ASSIGNMENT NO. 10

JAYSON ABABA

BELEN SAGAD ANGELESvs.ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYAGARCIA, J.:

FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.

Petitioner claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, she has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

Corazon in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the records of marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born wherein the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question "Legitimate?; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis - à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."

The trial court dismissed the petition on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco. Hence, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).

CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint Corazon as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles therefore be appointed as administratrix of his estate.

RULING: The Court of Appeals erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the factual basis therefor , i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.

The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.

G.R. No. 166520               March 14, 2008VILMA C. TAN vs.THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo's estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents' Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

Atty. Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix. However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.Respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio, in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, denied petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals, again insisting on petitioner Vilma's right to be appointed as special administratix which petition was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the court a quo both grievously erred in denying petitioners' plea to be given primacy in the administration of their father's estate.

RULING: The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of

a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of aspecial administrator, as theappointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardo's estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardo's estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma's non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the court's orders.

G.R. No. 183053 : June 16, 2010IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDO-SUNTAY vs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAYNACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Cristina and Federico Suntay died intestate and their only son, Emilio I, predeceased them. When Cristina died, she was survived by her husband, Federico, and several grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.

During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children, including herein respondent, Isabel. Emilio I's marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two different women. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a mere baby by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of Emilio I.

Consequently, because of the annulment of marriage of Emilio I and their mother, respondent and her siblings, lived separately from their father and paternal grandparents. Significantly,

Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

Respondent Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.

Federico filed his opposition stating that being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son namely: Emilio III and Nenita; that he is better situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife, he was already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabel's allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed a Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent's estate on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of administration.

Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfather's opposition, alleging thatFederico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate.

In the course of the proceedings Federico died.

After hearing the testimonies and evidence of both party, the trial court rendered a decision, appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate estate. Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Article 992 Of The Civil Code applies in the appointment of an administrator of the estate Under Section 6 Of Rule 78 of the Rules Of Court.

RULING:Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator of an estate:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the

discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their grandmother's, Cristina's, estate.The case of Uy v. Court of Appeals upheld the appointment by the trial court of a co-administration between the decedent's son and the decedent's brother, who was likewise a creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same vein, in Delgado Vda. deDe la Rosa v. Heirs of MarcianaRustiaVda. deDamia, it upheld that in the appointment of an administrator, the principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estates, a situation which obtains here.

Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita, but who was likewise adopted by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all, considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.

Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay was issued to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond.

G.R. No. 170243             April 16, 2008NANCY H. ZAYCO vs.ATTY. JESUS V. HINLO, JR.CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Enrique Hinlo died intestate. His heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Ceferina, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as special administratrix of Enrique's estate. Petitioners Nancy and Remo were appointed as co-

administrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer effectively perform her duties as special administratrix.

Respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique's estate. Petitioners opposed both the petition and the motion.

The RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique and directed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent.

Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but denied by the RTC. Petitioners filed a notice of appeal which the RTC likewise denied. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the orders were interlocutory and not subject to appeal and it was also filed beyond the prescribed period.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the orders appointing respondent Hinlo as administrator of the estate of Enrique were interlocutory and not appealable.

RULING: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and settlement of the decedent's estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable.

In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration. From the time petitioners received the order denying their motion for reconsideration, they had 30 days to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. The Court ruled that the appeal was made on time.

The petition is granted.

G.R. No. 170498               January 9, 2013METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANYvs.ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATIONBRION, J.:

FACTS: Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC) alleging that it made advance payments to AMC for some purchases covered by Metrobank Checks. These checks were all crossed, and were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC's General Manager.

Chua died and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate commenced before the RTC. This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua's death, for allegedly undelivered items. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18 Metrobank checks all payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payee's account only.

In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it had no knowledge of Chua's transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter. AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged liable to SHCI.

Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly done with the knowledge and consent of AMC. Further, Chua's records show that the proceeds of the checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it did not receive these proceeds.

Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge of its arrangements with Chua for several years but despite this, AMC did not object to nor did it call the attention of Metrobank about Chua's alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from questioning Chua's authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account.

Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth- party complaint against Chua's estate. It alleged that Chua's estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC. The RTC denied Metrobank’s motion.

The RTC categorized Metrobank's allegation in the fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo indebidoâ l1 - a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid. Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts that must be included in the claims required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased's estate under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed not before the RTC as a fourth-party complaint.

Metrobank responded to the RTC ruling by filing a petition for certiorariÏunder Rule 65 before the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling that Metrobank's fourth-party complaint should have been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether Metrobank's fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate should be allowed.

RULING:Metrobank's fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court

A distinctive character of Metrobank's fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature - the claim depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that

may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court:

Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. - All claims for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited in the notice. [italics ours]

Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court

Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply because it impleaded Chua's estate for reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the CA, to wit:

Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x xx must therefore prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6.‚rνl1

The court read with approval the CA's use of the statutory construction principle of lexspecialisderogatgenerali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely apply suppletorily.

In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have been so filed in Special Proceedings.

G.R. No. L-35925             November 10, 1932RICARDO SIKATvs.QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA VILLA-REAL, J.:

FACTS: Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, against QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the

intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.

In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set up a special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with interest and costs.

The plaintiff and defendant are both of age, the former are residing in the municipality of Malinao, and the latter in the municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, P. I.; that the plaintiff, Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, duly appointed in place of the former administrator, Enrique V. Kare, by the Court of Firts Instance of Albay; QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon appeal the Supreme Court decided that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the said intestate proceedings.

In view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay incompetent to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva, these proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application of Enrique Kare, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva in case No. 28244, filed on June 18, 1925, upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92, with legal interest from June 15, 1919.

After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva, administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and MamertoRoxas and NicanorRoxas as commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present complaint.

The said committee on claims and appraisal, composed of MamertoRoxas and NicanorRoxas, admitted the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report with the court accordingly.

In addition there was adduced evidence a document dated September 22, 1909, executed by the late Pedro Villanueva in favor of his father, the late Mariano P. Villanueva, which states the amount that Pedro owed to his father, Mariano P. Villanueva.

ISSUE: Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate to collect the credit against him has already prescribed.

RULING: The court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited Act No. 190, which reads:

SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. — If, in an action commenced, or attempted to be commenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail otherwise than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at the date of such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of action survive, his representatives, may commence a new action within one year after such date, and this provision shall apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.

This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190, "means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this definition, the proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which, according to the same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions and not special proceedings.

The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not directly apply to special proceedings.In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang, this court laid down the following doctrine:

The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.

The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.

Thus section 642, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:

SEC. 642. TO WHOM ADMINISTRATION GRANTED. — If no executor is named in the will, or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

x xxxxxxxx

2. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be unsuitable, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin neglect thirty days after the death of the person to apply for administration, or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve. . . .

It can be seen that under section 689 of the Code, the maximum period for the presentation of claims against the estate of a deceased person is eighteen months from the time fixed by the committee on claims and appraisal in its notice, and this period may be extended one month if a creditor applies for it within six months after the first term, according to section 690.

It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed to fix the time for filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe.

The object of the law in fixing short special periods for the presentation of claims against the estate of a deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible in order to pay off the debts and distribute the residue; and if a creditor having knowledge of the death of his debtor is interested in collecting his credit as soon as possible; and if according to law the persons entitled to the administration or to propose another person for administrator have thirty days from the death within which to claim that right, after which time the court may appoint any creditor of the intestate debtor: then the plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after the lapse of three years after this court had set aside the intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to June 18, 1925.

Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates, and the fact that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in the Court of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it, which was not allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and applying the provisions of section 49 of theCode of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare the claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to permit a creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely, by not instituting either testate or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the prejudice of the heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate under section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the time within which a creditor may file his claim to two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate.

G.R. No. L-24098      November 18, 1967BUENAVENTURA BELAMALAvs.MARCELINO POLINAR, administratorREYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No. 1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio Polinar above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder; The administrator Marcelino Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now deceased;

On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of the Peace of Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Bohol, the Information on said Criminal Case No. 1922 was filed on March 12, 1955;

On May 28, 1966, the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof, convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages.

On June 18, 1956, the accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed . However on July 27, 1956, while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of Appeals.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956.

ISSUE: Whether the civil liability of an accused of physical injuries who dies before final judgment, is extinguished by his demise, to the extent of barring any claim therefor against his estate.

RULING: We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below, Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter

acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should have been prosecuted by separate action against the administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87, since the claim is patently one "to recover damages for an injury to person or property" (Rule 87, sec. 1). Belamala's action can not be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule 86, because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral expenses, expenses for last sickness, judgments for money and "claims against the decedent, arising fromcontract, express or implied;" and this last category (the other three being inapposite) includes only "all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages manifestly have a tortious origin. To this effect was our ruling in Aguas vs. Llemos, L-18107, Aug. 30, 1962.

G.R. NO. 159130, August 22, 2008ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONESv.LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZBRION, J.:

FACTS: Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the allowance of the will of her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Lilia Henson-Cruz, one of the deceased's daughters. opposed Ruby's petition. She alleged that Ruby understated the value of their late mother's estate and acted with "unconscionable bad faith" in the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.

Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate of her late mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be appointed as Interim Special Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated Jose V. Ferro (Senior Vice-President and Trust Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines National Bank) as the Special Administrator. Ferro, however, declined the appointment.

The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the administration of the estate. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special Administrator's Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under his administration.

The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of income and disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones' claim for commission and that he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.

On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of the estate. The trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.

The respondents moved for the reconsideration, alleging that in view of the partition of the estate there was no more need for a special administrator. They also clarified that they were not asking for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts, vouchers, bank statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrator's Final Report and to examine the Special Administrator under oath.

Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and Mandamus which assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the appointment. The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal on May 23, 2002 on the ground of forum shopping. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

Respondents filed a petition for mandamus before the CA claiming that the trial court unlawfully refused to comply with its ministerial duty to approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court had neither the power nor the authority to deny the appeal on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court to dismiss an appeal, either motuproprio or on motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if the appellate court docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary period.

The petitioner faults the appellate court for refusing to resolve the forum shopping issue in its Decision of February 11, 2003 and the Resolution of July 17, 2003, thereby deciding the case in a way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Court. On the matter of forum shopping, the appellate court simply stated in its decision that "In view of the fact that respondent Judge had no power to disallow the appeal on the ground of forum shopping, we deem it unnecessary to discuss whether or not petitioners committed forum shopping." Neither did the appellate court pass upon the issue of forum shopping in its ruling on the petitioner's motion for reconsideration, stating that forum shopping should be resolved either in the respondent's appeal or in their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.

Hence, this petition for review.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the respondents' petition for mandamus on the ground of forum shopping?

RULING: NO.

Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same

issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another." It is directly addressed and prohibited under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is signaled by the presence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties who represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of the rights asserted and the relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. In simpler terms, the test to determine whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of litispendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.

The court sees no forum shopping after considering the standards as neither litispendentia nor res judicata would result in one case from a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal that subsequently became the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 and the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 70439 both stemmed from the trial court's Order dated April 3, 2002. The simple reason - as already discussed above - is that the petition and the appeal involve two different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one will not affect the other.

Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the developments in, the proceedings are taken into account - i.e., an estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow separate appeals and where the respondents have meticulously distinguished what aspect of the RTC's single Order could be appealed and what could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort in the cases it cited relating to forum shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual settings, simply do not apply to the attendant circumstances and special nature of the present case where the issues, although pertaining to the same settlement of estate proceedings and although covered by the same court order, differ in substance and in stage of finality and can be treated independently of one another for the purposes of appellate review.

Given our above discussion and conclusions, the court do not see forum shopping as an issue that would have made a difference in the appellate court's ruling. Nor is it an issue that the appellate court should, by law, have fully ruled upon on the merits. The court agrees with the respondent that the appellate court is not required "to resolve every contention and issue raised by a party if it believes it is not necessary to do so to decide the case."

The reality though is that the appellate court did rule on the issue when it stated that "it becomes unnecessary to discuss whether the latter engaged in forum shopping. Apparently, the issue on forum shopping was also raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private respondent can again raise the same in the appeal from the order dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should be properly resolved." To the appellate court - faced with the task of ruling on a petition for mandamus to compel the trial court to allow the respondents' appeal - forum shopping was not an issue material to whether the trial court should or should not be compelled; what was material are the requisite filing of a notice of appeal and record on appeal, and the question of whether these have been satisfied. We cannot find fault with this reasoning as the forum shopping issue - i.e., whether there was abuse of court processes in the respondents' use of two recourses to assail the

same trial court order - has specific pertinence and relevance in the sufficiency and merits of the recourses the respondents took.

G.R. No. 146989             February 7, 2007MELENCIO GABRIELvs.NELSON BILONAZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: Respondents filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and separation pay against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). These were consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-07420-95. On December 15, 1995, the complaint was amended, impleading as party respondent the Bacoor Transport Service Cooperative, Inc., as both parties are members of the cooperative.

Respondents alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney, driving their respective units bearing under a boundary system of P400 per day, plying Baclaran to Divisoria via Tondo, and vice versa driving five days a week, with average daily earnings of P400; That they were required/forced to pay additional P55.00 per day for the following: a) P20.00 police protection; b) P20.00 washing; c) P10.00 deposit; and [d)] P5.00 garage fees; That there is no law providing the operator to require the drivers to pay police protection, deposit, washing, and garage fees That on April 30, 1995, petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and when they went to the garage to report for work the next day, they were not given a unit to drive; and That the boundary drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered regular employees of the jeepney operators. Being such, they are entitled to security of tenure. Petitioner, however, dismissed them without factual and legal basis, and without due process.

On his part, petitioner contended that he does not remember if the respondents were ever under his employ as drivers of his passenger jeepneys. Certain, however, is the fact that neither the respondents nor other drivers who worked for him were ever dismissed by him. As a matter of fact, some of his former drivers just stopped reporting for work, either because they found some other employment or drove for other operators, and like the respondents, the next time he heard from them was when they started fabricating unfounded complaints against him; He made sure that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even for a day so he could collect his earnings; hence, it had been his practice to establish a pool of drivers. Had respondents manifested their desire to drive his units, it would have been immaterial whether they were his former drivers or not. As long as they obtained the necessary licenses and references, they would have been accommodated and placed on schedule; While he was penalized or made to pay a certain amount in connection with similar complaints by other drivers in a previous case before this, it was not because his culpability was established, but due to technicalities involving oversight and negligence on his part by not participating in any stage of the investigation thereof; and Respondents’ claim that certain amounts, as enumerated in the complaint, were deducted from their day’s earnings is preposterous.

The Labor arbiter decided in favor of the respondents averring that their dismissal was illegal and ordered the petitioner to pay for backwages and separation pay. Incidentally, petitioner passed away. A copy of the above decision was delivered personally to petitioner’s house. According to respondents, petitioner’s surviving spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter, after reading the contents of the decision and after they had spoken to their counsel, refused to receive the same. Nevertheless, Bailiff Alfredo V. Estonactoc left a copy of the decision with petitioner’s wife and her daughter but they both refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the decision.

The labor arbiter’s decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioner’s residence and the same was received on May 28, 1997. Counsel for petitioner filed an entry of appearance with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that petitioner passed away. On June 5, 1997, petitioner appealed the labor arbiter’s decision to the National Labor Relations Commission. The NLRC reversed ha assiled decision for lack of employee-employer relationship.

ISSUE: Whether the appeal was filed on time.

RULING: YES. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to have been validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As correctly pointed out by petitioner’s wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been validly effected on April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.

Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:

SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. – (a) Notices or summons and copies of orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the bailiff or authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by registered mail; Provided, That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative; Provided further, That in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served on both parties and their counsel ….

For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.

(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return, his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected, the serving officer shall state the reason therefore in the return.

Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure states that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the party’s or

counsel’s residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing therein."

The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the delivery of a copy of the tribunal’s decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before a copy of the labor arbiter’s decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not apply. As aptly stated by the NLRC:

… In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997 while Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during his lifetime. The decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to receive the same. His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were not in a position to receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the party’s residence is not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and is not just available to receive the decision.

The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become final because there was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent…. Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28, 1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 223 of the Labor Code.

G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVAROMERO, J.:

FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and was subsequently convicted. Pending appeal of his conviction he died at the NationalBilibid Hospital due to cardio respiratory arrest . The Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to Bayotas’ civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.

The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position, said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore, civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.

It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from the rule established was that the survival of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.

However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.10 departed from this long-established principle of law. In this case:

accusedSendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiego’s death supervened during the pendency of the appeal of his conviction.This court in an unprecedented move resolved to dismiss Sendaydiego’s appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished.

The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiego’s conviction despite dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so, this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

“The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).

The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court)

RULING: Whether the civil case arising from ex delicto is extinguished together with the criminal case upon the death of the accused

RULING: When the action is for the recovery of money’ ‘and the defendant dies before final judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided’ in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court The implication is that, if the defendant dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.

Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused. Ordinary money claims referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 involving claims against the estate, which in the case of Sendaydiego was held liable for Sendaydiego’s civil liability. “What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to Section 5 of Rule 86,14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property.”

Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.

Accordingly, the court rules: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject to Section 1, Rule 11116 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as (amended) file a separate civil action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines against whom the same shall be enforced.

If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be filed against the executor or administrator17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court:

“SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or administrator.—No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.”

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982NICANOR NACARvs.CLAUDIO A. NISTAL GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS: Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint entitled “Claim against the estate of the late IsabeloNacar with Preliminary Attachment” to recover an outstanding debt of the late IsabeloNacar. He further alleged that NicanorNacar is about to remove and dispose the property (seven carabaos) in his possession, with intent to defraud him. Considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the 7 cattles. Claiming ownership of the attached carabaos, Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention. NicanorNacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, and to order the return of the carabaos but it was denied by the court. Hence, NicanorNacar filed this instant petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul the order of Judge Nistal.

In a resolution, the Supreme Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00, directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. Judge Nistal was restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.

ISSUE: Whether the suit to recover the claim of private respondents may be filed against NicanorNacar, having the possession of the properties.

RULING: The filing of an ordinary action to recover money claim against the administrator is not allowed in any court. Even if settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of IsabeloNacar, the suit to recover the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the administrator or executor of his estate. This is expressly provided for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court, as follows: "No action upon claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; . . . ." The claim of private respondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in the administration proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceased IsabeloNacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed therein within the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of Court). Even if this action were commenced during the lifetime of IsabeloNacar, the same shall have to be dismissed, and the claim prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings (Sec. 21, Rule 3, Ibid.).

It was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.

Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the recovery of the outstanding debts of the late IsabeloNacar against his stepfather, the petitioner Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):

"Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in accordance with procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in the application and effectivity thereof."

Considering the foregoing, the respondent court’s denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper. With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the subject writ of attachment.

The petition is granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued is made permanent and the cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.

G.R. No. 147561             June 22, 2006STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, INC.vs.REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATIONPANGANIBAN, CJ:

FACTS: Respondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract with JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in Republic-Asahi's compound which was supposed to be completed within a period of 240 days. JDS executed, jointly and severally with petitioner Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI) Performance Bond in order to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its undertakings to Republic Asahi.

Republic-Asahi paid to JDS P795,000.00 by way of downpayment. Thereafter, two progress billings were submitted by JDS to Republic-Asahi, which the latter paid. According to Republic-Asahi, these two progress billings accounted for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be undertaken by JDS under the terms of the contract.

Several times Republic-Asahi engineers called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly slow pace of the construction, however said reminders went unheeded by JDS. Hence, dissatisfied with the progress of their work, Republic-Asahi informed JDS that they extrajudicially rescinded the contract, but shall not be construed as a waiver of Republic-Asahi right to recover damages and the latter's sureties according to Article XV of the contract. As a result of the rescission of the contract, Republic Asahi had to hire another contractor to finish the project, for which it incurred an additional expenses.

Republic-Asahi sent a letters to petitioner SICI demanding its claim for payment against the bond but those were allegedly went unheeded.

Republic-Asahi then filed a complaint against JDS and SICI. It sought from JDS payment representing the additional expenses they incurred for the completion of the project using another contractor, and from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment of damages in accordance with the performance bond, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Summons were duly served on defendant-appellee SICI, however, Jose D. Santos, Jr., proprietor of JDS, died the previous year and JDS Construction was no longer at its address and its whereabouts were unknown.

SICI then filed its answer, alleging that the Republic-Asahi money claims against petitioner and JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.

The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi against JDS and SICI, on the ground that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr. Hence, Republic-Asahi filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the lower court's order dismissing its complaint.

The lower court issued an Order, reconsidering and reinstating the order of dismissal of the case against SICI. However, the case against defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains undisturbed.SICI filed its 'Memorandum for Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect of Death of defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr.)' reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of Republic-Asahi’s complaint.The lower court then issued the assailed Order reconsidering its Order dated October 15, 1991, and ordered the case, insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. Republic-Asahi filed its motion for reconsideration which was opposed by SICI. The lower court denied Republic-Asahi’s motion for reconsideration. Hence, case was elevated to CA.

The CA ruled that SICI's obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.

The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing that the performance of the Contract in question had become impossible by respondent's act of rescission. The Contract was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow pace of work and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.

The CA ruled that performance of the contract was impossible, not because of respondent's fault, but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to make satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to non-performance of the same Pursuant to the Surety Contract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said Contract on the part of JDS Construction."

ISSUE: Whether petitioner's liability under the performance bond was automatically extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.

RULING: Effect of Death on the Surety's Liability

Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under the surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the bond.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation. Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law, the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.

Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond.

As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which provides as follows:

"Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section 4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a suretyship."

"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected."

Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appealsstated thus:

"x xx. The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal. Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the principal. x xx.

Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter's liability under the performance bond.

The court denied the petition and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

G.R. No. 189121               July 31, 2013AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZONvs.MA. LOURDES BELENPEREZ, J.:

FACTS: Elise Quiazon, the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen claims that she is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were both capacitated to marry each other. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her

mother, Ma. Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Las Piñas City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late father’s estate.

Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children Jenneth and Maria Jennifer, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Piñas City. In addition to their claim of improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be appointed administratix of Eliseo’s estate.

 RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Piñas City, from 1975 up to the time of Eliseo’s death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of Eliseo’s estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent was a resident of Las Piñas City. The petitioners’ Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the Court of Appeals.

ISSUE: Whether Elise is qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate of Eliseo.

RULING: There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her father’s marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of her father.  Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. Consequently, in the absence of any showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseo’s marriage was solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore, void ab initio.ar

Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners’ contention that Elise has not shown any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:Sec. 6.  When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a)  To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

anr0blesvirtualawlibrary(b)  If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected

by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

(c)  If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration must be filed by an interested person, thus:Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

a) The jurisdictional facts;b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the

creditors, of the decedent; c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

An “interested party,” in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.  Also, in estate proceedings, the phrase “next of kin” refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are entitled to share in the estate as distributees.

In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of Eliseo’s estate, is deemed to be an interested party.  With the overwhelming evidence on record produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners’ pounding on her lack of interest in the administration of the decedent’s estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals.  Certainly, the right of Elise to be appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds.  It is founded on her right as a compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are satisfied.29  Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseo’s estate as one of his natural children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.

The petition was denied for lack of merit.  Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed Decision and Resolution, are affirmed in toto.

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005BELEN SAGAD ANGELESvs.ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYAGARCIA, J.:

FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications required of an administrator.

Petitioner claims, as Francisco’s second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made administratix of Francisco’s estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Francisco’s legitimate daughter, the corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, she has not presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable document to prove such union. Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the administration of his estate.

Corazon in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the records of marriages of the Civil Registrar where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the RTC. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an entry stating that she was born wherein the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below the question "Legitimate?; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her scholastic and government service records.

After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove a cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence, failed to establish her filiation vis - à-vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M. Angeles."

The trial court dismissed the petition on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as legitimate child of Francisco. Hence, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).

CA reversed and set aside the trial court’s order of dismissal and directed it to appoint Corazon as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.

ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles therefore be appointed as administratrix of his estate.

RULING: The Court of Appeals erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However, the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing

proof of the factual basis therefor , i.e., that the child’s parents were legally married and that his/her conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to present evidence of Francisco’s marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate. Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.

The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child. None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein respondent’s legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latter’s marriage to Genoveva, having been judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.