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Strategic Warning and Risk Analysis Concepts Ken Knight [email protected] 703-220-8445

4th Workshop on Strategic Crisis Management, Keynote Presentation - Strategic Warning and Risk Analysis

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What is Warning?

The Dictionary definition: • An alert prior to a threatening act,

event, or behavior

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In practical terms, that means: • Productive, continuing interaction with decision-makers …

actionable foresight … enabling better decisions, broader options, increased resiliency

— Shape outcomes to achieve objectives — Prepare for outcomes that cannot be fully shaped — Mitigate impacts of outcomes that cannot be fully

prepared for — Avoid Complete Surprise (the enemy is at the gate)

! ! Strategic

Tactical

Common Causes of Surprise • Deliberate hostile actions • System shocks • Under-estimating or mis-

estimating trend implications • Confusing assumptions and

uncertainties • Not recognizing complex

linkages • Technological/operational

changes • Natural events

Enduring Challenges • A tough business, even under the best circumstances

– complex issues, set in the future, significant uncertainties, high stakes

• Defining your mission • Maintaining the mindset • Training, time, resources • Product/output

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• Finding the right place to ‘plug in’

• Success metrics • ‘3 Bears’ expectations • Not wanting to be wrong

Temptation to Warn of Everything …

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… Or Report Anything

Common Pitfalls • Consensus cultures (don’t rock the boat) • Functional specialization (experts rule) • Integration (old/new, regional/functional, etc.) • Imagination (that hasn’t happened before) • Mirror imaging (they’ll do what we would do) • Perception biases/pattern matching (seeing what we

expect to see)

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• Inappropriate analogies (true before, so true again)

• Depending too much on the information we have

• Ego (You can’t fool me) • Negativity bias … remembering

the bad more than the good • Holding on to entrenched beliefs

Not Possible to Completely Eliminate Surprise

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But We Can Improve the Odds • Conscious, deliberate, systematic efforts … not just

the by-product of daily activity • 3-dimensional capabilities

– Rapid detection for rapid response – Persistent surveillance of known threats – Strategic reconnaissance of emerging issues

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• Extensive collaboration and engagement … well beyond ‘your team’

• Energizing and focusing the entire enterprise • Specific training and tradecraft • Senior leader endorsement (‘partnership’ with analytic

organizations)

Warning System Essentials • Understanding and articulating

‘normal’ – Patterns, developments,

conditions, behaviors, actions, etc. that define the ‘steady state’

• Being able to recognize important deviations – Sources, metrics, analytic

criteria, etc. that help you detect significant change

• Knowing when (and when not) to warn – Reporting thresholds … how far

away from ‘normal’ before you tell somebody 9

Normal

Elevated

Significant Concern

Critical

Elements of a Systematic Process • Continuous effort to identify

existing and anticipate emerging threats

• Conscious evaluation of likelihood, impact, capacity to leverage/influence key factors

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• Consistent monitoring of critical factors impacting the warning/risk/opportunity event

• Regular communication with leadership and other stakeholders

• Generate, evaluate mitigation options?

Evaluating Risks • Should include:

– Clear articulation of the risk/warning event

– Examination of how it could ‘plausibly’ materialize

– Likelihood that it will occur within specified timeframe (with confidence statement)

• Problematic, but maybe most important – Potential impact should it materialize

• Not strictly an analyst function • Nature of the threat/risk and our

exposure/vulnerability • Local, regional, enterprise implications

– Potential points of leverage/influence – Follow-on actions – Critical uncertainties; emerging topics – Potential for additional warning

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Probability Assessment • Beware of the usual pitfalls

– Availability … Anchoring … Overconfidence • Many approaches, none fool-proof

– Quantitative Methods – probability theory, descriptive and inferential statistics, statistical modeling … when you have the data

– Expert Judgment – individual experts or groups of experts assess likelihood based on available information and their experience

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– Timeline/Indicator – probability is assessed according to the gap between detected/expected threat/risk activity levels

– Alternative Analyses (ACH) – specifically examining alternative scenarios/ hypotheses; matching those to existing evidence

– Drivers-Constraints – probability is assessed according to the relative number, strength, and weight of individual factors that would make the risk more or less likely to occur

– Decision Games – probabilities assessed using iterative models of stakeholder decision-making

Impact Assessment

• Expert analysis of potential impact on strategic interests should risk materialize

– How does the event itself affect our interests?

– How is (are) the issue, place, region, world, our interests different in the aftermath?

• Combines threat characteristics and institutional vulnerability/exposure

• Can be relatively simple and subjective … – High, Medium, Low

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• … Or more complex and quantitative – Weighted values, algorithms, models, numeric scoring

• Requires clear, understandable ranking values

Assessing Analytic Confidence

• Complexity • Information • Analytic Expertise • Plausible

Alternatives • Time

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The Ideal Analytic Output • Timely

– Detects the earliest signs – Within customer timelines and processes

• Credible – Uncertainties, gaps, assumptions and confidence are transparent – Considers and examines plausible alternatives – Convincingly delivered (sound, concise, tailored)

• Actionable – Evaluates impact (the event) and implications (aftermath) – Addresses context, direction, speed, completeness – Anticipates (posits) next steps … and potential triggers? – Identifies potential points of leverage/influence – Assesses potential for additional warning

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Many Different Methodologies Evidence-Based

• Timeline-Indicators • Trend Analysis • Modeling • Simulations • Drivers-Constraints

• Backcasting • Scenarios • Visioning • Structured Games and Workshops • Brainstorming

Possibilities-Based

• Analysis of Competing Hypotheses • Deception Assessment • Devil’s Advocacy • ‘What If’ Assessments • Team A/Team B

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Others

• Challenging Assumptions • Horizon Scanning • Red Teams • Delphi • Wild Card Assessments • Expert Surveys

Matching Methodologies to Problems • Where is the issue on the analytic continuum (known? …

knowable? … complex? … chaotic?) • What information would you like to have to address your

issue with high confidence? How does that compare with the information you have or are likely to get?

• Who is your primary intended consumer? What is his/her decision ‘space’ … time horizon … risk tolerance?

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• How much time do you have? • How do you plan to deal

(explicitly) with uncertainty? • What is the best (or most likely)

method of conveyance? • What methodologies are most

appropriate to your issue?

5 Useful Things to Have in Place • Structured analytic approaches tailored to

the problem

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• Comprehensive information strategies

• Communities of interest effectively linking stakeholders

• Regular dialogue with customers

• Designated analytic leads

Challenging Expert Thinking • What is the likelihood of XX … in XX

timeframe?

• Why do you think that? (assumptions, evidence, rationale, uncertainties)

• How confident are you in your assessment?

• Does anyone disagree with you? … What is their argument?

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• How recent is your most critical information?

• Has your assessment changed over time?

• What is the ‘newest’ big thing you have had to factor in?

• What evidence or developments would change your assessment?

• What would you most like to know that you don’t?

• How are you most likely to be wrong?

• What are the implications of your being wrong?

• When was the last time you were wrong?

Communicating Warning • Detailed, iterative

interactions with leadership

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• Risk assessments, not predictions

• Partnership throughout the process

• Use any surrogate access • Trust trumps most everything else • What you (and they) know, don’t know, think • Work hard to make this a productive relationship

Not So Easy to Get Right Assuming you see it coming … • The audience is pre-occupied … they might not be receptive • They have biases too … and other sources of information • You’re asking them to embrace a major discontinuity … potential

harm … that may never materialize … a very tough sell • Your case may rest more on rational possibilities than evidence • You hope to leave them worried (thanks!) … they may just be

complacent … or angry • They expect you to get it ‘just right’ … not too early or too late

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• Other experts disagree … they may try to push you toward consensus

• An ounce of prevention is hard to measure • Nobody, especially you, wants to be wrong • ‘Crying Sheep’

So …

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You will need to be: • Thoughtful • Deliberate • Calculating • Persistent • Tough-minded • Persuasive • Creative

What Does Your Decision-Maker Need? • What would you most like to know if you could

know anything? • What is your definition (strategic vision) of

success? • What are the top several things you most want

to accomplish? … most need to avoid? • What are your biggest concerns/fears?

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• What are the dangers of not achieving your vision? • What needs to change in order for you to be successful? • What developments (successes and failures) over the recent past

are most instructive? • What must be done now/next (the top priority first step)? • What one thing would you do if you could do anything?

Deciding When to Warn? • Likelihood and Impact • Are we approaching a

threshold? • Do other analysts share

my concern? • Is the policy community

aware?

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• How long has it been since we last engaged? • Are other narratives overly optimistic? • Has the risk narrative been fragmented?

Questions to Consider • What is the critical information

I must convey … in initial and subsequent interactions?

• What factors are causing me concern … how do I track and measure them?

• Who is my audience?

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• What are the principal obstacles to my effectively communicating this warning?

• What if I am not successful? • What opportunities/advantages do I have? • What is my most likely/effective means of conveyance? • What questions can I anticipate? • What are the main counter arguments?

A Useful Writing Style

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•Chapeau paragraph provides ‘bottom line’ assessments

•Bulleted sub-paragraphs provide supporting evidence

•Examples can be found at: http://www.dni.gov/index.php/about/organization/national-intelligence-council-nic-publications

Stop Light Charts

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Indicator Status

Normal Elevated Significant Concern

Critical

C2 Garrison Status Two Strategic CPs Deployed

3-4 Strategic CPs Deployed

More Than 4 Strategic CPs Deployed

Logistics Stocks in Depots Local Depots Out-Loaded

Regional Depots Out-Loaded

National Depots Out-Loaded

Maneuver Forces

Garrison Status 20-25% Out of Garrison

25-50% Out of Garrison

More than 50% Out of Garrison

Strategic Forces

Deterrent Status 25% in Ready Status

More than 25% in Ready Status

Fully Mobilized and Dispersed

Civil Defense Peacetime Status Reserve-Ready Status

Reserve Call-up Underway

Full Mobilization

National Reserves

Peacetime Status Single Sector Mobilization

Multiple Sector Mobilization

Full Mobilization

• Nuanced perspective on a dynamic, evolving situation • ‘Proof’ that something larger is not yet taking shape • Inspires confidence

Indicator Charts

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Indicator Status

15 Aug 12 Status

15 Sep 12

Direction

Alawi Cohesion (Overall Assessment)

Additional attacks on senior leadership Key security elements unwilling to act Desertions/defections among Alawi leadership or rank and file Redeployment to Alawi heartland Non-elite Alawi opposition to Assad Evidence of palace coup/attempt (arrests, purges, etc.)

Military/ Security Service/Key Leader Loyalty (Overall Assessment)

Desertion/defections Recruitment (conscription numbers) Casualties Unwillingness to act Coup/attempt (arrests of officers)

Military/Security Service Effectiveness (Overall Assessment)

Declining effectiveness of key units Shortages (numbers, arms, equipment) Logistics shortfalls impacting operations Capacity to seize/hold territory Capacity to project forces anywhere Dependence on militias

Opposition Effectiveness (Overall Assessment)

Numbers (recruits, arms, operations, etc.) Reducing capabilities gap in relationship to regime forces Clear structure/command and control Capacity to repel regime offensive operations Improved coordination Geographic scope of ops Intelligence capacity Capacity to establish safe-havens

Assad’s Perspective/Outlook (Overall Assessment)

Public profile Visible signs of strain/isolation Family posture

Integrated Risk Plots

IMPACT

Lower L I K E L I H O O D Higher

Iran Nuclear Surprise

WMD Terror Attack

Israel-Iran

Reversal in Afghanistan

Sudan Violence

Major Cyber Attack

NK Minor Provocation

NK Instability

Escalating Mexican Drug

Violence

US-PRC military event

I-P Conflict

Pakistan Instability

Lebanon Crisis

Reversal In Iraq

Russia-Georgia

Saudi Instability

Egypt Instability

Yemen Collapse

Haiti Instability

911-like Terror Attack

China- Taiwan

Major Mil – Tech Surprise

Mexico Instability

Double-Dip Recession

Higher

Nigeria Instability

2-Axis Scenario Output (How Country X Evolves)

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Looks Like Revolution

Blood, Sweat and Tears

Amplified Authoritarianism

The Long Twilight Struggle

Dashboard Charts

Direction:

Current Status

Velocity: Medium High Low

Helping with Mitigation • Do we have the capacity to affect risk

likelihood and/or impact? How? • Do we have the option of doing nothing? … or

of ‘getting out of the business’ altogether? • Can we share or deflect the risk?

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• Do we have a warning system in place for this risk?

• Do we have contingency plans? • Can we adapt? … or hedge

against it?

And Still They Don’t Listen …

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Questions?