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Radical Uyghur Groups and Their lnfluenceon Central Asian Development

█ Fu, Jen Kun

Abstract

The Uighur, which literally means "allied" or "united", can be epitomized as aTurkic people. Their origins can be traced back to Turkish nomads who lived in theSiberia region. They became the independent race of the Turks and created theUighur’s Kingdom in 744 AD, but were forced to leave their homeland in 840 AD. It was then that most of them immigrated to western China, to what was called TheXinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR).

Key word: Uighurs, Turk, China, Xinjiang, Central Asia, Silk Road.

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Radical Uyghur Groups and Their lnfluenceon Central Asian Development

█ Fu, Jen Kun

The assessment of dangers of Xinjiang movement

According to foreign observers, after Dan Siao Ping’s death in the spring of 1997, there was a surge in the activity of Xinjiang Independence Movement (XIM). Thisdevelopment attracted foreign observers’ attention. During the August of 1998, in the Xinjiang province of PRC, the number of fresh unrests sparked between Uighursand Hans on grounds of interethnic differences had created a worldwide response.American, Russian, EU (European Union), Canadian, Australian, Turkey and otherleading countries’ media provided instant coverage of these incidents.

In one excerpt, the Hong-Kong-based ‘Voice of America’ transmitted: “in recent days, there had been an increase in interethnic tensions and clash between theUighurs and Hans in Kashgar”. Lian Dun, the Head of Hong-Kong’s TV Department, who worked in Turkey and other countries during 1997, did a report on the XIM.He held a presentation of an actual movie depicting armed attempts by the followersof the XIM trying to establish their authority. The movie also reflected the fact thatMoslems had established a rather powerful organization in support of the movement.1

There were various opinions on the issue of this movement for independence.Some believed the movement represented a preparation for deployment of alarge-scale movement for independence in the new century. Others saw themovement for Xinjiang independence as rather weak, voicing only politicaldeclarations and hence unable to exercise any real influence on the political climatein Xinjiang. Sharing the latter view, the Professor of Xinjiang University Su Beyhay2 believed the separatists’ movement of Xinjiang posed no real threat for China, since the central leadership enjoyed the support of numerous Hans settlers in XUARwho were capable of preventing, at any time, any attempt to declare independence inXinjiang.

In addition, it was known that among all ethnic minorities, Kazakhs occupied thelargest territory in Xinjiang. At the same time, Kazakhs were not inclined toseparatism. Thirdly, the deployment of industrial and construction facilities in

1 Jen-Kun Fu. Discovering Central Asia.–Taipei, 2005.–p.164.2 Профессор Су Бэйхай приехал в Синьцзян в 1940 году; затем исполнял обязанность начальника штаба. Наведение порядкавСиньцзянепроводилосьпоегоинструкциям(Professor Su Baihuei went to Xinjiang in 1940; He completed his responsibility as commander of the commandcenter. Under his leadership, order was maintained in Xinjiang.)

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Xinjiang by the People Liberation Army of China facilitated solution to the problemof the independence movement, since the concentration of a military and technicalpresence in the region would deter any separatists’ attempts, without having to send in reinforcements and resorting to severe repressions. Fourth, the Russiangovernment, recently working towards unity in its own country, expressed seriousconcern toward sparks of separatism in Xinjiang.

Western attitude towards the Xinjiang issue

Xinjiang’s issue deserved closer inspection, based on the following assumptions: The separatist movement of ethnic minority in the country posed the core

problem for China;Russia condemned the separatist trends of Xinjiang, fearing the spread of the

self-identity idea of national minorities within the entire Central Asia region;The development during recent years in Eurasian region including declaration of

independence by Central Asia republics, civil war in Afghanistan, and Russianwar in Chechnya, in many respect lended hope to the supporters of Xinjiang’s independence, prompting more activities from them;

Only a limited number of states of all Moslem countries openly supportedseparatists. All demands of world community in support of Xinjiang’s independence are limited by pure political slogans and calls for human rightsprotection. At the same time, the threat of spreading the Islam fundamentalismposed the main obstacle for real assistance;

In recent years, China markedly strengthened its cooperation with Central Asiancountries, leading Beijing to coordinate its actions toward Xinjiang. On the otherhand, growing cooperation amongst Central Asian republics had a benevolenteffect on the situation in the area, by preventing infiltration of outside forces intoXinjiang territory, and preventing the organization of underground bases fromcarrying out undermining activity.

Modern Xinjiang established stable relations with the outside world throughvarious factors, such as the existence of major oil reserves, or the opportunity touse its area for cargo transportation. Today, it was worldly recognized thatCentral Asia and its neighboring countries were bound to become one of theworld’s suppliers of energy resources in the 21st century. For this reason, theworld powers will defend their strategic interests in the region. Presently, one canobserve a clash on the part of Russia, China and the Moslem world with the USA,Canada, EU and other countries.

If the Xinjiang Uighur issue was not resolved in the near future, it wouldseriously affect the stability and security in all of Eurasia.

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EU’s interest toward Xinjiang had become evident recently, through closemonitoring of the development in China and its relations with neighboringcountries of Central Asia. In Canada, the Xinjiang development aroused concernregarding future bilateral relations with China in economy and trade, particularlyin the supply of energy raw materials. According to Canadian specialists, thesupport for separatist movement from abroad may pose a certain threat for thePRC leadership and the gradual weakening of the central authority’s power in the peripheral parts of the country.

USA closely monitored the development in Russia, China, Central Asia, as wellas Russia’s reaction in light of the Xinjiang development. Russia expected PRC’s peaceful handling of the Xinjiang issue could succeed in promoting andestablishing the stability and economic development of the region. Thus, Russiastood against terrorism or any manifestations of separatism and religiousinstigations from abroad. Russia feared the unification of the Moslem world,which could provoke Russian-speakers of Tartarstan to manifest their ownnational sentiments.

Currently, there are frequent problems arising from national self-identity andseparatism in various parts of the world. One such example is China’s Xinjiang province. Regarding this trend, the world community faces a difficult dilemmabetween self and world reality. Integrity of the territorial state is regarded as thetop priority.

Hence, if the XIM chooses to pursue based on the principles of peace, security,and stability, as well as with respect to various forms of social structure, positiveresults may be achieved.

The internalization and the ways for peaceful solution of the issue

Regarding the Tibet issue, despite its peculiarity, succeeded in attracting theworld community’s attention. Dalay Lama and his government in emigrationreceived the assistance of international organizations and leading states of the world.As to the XIM, until 1995, it received assistance mainly from Saudi Arabia. Onlyafter the collapse of USSR did it attain support from Central Asia. In 1995, Isa–thespiritual leader of Uighur movement, died in Turkey while in exile. As a result, themovement was left without a world-recognized leader. For this reason, and the lackof an efficient opposition to the PRC authority, the Xinjiang issue failed to attract theworld community’s attention.3 This led to a manifold reduction of internationalassistance to the XIM in comparison to the one in Tibet.

After the delimitation process of the common border with neighboring countries

3 Xinjiang Separatist Movement Continues Heating Up // Inside China Mainland, Vo.20, No.11. - Taiwan: Institute ofCurrent China Studies, 1998.

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was completed, China turned its effort to fight against terrorism. Under the slogan ofcreation, the mechanism of collective security in Central Asia succeeded. From fourneighboring states, the guaranty for joint struggle against separatists and Islamismradicals was established. The XIM was depicted as a variety of internationalterrorism. This move led to the essential weakening of support from the outsideworld. It also provided Chinese authorities with additional advantages in dealingwith oppositional organizations without resorting to punishing measures.At the same time, China’s hard-line policy in Xinjiang led to the movement’s

internationalization. The emphasis made on the peaceful solution of the issue echoedin the new interpretation of the “Sovereignty”term. After the NATO intervention inthe Kosovo issue, many Christian countries sympathized with the Kosovo Moslems.This inspired leaders of the Uighur movement in emigration. For a long time, themovement had gained no concession from China. While by the world’s norms, an extended period of human rights violation, as within the XUAR, was unacceptable.

In line with those trends, the foreign-based organizations sought to illustrate apeaceful image of movement, seeking the help and attention to the Uighur issuefrom the world community.

Rapprochement of Uighur separatists with Islamic fundamentalists

As mentioned above, since 1997, China’s authorities hardened their policy toward Xinjiang separatists, while simultaneously strengthening their relations withRussia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In light of PRC’s actions in the recent years, the XIM turned to rapprochement with Islamic fundamentalists andposed a new turning point worthy of special attention.

Regarding recent events, one can suspect that the Xinjiang separatists based invarious corners of the globe enlisted with the Islamic fundamentalists. In August of2000, around two thousand Islamic fighters, headed by Namangani, 1/4th of whichwere Uighurs, intruded from northern Afghanistan through Tajikistan into Batkentoblast of Kyrgyzstan aiming to cross into Uzbekistan. Over 130 fighters were killedin clashes with Kyrgyz army special forces. Oppositional forces were concentratedat the Tajik border. By summer of 2001, the parties of Uzbek Islamists enemies ofIslam Karimov regime planned to launch an offensive for seizing areas aroundFergana valley for establishing the Islam Republic there.

Entrenched in Afghanistan, Bin Laden, the premier leader of all Islamicfundamentalists, sent 400 fighters to Chechnya as reinforcement in the sacred waragainst infidels. One hundred of those fighters were members of the XIM. SinceTalibs lended their support to Uighur separatists, some of Xinjiang Uighurs moved

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to north Afghanistan and fought alongside Talibs.4 According to certain reports, thetotal number of Uighurs from Xinjiang in Afghan-fighter ranks already reached2000. Some joined Bin Laden’s forces while others joined Uzbek Islamists and local groups.

There was a lasting concept of China’s threat in Central Asia. Many residents of the countries in this region expected that if Xinjiang gained independence, it maybecome the buffer zone between China and Central Asia. Even though the CentralAsian countries’ government lended their supportto China and refused to supportseparatists, the nationalists’ forces in those countries were in solidarity with the latter. At the same time, the terrorist activity of international Islamic extremistsundermined the efficiency of China’s actions against the Movement. In this light, thealliance of XIM with Islamic fundamentalists posed a serious problem for China.

The prospects for Uighur independence or autonomy were bleak. Uighurs dislikedthe media spotlight of their southern neighbors, the Tibetans, even though theythemselves had gradually garnered more international attention. For instance, ErkinAlptekin, an Uighur, was elected as the General Secretary of the UnrepresentedNations and Peoples Organization (UNPO) in early 2001, a post he had held for aninterim basis since October of 1999. While a Uighur diaspora numbering well overhalf a million resided in nearby Central Asian republics, China had used politicaland economic incentives to persuade these countries - most prominently Kazakhstanand Kyrgyzstan - to reject Uighur separatism. Moreover, in early October of 2001,Beijing announced a new campaign against Uighur "splittism" (the government'svague term for any self-determination movement) with the front that Uighurseparatists were engaging in terrorist activities. Broader repression had increased inthe XUAR under the pretense of the international war against terrorism; this alsomeant that separatist-inspired violence would continue, since neither side offeredany peaceful resolution or conflict regulating mechanism.5

Central Asia’s Uighurs activity ─ in a case of Kazakhstan

On the dawn of the Kazakhstan’s independence, the Uighur organizations and societies had also risen. Among those: Uighur Culture Center; Uighur association “Motherland”; United National Revolutionary Front for Liberation of Eastern Turkestan ; Organization for Liberation of Uighuristan; Interregional Association of Uighurs of CIS;

4 Из интервью с А. Дустумом / Е. Пастухов. Афганскийизумруд-2 // Континент. –2001. -№9 (47).(From interview of A. Dustoman / E. Pastuhof. Afghan’s Emerald-2 // Kontinent. -2001. -№9 (47).)

5 Sean L Yom. Uighurs flex their muscles. January 23, 2002

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International Antinuclear Movement of Uighurs; International Organization of Moslem-Women.

Some of the organizations dealt with the development of their national cultureand education. While others, for example, the United National RevolutionaryFront for Liberation of Eastern Turkestan, Organization for Liberation ofUighuristan and Interregional Association of Uighurs of CIS countries, carried outpolitical activity in support of Xinjiang independence.

The Interregional Uighurs Association, currently chaired by KakharmanKozhanberdiev, a scholar of the Uighurology Institute, was established in January of1992. The formation came about after various Uighur associations held their Sessionin Almaty, in which more than 300 delegates from 5 Central Asia states attended.6

The Session appealed to the President and Parliament of Kazakhstan, as well as thegovernment of other Central Asia republics, for assistance to Uighurs in theirnational liberation movement.

On June 20th, 1992, the founding congress of the Organization for Liberation ofUighuristan was held in Almaty. It attracted over 70 delegates, includingrepresentatives of Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan, as well asguests from Turkey, Germany and China. Held with open doors, the congress electeda central committee, and adopted a Charter and Program. Ashir Vakhidi, the formerscholar of the Orientology Institute of Kazakh Academy of Science, was appointedas the chairman. The Organization’s main goal was the liberation of Uighur people and establishment of independent Uighuristan within the Xinjiang UighurAutonomous Region of China.7

In May of 1995, 34 Uighurs residing in Almaty published a letter protestingaginst China’s colonialism towards ethnic minorities of Xinjiang in the newspaper,“Voice of Eastern Turkestan”. The letter described the planned birth rate controlpolicy and also the massed resettlement of Hans in XUAR. Additionally, the letterdescribed the wish of the Uighurs to actively participate in the struggle for theliberation of Eastern Turkestan.8

In June of 1995, an Imam of Uighur Moslems in Kazakhstan broadcasted amessage to all Moslems. The message urged Islamic countries to unite and standtogether against an arbitrary China, and also to assist Eastern Turkestan’s liberationfrom “fetters of Great Han chauvinism, drawing out the infidels and liberation of ancient land of Uighuristan”.9

6 Голос Восточного Туркестана, 02.02.1992. (The Voice of Eastern Turkestan, 02.02.1992.)7 Хлюпин В. Геополитический треугольник Казахстан-Китай-Россия: прошлое и настоящее пограничной проблемы. -Международный евразийский институт экономических и политических исследований, 1999. - С.211.(Helopin V. Geopolitics Triangle: Kazakhstan-Russia-China: Past and Present Problems. –International EurasianInstitute of Economic and Political Studies, 1999.–p.211)

8 Голос Восточного Туркестана, №156, 25.05.1995. (The Voice of Eastern Turkestan, No156, 25.05.1995.)9Уйгыр Авази, №157, июнь, 1995. - c.15. (Uigur Avas, No157, June, 1995.–p.15)

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In 1996, the Secretary of United National Revolution Front of Eastern Turkestanpointed out that completing the construction of the new Silk Way through Xinjiang“…while enriching foreign states, will shed rivers of blood of the “big Turkestan” peoples, for no peoples of Eastern Turkestan are willing to give up”.10

According to some foreign publications, the massed protests in Xinjiang duringMay of 1995 were covertly inspired by United National Revolutionary Front ofEastern Turkestan with Kazakhstan-based headquarters.11 In 1996, the Russianmedia12 also pointed out that armed conflicts between Xinjiang separatists andChinese authorities originated from Kazakhstan.

Actions of Kazakhstan authorities

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations with PRC, the Kazakhgovernment faced a difficult task –to define its attitude toward the XIM. On onehand, by normal legality, it was difficult to define just how dangerous theorganizations operating in the Kazakhstan territory were. The prohibitionistmeasures are in contradiction with Articles 20 and 23 of the Kazakhstan Constitutionguaranteeing “…freedom of speech and freedom for NGO foundation”.13 Moreover,it was known that Xinjiang’s Uighurs and Kazakhsshared a commonality in theirspiritual connections. Also, methods practiced by the Chinese authorities towardethnic minorities of Xinjiang aroused criticism in Kazakhstan.

As to the strategic prospects for strengthening the movement, if Xinjiang gainedindependence, it would serve as a shield protecting Kazakhstan from possible threatsin the east.

On the other hand, the purpose for the formation of Uighur organizations inKazakhstan was for the unification of Uighurs in support of establishing anindependent state in the Xinjiang – PRC province, which would affectKazakhstan-China relations. For this reason, the idea of employing radical methodspromoted by some Uighur organizations (based in Kazakhstan as well) could arousediscontent in China. It would be a threat to peace, not only inKazakhstan’s borders, but all over the region as well. Moreover, it was in contradiction with the foreignpolicies of Kazakhstan.

In June of 1996, during Tsen Tseming’s visit in Kazakhstan, President Nazarbayev once again confirmed Kazakhstani attitude towards Xinjiang. Hedeclared that Kazakhstan firmly pursued the policy of noninterference into domesticaffairs of other countries, including China. In addition, he would prevent any

10Караван, 12.07.1996. (Karavan, 12.07.1996.)11Хуаляньжибао, 20.06.1996. (Hualeungzhibao, 20.06.1996.)12Известия, 04.08.1996. (Ezvistia, 04.08.1996)13Конституция Республики Казахстан, c.20, 23. (Constitution of Republic of Kazakhstan, Article 20, 23)

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anti-China activity carried out by the Organization of Eastern Turkestan inKazakhstan, which would undermine Kazakhstan-China relations.14

Finally, it should be noted that in early April of 1996 and 1997, the Chinesegovernment held meetings with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistanleaders. The goal of which was to gain their agreement on curbing terrorist’s movement both within Xinjiang and abroad. In particular, Kazakhstan assured Chinathat it would provide neither support nor refuge to separatists’ groups.15As proof, theKazakhstan government banned all governmental bodies and non-governmentalinstitutions from providing open or covert support to any radical activity of Uighurs,which included: closing down a part of Uighur’s newspapers; and transforming theInstitute of Uighurology, which can be seen as the ban on every activity of Uighursin Kazakhstan. However, in reality, even today, there still existed cultural and otherUighur’s organization that complies with Kazakhstani lawswithin Kazakhstan.

Conclusion

Central Asian specialists believe that the Xinjiang unrests would provoke a newsurge in the Chechen war, and also induce an influx of Xinjiang Uighurs into Russia,leading to numerous new problems in the country.16 Within the context of itsinternational policy, Central Asian countries support PRC’s position and Beijing’s course toward the development of the XUAR economy: fight against the separatistsbut see the dialogue with the opposition as necessary; stand against terrorism andany calls for secession; and against slogans on political, social and economyfreedom practiced by the supporters of secession.

For centuries, the Uighur had been an important link between China andCentral Asia. Not only did they occupy more than 46% of the 15 million people inthe XUAR population, but there were also about one million Uighurs residing in theCentral Asia region. The Uighur lived along the Silk Road and worked as caravandrivers, transporting goods from the east and west. The strategic location of theirhomes enabled them to become the "middlemen" between the Orient and Europe.Their status was highly regarded by the international communities. Despite beingcharacterized by various political, religious, and ethnic conflicts throughout theirhistory, the Uighur were nevertheless described as a "proud, happy, and independentpeople." They possessed their own unique blend of cultural elegance. Such a raremixture of simplicity and sophistication had given the Uighur a unique charm,worthy of much discussion.

14Казахстанская правда, 05.07.1996. (Kazakhstan Pravda. 05.07.1996)15 Zhongqi, P. and Xiaomei, T. Ethnic Conflict in China: Characteristics, Causes, and Countermeasures // Issues & Studies.–1999.

- No.5. - p.165.16Независимаягазета, 18.08.1998. (Independent newspaper, 18.08.1998.)

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