that the enemy would have evacuated Laon for fear of an attack but for the crass stupidity of the Duke of Ragusa [Marmont], who behaved himself like a second lieutenant. The enemy is suffering enormous losses; he has attacked the village of Clacy [Ney’s ambush} five times--and been repulsed on each occasion. Unfortunately, the Young Guard is melting like snow. The Old Guard keeps up its strength, but the Guard cavalry is shrinking a great deal. It is vital that General Ornano should remount all dragoons and chasseurs--and even old soldiers--using all means in his power.

Despite terrible news from almost all fronts (Wellington was driving Soult across southern France, Bayonne was besieged, Bordeau had been betrayed to the English on 12 March, in Italy a British expedition had seized Genoa) Napoleon refused to cease fighting. Unaware of Blücher’s collapse, he hesitated to leave Soissons. When he learned that the Prussian St.-Priest had recaptured Rheims his indecision ended. Napoleon had the great captain’s knack of turning calamity into opportunity. Sweeping forty miles across Blücher’s front, he completely surprised St.-Priest on 13 March and recovered Rheims. (Casualties: Allies, 6,000; French, 700) At Rheims, Napoleon directly threatened Blücher’s left flank and Schwarzenberg’s right. French morale rallied. To the shocked Allies, it seemed as though Napoleon was able to whistle fresh armies out of the earth. The news halted Schwarzenberg on 16 March. Blücher had lurched southward on the 13th, Bülow reaching Compiegne, which he found too strong, and Sacken approaching Soissons, where Mortier defeated him. Learning the next day of St.-Priest’s fate, Blücher withdrew to Laon and went on the defensive, considerably heckled by French partisans

RHEIMS

SOISSONS

Despite terrible news from almost all fronts (Wellington was driving Soult across southern France, Bayonne was besieged, Bordeau had been betrayed to the English on 12 March, in Italy a British expedition had seized Genoa) Napoleon refused to cease fighting. Unaware of Blücher’s collapse, he hesitated to leave Soissons. When he learned that the Prussian St.-Priest had recaptured Rheims his indecision ended. Napoleon had the great captain’s knack of turning calamity into opportunity. Sweeping forty miles across Blücher’s front, he completely surprised St.-Priest on 13 March and recovered Rheims. (Casualties: Allies, 6,000; French, 700) At Rheims, Napoleon directly threatened Blücher’s left flank and Schwarzenberg’s right. French morale rallied. To the shocked Allies, it seemed as though Napoleon was able to whistle fresh armies out of the earth. The news halted Schwarzenberg on 16 March. Blücher had lurched southward on the 13th, Bülow reaching Compiegne, which he found too strong, and Sacken approaching Soissons, where Mortier defeated him. Learning the next day of St.-Priest’s fate, Blücher withdrew to Laon and went on the defensive, considerably heckled by French partisans

RHEIMS

SOISSONSCOMPIEGNE

At Rheims, Napoleon revived his earlier plan to crush Blücher, then move eastward to gather in the garrisons of his frontier

To add to his burdens he had become suspicious of a growing intimacy between Marie Louise and [his brother] King Joseph. “Do not be too familiar with the king,” he cautioned his wife. “Keep him at a distance, never allow him to enter your private apartments...do not let him play the part of adviser.” He wrote again the following day: “You trust [Joseph] too much… Everyone has betrayed me… Mistrust the king: he has an evil reputation with women.” Two days later: “The king is intriguing; he will be the first to suffer; he is a pygmy, swelling with his own importance.”

Asprey, p. 353

[On 23 March] the allies had intercepted a letter from Napoleon to Marie Louise informing her of his intended march to the Marne. At an allied council of war on the following day Czar Alexander persuaded Schwarzenberg to join Blücher in an attack on Napoleon’s much smaller force. But now the allies intercepted an official dispatch from Paris to Napoleon that spoke of an empty treasury, general discontent and the sensation caused by Wellington’s seizure of Bordeaux. Using this incentive the czar won Prussian and Austrian approval to march directly on Paris.

Asprey, p. 355

Advancing through Mery-sur-Seine (where he destroyed Würtemburg’s rear guard) Napoleon saw indications of a hasty retreat everywhere, and reverted to his former plan of marching eastward to collect his garrisons. Contemptuous of Schwarzenberg, he marched on Arcis-sur-Aube. Paris would have to defend itself. Napoleon was overly contemptuous of Schwarzenberg. Learning that some French troops were south of the Aube, the Austrian advanced on Mery, bringing on a haphazard clash (20 March) around Arcis. Here Ney and Sebastiani--led with cold savagery by Napoleon--whipped off twice their numbers. (Casualties: Allies, 2,500; French, 1,700) Concluding that Napoleon was stronger than reported, Schwarzenberg [once again] retired that night, concentrating 80,000 men for a defensive-offensive battle.

Napoleon first thought that he had encountered an unusually stubborn rear guard. Moving cautiously southward on 21 March to develop the situation, he found Schwarzenberg too strong to attack, and withdrew across the Aube. He then continued toward Vitry. Schwarzenberg attempted to follow,, was repulsed, and relapsed into confusion. Napoleon mistakenly believed that Schwarzenberg would fear having his LOC cut and have to follow him to the northeast. He also believed that Blücher and Bülow were not able to move on Paris by themselves. But he had fought his last battle of this campaign. Schwarzenberg was bullied by the Tsar into ignoring the threat to his rear and joining Blücher in the drive toward Paris.

[On the 29th] the Empress Marie-Louise and the King of Rome left the capital and headed south. They were followed toward Orléans by Joseph and part of the government on the 30th; some high officials, including the treacherous Talleyrand, found excuses for remaining in the capital where they busied themselves preparing a welcome for the Tsar. Thereafter the fall of Paris could not be long delayed….at two o’clock on the morning of the 31st, Marshal Marmont, the Duke of Ragusa, agreed to an armistice with the Allies, and under its terms withdrew his men to the south of the capital. Soon after, Allied cavalry were swarming through the barriers. After twenty-two years of practically continual warfare, the forces of reaction had attained their original avowed goal. Talleyrand made the most of his opportunity; rallying a rump of the government, he declared Napoleon to be deposed, and succeeded in dazzling the Tsar with his charm at their very first meeting. His genius for survival again stood him in good stead.

Chandler, pp.1000-1001

On 11 April a forlorn and dejected Napoleon dictated and signed his abdication. Caulaincourt and Macdonald remained with him but could not bring him out of a deep depression. On the night of 12 April the emperor attempted suicide by swallowing the contents of a phial that he had worn around his neck during the retreat from Russia. A combination of opium, belladonna and white hellebore made him very sick but did not kill him. After a ghastly night he recovered sufficiently to prepare himself for exile.

Asprey, p. 355

IV. Abdication

IV. Abdication

Adieux de Napoléon à la Garde impériale dans la cour du Cheval-Blanc du château de Fontainebleau.

You, my friends--continue to serve France. Its welfare was my single thought and will always be the object of my wishes. Do not pity me...I want to write about the great things that we have done together. Farewell, my children.

--Napoleon’s farewell address to the Old Guard,Fontainebleau, 20 April 1814

On 11 April a forlorn and dejected Napoleon dictated and signed his abdication..

Asprey, p. 355

Louis XVIII

France was occupied by foreign troops. Louis XVIII was placed on his throne by them. The aristocratic émigrés returned, dreaming of overturning the Revolution. Napoleon was escorted off to his new “empire” of Elba. Plans were made for a Congress in Vienna where the victors would divide the spoils. But it was not to be that easy...