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This presentation was given to Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark by Dr, Robbin F. Laird on May 22, 2014. The Danish Centre for Military Studies (CMS) was established on 1 April 2010. CMS carries out strategic research and provides research-based public sector services with a focus on topical military and defence and security policy issues and provides an organisational framework for interdisciplinary research cooperation between the University of Copenhagen, other research institutions and other relevant parties. http://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/about/
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This presenta,on was given to Centre for Military Studies, University of Copenhagen in Copenhagen, Denmark by Dr, Robbin F. Laird on May 22, 2014. The Danish Centre for Military Studies (CMS) was established on 1 April 2010. CMS carries out strategic research and provides research-‐based public sector services with a focus on topical military and defence and security policy issues and provides an organisaDonal framework for interdisciplinary research cooperaDon between the University of Copenhagen, other research insDtuDons and other relevant parDes. hGp://cms.polsci.ku.dk/english/about/
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This briefing is based on our new book, Rebuilding American Military Power in the Pacific: A 21st Century Strategy (Praeger, 2013) and reflects as well discussions held in the Pacific earlier this year. Some of those discussions can be seen in the Special Report on Australian Defense Moderniza,on hGp://www.sldinfo.com/australian-‐defense-‐moderniza,on-‐shaping-‐capabili,es-‐for-‐21st-‐century-‐opera,ons/
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This is a work in progress and one clearly driven by the evolving strategic context, new technologies and the forging of new concepts of opera,ons. It is also about cross-‐cuVng moderniza,ons among the US and its allies in response to North Korean and Chinese military developments as well, notably the reach and range of missiles and the “coming” out of the Chinese forces into the Pacific at greater range as well
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This slide highlights some of the significant drivers of change in the Pacific which are providing for pressure points on US and allied strategy and capabili,es: The impact of the PRC; The second nuclear age dynamics represented by North Korea whereby it is not about conven,onal to nuclear deterrence; its is about dealing with a small nuclear power’s capability right away if hos,li,es seem imminent; It is about the expansion of the “size” of the Pacific with the Arc,c opening, a development akin in some ways to the opening of the Suez canal on Europe and Asia; And the challenge of managing the sea and air space associated with the transit of goods and services over a vast ocean area which, in turn, allows one to provide for SLOC defense.
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The Russians will become a mari,me power in a real sense with the Arc,c opening and Canada will face the challenge of shaping an Arc,c grid to manage their security and defense challenges. A key requirement for Canada will be to shape a grid to cover the full geography, including her ArcDc interests. If one conceptualizes that a core challenge facing Canadian sovereignty is to provide for security and defense in the context of the ArcDc opening, then major acquisiDons should be made over Dme, and built out to that direcDon. In effect, the grid covering from Northern Europe to the Northern Pacific and over the ArcDc – built with allied collaboraDon – is clearly a key challenge but also one which could focus Canadian force development and also defense and security investments. It could also guide a way to think about public-‐private partnerships in the region, and tapping into the ongoing development of various Canadian civilian capabiliDes that are relevant to the ArcDc opening. hGp://www.frontline-‐defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2111
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The usual Pacific defense graphic shows the world as seen from the PRC facing east with Taiwan and the Taiwan straits and then Korea and then Japan. But this is not how it looks from the US standpoint; the tyranny of distance is what greats American naval and airpower.
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As things stand now, the core for the US effort from Hawaii outward is to enable a central strategic triangle, one that reaches from Hawaii to Guam and to Japan. This triangle is at the heart of America’s ability to project power into the Western Pacific. With a 20th century approach, one which is plaXorm-‐centric and rooted in step by step augmentaDon of force, each point of the triangle needs to be garrisoned with significant numbers of plaXorms which can be pushed forward. To be clear, having capability in this triangle is a key element of what the United States can bring to the party for Pacific operaDons, and it remains fundamental. But with a new approach to an aZack and defense enterprise, one would use this capability differently from simply providing for push forward and sequenDal escalaDon dominance. Rather than focusing simply on the image of projecDng power forward, what is crucial to an successful Pacific strategy is enabling a strategic quadrangle in the Western Pacific, anchored on Japan, South Korea, Australia, and Singapore. This will not be simple. CompeDDon, even mutual suspicion, among US allies in the Western Pacific is historically deep-‐rooted; as a former 7th USAF commander underscored, “history sDll maZers in impeding allied cooperaDon.” But in spite of these challenges and impediments, enabling the quadrangle to do a beZer job of defending itself and shaping interoperability across separate naDons has to become a central strategic American goal.
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Note: 1. Numbers include US Marines and Sailors aGached to Marine Corps Opera,onal units. Japan numbers include units that are deployed there from East Coast, West Coast and Hawaii as part of the Unit Deployment program. Those units’ numbers have been subtracted from the California and Hawaii numbers, to avoid double coun,ng. 2. Rotary Wing Aircraj includes Tiltrotor (MV-‐22)
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Notes: 1. Numbers include US Marines and Sailors aGached to Marine Corps Opera,onal units. Japan, Guam and Australia numbers include units that are deployed there from East Coast, West Coast and Hawaii Marine Corps units as part of the Unit Deployment program. Those units’ numbers have been subtracted from the California and Hawaii numbers, to avoid double coun,ng. 2. Rotary Wing Aircraj includes Tiltrotor (MV-‐22)
Within the distributed laydown, the Marines must retain the ability rapidly to respond to crises across the range of demands, from Major Combat opera,on in NE Asia to low-‐end Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) wherever it occurs. Each loca,on for the Marines is in transi,on as well. From Okinawa and Iwakuni, the Marines can locally train in Japan, Korea and the Philippines, as well as respond with “Fight Tonight” capabili,es if necessary. From Guam, the Marines can train locally in the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) to the north, the Federated States of Micronesia to the south, and Palau and the Philippines to the west. Guam and CNMI provide the Marines something we do not have anywhere else in the Pacific: A loca,on on U.S. soil where they can train unilaterally or with partner na,ons. In broad terms, prior to the DL (ca. 2011), the Marines were located in Japan (25,000 in Mainland Japan and Okinawa), Hawaii (approximately 6,000) and on the West Coast (approximately 45,000 in California and Arizona). With the DL (ca. 2025), there will be a projected force distribu,on as follows: Mainland Japan and Okinawa (15,000), Guam (approximately 4700), Hawaii (approximately 8800), West Coast (approximately 43,000) and a rota,onal force in Northwest Australia of
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The last slide and this one focus on the Pacific exercises of the Marines, the USN and the USAF in working with allies. These exercises are a crucial ,ssue through which combat innova,on is being shaped among the allies and the US in forging a 21st century approach to Pacific defense.
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A key element of the reshaping of the PACAF approach to air dominance is making progress on integrated air and missile defense. The Army’s ADA systems are a key part of the air dominance re-‐set.
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hGp://www.frontline-‐defence.com/index_archives.php?page=2164 hGp://www.sldinfo.com/australian-‐defense-‐moderniza,on-‐shaping-‐capabili,es-‐for-‐21st-‐century-‐opera,ons/
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Two key Aussie air assets as part of its moderniza,on strategy are seen here: the KC-‐30A air tanker and the Wedgetail air baGle management system. The photos were taken on visits to the bases of the respec,ve squadrons in Australia in March 2014.
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Japanese defense policy is in evolu,on. It started with a very narrow self-‐defense concept which focused on the homeland narrowly understood. But as the US role in the region changed over the past twenty years and threats in the neighborhood expanded such a policy made liGle strategic sense. The focus is now on “dynamic defense” which is shaping air and mari,me capabili,es to defend Japan more broadly and to over ,me work with the US and allies to be able to protect Japanese interests running North-‐South. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐re-‐set-‐of-‐pacific-‐defense-‐australia-‐and-‐japan-‐weigh-‐in/
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It is not really about a Pivot to the Pacific. It is about the PRC, North Korea and the allies reshaping the strategic environment. The ques,on then becomes how can the US reshape its capabili,es and strategies to be relevant.
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The size of the Pacific poses its own challenges. Shaping scalable and modular forces among the US and the allies is crucial to operate at distance and to shape targeted forces to deal with local crises. Also the constant challenge of dealing with humanitarian and disaster relief challenges in the region taxes US and allied forces. There is a frequent demand to come to mutual support and aid as well as to encompass a much wider range of partners in the region. All of these dynamics require not simply the existence and development of forces in the abstract. It requires regular training among the allies and with the United States. As a result, the exercise regimes are a crucial lifeblood for forging real capabili7es and effec7ve and innova7ve approaches to move forward. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/allied-‐pacific-‐exercises-‐and-‐training-‐shaping-‐a-‐deterrence-‐in-‐depth-‐strategy/
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The rebuilding of American military power will be reshaped by a number of new technologies as well as approaches. The challenge will be to be innova,ve enough to move ahead in a fiscally constrained environment and in the heavy presence of legacy thinking.
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This graphic shows the impact of ,ltorator technology coupled with the KC-‐130Js in reshaping a core capability hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐sp-‐magp-‐cr-‐training-‐for-‐scalability/ hGp://sldinfo.com/flipbooks/SPMAGTF/Special%20Purpose%20MAGTF%20Crisis%20Response/ hGp://www.defenceweb.co.za/index.php?op,on=com_content&view=ar,cle&id=33573:the-‐sp-‐magp-‐cr-‐training-‐for-‐scalability&ca,d=3:Civil%20Security&Itemid=113
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hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐pacaf-‐commander-‐and-‐reworking-‐pacific-‐defense-‐the-‐aor-‐will-‐become-‐a-‐caoc/ hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐chief-‐of-‐staff-‐of-‐the-‐australian-‐air-‐force-‐on-‐the-‐future-‐of-‐air-‐power-‐the-‐impact-‐of-‐the-‐f-‐35-‐on-‐the-‐raaf/ hGp://thediplomat.com/2013/04/game-‐changer-‐the-‐f-‐35-‐and-‐the-‐pacific/
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t is clear that the F-‐35 global enterprise is a unique enabler of the en7re re-‐set of US and allied airpower. Yet this crucial and even central reality is hardly recognized in the mounds or should one say piles of commentary on the F-‐35 program. And indeed, notably in tes,mony of defense officials in front of Congress, is the absence of emphasis upon how central the allies are to the program, or that the F-‐35 has recently become the plane of choice for all of the core Pacific allies. Allies are not simply “partners” in the program they are the enablers of 21st century air combat development and approaches. Allies are not simply “following” the US lead; they are innova,ng on their own and will infuse the F-‐35 global enterprise with the spirit of innova,on and inven,on, not mortgaged by the “sequestra,on” somnolent evident in Washington. hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐f-‐35-‐global-‐enterprise-‐viewed-‐from-‐down-‐under/
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hGp://www.sldinfo.com/a-‐21st-‐century-‐approach-‐to-‐airpower-‐the-‐italian-‐air-‐force-‐and-‐the-‐f-‐35/ The first issue is the ques,on of why the Italian Air Force was mixing its fleet between As and Bs. “We studied the issue carefully and for the kind of missions we face we needed the flexibility which the B can add to the fleet. We need to go to the mission not the airfield. We will operate in many areas where there are only short runways; the B allows us to operate in those condi,ons. We can mix the fleet and operate at sea on land, on our own ships or own others. It is the kind of flexibility, which we see as crucial to a 21st century seVng. I will give you an example of what we don’t want. We planned to operate with the USMC in Afghanistan. But we were three months later in the deployment than we intended because our Tornados could not operate in the same condi,ons as the USMC. We had to take three months to build out the air base from which we would operate with them. Time is crucial to many of the missions in which we will be engaged. The Bs give me a
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hGp://www.sldinfo.com/special-‐report-‐on-‐italy-‐and-‐the-‐f-‐35/ It is also difficult to argue with the proposi,on that the Mediterranean and the Middle East will not be a busy opera,onal area for NATO and allied forces. The F-‐35 fleet that rolls out from a diversity of users will need the kind of opera,onal and maintenance support which can be provided at Cameri. The Italians have built major warehouse facili,es to hold parts for the F-‐35 as well as maintenance bay accommoda,ons secured to collateral SECRET, and, with the IT system which can manage the parts which are stamped with common parts iden,fiers, it will be straighporward to manage the inventory coming in and out of these warehouses to support an allied fleet. A way to look at this would be the shape a graphic as follows with Cameri as the hub to support the Western and Eastern Mediterranean and the en,re sweep of allied F-‐35 fleet opera,ons. This could include the USAF, the USN, the USMC, the Italian forces, the Bri,sh forces, the Norwegian forces, etc. The Italians have understood the F-‐35 fleet concept and have laid down an infrastructure to support it AT THE SAME TIME as they built their FACO and wing
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The size of the Pacific poses its own challenges. Shaping scalable and modular forces among the US and the allies is crucial to operate at distance and to shape targeted forces to deal with local crises. Also the constant challenge of dealing with humanitarian and disaster relief challenges in the region taxes US and allied forces. There is a frequent demand to come to mutual support and aid as well as to encompass a much wider range of partners in the region.
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An emergent force is the enhanced role of connec7vity among joint and coali7on plaQorms and systems. It is no longer simply seVng a goal for greater interoperability; it is building in to the Pacific defense effort greater capability for divergent plaporms and systems to be connected in a dynamic defense and deterrent force. One way to express this dynamic is the coming of the aerospace combat cloud and the ability to engage in collabora,ve opera,ons much more effec,vely and fundamentally. The cloud concept has been highlighted by Lt. General (re,red) Deptula, the Dean of the Mitchell Ins,tute for Aerospace Studies of the Air Force Associa,on, as a key focal point in shaping the way ahead in integrated combat power.
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Rather than “integra,ng” separate plaporms and separate services and domains, a joint and coali,on force is emerging which can distribute through a baGlespace and operate by cross connec,ng and shaping an offensive defensive enterprise. Shaping a force that is cloud-‐ready is a key to the effort and acquisi,on of new plaporms in the future needs to proceed from an understanding that they need to connect to the cloud and operate flexibly in providing either offensive or defensive capabili,es dependent on the mission and the priori,es shaped by the decision-‐making process. And that process itself is undergoing major changes as distributed capabili,es populate the cloud and allow the force to operate in real ,me. The combat cloud provides situa,onal dynamic decisions to be made by war fighters at all levels to get deep inside the adversary’s decision cycle hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐next-‐phase-‐of-‐air-‐power-‐crajing-‐and-‐enabling-‐the-‐aerospace-‐combat-‐cloud/ hGp://www.sldinfo.com/the-‐gce-‐drives-‐usmc-‐avia,on-‐innova,on-‐major-‐cuomo-‐of-‐the-‐infantry-‐officer-‐course-‐discusses-‐the-‐iocs-‐team-‐perspec,ve/ 30
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While joint opera,ons designed to integrate the effects of separate plaporms by separate service components in their respec,ve domains has evolved to a degree, a joint and coali,on concept of opera,ons is emerging that can achieve even greater synergy. That greater synergy will be made possible through cross-‐domain opera,ons by plaporms distributed throughout the baGlespace. Those cross-‐domain synergies can be achieved only with an architecture enabled by robust, reliable, and secure connec,vity allowing for the universal sharing of informa,on to achieve the desired effects of the objec,ves of the opera,on. This is the goal of what is being no,onally described as a “Combat Cloud.” Shaping a force that can share informa,on among a dispirit collec,on of systems resident in a cloud-‐like architecture will be key to the concept. Acquisi,on of new plaporms in the future can be op,mized by an understanding that they need to connect in the cloud and operate flexibly in order to provide either offensive or defensive capabili,es dependent on the mission and their priori,es as shaped by the decision-‐making process.
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