Conventional Arms Control and Confidence Building Measures in Asia Takeshi Fukuda Researcher, National Diet Library of Japan The 22nd United Nations Conference

Conventional Arms Conventional Arms ControlControl

andandConfidence Building Confidence Building

MeasuresMeasures in Asiain Asia

Takeshi FukudaResearcher, National Diet Library of Japan

The 22nd United Nations Conference on Disarmament IssuesSaitama, Japan, 25-27 August 2010

Structure of PresentationStructure of Presentation

Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and

Conventional Arms Control

Classification of Conventional Arms Control

Regional Arms Control: In the Case of

Europe

Arms Control in Asia: Current Situation and

Challenges

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Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Controland Conventional Arms Control

Nuclear Arms Control Consequences of war: Catastrophe Image of Weapons: Horrible “absolute weapons” Appeal for arms control: Strong and morally persuasive

---- Many states support the ultimate goal of“a nuclear-free world”

Conventional Arms Control Consequences of war: Depend on situations Image of Weapons:

Less horrible, sometimes necessary for our security

Appeal for arms control: Not so strong and difficult to set the objectives

---- No state supports “a conventional weapons-free world” 2

Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control (cont.)and Conventional Arms Control (cont.)

Nuclear Arms Control “Nuclear weapons” is a single category of weapons Key players in arms control:

Limited (countries that possess nuclear weapons or

aspire to obtain them) Likelihood of nuclear warfare: Very low

Conventional Arms Control “Conventional weapons” is NOT a single category of weapons Key players in arms control:

Many (every state has a chance to be a key player)

Likelihood of conventional warfare: Extremely high 3

For many countries, conventional warfare is a more imminent threat than nuclear warfare.

The progress of conventional arms control could drastically influence the international security.

Conventional arms control is closely linked with nuclear arms control.

We need to see a broad strategic and political environment.

Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control Comparison of Nuclear Arms Control and Conventional Arms Control (cont.)and Conventional Arms Control (cont.)

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Classification of Conventional Arms ControlClassification of Conventional Arms Controlby Forms of Regulationby Forms of Regulation

Types Examples

Complete ban on a certain weaponMine Ban Treaty (1997)Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008)

Partial ban or restriction on a certain weapon

Amended Protocol II of CCW (1996)Protocol III of CCW (1980)

Restriction of the number of weapons

Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE Treaty, 1990)

Arms trade control Arms Trade Treaty (under negotiation)

Confidence Building Measures (CBMs)

Helsinki Final Act (1975)Vienna Documents of 1990s

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Ultimate Goal:Enhancing National, International, and Human Security

Arms Control for Humanitarian Purposes

Objective: Eliminating human suffering caused by weaponsHow to achieve the objective: Prohibiting or regulating weaponsExamples: Mine Ban Treaty Convention on Cluster Munitions

Arms Control for Strategic Purposes

Objective: Preventing warHow to achieve the objective: Increasing strategic stability (focusing on the military balance of power)Examples: CFE Treaty, CBMs in Europe

Classification of Conventional Arms ControlClassification of Conventional Arms Controlby Objectivesby Objectives

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Types Advantages / Disadvantages

UnilateralRapid decision and implementation

Lack of legal obligations, Difficulty in verification, No assurance that a rival state will take similar measures

Bilateral / Regional

Relative easiness of building a consensus and taking into account conditions unique to the concerned region

Limited geographical impact

Global

Universality of agreement (greater impact on international security)

Difficulty in consensus-building

Classification of Conventional Arms ControlClassification of Conventional Arms Controlby Geographical Area/Number of Participating by Geographical Area/Number of Participating

StatesStates

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Classifications don’t reflect priority or superiority.

Each framework has both advantages and disadvantages.

What is important is to choose a framework suitable for an intended goal.

Classification of Conventional Arms ControlClassification of Conventional Arms Control

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Regional Arms Control in EuropeRegional Arms Control in Europe

Europe is the place where the concept of CBMs / CSBMs was developed.

In 1973, NATO, WTO and the European neutrals agreed on starting negotiations under the framework of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (CSCE).

The 1975 Helsinki Final Act adopted in the CSCE is the first document on CBMs.

Helsinki Final Act prescribes that participating states shall notify their “major military manoeuvres exceeding a total of 25,000 troops” in advance to each other.

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Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.)Regional Arms Control in Europe (cont.)

Principal Measures Established by the 1999 Vienna Document

1. Annual exchange of information on a) Military organization, manpower and major weapon systems b) Plans for the deployment of major weapon systems c) Defense planning (defense policy and doctrine, force planning, defense expenditures and budgets)

2. Annual meeting for discussing the issues relating to defense planning

3. Facilitating contacts among military units and personnel (including joint military training and exercises)

4. Prior notification of major military activities (e.g. activities involving at least 9,000 troops or 250 battle tanks)

5. Invitation of observers from other states to major military activities

6. Restrictions on major military activities (e.g. States can conduct military activities involving more than 40,000 troops or 900 battle tanks only once within three years)

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The Open Skies Treaty Signed by the CSCE countries in 1992 and enforced in

2002.

States parties can conduct observation flights over the

territories of other parties by aircrafts equipped with

sensors.

In principle, the observing party can fly and observe

anywhere it wants as long as it follows the treaty’s

procedure.

The number of observation flights each state is obliged to

accept is basically determined by their geographical size

(For example, the US and the Russia-Belarus group: up to

42 flights per year / France, Germany, Italy, Turkey, and

the UK: up to 12).

From August 2002 to June 2010, 673 flights were

conducted (one observation flight every four days).

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Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe

(CFE Treaty) Signed by the NATO and WTO countries in 1990.

Setting the ceilings on the number of the five major

weapons (battle tanks, armored combat vehicles, artillery,

combat aircraft, and combat helicopters) deployed in the

area “from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountain”.

Because the ceilings were determined by considering the

military balance between NATO and WTO, each alliance can

possess the same number of weapons, for example, up to

20,000 battle tanks and 6,800 combat aircraft.

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Arms control in Europe has matured during the 1990s.

Fundamental question: Did the progress of arms control

increase the stability in Europe? Or, did the reduced

international tension enable agreements on arms control?

European history implies that successful arms control needs

a certain level of détente.

Paradox: Arms control is necessary for unstable regions with

intense conflicts, but in such regions, consensus-building on

arms control is quite difficult.

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Arms Control in AsiaArms Control in Asia

The structure of conflicts in Asia is considerably different from that in Europe.

In Europe: relatively simple structure of conflicts (“the East versus the West” during the Cold War)

In Asia: diverse and multifaceted conflicts (most of the conflicts are not interrelated with each other)

Many countries in Asia are modernizing and reinforcing their armed forces.

Arms control is much needed in Asia, but it is not easy for Asian countries to come to an arms control agreement.

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Arms Control in Asia (cont.)Arms Control in Asia (cont.)

Signatories of the Mine Ban Treaty in Europe and in Asia

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Signatories of the Convention on Cluster Munitions in Europe and in Asia

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1996 Agreement on CBMs between China and India

Aim: To stabilize the border areas Limitation of forces: To keep the strength of armed

forces within the border areas at “minimum levels” and set ceilings on those forces

Prior notification of large scale military exercises within the border areas

Weakness: Obligations under the agreement are not strong and not applicable to the forces outside the border areas

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CBMs under the Framework of the ARF The ARF requests the participating countries to;

Hold dialogues on security perceptions, including voluntary statements of defense policy

Have enhanced contacts, including high level visits and recreational activities

Exchange observers at military exercises Hold annual seminars for defense officials and military

officers

Weakness: NOT legally binding

Measures beyond mere dialogue, such as prior notification

of exercises or exchange of information on defense

budgets and force structure, are yet to be institutionalized

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Is it possible to enhance the arms control architecture in Asia?

Possible, but not a simple task

ARF framework is important, but forming a meaningful

agreement within it is not easy, because of the large

membership of the ARF

Bilateral and sub-regional dialogues are vital in Asia

We have no option other than to continue patient dialogues

for confidence-building and to gradually strengthen arms

control measures in the region

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