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Behavioral biometrics mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

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Page 1: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence
Page 2: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Why?

Watermarks; hwing; SDW; I AM MY PHONE

Page 3: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

A password is a single-factor

authentication factor that creates an

“assurance” that an individual is who

they say they are.

Passwords are doomed, and hated,

and unnecessarily difficult, and

perhaps irreplaceable.

Page 4: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

The password is a miserable authenticator

if it’s complex enough, it’s too hard to remember

if it’s simple enough, bad guys will guess it

can’t re-use them

can’t write them down

the places they are used often have surveillance systems & people with recording devices

bad guys steal huge batches of them (sort of)

disconnect between cost and true necessity

Page 5: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Unfortunately, no one is going to give up using

passwords. It’s all they know.

They’ve spent their lifetimes naming their pets

accordingly.

Something must be done to

SAVE the PASSWORD.

Page 6: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence
Page 7: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

passphrases

mnemonics

strength checkers

password management tool

Single sign on

openID+

NIST tips!

Page 8: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

life experience passwords

graphical password

drawn passwords / signatures

uSig (know the pic/have the gizmo)

questions

gestures

multi-touch gestures

tokens (have the gizmo)

e-signature (requires “device”)

Page 9: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Not a single scheme is dominant over passwords, i.e., does

better on one or more benefits and does at least as well on

all others. Almost all schemes do better than passwords in

some criteria…

Thus, the current state of the world is a Pareto equilibrium.

Replacing passwords with any of the schemes examined is

not a question of giving up an inferior technology for

something unarguably better, but of giving up one set of

compromises and trade-offs in exchange for another.

The Quest to Replace

Passwords: A Framework

for Comparative

Evaluation of Web

Authentication Schemes

Joseph Bonneau University

of Cambridge / Cormac

Herley Microsoft Research /

Paul C. van Oorschot

Carleton University / Frank

Stajanoy University of

Cambridge

Page 10: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

iris

retina

fingerprint

heart rate

face

ear geometry

hand geometry

palm vein pattern

thermal signature

odor

bioimpedance

+

Page 11: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Physical Biometrics is a miserable authenticator

people don’t want to give them up

once it’s in the wild, it’s gone

actual features identify a person, but does the digital representation adequately represent the actual feature

vulnerable – replay attacks+

Page 12: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Exploring novel, not-novel and failed mechanisms for multi-factor authentication

Page 13: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence
Page 14: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

handwriting

voice

gait

interactions like

keyboarding

touch

phone movement/position

decisionmaking

linguistics

app behaviors

diligence

web browsing / app switching

transportation

(method/route/speed)

outbound social behavior

+ everything else

Page 15: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

BehavioSec

• Keyboard Capture Intervals

• Application Switching

• Touch Motion

• Mouse Motion

Others

• Stylometry

• Application start

• Search behavior

• Covert games

RSA Conference –

Asia Pacific – 2013

DARPA Active

Authentication

Program: Behavioral

Biometrics

Page 16: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

burstiness

length of session

average time on a page

time between revisits

genre (diffbot.com)

User Authentication

from Web Browsing

Behavior

Myriam Abramson

Naval Research

Laboratory / David W.

Aha Naval Research

Laboratory

Page 17: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Behavioral Biometrics may be better

transparent to users

can be used continuously

but

requires privacy and security by design

adequate processing for adequately complex analysis is not yet available

requires authentication unit / chip

Page 18: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

For regular smartphone users, aggregating behavior information

will be adequate to verify identity.

Our phones could “know who we are”, if we taught them to “look at

our behavior”.

Rather than replacing passwords, which still have some security

purposes, as well as a psychological/cultural value, in the future

we could consider passwords to be the 2nd Factor – and behavioral

biometrics to be the1st Factor.

(mention the two Bs and EU Data Protection here)

Page 19: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

a theoretical app used to brainstorm about facets of human/phone interaction and convergence

(or a real app if someone wants to develop it)

Page 20: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

language (abbreviations, case usage, grammar, word omissions, slang, emoticons + )

keyboarding (use of autocomplete + )

errors and error correction (backspace/autocorrect)

locations / travel

app usage

gaming and in-game behavior

search behavior

phone positioning

unlock behavior

“telephone” usage (Bluetooth/speaker/handheld)

financial transactions

The role of VARIATION:

The extent to which each facet

VARIES in similar and different

contexts and assessed against

other facets, is itself an essential

facet.

Page 21: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

The elements of the outside world that interact with you converge on only one person.*

The way they contact you and the way you respond is an authentication factor. For today, we will call it “convergence”.

The measureable facets of “convergence” include:

how (text, email, app)

when

where

extent (“length of interaction”)

response time

* of course, there are exceptions

“Outbound interactions” are a

behavioral biometric. “Inbound

interactions” are not. The

combination of the two can be used

as an authentication factor.

Page 22: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

The theoretical “am I me” app makes a go/no-go decision regarding allowing

password submission.

The in-phone process creates “virtual images” that represent the person's range of

behaviors and connections (who/how+). The images are generated over time via

fly-by. Variability is critical; contrary to instinct, it is an identifying feature.

The "images" (akin to perceptual hashes) are the only aggregation point. The data

does not exist as a single unit except as represented in the image.

The images are stored in the app server. Then the current/recent "image" is

verified to the server images using complicated math. Based on the result, the

phone attests (or doesn’t attest) to the user, and a password can be submitted.

(In-phone verification is "possible" but seems (perhaps impossibly) more

vulnerable.)

Page 23: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence
Page 24: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

After here… some references and slides I didn’t use

Page 25: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

RE THE NEED FOR AN AUTHENTICATION PROCESSING UNIT

The challenge lies in assuring the security of the completed system

and for this, experience shows that general-purpose computing

systems cannot be made secure enough to resist compromise by a

determined adversary.

Historically, special-purpose computing needs have resulted in the

development of dedicated, special-purpose computing hardware.

Early in the history of computing, the Arithmetic Logic Unit (ALU)

was developed to augment the numerical processing capabilities of

more limited general-purpose CPUs. Likewise, Graphics Processing

Units (GPUs) were developed to provide high-performance graphics

handling. Similarly, designing and implementing a hardware

“Authentication Processing Unit” (APU) implementing the principles

of authentication outlined above would be an expected outcome of

such consideration.

Principles of

Authentication

Ed Talbot UC Davis /

Sean Peisert UC Davis

and Berkeley Lab /

Matt Bishop UC Davis

(SOUPS 2014)

Page 26: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Core Characteristics for Evaluating

Authenticators

Bruce K. Marshall PasswordResearch.com

Alternatives to passwords: Replacing the ubiquitous

authenticator

Ron Condon in Computer Weekly

Principles of Authentication

Ed Talbot UC Davis / Sean Peisert UC Davis and Berkeley

Lab / Matt Bishop UC Davis (SOUPS 2014)

Who You Are by way of What You Are:

Behavioral Biometric Approaches to Authentication

Michael Karlesky, Napa Sae-Bae, Katherine Isbister, Nasir

Memon NYU Polytechnic School of Engineering (SOUPS 2014)

User Authentication from Web Browsing Behavior

Myriam Abramson Naval Research Laboratory / David W.

Aha Naval Research Laboratory

The Quest to Replace Passwords: A Framework for

Comparative Evaluation of Web Authentication Schemes

Joseph Bonneau University of Cambridge / Cormac Herley

Microsoft Research / Paul C. van Oorschot Carleton

University / Frank Stajanoy University of Cambridge

DARPA Active Authentication

Website:

Page 27: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Abraham Aha

The authentication problem has been addressed in the context of masquerade detection in computer security by modeling user command line sequences

(Schonlau et al. 2001). In the masquerade detection problem, the task is to positively identify masqueraders but not to positively identify a particular user. Recent

experiments modeling user issued OS commands as bag-of-words without timing information have obtained a 72.7% true positive rate and a 6.3% false positive

rate (Salem and Stolfo 2010) on a set of 15000

commands for 70 users grouped in sets of 100 commands.

In that work, a one-class support vector machine (SVM) (Schölkopf et al. 2000) was shown to produce better performance results than threshold-based

comparison with a distance

metric. We extend the results of this work to features of Web browsing behavior individually and in combination with an ensemble.

LATER

The goal of this study is to verify the claim that users can be authenticated from their Web browsing behavior. All experiments

were conducted in the Weka machine learning workbench (Hall et al. 2009) augmented by our own ensemble algorithms.

We extracted the features of Web browsing behavior described above from each user session and aggregated them into one feature vector. A user’s dataset

consisted of all sessions collected for that user. For each user, we compared the false rejection rate (FRR) (i.e., false negative rate)and the false acceptance rate

(FAR) (i.e., false positive rate) for classifiers derived from each feature set and an ensemble classifier composed of classifiers based on a weighted random

sample of those features. FRR results were obtained using cross-validation on the user’s dataset while FAR results were obtained by applying the classifier

obtained on a dataset containing the data of all the other users.

LATER

One-class classification is pertinent in the context of classification with only positive examples where negative examples are hard to come by or do not fit into a

unique category. Some applications for one-class classification include anomaly detection, fraud detection, outlier detection, authorship verification and document

classification where categories are learned individually. The goal of one-class classification is to detect all classes that differ from the target class without knowing

them in advance. One-class classification is similar to unsupervised learning but tries to solve a discriminative problem (i.e., self or not self) rather than a

generative problem as in clustering algorithms or density estimation.

Several algorithms have been modified to perform one-class classification. We used a one-class SVM available with LibSVM (Schölkopf et al. 2000) as part of the

Weka machine learning toolbench. SVMs are large-margin classifiers that map feature vectors to a higher dimensional space using kernels based on similarity

metrics. The optimization objective in SVMs is to find a linear separating hyperplane with maximum margin between class boundaries.

Page 28: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Attacks

Masquerade attacks

Linkage attacks – like a database join

Graphical passwords – pattern based attacks

Page 29: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Abraham/Aha

Attribution is broadly defined as the assignment of an effect to a cause. We differentiate

between authentication and identification as two techniques for attribution of identity.

Authentication is defined as the verification of claimed identification (Jain, Bolle, and

Pankanti 1999). Their distinction is subtle in the sense that authentication is usually

obtained through identification. Likewise, identification can be obtained from

authentication attempts of each user in turn.

Identification involves recognition as a one-to-many matching problem while

authentication is a one-to-one matching problem. This paper focuses on the

authentication problem.

User syntactic patterns

Power Law distribution

Page 30: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

how difficult they are to guess, forge, or steal

or inadvertently reveal

or give away

or USE without the individual’s willing participation

Passwords lack integrity based on...

Page 31: Behavioral biometrics   mechanism for delaying password obsolescence

Wikipedia says there are “Three categories of authentication factors”

Knowledge – things the user knows (passwords)

Possession – things the user has (card)

Inherence - things the user is (biometrics)

- physical biometrics

- behavioral biometrics

There’s at least one more. There’s “convergence” which is the interactions of the outside world with you.