Revisiting the (Lost) Art of Ideal-Typing

Revisiting the (Lost) Art of Ideal-Typing in Public Administration

Margaret StoutWest Virginia University

ABSTRACT

Despite a renewed interest in Max Weber’s work in public ad-ministration literature, there has been little discussion of his ideal-type method as a useful tool for contemporary theory building and subsequent research. The article challenges the field to revisit the art of ideal-typing as an important methodology when applied accurately, distinguishing ideal-typing from other forms of classification. It revisits Weber’s original (translated) essays on methodology, clarifying the specific steps involved in generating and utilizing ideal-type models and illustrating each step with Weber’s ideal-type models as well as a recent study that employed the method to generate an ideal-type model of public administration theory based on logics of democratic legitimacy. Both applications make a case for the method’s appropriateness for public administration and its potential usefulness in generat-ing robust theoretical models from which to develop hypotheses and conduct a variety of both mental experiments and empirical research.

There is renewed interest in Max Weber’s work in recent public administration literature (Alkadry, 2004; Bartels, 2009; Gale & Hummel, 2003; Hummel, 2006; Raadschelders & Stillman, 2007; Rutgers & Schreurs, 2004, 2006; Thorne & Kouzmin, 2007; Tijsterman & Overeem, 2008). It is clear that Weber’s ideal-type of bureaucracy has had enormous influence on administra-tive theory, and his ideal-type model of authority has inspired organizational behavior and theory. Thus, he continues to figure prominently as a scholar of interest in public administration. Gale and Hummel (2003) suggest that in addition to their own exploration of Weber’s possible Hegelian ontological origins, it would be beneficial to explore his understanding of social action, his methodology of social science, and his ideal-type method. Like others

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(Migdal, 2001), they suggest that Weber’s work has possibly suffered from a long history of “misreading” (Gale & Hummel, 2003, p. 410). Agreeing with this problem of misinterpretation, Thorne and Kouzmin note that We-ber’s work was once brought to prominence through English translations, but scholars have been “adulterating” (2007, p. 51) it ever since. For example, translators and scholars relying on Weber’s work may have reinterpreted it to fit their own theoretical leanings (Gajduschek, 2003; Staniševski, 2004). Following this line of thought, scholars were invited to “rethink Weber on his own terms” (Rutgers & Schreurs, 2004, p. 103) in a 2004 forum on Weber in Administrative Theory & Praxis.

Some have chosen to reconsider the substantive content of Weber’s ideal-types. For example, Bartels (2009) builds an analytical framework starting from the ideal-type of bureaucracy, and Raadschelders and Stillman (2007) offer a reinterpretation of Weber’s ideal-types of traditional, charismatic, and legal authority by providing updated meanings based on contemporary governance contexts. Indeed, because of their cultural specificity, ideal-types must be recreated across time and place: “Weber insists on the inevitability of ever new ideal-typical constructions, depending on the changing perception of the problems which in turn depend on different cultural contexts” (Wein-ert, 1996, p. 79). This type of renewal of Weber’s ideal-types may be very useful in answering the question Raadschelders and Stillman pose for future research: “Upon what grounds can administrative authority be legitimized?” (2007, p. 32; emphasis in original). However, I assert that it may be more fruitful to replicate the method anew, rather than try to revise the substantive content of Weber’s ideal-types in some ad hoc fashion. Indeed, exploring the legitimate exercise of authority by all governance actors was the purpose of my own inquiry, which began with a new application of the ideal-type method (Stout, 2007).

Thorne and Kouzmin note that Weber used “ideal-typing sophistication which has so bedeviled positivist social science” (2007, p. 50). Bartels (2009) agrees, suggesting that for Weber’s resulting ideal-types to be useful in the modern study of public administration, both the method and its operationaliza-tion must be understood. His ideal-type method has been employed quite well in theory building by a descending lineage of scholars focused on the problem of social order and the role of the state and its institutions. For example, it has been shown that Hannah Arendt utilized the ideal-type method in her studies of pariahdom and totalitarianism (Parvikko, 2004). Alberto Guerreiro Ramos (1981) used it to develop an ideal-type model of delimited social systems in The new science of organizations. Hood and Jackson (1991) used it to create a typology for the “DNA” of several ideal-type administrative arguments. I employed the ideal-type method to produce a model of three distinct traditions of public administration theory identifiable based on their mutually exclusive understanding of democratic legitimacy (Stout, 2007).

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However, not every attempt to build theoretically useful typologies is suc-cessful, as will be discussed in this article. I assert that a careful application of Weber’s ideal-type method can help produce more robust theoretical models for the study of public administration. Unfortunately, his methodology and the ideal-type method are not widely discussed in public administration research texts. Therefore, here I seek to simply explain the ideal-type method itself to render it more accessible as a useful tool for contemporary theory building and subsequent social scientific research. To emphasize, rather than extending or revising Weber’s ideal-types, I am explaining the method and illustrating how it was used in public administration theory building.

In the following sections, I will revisit Weber’s original (translated) essays on methodology and clarify the specific steps involved in generating and utiliz-ing ideal-type models. Each step is illustrated using descriptions of Weber’s well-known ideal-type models in addition to my own inquiry that employed the ideal-type method to generate a model of public administration theory based on logics of democratic legitimacy (Stout, 2007). A concluding discussion of the substantive results points toward the method’s possible usefulness to public administration as an approach that results in robust theoretical models from which to develop hypotheses and conduct a variety of both mental and empirical experiments.

UNDERSTANDING WEBER’S IDEAL-TYPE METHOD

Answering the call from Gale and Hummel (2003) to more fully understand Weber’s ideal-type method, one must at least reference his methodology of social science, his interpretation of social action, and the epistemological com-mitments they infer. From this foundation, explication of the ideal-type method itself makes more sense. The following sections will summarize these concepts using examples from public administration theory whenever possible.

Weber’s Methodological Perspective

Weber’s approach to what he called “cultural science” (Weber, 1994e, p. 251) has come to be known as interpretive sociology, the purpose of which is “to understand ideas and practices from within their own intellectual and cultural horizon and on the basis of categories that are grounded in a meaningful social and historical context” (Heydebrand, 1994, p. xvi). This is an ambiguous epistemological position that offers the “potential for reflexive and critical inter-pretation” as well as a “sociological eye for empirical detail” (Heydebrand, 1994, p. xvii). Weber’s unique approach of using subjective interpretation of empirical observation to generate causal explanation is the topic of a substantial theoreti-cal debate on epistemology (see, for example, Winch, 1990) and could be the subject of an entire article in and of itself. For the present purpose, only the


manner in which this combination of interpretation and observation pertains most directly to ideal-typing will be discussed.

In Weber’s (1949b) view, the role of theory in social science is to help make sense of what is observed. In other words, theory is used to frame observation and analysis and to evaluate what is found. Ideal-type models are one such framework. In fact, Guerreiro Ramos asserts that ideal-typing as a primary original creation has “brought an unprecedented insight into the nature and meaning of theory building itself” (1981, p. 62). At its core, typifying is a key process in sense making (Husserl, 1931/1982). In fact, Weber suggests that “the discursive nature of our knowledge, i.e., the fact that we comprehend reality only through a chain of intellectual modifications . . . demands the use of such concepts” (1949b, p. 94). Types differentiate and group phenomena based on some kind of criteria or frame of reference. “It is only by means of demarcation or framing that the human mind can isolate phenomena and acquire knowledge about them” (Rutgers, 2001, p. 5). Indeed, Weber asserts that what is observed empirically is in large part constituted by such frame-works and the concepts that compose them:

The objective validity of all empirical knowledge rests exclusively upon the ordering of the given reality according to categories which are subjective in a specific sense, namely, in that they present the presup-positions of our knowledge and are based on the presupposition of the value of those truths which empirical knowledge alone is able to give us. (1949b, p. 110; emphasis in original)

As a result, Weber insists that theory cannot be derived simply from empiri-cal observation of facts, assuming that it is being done from some value-free, objective perspective. It must be constructed using value judgments that direct our empirical observations and then guide our interpretation (or “evaluation” in Weber’s terms) of those observations. He concludes that attempting an “objective” analysis of society is meaningless:

We are cultural beings, endowed with the capacity and the will to take a deliberate attitude towards the world and to lend it significance. Whatever this significance may be, it will lead us to judge certain phe-nomena of human existence in its light and to respond to them as being (positively or negatively) meaningful. . . . All knowledge of cultural reality, as may be seen, is always knowledge from particular points of view. (1949b, p. 81; emphasis in original)

Thus, even while promoting logic in theory building and highly systematic approaches to empirical observation and interpretive analysis, Weber critiques nomological positivism as an impossible goal: “An exhaustive causal inves-tigation of any concrete phenomena in its full reality is not only practically impossible—it is simply nonsense. We select only those causes to which are to

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be imputed in the individual case, the ‘essential’ features of an event” (1994e, p. 254). Furthermore, these causal relationships can transform radically by virtue of changes to the cultural meanings of the associated values. Therefore, his methodology “provides a unique synthesis of subjective and objective ap-proaches, addressing important critiques of positivism by blending elements of phenomenology, ordinary language analysis, structuralism, and critical theory” (Hekman, 1983a). In fact, some suggest Weber planted the seeds of what would later be called “social construction” (Maines, 2000).

Social construction assumes that what we perceive to be reality is made sensible and meaningful only through language and culture (Berger & Luckmann, 1966). This does not deny the existence of an objective reality but rather accepts that we can only perceive it, describe it, and make sense of it in ways that are framed by socially assigned meanings and interpreta-tions (Glassner, 2000). This is mutually exclusive to the positivist claim that theory-free observation of an objective truth is possible. Furthermore, social construction assumes that accepted meanings tend to function as provisional endpoints in any given time or place, and therefore compete for primacy in an ongoing process of revision (Glassner, 2000). Similarly, Weber asserted that all interpretations of meaning must remain at best “a peculiarly plausible hypothesis,” as opposed to a claim of verifiable truth (Weber, 1994d, p. 234). Against those who assert claims to truth, Weber points toward an important element of postmodern critiques of positivism. Long before the term “reifica-tion” came into use, he noted that phenomena perceived through value judg-ments masquerade as facts and must be analyzed with a critical view: “The specific function of science, it seems to me, is . . . to ask questions about these things which convention makes self-evident” (Weber, 1949a, p. 13). Indeed, another translation actually uses the term “reified” to explain his meaning (see Weber, 1994d, p. 240).

Weber’s pragmatic purpose is to clarify not only how values function in sense making, but how they are necessary for the conduct of meaningful social science. This type of inquiry identifies culturally relevant social problems for investigation and evaluates findings according to culturally meaningful ethi-cal principles, values, and philosophies. His discussions of what constitutes meaningfulness cover both the individual and societal levels of analysis. In regard to the individual, Weber insists that the most important object of sociological study is social action—a concept differentiated from behavior by the characteristic of having subjective meaning assigned to it by the actor (Weber, 1994d). He associates social action with various forms of rationality to differentiate it from habitual or reactive behavior that has no subjective meaning (Weber, 1994g).

At the societal level of analysis, Weber suggests that the most important purpose in social science is to “analyze the phenomena of life in terms of their cultural significance”:


Empirical reality becomes “culture” to us because and insofar as we relate it to value ideas. It includes those segments and only those seg-ments of reality which have become significant to us because of this value-relevance. . . . We cannot discover, however, what is meaningful to us by means of a “presuppositionless” investigation of empirical data. Rather, perception of its meaningfulness to us is the presupposition of its becoming an object of investigation. (Weber, 1994e, p. 252)

Unfortunately, neither my own reading nor a more in-depth study of We-ber’s methodology can discern the techniques through which the significance of these cultural meanings were determined:

Weber is not clear on how “cultural significance” is defined within a given society. Is it defined in terms of what a majority of the members of the society consider to be significant or by what the social scientist who studies the society deems significant? . . . Weber offers no satisfactory answers to these questions. (Hekman, 1983b, p. 28)

Weber simply insists that it is the values to which the scientist relates the object of inquiry that determine what is to be regarded as significant or im-portant about the phenomena, and in reference to these values, “there exists an infinite gradation of ‘significance’ arranged into an order which differs for each of us” (Weber, 1994e, p. 258). Patterns of significance also vary across time and culture. “But it obviously does not follow from this that research in the cultural sciences can only have results which are ‘subjective’ in the sense that they are valid for one person and not for others. Only the degree to which they interest different persons varies” (Weber, 1994e, p. 259).

In his discussion, Weber does provide an example of cultural significance that appears to rely on a sort of face validity: “the significance of exchange in a money economy can be the fact that it exists on a mass scale as a funda-mental component of modern culture. But the historical fact that it plays this role must be causally explained in order to render its cultural significance understandable” (Weber, 1994e, p. 253). While the generic features of ex-change have existed since antiquity, there is a culturally meaningful difference in significance between a time when money was limited and modern times when the money economy is carried out on a mass scale that reaches every aspect of life. Thus, it appears to be up to the scientist to explain and defend a logical rationale for cultural significance in a given study.

To summarize Weber’s methodological perspective as it is associated with the ideal-type method, theory is used to make sense of what is observed empirically. Value orientations inform theory and therefore guide both ob-servation and evaluation of what is observed. Nomological knowledge is limited by our capacity to consider the complexity of factors attributable to a given phenomenon and by its basis in perceptions that are also shaped by value orientations. The focus of social science is the subjective meaning of

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that which is culturally significant, concepts that are also value based and socially constructed. Therefore, claims of significance, meaning, and causal relationships can only be put forth with logical rationales and are subject to challenge as a hypothesis.

The Ideal-Type Method

As noted in the field of public administration, theory may be derived from philosophical reasoning or imagining about the world, or from empirical evi-dence actually observed (Waldo, 1984). From either source, theory identifies constructs that will be useful to scientific inquiry and specifies relationships among the constructs (Doty & Glick, 1994). Because constructs are conceptual abstractions of empirical phenomena, they are useful in explaining, predict-ing, understanding, and critiquing what is observed in scientific research. They are carefully constructed “nets cast to catch what we call ‘the world’” (Popper, 2002, p. 65).

Weber’s principal method of theory building was ideal-typing. “The ideal-type offers a way of understanding that comes closest to the notion of grounded theory, reflecting the categories of cognition as they appear to, and are selected by, the participant observer situated in a given social and cultural universe of discourse” (Heydebrand, 1994, p. xvii). In Weber’s (1949b) explication of the ideal-type method, he first goes to some lengths to express what it is not. He asserts that sense-making conceptual structures (Gedankenbild) are frequently used by social scientists without clear and intentional formulation. To do so unconscientiously is unacceptable: “The inevitable consequence is either that he [the social scientist] consciously or unconsciously uses other similar concepts without formulating them verbally and elaborating them logically or that he remains stuck in the realm of the vaguely ‘felt’” (Weber, 1949b, p. 94). In Weber’s view, this approach to theoretical constructs is less than adequate. Typologies are useful only to the degree that they are inclusive of many conceptual relationships that are of cultural significance as well as adequately comprehensive and systematic in their exposition.

This concern about thin theoretical typologies is not uncommon. Sorokin (1957) believes integration of analytical constructs requires more than merely placing them together and offers a hierarchical classification of typologies based on: (1) spatial characteristics, including time and place, (2) externally applied or insignificant characteristics, (3) causal/functional relationships, and (4) internal logico-meaningful similarities. Only the latter two form what he believes to be true integrated systems, providing the “means of ordering into comprehensible systems infinitely numerous and complex phenomena of the sociocultural world” (Sorokin, 1957, p. 9; emphasis in original). To illustrate with classifications of public administration theory, the historical approach is spatial and includes many types of differences in any given grouping by decade


or era. Classifications such as traditional, orthodox, New Public Management, New Public Administration, and New Public Service are groupings without mutual exclusivity that also have internal contradictions, and they are therefore external in nature. Dichotomies like politics–administration describe a causal/functional relationship. Classifications such as federalist and antifederalist that group ideas based on fundamental assumptions about democratic legitimacy or rationalist and nonrationalist that group theories based on epistemologi-cal assumptions are logico-meaningful. Following Sorokin (1957), only the politics/administration dichotomy or the federalist/antifederalist or rationalist/nonrationalist typologies would be sufficient for theory-building.

Many groupings presented as “typologies” continue to receive contem-porary criticism because they do not capture the full complexity of social phenomena and can be useful only as taxonomical guides for classification (Doty & Glick, 1994). Indeed, taxonomies only serve to categorize phenomena into mutually exclusive and exhaustive sets based on defined characteristics, and classification schemes may not even do that. There may be little or no theoretical relationship among the characteristics of the “types” themselves. Weber (1949b) makes note that these confusions stem from the many terms used in the conceptual characterization of things, including “typical,” “type,” and “kind.” Typical refers to something that occurs frequently or an average of specific occurrences. Kind refers to a generic concept or phenomenon that has no specific meaning. Type refers to a genetic meaning of a generic concept. Thus, typologies offer a theoretical argument about the internal consistency of a set of relationships among conceptual characteristics or constructs. Each type in the model represents a unique combination of characteristics that are believed to be linked to various outcomes. Such typologies meet the three criteria of theories: (1) identification of constructs, (2) specification of rela-tionships among constructs, and (3) ability to falsify anticipated implications (Doty & Glick, 1994).

The question at hand is what differentiates the ideal-type method from other approaches to typifying. Let us consider the latter first. Several no-table public administration role “typologies” have been developed primarily through empirical studies of individual practitioners (Brewer, Selden, & Facer, 2000; Denhardt & deLeon, 1995; Downs, 1967; Svara, 2006b). These classification frameworks are valuable in linking individual value systems to specific administrative functions, organizational missions, or job classi-fications. Furthermore, they are useful in describing different approaches to the administrator’s relationship with elected officials (Svara, 2006a, 2006b, 2006c). However, there is crossover of characteristics among the types de-vised, indicating that the types are not mutually exclusive on the basis of one fundamental organizing logic. Weber would say this is in large part because it is impossible to capture ideal-types from observation of particular instances because in practice, people enact mixed motives. Therefore, typologies based

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on limited empirical observation cannot create a robust theoretical framework of distinct constructs and the relationships among them.

The ideal-type method is devised to overcome these deficiencies in typify-ing purely from the basis of limited empirical observation and without clearly identifying the value orientations and presuppositions to the observation. To be robust and useful, a typology must be empirically grounded, well expli-cated, and comprehensive; in addition, it must result from a well-designed, logical, generalized, systematic approach rather than an inductive observa-tion of a small set of particulars. This process results in an ideal-type with three distinguishing characteristics: (1) it must be focused on a specific social phenomenon, (2) it must have a specified frame of reference, and (3) the ele-ments of the phenomenon considered must be of cultural significance and be sufficient for causal explanation (Weber, 1949b). These are all criteria to consider in evaluating an ideal-type or typology.

In regard to having an empirical basis, while ideal-types are grounded in experience through broad empirical observation, they are conceptual abstrac-tions of empirical reality:

It is not a description of reality but it aims to give unambiguous means of expression to such a description. . . . An ideal-type is formed by the one-sided accentuation of one or more points of view and by the synthesis of a great many diffuse, discrete, more or less present and occasionally absent concrete individual phenomena, which are arranged according to those one-sidedly emphasized viewpoints into a unified analytical construct (Gedankenbild). In its conceptual purity, this mental construct (Gedankenbild) cannot be found empirically anywhere in reality. It is a utopia. (Weber, 1949b, p. 90; emphasis in original)

Thus, many such utopias can be described and claim to be a representation of the meaning of a social phenomenon. Traits from empirical reality can be brought together into a meaningful unified construct based on different points of view, “for those phenomena which interest us as cultural phenomena are interesting to us with respect to very different kinds of evaluative ideas to which we relate them” (Weber, 1949b, p. 91).

As noted in the discussion on methodological perspective, both what are considered to be interesting phenomena and their essential tendencies are constructed based on values. However, they must make reference to the empirical world and subjective experience of it: “It is a matter here of con-structing relationships which our imagination accepts as plausibly motivated and hence as ‘objectively possible’ and which appear as adequate from the nomological standpoint” (Weber, 1949b, p. 92; emphasis in original). Ideal- types focus attention on the most significant features of social phenomena according to a specific frame of reference to make sense of them even given their vast complexity.


This is where the necessity for careful explication and comprehensiveness comes in. All important elements of the phenomenon or “end” must “be incor-porated into an axiological and normative system organizing conceptually all the values and activities which are or will be connected with it” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 86). In Weber’s terminology, the ideal-type is a possible reality ex-pressed as a generic conceptual pattern of essential characteristics and their genetic meanings. The term “generic” refers to concepts that are considered essential or causally linked to a given phenomenon and are categories of “kind” or “class” (Gattungsbegriffe) (Weber, 1994b, p. 273). The generic elements of the type are important, culturally significant, essential characteristics of the phenomenon in general. By “important” and “culturally significant,” he means the elements have meaning to the social actors themselves or value according to the social scientist. By “essential,” he means they are necessary to under-stand causal relationships. The ideal aspect of the type is its unique, genetic characteristics, or specific meanings associated with each generic element. When a generic concept contains a particular meaning, “it assumes a genetic character and becomes therewith ideal-typical in the logical sense” (Weber, 1994b, p. 273). Ideal-types are thus “ordered sets of elements between which certain relations hold” (Weinert, 1996, p. 84). For example, Hood and Jackson (1991) create a typology for the DNA of several administrative arguments, each of which has its own genetic code (specific meanings) of philosophies, doctrines, and justifications (generic elements) for administrative principles (the culturally significant social phenomenon).

Thus, an ideal-type is composed of generic kinds of elemental concepts that have a genetic meaning unique to the type itself. A model of two or more ideal-types would share generic elements (kinds or categories of concepts) but not the genetic meanings of those elements. Empirically, only the generic can be typical, meaning present in most instances of the phenomena under consideration. It is the genetic characteristics that are utopian or ideal in nature, and they are linked with one another through logical relationships.

This is where the need for a well-designed, logical, generalized, and sys-tematic approach comes in. Weber demands that ideal-types have “logical consistency and conceptual precision” (Weinert, 1996, p. 76). As “pure” types, they must be mutually exclusive in one or more key characteristics. This is very similar to Sorokin’s logico-meaningful integration, which is based on the consistency of identity formed by the “central meaning, idea, or mental bias that permeates all the logically related fragments” (1957, p. 11; emphasis in original). This also follows in Dryzek’s (1990) notion of coherent sets of logically related attitudes toward politics and public policy.

The term “logical” does not imply the formal logic and syllogisms of posi-tivism or the logic of proof. In this use, “logic” is systematic reasoning that describes relationships among ideas (Neufeldt, 1996). Weber (1949a) believes that value positions can be logically grouped in internally consistent axioms.

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Furthermore, validity of the construct is based on logic, not empirical fact (Weber, 1994f). Therefore, Weber recommends that all scientific investigation clearly lay out the values being employed. “Personally I am of the opinion that nothing is too ‘pedantic’ if it is useful for the avoidance of confusions” (Weber, 1994f, p. 261). In sum, to construct ideal-types, value judgments are used to perceive, clarify, and explicate internally consistent value axioms or principles characteristic of various elements of a given social phenomenon (Weber, 1949a).

In sum, ideal-typing is a form of theory building in that it develops “a set of logically interrelated statements concerning the nature or patterning of events” (Sjoberg & Nett, 1968, p. 54). The defining characteristic of an ideal-type is logical coherence, which “refers to the internal consistency and full articulation of the value judgments and action principles” (Bobrow & Dryzek, 1987, p. 153). Like some forms of interpretive policy analysis, this approach to typifying coherently links normative principles and values with social action (Dryzek, 1990; Fischer, 1995; Paris & Reynolds, 1983).

Once constructed, ideal-types are used “not as an end but as a means” (Weber, 1949b, p. 92; emphasis in original). A robust typology is ultimately designed to explore anticipated implications (Doty & Glick, 1994). This can be accomplished through mental experiments of logic (e.g., exploration of what would happen if the ideal-type were fully manifested) and through comparison of empirical observations to the ideal-type. Weber asserts, “This procedure can be indispensable for heuristic as well as expository purposes . . . it is no ‘hypothesis’ but it offers guidance to the construction of hypotheses” (Weber, 1949b, p. 90). Therefore, ideal-types provide strong “conceptual instruments for comparison with and the measurement of reality” (Weber, 1949b, p. 97; emphasis in original). These comparisons help us to see what is significantly different in order to ask questions like “Why is it different?” and “What are the implications?”

THE METHODOLOGICAL FIT TO PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION

This section explores how Weber’s methodological perspective and ideal-type method are appropriate to the study of public administration in particular. As already noted, ideal-types have been used by public administration scholars. This section will look more carefully at Weber’s research purpose and actual applications of the ideal-type method in addition to a contemporary example of its use.

Weber’s Research Purpose

Most broadly, it has been proposed that there are a number of different types of scholarship (Znaniecki, 1940): discovery of truth (using insight and power


of reason); systematization of knowledge (producing frameworks and text-books); contribution of research (fine-tuning, testing, and generalizing theory); advocacy (competing for truth claims using rational evidence); collection and review of eclectic or historical knowledge; and dissemination of knowledge through education or the popularization of knowledge.

In his various studies of societies, Weber began with a systematization of eclectic and historical knowledge into models that made sense of observed phenomenon and enabled hypothesis development. However, development of the ideal-type models he used to make sense of observed phenomena is also a discovery in that it uses insight and the power of reason to consider existing information in a new way. This is a process that challenges “every kind of dogmatism” (Znaniecki, 1940, p. 179). Indeed, the ideal-type method uses the logic of discovery rather than the logic of proof to formulate theoretical constructs that will be useful to future research. An ideal-type is designed to build theory, not to test it for validation or revision. However, once gener-ated, an ideal-type model can be used to test hypotheses to contribute new knowledge. While it is perhaps the most confused use of an ideal-type, it can also be used to advocate for or against a specified type (see, for example, Weber’s [1922/1968] critique of bureaucracy and the rationalization of so-ciety). Finally, an ideal-type model can be used to disseminate knowledge through pedagogy. Thus, Weber’s ideal-type method can be useful to every basic approach to scholarship, all of which can be found in the academic field of public administration.

Weber’s postpositivist methodological perspective is appropriate to the study of public administration. As Dwight Waldo said, “The truth is, there is no such thing as ‘pure fact’ divorced from all concepts and theory” (1984, p. 170). Positivism requires a level of objectivity and certainty that Weber rejects in social science and in public policy in particular. “Strictly and exclusively empirical analysis can provide a solution only where it is a question of a means adequate to the realization of an absolutely unambiguously given end” (Weber, 1949a, p. 26). Public administration is quite to the contrary:

Administrative study . . . is concerned primarily with human beings, a type of being characterized by thinking and valuing. Thinking implies creativeness, free will. Valuing implies morality, conceptions of right and wrong. It is submitted that the established techniques of science are inapplicable to thinking and valuing human beings. (Waldo, 1984, p. 171)

Similarly, Weber notes that sociology and political science emerged as aca-demic fields in response to practical considerations based on value judgments about social conditions. Therefore, in these disciplines, “an attitude of moral indifference has no connection with scientific ‘objectivity’” (Weber, 1949b, p. 60, emphasis in original). However, it is critical for scholars of public admin-

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istration to state their philosophical commitments in a forthright manner.In an empirical context like public administration where multiple ideations

of “right” exist and compete for primacy, it is clear that there is no way to simply record what is from a strictly positive empirical stance and try to make sense of it. “Normative standards of value can and must be the objects of dis-pute in a discussion of a problem of social policy because the problem lies in the domain of general cultural values. . . . The broader its cultural significance, the less subject it is to a single unambiguous answer on the basis of the data of empirical sciences and the greater the role played by value-ideas” (Weber, 1949b, p. 56; emphasis in original). Certainly, issues like administrative legiti-macy and authority have the very broadest cultural significance and demand consideration of multiple normative values. Therefore, Weber’s interpretive approach to pragmatic issues is a good fit for public administration.

Weber’s Applications

Given the broad possible application to a variety of research purposes and the methodological fit between Weber’s approach to social science and the study of public administration, we must further link the ideal-type method to issues that are of importance to public administration. Generally speaking, Weber’s interpretive sociology employs a type of functional analysis that begins with the whole, proceeds to the parts, and then goes back from the parts to the whole (Weber, 1994d). His ideal-type method is thereby simultaneously useful in both the study of social structure and social action. Social action is linked to subjective meaning at the individual level of analysis, and structural forms are a consequence or construction of social action (Hekman, 1983a). This combi-nation is particularly valuable to public administration because the manner in which administrative action and the social structures of governance interrelate requires an approach that considers both. On the one hand, ideal-types enable consideration of things like alternative meanings of important concepts or alternative motivations held by social actors. On the other hand, they enable analysis of associated or resulting social structures. In this way, an ideal-type can concurrently help interpret the meaning of the administrative role as well as critique the institutions of governance. Such a unified approach to the complex problems of social science provides a desirable connection between interpretive and critical logics. As an example, Anthony Giddens (1977) is an advocate of a theoretical synthesis of the structural analysis of social formation and explanation of the subjective meanings of human action.

Weber employed the ideal-type method in his sociological study of gov-ernmental, economic, and religious organizations as described in economy and society (1922/1968). Indeed, many of his sociological essays explicate ideal-type models employed in public administration theory. For example, Weber developed an ideal-type model of social action based on underlying


value orientations: traditional (habitual patterns of family and community), affective (friendship and romance), value–rational (Wertrational) (deonto-logical, based on a chosen normative value system), and purposive–rational (Zweckrational) (teleological, based on an instrumental calculus) (Weber, 1994g). These value orientations characterize the relationships among ac-tors and may serve to explain varying conduct in different social, economic, political, and cultural conditions. For example, Weber notes that communal forms of social relationship are based on affect or tradition, while associa-tive social relationships are based on rational orientations (Weber, 1994h). Therefore, conduct is not simply a matter of the individual actor but rather is somewhat dependent upon the social conditions—illustrating the reflexive functional relationship between the whole and its parts, and also contemporary principles of social construction.

Building on these value orientations, Weber (1994a) expanded the model to explain bases of legitimate power or authority. In this typology, power is conceptualized as the probability that the will of one person shall be obeyed by another regardless of his or her own will. Authority is the legitimate exer-cise of power. Authority must be deemed legitimate to be socially effective, but legitimacy is determined by particular value orientations. Therefore, the value orientation must be shared. Following the previous ideal-types of value orientation, the four bases of legitimate power are: tradition (e.g., patriarchal, patrimonial, and feudal systems), affect (charismatic leadership and emotion-ally grounded “followership” of an individual or office), a substantive rational belief in its absolute value (based on an ideological system such as ethics, religion, science, technical expertise, or power politics), and formal–legal rationality (acceptance of a legal establishment based on voluntary agreement or otherwise legitimate authority).

Building again on this typology of the bases of legitimacy, Weber (1994c) further explicated three types of authority: rational, traditional, and charis-matic. In this model, the two rational value orientations are collapsed into one that rests on the common belief in the legality of rules and the right of those empowered to exercise authority. However, those rules can be based on substantive grounds. Traditional authority rests on the common belief in the sanctity of existing traditions and the legitimacy of that authority thereby empowered. Charismatic authority rests on an uncommon devotion to the sanctity, heroism, or otherwise impressive character of an individual and to the dispositions openly enacted by that person.

Pulling all of these ideal-types together, Weber developed an ideal-type model of the logical structure of the state. He felt that the state as a social phenomenon “is by far the most complicated and most interesting” (Weber, 1994b, p. 271). He believed that the essential idea that bound phenomena as-sociated with the concept of the state is “the belief in the actual or normative validity of rules and of the authority-relationships of some human beings

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toward others” (Weber, 1994b, p. 272). How those beliefs are defined across time and place has great practical significance to social action. In his volume on economy and society, he asserts:

According to the kind of legitimacy which is claimed, the type of obe-dience, the kind of administrative staff developed to guarantee it, and the mode of exercising authority, will differ fundamentally. Equally fundamental is the variation in effect. Hence, it is useful to classify the types of domination according to the kind of claim to legitimacy typi-cally made by each. (Weber, 1922/1968, p. 213)

From this description, we can see that in Weber’s view, the social phe-nomenon of the state is made of these essential generic elements: basis of legitimacy, type of authority, mode of exercising authority, and type of admin-istrative staff. In a genetic ideal-type based on a traditional value orientation (habitual patterns of family and community), the type of authority might be patriarchal, patrimonial, or feudal in nature, while the mode of exercising authority will rely on the common belief in the sanctity of existing traditions and the legitimacy of those so empowered. This set of characteristics will logically lead to a particular form of administration that might look something like feudal China, which requires a particular administrative role.

Given these examples, it is clear that the ideal-type method is of use in studying issues of interest to public administration. Indeed, the enduring interest of public administration scholars in Weber’s work noted in the intro-duction is evidence of the applicability of the ideal-type method to the field. To illustrate its possible usefulness, I describe a contemporary application in public administration (Stout, 2007). In this study, a series of hypotheses framed the inquiry. It was posited that conceptualizations of the public administration role are linked to different meanings of legitimacy; that there is a relation-ship between role conceptualization and a variety of essential concepts and social structures deemed important to public administration; and ultimately that there may be only one basis of legitimacy that is best for contemporary democratic governance. Given this combination of individual and societal levels of analysis and the combination of both generic and genetic elements, it made sense to use Weber’s approach.

CONSTRUCTING AN IDEAL-TYPE MODEL

Following the ideal-type method (Weber, 1949b), first, a specific social phenomenon of interest must be identified. Second, a culturally significant organizing characteristic must be chosen and specified as the frame of refer-ence. Third, the generic elements essential for identifying causal relationships must be identified. The set should be culturally significant as well as compre-hensive as possible, and the manner in which these elements are thought to


be related must be explicated in a logical manner. Fourth, mutually exclusive meanings of each element must be interpreted so that the genetic character of the ideal-type is clear. These meanings must also be logical and coherent in their relationships with one another and plausible in comparison to experi-ence. The following sections will illustrate the results of these steps, using both Weber’s (1922/1968) well-known application of the ideal-type method in economy and society and a contemporary study of public administration theory (Stout, 2007).

Identifying Social Phenomena of Interest

Referring back to Weber’s (1922/1968) study, the social phenomenon of inter-est is the state. Clearly, as the organizing concept of all modern governments, it is of interest and import to broad sociological understanding. In my inquiry (Stout, 2007), the social phenomenon of interest was public administration in the United States, which includes both actors and structures in its definition. This is the subject of volumes of academic study, as well as the administra-tive apparatus of government, and was therefore deemed of sufficient import to warrant study.

Choosing a Culturally Significant Frame of Reference

In Weber’s (1922/1968) study, the frame of reference was forms of legitimate domination. He asserts that concepts of the state “are all bound together by an idea, namely, the belief in the actual or normative validity of rules and of the authority-relationships of some human beings towards others” (Weber, 1949b, p. 99). In his view, authority is the most important and culturally significant characteristic of the state, as it represents a legitimate exercise of power from the perspective of those subjected to it. While we are left uncertain as to how he arrived at this conclusion, it is clear that the state claims the legitimate right to exercise authority over its citizens. Thus, he uses authority (meaning legitimate domination) as his frame of reference, seemingly relying on the face validity of his rationale.

In my inquiry (Stout, 2007), the frame of reference was democratic legiti-macy. This is in a sense a subset of Weber’s frame of reference that is tailored to the more discrete phenomenon of public administration in the United States. As a democratic nation, competing ideations of legitimacy are limited and do not typically include broader sociological types as did Weber’s studies. How-ever, the fact that there are competing ideations of democratic legitimacy that have been linked to a self-identified “legitimacy crisis” in recent decades (see, e.g., Caron & Giauque, 2006; King, Stivers, & Collaborators, 1998; McSwite, 1997; Ostrom, 1989), it is reasonable to claim this issue is of significance to the culture of public administration.

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Identifying Essential Generic Elements

In the hope of informing causal hypotheses, the set of generic elements used to construct the ideal-type should be culturally significant and as compre-hensive as possible, and the manner in which these elements are thought to be related must be explicated in a logical manner. In Weber’s (1922/1968) study, he explores various forms of the state throughout history and their generic elements, including: approaches to domination and obedience, kinds of administrative staff, and organizational modes of exercising authority. To construct his ideal-type model, he develops a set of elements to explain the state’s system of authority and associated administration. Drawing from his explication of the ideal-type of the bureaucratic state, he identifies: (1) the basis of legitimate authority, (2) the mode of exercising authority, (3) the system of rank, (4) the system of accountability, (5) the approach to decision mak-ing, (6) the type of tasks completed, (7) the structure of labor, (8) the method of discharge of duties, and (9) the relational quality among administrators. Again his rationale for cultural significance and nomological adequacy is not completely clear in his explication of the ideal-type of bureaucracy but may be offered elsewhere in his writing. However, he does thoroughly discuss how these elements are related to one another logically in their expression in the bureaucratic ideal-type.

In my inquiry (Stout, 2007), the generic elements considered were those issues that appear to be significant to the culture of public administration based on inclusion in important written texts. Principal written texts were considered to be those that are widely used in graduate courses, frequently cited in textbooks and articles, commonly described as “foundational” or “refounding” in nature, or written by those considered to be leading theorists in the field. To produce a comprehensive typology of meanings, I analyzed a very broad set of literature, thus exploring both major strands of administra-tive theory: (1) organizational theory, including organizational behavior and management, and (2) political theory and philosophy (Simon, Smithburg, & Thompson, 1974; Waldo, 1948/1984). These texts were used as formative data for the ideal-types because this language generates “ideas, approaches, intuitions, assumptions, and urges that make up our world view; it shapes us” (Farmer, 1995, p. 1). This literature is clearly of cultural significance and is not a novel data source. In addition to the dissertation inquiry that gave us The Administrative state: A study of the Political Theory of American Public Administration (Waldo, 1948/1984), the meaning of these texts has been interpreted in several contemporary inquiries (Catlaw, 2007; Farmer, 1995; McSwite, 1997; Stivers, 2000). Such reinterpretation is an important critical function of philosophical inquiry (Bernstein, 1991).

The generic elements chosen from the issues discussed in these texts were: (1) ontology and political philosophy, (2) political authority and scope of action, (3)


criterion of proper behavior, (4) decision-making rationality, (5) organizing style, (6) role conceptualization, and (7) the assumed governance context.1 Each ele-ment is deemed necessary to achieve a sufficiently comprehensive understanding of the social actions of public administrators and the social structures of public administration, as well as causal relationships in which they are involved. The assumptions of each element rest on one another in a building-block fashion that formulates a coherent whole.

Specifically, ontology and political philosophy frame the underlying mean-ing of democratic legitimacy being promoted by a given ideal-type. In turn, each unique political philosophy prescribes how political authority should be distributed to government and the appropriate scope of action delegated to administration. To ensure that neither authority nor scope is being over-stepped, each ideal-type prescribes specific ways to achieve responsibility and accountability. These limitations on scope of action and paths to responsibility and accountability further influence the type of decision-making rationality that should be used. Furthermore, these combined elements shape the type of organizing style best suited for implementation. All together, these elements infer a specific social role conceptualization for public administration and administrators in a democratic society, assuming a particular type of gover-nance context. Given all of these constraints, the action of the administrator is channeled into a specific role pattern.

To judge comprehensiveness, the concepts selected deal with key issues of concern in the field’s literature addressing the internal operations of public administration as well as its external relationship to the polity (Box, 2004; Frederickson, 1971). They encompass many of the topics claimed as “big questions” of the field by others (Agranoff & McGuire, 2001; Behn, 1995; Brooks, 2002; Callahan, 2001; Cooper, 2004; Kirlin, 1996, 2001; Neumann, 1996; Raadschelders, 1999; Rohr, 2004). They include many of the elements believed to define both the forces of bureaucracy and democracy: ideas, emo-tions, philosophies, ideologies, myths, practices, procedures, institutions, technologies, and more (Waldo, 1980). Together, they are comprehensive enough to formulate a well-rounded model of public administration theory to be used in empirical research as well as in pedagogy.

Interpreting Genetic Meanings

Once generic elements are identified, mutually exclusive meanings of each element must be interpreted so that the genetic character of the ideal-type is clear. These meanings must also be logical and coherent in their relationships with one another and plausible in comparison to experience. In Weber’s (1922/ 1968) historical sociological study, he develops a set of elements to explain the state’s system of authority and associated administration. Identifying the differences in these elements, he concludes that there are several unique or

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genetic manifestations of legitimate authority that lead to differing forms of administration: traditional, charismatic, and legal–rational.2 These are the three ideal-types in his model of authority upon which he builds his understand-ing of the state. Drawing from his explication of the state ideal-type called “bureaucracy,” he interprets the genetic meaning (in italics) of each generic element as: (1) the basis of legitimate authority (formal–legal rationality), (2) the mode of exercising authority (hierarchical super- and subordination), (3) the system of rank (hierarchical position based on expertise and substan-tive rationality), (4) the system of accountability (conformity, audit, review, oversight), (5) the approach to decision making (formal written rules and procedures, routines, and precedent), (6) the type of tasks completed (com-plex and large scale), (7) the structure of labor (division and specialization), (8) the method of discharge of duties (life-long career, regular compensation, merit-based advancement), and (9) the relational quality among administrators (impersonal, objective). His explication goes into great detail on the logical relationship among these genetic meanings, providing case examples to il-lustrate their presence in historical contexts.

In my inquiry (Stout, 2007), noting Weber’s phenomenological emphasis of the meaning held by social actors, the hermeneutic technique was used to identify the varying bases of legitimacy assumed in public administration texts as “it is concerned with interpreting, with specifying significance, with achiev-ing intelligibility” (Farmer, 1995, p. 21). Hermeneutic interpretation reaches as far as possible toward the writer’s intended meaning. This is a difficult task, as “a person who is trying to understand a text is always projecting . . . the initial meaning emerges only because he is reading the text with particular expectations in regard to a certain meaning” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 269).

While acknowledging my own proclivities, in the spirit of conducting “a sociology of public administration,” I endeavored to present what the authors regard as true, without making validity judgments in their initial description (Znaniecki, 1940). As a result, the ideal-types were presented in their own terms: “It is not at all a matter of securing ourselves against the tradition that speaks out of the text then, but, on the contrary, of excluding everything that could hinder us from understanding it” (Gadamer, 2004, p. 272). To pursue an author’s meaning as closely as possible, rather than accepting a second-hand interpretation that may include “revisionist” assumptions (Lynn, 2001), original texts were read carefully to capture complex and sometimes contradictory meanings of statements pertaining to legitimacy. Furthermore, rather than distilling a theorist’s thinking into a general perspective, nuances of individual statements were analyzed to identify mutually exclusive ideas in terms of legitimacy logic.

To identify genetic differences among statements made in texts about the various generic elements, the categorization process used logico-meaningful interpretation whereby the central meaning or mental biases of a given cultural


perspective are identified and used to craft a consistent and integrated whole from logically related elements (Sorokin, 1957). This process utilizes both interpretive and critical reasoning (White, 1999) to make category assignments to genetic codes. In fact, the use of critical reason enables the deconstruction of previously held taxonomies of the field to reveal gaps in their logic according to the chosen frame of reference. For example, while democratic legitimacy was used as the organizing concept, a constitutional definition of its meaning was considered to be only one possible interpretation that is fully contestable. In this way, an evolving understanding of the meaning of democratic legitimacy was allowed throughout the text interpretation. Once the logical implications for democratic legitimacy of a given prescription for practice were explored, a new typology emerged. In this way, the ideal-type shows how a given logic is manifested in an array of concepts and social structures.

By deconstructing heterogeneous theories, arriving at differing assertions about the identified generic elements and then reconnecting logical sets of ideas based on differing understandings of democratic legitimacy, the analysis led to the conclusion that there are three genetic bases of democratic legitimacy in public administration: constitutional (classical bureaucracy), discretionary (autonomous professionalism), and collaborative (facilitated self-governance). Respectively, these ideal-types promote three distinct role types: bureaucrat, entrepreneur, and steward.3 These three logical sets of ideas are framed as traditions of public administration, rather than us-ing the term “ideal-type,” and have been discussed elsewhere (Stout, 2006, 2009a, 2009b). While complete explication is beyond the scope of this essay, a summary can be provided to make clear the genetic meanings of the generic elements (ontology and political philosophy, political authority and scope of action, formulations of responsibility and accountability, as-sociated decision-making rationality, associated organizing style, assumed governance context, and resulting role conceptualization) included in each ideal-type tradition.

The constitutional tradition’s logic is based on classical liberalism and conservatism whereby a political state ensures stability among atomistic, self-interested individuals. Because the source of legitimacy lies with the elected representatives, a functional dichotomy is used to limit the politi-cal authority and scope of administrative action. Because politics is trusted to produce the “good,” administrators serve through hierarchical rules and procedures, proving their accountability through adherence. This system promotes a deontological form of decision making in which rules are as-sumed to produce the best results by following hierarchical orders and political direction. This approach to accountability and decision-making authority requires a deep bureaucratic hierarchy to ensure appropriate over-sight. All together, this demands a role conceptualization of a competent, politically neutral implementer of management directives, while also being

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a conservator of values given by the political order. Thus, administrative bureaucrats play a servant role in a political state in which governance is conducted through agencies directed by the three branches of government. These meanings come predominantly from orthodox, traditionalist, and some early New Public Administration theories.

The discretionary tradition’s logic is based on modern liberalism whereby an administrative state ensures stability among self-interested individuals and groups. Because the source of legitimacy lies with administrative expertise, the political authority and scope of administrative action is expanded into policy making rather than mere implementation, and potentially beyond the halls of government to the best source of expertise. Because expertise and wisdom are trusted to produce the “good,” administrators prove their responsibility through achievement of desirable outcomes (e.g., efficiency, effectiveness, equity, ethics). This system promotes a teleological form of decision making in which professionally accepted criteria guide largely autonomous decision making. This approach to accountability and decision making requires a de-centralized, flattened hierarchy or functional matrix to empower administrators and review them through performance evaluation. Thus, administrative entre-preneurs (in pursuit of social values) play a master role in an administrative state in which governance is conducted through government organizations and their subcontractors. While present in writings of American founders (e.g., Hamilton) and founders of public administration (e.g., Wilson), these meanings come predominantly from New Public Management and agential New Public Administration theories.

The collaborative tradition’s logic breaks away from both forms of repre-sentative government, basing itself on the radical and communitarian political theories of direct democracy. Human beings are considered socially situated individuals with an innate social bond that enables self-governance. Because the source of legitimacy lies with affected citizens, the political authority and scope of administrative action is shared among all mature individuals. Indeed, taken to its logical conclusion, the administrative role might disappear completely. However, most theoretical discussions carve out a new facilitative role. Because citizens are trusted to produce the “good,” administrators are expected to show responsiveness to them. This system promotes a phenom-enological form of collaborative decision making in which intersubjective agreement is achieved through communicative action. This approach to self-governance requires fluid networking among affected individuals. This pattern requires a role conceptualized to be that of a steward—one who is both empowered as a citizen yet mutually answerable to one’s peers. Thus, administrators play a cocreator role in a democratic state in which governance is conducted through deeply nested affiliated groups of affected individuals. While present in writings of American founders (e.g., Jefferson) and early scholars of public administration (e.g., Follett and Addams), these meanings


come predominantly from New Public Service and transformational public administration theories.

Assessment of the ideal-type model must refer back to Weber’s criteria of mutual exclusivity, logical coherency, and empirical plausibility. As can be seen, each distinct set of ideas is logically linked by a shared understanding of democratic legitimacy that is distinct from the other two. For example, it is difficult to empower citizens in a hierarchical organizing context, yet a fluid networking structure is supportive. It is difficult to claim legitimacy based on the constitutional order when administrators act autonomously, but when legitimacy is instead based on expertise, this problem is eliminated. It is dif-ficult to benefit from administrative expertise and experience when strictly following top-down rules and procedures, but when autonomy is increased, these rewards can be reaped. Such hypothetical examples illustrating coher-ency are numerous. Furthermore, these value axioms are mutually exclusive. Taken to their logical ends, each tradition empowers a different social actor as the source of legitimacy and therefore is designed to ultimately trump the others in a situation of mutual disagreement. The constitutional tradition em-powers elected representatives, the discretionary tradition empowers expert administrators, and the collaborative tradition empowers affected citizens. Finally, these ideal-types are both utopian and yet plausible in reality. One is not likely to find a pure type in theory or practice, yet they describe patterns that are familiar in our observations.

Utilizing Ideal-Types in Analysis

As noted, while ideal-types have value in description and pedagogy, they are designed to ultimately be a means to develop and test hypotheses. They provide a value-based structure that can be used to make evaluative judgments of its expression or lack thereof. Therefore, the ideal-type method continues with analysis. One approach is to engage in various mental experiments. These explorations enable the development of hypotheses for further empiri-cal research but also can offer a platform for critical analysis. For example, returning to Weber’s (1922/1968) study as an example, upon completion of the ideal-type model, he used both mental experiments of logic and empiri-cal observations and histories of actual cases to consider the divergence and convergence with the ideal-types and the implications of these characteristics. In essence, he thought through “what a behavior pattern or thought pattern (e.g., a philosophical system) would be like if it possessed completely rational, empirical and logical ‘correctness’ and ‘consistency’” (Weber, 1949a, p. 42). In his study of social organization, he considered what a completely rational-ized society would look like carried to its logical ends, describing the likely implications for humanity through a set of mental experiments reflecting on historical empirical evidence. From these theoretical analyses, he produced his

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warning about the “iron cage” of bureaucracy and its excessive rationalization of social life (Weber, 1976).

Following suit, my inquiry (Stout, 2007) completed a set of mental ex-periments that imagined each ideal-type’s usefulness in the contemporary governance context. In brief, the three traditions promote different public administrator role conceptualizations that may or may not fit the actual governance context. In this sense, the ideal-types were used as value-based constructs for making evaluative judgments of the possible consequences of its expression. In other words, if the ideal-type were to be fully realized, what would be its consequences? This mental experiment was meant to expose underlying presuppositions that are commonly taken as self-evident within a given tradition.

The challenge was to devise a way to critique each ideal-type within the theoretical inquiry before creating research hypotheses and completing an empirical study through an attitudinal survey or observation of administrative action. Ultimately, a set of multiple critiques was designed in keeping with the notion that an “ensemble of analyses” produces a more useful understanding (Adorno, 1973, p. 27). Theoretical views from the literature and empirical data in the form of case vignettes and secondary descriptions from the literature were used in these interpretive and critical analyses. The purpose of the empirical “evidence” was purely illustrative. “In the interest of the concrete demonstration of an ideal-type or of an ideal-typical developmental sequence, one seeks to make it clear by the use of concrete illustrative material drawn from empirical-historical reality” (Weber, 1949b, p. 102, emphasis in original). The various analyses were designed to: (1) critique each ideal-type, (2) critique scholars’ attempts to integrate or conciliate the logics of the ideal-types, (3) explore novel ways to interpret the ideal-types using dialectic, and (4) identify the most desirable ideal-type for the contemporary context.

CONCLUSION

The purpose of this essay is to clarify the proper use of Weber’s ideal-type method in building typologies by illustrating step-by-step how it was used by Weber himself as well as in a contemporary study of public administration theory. The substantive results of both point toward the method’s potential usefulness to public administration because it offers a robust theoretical model from which to develop hypotheses and conduct a variety of both mental experiments and empirical research. While necessarily brief in form, given the limits of length, this sketch points to how the accurate application of the ideal-type method might serve not only to create new ideal-type models, but also to update those Weber constructed in a systematic fashion. Both efforts would be of value to the study of public administration and its role within society.


NOTES

1. In retrospect, this set could be described as a rediscovery, update, and extension of Waldo’s (1948/1984) The Administrative state study in which he considered: (1) the nature of the “good life,” (2) the criterion of action or the bases of decision, (3) the question of who should rule, (4) the separation of powers, and (5) centralization versus decentralization.

2. It is important to note that the legal–rational form of authority fuses substan-tive and instrumental rationality in a unique manner (Heydebrand, 1994). However, in postmodern organizations, these two forms of rationality may disaggregate and compete in the form of hierarchical managers versus technical experts.

3. It must be noted that these labels are given unique definitions within the ideal-type model than otherwise may be typical for the field.

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Margaret Stout is an assistant professor of public administration at West Virginia University. Her research explores the role of public and nonprofit ad-ministrators in furthering democratic social and economic justice with specific interests in administrative theory, public service leadership and ethics, and sustainable community development. Her work has been published in Admin-istration & society, Administrative theory & Praxis, Journal of Public Affairs Education, International Journal of organization theory and Behavior, and Public Administration and Management. She serves on the executive boards of the American Society for Public Administration’s Section on Democracy and Social Justice and Section on Public Administration Education.

Documents

Revisiting the (Lost) Art of Ideal-Typing