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China’s junior partner
Russia’s KoRean policy
Witold Rodkiewicz
NUMBER 72WARSAWDECEMBER 2018
China’s junior partnerRUSSiA’S KoREAN poliCy
Witold Rodkiewicz
© Copyright by ośrodek Studiów Wschodnichim. Marka Karpia / Centre for Eastern Studies
Content editorAdam Eberhardt, Marek Menkiszak, Wojciech Stanisławski
EditorKatarzyna Kazimierska, Anna Łabuszewska
Co-operationHalina Kowalczyk
TranslationMagdalena Klimowicz
Co-operationJim Todd
Graphic designpARA-BUCH
DTpGroupMedia
photograph on cover
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FiguresWojciech Mańkowski
pUBliSHERośrodek studiów Wschodnich im. Marka KarpiaCentre for Eastern Studies
ul. Koszykowa 6a, Warsaw, polandphone: + 48 /22/ 525 80 00Fax: + 48 /22/ 525 80 40osw.waw.pl
iSBN 978-83-65827-31-9
Contents
THESES /5
I. KoREA: RUSSiA’S AMBiTioNS AND iNTENTioNS /7
II. THE NUClEAR DpRK AND RUSSiA’S GEopoliTiCAl GAiNS /9
III. RUSSiA’S ‘TWo KoREAS poliCy’ /13
IV. THE KoREAN CRiSiS AND iTS CoNSEqUENCES FoR RUSSiAN-CHiNESE RElATioNS /22
V. THE SUMMiT iN SiNGApoRE FRoM THE RUSSiAN pERSpECTivE: WHAT NExT? /26
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THESES
• Russia’s policy towards the conflict over the North Koreannuclear program, which in 2017-18 assumed the proportionsofaseriousinternationalcrisis,hasbeensubordinatedtoitsgeopoliticalgoalsintheregionandtothestrategyitispursu-ingonaglobalscale.Itslong-termgoalistopreventthereuni-ficationoftheKoreanpeninsulaundertheaegisoftheUnitedStatesandtoweakentheUS’spositionintheregion.Itsshort-termgoalistoavertthedangerofanoutbreakofarmedcon-flictonthepeninsulaandthepossiblecollapseofNorthKorea.
• Russia’ssupportforthereunificationofthetwoKoreanstatesis purely declaratory; in practice the Kremlin is striving tomaintainthepoliticalstatus quoonthepeninsula.Atthesametime, Russia wants to maximise its influence by developingeconomic relations and maintaining political contacts withbothKoreas.
• Moscow does not view the denuclearisation of North Koreaas one of its priorities. Its approach to Pyongyang’s nuclearprogramme is instrumental; in Moscow’s eyes, although theprogramposescertainrisksforRussia,italsoopensanumberof opportunities. Officially, Moscow condemns Pyongyang’snuclearambitions.However,untilautumn2017iteffectivelyblockedWesternproposalsontheUNSecurityCounciltoim-poseeconomicsanctionsontheDemocraticPeople’sRepublicofKorea(DPRK).
• The course of the crisis so far has demonstrated that Russiadoesnothavesufficienttoolstoinfluencethecourseofevents.Asaconsequence, ithashadtoacceptaroleasChina’s ‘jun-ior partner’ in the Korean issue. Russia’s reduced role couldbe best seen in August-September 2017 when, under China’sinfluence,itreverseditspositionontheSecurityCouncilandapprovedtheintroductionofsanctionsagainsttheDPRK.
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• The Kremlin was satisfied with the results of the June 2018meetingbetweenUSPresidentDonaldTrumpandtheNorthKoreanleaderKimJong-un,onceitturnedoutthattheywouldnotleadtoarapiddenuclearisationoftheDPRK,whileatthesame time reducing the risk of American military action ontheKoreanpeninsula.Inthissituation,Moscowmadeeveryefforttoconcealthefactthatduringthemostseverestageofthecrisisin2017,itsroleturnedouttobeofsecondaryimpor-tancecomparedtothoseofWashington,BeijingandSeoul.
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I. KorEa: ruSSIa’S ambITIonS and InTEnTIonS
Russia’sreactionstothecrisis1weremainlydeterminedbyMos-cow’s geopolitical goals regarding the Korean peninsula. ThecrisisitselfhadbeentriggeredbyaseriesofnuclearandmissiletestscarriedoutbyNorthKorea,aswellasbytheTrumpadmin-istrationtougheningitspolicytowardstheregimeinPyongyang.OtherimportantfactorsdeterminingRussia’sreactionsincludedthebroadercontextofitsrelationswithboththeUnitedStatesandChina,aswellasitsbusinessinterestsontheKoreanpeninsula.
Moscow’sfundamentalandlong-termgeopoliticalgoalistopre-ventthe‘Germanreunificationscenario’fromhappeninginKo-rea. This would involve South Korea absorbing the DPRK whileretainingitsmilitaryalliancewiththeUSandcontinuingtohostAmericantroopsonitsterritory.Russiaisinterestedinstrength-eningtheDPRKasananti-Americanbufferstate,andinmodify-ingthegeopoliticalorder inNorth-EastAsiabywayofcreatingaregionalsecuritysystemthatwouldreducetheroleoftheUnitedStatesintheregion.Atthesametime,RussiaseekstomaximiseitspoliticalinfluenceandeconomicbenefitsontheKoreanpenin-sulabydevelopingitsrelationswithbothKoreanstates.
Moscow’sshort-termgoalistopreventthecollapseoftheNorthKoreanstateandtheoutbreakofanarmedconflictonthepenin-sula.Toachievethis,Russiaisproposingtoundertakemajorin-frastructureprojects(atrans-Koreangaspipelineandrailways,theintegrationofelectricitygrids),whichwouldgiveitadditionaltoolsofpoliticalinfluence,whileatthesametimeenablingittoobtaineconomicbenefits.
1 InMay2017,theUSexpertonKoreaStephenNoerperwrotethat“Tensionsrosetothehighestlevelsince1993/1994.”‘PeninsulaTensionsSpike’,Com-parative Connections, vol.19,no.1,p.33,http://cc.csis.org/2017/05/peninsula-tensions-spike/
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RussiaisalsotreatingtheconflictaroundKoreaasaninstrumentthat it can use both to put pressure on the United States and tostrengthenitsrelationswithChina.ItcalculatesthattheprospectofRussiancooperationinresolvingthecrisisonKoreanpeninsu-lamighthelptopersuadeWashingtontomaintainrelationswithMoscowanddissuadeitfromattemptstoisolateRussia2.ItisalsointendedtomotivateWashingtontomakeconcessionstoRussiaoverUkraine.Ontheotherhand,bycooperatingloyallywithChi-naovertheKoreanissue,RussiaintendstodemonstratetoBeijingthatitcanbeavaluablestrategicpartner,thusworkingtotightenitsrelationswithChina.ThisisincreasinglyimportantforMos-cow,especially in thecontextof itsworseningconflictwiththeUS.Atthesametime,itseemsthattheKremlinisstrivingtocon-cealthereductioninitsimportanceinthegeopoliticalgameoverKoreawhichhasbecomeevidentduringtherecentcrisis.There-peated attempts to arrange either a meeting between VladimirPutinwiththeleaderofNorthKorea,oratri-partite‘minisum-mit’betweentheRussianpresidentandtheleadersofthetwoKo-reas, appear to serve this purpose. Moscow has also repeatedlycalledontheinternationalcommunitytoestablishamultilateralmechanism to resolve the conflict, which would enable it to di-rectlyinfluencethecourseandcontentofthenegotiations.
2 Forexample,atapressconferencefollowinghismeetingwiththeUSPresi-dentinHelsinki(16July2018),PutinusedhisproposaltocooperateinthedenuclearisationoftheDPRKasoneoftheargumentsagainstthepolicyofisolatingRussia.HesuggestedthatthiswasoneoftheareasinwhichtheinterestsofRussiaandtheUnitedStateswereconverging.
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II. THE nuclEar dPrK and ruSSIa’S gEoPolITIcal gaInS
ReactionstothecrisisontheKoreanpeninsulain2017–18showedthatthedenuclearisationofNorthKoreaisnotoneofMoscow’sprincipal goals. The Kremlin intends to capitalise on the prob-lemofPyongyang’snuclearprogramme,treatingitasacircum-stance that brings Russia certain benefits, even though it posessomerisks.Russia’spolicytowardstheDPRK’snuclearambitionsissubordinatetoitsregionalandglobalgeopoliticalgoals,aswellasitseconomicinterests.
RussiadoesnotviewtheDPRK’spossessionofnuclearweaponsas a direct threat3. Russian experts have emphasised that theNorthKoreannuclearandmissilearsenalisnotdirectedagainstMoscow,andtheonlyriskwouldcomefromanaccidentalland-ingofamalfunctioningNorthKoreanmissileonRussianterri-tory.ItisnoteworthythatoncetheDPRKhasacquirednuclearweapons, Russia’s proposals – as formulated alongside its de-claredsupportforfulldenuclearisation–de facto pointtowardsthe ‘legalisation’ of North Korea’s nuclear status. This wouldbetheresult ifWashingtonweretoacceptRussia’sproposaltoabandon sanctions (or at least reduce them), and to revive theSix-PartyTalkswhichwerelaunchedin2003anddiscontinuedin20094.RussianexpertsarguethatthefulldenuclearisationofNorthKoreaisaUtopianaimbecausenoauthoritarianregime
3 “Infact,MoscowdoesnotviewtheDPRK’snuclearandmissileactivityasanimmediatemilitary-politicalthreattothesecurityoftheRussianFedera-tion,”wrotetheauthorsofareportpublishedbytheprestigiousMoscow-basedInstituteofWorldEconomyandInternationalRelations(IMEMO)oftheRussianAcademyofSciencesin2018.В.Михеев,А.Федоровский(ed.),Кризис и новая повестка дня для Корейского полуострова и региональных держав,IMEMORAN,Moscow2018,p.56.SeealsothestatementbySer-geyRyabkov,Russia’sdeputyforeignminister,inreactiontoNorthKorea’snucleartestsinSeptember2017,Говорить о возникновении ядерной угрозы России со стороны КНДР нельзя,TASS,4September2017.
4 This includes the DPRK, South Korea, the United States, China, RussiaandJapan.
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wouldunilaterallygiveupthesecurityguaranteesprovidedbyitspossessionofnuclearweapons.
Atthesametime,Russiaistryingtousethenuclearissuetopur-sueitsgeopoliticalinterestsintheregion.AccordingtoRussiandiplomats, one of the prerequisites for the denuclearisation oftheDPRKinvolvescreatingaregionalsecuritysysteminNorth-EastAsia.Backin2007,RussiahadinitiateddiscussionsonsuchasystemintheframeworkoftheSix-PartyTalks,andassumedthe chairmanship of a working group appointed to devise themechanisms and principles of this system. Moscow proposesthatthissystemshouldbebasedontheprinciplesof‘indivisibil-ityofsecurity’anda‘non-blocnature’,whichinconcretetermsmeansthedissolutionorweakeningoftheUS’smilitaryallianc-es in the region, and Russia gaining a right of veto in regionalsecuritymatters.
Moscow’sintentiontocapitaliseontheproblemofNorthKorea’snuclearambitionsisreflectedinthedualnatureofRussianpolicy.On the one hand, the Kremlin condemns the North Korean nu-clearprogrammeandtheDPRK’swithdrawalfromtheTreatyontheNon-ProliferationofNuclearWeapons,andhasdeclaredthatits aim is the full and verifiable denuclearisation of the Koreanpeninsula.Ontheother,Russiandiplomatsandexpertshavecon-sistentlydownplayedtheNorthKoreannuclearandmissilepro-grammesincethe1990s5.TheyhavealsoaccusedWashingtonofexaggeratingthethreatposedbythisprogrammeinordertojus-tifytheexpansionofitsmilitarypresenceinNorth-EastAsiaandincreasepressureontheNorthKoreanregime.TheconvictioninMoscowhasbeenthatthattheUnitedStatesisusingtheissueofdefendingthenon-proliferationregimeasa‘smokescreen’tocon-cealthetrueaimofitspolicy.Allegedly,thisaimisto“extendits
5 A sceptical assessment of North Korea’s achievements is also evident inrecentanalysesbyRussianexperts,seeС.Лузянин,ЧжаоХуашэн(ed.),Российско-китайский диалог: модель 2018,RSMD2018,p.27;Кризисиноваяповестка…,op. cit.,p.32.
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controlovertheentireKoreanpeninsula(…),therebyachievinga radical shift in the military and strategic balance of power inNorth-EastAsia”6.RussiahasemphasisedthattheDPRK’sdrivetoobtainnuclearweaponswasanaturalconsequenceofthethreatposed to Pyongyang by the US, which refuses to recognise theNorthKoreanregimeandnormaliseitsrelationswithit.Hence,RussiahassupportedNorthKorea’sdemandsfor ‘securityguar-antees’fromWashingtonasasine qua nonoftheeventualdenu-clearisationoftheDPRK.MoscowhasconsistentlystatedthatanynegotiationsovertheDPRK’snuclearissueshouldproceedwith-out using any military or economic pressure (sanctions). It hasalso supported North Korea’s demands for economic compensa-tionfromWesternstatesforsuspendingorgivingupitsnuclearprogramme.
The most telling element of Moscow’s Korean policy was thenegative position that Russian diplomacy had maintained untilautumn 2017 towards the US’s initiatives (which were usuallysupportedbyotherWesternpowers, JapanandSouthKorea)onthe UN Security Council to impose economic sanctions againstthe DPRK; Russia either blocked them or insisted on their non-obligatorynature.Bydoingso,RussiaprotectedtheDPRKagainsttheeconomiccostsofitsnuclearandmissilepolicy.ConsideringthatMoscowhasrepeatedlyresortedtosuchsanctionsinordertoputpressureonitsforeignpartners(forexample,theembargoonMoldovanwineimposedin2006,thelimitationsontheimportofgoodsfromUkraineintroducedinsummer2013,andtheeconom-icsanctionsagainstTurkeyimposedinautumn2016),itisdifficulttobelievethatRussia’sresistancetotheuseofsanctionsagainstthe DPRKis rooted in a belief about thegreater effectiveness ofgentle persuasion and incentives as opposed to sanctions. How-ever,forimage-relatedreasons,Russiacannotopenlyadmitthat
6 А.Жебин,‘Корейскийконандрум’,Проблемы Дальнего Востока2/2018,p.48.TheauthorisadirectoroftheKoreanStudiesCentreattheFarEastInstituteoftheRussianAcademyofSciences.
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itsobjectiontotheDPRK’snuclearprogrammeispurelydeclara-tiveandthatitisinpracticereadytotolerateit.Inthiscontext,Moscow’s ambivalent attitude to the nuclear non-proliferationregimeisalsorelevant.Ontheonehand,Russiaisinterestedinmaintainingthebanontheexpansionofthenuclearstatesclub,whileontheother,itisinclinedtodrawgeopoliticaladvantagesfromtheDPRKandIranviolatingthatsameban.
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III. ruSSIa’S ‘Two KorEaS PolIcy’
Russia’spolicyofmaintaininganddevelopinggoodrelationswithbothKoreanstatesdatesbacktothesecondhalfofthe1990s.ItwasinitiatedbythethenforeignministerYevgeniPrimakov,whobe-lievedthatRussia’sexclusivefocusonrelationswithSouthKoreaandthede factofreezeofitsrelationswiththeDPRK(whichwasthecasein1992–95),contributedtoitsmarginalisationinthere-gionandtheweakeningofRussia’spositionvis-à-visSouthKorea,andwasasignofRussianacceptanceofbeingtheUnitedStates’‘junior partner’. The attempts to rebuild Russia’s relations withthe DPRK which Primakov initiated were revived by PresidentPutin shortly after he assumed office. In February 2000, RussiasignedanewfriendshiptreatywiththeDPRKtoreplacethenow-invalidtreatysignedinSoviettimes,andinJuly2000VladimirPutinwasthefirstRussianpresidenttovisitPyongyang.
The ostentatious rapprochement with North Korea (after the firstmeeting,PutinmetNorthKoreanleaderKimJong-iltwicemore, in2001 and 2002) was mainly intended to improve Russia’s image inWashington and Seoul as a state whose close relations with Pyong-yangallowedittoactasanintermediarybetweentheDPRKandtheUS.Asashort-termgoal,PutintriedtousehisfirstmeetingwiththeNorthKoreanleadertostrengthenhispositionaheadoftheG8sum-mitinOkinawa(themeetinginPyongyangwasarrangedasastopovervisitonPresidentPutin’swaytothesummit),anduseitasanargu-mentagainsttheplantobuildamissiledefenceshieldannouncedbythenewUSadministration7.DuringameetinginVladivostokinAu-gust2002,forthefirsttimeRussiaannounceditsreadinesstobuildatransitrailwayconnectioncrossingtheterritoryoftheDPRKtolinkthe Trans-Siberian Railway and the port of Busan in South Korea8.
7 PutinclaimstohavereceivedapromisefromKimJong-ilregardingNorthKo-rea’swithdrawalfromitsballisticmissileprogramme,undercertainconditions.
8 OfficialpressreleaseontheKremlin’swebsite,23August2002,http://krem-lin.ru/events/president/news/27326
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Duringthesemeetings,theresumptionanddevelopmentofeco-nomiccooperationwasannounced,althoughtheintensityofeco-nomicrelationsbetweenRussiaandNorthKorearemainedverylow. Although their mutual trade turnover doubled in 2001–5,toreachUS$233million(whichwasapeakfigureinpost-Soviettimes),from2006itfelltoamereUS$49millionin2009,stabi-lisingatthelevelofaroundUS$100millionin2011–149.Thebar-riersincludedtheDPRK’sunpaiddebt(incurredbackinSoviettimes),aswellasNorthKorea’schronicshortageofconvertiblecurrencies. The only major Russian economic investment inthe DPRK was the construction of a terminal at the Rajin PortwortharoundUS$300million,carriedoutbyRussianRailways(RZhD)in2008–14.Thiswascombinedwiththemodernisationofa54-kilometre longstretchofrailway lineconnectingRajinand the Khasan railway station located on the Russian-NorthKoreanborder10.
Atthebeginningofthisdecade,MoscowmadeanotherattempttoreviveitseconomiccooperationwiththeDPRK.Aboveall,in2012itagreedtoresolvetheproblemofNorthKorea’sdebttotheUSSRof around US$11 billion. Russia remitted 90% of this debt andsplit the remaining US$1.09 billion into instalments to be paidovertwentyyears.Thesumsrepaidweretobespentonfinanc-ingjointinvestmentsinthefieldofhumanitarianandenergyco-operation11.AnothermethodofdevelopingeconomiccooperationinvolvedallowingworkersfromtheDPRKtofindemploymentinRussia.TherelevantagreementbetweenRussiaandNorthKoreawassignedin2007andcameintoeffect inDecember200912. In2010–15,thenumberofpermitsissuedbyRussiatoworkersfrom
9 L.Zakharova,‘EconomicCooperationbetweenRussiaandNorthKorea:Newgoalsandnewapproaches’,Journal of Eurasian Studies7(2016),figure1,p.156.
10 L.Zakharova,ibidem,p.157.11 RussiaratifiedthisagreementinMay2014.12 Т.Троякова,‘РабочаясилаизКНДРнароссийскомДальномВостоке:
историяисовременность’,Ойкумена,2017,no.2,p.186.
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NorthKoreadoubled,from21,000toover40,00013.Moreover,in2014,after three years’pause,meetingsof the Intergovernmen-tal Commission on Trade, Economic, Scientific and TechnicalCooperation were resumed, the Russian-North Korean BusinessCouncil was established, and Russian and North Korean banksopened mutual correspondent accounts to enable transactionsinroubles14.Allthesemeasuresfailedtobringanymajorresults.The big tri-partite investment projects (Russia–North Korea–SouthKorea)whichRussiahasproposedsincethebeginningofthiscenturyhaveremainedintherealmofdeclarations,andin2016–17tradeexchangebetweenRussiaandtheDPRKfellagain(toaroundUS$70millionannually)15.
RussiamaintainscontactswiththeDPRKinthefieldofmilitaryandmilitary-technicalcooperation,albeit inadiscretemanner;verylittleinformationonthisissueispubliclyavailable.Accord-ing to official sources, the most recent contracts for the supplyof Russian-made military equipment were signed in 200116. TheDPRK’smilitaryismainlyequippedwithSoviet-madeequipment,whichiswhyRussiahascontinuedtoserviceitandprovidespareparts.Russia’sdefenceministerSergeiShoigurevealedthat“sev-eral” agreements had been signed in this field, while announc-ingthatRussiahadsuspendeditsmilitary-technicalcooperationwiththeDPRKinconnectionwiththesanctionsadoptedbytheUNSecurityCouncilinautumn2017.Accordingtoexplanations
13 L.Zakharova,‘EconomicCooperationbetweenRussiaandNorthKorea:Newgoalsandnewapproaches’,op. cit.,p.158–159.
14 TheCommissionmetagainin2015;thentherewasapauseoftwoyears,andanothermeetingwasheldinMarch2018.L.Zakharova,‘Russia-NorthKoreaEconomicRelations’inJoint U.S.-Korea Academic Studies27(2016),p.213,216;http://tass.ru/ekonomika/5054861
15 Торговля между Россией и КНДР (Северной Кореей) в 2017 г.,15February2018,http://russian-trade.com/reports-and-reviews/2018-02/torgovlya-mezhdu-rossiey-i-kndr-severnoy-koreey-v-2017-g/
16 Thiswasacontractforthesupplyofarmouredvehicles;В.Волощак,Военно-техническое сотрудничество Российской Федерации и Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики с 1991 г., http://militaryrussia.ru/forum/download/file.php?id=1068
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providedbyAleksandrMatsegora,Russia’sambassadortoPyong-yang, these agreements cover the post-warranty servicing ofSoviet-andRussian-mademilitaryequipment17.
In November 2015, Russia signed an agreement with the DPRKonpreventingdangerousmilitaryactivities18,pursuanttowhicha joint military committee was established. The committee isscheduledtoholdmeetingsatleastonceayear;itsfirstmeetingwas held in December 2017 in Pyongyang19. By establishing thiscommittee,RussiahascreatedadirectchannelofcommunicationwithNorthKorea’sarmedforces(theagreementcontainsdetailedprovisionsregardingtheproceduresofestablishingdirectradiocontactbetweenrepresentativesofbothcountries’armedforces).
IncontrasttothestagnationinRussia’seconomicrelationswiththeDPRK,itseconomiccooperationwithSouthKoreahasflour-ishedthiscentury. Overfifteenyears(2000–14), tradeturnoverrosefromUS$2.8billiontoUS$25.8billion(withatemporaryde-clinein2009fromUS$18billiontoUS$10billionduetotheglobaleconomiccrisis).Althoughitdeclinedagainin2015–16,thistimetoUS$13billion,in2017itreachedUS$19billion.SouthKoreancom-panieshavecarriedoutintensiveinvestmentactivitiesinRussia,inparticularin2006–9,andattheendof2016theirinvestmentswere worth US$2.5 billion. South Korea has become Russia’ssixthbiggesttradepartnerintermsoftradevolume(outsidetheCISarea).However,takingintoaccountSouthKorea’seconomic
17 Александр Мацегора: любое сотрудничество с КНДР сейчас упи ра ется в санкции,RIANovosti,18July2018,https://ria.ru/20180718/1524836372.html
18 Соглашение между Правительством Российской Федерации и Прави тель-ством Корейской Народно-Демократической Республики о предотвращении опасной военной деятельности,http://www.mid.ru/foreign_policy/inter-national_contracts/2_contract/-/storage-viewer/bilateral/page-20/43776
19 See the press release published by the Embassy of the Russian Federa-tion in Pyongyang, http://www.rusembdprk.ru/ru/posolstvo/novosti-posolstva/601-delegatsiya-ministerstva-oborony-rossii-v-kndr
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Figure 1. Trade turnover between Russia and South Korea, 2000–16
0
5000
10000
15000
20000
25000
30000
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016
[US$ millions]
exports to Russia
imports from Russia
turnover
Source:ЛиЧжэЁн,‘Новая«Севернаяполитика»икорейско-российскоесотрудничество’,Валдайские записки,No76,Октябрь2017,p.6(basedondatafromKITA).
Figure 2. South Korean investments in Russia
amount invested
0
50 000
100 000
150 000
200 000
250 000
300 000
350 000
400 000
450 000 [US$ thousands]
2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 2014 2016Source:ЛиЧжэЁн,‘Новая«Севернаяполитика»икорейско-российскоесотрудничество’,Валдайские записки,No76,Октябрь2017,p.7(basedondatafromKEXIM).
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potential20 and the major investment projects announced duringsuccessivemeetingsbetweentop-rankingpoliticians(inparticularduringPresidentPutin’svisittoSeoulin2013),theresultsofthiscooperationhavenotbeenveryimpressive.Thishastriggered“dis-appointmentanddistrustonthepartofSouthKorea”21.Atpresent,economiccooperationwithRussiaisofminorsignificancetoSouthKorea:Russia’sshareinSouthKoreanexportsisamere1.2%,and2.5%in its imports22.Evenasasupplieroffuel,RussiahasfailedtoachieveanysignificantpositionontheKoreanmarket; forex-amplein2017theimportofRussianoilandliquefiedgasaccountedforamere5%ofSouthKorea’simportofthesecommodities23.Co-operationintheship-buildingindustryisofsomesignificance,al-thoughduetothesizeoftheSouthKoreanship-buildingsectorthisis rather limited24. South Korean companies (Daewoo, Samsung,STX)holdade factomonopolyonthesupplyofshipstransportingliquefiedgasfortheRussianstate-controlledship-owningcompa-nyRoskomflot(elevenshipswerelaunchedin2007–15,andanother
20 Russia’sshareinSouthKorea’sforeigntradeislessthan2%,andtheshareofSouthKoreaninvestmentinRussiaislessthan2%ofitsforeigninvest-ments.ЛиЧжеЁн,‘Новая„Севернаяполитика”икорейско-российскоесотрудничество’, Валдайские записки,October2017,no.76,p.6–7;http://ru.valdaiclub.com/files/22115/
21 Ibidem.22 Data for 2017. The author’s own calculation, based on data available on
the official websites of South Korea’s customs service, http://www.cus-toms.go.kr/kcshome/trade/TradeCountryList.do?layoutMenuNo=21031,http://english.motie.go.kr/en/if/tb/trade/tradeList.do
23 Calculated based on data after Оперативные данные по статистке внешней торговли Российской Федерации за 2017 г.,p.1,Tab.3,p.6,Tab.7,p.10;Оперативные данные по статистике внешней торговли Российской Федерации за I-II кв. 2018 года,p.1,chart3,p.7,chart8,p.12,availableonthewebsiteoftheMinistryofEconomicDevelopmentoftheRussianFederation,http://www.ved.gov.ru/exportcountries/kr/analytic_kr/?analytic=26
24 In2007–15,theannualvalueofexportgeneratedbytheKoreanshipbuildingsectorwasUS$27–57billion,US$39billiononaverage.Korea in Global Value Chains: Pathways for Industrial Transformation (Joint Project between GVCC and KIET),chapter4,figure16,p.42,https://gvcc.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/Duke_KIET_Korea_and_the_Shipbuilding_GVC_CH_4.pdf
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willbelaunchedin2020)25.TheSouthKoreancompanyHyundaiisinvolvedintheconstructionofafloatingLNGterminalforKa-liningrad26.SeveralSouthKoreancompanieshaveestablishedjointventureswithRussiancompaniesintheship-buildingsectorintheFarEast,withtheaimofbuildingtankersandicebreakersoncom-missionfromRussiancompaniesoperatingintheoilandgassectorandfromtheRussianstate27.
InthecontextofthedevelopmentofeconomicrelationswithSouthKorea,MoscowhasopenlydeclaredthatitdoesnotintendtoallowSeoultoexploitthesetiestoexertpressureonRussia’spolicytowardstheDPRK28.DespiterepeateddeclarationsduringthepresidenciesofLee Myung-bak (2008–13) and ParkGeun-hye (2013–17), the SouthKoreansidehasattemptedtouseeconomiccooperationasa‘carrot’topersuadeRussiatoputpressureontheDPRK,buttonoavail.
25 Roskomf lot’s official website: http://sovcomf lot.ru/en/f leet/f leetlist/item388.html
26 Котел – регазификатор на строящемся в Южной Корее для Кали нинградской области плавучем СПГ-терминале (FSRU) Маршал Васи левский при испытаниях поврежден. За чей счет будет замена?,16May2018,https://neftegaz.ru/news/view/171507-Kotel-regazifikator-na-stroyaschemsya-v-Yuzhnoy-Koree-dlya-Kaliningradskoy-oblasti-plavuchem-SPG-terminale-FSRU-Marshal-Vasilevskiy-pri-ispytaniyah-povrezhden.-Za-chey-schet-budet-zamena
27 X.Zeng,South Korean shipbuilders sign JV agreements with Russian peers,12Sep-tember 2017, https://fairplay.ihs.com/ship-construction/article/4291516/south-korean-shipbuilders-sign-jv-agreements-with-russian-peers; Ini-tially,theagreementcoveredupto29vessels(tankers,icebreakers),butthestatusoftheseordersisunclear.‘РФзаказалауЮжнойКореистрои-тельство29судов,включая15танкеров-ледоколов’,TASS,16July2018,https://tass.ru/vef-2018/articles/5376871
28 AtthispointitisworthmentioninganarticlepublishedbyRussiandiplomatsin2005,inwhichtheywarnedSeoulnottoyieldto“romanticexpectations”inconnectionwiththedevelopmentofeconomiccooperationwithRussia,andemphasisedthat“itisimportantthattheauthoritiesinSeoulshouldnotdemandthatRussiashouldconstantlyputpressureontheDPRK,encouragePyongyangtomakespecificdecisionsthattheSouthKoreansidemaybeinterestedin[…]OneshouldnotintendtoachievespecificbenefitsatRus-sia’scost,tothedetrimentofitsrelationswithNorthKorea”.А.Торкунов,В.Денисов,‘Россия-Корея:взглядизпрошлоговнастоящее’,Мировая экономика и международные отношения,2005,no.1.
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Military-technical cooperation has a special place in Moscow’srelationswithSeoul.Inmilitaryaffairs,SouthKoreacooperatescloselywiththeUnitedStates.Therefore,itisaparadoxthatthisisthefieldinwhichRussiahasbecomeanimportantandseem-ingly almost irreplaceable partner. The starting point for thiscooperation,backinthesecondhalfofthe1990s,layinthesup-pliesofRussianmilitaryequipmentasrepaymentofaportionoftheSovietdebtinheritedbytheRussianFederationamountingtoUS$2.1billion29.Amajorimprovementinthequalityofthiscoop-erationbecameevidentfollowingPresidentRohMoo-hyun’svisittoMoscowinSeptember2004,whentheRussiansideagreedtorepaytheremainingportionofthedebtbyprovidingtechnologyandknow-howfortheconstructionoftheSouthKoreanKSLV-1carrierrocketandassistinginthecreationoftheKoreanspace-portknownastheNaroSpaceCenter.Officially,thiscooperationcoveredtheciviliansector,buttheexperience(andprobablyalsothetechnology)gainedduringtheprogramme’simplementationlaid the essential basis for the Korean military rocket buildingprogramme. Alongside this, Russian arms-manufacturing com-panies (Almaz-Antey and Fakel) cooperated with South Koreaon the construction and deployment of KM-SAM (Cheongung),amodernaerialandmissiledefencesystem30.
RegardlessofitsdevelopingcooperationwithbothKoreanstates,RussiaisnotinterestedinthepoliticalreunificationoftheKorean
29 ‘RussiatoSettleSovietDebtin2017’,The Moscow Times,17February2017,https://themoscowtimes.com/news/russia-to-settle-its-soviet-debts-be-end-of-2017-57193
30 Ён Сонг Хым, Россия и Республика Корея: взгляд из Сеула, March 2012,https://interaffairs.ru/jauthor/material/628; В. Самсонова, Сотру дни-чество России и Южной Кореи в области науки, техники и образования,30 September 2013, http://russiancouncil.ru/analytics-and-comments/analytics/sotrudnichestvo-rossii-i-yuzhnoy-korei-v-oblasti-nauki-tekhn/;М. Казанин, Корейские оружейники загорелись от нашего «Факела»,18April2017,https://vpk-news.ru/articles/36289;S.Roblin,South Korea is deploying its own missile shield, 12October2017,https://warisboring.com/south-korea-deploys-its-own-missile-shield/;M.Piotrowski,‘SouthKorea’sBallisticandCruiseMissiles’,PISM Bulletin 57,18April2018.
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peninsula,especiallyastheonlypossiblescenarioforsuchreuni-fication(duetothetwostates’differingpotentials)wouldbetheabsorptionoftheDPRKbySouthKorea.ThisiswhytheRussianleadership(PresidentVladimirPutinhimself,aswellasForeignMinisterSergeiLavrov),whendeclaringitssupportfortheideaofareunificationoftheKoreannationandpromisingassistancein its implementation, has at the same time formulated a num-berofconditionsthatneedtobemet,andwhichwouldmaketheprospectofreunificationde factounattainable.In2013,PresidentPutinsaidthatthereunificationprocessshouldnotonlybepeace-ful,butalsothatitshouldproceed“whiletakingintoaccounttheinterestsofboththenorthernandthesouthernpartofthepenin-sula”,andthat“nothingshouldbeforcedonthepartners”duringitsimplementation31.TherequirementtotaketheinterestsoftheNorthKoreanregimeduringtheprocessofreunificationintoac-count–asthisishowPresidentPutin’sdeclarationshouldbein-terpreted–wouldinpracticemeanblockingtheprocess.Inade-bateonahypotheticalmodelofreunificationthatRussiawouldaccept,Russianexpertsanddiplomatshavecitedotherconditionsaswell:theseincludetheneutralstatusofahypotheticallyunitedKorea (i.e. the breaking of the military alliance between SouthKoreaandtheUnitedStates),theremovalofAmericantroops,andtheadoptionbytheunifiedstateofapolicyinvolvingmaintainingequallycloserelationswiththeUnitedStates,RussiaandChina.Thereisnodoubtthattheexperienceconnectedwiththereunifi-cationofGermanyhasaffectedRussia’sattitudetowardsthepos-siblereunificationoftheKoreas.AccordingtoaleadingRussianexpert on Korean affairs, from Russia’s point of view the emer-genceofaunitedpro-AmericanKoreawouldbe“equivalenttotheemergencenearoureasternbordersofanAsiancloneofNATO”32.
31 PresidentPutin’sinterviewfortheKoreanBroadcastingSystem:Интервью южнокорейской телерадиокомпании KBS,12November2013,http://krem-lin.ru/events/president/news/19603
32 A.Zhebin,‘Russia'sVisionofRe-unifiedKorea'sPlace…’,op. cit.,p.113.
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IV. THE KorEan crISIS and ITS conSEquEncES for ruSSIan-cHInESE rElaTIonS
Theaggravationof tensionaroundtheDPRKanditsnuclear&missile programme in 2017 came as a major challenge for theKremlin, which now had to take into account that PresidentTrump would not refrain from using force against the DPRK.Anoutbreakofarmedconflictthatcouldinvolvetheuseofnu-clearweaponswouldentailaseriesofnegativeconsequencesfortheKremlin.Firstly,theconflictwouldtakeplaceonterritorythat borders Russia, which could cause economic losses due tothedisruptiontothenormaloperationoftransportationroutesintheregion.OtherconsequencesincludetheriskofamassivewaveofrefugeesfromtheDPRK,andtheriskofhumanandma-teriallossescausedbyfriendlyfire.However,moreimportantly,theAmericanmilitaryactionmightbesuccessful(andcouldre-sult intheeliminationoftheNorthKoreannuclearpotential),and–intheworst-casescenario–couldcausethecollapseoftheNorth Korean regime. A successful military campaign wouldalso significantly strengthen the position of the United States,which the Kremlin considers its main geopolitical rival andasourceofthreattotheexistenceofPutin’sregime.AcollapseoftheDPRKwouldmeaneithertheprospectofthe‘Germanvari-ant’ofthereunificationofKorea,ortheneedtocarryoutamili-taryinterventiontogetherwithChinatomaintainNorthKoreaasabufferstate33.
Ontheotherhand,asituationinwhichtheDPRKyieldedtotheUS’sdemands,combinedwiththethreatoftheuseofforce,wouldnot be favourable for the Kremlin because it would strengthenthepositionoftheUnitedStates(aswouldasuccessfulAmericanmilitaryaction).Thefurthertighteningof thesanctionsregime
33 ThisscenarioisdiscussedbyA.Lukinin‘TheNorthKoreaNuclearProblemandtheUS-China-RussiaStrategicTriangle’,Russian Analytical Digest209,24October2017.
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whichtheUSproposeswouldbeunfavourableforRussiabecause–ifitprovedsuccessful–itcouldleadtothecollapseoftheregimeinPyongyang.Moreover,itwouldstandincontrasttotheKrem-lin’sdeclaredhard-lineattitudetowardseconomicsanctionsasanunacceptablemethodofpressure.
ThecourseofthecrisissofarhasdemonstratedthatRussiadoesnothavesufficienttoolsatitsdisposaltoinfluencethedevelop-ment of events. It seems that the awareness of this fact, com-binedwiththeneedtodemonstratecloserelationswithChina(triggeredbythecrisisinMoscow’srelationswithWashington),hasencouragedtheRussianleadershiptotakeanunprecedent-ed step. This step involved formulating the initiative (togetherwithChina)oftheso-calleddoublefreeze,proposedbythetwocountries’foreignministersduringtheChinesePresidentXiJin-ping’s visit to Moscow on 4 July 2018. This boiled down to theDPRK freezing its nuclear and missile tests and a concurrentsuspension of joint American-Korean military exercises “onalargescale”34.
Another important fact is that during the UN Security CouncilsessionsinAugustandSeptember2017dedicatedtoadoptingfur-thersanctionsagainstNorthKorea(whichthistimeweretohavebeenreallypainfulfortheregime),theChinesediplomatsalleg-edlyurgedtheirRussiancolleaguesnottomakeanydelayinap-provingthem35.
ItislikelythatthecasesofRussiancompaniesviolatingthesanc-tions (the smuggling of oil, illegal imports of coal and marineproducts) which Western intelligence services have uncoveredwerecarriedoutbyMoscowwiththetacitagreementofChina.
34 For the declaration’s content, see http://www.mid.ru/ru/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/2807662
35 А.Ланьков,‘КакРоссияотноситсякновымсанкциямпротивСевернойКореи’,16January2018,www.carnegie.ru/commentary/75259
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Officially,BeijingintendedtoforceNorthKoreatomakeconces-sionsand‘punish’KimJong-unforignoringits‘advice’byadopt-ing harsh sanctions. Another intention was to demonstrate tothe US that China is ready to change its former policy of ‘pro-tecting’theDPRKtoreducetheriskofTrumpdecidingtolaunchmilitaryaction.Ontheotherhand,Chinadoesnotwanttotrig-ger the destabilisation of the regime. In this situation, Russia(whoserelationswithWashingtonhavedeterioratedandwhoseimage in theWestwasunfavourable)couldagreetodoBeijinga‘diplomaticfavour’.
In thediplomaticmanoeuvresaroundthe issueofNorthKorea,whichhavebeenongoingforayearandahalf,Moscow’srolehasclearly been less prominent than that of Beijing. The most evi-dentmanifestationofBeijing’sdominancehasbeenthefactthatthe North Korean leader Kim Jong-un has travelled to China upto three times to hold talks with China’s leader Xi Jinping. It isnoteworthythathisthirdvisitwasorganisedon19–20June,al-mostimmediatelyafterhismeetingwithTrumpinSingaporeon12June.
The North Korean leader’s readiness to consult his decisionswithBeijingstoodincontrastwithhisignoringtheattemptsbyRussiandiplomatstoarrangeameetingbetweenhimandPutinaheadoftheSingaporesummit.TheonlythingthatRussia’sfor-eignministerSergeiLavrovmanagedtoachieveduringhisvisittoPyongyangon31Maywasarathervagueprospectofameet-ing between the North Korean leader and President Putin to beheldbeforetheendof2018.Forthetimebeing,PutinhashadtomakedowithameetingwithKimYong-nam,thePresidentofthePresidium of the Supreme People’s Assembly of North Korea, inMoscowon14June.Duringthismeeting,Putinreiteratedhisinvi-tationtoKimJong-un,communicatedtotheNorthKoreanleaderbyLavrovinMay,andemphasisedtheflexibilityoftheRussiansidetoreceiveKimJong-un,eitherattheEasternEconomicForuminVladivostokorintheformulaofaspeciallyarrangedindividual
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visit36.However,theNorthKoreanleaderdidnotappearattheFo-rum,andthetimingofhisvisittoRussiaremainsunspecified37.
36 ВстречасПредседателемПрезидиумаВерховногонародногособранияКНДРКимЁнНамом,14June2018,http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/57784
37 SeestatementbyYuriUshakov,AidetothePresidentoftheRussianFedera-tionresponsibleforinternationalaffairs,Ясности с возможным визитом Ким Чен Ына на форум во Владивосток пока нет,Interfax,24July2018.
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V. THE SummIT In SIngaPorE from THE ruSSIan PErSPEcTIVE: wHaT nExT?
AlthoughRussiadidnotplayamajorpartinmakingtheAmer-ican-NorthKoreansummitmeetinghappen,Moscowwelcomedthemeeting’sresultswithevidentrelief.ForRussia,theelimina-tionoftheriskofarmedconflictwasthemostimportantresult.Official statements emphasised that the summit has set a prec-edent, and expressed optimistic expectations as to the furtherdevelopmentofthesituationaroundKorea.AccordingtoRussiandiplomats,themeetingdemonstratedthatthemainactorshavede factoadoptedtheRussian-Chineseformulaofthe‘doublefreeze’,whichwasintendedtoemphasiseRussia’scontributiontoan(atleasttemporary)containmentofthecrisis.Fortheirpart,expertsandmediacommentatorsmainlyemphasisedtheabsenceofcon-creteconclusionsinthedeclarationadoptedatthesummit.Athe-sishasalsobeenformulatedthatthemeetingwasade factosur-renderbyPresidentTrump,becausebyholdingthismeetinghelegitimisedtheNorthKoreanleaderandwelcomedhisstatementregarding his readiness to negotiate the denuclearisation of theKoreanpeninsula(ratherthantoeliminateNorthKorea’snuclearpotential).Moreover, theUSPresident haswithdrawnfrom thedemandshehadformulatedaheadofthesummittorequestthatPyongyangproduceadetailedplanfordenuclearisation.
FromtheKremlin’spointofview,themeetinghasbroughtnear-lyoptimum results.The talksbetween TrumpandKimJong-unhave reduced the risk of an American military intervention onthepeninsulatoaminimum.Atthesametime,theydidnotcre-ateanyclearprospectfortherapidresolutionoftheconflictortheeliminationofNorthKorea’snuclearpotential.Infact,theyhaveopeneduptheprospectoflaunchingaprocessoflong-lastingne-gotiationsandbargainingbetweenWashingtonandPyongyang,duringwhichMoscowmayattempttoactasanessentialinterme-diary.ItmayalsousethissituationtonormaliseitsrelationswiththeUnitedStatesandstrengthenitsbargainingpositionvis-à-vis
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Washington,aswellastogainadditionalopportunitiesfordevel-oping its economic cooperation with both Korean states, and torebuilditsimageasanindependentandessentialactorinthedip-lomaticgamearoundKorea.
RussiandiplomatshaveemphasisedthatapermanentresolutiontotheproblemofNorthKorea’snuclearpotentialrequiresmulti-lateralnegotiationsbetweenalltheinterestedparties(preferablyintheformulaofaresumptionof theSix-PartyTalks includingthe two Koreas, China, Russia, the United States and Japan). Atthesametime,RussiahaslaunchedattemptsintheUNSecurityCounciltoeasethesanctionsagainsttheDPRK38.TheKremlinhadbeenhopingthatitwouldmanagetouseitsgoodrelationswiththetwoKoreanstatestoorganiseaspectacularmeetingbetweentheleadersofthetwoKoreasattheEasternEconomicForuminVladivostokinSeptember201839.TheseattemptsultimatelyfailedbecausethetwoKoreanleadersdeclinedRussia’s invitationandorganisedasummitmeetingthemselves,therebydemonstratingthattheyhadnoneedofRussia’smediation40.
The 2017–18 crisis has mainly demonstrated how Russia’s policyof capitalising on regional tensions and North Korea’s nuclearambitionstoengageingeopoliticalrivalrywiththeUnitedStateshas led to Russia becoming Beijing’s ‘junior partner’ in the Ko-reanissue. IntheNorth-EastAsiancontext,Russia’sstrategyofstrengtheningMoscow’sbargainingpositionbynurturingitsre-lationswithastatethatisattemptingtoobtainnuclearweaponsandisinconflictwiththeUnitedStates(asimilarstrategytothatwhichitusedtowardsIran)hasprovedcounter-productive,and
38 Россия допустила возможность поднятия вопроса о санкциях против КНДР в ООН,RIANovosti,18July2018;‘РФвыступаетзапостепенноесмягчениесанкцийпротивКНДР’,RIANovosti,26July2018.
39 М. Коростиков, Юг и Север Кореи ждут во Владивостоке, 30 July 2018,https://www.kommersant.ru/doc/3700528
40 StatementbyYuriUshakov,AidetothePresidentoftheRussianFederationresponsibleforinternationalaffairs,Interfax,20August2018.
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hascontributedtoRussia’srelativemarginalisation.There isnoindicationthatMoscowisreadytofundamentallyrevisetheas-sumptions of its foreign policy; it should therefore be expectedthatitsfurtheractionswillfocusonposingasan‘essential’par-ticipant in the geopolitical game that is ongoing around Korea,andatthesametimeonthecontinuedandunavoidable‘coordina-tion’ofRussia’spolicywiththatofBeijing.
Witold RodkieWicz
