“THE OIL AND GAS DISPUTE”

Master Programme in International Relations

Modern and Contemporary History of Cyprus

IREL 620

Directed by Dr. Hubert Faustmann

SUMMER SEMESTER 2015

Student: Demetrios Amaxaris

University ID: U082N0065

Nicosia, July 16, 2015

ContentsUseful Terms and Definitions

List of Abbreviations

Introduction

I. PART I

The Discovery of Oil and Gas Timeline and the Main

Chronological Events of the Dispute

II. PART II

The Emerging Security Environment in the Eastern

Mediterranean Sea, Conflicting and Converging National Interests

and the Geopolitical and Geoconomic Dimensions of the Dispute

III.PART III

The Oil and Gas Dispute, the security context in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Cyprus Problem; Future Promises

and Challenges

Epilogue and Conclusions

Main Bibliography and Sources

Additional Bibliography

Useful Terms and Definitions (UNCLOS 1982 In Pictures)

List of Abbreviations

EEZ: Exclusive Economic Zone

PM: Prime Minister

RoC: Republic of Cyprus

TRNC: Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

TCF: Trillion Cubic Feet

TFT: Turkish Foreign Policy

Introduction

The purpose of the Essay is the study of the oil and gas

dispute in the Eastern Mediterranean, which involves the

countries of the region and the Great Powers that realize that

the discovery of hydrocarbons in the Eastern Mediterranean in

relation to the great instability in the Middle East and

Northern Africa (where many thorny issues remain still

unresolved1), the need of Europe to find alternative sources of

energy supplies and the re-emergence of a new multipolar

1 ISIS advance in Syria and Iraq, Syrian civil war, the nuclear program ofIran, terrorism in the Middle East and Europe, the Palestinian issue, theSunni – Shia confrontation, Saudi military intervention in Yemen, theCyprus problem, the Kurdish issue in Turkey, internal instability in Iraq,the increasing flow of illegal immigrants from Northern Africa and theMiddle East to Europe, etc.

confrontational system of international relations (now mainly

in the economic field) is changing the geopolitics and

economics of the region in ways that are still evolving and

could significantly affect the future state of foreign

relations, the balances of power and the security environment

in all countries which have access to the Eastern

Mediterranean and Europe itself.

The first part of the essay presents a chronology of the

events that took place from 2003 until today, regarding the

discovery of Hydrocarbons in the EEZ of Cyprus and its

neighbouring countries, as well as, the Turkish and the

Turkish Cypriot responses towards the efforts of the Republic

of Cyprus (RoC) to implement a strategic plan for the

exploration and exploitation of its energy resources.

Part II, elaborates on the broader geopolitical and

geoconomic dimensions of the oil and gas dispute in the

examined geographical region and the new emerging security

environment in the aforementioned vital space, in connection

with the conflicting or the converging national Interests of

the main state actors involved.

Finally, Part III studies the consequences of the dispute

upon the efforts for a solution of the Cyprus problem within

the broader geopolitical context of the region and the

potential ways to transform the discovery of oil and gas from

a source of frictions and dangerous tensions (a curse) to a

bridge of peace and stability between the Middle East and

Europe (a truth blessing).

I. PART I

The Discovery of Oil and Gas Timeline and the Main Chronological

Events of the Dispute

Part I (a) Oil and Gas Discoveries, Delimitation

Agreements and Future Exploration and Exploitation

Plans

Until 2003, much of the hydrocarbons in Eastern

Mediterranean turned out to be undiscovered because the

resources lie in very deep waters (known in the industry as

“ultra-deep-water”);2 this made it technically difficult, risky

and expensive to carry out exploration in the area. However,contemporary technological advances, combined with the high

international oil prices during the period 2000 - 20143, which

tend to encourage oil and gas companies to invest, prompted

new exploration at the beginning of the 21st century. Those

efforts are encouraged by various multinational companies that

see new opportunities for profit, the Eastern Mediterranean

states for economic and geopolitical reasons and finally, the

US together with the most powerful European states, which

understand that those discoveries could change the

2 The depths of the resources lie more than two kilometers (1.24 miles) insome locations.3 Prices were over $110 (USD) until June 2014, when they then began to falldown to even less than $ 50 in January 2015.

geopolitical map and the security environment in the region,

thereby, influencing their own national interests.

The first significant event took place in 2003, with the

first substantial ultra-deep-water discovery by Shell of

natural gas offshore Egypt, in the Nile Delta region’s North

East Mediterranean (NEMED) block or “concession”4.

In 2006 the RoC began prospecting for hydrocarbons in an

exploration area of 51,000 sq. km offshore Cyprus. The

4 Ayla Gurel, Flora Mullen, and Harry Tzimitras: “The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue,Context Positions and Future Scenarios”, PCC Reports, 1/2013, PRIO Cyprus (2013),Available at: http://file.prio.no/publication_files/Cyprus/Report%202013-1%20Hydrocarbons.pdf. Accessed on July 07, 2015, p.1

exploration area, divided into 13 blocks, is only part of the

total EEZ proclaimed by the RoC, as depicted in the map herein

below.

Delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones in Eastern Mediterranean

Sea according to the UNCLOS 1982

Two-dimensional (2D) surveys were conducted in March to

May 2006 in all 13 blocks and three-dimensional (3D) surveys

were conducted in January–March 2007 in Block 3. Having

already signed in February 2003 an EEZ delineation agreement

with Egypt, the RoC also made a similar agreement with Lebanon

in January 2007, although to date the latter has not been

ratified by the Lebanese Parliament. This did not happen

because of the Turkish influence in the internal politics of

Lebanon (Turkish support to Hamas against Israel) and the

disagreement between Israel and Lebanon regarding the maritime

boundaries of their EEZ5. The maritime border conflict between

the two countries is considered one of the main obstacles to

the effective development of the hydrocarbon resources in the

Eastern Mediterranean as it affects the relations between

Lebanon, Israel and Cyprus. It appears that Lebanon will not

ratify its agreement with Cyprus until it has been

renegotiated. However, this cannot happen unless Cyprus

manages first to renegotiate its boundary with Israel, which

is most unlikely, as Israel would not accept such a revision.

Moreover, Cyprus seeks to further strengthen its relations

with Israel at the energy sector due to the proximity of the

Aphrodite exploration block to Israel’s Leviathan blocks, as

those deposits together with Egypt’s hydrocarbons, could

become a new energy source for Europe, at the same time as it

aims to the development of a close strategic partnership with

Israel in the fields of security and defense, diplomacy and

economy. Alternatively, ratification will become possible if5 LLebanon’s EEZ is an area of 22,000 square kilometers divided into 10blocks of which blocks 8, 9 and 10 are located adjacent to Israel’sEEZ. The disputed area between Israel and Lebanon is 860 km2.

the dispute between Israel and Lebanon is settled although the

two countries are formally at war and without diplomatic

relations.

In February 2007 and based on the available seismic data,

the RoC launched its first international tender for three-year

oil and gas exploration licenses. In this round 11 of the 13

blocks were offered (Blocks 3 and 13 were excluded). At that

time, there were only three bids, and just one company, Noble

Energy, was awarded a licensee in Block 12. A production-

sharing contract was signed with Noble in October 2008. After

further seismic surveys, and an EEZ agreement signed with

Israel in December 2010, the first exploratory drilling began

on 20 September 2011.

In December 2011, Noble announced that it had discovered an

estimated 5 to 8 tcf with a gross mean of 7 tcf (198 bcm) in

the field known as Aphrodite, revised to a range of 3.6 to 6

tcf in October 2013. In November 2014, the estimated resources

were further revised upwards by 12%. The Cypriot Government

closed a second bid round on 11 May 2012 for licensees for an

additional 12 offshore blocks. There were 33 applications

received for 9 of the 12 blocks from 15 companies or consortia

(representing 29 companies in total). In January 2013, an ENI-

KOGAS consortium was granted licenses for Blocks 2, 3 and 9.

Total E&P was granted licenses for Blocks 10 and 11 in

February 20136. The ENI-KOGAS consortium began exploratory6 Total Official Homepage: The licenses extend over 2,572 square kilometersand 2,958 square kilometers respectively, southwest of Cyprus, in water

drilling in September 2014 but in March 26, 2015 the drilling

conducted by the drilling rig SAIPEM 10000 reached the

predicted depth of 5,485 meters without locating an

exploitable concentration of hydrocarbons.7 This was the second

failure of the company to detect hydrocarbons at the said

block. Furthermore, in January 2015 Total also announced that

it had finished its geological tests in Block 11 “without

recognizing any potential drilling targets8.” However, in March

2015 Total and the RoC signed a new deal which envisions

further exploration in Block 11, which is considered from a

geological point of view as one of the most difficult cases.

The recent failures by TOTAL and ENI – KOGAS have not

discouraged the Cyprus Government that is continuing its

discussions and negotiations concerning the infrastructure

required for landing the gas in Cyprus and liquefaction for

export, while exploring all the alternatives for Cyprus gas

exports, through collaboration with other countries in the

Eastern Mediterranean region and in particular Israel, Greece

and Egypt.9

depths ranging from 1,000 to 2,500 meters. See more at:http://www.total.com/en/media/news/press-releases/20130206-total-enters-deep-offshore-exploration-cyprus?xtmc=cyprus&xtnp=1&xtcr=1#sthash.gt7YK9Ny.dpuf 7Cyprus News Agency: “Energy Minister: ENI-KOGAS failed drilling does not mean there are nohydrocarbons in Cyprus EEZ”, March 26, 2015, Available at: http://www.cna.org.cy/webnewsEN.asp?a=4d3f4ef215ec4b619718d65e71ff0eea,Accessed on July 10,2015 8 e- Kathimerini: “France’s Total to press on with Cyprus oil and gassearch”, March 18, 2015. Available at:http://www.ekathimerini.com/168364/article/ekathimerini/business/frances-total-to-press-on-with-cyprus-oil-and-gas-search . Accessed on July 10,2015.9 Deloitte: “The Deloitte Guide to oil and Gas in Cyprus, Where Potential Lies”, (2015). Availableat: http://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/cy/Documents/energy-resources/oil-and-gas/CY_EnergyAndResources_OilAndGas_Noexp.pdf Accessed on

Despite the recent disappointment and the troubled

relations with Turkey, Cyprus comparative advantages are still

in place given that Cyprus is located at the crossroads of big

international energy routes, is a full member state of the EU

with stable business environment (despite the deposit’s

haircut in March 2013), it has an open services-oriented

market economy, it has the potentials to become a strategic

hub for business activities in the region, the big hydrocarbon

discoveries in the region allow the development of strategic

partnerships with neighboring countries, it possesses a

promising regional geological background, which could lead to

future hydrocarbon discoveries of considerable size, and

finally, its position provides with easy access to the EU

market and the greater Mediterranean Region (large potential

for oil and gas trading)10.

In this regard, in November 2014, the VTTV Company11

completed in the southern coast of Cyprus the construction an

oil-storage terminal, comprising 28 fuel-storage tanks that

can accommodate over 540,000 m3 of cargo and a four-berth

loading and unloading jetty, which represents a capital

investment of €300 million. The second phase, which is

currently under evaluation, will include 13 additional tanks

which will increase total capacity to 849 K m³. This is

July 05, 2015.10 Solon Kassinis: Presentation, “The Status of Hydrocarbon Exploration inCyprus”, Israel Business Conference Tel Aviv, Ministry of Commerce,Industry & Tourism Republic of Cyprus, December 12, 2011.Available at: http://www.mcit.gov.cy/mcit/mcit.nsf/All/F35CAD9F4226E424C225771B00546F25/$file/presentation_Israel%20Business%20Conference_Dec.%202011.pdf Accessed on July 02, 2015.11 VTTI’s shareholders are the Dutch energy giant Vitol, the largest privateenergy trading company in the world, and MISC, a leading internationalshipping company, owned by the Malaysian state oil company Petronas.

expected to be completed in 201612. The said construction

constitutes part of the Cyprus government’s vision of setting

up an “energy hub” at Vassilikos area, which will accommodate

VTT Vasiliko’s premises, all of Cyprus’ strategic oil

reserves, and an LNG terminal (plans for which are currently

on hold).

What is more, on February 16, 2015 Cyprus and Egypt

signed in Egypt a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) on

cooperation in the field of oil and gas. It provides for

cooperation between the two countries in the development and

exploitation of the Cypriot ‘Aphrodite’ gas field in block 12

of Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone, utilizing existing gas

infrastructure in Egypt for the mutual benefit of the two

12Gold News: “First Phase of VTT Vasiliko Construction Completed”, November 28, 2014.Available at:http://www.goldnews.com.cy/en/companies/first-phase-of-vtt-vasiliko-construction-completed Accessed on July 11, 2015.

countries. In particular, the MoU authorizes the Egyptian

Natural Gas Holding Company (EGAS) and the Cyprus Hydrocarbons

Company (CHC) Ltd to examine technical solutions for

transporting natural gas, through a direct marine pipeline,

from the Aphrodite field to Egypt. This agreement constitutes

another indication of the strengthening of the bilateral

relations between Cyprus and Egypt, where the latter under the

leadership of President Al – Sisi, seeks for a strategic

partnership with Cyprus, firstly, for economic reasons and

secondly, for political and security reasons as the Egyptian

leader is dissatisfied with Turkey’s foreign ambitions in the

region and president Erdogan’s interventions in Egypt’s

internal affairs (see Part II)13.

Finally, another ambitious project of geopolitical and

geoconomic importance on the energy sector, which will be

funded by PPC-Quantum Energy (Greece) and will be developed in

cooperation with the Israel Electric Corporation Ltd. (IEC)

and DEH Quantum Energy of Cyprus, was announced in January

201214. According to the project an underwater electric cable

of 400KV stretching 540 nautical miles and reaching depths of

up to 2,000 meters, will link the countries of Israel, Cyprus

and Greece, which will be able to produce cheap electricity

due to the exploitation of the natural gas deposits in the

Aphrodite Block and the Leviathan Basin in the Israeli EEZ.

The management of the project will be undertaken by

13 Cyprus Mail: “Cyprus and Egypt sign oil and gas MoU”, February 16, 2015. Availableat: http://cyprus-mail.com/2015/02/16/cyprus-and-egypt-sign-oil-and-gas-mou/ Accessed on July 11, 2015.

14 Euro Asia Interconnector: Available at http://www.euroasia-interconnector.com/Index.aspx Accessed on July 08, 2015.

technocrats of the parties and representatives of Israel,

Cyprus and Greece15. As a project the "Euro Asia

Interconnector" is a European Project of Common Interest (PCI)

and takes precedents over the cables connecting Norway -

Netherlands, Central Italy - Sardinia, and Spain - Majorca.

The Euro Asia Interconnector is a strategic project that,

among other benefits, could end the energy isolation of

Israel, Cyprus and Crete, enhance the Security of supply of

the involved countries and enable developments for generation

from renewable energy resources. In addition, the project will

give Israel the opportunity to export electricity, due to its

advantage and ability compared to other countries in the

region towards Europe, which needs alternative sources of

energy supply besides Russia and the Middle East16. At present,

according to the Euro Asia Interconnection official homepage,

the project between Israel and Cyprus is planned to begin

operation at the end of 2019 and the final connection to

Greece will be completed in 2022.

15 Ibid: The Interconnector will have a capacity of 2000 MW and a totallength of around 820 nautical miles/around 1518 km (approx. 329 km betweenCY and IL, 879 km between CY and Crete and 310 km between Crete and Athens)and will allow for the bi-directional transmission of electricity betweenthe connected countries.16 Ibid: In May 18, 2015, Dr. David Elmakias, the IEC Senior Vice Presidentof Planning, Development and Technology, who is the IEC’s Euro Asia Projectmanager, presented the IEC’s planning for the project and during a sitevisit the cable landfall area (Joint-Pit) in Hadera was examined.Furthermore, cooperation between ΔΕΗ QUANTUM ENERGY and IEC for theexecution of the three Project-related studies was discussed. The studiesinclude the Technical/Technological Study, the Reconnaissance Survey andthe Environmental Studies/EIA, which have all been approved for funding bythe European Union. The Euro Asia Interconnector receives recognition fromEU by approving its application for Grants for Studies, while at the sametime the execution of the above studies will substantially contribute tothe progress and maturity towards the implementation of the Euro AsiaInterconnector.

Part I (b) Oil and Gas Discoveries, Delimitation

Agreements and the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot

Reactions – The Turkish Position

Turkey, which military intervened into Cyprus in 197417

does not recognize the Republic of Cyprus, and contests its

right to enter into EEZ agreements or to exploit unilaterally

natural resources until there is a comprehensive settlement.

It argues that the Greek Cypriot government does not represent

the interests of Turkish Cypriots or a united island, refutes

Greek Cypriot claims to exclusive sovereignty, saying

sovereignty is being negotiated in the current talks, and

evokes its status as a guarantor state under the 1960 Treaty

of Guarantee to protect Turkish Cypriots’ rights18.

As a result of the new state of affairs, that occurs

after the bilateral agreement between Cyprus and Egypt (2003)

for the delimitation of their EEZ, as well as, the first two –

dimensional seismic survey conducted by the Norwegian

Organisation PGS (March – May 2006) on behalf of the RoC

inside the Cyprus EEZ ,Turkey has begun to directly challenge

the sovereign rights of the Roc inside Cyprus EEZ, territorial

waters, and national air space, as well as, its control over

the Nicosia FIR, in order to prevent Cyprus, Egypt, Lebanon,

and Israel to become the main geoconomic actors concerning the

exploitation of the energy resources of the Eastern

Mediterranean sea. In September 2011, Turkey ratified an

illegal agreement with the so called TRNC for the delimitation17 Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974 after a coup d’état staged by theGreek Junta against the president of the RoC Archbishop Makarios. Sincethen, Turkey illegally occupies the Northern part of the island, whichrepresents 36.5% of the total surface of the Republic of Cyprus. 18 International Crisis Group: “Aphrodite’s Gift: Can Cyprus Gas Power a new Dialogue?Europe Report No. 216, April 2, 2015. Available at:http://www.crisisgroup.org/~/media/Files/europe/turkey-cyprus/cyprus/216-aphrodites-gift-can-cypriot-gas-power-a-new-dialogue.pdf Accessed on May05, 2015.

of their EEZ, and the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)

also signed an agreement with the “TRNC” for the exploration

and exploitation of natural resources in the EEZ of Cyprus.

Moreover, Turkey claims that the sea area west of the meridian

32ο 16΄ 18΄΄ East (From Cyprus’s west shores until the Greek

islands of Karpathos – Rhodes), including the offshore blocks

4, 5 and 6, lying south-to-southwest off the coast of Cyprus,

is part of its own continental shelf.

Turkish Maps issued in September 2011 depicting the so called

delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zones between the Turkish

Republic and the so called “TRNC” (Turkish Republic of Northern

Cyprus) (Map 2) and the Exploration Blocks, where Turkey has

illegally announced and conducted seismic researches

Delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones in Eastern Mediterranean

Sea according to the Turkish Position

Delimitation of Exclusive Economic Zones in Eastern Mediterranean

Sea according to the Turkish Position

Furthermore, from 2008 until 2009, in many occasions,

Turkish warships and aircrafts systematically harassed the

geological and seismic surveys conducted by various research

vessels on behalf of the RoC in Cyprus EEZ (“Harrier Explorer”

and its accompanying ship “Marja” of panama flag, “Maria s.

Merian” of German flag). From 2011 until 201419, the Turkish

survey vessels “Piri Reiss” and “Barbaros”20 entered the EEZ

four times, and in October 2014 Turkey issued a NAVTEX21 that

reserved a swathe incorporating parts of blocks 1, 2, 3, 8 and

922, where for the first time, “Barbaros23” carried out seismic

explorations in the island’s EEZ in earnest24.

19 In January 2014, Turkey reserved a sea area that trespassed into parts ofoffshore blocks 4, 5 and 6, lying south-to-southwest off the coast ofCyprus. The three blocks fall within an area which Turkey claims as its owncontinental shelf.20 The Barbaros was purchased by the Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO)reportedly for $130m. It is capable of carrying out 3D surveys of theseabed, gathering geological data used to determine the presence ofhydrocarbons.21 Navtex (Navigational Telex) is an international automated mediumfrequency direct-printing service for delivery of navigational andmeteorological warnings and forecasts, as well as urgent marine safetyinformation to ships.22 The Italian – Korean cooperation ENI-KOGAS was operating its drill shipSaipem 10000 within offshore Block 9, when the Turkish NAVTEX took place in2014 - 2015. The drill left Cyprus one day before the withdrawal of“Barbaros” on March 30, 2015. 23 The Barbaros was accompanied by support vessels M/V Bravo and M/V DeepSupporter, as well as, the Turkish warship TCG Gelibolu.24 Staff Reporter, “Turkey trespasses for fourth time since hydrocarbons discovered”,Cyprus Mail, October 21, 2014. Available at:http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/10/21/turkey-trespasses-for-fourth-time-since-hydrocarbons-discovered/ Accessed on May 23, 2015.

Barbaros Research Vessel East of Cyprus

The Turkish action led to the interruption of the

negotiation talks between the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish

Cypriot sides and a new NAVTEX, which was announced in January

2015, finally ended without further seismic surveys to the

withdrawal of the Turkish vessel from Cyprus on March 30, 2015

and the resume of the negotiation talks in May 2015.

Finally, Turkey claims that the sea territory surrounding

the so called “TRNC “and the Cyprus air space above the

occupied part of Cyprus, belong to the “Turkish Search and

Rescue Region” and in every opportunity, the Turkish naval and

air forces in Cyprus attempt to show their presence, in order

to question the jurisdiction of the “Cyprus Search and Rescue

Center”. Finally, since 2012 Turkish war planes, the air

traffic control tower of Tympou (ERCAN) airport in the

occupied part of Cyprus (10 km east of Nicosia) and the

Turkish Center of Air Operations in Ahlatibel – Ankara

(Turkey), constantly communicate with civil aircrafts and

foreign military planes flying over Northern Cyprus, inside

the Nicosia FIR, informing them that they are passing through

the Air Space of the TRNC and that they have to communicate

with the air control tower of the ERCAN airport.

II. PART II

The Emerging Security Environment in the Eastern

Mediterranean Sea, Conflicting and Converging National Interests

and the Geopolitical and Geoconomic Dimensions of the Dispute

In order to understand the various implications and the

national policies of the main state actors involved regarding

the exploitation and exploration of gas and oil in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the EEZ of Cyprus, one should understand the

geopolitical and geoconomic dimensions of the issue, as well

as, the defence and security considerations of the main

parties involved. At present, the security system in the

Eastern Mediterranean Sea undergoes a transitional period due

to the 2010 discovery of what may potentially be122 tcf of

natural gas and 1.7 billion barrels of oil in the Leviathan

basin25, in addition to the verified26 and potential quantities

of natural gas in Cyprus EEZ27, the existing hydrocarbons in

the Egyptian EEZ28 and the significant potential energy sources

25 US Geological Survey: “Assessment of Undiscovered Oil and Gas Resources of the LevantBasin Province, Eastern Mediterranean”, March 2010. Available at: http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2010/3014/pdf/FS10-3014.pdf Accessed on July 09,2015.26 The Republic of Cyprus Block 12 has been officially declared by Noble oilcompany as commercially viable ( 4,5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas)27 122 trillion cubic feet 28 The estimated quantities of oil and gas in the Nile Delta Basin are estimated to 223 tcf

in the Ionian and the Aegean seas, as well as, the sea

territories south of the island of Crete.

LEVANTBASIN

PROVINCE

EEZ OF GREECE AND CYPRUS UNDER UNCLOS 1982 – CONTEMPORARY ENERGY BLOCKS

At the geopolitical level, the redeployment of the USA

from Iraq has created a power vacuum, where Turkey, within the

framework of its “new ottoman offensive geopolitical vision”, attempts to

profit from this situation to become a regional power and

expand its sphere of influence in the Muslim world. Turkey, as

Iran in the Persian Gulf, because of its rising national power

and its exceptional geography, constitutes a paramount player

in the Eastern Mediterranean; however, in contrast to the

other states in the region, it lacks indigenous energy

resources, while it seeks to become the main energy hub which

links the Caspian and the Mediterranean Seas and the Caucasus

to the energy hungry Europe, which is largely depended on

Russia for its energy supplies in natural gas, and the Middle

Eastern countries for oil. For this reason, Turkey which has

intentionally ratified neither of the relevant conventions

regarding the Law of Sea (1958 Convention on Continental Shelf

and its successor the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the

Sea), has deployed since 2007 powerful maritime forces in the

Nile Delta Basin

Leviathan Basin

Eastern Mediterranean29 and it has challenged the legal

national interests of the other states involved30 and

especially those of Cyprus and Greece.

In light of the above, during the last decade the term

“Eastern Mediterranean” has obtained a specific strategic

importance not only for Turkey but also for all the states of

the region and the great powers, which have deployed maritime

forces. For the first time, except form the USA and the UK,

China, Russia, India, and Iran have projected a show of naval

presence. Especially Turkey and Israel have rapidly deployed

strong naval forces, with the latter developing new naval

29 Participation of the Turkish Navy at UN Interim Force in Lebanon(UNIFIL). Maritime Task Force (One Frigate / Corvette / FastAttack Boat / Patrol Ship). The Turkish vessels often dock atFamagusta port.

- Operation Active Endeavour (Surface Ships, Maritime PatrolAircrafts)?

- The formation and development of the Turkish Maritime Task Group(TMTG), which has been activated since 2010 in order to promoteTurkey's foreign policy and show presence worldwide. TMTG consistof surface ships, helicopters, Underwater Ops, Amphibious AttackTeams and Diving Teams. Since its activation, the abovementionedTask Force has repeatedly conducted naval and air exercises south,south east and east of Cyprus.

- Operation Mediterranean Shield. Its implementation began inOctober 2006 and its main purpose is to protect the territorialwaters around Ceyhan area as the port city has become a majornatural gas transportation hub (Baku – Ceyhan pipeline). Moreover,it aims to the maritime security of the Eastern Mediterraneanagainst asymmetrical threats (terrorism, piracy, illegalimmigration). Since November 2008, the naval assets, whichparticipate in the mission, have a permanent presence at Famagustaport.

30Georgios Kentas: «Το Αναδυόμενο Πλαίσιο Ασφαλείας στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο», (The RisingSecurity Framework in Eastern Mediterranean), National Guard and History, 34th

Edition (July – December 2014), pp. 19-25.

defence programmes31. Moreover, the involvement of European oil

companies, such as TOTAL and ENI, in the exploration and

exploitation of oil and gas, has also led to the deployment of

European Naval Forces in the Eastern Mediterranean

As regards the relations between Turkey, Cyprus, and

Greece, Turkey continues to implement a pre-emptive long-term

strategy for the strategic containment of “Hellenism”, the

acquisition of maritime and air control in the Aegean Sea32,

the preservation of the absolute strategic control of the

occupied part of Cyprus and the acquisition of exploration

rights in the EEZ of Greece and Cyprus. In this respect,

Turkey as it was pointed out in the first part of the essay

has also used the so called TRNC33 to dispute sovereignty over

the Republic of Cyprus gas and oil fields, and through an

offensive pre-emptive diplomacy it has prevented Greece from

signing an agreement with Cyprus for the delimitation of their

EEZ. In contrast, it has failed to prevent the signing of

similar agreements between Cyprus and Egypt and Cyprus and

Lebanon. The Turkish maritime policy seeks to limit the

islands’ entitlement to their own EEZ, territorial waters and

continental shelf. The Turkish line has serious repercussions

31 In March 2012, the Turkish government introduced a five year strategicplan to make the country’s defence industry one of the world’s 10 largestby 2016, which reflects the AKP ruling party ambition to wean Turkey out ofthe US and European spheres of dependence and influence. See NiklasAnzinger, “Will the Eastern Mediterranean become the next Persian Gulf?”, AmericanEnterprise Institute for Public Policy, Research, No 3, July 2013, p3.32After 1974, Turkish vessels and Jet fighters constantly violate theterritorial waters of Greece and the Athens FIR respectively. 33 TRNC: The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus is a proxy state which isinternationally recognised only by Turkey. It was formed after the Turkishinvasion of 1974, in November 1983 in the occupied part of Northern Cyprusthat is a Turkish Cypriot governed territory, under Turkish military andpolitical control.

vis- à-vis the potential delimitation of all three zones with

Greece in the Aegean and the Mediterranean Sea (the case of

Castelorizo) and of course in the case of Cyprus34.

For this reason, as far as Greece is concerned, Turkey

strongly opposes Greece’s right to expand its territorial

waters to 12nm35 and argues that the Greek islands should not

be entitled to their own continental shelf since such a

decision would drastically limit the surface of Turkey’s EEZ

to a small area where there are no reliable evidence for the

existence of oil and gas. Consequently, on June 8, 1995, the

Turkish National Assembly issued a resolution granting the

Turkish government full and perpetual competence to declare

war (casus belli) against Greece, should Greece decide to

expand its territorial waters over 6nm.

In connection with the above, the Eastern Mediterranean

Sea is now considered by Turkey as a new sea area of huge and

vital geopolitical and geoconomic importance. The

aforementioned sea area also includes the Aegean Sea and the

Adriatic Sea, and its limits expand until the Gulf of

Alexandretta and the Suez Canal, which holds a key position

upon the most significant sea trade route of the planet that

connects the Atlantic Ocean with the Indian Ocean through the

34 Hubert Faustmann, Aya Gurel, and Gregory M. Reichberg: “Cyprus OffshoreHydrocarbons: Regional Politics and Wealth Distribution”, Friedrich Elbert Striftung (FES)Institute, Report 1/2012, PRIO (2012).Available at: http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/zypern/10656.pdfAccessed on July 04, 2015.35 Turkish Studies Lectures, spring 2015 (Professor Michalis Kontos): Insuch a case, 71, 5% of the Aegean would fall under Greek sovereignty and 8,7% under Turkish.

Suez Canal. According to Ahmed Davutoglou36, the Eastern

Mediterranean is a new “vital space” with its own internal

balances that connects the Balkan policies with the Middle

East policies (all of them are now interrelated) and because

of its central position on the main energy routes from Saudi

Arabia to Iraq (together with the discovery of oil and gas in

the aforementioned region), it will constitute a field of

global competition.

The central strategic position of Cyprus in the “Vital

Space” of the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, its military value as

an unsinkable sea – carrier, and the discovery of oil and gas

in its EEZ, turn Cyprus into a vital region for Turkey’s

strategic interests. In this regard, the Foreign Policy of

Turkey, vis a vis Cyprus, based on the political analysis of

the Turkish PM Ahmet Davutoglou37 in his famous book the

“Strategic Depth”, must be studied on two main axes. The first

axis has a social character and concerns the protection of the

Turkish Muslim community in Cyprus, in the same manner as the

Ottoman Empire was protecting its Muslim servants.

The second axis concerns the geostrategic importance of

Cyprus38, which has two important dimensions; the first36 Ahmet Davutoglou is a Turkish diplomat and politician who has been thePrime Minister of Turkey since 28 August 2014 and the leader of the Justiceand Development Party since 27 August 2014. He is considered the mentor ofpresident Erdogan and the architect of the new Turkish Foreign Policy underthe AKP governance.37 Ahmet Davutoglou: «Στρατηγικό Βάθος (Strategic Depth - translated in theGreek language by Nikolaos Raptopoulos, scientific diligence by NeoklisSaris) », Piotita Publications, (2010), pp. 274 – 281. 38 Davutoglou writes in his book: “This axis (geostrategic) per se is of a vital importanceindependently of the human element there (Cyprus). Even if there was not even one Muslim Turk there,Turkey must maintain a Cyprus issue ….. ; so Turkey is obliged to be interested beyond the humanfactor”.

concerns the balance of power between Greece and Turkey, and

“TRNC”39 and the “Rum”40 administration of Cyprus in the Eastern

Mediterranean Sea. After the missile crisis of 1996, when

Cyprus and Greece developed the doctrine of the “Common

Defence Space (Δόγμα Ενιαίου Αμυντικού Χώρου)”, Turkey

estimates that Cyprus in the hands of Greece can become a

direct military threat, against the security of Asia Minor, as

it constitutes a kind of a floating base. The second dimension

concerns the strategic importance of the position of Cyprus

for regional and global strategic calculations and strategies.

No country that makes strategic calculations in the Middle

East, the Aegean, the Eastern Mediterranean Sea, the Suez

Canal and the Persian Gulf can neglect Cyprus. Turkey must

take into advantage the strategic benefit that it has obtained

in Cyprus after the 1970’s (Davutoglou implies the Turkish

military illegal occupation of Northern Cyprus), not only as

an element of Cypriot defence policy, but also as a diplomatic

pillar for the implementation of an “Offensive Sea Strategy” that

will allow Turkey to become the dominant power in the region.

Within this framework, Cyprus has a particular importance for

Turkey as a key element for the development of its sea

strategy in the sea territories along the axis Caspian Sea –

Black Sea – the Straits – Aegean Sea – Eastern Mediterranean

Sea – Suez Canal, where the main energy and trade corridors

between the East and the West flow.

39 TRNC: The “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” is an illegal Turkish Cypriotadministration, which has been established in the northern occupied part ofthe Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. It is officially recognised only byTurkey, since November 1983. 40 The word refers to the Christian orthodox residents of Cyprus and it isused by the Turks since the Ottoman era when they refer to the Greekcommunities.

What is more, the implementation of the new “Turkish offensive

foreign policy” in the Middle East, has resulted in the severe

deterioration of its long strategic partnership with Israel,

as it has openly opposed Israel concerning the issue of

Palestine and it has recognised Hamas, a declared terrorist

group and an official enemy of Israel, as an equal partner41.

The 2010 Mavi Marmara flotilla incident, in which the attempt

to break Israel’s blockade of Gaza resulted in the deaths of

Turkish citizens at the hands of the Israeli Defence Forces,

and Turkey’s vote against sanctions on Iran at the UN Security

Council widened the chasm between the two countries42. Although

Israel has demonstrated the willingness to normalize the

relationship, Turkey’s foreign policy seems to systematically

exacerbate the problem.43 Despite an apology by Israeli Prime

Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to Erdogan brokered by President

Barack Obama in 2013, Turkey and Israel have not been able to

41 In 2009 President Erdogan accused Israel for state terrorism and Turkeyturned against Israel during the military operation Cast Lead in Gaza in2008 – 2009. In December 2009, in an international conference in Davos,president Erdogan publicly railed against long-time dove and Israelipresident Simon Peres, in an effort to promote the neo – ottoman image ofTurkey in the Muslim world.42 Kevin Johnson, Alex Ross, and Endy Zemenides: “Natural Gas in the EasternMediterranean: The Coal and Steel of the 21st Century?” The Chicago Council on GlobalAffairs, June 2015, Available at:www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/EL%202015%20EnergyReport_v6.pdf Accessed on July 09, 2015

43 Zenonas Tziarras & Gabriel Mitchell, “Full of Gas, Full of Problems: The EasternMediterranean's Hydrocarbon Showdown”, Diplomatic Academy, University of Nicosia,January 06, 2015.file:///C:/Users/User/Documents/Academia%20UNIC/Turkish_Studies/Essay_Sources/Full-of-Gas-Full-of-Problems-The-Eastern-Mediterraneans-Hydrocarbon-Showdown.pdf Accessed on May 20, 2015.

re-establish even a working relationship and are still far

from realigned.44

The deterioration of the relations between Turkey and

Israel and the surrounding of the country by Islamic failed

states have obliged Israel to seek alternative regional

alliances and more strategic depth to the west, in order to

foster its security and secure alternative routes for the

delivery of its energy resources to its main trade partner,

Europe. This shift of the Israeli Foreign policy has led to a

set of bilateral defence and security agreements with Greece

and Cyprus and to the intensification of the cooperation with

Cyprus in the fields of energy, culture, disaster management

and civil protection, environment and defence. As a result, in

February 2012, Israel PM Netanyahu visited Cyprus, the first

visit of an Israeli Prime Minister in history, and the two

countries signed a search and rescue agreement. Since then the

two countries have conducted various military45 and safe and

rescue exercises and have strengthened their cooperation at

44 Kevin Johnson, Alex Ross, and Endy Zemenides: “Natural Gas in the EasternMediterranean: The Coal and Steel of the 21st Century?” The Chicago Council on GlobalAffairs, June 2015, Available at:www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/EL%202015%20EnergyReport_v6.pdf Accessed on July 09, 201545 Wikipedia: In 21 October 2014 Israel and Cyprus held joint militaryexercise that included aerial manoeuvres by Israeli Air Force fighter jetsin Cypriot airspace in collaboration with the Cypriot National Guard.Another part of the military drill took place in Cypriot territorial watersoff the island of Crete. Moreover, in 11 February 2014, between 11am and1am Israel and Cyprus held a joint military exercise codenamed ‘Onisilos-Gideon’ in Cypriot FIR and the scheduled drill occurred inside the Nicosiaflight information region (FIR). Israeli fighter jets carried out flybysover areas south of Limassol featuring 32 F15 and F16 jets and six moresupport aircraft of the Israeli Air Force. The exercise included simulatedfiring at targets on land and sea along the southern coast from Limassol toPaphos.

all levels. On June 15, 2015, the Cyprus President Mr. Nikos

Anastasiades held an official visit to Israel, another

indication of the efforts of the two states to extend their

bilateral cooperation, mostly in the fields of energy and

security46.

Finally, to conclude with the regional system of

international relations and the security conditions in the

Eastern Mediterranean, we cannot also neglect the significant

deterioration of the traditionally good relations between

Turkey and Egypt after the ouster of the elected leader of the

Muslim Brotherhood, Mohamed Morsi by the Egyptian army (July,

03, 2013) and the open support of Turkey to the Muslim leader.

Because of Turkey’s stance, on November 2013, after many

months of a long diplomatic crisis, the Egyptian government

expelled the Turkish ambassador in Cairo. As a result, Turkey

adopted a contentious stance toward Egypt’s new president,

General Abdel Fattah al-Sisi, leading to a further severing of

diplomatic ties between the two countries. The said event, as

expected pushed Egypt to strengthen its bilateral relations

with Cyprus in the energy field and put an end to Turkey’s

efforts to achieve an agreement with Egypt for the delineation

of their EEZ against the national interests of Greece and

Cyprus.

46 Cyprus News Report: “President Anastasiades Meets PM Netanyahu in Israel”. June 15,2015. Available at: http://www.cyprusnewsreport.com/ Accessed July 13,2015.

III.PART III

The Oil and Gas Dispute, the security context in the Eastern

Mediterranean and the Cyprus Problem; Future Promises

and Challenges

To summarise in relation to my previous analysis, I

repeat that the discovery of vast oil and gas deposits in the

Nile’s Delta Basin in 2003 and the Levant Basin in 2010, as

well as, the potential exploitation of the EEZ of Cyprus after

the discovery of natural gas in the Aphrodite Block in 2012,

has changed the global energy map and has obliged great powers

and especially the US, as well as Eastern Mediterranean

countries to reconsider their strategic planning in the

region. The new aforesaid geoconomic reality directly

influences the Cyprus problem and has triggered a competition

over exclusive economic zones among countries such as Israel,

Cyprus, Turkey and Lebanon. This competition is leading to the

creation of new political, economic and defense alliances,

which may oblige the US, a highly significant actor in Cyprus

political affairs, to bolster its force posture in the region

by establishing new cooperative security sites, and by helping

develop new regional defense partnerships47 which could include

a new United Cyprus having a specific role in the region as a

security pillar for Israel and as an intermediate energy hub

47 Kevin Johnson, Alex Ross, and Endy Zemenides: “Natural Gas in the EasternMediterranean: The Coal and Steel of the 21st Century?” The Chicago Councilon Global Affairs, June 2015, Available at:www.thechicagocouncil.org/sites/default/files/EL%202015%20EnergyReport_v6.pdf Accessed on July 09, 2015

and a link for the flow of gas from Israel, Egypt, Cyprus, and

eventually Lebanon to Europe.

Turkey, although ideologically committed to its new pan –

ottoman Islamic political ideology, remains as a national

state, a rational actor that continues to implement in Cyprus,

a “Real Politic” policy based on its relative power relations with

Greece and Cyprus and the existing vacuum of power in the

Middle East that Turkey aims to exploit. In addition, Turkey

does not neglect in its geopolitical and geoconomic

calculations, its specific relations with the EU (Turkey is a

candidate member since 2005), the failure of its zero –

problems policy with its neighbouring countries and its

strategic alliance with the US. On the other hand the TFP

under president Erdogan has shown some signs of arrogance and

defiance of the leading role of the US and Israel in the

Middle East, a development which could affect the security

system and the balance of power in the studied region.

What is more, Turkey by the use of its strong military

capacity (2nd largest army in NATO), and its rising economic

power (an active member of the G-20) and benefited by its

exceptional geographical position and its great geopolitical

importance for the USA and the west in general, has created

many crises in the Aegean Sea and in Cyprus that resulted in

the termination of the “Common Defence Doctrine” between

Greece and Cyprus after the S-300 missile crisis in 1996, and

led to the progressive shrinkage of the national powers of

Greece and Cyprus. This shift of power created a fear syndrome

in both states, and especially in Athens, that follows a

constant policy of strategic appeasement of Turkey, which

under the AKP leadership has maximized its national power48.

Greece, although entitled to expand its EEZ under the UNCLOS

III and UNCLOS 1982 provisions — to which it is a signatory —

refrains so far from claiming its own EEZ in the face of

Turkish threats on Greece’s right to extension of territorial

waters to twelve nautical miles (22 km) and to sign an

agreement for the delimitation of its EEZ with Cyprus.

In addition, the recent economic crises in both Greece

and Cyprus have further weakened the negotiating position of

Cyprus and have created more incentives for the said countries

to resolve their disputes with Turkey, in order to acquire any

possible financial profits from the exploitation of gas and

oil. Especially as far as Cyprus is concerned, a viable

solution would allow a new United Cyprus being an EU member

state, to exploit its resources in a secure environment and

reboot its economy. In such a case the construction of a gas

pipeline connecting Cyprus and Turkey, would signal the

beginning of a new cooperation with a new Turkey, which

accordingly needs to re-examine its political orientation

between its conservative neo – Islamic agenda and a pro-

western and a pro - EU secular political agenda. In this

sense, the oil and gas dispute in Cyprus, which is directly48 According to the Turkish Military Manual MT 145-1 and the decisions ofthe Turkish Security Council the National Power of a state can be definedin terms of its human dynamics (size of a population, education,demography, rate of growth), its geographic position (natural sources,size, strategic value, boarders formation), its economic and diplomaticpower, its military power, its social and psychological power (culture,civilization, history, moral values) and its technological power. ChristosMinagias, “The Geopolitical Strategy and the Military Power of Turkey” (Η ΓεωπολιτικήΣτρατηγική και η Στρατιωτική Ισχύς της Τουρκίας), Touriki Publications,(2010): 128 – 130.

related to the Greco – Turkish dispute over the Aegean Sea is

additionally directly interrelated to the geopolitical

aspirations of Turkey that have unfortunately led to its

political confrontations and frictions with all the potential

oil and gas partners and producers of oil and gas in the

Eastern Mediterranean.

Nonetheless, despite Turkey’s offensive “Real Politic” foreign

policy agenda under the AKP governance, it should be stressed

that it is commonly accepted by the international community,

as well as, by the present and the previous government of the

Republic of Cyprus (exclusively represented by the Greek

Cypriot community) that the Turkish Cypriot community, which

is de facto (hopefully only temporarily) a separate self-

administered ethnic entity in the Northern part of Cyprus,

must be equally benefited by the oil revenues that will emerge

from the exploitation of Cyprus hydrocarbons, when a viable

solution of the Cyprus problem will emerge bringing to an end

one of the most protracted ethnic conflicts of the 20th and 21st

centuries.

Moreover, some other third state and non – state actors

argue that the non – active involvement of the Turkish Cypriot

community in the present exploitation and exploration

procedures conducted by the Greek Cypriot administered

Republic of Cyprus is a counter - productive unilateral

action, which does not positively contribute to the solution

of the Cyprus issue and could lead to more frictions and even

military confrontations in the region. Even so, the resume of

the negotiation talks in summer 2015 by the recently elected

moderate Turkish Cypriot leader Mustafa Akinci and the Greek

Cypriot President Nikos Anastasiades, alongside the withdrawal

of the Turkish exploration vessel Barbaros from the EEZ of

Cyprus, earlier in 2015, has open a glimmer of hope for a

final settlement of the Cyprus issue that will include a fair

arrangement of the oil and gas issue. Furthermore, I assert

that the effort of the Roc to continue its energy plans is not

an obstacle to a solution, as long as the internationally

recognised government of the RoC, which is also an EU member,

has acted according to the UNCLOS 1982 which it ratified in

December 12, 1988.

Finally, it should be stressed that in any potential

solution of the Cyprus issue, the exploitation and management

of the natural resources of Cyprus, will unavoidably and

largely depend on the strategic posture, political agendas and

the geopolitical - geoconomic relations between the US, GB,

Turkey, Israel, Russia, Egypt and finally, the EU as an

emerging global actor. Having said that, I also estimate that

as long as the final desired end state of the TFP is at first

phase, the de facto recognition and acceptance of the so called

“TRNC” as an autonomous national sovereign entity inside the

territory of the RoC, and in a second phase, the creation of

fertile grounds for a potential de jure recognition of the

Turkish Cypriot administration in the northern part of the

island, the use of the oil and gas discoveries, as a dynamic

driving force for a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem,

will turn out to be futile.

Epilogue and Conclusions

To conclude with, the present and future discovery of

significant oil and gas deposits in the Eastern Mediterranean

has changed the security environment in the region that became

from one hand a field of global and regional competition but

on the other hand, it has created new potentials for a broader

cooperation between the Nations – States of the region, which

could establish a new safe and secure environment. The US also

understood that the region is now much more vital for its

strategic interests, as well as, those of Israel that wants to

stop its energy isolation and seeks for strategic depth

towards Greece and Cyprus, without neglecting the fact that a

dramatic positive change in TFP could lead to a pro – western

Eastern Mediterranean energy and security alliance. In such a

case, a win – win situation, could provide for a new

alternative, or at minimum, an additional source of energy

supplies to Europe, thereby, reducing the geoconomic

dependence of Europe from Russia and the Middle East.

Many developments will largely depend on the future

strategic posture of Turkey and its hegemonic aspirations in

the region, in correlation with the geopolitical, geoconomic

and security considerations of the US, Israel, Egypt and the

EU. Moreover, the security status and the energy security of

the region, will basically depend on the future events in the

chaotic Middle East, where crucial disputes and social unrest

threat to destabilise not only the Middle East but also

Europe, which currently suffers from a large – scale arrival

of illegal immigrants, mostly in Italy and Greece and fears

for more terrorist attacks in its capitals. From a Cyprus

perspective, Cyprus and the leaders of the Cypriot Communities

must do their best to reach to a viable solution in a win –

win situation, the soonest possible. However, no effort could

be successful without mutual compromises and a less

imperialistic approach on behalf of Turkey, since Greece is

too weak and unwilling for any strategic aspirations in

Cyprus. I would also argue that Cyprus inside NATO and the EU

will have better chances to safeguard its energy security and

its future exploration and exploitation plans with success.

With a bit of luck, I personally hope that this will be the

end of a long and thorny historical voyage, which begun more

than a century ago when Cyprus was falling in the hands of the

British Empire.

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Additional Useful Bibliography:

Alan Palmer: “The Penguin Dictionary of Twentieth Century History”,

Fifth Edition, Penguin Reference Books (2002).

Anthony Kenny: “The Oxford Illustrated History of Western Philosophy”,

Oxford University Press, (1997).

Chester A. Crocker, Fen Osler Hampson, Pamela Aall:

“Managing Global Chaos, Sources and Responses to International Conflict”,

United States Institute of Peace Press (2000)

Christopher Hill: “The Changing Politics of Foreign Policy”, Palgrave

Macmillan, (2003).

Colin S. Gray: “Another Bloody Century, Future warfare”, Phoenix

Paperback (2005)

David Miller, Janet Coleman, William Connolly, Alan Ryan:

“The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of political thought”, Blackwell Publishers

Inc. (1998).

Fred Chernoff: “Theory and Metatheory in International Relations”,

Palgrave Macmillan (2007).

Goff / Moss / Terry / Upshur: “The Twentieth Century, a Brief Global

History”, McGraw-Hill Higher Education, (2002).

Graham Allison/ Philip Zelikov: “Essence of Decision: Explaining the

Cuban Missile Crisis.” Second Edition, Addison Wesley Longman, Inc,

(1999).

Graham Evans end Jeffrey New ham: “The penguin Dictionary of

International relations”, Penguin Books, (1998).

Henry Kissinger: “Diplomacy”, Touchstone Books, Simon &

Schuster, (1995).

Keith Webb: “An Introduction to Problems in the Philosophy of Social

Science», Pinter, London-New York (1995).

J.M Roberts: “The Penguin History of the world”, Penguin Group,

(1995).

Robert Jackson and George Sorensen: “Introduction to International

Relations”, Oxford University Press, (2003).

John Baylis and Steven Smith: “The Globalisation of World Politics”

Oxford University Press (2006)

Richard Stubbs, Geoffrey R.D.Hunderhill: “Political Economy

and the Changing Global Order”, Oxford University Press, (2000).

Simon Blackburn: “Oxford Dictionary of Philosophy”, Oxford

University Press, (1996).

Simon Bromley: “Governing the European Union”, SAGE

publications, (2001).

Stephen d. Tansey: “The Basics Politics”, 3rd edition, Routledge

Taylor and Francis group, (2004).