Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-47

CdW Intelligence to Rent -2016- In Confidence [email protected]

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-47

Supposedly ‘Decimated’ Al-Qaida Spreading Like Wildfire Across Afghanistan

“Al Qaeda’s core leadership has been decimated,” President Obama roundly declared at his foreign policy debate with then-Republican presidential nominee Mitt Romney in 2012. The U.S. Department of State even claimed al-Qaida was “severely degraded” in its 2016 country report on terrorism.The military is now hunting al-Qaida leaders in seven different provinces, indicating a high level of growth since the U.S. invasion in 2001, Commander of all U.S. forces in Afghanistan Army Gen. John Nicholson admitted to reporters yesterday.Al-Qaida operations have increased throughout Afghanistan since the end of U.S. combat missions in 2014. The U.S. assisted an Afghan-led operation in 2015 that destroyed the largest al-Qaida training camp seen in the history of the Afghan war. U.S.-backed Afghan forces raided another al-Qaida training base Sept. 19. The base was well stocked with weapons, suicide vests, and fake identification.

Al-Zarqawi explained his strategy in a letter he wrote to Al-Qaeda’s leaders in 2004. He would kill Shiite civilians—irrespective of the rules governing Islamic warfare—to provoke the Shiite majority to retaliate against the Sunnis, who would be forced to turn to the jihadists for protection.

Western efforts to contain, let alone defeat, al Qaeda in the Sahel region are failing. Its ultimate aim is to establish Islamic emirates in Africa that will unify into a caliphate.

U.S. officials now admit they are hunting al-Qaida in new Afghan provinces, after nearly a decade of referring to the group as “decimated.”

There are direct links between the al-Qaida terror networks of the last decade, and the Islamic State-linked terror cells in Europe that have carried out a series of attacks in recent months, according to a new report.

“Perhaps one of the most worrying factors is that a number of these individuals were stopped by police on their returns, showed fake identities and gave fake names, and were able to continue on their journey.”

Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allied militant groups have undergone something of an operational revival since late 2015, expanding their area of operations and mounting high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali.

AQIM’s process of adapting and responding to Islamic State should be seen as a “normalization" of AQIM of sorts.

Al Qaeda and the Islamic State now represent two big players in a sea of militancy filled with many competing currents.

Advances in communication and transportation have made each generation’s radicalization, recruitment and mobilization easier and subsequently faster. This trend, should it continue, points to a new wave of jihad arising fairly quickly.

While “al Qaeda” or “ISIS” may be convenient for communicating media narratives, today’s vast jihadi landscape cannot be accurately characterized by the names of two groups who are past their primes and that have, at best, limited ability to control their adherents. However, this paradigm will continue in the near term because….

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”

― Sun Tzu, The Art of WarCdW Intelligence to Rent Page 1 of 14 01/05/2023

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Study: Former Al-Qaida Terrorists Training Islamic State Cells in EuropeLONDON — Sep 20There are direct links between the al-Qaida terror networks of the last decade, and the Islamic State-linked terror cells in Europe that have carried out a series of attacks in recent months, according to a new report.The study by the Henry Jackson Society, a London-based research institution, looked at the al-Qaida-linked terror networks in Europe in the early 2000s, around the time of the NATO-led invasion of Afghanistan, and the current networks linked to Islamic State that were responsible for the recent attacks in Paris and Brussels. Time and again, the same names appeared.

'Training and grooming'“The recidivism of those individuals who had originally been convicted of al-Qaida activism, almost training and grooming those individuals who would go on to be involved in the Paris and Brussels attacks,” said Rupert Sutton, co-author of the report.Those individuals included Abdelhamid Abaaoud, chief coordinator of the Paris attacks in November 2015, and Najeem Laachraoui, one of the network's chief bomb makers, who detonated a suicide bomb at Brussels airport in March.“They were connected to a number of individuals with previous convictions for al-Qaida activity, and to a cleric called Khalid Zerkani, who acted almost as a father figure to a number of these individuals. He was actually known as 'Papa Noel' [Father Christmas] because he used the proceeds of his petty crime to shower them with gifts and look after them at the same time as radicalizing them,” Sutton said.Many of the elder members of former al-Qaida networks had traveled to fight in Afghanistan the previous decade, and passed on their knowledge to embryonic terror cells in Europe as the Syrian civil war became a rallying call for jihadist fighters.“Providing them with expertise on bomb-making or network formation, but also providing them with advice on perhaps how to travel to a conflict zone to gain training, how to gain combat experience and how to use those conflict zones as areas in which you can formulate your own ideas and formulate your own attacks," Sutton said.

Combat experienceHe added combat experience appears key, as the most serious Islamic State-linked terror plots in Europe have been planned by European citizens returning from the Syrian frontline, however, those individuals are often beneath intelligence radars.“Often these individuals perhaps haven't come into contact with the authorities in the past. So whilst there are direct connections between the two networks, the individuals that are recruited by those veterans perhaps have only come into contact with the police through a record of petty crime," he said.Sutton said former al-Qaida operatives also passed on expertise in how to evade detection on their return to Europe. “Perhaps one of the most worrying factors is that a number of these individuals were stopped by police on their returns, showed fake identities and gave fake names, and were able to continue on their journey.”The report's authors say the links show the need to improve efforts to challenge radicalization in prisons and develop better ways of preventing offenders from being drawn into terrorism.

AQIM’s Resurgence: Responding to Islamic StatePublication: Terrorism Monitor Volume: 14 Issue: 5March 3, 2016 07:06 PM Age: 7 months By: Jacob Zenn, Dario Cristiani

“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”― Sun Tzu, The Art of War

CdW Intelligence to Rent Page 2 of 14 01/05/2023



AQIM’s Resurgence: Responding to Islamic StateJacob Zenn and Dario CristianiAl-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and its allied militant groups have undergone something of an operational revival since late 2015, expanding their area of operations and mounting high-profile attacks in Burkina Faso and Mali. Local and regional concerns play a role in these, but a more significant factor is the growing rivalry with Islamic State in northwest Africa and further afield.

Ouagadougou and Bamako Hotel AttacksRecent high-profile attacks by AQIM and their affiliates in Burkina Faso and have shifted the threat level in the Sahel region to bear more similarities with the security situation in littoral West Africa. On January 15, 2016, at least three heavily armed gunmen stormed the Cappuccino Cafe and Splendid Hotel in the heart of Burkina Faso’s capital, Ouagadougou, killing around 30 people, most of whom were foreigners. Burkinabe and international security forces finally intervened to end the siege, freeing about 176 hostages. Just two days later, on January 17, AQIM claimed responsibility for the attack and released a list of those involved, one of whom was named Ahmed al-Fulani. The fighter’s name suggests he comes from West Africa’s most transnational ethnic group, the Fulani, a group AQIM has been courting in order to expand its influence across the region. (Sidwaya [Ouagadougou], January 16, 2016, Jeune Afrique, January 19). A few weeks later, AQIM also claimed responsibility for an attack against the UN MISMUNA forces in Timbuktu. On February, 5, militants launched an attack against the old La Palmeraie Hotel, located between the airport and the administrative area of the city in the south, which is home to Nigerian policemen working with MINUSMA (Studio Tamani, February 7).Two months prior to these attacks, on November 20, 2015, gunmen stormed the Radisson Blu Hotel in the Malian capital, Bamako. As with the Ouagadougou attack, the operation was carried out by a relatively small group – just three gunmen armed with assault rifles and grenades. The attackers broke through a security barrier at dawn and opened fire, shouting Allahu Akbar (Jeune Afrique, November 20, 2015; Reuters, November 20, 2015). The attack reportedly killed 27 people. The target, the Radisson Blu Hotel, was considered one of the safest places in Bamako. Indeed, the Malian capital as a whole had been considered safe from the types of attacks that have struck the country’s north (Timbuktu and Kidal), and other West African cities in Niger (Arlit and Agadez), Nigeria (Kano and Abuja), and Chad (N’djamena).

Bolstering Local AlliancesMalian authorities have highlighted the role played in the Bamako attack by local accomplices (Journal Du Mali, November 24, 2015), raising fears that sleeper cells remain present in the Malian capital (Jeune Afrique, November 20, 2015). Al-Mourabitun – the group supposedly led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar, though his status following an air strike last year remains unclear (see Militant Leadership Monitor’s August 2015 issue) – claimed responsibility for the Bamako attack on November 22. It also condemned France for its role in the region.Two weeks later on December 4, AQIM leader Abdel Malek Droukdel also claimed the Bamako attack, calling it the first “joint act” between al-Mourabitun and AQIM. A second statement from al-Mourabitun later that day day confirmed the group was “united” with AQIM, an unexpected claim as Belmokhtar had previously feuded with Droukdel (Al-Akhbar, [Nouakchott], November 20); however, possible evidence that the al-Mourabitun leader was indeed killed in an airstrike in Libya.The AQIM-Sahara Branch, the Fulani-led Macina Liberation Front (FLM), and Ansar





Dine also all claimed the Bamako attack, suggesting multiple allied local groups are integrated within AQIM. Further, when AQIM named the three militants “martyred” in the attack, the list included two brothers with the name “al-Fulani,” just like the Ouagadogou attacker.In August 2015, a smaller-scale hotel attack in Mali, saw militants target the Byblos hotel in Sévaré, central Mali. Twelve people (five soldiers, five militants, and two foreigners) were killed after Malian troops intervened (AFP, August 11, 2015). Although the targets, which were UN personnel staying at the hotel, are more consistent with AQIM-Sahara Branch and Ansar Dine operations, al-Mourabitun claimed responsibility, saying the attack’s “executor” was from the Songhai tribe of southern Mali. The Malian government, however, believed the FLM was behind the attack (L’Indicateur du Renouveau [Bamako], August 13, 2015).Earlier still, in March 2015 in the first major terrorist attack in Bamako, militants killed five people at a nightclub, including two foreigners. Nine other people were wounded in the attack, which was claimed by al-Mourabitun. Again, the network behind the operation appears to have been made up of AQIM and AQIM-Sahara Branch, al-Mourabitun, and more local elements, such as Ansar Dine and FLM.

Wider Strategic ImperativesThe AQIM affiliates behind the recent wave of attacks in West Africa likely have multiple motivations ranging from the local to the global, but the incidents come at a time of high-profile Islamic State attacks on several cities around the world, both of sophisticated (Paris in November 2015) and unsophisticated (Jakarta and Istanbul in January 2016) nature.The Radisson Blu attack in Bamako, for example, came just 10 days after the Islamic State attack in Paris and, whether intended or not, shifted the focus from Paris back to the threat of AQIM in northwest Africa and the Francophone space; Air France staff at the Radisson Blu were reportedly among the attackers’ primary targets (ICG, November 20). In addition, the attack on the Radisson Blu coincided with an ongoing and regionally supported peace process between the Malian government and the secular Tuareg National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA), which Ansar Dine leader Ag Ghaly labeled a “platter of shame” in a October 29, 2015, video. Other local-level operations carried out by AQIM include the killing of tribal leaders labeled “traitors” by the group for cooperating with Malian security forces. AQIM has also released videos of its militants intervening in tribal meetings near Timbuktu to encourage opposition to France.Similarly, the attack at the Cappuccino Cafe and Splendid Hotel in Ouagadougou on January 15, 2016, coincided with the end of a “tacit peace” that the regime of Burkina Faso’s deposed president Blaise Compaoré had achieved with AQIM (Limes [Rome] January 20). It also occurred two days after the Islamic State attack in Jakarta and thereby stole the media limelight away from the group’s first ever attack in southeast Asia.It is unlikely that AQIM’s attacks in Bamako and Ouagadogou are timed to respond directly to the Islamic State’s attacks in Paris and Jakarta, especially considering the amount of preparation AQIM would have needed to execute the operations. However, AQIM and other al-Qaeda affiliates are conscious that Islamic State intentionally carries out attention-grabbing attacks in multiple regions of the world. This prompts al-Qaeda affiliates to match Islamic State with high-profile attacks of their own, as seen in Bamako and Ougadougou.This ideological and political rivalry with Islamic State is an important influence on the recent AQIM attacks in northwest Africa, a region characterized by weak states incapable of adequately tackling the security challenges they face. The targeting of luxury hotels and restaurants frequented by foreigners – as well as the targeting of the foreigners – damages





the economies of the countries in the region, reducing tourism and spooking potential investors.

Rivalry with Islamic StateIn recent months AQIM-Sahara Branch released videos of two hostages, a South African and a Swedish citizen kidnapped in 2012, while AQIM and al-Mourabitun announced the kidnappings in Timbuktu of a Swiss citizen and an Australian couple (both in January 2016), as well as a Romanian laborer (kidnapped in April 2015) in northern Burkina Faso (20min.ch [Zurich], January 10, ABC, January 17, Jurnalul [Bucharest], August 30, 2015). These kidnappings are unlike AQIM’s past abductions, however. The group is moving southwards in search of operations that score propaganda victories. The value of such kidnappings is in the additional international attention they provide to AQIM in its rivalry with Islamic State, as opposed to the millions of dollars earned through earlier operations.The shift comes as a result of AQIM’s relatively newfound competion against a powerful brand. An affiliation with Islamic State can benefit local, smaller groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), in search of jihadist legitimacy. MUJAO’s leaders, Walid Abou Adnan Sahraoui and Hamadou Kehiry, pledged allegiance to Islamic State leader Abubakr al-Baghdadi last year (Al-Akhbar [Nouakchott], May 13; Jeune Afrique, May 14). Similarly, Abubakr Shekau, the leader of Boko Haram (now Islamic State in West Africa Province), pledged his allegiance to al-Baghdadi in March 2015 to much fanfare from Islamic State supporters in Africa and the Middle East. This move by militant groups towards Islamic State loyalty has impacted regional recruitment dynamics. AQIM and allied militants fear a rising and unfettered Islamic State can attract more young militants via the ideological pull of al-Baghdadi’s announcement of the Caliphate and the Islamic State social media recruitment campaign that comes with it.Another development worth noting is AQIM’s adoption of themes and stylistic features popular in Islamic State videos that had been previously absent from AQIM’s past propaganda material. This includes AQIM-Sahara Branch’s newfound focus on conquering Rome, the casting of a British-accented “Jihadi John”-style militant in videos, and the use of distinctive Islamic State production techniques, such as the nasheed (Islamic chants) overlaying its films (Le Monde [Paris], January 18). However, Islamic State also follows AQIM’s operations and propaganda in Northwest Africa. Following the attacks in Bamako and Ougadougou, Islamic State heavily promoted its own video series focusing on the Maghreb region and calling on Muslims in the area to join the organization’s ranks.Organizational differences remain between the two groups. Consistent with its vertical organizational structure, key decisions by Islamic State affiliates are directed from Raqqa by Islamic State’s “core” that dictates strategic priorities. In contrast, al-Qaeda is organized more horizontally, allowing its affiliates like AQIM and AQIM-Sahara Branch, allies such as al-Mourabitun, and local franchises such as Ansar Dine and FLM considerable freedom to set their own agendas. Islamic State meanwhile avoids relying on local fighters to guide its operations, but encourages militants to migrate to Syria and Iraq; Libya and, to a lesser extent, Nigeria, now also feature as “migration” destinations in Islamic State propaganda. Islamic State also appoints emirs from the Middle East to oversee local operations in West Africa – among them, the unnamed Libyan emir for Boko Haram who Abdulbakar Shekau, the local Boko Haram leader, refers to only as the wali, or governor. (See Militant Leadership Monitor’s December 2015 issue). All things considered, the two strains of militancy maintain significant cultural and ideological influences and similar long-term strategic aims.

Conclusion“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”




AQIM’s process of adapting and responding to Islamic State should be seen as a “normalization" of AQIM of sorts. Since the rise of Islamic State, AQIM has become more sensitive to what happens on the global stage. This indicates a significant change, as AQIM had been peculiarly localized in its priorities, even after its 2007 rebranding as a part of al-Qaeda.AQIM’s recent operational revival comes in response to a number of factors. While local priorities play a role, increasing competition with Islamic State is the key driver behind AQIM’s adapted rhetoric and operations and the group has consequently translated its strategic communications and resources into high-profile attacks on international targets in cities where it had previously lain dormant.Jacob Zenn is a Fellow on African and Eurasian Affairs for The Jamestown Foundation. Dario Cristiani is an adjunct professor in international affairs at Vesalius College in Brussels and a senior analyst at the Global Governance Institute.

Terrorism_Monitor_-_Volume_XV__Issue_5_02.pdf

Al-Zarqawi explained his strategy in a letter he wrote to Al-Qaeda’s leaders in 2004. He would kill Shiite civilians—irrespective of the rules governing Islamic warfare—to provoke the Shiite majority to retaliate against the Sunnis, who would be forced to turn to the jihadists for protection. Al-Qaeda was leery of the strategy and of the mind that had conceived it, but it needed operatives inside Iraq. Al-Zarqawi was happy to oblige in return for Al-Qaeda’s label, which he hoped would attract foreign fighters to his cause.It was a marriage of convenience Al-Qaeda would soon regret. Al-Qaeda’s leaders chided al-Zarqawi for killing civilians and distributing videos of gruesome beheadings. Such tactics would alienate Sunni leaders, they complained, and make it impossible to ally with them against the American occupation and the Shiite government in Baghdad. Without popular support, Al-Qaeda warned, al-Zarqawi would be unable to establish an Islamic state, much less a caliphate. Al-Qaeda also cautioned al- Zarqawi against proclaiming a state until the jihadists had persuaded the Americans to leave. No nascent state could hope to thrive in land occupied by the world’s most powerful military. From time to time, al-Zawahiri has held out an olive branch, saying he would fight alongside the Islamic State if he were in Iraq. But he refuses to recognize the statelet as a caliphate and dismisses it as a front for former Saddam loyalists. The Islamic State dismisses al-Zawahiri as a has-been and deems the Al-Qaeda project a failure compared to the achievements of the caliphate.The feud between Al-Qaeda and the Islamic State is playing out on the global stage. The State orchestrates and inspires attacks in the West to rival those of Al-Qaeda. It sets up local chapters in the countries where Al Qaeda has franchised. The competition is not only for recruits but also for custody of the jihadist enterprise to establish Islamic states: the brawling, winner-take-all Islamic State versus the cerebral and cooperative Al-Qaeda. The world suffers while the feud endures.

Two-And-A-Half Years After ISIS’s Rise: Global Jihad Spreads And Morphs – AnalysisBY PUBLISHED BY THE FOREIGN POLICY RESEARCH INSTITUTE SEPTEMBER 29, 2016By Clint Watts*(FPRI) — Today, Islamic State foreign fighters bleeding out of Iraq and Syria power an





unprecedented wave of directed attacks on three continents inspiring cascading waves of inspired violence from distant supporters scattered around the world. With that having been said, the good times for the Islamic State ended in 2016. Their decline has come as fast as their rise and points to yet another shift in global jihad. The jihadi landscape, in only three years, has transformed from the unipolar world of al Qaeda to a bipolar competition between the al Qaeda and Islamic State networks to a multipolar jihadi ecosystem with dozens of groups holding varying degrees of allegiance and affinity for their extremist forefathers. Al Qaeda and the Islamic State now represent two big players in a sea of militancy filled with many competing currents. As seen in Figure 10 below, the world of jihad has never been so vast, dispersed, and diluted.As always, there are a few notes on the al Qaeda versus Islamic State chart as of September 2016 (see Figure 10). I generally don’t like organizational charts for describing jihadi terrorist groups. I’ve been to too many military briefings where organizational charts have been pushed as command and control diagrams. Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and their affiliates largely represent swarming collaborative relationships rather than a directed, top-down hierarchy synonymous of Western military constructs.In the chart, circle size represents an imperfect estimate of a group’s relative size compared to other groups. Larger circles equal bigger groups, smaller circles denote lesser-sized groups and I can only make circles down to a certain size before the writing becomes illegible. More overlap between circles represents my estimate of greater communication and coordination between the groups. Sometimes I couldn’t overlap groups as much as I’d like due to space limitations and this being a two- rather than a preferred three-dimensional rendering. I’ve inserted dashed circles for what I anticipate to be emerging Islamic State affiliates or new jihadi groups of no particular leaning. I could probably list a dozen other names in the chart but to prevent excessive cluttering I’ve stopped with these names. (Many thanks go to Will McCants for insights on ISIS affiliates, J.M Berger as always for his social media prowess and Aaron Zelin, particularly this year, for further refining my perspective on the emergence of fractures.) For past estimates of al Qaeda versus the Islamic State, see depictions from February 2014, March 2014, and April 2015.





What’s changed in two-and-a-half years? What should we think of jihad’s winding path?

Remarkable Speed Of Change. The most remarkable aspect of jihad’s last five years has been the speed with which things have changed. The end of the Afghan Mujahideen to al Qaeda’s zenith on September 11, 2001 took a decade. Al Qaeda’s downward spiral in Iraq began in 2008 and the Islamic State’s rise began in 2013 –i.e., half the time of the previous generation. ISIS broke from al Qaeda and overtook them in roughly eighteen months and has now receded dramatically in nearly the same amount of time–a rise and fall occurring in a little over three years. Each foreign fighter mobilization and outflow over the last thirty years has been larger and faster than the one before it. Advances in communication and transportation have made each generation’s radicalization, recruitment and mobilization easier and subsequently faster. This trend, should it continue, points to a new wave of jihad arising fairly quickly.

Volume Of Fighters And Groups. The Syrian conflict generated the largest foreign fighter wave in history. Despite the Islamic State’s reckless consumption of its foreign manpower, today and through the near-term, there will be more jihadi foreign fighters scattered around the world than at any point in history. Compared to previous generations of jihadis, survivors of Syria and Iraq’s battlefields will be better trained, more experienced, better connected physically and virtually, and have greater opportunities amongst numerous weak and failing states. The world should prepare for, and expect, years of jihadi violence emanating from this most recent foreign fighter mobilization.Don’t mistake dispersion for strength. Scary maps showing the spread of jihad have been a favorite scare tactic of governments and the counterterrorism punditry for a decade. Similar to al Qaeda’s transition to affiliates beginning around 2004, the Islamic State’s members, supporters and re-branded followers have now spread from Morocco to the





Philippines. Unmet jihadi dispersion can equate to resilience, but should not be confused with strength. With the exception of a declining emirate in Libya and challenged affiliates in Yemen and Afghanistan, the Islamic State’s affiliates operate largely as small terrorist groups working to establish their base of operations and local popular support. Likewise, al Qaeda’s affiliates have yet to regain their previous heights–e.g., al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) of 2011, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) of 2012, and al Shabaab of 2013. Affiliates of either stripe, as of yet, lack the projection power and global appeal of their headquarters. Don’t make what are mostly molehills into mountains just yet; this is particularly the case when there remain sufficient unconventional warfare methods to encourage their destructive competition.Scale of jihad matters more than it’s spread. Dispersion should bring concern when one or more affiliates begin to scale in size. Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) during al Qaeda Central’s decline (2009 – 2012) and the Islamic State since taking Mosul demonstrate what Clauset and Gleditsch revealed in their study “The Developmental Dynamics of Terrorist Organizations” that the larger a terrorist group grows the greater number, pace and size of terrorist attacks they can execute.Al Qaeda’s growth from 1993 to 2001 allowed them to increase the pace, complexity, and lethality of their plots. The swelling of the Islamic State’s ranks and the grabbing of turf in Syria and Iraq enabled the creation of operational space for developing external operations branches and the manpower to reach Western targets. Their growth brought the recent unprecedented violence of their Ramadan offensive–i.e., directed and networked attacks every day in a new country creating a wave of cascading terrorism perpetrated by inspired followers. The lesson for the West: ignoring jihadi group growth will lead to a terrorism cancer nearly impossible to rein in.Fracturing and Competition. Despite recent fear mongering over the Islamic State’s rise or al Qaeda’s comeback, the global jihad as a whole has more fracturing and infighting than any time in its history. The Islamic State versus al Qaeda rivalry remains but is likely secondary to the generational and resource competition occurring across many affiliates. Splinters have erupted in Jabhat al-Nusra/Fateh al-Sham (Syria), Boko Haram (Nigeria), al Shabaab (Somalia), and the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU – AFPAK) in just the past few months. Characterizations of global jihad as unipolar or even bipolar should be met with skepticism–the sands have never shifted so much or so quickly. Remember, jihadis are violent young men, routinely narcissistic, highly egotistical, often jealous of each other, and particularly rash. Analysts should beware imprinting order on what is largely chaos.

What might we think of today’s jihadi terrorism landscape moving forward? The al Qaeda versus Islamic State debate is nothing more than a silly DC Beltway sideshow. Three years ago, pundits and analysts widely refuted the notion of an al Qaeda break up. Two years ago, I participated in a debate regarding “al Qaeda’s grand strategy” while the Islamic State was overtaking their terrorist forefathers by seizing Mosul and declaring a caliphate. Despite these analytical surprises, similar prophesying about jihad’s future direction has returned. Some analysts again trumpet a resurgent al Qaeda, a claim made by an analyst every year since the 9/11 attacks, or they have begun parallel theorizing about the Islamic State’s grand strategy. Luckily for pundits, no one keeps score in the counterterrorism fear factory where production is rewarded over performance.The “al Qaeda versus Islamic State” dichotomy is a hollow paradigm, reflective of analytical status quo bias from those unable or unwilling to envision a future of jihadism different from what has been seen in the past. While “al Qaeda” or “ISIS” may be





convenient for communicating media narratives, today’s vast jihadi landscape cannot be accurately characterized by the names of two groups who are past their primes and that have, at best, limited ability to control their adherents. However, this paradigm will continue in the near term because….Right now, we know less, proportionally, about what’s going on in jihad than anytime since September 11, 2001. Never have counterterrorism analysts and pundits had so much to cover and so little time and ability to do so. Today, jihadi ranks have expanded widely across three continents and they communicate in dozens of languages. With the exception of a couple of open source outlets and academic think tanks, no one can track the endless string of al Qaeda and Islamic State “Number 2’s” killed by airstrikes. The rapid, successive deaths of leaders in nearly all jihadi groups worldwide has created a chaotic jihadi stew where younger, more violent emerging leaders strike out seeking to raise both their own stature and that of their group locally.Successfully anticipating jihad’s divergence will require tens or even hundreds of analysts equipped with advanced degrees, language skills, and field experience tapped into a blend of human and technical sources. Luckily, we have that! It’s called the U.S. intelligence community. Moving forward, Western intelligence services will be positioned to put together the global picture.Jihadis have gone local and academics and analysts should as well. To understand jihad’s local flavor moving forward, look to journalists (like here and here) and academics (here’s one) doing true field research, in-person interviews and reporting rather than those relying heavily on social media personas of dubious access and reliability.Connections Mean Less, Intentions Mean More. A decade ago, and even in recent years, al Qaeda connections were used to characterize perpetrators or groups. But terrorist connections mean little in the wake of the Islamic State’s rise and the unending battle in Syria. Tens of thousands of foreign fighters from Africa through Asia have fought with al Qaeda last decade or the Islamic State this decade. Every Arab male between 18 and 26 years of age is now more likely than not to have a connection in some form to a person that fought with either or both terrorist group. Even recent inspired terrorist plots lacking any physical connection to al Qaeda or the Islamic State have surfaced links to both groups (here and here). Moving forward, analyses must wade past connections to examine the intentions of jihadis and their groups. Do they seek to target the West? If not, then add them to the long list of those needing monitoring but too numerous to thoroughly vet simply because “they are connected to a guy on Twitter who is connected to a guy who might be in the Islamic State”.The next five years of jihad will look more like the 1990s than the 2000s. Figure 10 demonstrates the diffusion of jihad. I can’t properly account for all of the groups rising and falling, shifting between networks while paving their own local agendas. With the Islamic State’s decline, and al Qaeda’s limited reach, emerging groups powered by returning foreign fighters will converge and diverge largely based on regional and local forces. Instead of the al Qaeda versus Islamic State paradigm currently being put forth, the multipolar jihadi landscape of the 1990s leading to al Qaeda’s rise provides a more appropriate historical framework for anticipating future jihadi manifestations.Prior to the September 11 attacks, many different Sunni terrorist groups with or without connections to al Qaeda pursued their own agendas competing for recruits, resources and influence amongst many different countries. This setting appears more reflective of the diffuse set of jihadis pursuing a range of ideological positions and local agendas in the near-term. Those groups that scale the largest and the quickest amongst this chaotic stew will be of the greatest concern moving forward.





Final NoteUnless something changes, Figure 10, will be my last al Qaeda versus Islamic State bubble chart. Surely my comments above have pointed to my own hypocrisy and underlying belief–there are too many actors, locations and competing interests to characterize jihad in a simple bipolar chart. Last decades’ theorizing should remind us how unlikely anyone will be to accurately estimate where, when, and how jihad’s next wave will emerge. Rather than focus on groups and fighters, it will be long-run forces that forge where jihad will revive and thrive next. Rest assured, after the Islamic State’s foreign fighter mobilization their surviving legions will unleash violence again somewhere soon.Al Qaeda versus the Islamic State: a short videoWatch this short movie (bottom of the article) to see how the al Qaeda versus Islamic State estimates have changed in the past two-and-a-half years.

No. 237/2016 dated 26 September 2016

Driving Out ISIS From Libya:What Lies Ahead?By Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan and Mohamed Sinan Siyech

SynopsisLibyan forces with US air support are driving out Islamic State fighters in Libya. Still the oil-rich nation is deeply divided by rival factions and armed militias.CommentaryLIBYAN FORCES are close to securing victory over militias from IS, also known as ISIS, in the city of Sirte, the hometown of the late leader Muammar Gaddafi. The city has been under ISIS control since early last year. Currently, with the support of US air strikes, ISIS fighters have been cornered in a small section of Sirte.According to US Defence Secretary, Ashton Carter, it is just a matter of time before ISIS is eliminated from Libya. This anticipated victory against ISIS will however be temporary and celebrations will be premature as Libya faces an even tougher challenge - uniting fragmented factions.Deeper TensionsThe battle of Sirte has proved to be a test for unity among warring factions in Libya. Currently, the Misratans hailing from the city of Misrata west of Sirte and the Petroleum Facilities Guard (PFG) militias from the areas east of Sirte are fighting against ISIS. Both of these militias had previously battled each other and are expected to continue to fight even after the ouster of ISIS fighters. The Misratans have already declared that they are ready to take over Sirte and will head to the capital, Tripoli, the stronghold of the UN-backed government, General National Accords (GNA). The GNA recently suffered a setback after getting a vote of no-confidence from a rival government, House of Representatives (HoR), which is based in the eastern city of Tobruk. Meanwhile, other rival militias across the country are carrying out extrajudicial killings to demonstrate their power as territories and oil ports are being seized. The most recent incident is the takeover by the Libyan National Army (LNA) commanded by Khalifa Heftar, of oil fields belonging to the PFG. The seizure has caused some instability in the Libyan politico-military landscape. The takeover may result in the diversion of the PFG’s attention from the fight against ISIS. Also, LNA’s failure to join in the liberation of Sirte, and ISIS’ defence and counter-attacks, has led to the anti-ISIS operations being protracted.Moving Forward Post-ISISA post-ISIS Libya does not guarantee stability in the current scenario. It is uncertain if the fighting among the Misratans and PFG will cease or if the two governments, the HoR and the GNA, will agree on any settlement or collaboration. These uncertainties have caused a fair amount of confusion and disorder in the country, caused





by the LNA’s refusal to submit to the GNA’s authority. This is because the LNA is the strongest force that can help to integrate the various militias into the governmental forces and stabilise the situation in Libya. Thus the eventual elimination of ISIS, while necessary, is not the end of Libya’s political quagmire. There has to be political reconciliation between the different factions before there can be any improvement in the security situation or attention paid to economic development. Libya will also have to look beyond its oil industry because it is usually the target in any attempt to destabilise the oil-dependent government. Trying to diversify its earnings from other sectors will help to mitigate its economic problems, although it will be a long process.Beyond Libya’s BordersAt the regional level, Egypt’s military support for General Heftar, whose spokesperson has announced the group’s intentions to export oil in the Egyptian currency, adds another level of complication. These trade relations only highlight the expanding relations between the two parties. This is also supplemented by General Heftar’s amenities granted to the Egyptian government which were not authorised by his superiors, the HoR. General Heftar’s collaborations with Egypt will therefore mean that seeking Egypt’s support will now be crucial to bring about stability in Libya.The neighbouring countries of Tunisia, Algeria, Chad and Niger will also have a part to play due to the influx of incoming militant refugees. Although Tunisia closed its borders with Libya in June 2015, it was reopened soon after. Such steps would not have helped much in stopping cross- border human smuggling, especially given that there are many established routes between these two countries. At the international level, the United States and the United Kingdom will have a vital role to play financially and politically. Although the US has weighed in on Libya by launching air strikes since August 2016, there are other ways that the US will be expected to help. The most important will be to integrate all the different local militias into the GNA which also requires the help of the UK.This could become slightly easier than before due to an increase in the GNA’s legitimacy after the expected victory over ISIS; however there are still many more security as well as political and economic issues that will have to be looked at before these steps can be implemented.

Ahmad Saiful Rijal Bin Hassan is a Senior Analyst and Mohammed Sinan Siyech is a Research Analyst with the International Centre for Political Violence and Terrorism Research (ICPVTR), a constituent unit of the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS), Nanyang Technological University, Singapore.

Regards Cees***

Amid rising Pakistani-Indian tensions over the disputed Kashmir region, Indian generals are reportedly calling on the government to approve a sustained six-month campaign to destroy “terrorist infrastructure” on the Pakistani side of the de-facto border.“We have to look at a sustained campaign. The terror network is on the back foot, but to really achieve something, we have to look at a medium-term plan, a six-month campaign. A one-off event will not deter them,” a top Indian Army official was quoted by Times of India as telling the country’s government.The suggestion comes at a time of rising tensions over Kashmir, a mountainous border area that India and Pakistan have been disputing for seven decades. Each party controls part of the region, while claiming sovereignty over all of it. Two of the three wars that the two nations have fought were over Kashmir.

Warning from the Sahel: Al Qaeda's Resurgent Threat“Know your enemy and know yourself and you can fight a hundred battles without disaster”




By Katherine Zimmerman, Alix Halloran September 1, 2016

Al Qaeda is setting conditions in the Sahel that will threaten US and European interests. The Sahel is the transitional zone between Northern Africa and Sub-Saharan Africa. Al Qaeda’s affiliate there, al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), is developing capabilities that threaten American interests in West Africa in a way that does not raise red flags in Washington. Its operations seem to be part of localized fighting, and its attacks remain below the threshold for a US or Western response. However, the combination of its objectives, close ties to al Qaeda, support from aggrieved populations, and ability to field and regenerate advanced attack capabilities make it a potent long-term threat. Western leaders make a serious mistake in underestimating the danger AQIM will pose in the future. AQIM’s objectives are to force the West to retreat from the region and to lead a Salafi-jihadi insurgency against current regimes. It has killed two Americans in the past year while attacking West African hotels and retains the intent and capability to carry out similar attacks in the region, although it does not now pose a direct threat to the US homeland.1 Multinational corporations in the region, including US-based companies, are also among AQIM’s named targets.2

Its ultimate aim is to establish Islamic emirates in Africa that will unify into a caliphate. AQIM is building a network among populations that do not necessarily share its ideology by successfully co-opting ethnic disputes and grievances in Mali. These methods are similar to those used by other al Qaeda affiliates, such as Jabhat al Nusra in Syria and al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula in Yemen.3 Integration into the local population will complicate future efforts to disaggregate and degrade AQIM’s network.The increasing sophistication of AQIM’s attacks is a dangerous sign that the group is gaining strength despite ongoing international counterterrorism operations. It can now conduct attacks from the southern coast of the Mediterranean Sea down to the Gulf of Guinea—a dramatic expansion of its reach over the past few years. It fields advanced terrorist capabilities in Mali, reconstituted after the 2013 French military intervention, and can use these capabilities against targets hundreds of miles away from its Malian sanctuary. Western efforts to contain, let alone defeat, al Qaeda in the Sahel region are failing. Its ultimate aim is to establish Islamic emirates in Africa that will unify into a caliphate.1. Thomas D. Waldhauser, “Advance Police Questions,” testimony before the Committee on Armed Services Committee, US Senate, June 21, 2016, p. 7, http://www.armed-services.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/ Waldhauser_%20APQs_06-21-16.pdf.2. SITE Intelligence Group, “AQIM Officials Calls to Attack Multinational Corporations, Western Capitals,” September 29, 2015, http://www.siteintelgroup.com (subscription





required). Abu Obeida Yusuf al Annabi, the head of AQIM’s Council of Notables, called for targeting the capitals, major cities, political institutions, and economic centers of “crusader” countries. He specifically called for targeting multinational companies because of their global footprint and their role in international decision making.3. See Katherine Zimmerman, “AQAP: A Resurgent Threat,” American Enterprise Institute, Critical Threats Project, September 11, 2015,http://www.criticalthreats.org/yemen/zimmerman-aqap-resurgent-threat-september-11-2015; and Jennifer Cafarella, “Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria,” Institute for the Study of War, December 2014, http://www.understanding war.org/report/jabhat-al-nusra-syria.




Documents

Al-Qaida chief Ayman al-Zawahiri The Coordinator 2015 Part 19-138-Caliphate- The State of al-Qaida-45-Our Performance-47