Updating in personality theory

UPDATING IN PERSONALITY THEORY ~ BY FERI~-AI~!DO TAPIA, M.D.

There is as yet no unifying theory of personality which com- prehensively and satisfactorily organizes the many isolated findings about individual or collective behavior that already exist or that are constantly emerging from the laboratory, the clinic, or the field. The complexity of perso.nMity continues to defy us, and those investigators who have held to strict objectivity still remain at the periphery of the very thing they want to understand. Those who look ~at man "through the duodenum of a mouse" as yet do not have a clear picture.

On the other hand, there are those who have made broad theoretical explanations while waiting for corroborating facts. This group must consta,ntly sift the new material and make the necessary adjustments to retain plausibility for the hypothe,ses offered. I t is only proper, then, that expla~a,ations such as these be pre- sented with the humility and tentativeness befitting a hypothesis.

Clinical needs demand a working theory while at the same time providing experiences which offer material for reas.o.nable hypoth- e sis. Although such materials are not, like laboratory experiments, repeatable, they involve countless actual observatioaa, s, many of them dramatically clear and consistent. The recognized import- ante of understanding mental illness dictates, to reaso.nable clinicians, that they take a comprehensive approach and that they consider the past experiemces of the individual. At the same time, the clinician must find ways of applying his working theory in the treatment of his patients. The time comes when every clinician must differentiate what he really believes from all that he "knows," h~s read, and, for dialectic purposes, can quote with ease. To be a sophist ~nd enjoy autocasuistry leads to being hoist on one's own petard or, at best, to protecting anachronistic clichds while the rest of science moves ahead.

There are many definitions of personality. Pos~sibly one of the better ones states that "personality is the organized system of attitudes and behavioral predispositions by which one establishes relationships with others and with one's self." Another defini- t ion--"the dynamic organization within the individual of those psychophysical systems that determines his characteristic be-

~From the Child Psychiatry Section, University of Missom'i School of Medicine.

124 UPDATIL~G tIN PERSO1/ALrTu TI-IEORY

havior and thought." To explain such a complex organization many theories have been proposed. Either in "pure" form or in modified versions, the most significant theories stem from Sig- round Freud and his thoughts on the unconscious, the ego, id, superego, conflict, and psychosexual development.

During his lifetime Freud modified his hypotheses. His students varied or altered them. Since his death, in the light of many new findings, further modifications have come naturally. For instance, in the light of sensory studies like those of H. F. Harlow and his monkeys (kinesthetic), "imprinting" (visual), W. H. Bridger's s on newbor.ns (auditory), and studies that question the need for a baby to suckle, Freud's oral stage nurturance is no longer considered an exclusively oral ingestion phenomenon. We now easily view the fir.st stage of per,so.nality development as a product of total input although, perhaps, the consequences may have similar- ity with the original orality concepts. This, for instance, .now highlights the question whether, as Freud implied, emotional factors are really so much more important than cognitive experience in persoa,ality developme.nt.

One of the basic aspects of the original Freudian theory which has been considerably modified and updated is the concept of "ego." From it.s psychological inception, this word e.njoyed increasing popularity amo.ng those dealing with personalities, patho- logic or otherwise. However, as time passed and the term became more popular, it lost whatever specificity it ever had. Everyone "knew" what it meant, but it seemed everyone had his own defini- tion. Terms like ego defenses, ego ideal, ego strengths, and ego boundaries compounded the confusion. And yet, the concept had give.n an undeniable impetus to the understanding of personality.

In paraphrasing Freud we get an idea of the original ego. "The Ego i.s that part of the Id which has been modified by the direct influence of the external world acting upo~ the Id through the perceptual consciousnes,s. The Ego has the task of bringing the influence of the external world to bear upon the Id and its tendencies and it endeavors to substitute the reality principle for the pleasure principle. The Ego represents that which we call reason and sanity in contrast to the Id 'which contains the pas- sions. '" Generally, the ego has been considered more on its functional basis, i.e., executive, defensive, and mediative functions, etc. Naturally, ego components are distinguished and their pres-

FERI~TA1WDO TAPIA~ M.D. 125

ence felt in a dynamic way much as one might recognize the presence of a well camouflaged animal only when it moves. But can one learn to analyze the ego components and, perhaps event- ually quantify these parts ? And what are the components of the ego ? Four ego components seem to be gaining general recognition. These are (1) Perceptual Framework, (2) Cognitive Sophistica- tion (reality testing), (3) Object Relationships, and (4) Impulse Control. How are these described?

I. PERCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Perception here is not seen as a physical input aw~areness phenomenon, but rather as an active, creative process. I t is an immediate or intuitive judgment implying observation and discrimination. Perceiving is considered an integrative pro,cess in which successive stimulus samples from the external as well as internal environments are simultaneously and more or less immediately registered in some relationship to a set and expectancy. The stimuli are then reorganized, d~storted, and embellished by in- leraction with previous percepts, affects, and meanings which form a s,cheme or framework into which all ongoing perception must fit. Perceptions are learned and are the product of the in- teraction between sensory input and experientially acquired, and constantly developing, cognitive structure. I t must be noted that the actual stimulus world (of internal or external origin) is not the determinant of development--the perceptual world is--and that internal determinants such as expectancies, values, needs, and sets will modify what is perceived.

The term "framework" is useful, for it helps to imply a growing structure with potential variations emerging from a previous set. In children there would appear a more sparse, but more rapidly growing and hardening, framework. Psychosexual development involves perceptual experiences and the basic development of the perceptual framework. A child, having scant previous experiences to help him differentiate, will essentially accommodate all that he assimilates. However, with growth of reality testing and the loss of empiricism, whatever is accepted must come in a more organized form, and thus alterations to the perceptual framework are harder to come by. "The aptitude to apprehend the external world with freshness of perception commonly be-

126 UPDATING I N PERSONALI'TY THEORY

comes saturated as the mind and senses become (~onditioned by re- peated experien.ces. ''~

A moot question arises when it is asked whether perception, or perceptual acuity, is not actually part of reality testing which in turn is another ego component. Perhaps the best answer is that they may be temporally contiguous and that they help form and facilitate each other, but that, actually, reality testing begins where perception leaves off. An example may help clear this up: A professor sits down at his desk and suddenly notes a snake coiled up on his blotter ready to pounce on him. He comes to an immediate and intuitive judgment and backs off, naturally. But, be backs off only six feet or so Reality testing has set in and he knows snake,s do not jump that far. Now he can take a closer look and notices that the snake hasn't moved. He suspects it's a pi~actieal joke al~d from there goes o.n to inspecting it more closely, poking it with a handy yardstick, etc.

Thus, we have seen a reality testing which followed a perceptual experience. A young child with poorer reality testing, on seeing the snake, would have ran comple+~ely out of the room and avoided returning there. A still more innocent child would not have jumped (since he would not have perceived danger) and would probably bare readily grabbed the "pret ty thing." In the final analysis a logical conclusion is that reality testing is a determinant of per- cepiion and that changes in reality testing, a function, for instance, of increasing age, co asequently modify perceptions.

II. CoaNmw SOPHISTICATION (REALITY TESTING) There are several characteristics of cognitive sophistication

which may be considered as essential to the development of con- ceptualization, reasoning, and problem solving, i.e. reality testing. Ausubel 1 has given one of the more comprehensive analyses of the characteristics involved, and much of what follows is based on his exposition. How these characteristics of cognitive s.ophisti- cation apply to reality testing becomes readily apparent as several of these are reviewed.

A. Atte~,tion spa, n

Theories of cognition and intelligence are rapidly proliferat- ing at present. Out of this plethora of ideas several particulars emerge which can be considered within the scope of reality testing as it pertains to an ego fmlction. Perhaps the simple,st element

FER~AI~IDO TAPIA, M.D. 127

is a span of attention. Without reasonable ability to focus de- tainedly, a decrement to reality testing exists. The brain-damaged child with his shortened attention span is a vivid example of this pro,blem. Much of his inability to adjust to school is caused by his haste and incapacity to attend along with his peers. The problem arises for the clinician in discriminating short attention ,span as a defect per se, or as a consequence of distractibility and/or impulsivity.

B. Wide,ned cogeitive field (spatial and temporal) During the elementary school years the world of time and space

is gradually extended beyond the confines of home, ,neighborhood, personal concerns, :and the immediate present to include the globe, the past, and the future. This increasing complexity will allow the handling of more elaborate problems and situations.

C. Familiarity with the psychological world Increasingly familiarity facilitates discrimination. The young

child's very limited experiences force him to accommodate most of his assimilated experiences. This makes him most vulnerable to the impact of the e~vironment during his earlier years of life. Empiricism, however, declines as familiarity with the psychological world increases.

A question arises as to the importance of this cognitive familiarity in the light of failure to apply obviously familiar knowl- edge. Scanning-out or repressing the available material may explain th~s phenomenon. Genecally, however, whether subject ~o disuse or m~st~se, familiarity with the psychological experience is ~a necessary component of reMity testing.

D. Increased differentiation That all is not black or white, but that there are many shades

of gray in between, may be a way of describing "increased different~ation." Thus, relative values or a scale of merit can be noted and more appropriate concepts become available to the individual. Increasing differe,n~iation will also reduce confusion by facilitat- ing the emergence of one percept from a total pattern of stimulation s~nee ~specificity ~and precision are now more attainable as a concept.

E. Selective schematizatio.~ This involves the omission of irrelevant detail and thus, by

selection, allows for greater facility in manipulating an array of stimulation. Schematizing the stimulus field may be the only way

128 UPDATI~qG II~ PERSOIqALrTY THEORY

to include relevant material without being bogged down with detail.

F. Object perma~.e,ncy and co~stancy The more one learns to perceive the permanent external world

as it actually exists, rather than as it appears, the greater the advantage in adapting to physical reality. Thus cognitive sophistication enhances the ability to discount fluctuations in sensory data when objects and symbols are known to have permanency and constancy. Thins aspect of cognition, however, cam be carried too far and fixed perceptions arise even after actual permanent changes have takem place.

G. Inductive and deductive rcasoniny (categorizin.g, abstract- ing, and generalizimg)

Here lies the ability to conceptualize on the basis of inference, categorization, and verbal symbols. I t allows for the anticipation of coa~sequences and the pretesting of alternatives. The older child is now les~s concretely stimulus-bound.

Is intelligence the essence of reality testing? Are IQ and cognitive sophistication identical, or at least equal? I t seems that there may be more than one element (IQ and cognitive sophistication) involved although overlapping may exist. When abstractions (as in the Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children) are used as part of the intelligence assessment, then overlapping does exist. How- ever, when Guilford 7 points out the pas~sibility of as many as 120 identifiable factors in intellect, then the question arises as to how factors dealing with problem solving have been differentiated from those factors dealing with, say, academic learning aptitude.

Piaget, according to Flavell, ~ saw a structural and a functional intelligence. Cognitive structure, unlike functional intelligence, is not inherited. Certainly, functional intelligence generates cognitive structure, but only through functioning. Thus, the ground- woTk is laid for a distinct group of intellectual factors more intimately eonnected with problem solving in life situations, and thus more akin, say, to "ego strength." Furthermore, these factors are developed experientially as can be inferred from experiments which show the greater problem solving ability of pet-raised ver- sus cage-raised dogs (Thompson~0 or from the observations made by Goldfarb ~ of children raised in orphanages with a restricted environment. The evidence from dogs is stronger than from rats, a fact suggesting that the importance of early cognitive or per-

FEI~NA:NDO TAPIA, ~r 129

ceptual experience probably increases up the phylogenetic ,scale as that portion of the brain without direct connection to sensory or motor outlet increases relative to the portion which does have sensory and/or motor connections. 9

In recapitulating, cognitive sophistication druws from IQ, but is not the ,same intellectual factor. I t (cognitive sophistication) is probably developed best by rich and varied experiences. "Hu- man beings thus perceive the world and respond to it not through the whole spectrum of their potentialities, but only through the areas of this spectrum which have been made functional by envi- ronmental influences, especially the early ones, and which are ~.ot blocked by inhibitory mechanisms.""

III . OBz~c~ REIATIONS~IPS The term object relationship could be misleading if the word

"object" is taken literally. As of now, there is little, if any, im- plication of inanimate objects. Thus, for the sake of clarity in re- viewing the matter of object relationships, it should be stated at the outset that what is meant is relationship to others, to self, and to ow~ ego.

Here we may be in the penumbra of readily measurable and testabie coacepts. Yet these are factors which enhance the broad theoretical explanation although they must wait for corroborating data before they can be offered in a less tentative fashion. Clinical experience with autistic children, schizoid personalities, etc., helps those who have the need to elaborate a working theory. However, there is also a growing body of research observations on such associated matters as imprinting, emotional attachments, loss of fazniliar persons, etc., which must be considered in form- ulating any theory.

A. Relatio,nship to others

Perhaps relationship to others begins with the need for others and the desire for Weir ap~proval. The person must not only consider people to be important, but should be able to empathize a~d be capable of identifying with them. The person, by being able to live "in the other's skin," can profit by the experience of others. From this relationship to others emerges the person as a social being with his need for adjusting as well ~s his motiva- tio.n to do so. Much of the origin of culturally instigated anxiety

130 UPDATII~G I N I~ERSO]qALI'TY T H E O R Y

(when, for instance, loss of love or loss of prestige is involved) stems from the capacity to relate to others.

Whether affect vitalizes relationships or whether affect is a product of the .ability to relate is possibly one of those chicken- and-egg problems. One thing seems clear, however, and that is that these two factors, affect and ability to re,ate to others, fluc- tuate synchronously in a definite relationship. A person is upset by, say, the attitude of the group; another is influenced by the apparent approving comments of an interviewer or tester; another is terrified by the possible disapproval for some action he might take. On the other hand, one can recall the lack of affect]re re- spouse by an auti~stic child in spite of his mother's chagrin, a playmate's displeasure, or a sibling's plea. Thus it appea~s that the feeling tone of a person's reaction maintains some proportionality to his ability to relate to others.

What creates this relationship-to-others ability? Neither association with the gratification of libidinal or homeostatic needs, nor association with food rewards or success in goal achievement, nor recognitive familiarity seems to be a complete answer. Some brain-damaged children show poor ability to relate, and it has been noted how mothers of phenylketonuric children claim their children relate to them better once the phenilalanine-free diet is begun. H.owever, this paper is not so much concerned with the etiology of lack of affect as it is with description of it as a possible ego component.

B. Relatianship to self Autism is a commonly noted symptom in disturbed people,

both adults and children. Bleuler ~ described it as one of the fun- damental symptoms of schizophrenia and elaborated on it in the context of relation to reality. Kanner 11 has described a syndrome (early infantile autism) in which the patients were unable to relate themselves in the ordinary way to people. Yet in both de- scriptions there is noted a relation.ship to themselves in which others are excluded while creating an autistic existence. Pre:sum- ably this relationship, to self involves communication with one's own wishes, one's prinmry process th~nking, and one's own feel- in~s and impulses. Yet it cannot be considered, per se, a patho- logic relationship. Only when there is improper balance with the ability to relate to others will the ability to relate to self appear in poor perspective.

FER~A:NDO TAPIA~ IVLD. 131

Thus we must consider varying proportions of ability of patients to relate to others and to themselves. At one extreme--e.g., good ability to relate to self but ,no,he to relate to others--we will find the very circumscribed child who is completely engro,ssed with himself and his hnmediate perimeter and excludes all persons as well as pragmatic elements of the external world. Then take a child who does not relate to himself exclusively, but only preferenti,ally, while he does have ,selected relationships with others and with elements of the external world. This child may pick up language, but then puts it to his own idiosyn,cratie use, sometimes to the point of having a personalized symbol language. He may know about bridges, spacemen, trains, or cars, but then personalizes them into a dereistic worm which he pursues to extreme, much to the despair of his parents.

Further along the scale of proper proportionality of ability to relate to other's and to self, the ranges of ~ormaley are en- countered. As the scale shifts toward excessive ability to relate to others in proportion to the ability to relate to self, the perso,nMities change as well as the types of pathology. Perhaps here belong these personalities given to pleasing others at the sacri- flee of asserting themselves or expressing any creativity. ~ahler 's symbiotic psyehos~s 12 can be an expression of this relatedness to another person with a gross inability to relate to self and to personal resources.

Whether an individuM prefers to respond to his own personalized fantasies, or whether he has no choice, may be a function of the degree of ability to relate to others. The need to relate to others and thus to reality may settle this is~sue toward wanting help with soeiM integration. Therapists have been accus- tomed to viewing withdrawal as ,a retreat from, ,say, a harsh reality, just as a search for therapy is a flight from the harsh consequences of a "neurotic" existence previously sustained by a preference for making concessions to one's own needs and fan- tames. Finally, it is assumed that early experiences as well as inherent qualities ,are responsible for the development of the proportions previously mentioned as existing between ability to relate to others and ability to relate to self.

C. Relatio,nship to ow~n ego

When a person views his total self and strives toward maturity, emotional comfort, and social adjustment by taking into eonsid-

132 UPDATING Ii~ PERS01~ALI'TY TIIEORY

eration his ego assets and deficits, he is relating to his own ego. Or when he considers only a salient aspect of any of his ego components, he is relating to his own ego. There seems to be an element of insight involved here; and more, to relate would imply more than intellectual insight and thus include some emotional impact.

A person who has a prejudice against Negroes, who finds himself frequently depreciating them and automatically judging them in stereotyped ways, but who says, "I know I'm wrong and I hope :[ change," is relating to his owa ego. He is aware that his perceptual framework is distorted as he relates to that part of his ego; he is aware of the rigidity of his own feelings and is relating to that. There can be many more examples : the alcoholic who knows that the first drink sets him off and, therefore, won't touch liquor; the young patient with a compulsion to clog toilets who asks an attendant to accompany him to the bathroom, or the young nurse who finds too great an empathy with dying patients and asks transfer to the out-patient clinic.

This has been a brief view of object relationships as an ego component. No effort was made to elaborate on its development from ~ psychosexual standpoint or within a total personality. This will be done later for it is of interest to note how well these elements can be integrated in a theory of personality development.

IMPULSE CONTROL

The study of motivation has led us through instincts, libido, drives, learned drives, arousal level, and exploratory behavior. At the same time, we are becoming more and more aware of the many parts of the brain limbie system, thalamus, hypothalamus, etc. whose activity promotes or inhibits behavior such as aggres- sion, sex, drinking, ~sleep, aversion, pleasure, etc. In all instances the matter of impulses has persisted as h~s the matter of impulse control. These are all those impulses %o act in a concerted, force- ful, and sometimes emotionally ladened way--to attack, show anger, cry, satisfy sex, be jealous, revel, show affection, to explore, to hoard, etc.

Perhaps it is immaterial and, for this particular exposition, an unnecessary speculation to consider whether impulses are the ingredients of drives and/or instincts. Perhaps they are not, yet

FERNA~DO TAPIA, ]VI:.D. 133

the fact remains that the personality must deal with these impulses and, preferably, control them.

Again, it can be pointed out how the impulses can be over-in- hibited as well as poorly controlled. In children these qualities stand out more conspicuously as show~ by the following com- parison lists :

Low Impulse Control High Impulse Control (1) Restlessness, inability to sit still; (1) Behaves like a little adult

hyperactive, always on the go (2) Disruptiveness; tendency to annoy (2) Shy, bashful and easily embar-

or to tease others rassed (3) Can get silly and "carried away" (3) Seems to lack self-confidence

and become boisterous and rowdy (4) Shows jealousy over sibling rivals (4) Chronic general fearfulness, anx-

iety (5) Easily roused to anger and ag- (5) Generally soft-spoken with ap-

gression, irritable patently little to say; gentle (6) Gets into actual fights (6) Slow to warm up to people and

situations (7) Temper tantrums (7) Neat and careful (8) Disobedient, hard to discipline; (8) Obedient and reliable

persists in disapproved behavior (9) Poor peer relations for lack of

cooperativeness (10) Destructive with own or others'

property (11) Uses profane language, swearing,

cursing (12) Has some reputation for lying (13) Doesn't mind and even promotes

body contacts (14) Likely to do sudden, impulsive

things (15) Approachesstrangers easily

Considering how frequently an impulsive, tempestuous child is found among brain-damaged children, the point logically arises as to the possible et~ology for poor impulse control. Also, emotional lability is a common feature of the adult organic brain syndrome. Furthermore, one of the features of lobotomized patients is impulsive behavior. I t appears, therefore, that organic cerebral integrity is necessary for control of impulses. On the other hand, within the bounds of normalcy, variations in impulse control may be noted in different cultures and in different environ- mental settings, thus confirming the effect of nurture as well as nature in the resultant quality and quantity of impulse control.

134 UPDATIIqG I ~ PERS0:NALITY TI-IEORY

This concludes the description of the four ego components. At least for some clinicians, this scheme makes eminent sense and helps clarify much of the thinking which revolves around the ego as part of the personality. This comes about logically as the parts of the ego are looked at separately and both the defective and wholesome aspects are noted. If we can appreciate tha~ a patient's serious defect lies in object relationships (too great a relationship to self at the sacrifice of relationship to others) and not in cognitive sophistication, this approach can help explain that far-from-rare schizophrenic who abstracts well. The different sociopaths, the remorseful and the callous, can be explained if both have serious difficulty with impulse control, but the first (remorseful)sociopath has better object relationships and con- sequently, a feeling for how he has disappointed others and a regret that he is not adjusting socially. This attitude of guilt could be considered as resulting from element,s of the superego. However, it is possibly too speculative to imply that the superego is exclasively a product of object relationships and the con- sequent identification.

At the same time, implications for treatment are available. The notion that psychotherapy in particular situations could be considered a skillfully promoted mobilization of the cognitive functions to change the perceptual framework, is very appealing. Haigh 8 has offered such a suggestion. (He considers an inter- mediate step in perceptual change which he calls "cognitive perceiving" and which precedes the new "modal" perception.) The idea that mental health equates itself with constant and smooth perceptual changes is not farfetched. A paragraph from Ittelson and Kutash 1~ reiterates these thoughts: "Many of the changes which take place ~n psychotherapy and in everyday living as well can be conceptualized as perceptual changes. A patient's capacity for changing h~s perceptions, i.e., his perceptual flexibility, may well reflect his capacity for benefitting through psychotherapy as well as his potentialities for effective living following therapy."

A therapeutic program for a particular child in an in-patient service could be part ly involved with a plan like the following:

1) Teaching and training him in those areas of cognitive functioning which are defective.

2) Helping him apply cognitive ability and overcome any re- sistance to using it.

FERNAND0 TAPIA~ ~.D. 135

3) Change, thereby, distorted perceptions of self and others. I f a child can be helped to conceptualize, to think in broader

and more abstract terms, to find more meaning from parts of a whole, and to sustain his thoughts and include more pertinent factors in his thinking, he is well on his way toward mental health, especially if the rate of maturity attainment is faster than can be expected merely from normal growth. Pedagogicotherapy could make a great contribution here.

While on the subject of programming therapy for disturbed youngsters in an in-patient service, further details of the therapeutic ,approach might be elaborated. For instance, the youngster with poor object relationships and the youngster with poor impulse control, if either of these is the cardiinal defect, would be approached quite differently--always with the plan to correct an ego defect. However, as of .now, both the assay of ego defects and the effective remedial intervention are poorly accomplished due mostly to imperfect understanding. Much is expected from research in perception and cognition which is now rather popular among psychologists and educators. Perhaps more needs to be done in the area of object relationships and in the matter of impulse control although these areas are not wanting for investi- gation, especially by neurophysiologists, in the ease of the latter component.

Hopefully, researchers will approach the problem from all sides. To correlate ego components with autonomous functions of the ego would be only partially appropriate, since it is felt that autonomous functions are genetic and organismic. True, studies on primary behavior pattern 1~ imply a greater importance for genetic and predisposing factors. However, a comprehensive view of what can be considered ego carmot avoid concluding that experiences, especially early ones, affect the formation of the ego and its parts.

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l~EFEEENCES ]. Ausube]~ D. P. : Theory and Problems of Child Development. Chapter 17. Grane

an(] Stratton. New York. 1958. 2. Bleuler~ E.: Dementia Praecox or the Group of Schizophrenias. Internat ional

Universities Press. New York. 1950.

136 UPDATING IN PERSONALITY THEORY

3. Bridger, W. H. : Sensory discrimination and autonomic function in the newborn. J. Am. Acad. Child Psychiat., 1: 67-82, 1962.

4. Dubos, l~en6: ttumanistir biology. Am. Sci., 53: 4-19, 1965. 5. Flavell, J. H. : The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget. Pp. 42-43. Van

Nostrand. Princeton, N. J . 1963. 6. Goldfarb, W. : Emotional and intellectual consequences of psychological depriva-

tion in infancy: u re-evaluation. In : Psychopathology of Childhood. Paul ttoch and Joseph Zubin, editors. Pp. 105-119. Grune and Stratton. New York. 1955.

7. Guilford, J. P.: The structure of intellect. Psychol. Bull., 53: 267-293, 1956. 8. Haigh, G. : Perceptual learning in psychotherapy. Bull. Menninger Clin., 27: 74-

83, 1963. 9. Hunt, J. McV. : Traditional personality theory in the light of recent evidence.

Am. Sci., 53" 80-96, 1965. 10. Ittelson, W. I-I., and Kutash, S. B.: Perceptual Changes in Psychopathology.

P. 21. Rutgers University Press. New Brunswick, N. J . 1961. ~3. Kanner, L.: Early infantile autism. 5. Pediat., 25: 211-217~ 1944. ]2. Mahler, ~ . S.: On child psychosis and schizophrenia: autistic and symbiotic in-

fantile psychosis. In : Psychoanalytic Study of the Child. 7: 286-305. Inter- national Universities Press. New York. 1952.

13. Thomas, A., et al.: Behavior Individuality in Early Childhood. New York Uni- versity Press. New York. 1963.

14. Thompson, W. R., and Heron, W. : The effects of restricting early experience on the problem-solving capacity of dogs. Canad. J. Psychiat., 17-31, 1954.

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Updating in personality theory