COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR POLITICAL LAW (2014-2015)

8/9/2019 COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR POLITICAL LAW (2014-2015)

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COMPIL TION OF SUPREME COURT DECISIONS

(MARCH 2014-MARCH 2015)

Prepared by : ATTY. RESCI ANGELLI RIZADA, RNAteneo de Davao University

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POLITICAL LAW

• G.R. No. 171496. March 3, 2014 Republic of

the Philippines, represented by theDepartment of Public Works and Highways

(DPWH) Vs. Ortigas and Company LimitedPartnership

• Owners whose properties weretaken for public use are entitledto just compensation.

Appeals from the Regional Trial Courtto the Court of Appeals under Rule 41must raise both questions of fact andlaw

Section 2 of Rule 50 of the Rules of Court

provides that appeals taken from theRegional Trial Court to the Court ofAppeals raising only pure questions of laware not reviewable by the Court ofAppeals. In which case, the appeal shallnot be transferred to the appropriatecourt. Instead, it shall be dismissedoutright.

Appeals from the decisions of the RegionalTrial Court, raising purely questions of lawmust, in all cases, be taken to theSupreme Court on a petition for review oncertiorari in accordance with Rule 45. Anappeal by notice of appeal from thedecision of the Regional Trial Court in theexercise of its original jurisdiction to theCourt of Appeals is proper if the appellantraises questions of fact or both questionsof fact and questions of law.

There is a question of law when theappellant raises an issue as to what lawshall be applied on a given set of facts.Questions of law do “not involve an

examination of the probative value of theevidence presented.” Its resolution restssolely on the application of a law given thecircumstances. There is a question of factwhen the court is required to examine thetruth or falsity of the facts presented. Aquestion of fact “invites a review of theevidence.”

The sole issue raised by petitioner

Republic of the Philippines to the Court ofAppeals is whether respondent Ortigasproperty should be conveyed to it only bydonation, in accordance with Section 50 ofPresidential Decree No. 1529. This

question involves the interpretation andapplication of the provision. It does notrequire the Court of Appeals to examinethe truth or falsity of the facts presented.Neither does it invite a review of theevidence. The issue raised before theCourt of Appeals was, therefore, aquestion purely of law. The proper modeof appeal is through a petition for reviewunder Rule 45. Hence, the Court ofAppeals did not err in dismissing theappeal on this ground.

In other words, what Section 1 of Rule 41prohibits is an appeal taken from aninterlocutory order. An interlocutory orderor judgment, unlike a final order or judgment, does “not completely dispose othe case [because it leaves to the court]something else to be decided upon.”Appeals from interlocutory orders aregenerally prohibited to prevent delay inthe administration of justice and toprevent “undue burden upon the courts.”

Orders denying motions forreconsideration are not alwaysinterlocutory orders. A motion forreconsideration may be considered a finadecision, subject to an appeal, if “it putsan end to a particular matter,” leaving thecourt with nothing else to do but toexecute the decision.

The trial court’s order denying petitionerRepublic of the Philippines’ motion forreconsideration of the decision grantingrespondent Ortigas the authority to sell itsproperty to the government was not aninterlocutory order because it completelydisposed of a particular matter. An appeafrom it would not cause delay in theadministration of justice. PetitionerRepublic of the Philippines’ appeal to theCourt of Appeals, however, was properlydismissed because the former used thewrong mode of appeal.

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Section 50 of Presidential Decree No.1529 does not apply in a case that isthe proper subject of an expropriationproceeding

Respondent Ortigas may sell its propertyto the government. It must becompensated because its property wastaken and utilized for public roadpurposes.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippinesinsists that the subject property may notbe conveyed to the government throughmodes other than by donation. It relies onSection 50 of the Property RegistrationDecree, which provides that delineatedboundaries, streets, passageways, andwaterways of a subdivided land may notbe closed or disposed of by the ownerexcept by donation to the government.

Petitioner Republic of the Philippines’reliance on Section 50 of the PropertyRegistration Decree is erroneous. Section50 contemplates roads and streets in asubdivided property, not publicthoroughfares built on a private propertythat was taken from an owner for publicpurpose. A public thoroughfare is not a

subdivision road or street.

More importantly, when there is taking ofprivate property for some public purpose,the owner of the property taken is entitledto be compensated.

There is taking when the followingelements are present:

1. The government must enter theprivate property;

2.

The entrance into the privateproperty must be indefinite or

permanent;

3. There is color of legal authority inthe entry into the property;

4. The property is devoted to publicuse or purpose;

5. The use of property for public use

removed from the owner all

beneficial enjoyment of theproperty.

All of the above elements are present inthis case. Petitioner Republic of thePhilippines’ construction of a road — apermanent structure — on respondentOrtigas’ property for the use of thegeneral public is an obvious permanententry on petitioner Republic of thePhilippines’ part. Given that the road wasconstructed for general public use stampsit with public character, and coursing theentry through the Department of PublicWorks and Highways gives it a color oflegal authority.

As a result of petitioner Republic of thePhilippines’ entry, respondent Ortigas maynot enjoy the property as it did before. Itmay not anymore use the property forwhatever legal purpose it may desireNeither may it occupy, sell, lease, andreceive its proceeds. It cannot anymoreprevent other persons from entering orusing the property. In other words,respondent Ortigas was effectivelydeprived of all the bundle of rights from

entering or using the property. In otherwords, respondent Ortigas was effectivelydeprived of all the bundle of rights

It is true that the lot reserved for roadwidening, together with five other lots,formed part of a bigger property before itwas subdivided. However, this does notmean that all lots delineated as roads andstreets form part of subdivision roads andstreets that are subject to Section 50 ofthe Property Registration DecreeSubdivision roads and streets areconstructed primarily for the benefit of theowners of the surrounding propertiesThey are, thus, constructed primarily forprivate use — as opposed to delineatedroad lots taken at the instance of thegovernment for the use and benefit of thegeneral public.

In this case, the lot was reserved for road


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widening at the instance of petitionerRepublic of the Philippines. While the lotsegregated for road widening used to bepart of the subdivided lots, the intentionto separate it from the delineated

subdivision streets was obvious from thefact that it was located at the fringes ofthe original lot — exactly at petitionerRepublic of the Philippines’ intendedlocation for the road widening project.Moreover, petitioner Republic of thePhilippines’ intention to take the propertyfor public use was obvious from thecompletion of the road widening for the C-5 flyover project and from the fact thatthe general public was already takingadvantage of the thoroughfare.

Delineated roads and streets, whetherpart of a subdivision or segregated forpublic use, remain private and will remainas such until conveyed to the governmentby donation or through expropriationproceedings. An owner may not be forcedto donate his or her property even if it hasbeen delineated as road lots because thatwould partake of an illegal taking. He orshe may even choose to retain saidproperties. If he or she chooses to retainthem, however, he or she also retains the

burden of maintaining them and payingfor real estate taxes.

An owner of a subdivision street whichwas not taken by the government forpublic use would retain such burden evenif he or she would no longer derive anycommercial value from said street. Toremedy such burden, he or she may opt todonate it to the government. In such case,however, the owner may not force thegovernment to purchase the property.That would be tantamount to allowing the

government to take private property tobenefit private individuals. This is notallowed under the Constitution, whichrequires that taking must be for publicuse.

Further, since the Constitution proscribestaking of private property without justcompensation, any taking must entail a

corresponding appropriation for thatpurpose. Public funds, however, may onlybe appropriated for public purposeEmployment of public funds to benefit aprivate individual constitutes

malversation.

Therefore, private subdivision streets nottaken for public use may only be donatedto the government.

In contrast, when the road or street wasdelineated upon government request andtaken for public use, as in this case, thegovernment has no choice but tocompensate the owner for his or hersacrifice, lest it violates the constitutionaprovision against taking without justcompensation

Respondent Ortigas, immediately upon thegovernment’s suggestion that it needed aportion of its property for road purposeswent so far as to go through the processof annotating on its own title that theproperty was reserved for road purposesWithout question, respondent Ortigasallowed the government to construct theroad and occupy the property when itcould have compelled the government to

resort to expropriation proceedings andensure that it would be compensatedNow, the property is being utilized, not forthe benefit of respondent Ortigas as aprivate entity but by the publicRespondent Ortigas remainsuncompensated. Instead of acknowledgingrespondent Ortigas’ obliging attitudehowever, petitioner Republic of thePhilippines refuses to pay, telling insteadthat the property must be given to it at nocost. This is unfair.

Title to the subject lot remains underrespondent Ortigas’ name. Thegovernment is already in possession of theproperty but is yet to acquire title to it. Tolegitimize such possession, petitionerRepublic of the Philippines must acquirethe property from respondent Ortigas byinstituting expropriation proceedings orthrough negotiated sale, which has


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already been recognized in law as a modeof government acquisition of privateproperty for public purpose.

Taking of private property without just

compensation is a violation of a person'sproperty right. In situations where thegovernment does not take the trouble ofinitiating an expropriation proceeding, theprivate owner has the option to compelpayment of the property taken, when justified. The trial court should continue toproceed with this case to determine justcompensation in accordance with law.

• G.R. No. 190837. March 5, 2014 Republic of

the Philippines rep. by the Bureau of Foodand Drugs (BFAD) now Food and DrugsAdministration Vs. Drugmaker'sLaboratories, Inc. and Terramedic, Inc.

• The primordial issue in this case iswhether or not the FDA mayvalidly issue and implementCircular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997.In resolving this issue, there is a

need to determine whether or notthe aforesaid circulars partake ofadministrative rules andregulations and, as such, mustcomply with the requirements ofthe law for its issuance.

The FDA contends that it has the authorityto issue Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 asit is the agency mandated by law to

administer and enforce aws, includingrules and regulations issued by the DOHthat pertain to the registration ofpharmaceutical products.

For their part, respondents maintain thatunder RA 3720, the power to make rulesto implement the law is lodged with theSecretary of Health, not with the FDA.

They also argue that the assailed circularsare void for lack of prior hearing,consultation, and publication.

Administrative agencies may exercisequasi-legislative or rule-making powersonly if there exists a law which delegatesthese powers to them. Accordingly, therules so promulgated must be within theconfines of the granting statute and mustinvolve no discretion as to what the lawshall be, but merely the authority to fixthe details in the execution orenforcement of the policy set out in thelaw itself, so as to conform with thedoctrine of separation of powers and, asan adjunct, the doctrine of non-delegability of legislative power.

An administrative regulation may be

classified as a legislative rule, aninterpretative rule, or a contingent ruleLegislative rules are in the nature ofsubordinate legislation and designed toimplement a primary legislation byproviding the details thereof. They usuallyimplement existing law, imposing general,extra-statutory obligations pursuant toauthority properly delegated by Congressand effect a change in existing law orpolicy which affects individual rights andobligations.

Meanwhile, interpretative rules areintended to interpret, clarify or explainexisting statutory regulations under whichthe administrative body operates. Theirpurpose or objective is merely to construethe statute being administered andpurport to do no more than interpret thestatute. Simply, they try to say what thestatute means and refer to no single



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person or party in particular but concernall those belonging to the same classwhich may be covered by the said rules.

Finally, contingent rules are those

issued by an administrative authoritybased on the existence of certain facts orthings upon which the enforcement of thelaw depends.

In general, an administrative regulationneeds to comply with the requirementslaid down by Executive Order No. 292, s.1987, otherwise known as the “Administrative Code of 1987,” on priornotice, hearing, and publication in order tobe valid and binding, except when thesame is merely an interpretative rule. Thisis because “[w]hen an administrative ruleis merely interpretative in nature, itsapplicability needs nothing further than itsbare issuance, for it gives no realconsequence more than what the law itselfhas already prescribed. When, on theother hand, the administrative rule goesbeyond merely providing for the meansthat can facilitate or render leastcumbersome the implementation of thelaw but substantially increases the burdenof those governed, it behooves the agency

to accord at least to those directly affecteda chance to be heard, and thereafter to beduly informed, before that new issuance isgiven the force and effect of law.”

In the case at bar, it is undisputed that RA3720, as amended by Executive Order No.175, s. 1987 prohibits, inter alia, themanufacture and sale of pharmaceuticalproducts without obtaining the proper CPRfrom the FDA. In this regard, the FDA hasbeen deputized by the same law to acceptapplications for registration ofpharmaceuticals and, after due course,grant or reject such applications. To thisend, the said law expressly authorized theSecretary of Health, upon therecommendation of the FDA Director, toissue rules and regulations that pertain tothe registration of pharmaceuticalproducts.

A careful scrutiny of the foregoingissuances would reveal that AO 67, s1989 is actually the rule that originallyintroduced the BA/BE testing requirementas a component of applications for the

issuance of CPRs covering certainpharmaceutical products. As such, it isconsidered an administrative regulation –a legislative rule to be exact – issued bythe Secretary of Health in consonancewith the express authority granted to himby RA 3720 to implement the statutorymandate that all drugs and devices shouldfirst be registered with the FDA prior totheir manufacture and sale. Consideringthat neither party contested the validity ofits issuance, the Court deems that AO 67,s. 1989 complied with the requirements of

prior hearing, notice, and publicationpursuant to the presumption of regularityaccorded to the government in theexercise of its official duties.

On the other hand, Circular Nos. 1 and 8,s. 1997 cannot be considered asadministrative regulations because theydo not: (a) implement a primarylegislation by providing the detailsthereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explainexisting statutory regulations under which

the FDA operates; and/or (c ) ascertain theexistence of certain facts or things uponwhich the enforcement of RA 3720depends. In fact, the only purpose ofthese circulars is for the FDA to administerand supervise the implementation of theprovisions of AO 67, s. 1989, includingthose covering the BA/BE testingrequirement, consistent with and pursuantto RA 3720.

Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authorityto issue the said circulars and since they

would not affect the substantive rights ofthe parties that they seek to govern – asthey are not, strictly speaking,administrative regulations in the first place– no prior hearing, consultation, andpublication are needed for their validity.

In sum, the Court holds that Circular Nos1 and 8, s. 1997 are valid issuances and


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binding to all concerned parties, includingthe respondents in this case.

• G.R. No. 204869. March 11, 2014 Technical

Education and Skills DevelopmentAuthority (TESDA) Concurring and

Dissenting Opinion

J. Brion • The Constitution vests COA, as

guardian of public funds, withenough latitude to determine,prevent and disallow irregular,unnecessary, excessive,extravagant or unconscionableexpenditures of government funds.

The COA is generally accorded completediscretion in the exercise of itsconstitutional duty and the Court generallysustains its decisions in recognition of itsexpertise in the laws it is entrusted toenforce.

We do not find any grave abuse ofdiscretion when COA disallowed thedisbursement of EME to TESDA officials forbeing excessive and unauthorized by law

The GAA provisions are clear that theEME shall not exceed the amountsfixed in the GAA. The GAA provisionsare also clear that only the officials

named in the GAA, the officers ofequivalent rank as may be authorizedby the DBM, and the offices underthem are entitled to claim EME notexceeding the amount provided in theGAA.

The COA faithfully implemented the GAAprovisions. COA Circular No. 2012-001states that the amount fixed under theGAA for the National Government officesand officials shall be the ceiling in the

disbursement of EME. COA Circular No.89-300, prescribing the guidelines in thedisbursement of EME, likewise states thatthe amount fixed by the GAA shall be thebasis for the control in the disbursementof these funds.

The COA merely complied with itsmandate when it disallowed the EME thatwere reimbursed to officers who were not

entitled to the EME, or who received EMEin excess of the allowable amount. Whenthe law is clear, plain and free fromambiguity, there should be no room forinterpretation but only its application.

However, TESDA insists on itsinterpretation justifying its payment ofEME out of the TESDP Fund. It argues thatthe 2004-2007 GAAs did not prohibit itsofficials from receiving additional EMEchargeable against an authorized funding,the TESDP Fund in this case, for anotheroffice to which they have been designated

We do not find merit in TESDA’sargument.

The TESDA is an instrumentality of thegovernment established under RepublicAct No. 7796 or the TESDA Act of 1994Under Section 33 of the TESDA Act, theTESDA budget for the implementation ofthe Act is included in the annual GAA;hence, the TESDP Fund, being sourcedfrom the Treasury, are funds belonging tothe government, or any of itsdepartments, in the hands of publicofficials.

The Constitution provides, “No moneyshall be paid out of the Treasury except inpursuance of an appropriation made bylaw.” The State Audit Code, whichprescribes the guidelines in disbursingpublic funds, reiterates this importantConstitutional provision that there shouldbe an appropriation law or other statutesspecifically authorizing payment out ofany public funds.

In this case, TESDA failed to point out the

law specifically authorizing it to grantadditional reimbursement for EME fromthe TESDP Fund, contrary to the explicitrequirement in the Constitution and thelaw. In Yap v. Commission on Audit , weupheld COA’s disallowance of medicaexpenses and other benefits such as carmaintenance, gasoline allowance anddriver’s subsidy due to petitioner’s failureto point out the law specifically

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authorizing the same. There is nothing inthe 2004-2007 GAAs which allows TESDAto grant its officials another set of EMEfrom another source of fund like theTESDP Fund. COA aptly pointed out that

not even TESDA’s inclusion of EME fromboth the General Fund and the TESDPFund in the 2005 GAA justified itspayment of excessive EME from 2004 upto 2007. The 2005 GAA provided for aceiling on EME that TESDA still had tocomply despite the grant of EME in the2005 GAA for foreign-assisted projects.

The position of project officer is notamong those listed or authorized to beentitled to EME, namely, the officialsnamed in the GAA, the officers of

equivalent rank as may be authorized bythe DBM, and the offices under them. Theunderlying principle behind the EME is toenable those occupying key positions inthe government to meet various financialdemands. As pointed out by COA, theposition of project officer is not evenincluded in the Personnel ServiceItemization or created with authority fromthe DBM. Thus, the TESDA officials were,in fact, merely designated with additionalduties, which designation did not entitle

them to additional EME.

Having settled that COA properlydisallowed the payment of excessive EMEby TESDA, we proceed to determinewhether the TESDA officials should refundthe excess EME granted to them.

the Director-General's blatant violation ofthe clear provisions of the Constitution,the 2004-2007 GAAs and the COAcirculars is equivalent to gross negligenceamounting to bad faith. He is required torefund the EME he received from theTESDP Fund for himself. As for the TESDAofficials who had no participation in theapproval of the excessive EME, they actedin good faith since they had no hand inthe approval of the unauthorized EME.They also honestly believed that theadditional EME were reimbursement fortheir designation as project officers by the

Director-General. Being in good faith, theyneed not refund the excess EME theyreceived.

• G.R. No. 192100. March 12, 2014 Republic

of the Philippines, represented by the

Department of Public Works and Highways(DPWH) Vs. Asia Pacific Intergrated SteeCorporation

• Hence, this petition assailing theCA’s affirmance of the trial court’saward of just compensation, thelegal basis of which is allegedlyinsufficient.

Section 5 of R.A. 8974 enumerates thestandards for assessing the value ofexpropriated land taken for nationagovernment infrastructure projects, thus:

SECTION 5. Standards for the Assessmentof the Value of the Land Subject of

Expropriation Proceedings or NegotiatedSale. – In order to facilitate thedetermination of just compensation, thecourt may consider, among other well-established factors, the following relevantstandards:

1. (a) The classification and use fo

which the property is suited;2. (b) The developmental costs for

improving the land;3. (c) The value declared by the

owners;4. (d) The current selling price of

similar lands in the vicinity;5. (e) The reasonable disturbance

compensation for the removal

and/or demolition of certain improvementson the land and for the value of the

improvements thereon;

(f) The size, shape or location, taxdeclaration and zonal valuation of theland;

(g) The price of the land as manifested inthe ocular findings, oral as well asdocumentary evidence presented; and

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(h) Such facts and events as to enable theaffected property owners to havesufficient funds to acquire similarly-situated lands of approximate areas asthose required from them by the

government, and thereby rehabilitatethemselves as early as possible.

In this case, the trial court consideredonly (a) and (d): (1) the classification ofthe subject property which is located in anarea with mixed land use (commercial,residential and industrial) and theproperty’s conversion from agricultural toindustrial land, and (2) the current sellingprice of similar lands in the vicinity – theonly factors which the commissionersincluded in their Report. It also found the

commissioners’ recommended valuation ofP1,000.00 to P1,500.00 per square to befair and just despite the absence ofdocumentary substantiation as said priceswere based merely on the opinions ofbankers and realtors.

We find that the trial court did not judiciously determine the fair marketvalue of the subject property as it failed toconsider other relevant factors such as thezonal valuation, tax declarations and

current selling price supported bydocumentary evidence. Indeed, justcompensation must not be arrived atarbitrarily, but determined after anevaluation of different factors.

It is settled that the final conclusions onthe proper amount of just

compensation can only be made after dueascertainment of the requirements

set forth under R.A. 8974 and not merelybased on the declarations of the parties.Since these requirements were notsatisfactorily complied with, and in theabsence of reliable and actual data asbases in fixing the value of thecondemned property, remand ofthis caseto the trial court is in order.

• G.R. No. 163361. March 12, 2014 Spouses

Jose M. Estacion, Jr. [Deceased,

substituted by Jose T. Estacion III,Edgardo T. Estacion, Michael T. Estacionand Jocelyn Estacion Hamoy] and AgelinaT. Estacion Vs. Hon. Secretary,Department fo Agrarian Reform, et al.

ISSUE: JUST COMPENSATION

The petitioners have no personality tofile the petition for the determinationof just compensation

Records bear out the fact that at the timethe petitioners filed the Amended Petitionin 1998, ownership of the propertiessought to be compensated for was alreadytransferred to respondent PNB. As early as1969, the petitioners already mortgagedthe properties as security for the sugarcrop loan they originally obtained fromrespondent PNB, and as admitted by thepetitioners, respondent PNB foreclosed themortgage on the property in 1982. As aresult, title to the properties wasconsolidated in the name of PNBMoreover, as disclosed by PNB, theproperties were already transferred to thegovernment pursuant to the mandate ofExecutive Order No. 407, which directedall government-owned and -controlled

corporations to surrender to the DAR allandholdings suitable for agricultureClearly, the petitioners have nopersonality to seek determination of justcompensation given that ownership of andtitle to the properties have already passedon to PNB and eventually, the State.

The petitioners cannot solely rely on TCTNo. T-9096 to assert ownership over theproperties since it is merely an evidenceof ownership or title over the particularproperty described therein.

Exclusive and original jurisdiction ofthe SAC to determine justcompensation

Contrary to the CA’s position, however,the RTC, acting as a SAC, has jurisdictionto determine just compensation at thevery first instance, and the petitioners



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need not pass through the DAR for initialvaluation.

The determination of just compensation isessentially a judicial function, which is

vested in the RTC acting as SAC. It cannotbe lodged with administrative agenciessuch as the DAR. The Court has alreadysettled the rule that the SAC is not anappellate reviewer of the DAR decision inadministrative cases involvingcompensation.

Nevertheless, as correctly pointed out bythe SAC, it does not have the power todetermine the validity of the extrajudicialforeclosure of the mortgage conducted byPNB over the properties, as prayed for bythe petitioners. The jurisdiction of the SACvested by Section 57 of R.A. No. 6657,while original and exclusive, is limited onlyto petitions for the determination of justcompensation to landowners, and theprosecution of all criminal offenses underthis Act.

• G.R. No. 201643. March 12, 2014 Office of

the Ombudsman Vs. Jose T. CapulongISSUE: NON-FILING OF SALN’S; NON-DISCLOSURE OF SPOUSE’S BUSINESSINTEREST

Essentially, the issue presented to theCourt for resolution is whether the CA has jurisdiction over the subject matter andcan grant reliefs, whether primary orincidental, after the Ombudsman has liftedthe subject order of preventivesuspension.

As a rule, it is the consistent and generalpolicy of the Court not to interfere with

the Ombudsman’s exercise of itsinvestigatory and prosecutory powers. Therule is based not only upon respect for theinvestigatory and prosecutory powersgranted by the Constitution to theOmbudsman but upon practicality as well.It is within the context of this well-entrenched policy that the Court proceedsto pass upon the validity of the preventivesuspension order issued by the

Ombudsman.

In the instant case, the subsequent liftingof the preventive suspension order againstCapulong does not render the petition

moot and academic. It does not precludethe courts from passing upon the validityof a preventive suspension order, it beinga manifestation of its constitutionallymandated power and authority todetermine whether or not there has beena grave abuse of discretion amounting tolack or excess of jurisdiction on the part ofany branch or instrumentality of theGovernment.

The preventive suspension order isinterlocutory in character and not a finaorder on the merits of the case. Theaggrieved party may then seek redressfrom the courts through a petition forcertiorari under Section 1, Rule 65 of the1997 Rules of Court. While it is true thatthe primary relief prayed for by Capulongin his petition has already been voluntarilycorrected by the Ombudsman by theissuance of the order lifting his preventivesuspension, we must not lose sight of thefact that Capulong likewise prayed forother remedies. There being a finding of

grave abuse of discretion on the part ofthe Ombudsman, it was certainlyimperative for the CA to grant incidentareliefs, as sanctioned by Section 1 of Rule65.

The decision of the appellate court toproceed with the merits of the case isincluded in Capulong’s prayer for such “other reliefs as may be just and equitableunder the premises.” Such a prayer in thepetition justifies the grant of a relief nototherwise specifically prayed for.

ore importantly, we have ruled that it isthe allegations in the pleading whichdetermine the nature of the action and theCourt shall grant relief warranted by theallegations and proof even if no such reliefis prayed for.

Significantly, the power of adjudication

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vested in the CA is not restricted to thespecific relief claimed by the parties to thedispute, but may include in the order ordecision any matter or determinationwhich may be deemed necessary and

expedient for the purpose of settling thedispute or preventing further disputes,provided said matter for determinationhas been established by competentevidence during the hearing. The CA is notbound by technical rules of procedure andevidence, to the end that all disputes andother issues will be adjudicated in a just,expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.

The requisites for the Ombudsman toissue a preventive suspension order areclearly contained in Section 24 of R.A. No.

6770. The rule is that whether theevidence of guilt is strong is left to thedetermination of the Ombudsman bytaking into account the evidence beforehim. In the very words of Section 24, theOmbudsman may preventively suspend apublic official pending investigation if “inhis judgment ” the evidence presentedbefore him tends to show that the official’sguilt is strong and if the further requisitesenumerated in Section 24 are present.

The Court, however, can substitute itsown judgment for that of the Ombudsmanon this matter, with a clear showing ofgrave abuse of discretion on the part ofthe Ombudsman.

Undoubtedly, in this case, the CA aptlyruled that the Ombudsman abused itsdiscretion because it failed to sufficientlyestablish any basis to issue the order ofpreventive suspension. Capulong’s non-disclosure of his wife’s business interestdoes not constitute serious dishonesty orgrave misconduct. Nothing in the recordsreveals that Capulong deliberately placed “N/A” in his SALN despite knowledgeabout his wife’s business interest. Asexplained by Capulong, the SEC alreadyrevoked the registration of thecorporations where his wife was anincorporator; hence, he deemed it not

necessary to indicate it in his SALN.

Ineluctably, the dismissal of anadministrative case does not necessarilybar the filing of a criminal prosecution for

the same or similar acts, which were thesubject of the administrative complaintThe Court finds no cogent reason todepart from this rule. However, the crimeof perjury for which Capulong wascharged, requires a willful and deliberateassertion of a falsehood in a statementunder oath or in an affidavit, and thestatement or affidavit in question here isCapulong's SALNs. It then becomesnecessary to consider the administrativecharge against Capulong to determinewhether or not he has committed perjury

Therefore, with the dismissal ofCapulong's administrative case, the CAcorrectly dismissed its criminacounterpart since the crime of perjurywhich stemmed from misrepresentationsin his SALNs will no longer have a leg tostand on.

• G.R. No. 198271. April 1, 2014 Arnaldo M

Espinas, Lillian N. Asprer, and Eleanora RDe Jesus Vs. Commission on ElectionsISSUE: Notice of Disallowance coveringpetitioners’ reimbursement claims for

extraordinary and miscellaneous expensesfor the period January to December 2006.

The CoA’s audit power is among theconstitutional mechanisms that gives lifeto the check-and-balance system inherentin our system of government. As anessential complement, the CoA has beenvested with the exclusive authority topromulgate accounting and auditing rulesand regulations, including those for theprevention and disallowance of irregularunnecessary, excessive, extravagant, orunconscionable expenditures or uses ofgovernment funds and properties.

As an independent constitutional bodyconferred with such power, it reasonablyfollows that the CoA’s interpretation of itsown auditing rules and regulations, asenunciated in its decisions, should be

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accorded great weight and respect.

Viewed in the foregoing light, the Courtfinds that the CoA did not commit anygrave abuse of discretion as its affirmance

of Notice of Disallowance No. 09-001-GF(06) is based on cogent legal grounds.

First off, the Court concurs with the CoA’sconclusion that the “certification”submitted by petitioners cannot beproperly considered as a supportingdocument within the purview of ItemIII(3) of CoA Circular No. 2006-01 whichpertinently states that a “claim forreimbursement of [EME] expensesshall be supported by receipts and/orother documents evidencingdisbursements.” Similar to the word “receipts,” the “other documents”pertained to under the above-statedprovision is qualified by the phrase “evidencing disbursements.” Citing itslexicographic definition, the CoA statedthat the term “disbursement” means “topay out commonly from a fund” or “tomake payment in settlement of debt oraccount payable.”

That said, it then logically follows that

petitioners’ “certification,” so as to fallunder the phrase “other documents”under Item III(3) of CoA Circular No.2006-01, must substantiate the “payingout of an account payable,” or, in simpleterm, a disbursement. However, anexamination of the sample “certification”attached to the petition does not, by anymeans, fit this description. The signatorytherein merely certifies that he/she hasspent, within a particular month, a certainamount for meetings, seminars,conferences, official entertainment, publicrelations, and the like, and that thecertified amount is within the ceilingauthorized under the LWUA corporatebudget. Accordingly, since petitioners’reimbursement claims were solelysupported by this “certification,” the CoAproperly disallowed said claims for failureto comply with CoA Circular No. 2006-01.

Lastly, the Court upholds the CoA’s findingthat there exists a substantial distinctionbetween officials of NGAs and the officialsof GOCCs, GFIs and their subsidiarieswhich justify the peculiarity in regulation

Since the EME of GOCCs, GFIs and theirsubsidiaries, are, pursuant to law,allocated by their own internal governingboards, as opposed to the EME of NGAswhich are appropriated in the annual GAAduly enacted by Congress, there is aperceivable rational impetus for the CoAto impose nuanced control measures tocheck if the EME disbursements of GOCCs,GFIs and their subsidiaries constituteirregular, unnecessary, excessiveextravagant, or unconscionablegovernment expenditures. Case in point is

the LWUA Board of Trustees which,pursuant to Section 69 of PD 198, asamended, is “authorized to appropriateout of any funds of the Administrationsuch amounts as it may deem necessaryfor the operational and other expenses ofthe Administration including the purchaseof necessary equipment.” Indeed, theCourt recognizes that denying GOCCsGFIs and their subsidiaries the benefit ofsubmitting a secondary-alternatedocument in support of an EMEreimbursement, such as the “certification”discussed herein, is a CoA policy intendedto address the disparity in EMEdisbursement autonomy. As pertinentlystated in CoA Circular No. 2006-01, theconsideration underlying the rules andregulations contained therein is the factthat “[g]overning boards of [GOCCs/GFIs]are invariably empowered to appropriatethrough resolutions such amounts as theydeem appropriate for extraordinary andmiscellaneous expenses.” Hence, in duedeference to the CoA’s constitutiona

prerogatives, the Court, absent anysemblance of grave abuse of discretion inthis case, respects the regulation, andconsequently dismisses the petition.

• G.R. No. 199549. April 7, 2014 Civil Service

Commission and Department of Scienceand Technology, Regional Office No. V

• We find the present petitionpartially meritorious. Therespondent is guilty of simple

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insubordination.• Insubordination is defined as a

refusal to obey some order, whicha superior officer is entitled to giveand have obeyed. The term

imports a willful or intentionaldisregard of the lawful andreasonable instructions of theemployer.

In this case, the respondent committedinsubordination when she failed topromptly act on the June 16, 2000memorandum issued by her superior,Regional Director Nepomuceno, remindingher of her duties to immediately turn-overdocuments to and exchange roomassignments with the new Administrative

Officer-Designate, Engr. Lucena. Thesubject memorandum was a lawful orderissued to enforce Special Order No. 23, s.of 2000 reassigning the respondent fromAdministrative to Planning Officer, andwhich warranted the respondent’sobedience and compliance.

We see in the respondent's initial inactionher deliberate choice not to act on thesubject memoranda; she waited until theresolution of her motion for

reconsideration of her reassignment (thatshe filed on June 27, 2000) before sheactually complied. The service wouldfunction very inefficiently ifthese typesofdilatory actions would be allowed.

• G.R. Nos. 204819, 204934, 204957,204988, 205003, 205043, 205138,205478, 205491, 205720, 206355,207111, 207172 & 207563. April 8,2014 James M. Imbong, et al. Vs. Hon.

Paquito N. Ochoa, Jr., et al. Concurringand Dissenting Opinion C.J. Sereno, J.

Del Castillo, J. Reyes, J. Perlas-Bernabe

Concurring Opinion

J. Carpio,

J. Leonardo-De Castro, J.Abad Separate Concurring Opinion J.

Brion Dissenting Opinion J. Leonen

• I. PROCEDURAL: Whether theCourt may exercise its powerof judicial review over thecontroversy.

• 1] Power of Judicial Review 2]

Actual Case or Controversy 3]Facial Challenge4] Locus Stand5] Declaratory Relie6] One Subject/One Title Rule

•

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether theRH law is unconstitutional:• 1] Right to Life

2] Right to Health3] Freedom of Religion and theRight to Free Speech 4] The Family5] Freedom of Expression andAcademic Freedom6] Due Process

• 7] Equal Protection8] Involuntary Servitude9] Delegation ofAuthority to theFDA

10] Autonomy of LocaGovemments /ARMM

*SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:

A. Whether or not (WON) RA10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law isunconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life

2. Right to health

3. Freedom of religion and right to freespeech

a.) WON the RH Law violates theguarantee of religious freedom since itmandates the State-sponsoredprocurement of contraceptives, whichcontravene the religious beliefs of e.g. the

petitioners

b.) WON the RH Law violates theguarantee of religious freedom bycompelling medical health practitioners,hospitals, and health care providersunder pain of penalty, to refer patients toother institutions despite their

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conscientious objections

c.) WON the RH Law violates theguarantee of religious freedom byrequiring would-be spouses, as a conditionfor the issuance of a marriage license, toattend a seminar on parenthood, familyplanning, breastfeeding and infantnutrition

4. Right to privacy (marital privacy andautonomy)

5. Freedom of expression and academicfreedom

6. Due process clause

7. Equal protection clause

8. Prohibition against involuntaryservitude

B. WON the delegation of authority to theFood and Drug Administration (FDA) to

determine WON a supply or product is tobe included in the Essential Drugs List isvalid

C. WON the RH Law infringes upon thepowers devolved to Local Governmentsand the Autonomous Region in MuslimMindanao (ARMM)

* HELD:

A.

1. NO.

2. NO.

3.

a.) NO.

b.) YES.

c.) NO.

4. YES.

5. NO.

6. NO.

7. NO.

8. NO.

B. NO.

C. NO.

* RATIO:

1.) Majority of the Members of the Courtbelieve that the question of when lifebegins is a scientific and medical issuethat should not be decided, at this stage,without proper hearing and evidenceHowever, they agreed that individuaMembers could express their own viewson this matter.

Article II, Section 12 of the Constitutionstates: “The State recognizes the sanctityof family life and shall protect andstrengthen the family as a basicautonomous social institution. It shalequally protect the life of the mother andthe life of the unborn from conception.”

In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canonin statutory construction), the traditiona


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“mandatory” only after these devicesand materials have been tested,evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine thatcontraceptives are “safe, legal, non-

abortificient and effective”.

3.) The Court cannot determine whetheror not the use of contraceptives orparticipation in support of modern RHmeasures (a) is moral from a religiousstandpoint; or, (b) right or wrongaccording to one’s dogma or belief.However, the Court has the authority todetermine whether or not the RH Lawcontravenes the Constitutional guaranteeof religious freedom.

3a.) The State may pursue its legitimatesecular objectives without being dictatedupon the policies of any one religion. Toallow religious sects to dictate policy orrestrict other groups would violate ArticleIII, Section 5 of the Constitution or theEstablishment Clause. This wouldcause the State to adhere to a particularreligion, and thus, establishes a statereligion. Thus, the State can enhance itspopulation control program through the

RH Law even if the promotion ofcontraceptive use is contrary to thereligious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.

3b.) Sections 7, 23, and 24 of the RH Lawobliges a hospital or medical practitionerto immediately refer a person seekinghealth care and services under the law toanother accessible healthcare providerdespite their conscientious objectionsbased on religious or ethical beliefs.These provisions violate the religious

belief and conviction of aconscientious objector. They arecontrary to Section 29(2), Article VIof the Constitution or the FreeExercise Clause, whose basis is therespect for the inviolability of thehuman conscience.

The provisions in the RH Law compelling

non-maternity specialty hospitals andhospitals owned and operated by areligious group and health care serviceproviders to refer patients to otherproviders and penalizing them if they fai

to do so (Sections 7 and 23(a)(3)) as welas compelling them to disseminateinformation and perform RH proceduresunder pain of penalty (Sections 23(a)(1)and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24) alsoviolate (and inhibit) the freedom ofreligion. While penalties may beimposed by law to ensure compliance toit, a constitutionally-protected rightmust prevail over the effectiveimplementation of the law.

Excluding public health officers from beingconscientious objectors (under Sec. 5.24of the IRR) also violates the equaprotection clause. There is no perceptibledistinction between public health officersand their private counterparts. Inaddition, the freedom to believe is intrinsicin every individual and the protection ofthis freedom remains even if he/she isemployed in the government.

Using the compelling state interest test

there is no compelling state interest tolimit the free exercise of conscientiousobjectors. There is no immediatedanger to the life or health of anindividual in the perceived scenario of theabove-quoted provisions. In addition, thelimits do not pertain to life-threateningcases.

The respondents also failed to showthat these provisions are leastintrusive means to achieve a legitimate

state objective. The Legislature hasalready taken other secular steps toensure that the right to health isprotected, such as RA 4729, RA 6365 (ThePopulation Act of the Philippines) and RA9710 (The Magna Carta of Women).

3c.) Section 15 of the RH Law, whichrequires would-be spouses to attend a

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seminar on parenthood, family planning,breastfeeding and infant nutrition as acondition for the issuance of a marriagelicense, is a reasonable exercise of policepower by the government. The law does

not even mandate the type of familyplanning methods to be included in theseminar. Those who attend the seminarare free to accept or reject informationthey receive and they retain the freedomto decide on matters of family life withoutthe intervention of the State.

4.) Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law,which permits RH procedures even withonly the consent of the spouse undergoingthe provision (disregarding spousal

content), intrudes into martial privacyand autonomy and goes against theconstitutional safeguards for thefamily as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section 3, Article XV of theConstitution mandates the State todefend: (a) the right of spouses to found afamily in accordance with their religiousconvictions and the demands ofresponsible parenthood and (b) the rightof families or family associations toparticipate in the planning andimplementation of policies and programs

that affect them. The RH Law cannotinfringe upon this mutual decision-making,and endanger the institutions of marriageand the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in caseswhere a minor undergoing a procedure isalready a parent or has had a miscarriage(Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 ofthe Constitution, which states: “Thenatural and primary right and duty ofparents in the rearing of the youth forcivic efficiency and the development ofmoral character shall receive the supportof the Government.” In addition, theportion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “inthe case of minors, the written consent ofparents or legal guardian or, in theirabsence, persons exercising parentalauthority or next-of-kin shall be required

only in elective surgical procedures” isinvalid as it denies the right of parentaauthority in cases where what is involvedis “non-surgical procedures.”

However, a minor may receive information(as opposed to procedures) about familyplanning services. Parents are notdeprived of parental guidance and controover their minor child in this situation andmay assist her in deciding whether toaccept or reject the information receivedIn addition, an exception may be made inlife-threatening procedures.

5.) The Court declined to rule on theconstitutionality of Section 14 of the RHLaw, which mandates the State toprovide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive HealthEducation. Although educators might raisetheir objection to their participation in theRH education program, the Court reservesits judgment should an actual case be filedbefore it.

Any attack on its constitutionality ispremature because the Department of

Education has not yet formulated acurriculum on age-appropriatereproductive health education.

Section 12, Article II of the Constitutionplaces more importance on the role ofparents in the development of theirchildren with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents inupbringing their youth is superior to thatof the State.

The provisions of Section 14 of the RHLaw and corresponding provisions of theIRR supplement (rather than supplant) theright and duties of the parents in themoral development of their children.

By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials,and other interest groups in developing


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the mandatory RH program, it could verywell be said that the program will be inline with the religious beliefs of thepetitioners.

6.) The RH Law does not violate thedue process clause of the Constitutionas the definitions of several terms asobserved by the petitioners are notvague.

The definition of “private health careservice provider” must be seen in relationto Section 4(n) of the RH Law whichdefines a “public health service provider”.The “private health care institution” citedunder Section 7 should be seen assynonymous to “private health careservice provider.

The terms “service” and “methods” arealso broad enough to include providing ofinformation and rendering of medicalprocedures. Thus, hospitals operated byreligious groups are exempted fromrendering RH service and modern familyplanning methods (as provided for bySection 7 of the RH Law) as well as from

giving RH information and procedures.

The RH Law also defines “incorrectinformation”. Used together in relation toSection 23 (a)(1), the terms “incorrect”and “knowingly” connote a sense of maliceand ill motive to mislead or misrepresentthe public as to the nature and effect ofprograms and services on reproductivehealth.

7.) To provide that the poor are to begiven priority in the government’s RHprogram is not a violation of the equalprotection clause. In fact, it is pursuantto Section 11, Article XIII of theConstitution, which states that the Stateshall prioritize the needs of theunderprivileged, sick elderly,disabled, women, and children andthat it shall endeavor to provide

medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to targetthe poor to reduce their number, sinceSection 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poorand marginalized couples who aresuffering from fertility issues and desire tohave children. In addition, the RH Lawdoes not prescribe the number of childrena couple may have and does not imposeconditions upon couples who intend tohave children. The RH Law only seeks toprovide priority to the poor.

The exclusion of private educationainstitutions from the mandatory RHeducation program under Section 14 isvalid. There is a need to recognize theacademic freedom of private educationainstitutions especially with respect toreligious instruction and to consider theirsensitivity towards the teaching ofreproductive health education.

8.) The requirement under Sec. 17 of theRH Law for private and non-governmenthealth care service providers to render 48hours of pro bono RH services does not

amount to involuntary servitude, fortwo reasons. First, the practice ofmedicine is undeniably imbued with publicinterest that it is both the power and aduty of the State to control and regulate itin order to protect and promote the publicwelfare. Second, Section 17 onlyencourages private and non-governmentRH service providers to render probono service. Besides the PhilHealthaccreditation, no penalty is imposedshould they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors areexempt from Sec. 17 as long as theirreligious beliefs do not allow them torender RH service, pro bono or otherwise(See Part 3b of this digest.)

B. The delegation by Congress to the FDAof the power to determine whether or not


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a supply or product is to be included in theEssential Drugs List is valid, as the FDAnot only has the power but also thecompetency to evaluate, register andcover health services and methods (under

RA 3720 as amended by RA 9711 or theFDA Act of 2009).

C. The RH Law does not infringe upon theautonomy of local governments.Paragraph (c) of Section 17 provides acategorical exception of cases involvingnationally-funded projects, facilities,programs and services. Unless a localgovernment unit (LGU) is particularlydesignated as the implementing agency, ithas no power over a program for which

funding has been provided by the nationalgovernment under the annual generalappropriations act, even if the programinvolves the delivery of basic serviceswithin the jurisdiction of the LGU.

In addition, LGUs are merely encouragedto provide RH services. Provision of theseservices are not mandatory. Therefore,the RH Law does not amount to an undueencroachment by the national governmentupon the autonomy enjoyed by LGUs.

Article III, Sections 6, 10, and 11 ofRA 9054 or the Organic Act of theARMM merely delineates the powersthat may be exercised by the regionalgovernment. These provisions cannotbe seen as an abdication by the Stateof its power to enact legislation thatwould benefit the general welfare.

• G.R. No. 181792. April 21, 2014 Star

Special Watchmen and Detective Angency,Inc., et al. Vs. Puerto Princesa City, Mayor

Edward Hagedorn, et al.• Petitioners basically argue that the

remedy of mandamus is proper tocompel respondents to comply withthe November 18, 2003 decision ofthe RTC-Br. 223 which orderedrespondents to pay petitioners thesums of money stated therein.

The Court cannot blame petitioners forresorting to the remedy of mandamusbecause they have done everything in thebooks to satisfy their just and demandableclaim. They went to the courts, the COA,

the Ombudsman, and the DILG. Theyresorted to the remedy of mandamusbecause in at least three (3) cases, theCourt sanctioned the remedy in cases offinal judgments rendered against a locagovernment unit (LGU). The Court ruledthat a claimant may resort to the remedyof mandamus to compel an LGU to enactthe necessary ordinance and approve thecorresponding disbursement in order tosatisfy the judgment award.

Considering that a writ of execution was

already issued by RTC-Br. 223, theremedy of petitioners is to follow up theirclaim with the COA. Petitioners rightfullydid so, but the COA erred in not acting onthe claim.

From the above provisions, it is clear thatthe COA has the authority and power tosettle “all debts and claims of any sort duefrom or owing to the Government or any

of its subdivisions, agencies andinstrumentalities.” This authority and

power can still be exercised by the COAeven if a court’s decision in a case hasalready become final and executory. Inother words, the COA still retains itsprimary jurisdiction to adjudicate a claimeven after the issuance of a writ ofexecution.

Considering that the COA still retained itsprimary jurisdiction to adjudicate moneyclaim, petitioners should have filed a petition for certiorari with this Courtpursuant to Section 50 of P.D. No. 1445Hence, the COA's refusal to act did notleave the petitioners without any remedyat all.

WHEREFORE, the petition for mandamusis DENIED. Petitioners are enjoined torefile its claim with the Commission onAudit pursuant to P.D. No. 1445.

• G.R. No. 203335/G.R. No. 203299/G.R

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No. 203306/G.R. No. 203359/G.R. No.203378/G.R. No. 203391/G.R. No.203407/G.R. No. 203340/G.R. No.203453/G.R. No. 203454. April 22,2014 Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., et al., Vs.

The Secretary of Justice, et al./Louis “Barok” C. Biraogo Vs. National Bureau ofInvestigation, et al./ Alab NgMamamahayag (ALAM), et al. Vs. Office ofthe President, et al./ Senator Teofisto DlGuingona III Vs. The Executive Secretary,et al./ Alexander Adonis, et al. Vs. TheExecutive Secretary, et al./Hon. RaymondV. Palatino, et al. Vs. Hon. Paquito N.Ochoa, Jr., et al./Bagong AlyansangMakabayan Secretary General Renato M.Reyes, Jr., et al. Vs. Benigno Simeon C.Aquino III, et al./ Melencio S. Sta. Maria,

et al. Vs. Hon. Paquito Ochoa, etal./National Union of Journalists of thePhilippines, et al.Vs. The ExecutiveSecretary, et al./Paul Cornelius T. Castillo,et al.,Vs. The Hon. Secretary of Justice, etal./Anthony Ian M. Cruz, et al. Vs. HisExcellency Benigno S. Aquino III, etal./Philippine Bar Association, Inc., Vs. HisExcellency Benigno S. Aquino III, etal./Bayan Muna Representative Neri J.Colmenares Vs. The Executive SecretaryPaquito Ochoa, Jr., /National Press Club OfThe Philippines, Inc., Represented ByBenny D. Antiporda in his Capacity asPresident and in his Personal Capacity Vs.Office of the President, President BenignoSimeon Aquino III, et al. PhilippineInternet Freedom Alliance, et al. Vs. TheExecutive Secretary, et al. Dissenting andConcurring Opinion C.J.

Sereno Dissenting Opinion J. Brion, J.

Leonen

• Section 6 of the cybercrime lawimposes penalties that are onedegree higher when the crimes

defined in the Revised Penal Codeand certain special laws arecommitted with the use ofinformation and communicationtechnologies (ICT). Some of thepetitioners insist that Section 6 isinvalid since it produces an unusualchilling effect on users ofcyberspace that would hinder freeexpression.

• • Petitioner Bloggers and Netizens

for Democracy insist that Section 6cannot stand in the absence of adefinition of the term “information

and communicationtechnology”.2 But petitioner seemsto forget the basic tenet thatstatutes should not be read inisolation from one another. Theparameters of that ICT exist inmany other laws. Indeed thoseparameters have been used asbasis for establishing governmentsystems and classifyingevidence.3 These along withcommon usage provide the neededboundary within which the law may

be applied.• • The Court had ample opportunity

to consider the proposition thatSection 6 violates the equaprotection clause via the partiespleadings, oral arguments, andmemoranda. But, as the Decisionstressed, the power to fix thepenalties for violations of penalaws, like the cybercrime law,exclusively belongs to Congress.

• •

In any event, Section 6 of thecybercrime law merely makes thecommission of existing crimesthrough the internet a qualifyingcircumstance that raises by onedegree the penalties correspondingto such crimes. This is not at alarbitrary since a substantiadistinction exists between crimescommitted through the use of ICTand similar crimes committed usingconventional means.

• • The United Nations Specia

Rapporteur,4 Frank La Rueacknowledged the materiadistinction. He pointed out that “[t]he vast potential and benefitsof the Internet are rooted in itsunique characteristics, such as itsspeed, worldwide reach andrelative anonymity.” For this

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reason, while many governmentsadvocate freedom online, theyrecognize the necessity to regulatecertain aspects of the use of thismedia to protect the most

vulnerable.5

• • Not infrequently, certain users of

the technology have found meansto evade being identified and forthis reason have been emboldenedto reach far more victims or causegreater harm or both. It is,therefore, logical for Congress toconsider as aggravating thedeliberate use of available ICT bythose who ply their wicked trades.

•

•

Compared to traditional crimes,cybercrimes are more perverse. Intraditional estafa for example, theoffender could reach his victim onlyat a particular place and aparticular time. It is rare that hecould consummate his crimewithout exposing himself todetection and prosecution. Fraudonline, however, crosses nationalboundaries, generally depriving itsvictim of the means to obtainreparation of the wrong done andseek prosecution and punishmentof the absentcriminal. Cybercriminals enjoy theadvantage of anonymity, likewearing a mask during a heist.

• • Petitioners share the Chief Justice’s

concern for the overall impact ofthose penalties, being one degreehigher than those imposed onordinary crimes, including the factthat the prescriptive periods for the

equivalent cybercrimes havebecome longer.6

• • Prescription is not a matter of

procedure over which the Courthas something to say. Rather, it issubstantive law since it assumesthe existence of an authority topunish a wrong, which authoritythe Constitution vests in Congress

alone. Thus, there is no questionthat Congress may provide avariety of periods for theprescription of offenses as it seesfit. What it cannot do is pass a law

that extends the periods ofprescription to impact crimescommitted before its passage.7

• • It is pointed out that the legislative

discretion to fix the penalty forcrimes is not absolute especiallywhen this discretion is exercised inviolation of the freedom ofexpression. The increase in thepenalty for online libel creates,according to this view, greater andunusual chilling effect that violates

the protection afforded to suchfreedom.

• • But what the stiffer penalty for

online libel truly targets are thosewho choose to use this mostpervasive of media without qualms,tearing down the reputation oprivate individuals who value theirnames and communitystanding. The law does notremotely and could not have anychilling effect on the right of thepeople to disagree, a mostprotected right, the exercise ofwhich does not constitute libel.

The constitutional guarantee against priorrestraint and subsequent punishment, the jurisprudential requirement of “actuamalice,” and the legal protection affordedby “privilege communications” all ensurethat protected speech remains to beprotected and guarded. As long as theexpression or speech falls within theprotected sphere, it is the solemn duty of

courts to ensure that the rights of thepeople are protected.

At bottom, the deepest concerns of themovants seem to be the fact that thegovernment seeks to regulate activities inthe internet at all. For them, the Internetis a place where a everyone should be freeto do and say whatever he or shewants. But that is anarchical. Any good


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thing can be converted to evil use if thereare no laws to prohibit such use. Indeed,both the United States and the Philippineshave promulgated laws that regulate theuse of and access to the Internet.10

• The movants argue that Section4(c)(4) is both vague andoverbroad. But, again, online libelis not a new crime. It is essentiallythe old crime of libel found in the1930 Revised Penal Code andtransposed to operate in thecyberspace. Consequently, themass of jurisprudence that securesthe freedom of expression from itsreach applies to online libel. Anyapprehended vagueness in its

provisions has long been settled byprecedents.

• G.R. No. 203974/G.R. No. 204371. April22, 2014 Aurelio M. Umali Vs.

Commission on Elections, Julius Cesar Vs.Vergara, and The City Government ofCabanatuan/J.V. Bautista Vs. Commissionon Elections Dissenting Opinion J.

Leonen

The bone of contention in the presentcontroversy boils down to whether thequalified registered voters of the entire

province of Nueva Ecija or only those inCabanatuan City can participate in theplebiscite called for the conversion ofCabanatuan City from a component cityinto an HUC.Sec. 453 of the LGC should beinterpreted in accordancewith Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution

Before proceeding to unravel the seemingconflict between the two provisions, it isbut proper that we ascertain first the

relationship between Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution and Sec. 453 of the LGC.

First of all, we have to restate the generalprinciple that legislative power cannot bedelegated. Nonetheless, the general rulebarring delegation is subject to certainexceptions allowed in the Constitution,namely:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

(1) Delegation by Congress to thePresident of the power to fix “tariff rates,import and export quotas, tonnage andwharfage dues, and other duties orimposts within the framework of the

national development program of theGovernment” under Section 28(2) ofArticle VI of the Constitution; and

(2) Delegation of emergency powers byCongress to the President “to exercisepowers necessary and proper to carry outa declared national policy” in times of warand other national emergency underSection 23(2) of Article VI of theConstitution.

The power to create, divide, merge,

abolish or substantially alter boundaries ofprovinces, cities, municipalities orbarangays, which is pertinent in the caseat bar, is essentially legislative in nature.5

The framers of the Constitution have,however, allowed for the delegation ofsuch power in Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution as long as (1) the criteriaprescribed in the LGC is met and (2) thecreation, division, merger, abolition or thesubstantial alteration of the boundaries issubject to the approval by a majority votein a plebiscite.

True enough, Congress delegated suchpower to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan orSangguniang Panlungsod to createbarangays pursuant to Sec. 6 of the LGC,whichprovides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 6. Authority to Create LocaGovernment Units. – A local governmenunit may be created, divided, merged,abolished, or its boundaries substantially

altered either by law enacted by Congressin the case of a province, city,municipality, or any other politicasubdivision, or by ordinance passed by thesangguniang panlalawigan orsangguniang panlungsod concernedin the case of a barangay locatedwithin its territorial jurisdictionsubject to such limitations andrequirements prescribed in this Code.”

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(emphasis supplied)

The guidelines for the exercise of thisauthority have sufficiently been outlinedby the various LGC provisions detailing the

requirements for the creation ofbarangays6, municipalities7, cities8, andprovinces9. Moreover, compliance with theplebiscite requirement under theConstitution has also been directed by theLGC under its Sec. 10, whichreads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 10. Plebiscite Requirement . – No creation, division, merger, abolition, orsubstantial alteration of boundaries oflocal government units shall take effectunless approved by a majority of the

votes cast in a plebiscite called for thepurpose in the political unit or unitsdirectly affected.” (emphasis supplied)

With the twin criteria of standard andplebiscite satisfied, the delegation to LGUsof the power to create, divide, merge,abolish or substantially alter boundarieshas become a recognized exception to thedoctrine of non–delegation of legislativepowers.

Likewise, legislative power was delegatedto the President under Sec. 453 of theLGC quoted earlier, whichstates:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 453. Duty to Declare HighlyUrbanized Status. – It shall be the dutyof the President to declare a city as highlyurbanized within thirty (30) days after itshall have met the minimum requirementsprescribed in the immediately precedingSection, upon proper application thereforand ratification in a plebiscite by the

qualified voters therein.

In this case, the provision merelyauthorized the President to make adetermination on whether or not therequirements under Sec. 45210 of the LGCare complied with. The provision makes itministerial for the President, upon properapplication, to declare a component city ashighly urbanized once the minimum

requirements, which are based oncertifiable and measurable indices underSec. 452, are satisfied. The mandatorylanguage “shall” used in the provisionleaves the President with no room for

discretion.

In so doing, Sec. 453, in effect,automatically calls for the conduct of aplebiscite for purposes of conversionsonce the requirements are met. No furtherlegislation is necessary before the cityproposed to be converted becomes eligibleto become an HUC through ratification, asthe basis for the delegation of thelegislative authority is the very LGC.

In view of the foregoing considerations

the Court concludes that the source of thedelegation of power to the LGUs underSec. 6 of the LGC and to the Presidentunder Sec. 453 of the same code is noneother than Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution.Respondents, however, posit that Sec453 of the LGC is actually outside theambit of Sec. 10, Art. X of theConstitution, considering that theconversion of a component city to an HUCis not “creation, division, merge, abolitionor substantial alternation of boundaries”encompassed by the said constitutionaprovision.

This proposition is bereft of merit.

First , the Court’s pronouncement inMiranda vs. Aguirre11 is apropos and maybe applied by analogy. While Mirandainvolves the downgrading, instead ofupgrading, as here, of an independentcomponent city into a component city, itsapplication to the case at bar is

nonetheless materi

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COMPILATION OF SC DECISIONS FOR POLITICAL LAW (2014-2015)