Counterguerrilla Operations - Ch3

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CHAPTER 3

Counterinsurgency Operations

Section I. General

3-1. Different conditions.

a . As described in chapters 1 a nd 2, the na ture of counterguerrillaoperations differs from the conditions most soldiers expect to face

in combat. The counterguerrilla commander faces an enemywhose objectives, tactics, and concepts are usually different from

his own.

b. This chapter exam ines the role of ta ctica l count erguerrilla

operations in relation to the COIN program. In addition, itdiscusses planning considerations and principles for thesuccessful conduct of counterguerrilla operations, as well asrelated operations that the counterguerrilla force must be

acquainted with.

3-2. US role.

The most common role in which US forces will conduct counter-guerrilla operations will be as a foreign internal defense (FID) force.The FID is designed to support the host country’s national objectivesand COIN plan. Two of the primary considerations for the FIDcommander are the final goals of the host country COIN program and

how to coordinate his operations to support hose goals.

Section Il. Considerations

3-3. FID operations.

a . Most US forces conducting counterguerrilla operations will bepart of an FID force. The commander must understand how FID

operations support the host country COIN plan. In this sense, thegoals of the host country COIN plan become the goals for the FID

force and the counterguerrilla commander.

b. The primar y considerat ion w hen planning count erguerrilla

operations is the effect operations will have on the populace.Commanders must attempt to win the active support of thepopulation for the government. At a minimum, counterguerrillaactivities must eliminate incidents which the guerrilla mayexploit in his psychological operations.

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3-4. Support of coin.

a . US forces committed to FID in the host country have a dualmission. First , they must defeat or neutral ize the guerri l la

militari ly so the host country government can begin or resumefunctioning in previously contested or guerrilla-controlled areas.

Second, they must support the overal l COIN program byconducting noncombat operations to provide an environmentwhere the host country government can win the trust and support

of its people and ultimately become self-sustaining. Both aspects

of the COIN mission a re of equal importa nce and a re usual lyconducted simultaneously.

b. A common mista ke ma de by FI D forces w hen tr ying to ga inpopular support is that they sometimes win popular support only

for themselves. The commander must ensure that popular

support, in the end, is for the host country government. Credit for

successful campaigns against the guerril las, or programs to help

the people, should go to the host country government and not tothe FID force commander.

3-5. Purpose of tactical operations.

Tactical counterguerrilla operations are conducted to reduce theguerri l la threat or act ivi ty in the area , and to provide a favorableenvironment for the host country’s development program. Thesepurposes are complementary. When the guerril la threat is reduced,internal development can begin, and when internal developmentworks, th e causes of dissat isfaction w hich ga ve rise to the insurgency

are alleviated. This deprives the guerrilla of both popular support and areason for fighting (which he needs to survive).

3-6. Planning considerations — METT-T.

a . Mission.

(1) Foreign internal defense operations fall into six areas:

(a ) Intelligence operations.

(b) Psychological operations.

(c) Populace and resources control operations.

(d) Military-civic action.

(e) Tactical operations (both strike and consolidation).

(f) A d v i s o r y a s s i s t a n c e .

(2) The combat brigade is most often concerned with tacticaloperations, but because of the nature of counterguerrillawarfare, a specif ic tact ical operat ion or campaign wil l

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probably involve elements of th e five oth er opera tions t osome degree. The commander’s guidance for counterguerrilla

operations is more detailed and comprehensive than formore conventional opera t ions an d mu st accommodat e a l l

operational aspects inherent in brigade counterguerrillaoperations.

(3) Before receipt of a specific mission, the commander’sguidance and subsequent planning is based on all probablemissions, to include supporting consolidation operations orconducting strike operations, as well as on the specificcharacteristics of the guerrilla, terrain, and population in the

specific opera tiona l ar ea. After receipt of th e mission, hisguidance becomes more specific and includes the extent towh ich t he briga de w ill become involved in each of the six

areas of FID operations.

b. Enemy. When evaluating the guerrilla capabilities and limitations,the comma nder considers:

(1) National and regional origins.

(2) Organization, to include effectiveness and unity of command.

(3) Str ength, morale, and st a t us of tra ining.

(4) Tactics being employed and tactical proficiency.

(5) Capability to attack, defend, and reinforce.

(6) Resources available:

(a) Food and water.

(b) Arms, ammunition, demolitions, fuels, medicines, andneclear, biological, chemical (NBC) protective equipment(agents, detection devices, and employment assets);external support — personnel, materiel, and mora le.

(7) Lea ders a nd t heir personalities.

(8) Relat ions w ith th e civilian populat ion.

(9) Status of supplies.

(10) Effectiveness of communications.

(11) Effectiveness of intelligence and counterintelligence, toinclude th e extent of infiltra tion of host countr y civil an d

mil i tary es tabl ishments .(12) Lines of communications.

(13) Vulnerabilities.

(14) External support.

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c. Terrain and weather. When evaluating the effects of terrain

and weather on counterguerri l la operat ions, the commanderconsiders:

(1) Effects of seasons of th e yea r (to include plant ing andharvesting periods), phases of the moon, and coastal t ides.Particular attention is focused on the effects of the weatheron men, equipment, visibility, and mobility (on both USforces a nd the guerril la ).

(2) Su ita bility of terr a in (to include lan ding zones a nd pickupzones) and road nets for tactical and logistical operations. As

with weather, particular attention is focused on the effects

the terrain has on men, equipment, visibil i ty, and mobili ty(on both U S forces an d t he guerril la).

d. Troops and resources available.

(1) The comma nder ha s a var iety of comba t, comba t support,a nd comba t service support asset s at his disposa l. Theseassets may be from US forces and civil ian agencies, or fromhost country forces and civilian agencies, or from a

combination of all these.

(2) Su ccessful count erguerrilla opera tions depend upon th ecommander uti l izing his available assets to maximize theirstrength s a nd m inimize their w eaknesses. To do this, thecommander real ist ical ly appraises the capabil i t ies andlimita t ions of his assets a nd t hen organizes and employs

them on suitable missions. Oftentimes, the commander findshe lacks assets which would greatly faci l i ta te mission

accomplishment. In these instances, he should request whathe needs from his higher headquarters. If his needs cannotbe met, he has the option of improvising a solution or doingwithou t .

(3) The peculiar circumst a nces of count erguerrilla w a rfa rerequire that senior commanders al low subordinate leaders,

at all levels, a great deal of flexibility in accomplishing theirmissions.

e. Time.

(1) Time is rela tive. The cond itions lea ding t o th e developmentof the insurgency did not appear overnight, and they will notdisappear overnight, ei ther.

(2) U S forces involved in FI D opera tions should a nt icipat estaying in the host country only as long as required tocomplete their mission. Usually, this will only be as long as it

takes the host country forces to assume missions thecounterguerrilla force is accomplishing. No matter how

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(3)

(4)

(5)

3-7.

a .

b.

c.

successful FID forces ar e milita rily, the insurg ency is notdefeated until the political, economic, and social problemswhich led to it are corrected or significantly alleviated. Thisusually takes a considerable length of t ime.

In the area of tactical operations, time available for planning

and execution varies. When planning for long-term actions,such as consolidation campaigns, a long lead time isnecessary to permit planning in meticulous detail. However,when planning shorter term actions, such as strike campaigns

or offensive operations against f leeting guerrilla targets,planning time is usually short .

Commanders at all levels can use the time available to them

more efficiently by planning for contingency missions. Lackof hard information precludes planning in detail, but routine

tasks common to similar missions should be codified instanding operating procedures (SOP) and understood by all

concerned. When the need to execute a contingency missionarises, the basic plan can be reviewed and planningexpedited by making minor adjustment as required.

Planning t ime is of ten extremely l imited. Warning andoperation orders are normally issued orally. In these

instances, the one-third rule applies: the commander utilizes

one third of the a vai lable t ime for his own plan ning a ndallows tw o thirds of the a vailable time for his subordinat es todevelop their plans and issue their orders. In many cases,

planning time will be so limited that formal planning isprecluded. In these instances, commanders direct theirsubordinates by using fragmenta ry orders .

Restrictions.

US forces engaged in counterguerril la operations function underrestrictions not encountered in other types of warfare. Theserestrictions may appear to hamper efforts to find and destroy theguerri l la . For example, the safety of noncombatants and thepreservat ion of th eir property is vi ta l ly importa nt to w inningthem over to the government’s side.

The guerril la knows this and will attempt to capital ize on i t byengaging US forces at locations where US fire would endangercivilians or damage their property. While the temptation to returnf i re ma y be great , a few dead or injured enemy wil l in no wa y

compensate for the ill will of the local populace if some innocentcivilians are killed or injured or their homes and propertydestroyed.

Political considerations influence the conduct of counterguerrillaoperations. It is essentially a contest between the host government

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and guerrillas concerning political, social, religious, or economicissues. The government and its representatives must presentthemselves and their program as the better choice.

d. Comma nders must be prepar ed to operat e in a broa d ra nge ofpolitica l a tm ospheres. The h ost country ’s form of governmentmay be anything from an absolute, and not too benevolent ,dictatorship to a democracy struggling to establish itself , or

anything in between.

e. No matter what political atmosphere prevails in the host country,the brigade comma nder must engage the guerri lla w ith everyasset a t the commander’s disposal . He must real ize thatdemocratic principles may not be immediately applicable.However, he should act within the l imits of his authori ty toimprove the circumsta nces of the government he w as sent t osupport. Any incidents of deep-rooted corruption, gross inefficiency,

or violat ion of huma n r ights sh ould be documented a nd r eportedto higher headquarters. The commander can also offer othera lterna tives to a ccomplish t he sa me objective. It is the respon-sibility of the US Government to influence the hostgovernment’s attitude toward democratic principles; it isnot the responsibility of the commander.

f . There will be situations where well-defined responsibilities in alocal area may not be readily apparent. I t is the duty of the higher

headquarters to determine these responsibilities and make them

known prior to the insertion of US forces, especially in the

execution of strike missions. However, there maybe eventualitiesin which the counterguerrilla force commander may be required to

coordinate with numerous governmental officials to locatesources of authority and decision. If the commander encountersgovernment of f icia ls wh o habitua l ly h inder operat ions aga instthe guerrillas through incompetence, self-interest, or suspectedsympathy for the guerril la cause, he should document his caseand forward i t to the next higher commander for disposition.

3-8. Operating principles.

a . Intelligence. Ta ctica l intelligence is the key to defeat ing t he

guerri lla . I t provides t he comma nder w ith informat ion a boutguerril la locations, activit ies, strengths, weaknesses, and planswhich enable the commander to seize the initiative. Without

intelligence sources, the chances of success (particularly inoffensive operations) are l imited and the commander must reactto guerrilla initiatives rather than controlling the situation in the

area of operations. Every relevant source of information about the

commander’s area of operation should be exploited and include:

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(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

The brigade intelligence section (and augmentation):

(a ) Ground surve i l l a nce ra da r ( a ugmenta t i on f romdivision).

(b) Ground sensors (augmentation from division).(c) Long-range surveillance unit (augmentation from

div is ion) .

(d) Aviation assets (augmentation from division).

(e) Aerial imagery reconnaissance (from corps).

The maneuver battalion’s intelligence section and recon-naissance platoons.

The maneuver companies’ sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Combat support units’ target acquisit ion batteries, mili tary

police, chemical reconnaissance units (if available), andsightings and reports (combat information).

Combat service support units’ sightings and reports (combatinformation).

Other sources:

(a )

(b)

(c)

(d )

(e)(f)

(g)

Local populace.

Intelligence agents (from division and corps).

Host government civil ian agencies.

Captured enemy documents (from division and corps).

Enemy prisoners (from division and corps).Intercepted enemy communications (from division andcorps).

Special operation forces.

b. Tactical situation. The organization for, and conduct of,counterguerrilla operations is dependent on the tactical situation.Units are organized and employed to counter the current guerrilla

th rea t. For example, if guerrillas a re operat ing in pla toon-sizeunits, then platoon- or company-size units are used against them.

These units conduct independent operations such as patrols andambushes, under centralized control (company or battalion). This

enables them to cover more area simultaneously th a n a largerunit and still have the firepower to deal with the typical guerrillaunit they might encounter. Employing a large force to counter a

significantly smaller guerrilla force is inefficient because itcompromises the chance of achieving surprise, reduces the area

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that can be covered at any one time, and is more difficult to move

(than a smaller force) if it is required elsewhere. However, sendinga sma ll force to counter a significant ly larger guerril la force ma yprove disastrous unless the smaller force is supported by fire or

can be rapidly reinforced.

c. Flexibility. Forces engaged in counterguerril la operations aref lexible and capable of adapting to rapidly changing tact icalsituations. The nature of counterguerril la warfare necessitatesbeing able to make swif t transi t ions from large to small unitoperat ions; to adjust to extremes of terrain, weather, andvisibility; to move on foot, by vehicle, or by aircraft; and tofunction in offensive or defensive modes. Adapting to changing

tactical situations keeps the guerrilla force off balance andprevents it from developing effective tactical operations.

d. Mobility.

(1) Count erguerr illa forces most possess mobility equa l to or

greater than that of the guerril la in order to find, fix, fight,and pursue him. Since the guerrilla is primarilly footmobile,

counterguerrilla forces equipped with motorized, mechanized,or air transportat ion assets would appear to have asignif icant mobil i ty advantage. However, the guerri l latypically operates from terrain that precludes (or severelyl imits) speed on a ground a pproach. The count erguerrillaforce’s mobil ity a dvan ta ge may n ot be as gr eat as i t f i rstappears to be. When terrain, weather, or the guerril la forcedisposition precludes closing on guerrilla positions byhigh-speed air or ground tr a nsport, th en counterguerr illaforces should be moved by the fastest available transportation

to the nearest sui table, safe area to launch footmobileoperations. A well-trained, footmobile counterguerrilla force,that can use terra in bet ter than the enemy, can achieve atac t ica l mobi l i ty advantage.

(2) Comma nders should not overburden soldiers with excessiveloads because the guerrillas will be able to outrun them.

Soldiers should carry only the things they need to find andf ix the guerrilla. Once this is accomplished, they can beresupplied by ground or air.

e. Minimum use of force.

(1) Only th e minima l firepow er needed to a ccomplish a givenmission is employed. If US forces come under guerrilla fire,

and i f by returning f ire noncombatant civi l ians maybeinjured or their homes and property destroyed, then only the

amount of fire necessary to protect US forces is returned.Under these circumstances, the commander at tempts tosuppress the guerril las with minimal return fire (possibly

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using snipers) and moves his forces to advantageouspositions from which he may engage the guerrillas while notendangering civilian life or property. He may use smoke and,

i f authorized, riot control agents to facili tate maneuver. Ifthe guerrillas cannot be engaged without endangeringcivilian life or property, the commander moves his forces(over covered or concealed routes) to positions that cut off

th eir esca pe routes a nd encircle th em. Then he begins t ot ighten the r ing around them.

(2) The unrest ricted use of firepower in th e vicinity of civilia nsor their property will result in turning their anger toward the

government a nd ma y turn them to the insurgent cause . US

soldiers must understand this and follow strict rules ofengagement. However, the right to self defense is neverdenied.

(3) All a va ilable fire ma y be brought t o bear on guerrillas w henit does not endanger civilian life or property. However, theexpenditure of ammunition should be appropriate: mortarsto knock out a ma chine gun position; small a rms t o kill asniper. The use of indirect fire, while effective in some cases,

is not a substitute for maneuver.

f. Patience. Counterguerrilla forces must anticipate long periodswithout making contact. The guerrilla knows he is outnumbered

and outgunned and avoids engagement unless it is on his terms.Counterguerrilla forces should not develop a false sense ofsecurity if i t appears the guerrilla has ceased operations in theirarea. I t must be assumed that the guerri l la is always observingthe operating patterns of the counterguerrilla force for weak

points, and waiting for lax security to strike with minimum risk. Aguerrilla attack must be expected at any time.

g . Reserves.

(1) The commander always maintains a reserve to takea dvan ta ge of sudden opportunities, and to counter guerrillainitiatives. The size of the reserve depends on the size of its

parent uni t a nd the ta ct ical s i tua t ion.

(2) In offensive opera tions, a compan y might keep a squa d inreserve; battalions, a platoon; and brigade, a company.

(3) In defensive operations, because of the need for 360-degree

security, a reserve at company and battalion is complicatedby the fact that the on-line strength of the perimeter isreduced.

(4) The compa ny or bat ta lion comma nder ma y ha ve to spreadhis forces thin to protect his perimeter. In these instances,the commander has four options: establish a small, centrally

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(5)

(6)

(7)

located reserve at the expense of on-line strength; establishno reserve but specify units on-line to be prepared to shift a

portion of their strength to other sections of the perimeter;establish no reserve but reinforce the most heavily contested

section of the perimeter by fire; and consider reducing thesize of the perimeter.

Brigades too should maintain a company in reserve in

defensive operations. This mission should be rotated amongcompanies, with the company that has spent the most t imein the field (or that has seen the heaviest action) beingdesigna ted a s the reserve. The reserve compa ny can r est,rearm, and train during the time it has the reserve mission.

The reserve unit should be highly mobile. Air transport is thepreferred method for moving the reserve because it is fast

and not dependent on open ground routes as are motorized ormechanized modes of transport. Whatever its mode of

transportation, the reserve’s vehicles are dedicated to thereserve and immediately available for employment.

Reserve units are prepared for contingency missions. If thereserve is committed, the commander designates a new reserve. In this case, his least committed unit is the first

choice.

Section III. Strike Campaigns

3-9. Targets.

This section provides guidance on the organization, missions,concepts, and operations of strike campaigns. Strike campaignsconsist of a series of major combat operations targeted againstinsurgent tactical forces and bases in contested or insurgent-controlledzones. Other int erna l defense activities ma y support t a ctical forcesduring strike operations. Strike campaign operations are usually ofrelatively short duration (generally, one day to several weeks). Whilethe guidance outlined here is focused on the infantry brigade, thissection may be extended to apply to any combined arms organizationconducting counterguerrilla operations.

3-10. Organization.

Brigades assigned strike campaign missions either are relieved fromarea responsibility in advance of the mission or, preferably, are

constituted as specialized forces held at the national or regional levels.Brigade strike forces are organized as self-sufficient task forces

capable of operating in areas remote from logistical bases. Brigadesare assigned support bases in secure areas for elements not committedto operations.

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3-11. Missions.

Strike campaigns are conducted against guerrilla forces and bases.They serve to keep guerrilla forces moving and off ba lan ce. St rikecampaign areas are usually outside of those undergoing consolidationor those under friendly control. Ground or water means of entry maybe

used, but air assault or parachute deliveries can be employed.

3-12. Concepts.

a . St rike campa igns include offensive ta ctics such a s ra ids,reconnaissance in force, hasty or deliberate attacks, and pursuit(or combinations of these operations).

b. Brigade strike campaign operations are conducted to:

(1) Harass the guerrilla to prevent the buildup of personnel andlogistical resources.

(2) Destroy the guerrilla force and its base complexes.

(3) Demonstrate support for the government and for thepopulace in the local area.

(4) Expand consolidation areas.

3-13. Operations.

a . Brigades committed to strike campaigns are assigned a tactical

area of responsibility. The brigade commander normally assignsoperational areas to the subordinate battalions which, in turn,may assign areas to companies. Company commanders may

assign specific areas to platoons at times; however, ’ platoons arenormally assigned specific missions rather than operationalareas. Each battalion normally establishes a separate operationalsupport base (OSB). Companies normally operate from patrolbases, but at t imes may operate separat e company OSB s. Whenthe areas assigned to units are too large to be reconnoiteredconcurrently by subordinate units, commanders establish anorder of priority for reconnaissance of the areas.

b. Battalion commanders maintain reserve forces (ready forces) toreact quickly to situations requiring an immediate response. Eachrifle company patrols its area of operations continuously and

a ggressively. The location of the compan y pa trol base a nd pa trolroutes are varied to ensure complete coverage of the area.

c. The rifle company moves to, secures, and occupies the companypatrol base with sufficient supplies to permit limited independentoperat ions. I f i t is to operate in the same area for a period of t ime, i tshould consider establishing small ration and ammunitionreserves.

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d . The company area is patrolled to provide complete coverage day

and night with emphasis on night patrols. Generally, platoon-size

patrols have sufficient f irepower to handle the situation if aguerrilla force is encountered. If additional support is needed, thecompany commander may maneuver his other platoons against

the guerril las, or he may request assistance from the battal ion

reserve (ready force). Emphasis is placed on engaging theguerril la with organic means of fire and movement (i f required)and on employing supporting arti l lery and air support.

e. Orders issued to the company commanders include the area

assigned and resupply instructions. The conduct of operations isbased on decentralized planning and execution. Companycommanders plan and coordinate platoon activities to ensurecompletion of the overall compa ny m ission. P lat oons on pa tr ol

carry l ight ra t ions a nd s tore unneeded equipment a t OSB s.

f . Rifle compa ny morta rs ma y (a t times) be located in bat ta lion

OSBs while fire support teams (FIST) move with the companies. Ifthe terrain and situation permit, battalion OSBs may be moved as

the companies move their patrol bases. If civilian communitiesare in the area, and if security conditions permit, battalion basesmay be near (but not within) the community. Here, the battal ionmay conduct psychological, intelligence, and military-civicaction operation.

g. Brigade commanders use all available means to locate guerril laforces and bases, and they give priority to destroying the guerrillaforces. An attack on a guerrilla force normally requires superiorcombat power. Reserves (ready forces) attempt to immediatelyengage and destroy moving guerrilla forces before they candisperse. Depending on the si tuation, either hasty or deliberate

attacks are made on guerril la bases that contain forti fications.

After a successful at ta ck on guerr illa forces, troops th oroughlysearch the area for guerrilla personnel, supplies, equipment, and

documents. Pursuit operat ions are undertaken to destroy orcapture forces attempting to flee. Arti l lery, air support, and aira ssault forces support ground pursuit .

h. The brigade does not normally occupy the a rea defensively for a n

extended time following a successful attack. Operations to searchout guerril las continue. Elements of the brigade may be rotatedthrough the brigade support base for periods of rest and training.

i. Speed and surprise are important in strike operations, especially

when attacking a known guerril la stronghold. The sudden andunexpected delivery of combat forces into a guerrilla-held or

contested a rea provides signif icant ad vant ages t o the counter-guerril la commander. If caught by surprise, the guerril la maybeunable to react in time to save himself. He is confused initially and

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may panic. In t he time it t akes him to become aw ar e of the ta ctical

situation, or to take effective action, the counterguerrilla forcesmay encircle him. Speed and surprise may be achieved by using

air assault tactics to insert the f irst counterguerrilla forces intothe area of operations. Subsequent forces can be delivered on laterairlif ts or by other modes of transportation.

j. Strike forces are most vulnerable just after entering a new area ofoperations. Initially, there is some confusion until patrol basesare established and patrols are sent out. counterguerrilla forcesmust be especially security conscious the first few hours in a new

location. Upon arrival, they should immediately establish targetreference points, observation posts, and listening posts.

Section IV. Consolidation Campaigns

3-14. Control.

a . This section provides the brigade guidance on the missions,organization, and operations of consolidation compaigns.Consolidation campaigns are the application of all civil andmilitary aspects of internal defense and internal developmentprogra ms. They a re designed to esta blish, rega in, or ma inta incontrol of specific areas.

b. The brigade pa rt icipat es in consolidat ion ca mpaigns by conducting

tactical, intelligence, psychological, civil affairs, populace andresources control, and advisory assistance operations.

c. Brigades committed to consolidation campaigns support theoverall host country internal defense and development (IDAD)

effort by applying their resources in the following manner:

(1) In the preparation and offensive phases, tactical operationsa re stressed. Initia l area cont rol is established by clearingguerrilla forces from an area, expanding it , and linking it toother areas as they are cleared.

(2) In th e development pha se, th e prima ry mission is ta cticaloperat ions t o maint ain security of the clea red ar ea. Concur-rently, the brigade performs intelligence, psychological,

populace and resources control, civil affairs, and advisoryassistance operations. The brigade also conducts military-civic

action in conjunction with civil affairs programs.

(3) Dur ing the completion pha se, wh en guerrilla a ctivity wit hina consolidated area has been largely neutralized and hostcountry agencies have resumed control of the area, thebrigade begins to phase out its participation in localoperat ions a nd prepares t o conduct operat ions in a nothera r e a .

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3-15. Preparatory phase.

Consolidation campaign plans are detailed and provide for long-rangecommitment of both personnel and materiel . Plans are coordinated

with al l a gencies involved in the consolidation campa ign. In a dditionto planning, the brigade conducts necessary training and becomesengaged in intell igence and other FID activit ies.

3-16. Offensive phase.

a . The offensive phase of a consolidation campaign involvesmoving the civil-military task force into the operational area,neutralizing guerrilla forces and sympathizers, and removinginsurgent personnel who may have infi l trated the local govern-

m e nt .

b. P a trolling, a rea surveil lan ce, a mbushes, an d other sma ll-unitactions are used extensively. Offensive operations, such asmovements to contact , hasty or del iberate a t tacks, ra ids, orpursuits fol low the small unit reconnaissance as targets arelocated.

c. Care is taken that once cleared, the friendly, controlled areas arenot allowed to revert to guerrilla domination.

3-17. Development and completion phases.

a . During the development and completion phases of a consolidationcampaign, brigade operations involve holding an area to permit

government agencies to conduct their internal defense anddevelopment programs. Operations also involve training localforces to assum e the defensive a nd security missions from the

regular a rmed forces. Aggressive defensive operat ions providesecuri ty against guerri l la a t tack, deny guerri l las access tosupport, and provide a secure base from which to expand theconsolidated areas. Offensive action is continued to destroyguerrilla forces; however, defense must be provided for population

centers, tact ical bases, logist ical instal la t ions, a irbases andairfields, and lines of communication.

b. Defensive actions are conducted to a ccomplish one or more of th efollowing:

(1) Dest roy or ca ptur e guerrilla forces.

(2) Reduce guerrilla ca pability an d opport unity for offensiveact ion.

(3) Deny guerrilla entry into an a rea.

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(4) P rovide security a nd th us develop fa vora ble condit ions forother IDAD operations.

c. The normal defense in consolidation campaign operations

employs small-unit tactics, using air assault and other reserveforces (ready forces) to immediately react to intelligence or aninsurgent attack. Artillery and air support is prearranged to thedegree possible, and plans are adjusted as required.

d . Security forces conduct extensive pat rolling t hroughout the a rea.The bulk of the brigade force may be assigned areas of responsibilityand be heavily engaged in patrolling and supporting efforts oflocal security forces.

e. The composition of the brigade reserve varies with the size of the

area, na ture of the enemy t hreat , a nd the terra in . Some brigadeunits ma y be fragmented into small elements a nd required todefend dispersed installations. In this situation, the reserve

elements are assigned contingency missions to provide reactionforces for several installations.

f. Area coverage may require assignment of f ire support units to a

much lower level than is normal in conventional operations. Tosupport dispersed security elements, decentralization of firesupport may be required. Direct fire supporting weapons(including artillery in the direct fire role) can be effective at short

ranges when using time and super quick fuze. Direct fire support

weapons are important if the guerrilla force moves within theminimum range of indirect f ire weapons.

g . All military and critical civilian installations and population

centers must be protected a gainst sabotage a nd a t ta ck.

h. The larger insta llat ions a nd communit ies a nd th e surrounding

smaller ones mutually assist each other in their defense. Firesupport from several installations and communities can contributeto mutual defense.

i. The defense of communities is primarily the task of localparamilitary forces and police. The defense of communities isconducted with special emphasis on physical security andpopulace and resources control measures. In planning thedefense, military units may be required to secure lines ofcommunication in the area. They may do so by surveillance,occupation of tactical positions, or use of guards for convoy

security, patrolling, and security posts. Along lines of communi-cation, fixed security posts protect critical points such as

terminals, tunnels, bridges, and road or railway junctions. Thesize of the security post depends on the mission and the type and

size of the hostile forces which may attack it . Security posts inremote areas are larger than those near supporting forces.

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Section V. Offensive Operations

3-18. Three phases.

This section discusses offensive operations which brigades (andsubordina te units) ma y h a ve to conduct. For purposes of organiza tionand clarity, operations are discussed under those phases of aninsurgency in which they will most often have to be conducted.Depending on the tactical situation, these operations, or variationsand combinations of them, may be conducted during any of the threephases of insurgent activity: latent and incipient insurgency; guerrilla

warfare ; and war of movement.

3-19. Phase I — Latent and incipient insurgency.

a . This phase ranges from subversive activity that is only a

potential threat, latent or incipient, to situations in whichfrequent subversive incidents and activities occur in an organizedpattern. It involves no major outbreak of violence or uncontrolledinsurgency activity.

b. P ossible insurgent activities during P ha se I include at ta cks onpolice forces, other terroristic activities, and some minor military

operations carried out to gain additional influence over thepopulation (or provide arms for the movement) and to challengethe government’s ability to maintain law and order. Furthermore,groundwork is laid for extensive external materiel support which

is essential in most cases for the expansion of the insurgency and

its eventual success.

3-20. Police-type operations.

a .

b.

c.

To control the m ovement of insurgents or guerrilla s, a nd t heir

materiel, police-type operations are conducted. These operationsare executed by host country police, paramilitary, or militaryforces. For various reasons, this may not be possible, and USforces may have to conduct police-type operations until hostcountry forces are available to relieve them. (Under US law, themilitary cannot advise or train foreign police forces.)

If US forces must conduct this type of operation, military policeunits are suitable for this function. If they are not available,combat forces do the job.

When conducting police operations, host government representativesare with US troops to serve as interpreters and advise on localcustoms and courtesies. When performing these duties, US troops

treat passive civilians and their property with as much courtesyand respect as the situation permits.

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3-21. Searches.

a .

b.

c.

d .

e.

f.

g.

h .

The need for a counterguerrilla force to conduct search operations

or to employ search procedures is a continuous requirement. Mostsearch operations support strike operations or consolidationoperations, or they may be conducted as the main effort in

populace and resources control operations. A search maybeoriented to people, to materiel, to buildings, or to terrain. It usually

involves both civil police and military personnel.

Since misuse of search authority can adversely affect the ultimate

outcome of operations agtainst guerrillas, seizure of contraband,evidence, intelligence material, supplies, or minor items duringsearches must be accomplished lawfully and properly recorded to

be of future legal value. Proper use of authority in searches gains

the respect and support of the people. Abusive, excessive, or

inconsiderate search methods may temporarily suppress theguerrilla force or expose elements of it, but at the same time such

methods may ultimately increase the civilian population’ssym pat hy for a nd/or support of th e guerrilla.

Auth ority for search opera tions is carefully review ed. Milita rypersonnel must be aware that they perform searches only in areaswithin military jurisdiction (or where otherwise lawful) for

purposes of apprehending suspects or securing evidence thattends to prove an offense has been committed. Usually, there are

special laws regulating the search powers of the military forces.These laws are given wide dissemination.

Search teams have detailed instruction on controlled items. Lists

of prohibited or controlled-distribution items such as chemicals,medicines, machine tools, and other items should be distributed.The military or civil police who administer the populace andresources control program are contacted before the conduct ofsearch operations, or periodically if search operations are acontinuing activity.

Sea rch operat ions involving U S forces ma ybe ineffective w henlanguage difficulties prevent full communication with theindigenous population. US units given a search mission areprovided with interpreters as required.

The pace at which a search operation is conducted is slow enough

to allow for an effective search but not so slow as to allow the

guerrilla force time to react to the threat of the search.

If a ctive resista nce develops t o the sea rch opera tion, offensiveoperations are conducted to eliminate the resistance.

Consideration is f iven to returning to a searched area after thecompletion of an initial search to surprise and eliminate

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guerri l las or their infrastructure that may have remainedundetected or may have returned.

3-22. Search of individuals.The fact that anyone in an area to be searched can be a guerrilla or aguerrilla sympathizer is stressed in all search operations. However,searchers are tactful to avoid making an enemy out of a suspect whomay, in fact, support the host country government. It is during theinitial ha ndling of a person a bout to be sea rched t ha t the great est

caution is required. During the search of an individual, one member of

a sear ch team alwa ys covers the other member w ho makes the actualsearch. (For information on how to conduct searches, see Appendix G.)

3-23. Checkpoints, roadblocks, and vehicle searches.

a . It will be necessary to maintain a continuous check on roadmovement to a pprehend suspects a nd t o prevent smuggling ofcontrolled items. This requires the use of checkpoints. Sincecheckpoints cause considerable inconvenience and even fear, it is

important that the civil population understands that checkpoints

are a preventive and not a punitive measure.

b. Checkpoints maybe described as either deliberate or hasty. Thedeliberate checkpoint is positioned in a town or in the opencountry, of ten on a m a in roa d. I t a cts a s a useful deterrent tounlawful movement. The hasty checkpoint is highly mobile and is

quickly positioned in a town or in the open country. The actuallocation of the hasty checkpoint is designed to achieve quick

success.

c. Concealment of a checkpoint is desirable, but often impossible.The location should make it difficult for a person to turn back orreverse a vehicle wit hout being observed. Culverts, br idges, ordeep cuts may be suitable locations. Positions beyond sharpcurves have the advantage that drivers do not see the checkpoint

in sufficient time to avoid inspection. Safety disadvantages mayoutweigh t he a dva nta ges of such positions. A scarcity of goodroads increases the effect of a well-placed checkpoint.

d . A checkpoint requires adequate troops to prevent ambush andsurprise by a guerrilla force. An element of the checkpoint force is

positioned and concealed an appropriate distance (one hundred to

several hundred meters) from the checkpoint to prevent the escapeof any vehicle or person attempting to turn back upon sighting the

checkpoint. The vehicle, driver, and passengers are searched. Ifthe checkpoint is manned for any length of time, part of the force

is allowed to rest. The rest area is located near the search area so

tha t the t roops can be a ssembled q uickly a s a reserve force. (For

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information on how to conduct checkpoints and roadblocks, seeAppendix G.)

3-24. Search of built-up areas - cordon and searchoperations.

a . Techniques. Search techniques in built-up areas are practicedby police and military forces operating in populated areas. Thesetechniques are required for searching either a few isolated huts or

buildings, or for searching well-developed urban sections. Search

operations in built-up areas require thorough preparation andrehearsal. Special emphasis should be given to the following:

(1) Divide th e a rea to be sear ched into zones, a nd assign asearch part y t o each. A sear ch party consists of a sear ch

element (to conduct the search), a secur i ty el ement (t oencircle the area and prevent entrance and exit, and to secure

open areas), and a r eser ve el ement (to a ssist , a s required).

(a ) The search element conducts the mission assigned forthe operation. Normally it is organized into specialte ams.

(b) The security element surrounds the area while thesearch element moves in. Members of the securityelement orient primarily upon evaders from thepopulated area; however, they can cut off any insurgentstr ying t o reinforce. Checkpoints a nd r oad blocks a reestablished. Subsurface routes of escape, such as

subways and sewers, must be considered when operat ingin cities.

(c) The reserve element is a mobile force within a nearbyarea. I ts specif ic mission is to assist the other twoelements should they meet resistance they cannothandle. In addition, it is capable of replacing orreinforcing either of the other two elements should the

need arise.

(2) Consider an y enemy materia l found, including propaga ndasigns and leaflets, to be booby-trapped until inspectionproves it is safe.

(3) Thoroughly search underground and underw at er area s. Anyfreshly exca vat ed ground ca n be a hiding place. U se minedetectors to locate metal objects underground and under-w a t e r .

(4) Deploy ra pidly, especia lly w hen a guerr illa force is st ill in the

area to be searched. The entire area to be searched is

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surrounded simultaneously. If this is not possible, observedfire must cover that portion not covered by soldiers.

b. Principles. A basic principle when searching a built-up area is

to conduct it with limited inconvenience to the population. Thepopulace may be inconvenienced to the point where theydiscourage guerrillas and insurgent sympathizers from remaining

in the locale, but not to the point that they collaborate with theguerrilla force as a result of the search. The large-scale search of a

built-up a rea is norma lly a combined civil police a nd m ilita ryoperation. It is planned in detail and rehearsed when possible.Physical reconnaissance of the area just prior to a search isavoided. Information needed about the terrain may be obtainedfrom aerial photographs. In larger towns or cities, the local police

may have detailed maps showing relative size and location of

buildings. For success, the search pla n mu st be simple an d beexecuted swiftly.

c. Command and control. Normally, a search involving abattalion or larger force is best controlled by the militarycommander with the civil police in support. A search involving asmaller force is best controlled by the civil police with the militaryin support. Regardless of the controlling agency, the actual search

is performed by h ost count ry police w hen t hey a re a va ilable in

adequate numbers and have been trained in search operations.(For detailed information on how to conduct cordon and search

operations, see Appendix G.)

3-25. Aerial search operations.

a .

b .

c.

d .

Search unite mounted in armed helicopters use the mobility and

firepower of these aircraft to the maximum. (This may seriouslyaffect the morale of the guerrilla force.)

Air assault combat patrols, conducting an aerial search,reconnoiter an assigned area or route in search of guerrilla forces.

When a guerrilla force is located, the air assault combat patrolmay engage i t from the air or may land and engage i t on theground. This technique has little value in areas of densevegetation. Use of air assault combat patrols should be limited to

those operations in which sufficient intelligence exists to justifytheir use a nd t hen norma lly in conjunction wit h ground oper-a t ions .

In ground search operations, helicopters drop off troops in an area

suspected of containing guerrilla elements. With the helicoptersovermatching from the air, troops search the area. Troops are then

picked up and the process is repeated in other areas.

Members of air assault combat patrols should be trained intracking procedures in order to follow guerrillas to their base. If

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the patrol encounters a large guerrilla force, the reserve (readyforces) are committed. Plans must provide for evacuation ofprisoners, casualties, and materiel.

3-26. Civil disturbance and riot control.

a . US forces participating in counterguerrilla operations may betasked to assist host country police and military forces inrestoring order disrupted by civil disturbance or riot. If thisoccurs, US force participation should be limited to containing the

disturbance and protecting US lives and property.

b. The suppression of demonstrators or rioters should be left entirely

to host count ry forces. Any d irect a ction by U S t roops aga instdemonstrators or rioters will be misrepresented by the insurgents

and their sympathizers as brutal suppression of legit imate

dissent and be used by them as a propaganda weapon. (Forfurt her inform a tion on specific techniq ues, see FM 19-15.)

3-27. Phase II — Guerrilla warfare.

a . Phase II is reached when the subversive movement, havingga ined sufficient loca l or externa l support, init iat es orga nized

guerrilla warfare or related forms of violence against thegovernment. Examples of insurgent activities during Phase IIinclude:

(1) Activities initia ted in P ha se I ar e cont inued a nd expan ded.Insurgent control, both political and military, over territoryand populace, is intensified.

(2) G uerrilla w a rfa re is used on a larger sca le, a nd limiteddefense is conducted in some geographic areas.

(3) An insurgent government is esta blished in insurgent-dominated a reas a s the mil ita ry si tuat ion permits . In a reasnot yet controlled, efforts are made to neutralize actual orpotential opposition groups and to increase infiltration intogovernment agencies. Intimidation through terror andthreat of guerrilla action increases and thus becomes moresignificant.

b. Milita rily, th e ma jor goa l is to contr ol a dditional a reas; th egovernment is forced to strain its resources trying to protecteverything at the same time. Insurgent forces attempt to tie down

government troops in static defense tasks, interdict and destroylines of communications, a nd ca pture or destroy supplies a nd

other government resources.

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3-28. Small-unit operations.

Small-unit operations are used against guerrilla activities in the

second phase of an insurgency. They are effective since small units cancover more territory than a large unit, they keep the guerrilla offbalance, and their friendly firepower (that can be rapidly massed) may

provide a fa vora ble ra tio in meeting engagements. In P ha se II , theguerrilla is usually opera ting in sm aller units, t oo.

3-29. Raid.

a .

b.

c.

A raid is an operation involving a swift penetration of hostileterritory to secure information, harass the guerrilla force, ordestroy the guerrilla force and its installation. It ends in aplanned withdrawal upon completion of the assigned mission. Asuccessful raid is based on accurate, timely, and detailed

information. Raids are usually targeted against single, isolatedguerrilla base camps. To assist in attaining surprise, the raidingforce uses inclement weather, limited visibility, or terrainnormally considered impassable.

The raiding force is normally organized into an assault element

and a security element. A larger raiding force may add a supportelement while a small raiding force includes supporting weaponsin the assault element.

The use of airborne and air assault forces for a raid enhances

surprise. If night airborne or air assault raids are conducted, theforce must be accurately inserted and oriented on the ground. Air

assault forces supported by armed helicopters offer infinite

possibilities for conducting raids. This type of raid force can movein, s trike the object ive, and withdraw without extensive preparat ionor support from oth er sources. (For furt her informa tion on th ecomposition and organization of raid forces, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10,

and FM 7-20.)

3-30. Patrols.

a . Conventional pa trolling doctrine norma lly a pplies to count er-guerrilla operations, but some techniques must be oriented to meet

the guerrilla’s activities and the operational environment.Patrolling becomes more significant in counterguerrilla operations

because of the difficulty in locating and identifying guerrilla

forces and determining their intentions. Patrolling is used whenlimited (or no) intelligence on guerrilla activity is available.Personnel should be thoroughly briefed, carry only mission-essentialequipment, a nd be physica lly fit. Routes a re pla nned carefullyand coordinated with higher, lower, and adjacent units, to include

air and ground fire support elements and reserve forces.

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b. Patrolling is done to f ind and destroy the guerrilla, and to denyhim use of an area. Patrols are usually categorized as either

combat or reconnaissance.

c. P a trols can be employed to:(1) Sa tura te area s of suspected guerrilla a ctivity.

(2) Control critical roa ds and tra ils.

(3) Maint a in conta ct between villa ges a nd units.

(4) Establish population checkpoints.

(5) P rovide securit y for friend ly forces.

(6) Int erdict guerrilla rout es of supply a nd communica tion.

(7) Est a blish a mbushes.

(8) P ursue, ma inta in conta ct wit h, a nd destroy guerrillas.

(9) P rovide interna l securi ty in rura l ar eas.

(10) Loca te guerrilla units and base camps.

d. Sa tura tion patr olling is extremely effective in P ha se II situations.

In this technique, patrols are conducted by many lightly armed,small, fast-moving units and provide thorough area coverage.Patrols move over planned and coordinated routes which arechanged frequently to avoid establishing patterns. Use ofsaturation patrolling results in the sustained denial of an area to

guerrilla forces as they seek to avoid contact with the counter-guerrilla units. In addition to harassment and discovery of

guerrilla tactical forces, this technique provides:

(1) An opportunity t o gain a n intima te knowledge of the area ofoperations.

(2) A form of reassu ra nce to th e local populat ion tha t thegovernment is concerned about their protection and security.

(3) A means by which informa tion a bout the guerrilla ca n beobtained. (For further information on preparation, execution,

and operational techniques of patrols, see FM 7-10, FM 7-20,

and Appendix D.)

3-31. Ambush

a . An ambush is a surprise attack from a concealed position upon

a moving or temporarily halted target. Ambushes give thecounterguerrilla force several advantages:

(1) An ambu sh does not require ground t o be seized or held.

(2) Sm a ller forces w ith limited weapons a nd equipment ca nharass or destroy larger, better armed forces.

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(3) G uerrillas can be forced to engage in decisive comba t a tunfavorable times and places.

(4) G uerrilla s ca n be denied freedom of movement a nd deprived

of weapons and equipment that are diff icult to replace.b. Well-plann ed and w ell-executed ambush es ma ybe the most

successful operational technique employed against guerrillas. Itis an effective technique to interdict movement of guerrilla forceswith in a n a rea. S election of the site is a key step in developing awell-organized ambush. Also, leaders must be proficient in usingmines, antihandling devices, demolitions, and expedient devicesfor organization of the position. Fire support is prepared forimmediate delivery on call.

3-32. Night ambush.

Ambush during darkness is difficult to control, but darkness increases

the security of the ambush party and the confusion of those beingambushed. A small ambush party generally is more practical;however, the size of the party depends on factors such as the size of theunit to be ambushed and the estimated guerrilla strength in the area.(For further information on preparation, execution, and operational

ambush techniques, see FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and Appendix C.)

3-33. Encirclement.

a . Encirclement offers the best chance to fix guerrilla forces inposition and achieve decisive results. The battalion and largerunits will usually plan and conduct encirclements. The companyand smaller units normally do not have the manpower and

command and control capability to execute encirclements exceptas part of a larger force.

b. E ncirclements requir e a ccura te intelligence on th e loca tion of

guerrilla elements. Since it requires a major portion of thecounterguerrilla force to execute this maneuver, it is usuallytargeted against large guerrilla forces or guerrilla base complexes,a series of smaller base camps clustered within an area.

c. Planning, preparation, and execution are aimed at encircling the

guerrilla force rapidly. Maximum security a nd surprise ca n bega ined by occupying t he initia l encirclement positions duringdarkness .

d. In large operat ions, air assa ult a nd airborne troops a dd speed an dsurprise to the operation. Positions are occupied simultaneouslyin order to block escape. If simultaneous occupation is not

possible, probable escape routes are covered first. Initialoccupation is the most critical period of the operation. When theguerrillas become aware that they are being encircled, they will

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e.

f.

g .

h .

i.

probably probe for ga ps or a t t ack weak points a nd a t t empt tobreak out.

Encircling units provide strong combat patrols far to their front togive early warning of attempted breakouts. Mobile reserves are

positioned to counter a breakout and to reinforce difficult areassuch as broken terrain or areas with caves, tunnels, orfortification complexes.

Indirect f ire support can serve to cloak an encirclement bygaining and holding the guerrillas’ attention. Fires are planned in

detail to support the encirclement.

Following completion of the encirclement, the circle is contracted

to capture or destroy the guerrilla force. As the circle is contracted,units m ay be removed from t he l ine and a dded to the reserve.Against small guerril la forces, the encircled area may be clearedby contraction and a final sweep. Against larger guerril la forces,however, at some point, some action other than contraction will be

required.

One technique consists of driving a wedge through the guerril laforce to divide it and then destroying the guerrillas in eachsubarea .

Another technique, employed after some degree of contraction, is

to employ a blocking force on one or more sides of the perimeterwhile the remainder of the encircling force drives the guerrillasagainst the blocking force. Either element may accomplish theactual destruction. This technique is effective when the blockingforce can be located on, or immediately in the rear of, a natural

terrain obstacle. (For further information, see Appendix G.)

3-34. Phase III — War of movement.

The si tuation moves from Phase II to Phase III when insurgency

becomes primarily a war of movement between organized insurgentforces a nd forces of th e establ ished government. During P ha se III ,insurgent activit ies conducted in Phases I and II are continued and

expanded. Larger insurgent units are used to fight government forcesand to capture key geographical and political objectives to be used todefeat government forces.

3-35. Large-unit operations.

When an insurgency enters Phase III, the guerrilla begins to mass his

forces and challenge government forces openly. He may begin to useconventional warfare tactics to a greater degree. He may even elect to

stand and fight in defense of terrain i f he feels that i t is in his interest toreta in it or if he feels tha t h e ca n dea l government forces a seriousmilitary or poli t ical defeat by defending. In this phase, conventional

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warfare tactics can be effectively employed to defeat the guerrilla. (For

further information on how to employ these tactics, see FM 7-8, FM7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 7-30.)

3-36. Movement to contact.

a . Movement to contact in counterguerrilla tactical operations isbasically th e sam e a s in conventional conflicts. Night movement,clandestine movement, and counterambush precautions areemphasized.

b. C ar e is ta ken t o avoid a mbushes in movement t o conta ct . Theinfantry maintains contact by aggressive frontal and f lank

patrolling by small security elements, thereby exposing aminimum of troops to ambush. Supporting fires are placed

close-in along, and parallel to, the route of advance.

3-37. Reconnaissance in force.

a . Reconnaissance in force is a limited-objective operation todiscover and test guerrilla positions, locations, and strength, and

to gather information. In counterguerri l la operat ions, theobjective is collection of information about guerrillas and thedestruction of units and facilities. The commander is prepared to

exploit m eeting engagements a nd intell igence to a chieve ta cticalsuccess by conducting a ha sty or delibera te a t t ack to destroydiscovered guerrilla units and facilities. The recon force mayconduct the operation as a unit, or selected subordinate units may

be committed on a limited scale.

b. Reconnaissance-in-force operations normally develop informationmore rapidly a nd in more detai l tha n do other reconna issancemethods. When firm intelligence is lacking, the principal effort ofthe recon unit may be a widespread and continuous reconnais-sance-in-force operation coupled with mandatory securitymissions. In arriving at a decision to reconnoiter in force, thecommander considers:

(1) His overall mission.

(2) His knowledge of the enemy s itua tion.

(3) The urgency and importa nce of other informa tion,

(4) The efficiency and speed of other intelligence collection

agencies .

(5) The possibility that the reconnaissance may lead to ageneral engagement under favorable conditions.

(6) The continuin g requirement s for local and a rea security.

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(7) The availability of adequate reserves (reaction forces) andthe resources to deliver them quickly to the area to beexploited.

(8) The availability of adequate, all-weather fire support means.

c. The reconnaissance elements in the force should have mobility at

least equal to that of the enemy. Mobile reserves (ready forces)quickly exploit guerrilla weaknesses and influence the action.

3-38. Hasty attack.

a .

b.

c.

d .

Once contact with the enemy is made, the commander deploys his

force, coordinating movement, fires, air support, and other means

in an attempt to immediately destroy the enemy or fully develop

the situation. Generally, if the leading element contacting theenemy cannot defeat him quickly, the commander must decide

whether to conduct a hasty attack or to take time to develop thesituation more carefully and then conduct a deliberate attack.

At times, the intelligence available to the commander indicatesclearly which course he should follow. At other times, however,judgment may dictate that he conduct a hasty attack to avoid

being held up by inferior forces and being unnecessarily delayed.At the same time, he must be careful to avoid being drawn into

ambush .

Conduct of a hasty attack is a diff icult and challenging operation.Ideally, there should be no pause in the forward momentum of the

force upon initial contact. Maneuver units swing into actionimmediately, using movement techniques appropriate to theenemy a nd terra in .

The commander calls for available fire support. He coordinatesand maneuvers resources so as to apply the combat power needed

aga inst t he enemy. The ha sty at ta ck tries to fix enemy elements inplace with firepower and either overrun or encircle them. Speed is

essential. The reserve force has to be deployed early if maneuverelements are held up. If momentum is lost, the hasty attack fails.

3-39. Deliberate attack.

a . When the force commander knows he has encountered a strongenemy force in well-prepared defensive positions, he mayconclude that a deliberate attack is necessary.

A deliberate attack is characterized by detailed (and widelydistributed) knowledge of enemy positions, by large volumes ofeffectively delivered supporting fires, by extensive deception, byfull exploitation of electronic warfare (EW), and by employing

b.

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measures beyond those possible in a hasty attack. Continuedcontact with the guerrilla force must be maintained to prevent its

escape.

3-40. Exploitation.

a . If an attack succeeds, exploitation and pursuit follow. Exploitation

is an operation undertaken to follow up success in the attack.Following the principle of reinforcing success, immediate

exploitation using an uncommitted element of the force isadvisable.

b. The exploiting force drives swiftly to disrupt guerrilla commandand control functions, severs escape routes, destroys reserves andequipment, and denies the enemy an opportunity to reorganize hisdefense. The exploitation force is large, reasonably self-sufficient,

and well-supported by tactical air , air cavalry, and attackhelicopters. It does not pause to achieve minor tactical successesagainst isolated or f leeing enemy units; i t attempts to f ix themwhile concentrating on destroying the main guerrilla force. The

commander provides mobile support, including helicopters foremergency supply of petroleum, oil, and lubrican ts (POL ) a nda mmun ition, an d ensures sufficient follow -on forces t o at ta ckguerrilla forces bypassed or fixed by the exploiting force.

3-41. Pursuit.

a .

b .

c .

d.

Pursuit is an offensive action against a retreating enemy. It is the

f inal phase of the exploitation and occurs when a large guerrilla

force attempts to disengage. Normally, i t at tempts to cut offescape routes and encircle and destroy the guerrilla force. Itmaintains pressure with an exploiting force.

As the guerrilla unit disintegrates, exploitation may develop intopursuit. Pursuit may develop in any operation in which the enemy

has lost his ability to operate effectively and attempts to flee.Pursuit requires energy and resolution to press on despite fatigue,dwindling supplies, or the approach of darkness. Nighttimepursuit increases the enemy’s confusion and speeds his disinte-grat ion.

The primary purpose of pursuit is to destroy the guerrilla force.Although terrain objectives may be assigned as control measures,

the primary objective is the guerrilla force.

In pursuit, the requirements and command relationships forforces which follow and support are the same as in exploitation.They destroy bypassed enemy strongholds, relieve supportedunits that have halted to contain enemy forces, guard prisoners,

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open and secure lines of communications, and control refugees. In

conducting a pursuit , t he comma nder ma inta ins unremitting,direct pressure aga inst t he enemy w hile try ing to envelop him to

cut his line of retreat. When conditions permit, the commanderorders double envelopments of the retreating guerrilla force. Hemakes maximum use of fire support, air assault forces, andoffensive electronic warfare.

Section VI. Defensive Operations

3-42. Variations.

a . This section discusses defensive operat ions w hich brigades a nd subordinate units may have to conduct. Depending on the tactical

situation, these operations, or variations of them, may beconducted during any phase of an insurgency. In some instances,

the type of operation under consideration is identical to onealrea dy discussed in Section V. The difference is the purpose.

b. For example, patrolling maybe either offensive or defensive in

purpose. When its purpose is offensive, it is done to locate the

enemy and destroy him. When its purpose is defensive, it is done todeny the enemy access to an area, and to keep him fromorganizing for offensive opera tion. (For similarities of offensiveand defensive operations, see Section V.)

c. This section also provides guidance to commanders concernedwith the defense of various types of temporary or semipermanent

bases, such as logistical installations, OSBS, airfields, andairbases, under varying conditions of security that may exist in

an area of operations.

d. It is also applicable to the defense of civilian communities.

Commanders responsible for bases, facilities, and communitiesshould exercise those principles and techniques discussed whichapply to their particular situation.

3-43. Base defense environment.

a . De fense and secur ity of t ac t ica l un it s and insta l l a t ions a reintegra l part s of combat missions. (The term “ba se” is used toinclude all types of facilities to be defended.)

b . B a se defense operat ions a re executed un der th e guidan ce of a na rea comma nder w hose responsibilities include protecting th eresources of his area from interruptions caused by enemyactivities. This is a territorial responsibility in which basecommanders provide for the local defense of their immediate base

ar eas. In addition, base comma nders ma y be a sked t o provide

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resources for other activities which may be classified as rear

battle.

c. The base defense environment is established in an area generally

controlled by friendly forces but not sufficiently secure to preventguerrillas from moving in small groups, establishing firingpositions, or mounting small-scale attacks.

d. Conditions which may characterize the environment for basedefense include:

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

(7)

(8)

(9)

3-44.

US forces are in a host country.

Other nations in similar roles may be in the same hostcountry.

Unity of comma nd or a combined headqua rters ma y or ma ynot exist.

Although there is organized armed conflict, there is norecognized state of war.

Many of the guerrillas do not wear distinctive uniforms. Attimes, some may appear dressed in government uniforms.Guerrillas cannot always be distinguished from governmentsupporters or n eutra ls even w hen they a re conducting overtoperations.

External support may be provided to the guerrillas, bothovertly and covertly. Nations or groups supporting theguerrillas ma y provide san ctua ries where guerrilla forcesmay establ ish base areas.

Paramilitary forces may assume increased responsibilities.

No military "frontline" exists where continuous contact canbe maintained.

Guerrillas usually do not hold territory. They may disperseand avoid combat at the appearance of a stronger force.

Missions, functions, and responsibilities.

a . Base defense consists of both normal and emergency localmilitary measures taken to nullify or reduce the effectiveness ofenemy attacks or sabotage. Base defense is conducted to ensurethe continued effectiveness of its facilities and units to fulfill theirmissions.

The commander of an area or a subarea tha t conta ins a base isresponsible for its overall defense. The base commander, however,

is responsible for its local defense; he must have under his

operational control all forces, regardless of branch of service, thatare assigned to the base primarily for its defense. Forces assigned

b.

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to the ba se for other prima ry purposes w ill also assist in loca ldefense during an attack. Each commander of forces located at abase is responsible for:

(1) Participating in preparation of base defense plans. Traininghis forces for base defense.

(2) Providing appropriate facilities and essential personnel for

the base defense operations center and appropriate personnelfor the base defense force staff.

(3) Providing for internal security of his own command.

3-45. Passive defense.

In addition to their assigned defense missions, all units in the base area

are responsible for maximum implementation of passive defense.

Passive defense consists of measures taken to reduce the probability(and to minimize the effects) of damage caused by hostile action,wit hout t he expecta tion of ta king the initia tive. Responsibility for t heconduct of specialized passive defense measures is assigned tofirefighting units, chemical units, medical units, and other appropriateorganizations capable of satisfying passive defense requirements.Additionally, a ll units a ssigned to the base initiat e pa ssive defensemeasures, such as dispersion, camouflage, blackout, and use ofshelters. These measures assist in preserving the operating integrity of

th e base a nd ensuring decisive a nd effective action a ga inst enemyat tack.

3-46. Command relationships.

Command relationships for base defense operations provide unity ofcommand while preserving simplicity. The urgency of base defenseoperations requires clear-cut authority.

3-47. Fundamentals of base defense.

a . Base defense. It is established to provide all-round security forthe ba se with a vailable forces a nd is chara cterized by deta i ledplanning and centralized control. Security measures may alsoinclude provisions to protect adjacent civilian communities, iffeasible. Consta nt a nd aggressive a ction by friendly elementsagainst enemy forces constitutes a major element of base defense.

Vigilance and sound security measures reduce enemy interferencewith operations at the base and also tend to cause enemy forces to

divert their operations from the area.

Use of terrain. Proper evaluation and organization of the areaare essential to hold down the number of additional forcesrequired for base defense. Factors considered are:

b .

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(1) Natural defensive characteristics of the terrain.

Use of artif icial obstacles to enhance the natural defensive

characteristics of the terrain.(2)

Existing roads and waterways used for mili tary l ines ofcommunications and civilian commerce.

(3)

Control of land areas surrounding the base complex to arange beyond that of enemy mortars and rockets , and alsocontrol of water approaches.

(4)

c. Security. Ea rly w ar ning of pending actions ensures th e basecommander time to react to any threat. Outposts, patrols, ground

surveillance andcountermortar radar, infantry scout dogs (if

ava ilable), a nd a ir reconna issance and surveillance provide ea rlywarning. Civilian informants and actions of indigenous personnel

near the base are excellent indicators of pending enemy actions.

Securi ty measures va ry w ith enemy threat , forces a vai lable, a ndother factors; all-round security is essential.

d. Mutual support. Defending forces are positioned to ensuremutual employment of defensive resources, which include fires,observation, and maneuver elements. Mutual support betweendefensive elements requires car eful pla nning, positioning, a ndcoordination because of the circular aspects of the base area.Surveillance, obstacles, prearranged fires, and maneuver are usedto control ga ps. Defense pla ns provide for use of all a va ilablesupport, including attack helicopters and close air support.

e. All-round defense. In defensive planning, the base commanderhas to be prepared to defend against enemy attack from any

direction. Plans are sufficiently flexible, and reserves arepositioned to permit reaction to any threat. Base defense forces(BDF) are assigned primary and alternate positions and sectors ofresponsibility. All personnel are assigned duty stations orshelters.

f . Defense in depth. Alternate and supplementary positions,combat outposts, and mutually supporting strongpoints in frontof the base forwa rd defense area extend t he depth. The comman der

plans fires throughout the defensive area up to the maximumrange of available weapons. Portable obstacles may be placedaround critical targets during reduced visibility to disrupt theenemy’s pla n a nd a dd depth t o the defense.

Responsiveness. Attacks against a base may range fromlong-range sniper, mortar, or rocket fire to attacks by suicidedemolition squads or major forces. The enemy has the advantage

of deciding when, where, and wit h w ha t force he will at ta ck. Thedefender positions his forces and plans fires and movement so he

can respond to the widest possible range of enemy actions. The

g .

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defender prepares plans, t o include countera t t ack plans, a ndrehearses, evaluates, and revises them as necessary.

h . Maximum use of offensive action. Since the objective of thebase defense is to maintain a secure base, the defender uses

offensive action to the maximum to engage enemy forces outsidethe base. On initial occupation of the base site, friendly forces take

offensive actions to destroy enemy forces in the immediate area.The area commander employs patrols, ra ids, ambushes, a ir

at tacks, and supporting f ires to harass and destroy anyremaining enemy force. Once the enemy has been cleared from the

area, the base can be defended by a smaller force. The BDFcommander mainta ins constant l ia ison wi th major tac t ica l uni tcommanders in the area to stay abreast of efforts to remove the

t h r e a t .

3-48. Defense preparations.

a . Implementation of base defense measures in a new base beginsbefore base units ar rive, if possible. Norma lly, comba t unit s

provide the initial defense in a new base area, These combat forcesremain in the base area, conducting aggressive offensive actions,until base units are capable of assuming the mission.

When base units arrive, they immediately start organizing thebase defense. They perform many of the tasks concurrently, butsome tasks require priority. The base commander specifies the

sequence for preparation of the defense system. (FM 7-8, FM 7-10,

and FM 7-20 provide a recommended sequence for tacticaldefense. For more information on base defense, see Appendix E.)

3-49. Patrols.

b.

a .

b .

c .

Base defense operations to counter small groups of enemy forcesinclude aggressive, frequent patrolling by squad- and platoon-size

forces to detect and capture or destroy small groups of guerrillas.Infantry scout dogs, i f available, maybe used to add security and

additional detection abil i ty to patrol operations.

Patrolling is conducted by small, highly mobile units moving onfoot or by vehicles during daylight and darkness. It may includethe use of a ircraf t or boat s. Populat ed areas n ear t he base are

searched, and surprise checkpoints are established along knownor suspected routes of guerrilla communications.

Dug-in or concealed night ambush sites are manned outside thebarrier system t ra ce on a ra ndom basis. Indigenous personnelshould accompany ambushes near populated areas. Theirknowledge of local populace and terrain assists the ambushmission. Artillery and mortar targets are registered and plotted to

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provide rapid on-call support. Detectors and sensors are emplaced

to provide early warning.

d. BD F or other base uni t reconnaissance patro ls obta in targe ta cquisition da ta . They ma y penetra te known guerrilla-contr olledterritory to install sensors that report the enemy’s presence alonginfil tration and supply routes. In addition, such patrols observeknown infi l tration and supply routes and report any activi tyalong these routes. They provide early warning of guerrillaa ssembly of personnel; movement of w eapons, am munit ion, orother supplies; and preparation of mortar and rocket firing sites.

In addition to the acquisition of specific targets, reconnaissancepatrols may be used to locate suspected areas where other types of

surveillance or acquisition systems may be employed to obtaininformation. Indigenous personnel are valuable assets toreconnaissance patrols. Their knowledge of the terrain, ability to

operate effectively in the environment, knowledge of the

language, and familiarity with local customs are useful.e. Combat patrols, when used for base defense, are employed in

diff icult terrain some distance from the base but within range ofsupporting artil lery. Combat patrols employ ranger-type tacticsand remain committed for relatively long periods. They may besupplied by air and equipped to communicate with the base andsupporting aircraft . Such patrols may vary in size from squad toplatoon. They have the mission of making planned searches tolocat e ar eas us ed by guerrillas to hide supplies, regroup, rest,train, or otherwise prepare for offensive actions. Small groups ofguerrillas are engaged and destroyed. Large groups are reportedand kept under surveillance until they are attacked. Augmentationin the form of loca l para military guides or tra ckers increases th e

effectiveness of combat patrols.(1) Reaction force operations. When a guerrilla unit is

located, the reaction force is deployed rapidly to engage theunit, disrupt its cohesion, and destroy it. If the guerrilla force

cannot be contained and destroyed, contact is maintained;reinforcements are dispatched if needed; and the guerrillasare pursued. When escape routes have been effectivelyblocked, the attack is continued to destroy the enemy force.The required mobility is provided by ground and air vehicles

and by rapid foot movement. Wheeled vehicles for reactionforces are predesignated.

(a) Reaction operations are simple, planned, and rehearsed

day and night . Pr imary and a l ternate points arepredesignated for the release of reaction forces from

centralized control to facilitate movement againstmultiple targets. Such points are reconnoitered andphotographed for use in planning and briefing. Withinsecurity limitations, actual release points are used

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during rehearsals to promote complete familiarity with

the area.

(b ) Immediate reaction to any type of attack is essential

and is attained through employment of firepower andmovement of forces and their equipment. Immediatereaction to accurate and t imely intel l igence maypermit destruction of the guerrilla force before anattack. Immediate reaction to standoff mortar or rocket

fire may permit destruction of the guerrilla force during

an assault on the base and facilitate blocking routes ofwi thdrawa l .

(2 ) Host and third country forces. The BDF commander

normally considers the integration of host and third countryforces in the overall base defense effort. Particular emphasis

is on integration of host country forces in patrol andpopulace cont rol a ctivities. B oth host an d third country

forces provide local security for their own units; however, toensure maximum benefit , all such local plans should becoordinated with, and integrated in, the base master defenseplan. The degree of participation in base defense by host and

third country forces depends on the orders and guidance oftheir governments.

3-50. Securing lines of communication (LOC).

a . Guerril las may attempt to sever l ines of communications (LOC)by various methods. Road s, wa terwa ys, an d ra i lwa ys can bemined, or am bush sites locat ed ad jacent to them. B ridges an dtunnels can be destroyed by demolitions. It is impossible toabsolutely secure long lines of communication, but measures can

be taken to minimize the effect of guerrilla activity against them.b . Patrolling by counterguerrilla forces increases the chances of

detecting guerrillas before they can emplace mines or demolitions,or establish ambushes or roadblocks. During Phases I and 11 of aninsurgent action, military police can do most of the patrolling of

ground lines of communication, but the tactical situation maydictate combat forces having to perform this mission.

c . P at roll ing is done regularly , but pa trols should not esta bl ish aroutine which ena bles th e guerril la to avoid or a mbush t hem.Patrols must pay par t icular a t tent ion to probable ambush s i tesand chokepoints where roadblocks or mines and demolitionswould be effective.

d. Aerial patrols are effective for covering large areas in a short time.e. Surface patrols are slower, but they can check routes in greater

detail. Surface patrol members must be trained in the detection ofmines and booby traps. Mine detectors and infantry scout dogs, if

ava i lable , may a id them in this task.

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f .

g .

h .

i .

j .

The prima ry fun ction of a pa tr ol is to check th e securit y of theroutes i t pat rols. Ordinar i ly , ma npower constr aint s prohibi t apatrol from being organized and equipped to counter a large

guerrilla force; however, reinforcement by artillery and attackhelicopters increases a patrol ’s capabil i ty to deal with guerril lasthey encounter. Patrols are organized with enough combat power

to survive an initia l conta ct. Recent guerr illa a ctivity providesguidance on how patrols are organized. If the guerrilla is found in

strengt h, h is destruction is th e reaction force mission.

P at rols a lwa ys a t tempt to make init ia l conta ct wi th the sma l les t

of their elements, and they must be thoroughly proficient in counter-am bush techniques .

Roadblocks, checkpoints, and guardposts at critical chokepoints(such as bridges and tunnels) are effective in preventing acts ofsabotage. Vehicles and persons are stopped and searched before

being allowed to proceed. Vehicles are not allowed to stop on orunder bridges or in tunnels.

Crit ical chokepoints a re wa tched car efully a t night . P ersonnelguar ding them a re equipped w ith night vision equipment, a ndground survei l lance radar and sensors are used to cover theimmediate, surrounding area. Curves on rai lroads are a lsowatched. Mining indirect approaches to sensitive areas may help

to lessen the chances of ground attack. The area is ringed withplan ned a rt i l lery f ires, an d bunkers a re constr ucted to protectguard personnel and provide them positions from which to fightuntil reinforced. Underwater approaches to bridges are reinforced

by booby-trapped obstacles.

E ngineers a re used t o help keep lines of communicat ion open.They can loca te a nd clea r mines, clear potent ial a mbush sit es,

and repair damage. They may also prepare defensive systems aroundchokepoints.

3-51. Defending against guerrilla offensive.

a . When insurgent action enters Phase III , the guerril la may beginto a t tack using conventional tact ics with the intention ofcapturing and holding facilities, installations, bases, communities,

and t.errority. He also attemps to permanently sever critical linesof communication. These attacks are similar to attacks conducted

by conventional infa ntr y except th e initial a bsence of esta blished

lines enables the guerrilla to strike from any direction, or frommany directions at once. As host government and US forces react

to these initiatives, enemy and friendly lines may evolve;however, during the initial stages of the guerrilla’s offensivecampaign, friendly bases, facil i t ies, instal lation, and even citiesmay be surrounded and come under siege.

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The organization of the defense and the construction of physicaldefenses must be at least part ia l ly completed prior to theguerrilla’s attack if the defenders are expected to hold until acount eroffense ca n begin.

c . Once enemy and friendly lines a re esta blished, conventiona ltactics are employed by both sides. Initial ly, however, US forcesma y ha ve to conduct l imited a tt acks to reopen l ines of communi-cation or to relieve besieged areas.

Section VII. Common Operations

Operations common to offensive and defensive counterguerrillaopera t ions ma y be conducted during a ny of the t hree phases of aninsurgency. The degree to which these operations are utilized isdependent on the tactical si tuation.

3-52. Movement security.

a . All movements of troops and supplies are planned and conducted

as tact ical operat ions with emphasis on extensive securi tymeasures. These security measures may include:

b .

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

Secrecy when planning and disseminating orders, strictnoise and light discipline during movement when appropriate,

and varying routes and schedules of movement.

Security forces organized and equipped to ensure effectivefront , f l ank, and rear securi ty during movement and hal ts .

Pre-positioning security elements along the route of movementhelps in performing route reconnaissance and movement

security.

Coordination with supporting air units to ensure a thoroughunderstanding of air support used to assist the movement,both in taking preventive measures and in close combatopera tions. The need for secrecy ma y preclude initia l a ircover, but it will not preclude use of close air support whenrequired. The use of aerial photographs is critical.

Fire support elements which provide close and continuousfire support for the movement.

Maneuver for counterambush actions, to include contingencyplan s for immediat e act ion a gainst a n a mbush an d use of

formations which allow part of the column to be in position tomaneuver against an ambush force.

Communications with supporting units, adjacent hostcountry forces, and higher headquarters, to include airborne

radio relay.

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Varying the locat ion o f leaders , communicat ions , andautomatic weapons within the movement formation.

(8 ) Questioning local civilians along the movement route for

intelligence information, to include possible guerrillaambush si tes .

(9) Movement by bounds with overmatching f ire.

(10) Use of infant ry scout dogs, i f a vaila ble, and other ambushdetection means.

(7)

b. Organiza tion of the movement depends upon the type ofmovement, whether by ground, air, or water.

c . Planning for movement is coordinated with military units along

routes of movement and considers the following:

(1) Communications. Communications are vital to thesuccess of movements. Radio communication is planned andavailable between convoy serials and march units , withart i llery forwa rd observers and a ir controllers , and withunits and population centers in the areas along the route ofmovement. Visual and sound signals, which include coloredsmoke, identification panels, and whistle or horn signals, areprearranged. While limited, these communication means are

effective when prearranged meanings and responses areunderstood and rehearsed.

(2) Artillery and mortar support. Artil lery and mortarsupport may be provided by units within range of the route of

movement or by arti l lery and mortars which may bepositioned within range of the proposed route. Movements

requiring artillery and mortar support have observers eitherwith them or in supporting observation aircraft . Strip mapsmarked with planned targets enable personnel (other thanforward observers) to request f ires. Coordination with f iredirection centers (FDC) capable of providing fire along theroute of movement ensures that forward observers can enter

the FDC net, make routine location reports, and request and

adjust f ires. Call signs, frequencies, authentications, areasof possible employment, schedules of movement, and targetnumbers are coordinated.

(3) Aircraft. Experience has shown that the presence ofaircraft deters ambushes. Column movement covered by

t ravel ing overwatch or bounding overwatch at tack hel icopters ,in conjunction with a route reconnaissance by scouthelicopters or fixed-wing strike aircraft, maybe requested.Planning includes the type, number, and method of employ-

ment of aircra ft. Met hods of employment include columncover, air alert, and ground alert. Column cover by f ighter

3 - 3 8



FM 90-8

aircraft is expensive in terms of crew fatigue and equipment

maintenance; therefore, l ight observation-type aircraft thatcan direct on-call air support are used for short movementsover frequently used routes in more secure areas. When air

support is planned, communications information concerningradio frequencies, call signs, and identification procedures is

provided to all who may need to use them. In addition, thesupporting air unit knows the maneuver intentions of theground element in case of am bush.

(4) Route clearing. This operation may be conducted beforecertain critical movements. The use of route-clearingoperations depends upon the availability of troops, theimportance of the movement, and the guerrilla threat within

the area. Normally the units responsible for the area through

w hich the movement will pass a re used in route-clearing

operations. These route-clearing forces normally include

both mounted and dismounted elements. In addition to ath orough reconna issan ce of the ma in route of movement,critical terrain near the route is secured. This maybe done byplacing pickets a long critical st retches of th e route or byselective placement of tactical units.

(5) Reserves. Reserves (ready forces) are vital to counteringambushes. The guerrilla must be convinced that ambushesproduce a fast, relentless, hard-hitting response by counter-guerrilla supporting forces, to include airstrikes and ground

pursuit. Prior to a movement, reserve force commanders and

aviators are briefed on the general area of operations;landing areas, known and suspected guerrilla locations, and

communications are emphasized. If the distance to becovered from a single location prevents quick reaction,reserve ready forces are designated in successive areas. (Forfurther information on movement security, see Appendix G.)

3-53. Motor movement.

a . Special escort attachments may not be available to support allmotor movements; therefore, many convoys must be prepared tosecure themselves for part or all of the distance. When a maneuverunit is designated to provide escort for a vehicle convoy, elements

of the unit provide escort through their respective areas ofresponsibility. Armor or ar mored ca valry units a re ideally suited

to provide convoy escorts. Reconnaissance of the route immediatelyprior to the passage of the convoy is desirable. When a single unit

is to provide escort through other units’ areas of responsibility,the single unit coordinates closely with those other units to ensure

adequate fire support and available reinforcements duringpassage of the convoy.

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Since there is seldom t ime to issue orders during a n a mbush, th esecurity detachment’s actions are planned and, when possible,rehearsed by drills prior to the movement.

c . Convoy command responsibility is clearly fixed throughout thechain of command. The commander and as many of hissubordinates as possible are briefed on the latest informationabout the area through which they are to pass. The commanderformulates his plans and issues his orders to include formation,intervals between echelons and vehicles, rate of travel, anddetailed plans for action if a guerrilla force attacks the convoy. All

personnel board their vehicle in such a way that they candismount ra pidly int o predrilled format ions. Arms a nd ammun itionare readied for immediate action, and vehicle commanders areresponsible for keeping personnel alert (Figure 3-1 ).

d . Convoys may be escorted by reconnaissance aircraft or attack

helicopters and may have tactical air support on call . The use ofreconnaissance Army aircraft to survey routes immediately

b .

forward of a convoy often provides early warning of danger.-

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3-54. Armor and cavalry movement.

a . During movements, unit vehicles and equipment are arranged to

facilitate their employment upon contact with, or interference

from, the enemy. Traveling, traveling overwatch, and boundingoverwatch techniques are used in movement. (See FM 71-2 forarmor ground movement security techniques, and FM 17-95 forcavalry movement techniques.)

Air cavalry can be used to provide column cover and to give earlywarning of hosti le activity. Security measures are employed tokeep the enemy from learning of the movement or its destinationonce the column has begun moving.

b.

c . Terrain and weather permitting, aground security force (advance

gua rd, f la nk security, a nd/or rear g ua rds) are used t o providesecurity. When terrain precludes the use of these ground securityelements, air cavalry may perform these activit ies as part of thesecurity mission.

3-55. Rail movement.

a . Mission. The primar y mission of tra in personnel a nd combat orsecurity troops is to get the train to i ts destination.

b . Concept. As long as the train continues to move, controlremains with the train crew; however, i f an ambush or firefightdevelops and the train is unable to disengage by movementforward or backward, the escort commander takes command andundertakes defense of the train with al l available personnel. Ifthere is no escort , the senior mil i tary member aboard takescommand. Radio communications are used to call for assistance.

Securi ty detachments guarding the r ight of way have their owncommunication system which may be t ied into the rai lwaycommunication system, when required.

c . Organization. Rai lwa y insta l la t ions a nd ra i l t ra f f ic are securedby establishing defined areas of responsibility. Standingoperating procedures on organization for rail movement arenormally published by the highest level of command. Railsecurity is coordinated with area and tactical commands whichprovide support.

d . Operations. Armored tra ins ma y be used for pa trol ling tra ckwhere guerrilla activity may be expected. Armored trains operate

tactically under orders of the appropriate mili tary commander.

Since the operation of an armored train is quite different from thatof other tra ins, the mil i tary transportat ion service assigns aspecially selected train crew. This crew coordinates the trainmovement with that of other trains and with proper regard for the

tactical si tuation. Railway gondolas may be prepared for defense

3-41

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by piling sandbags on the f loor and at the sides and by mountingmachine guns, mortars, and rocket launchers. These cars mustnot be placed next t o ca rs cont a ining ga soline, amm unition, orother flammables. Locomotives should be preceded by two or more

cars loaded with sandbags, rocks, or scrap material for protectionagainst mines and obstructions. On a single-track rail divisionsubject to guerrilla attack, the positive-block method of operationsis employed. In this method of operation, a following train is not

permitted to enter a block until the preceding train has cleared it.This permits the train in the block, if attacked, to back up ifnecessary and to receive reinforcements by train from eitherdirection.

3-56. Water movement and riverine operations.

Counterguerrilla operations may be conducted in large inundatedareas (lakes, coastal waters, flooded delta areas, and inland waterways)

wh ich a re inhabited by large populat ion segments an d w hich ha velimited, or no, rail and road nets. The ability of the counterguerrillaforce to operate in these areas is a requirement for successful missions.

(See FM 31-11 and FM 31-12 for amphibious operations.)

a . Mission and concept. Boats may be used to perform a variety of

tactical as well as logistical tasks. Waterway movement of troopsand supplies is planned and conducted in much the same manneras mounted movements on land; however, special characteristicsof water transportation must be considered. The counterguerrillaforce may participate in riverine operations along with hostcountry regular forces (particularly naval forces), paramilitaryforces, US Army waterborne transportation forces, and US naval

forces.b . Organization. When a large waterborne force moves, it adopts a

march formation similar to a ground convoy. Advance and rearguards in boats are organized. Flank security maybe provided by

pat rols in boat s in a djacent str eams or on foot on t he banks.Unlike ground convoy procedures, movement is not necessarily infile or column formation. The formation depends upon thepurpose of the movement, the strength of the friendly force, andthe width of the stream. It is based on the same considerations as

those for combat formations on land, to include control, security,flexibility, speed of reaction, observation, and fields of fire.

c . Operations.

(1) Waterways afford little cover and concealment. Power-drivenboats are noisy and at tract at tention. Boats can be seen andf ired on easily in daylight, but this disadvantage can be

reduced by night movement and by traveling close to thestream banks where shadow and overhead branches aid

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concealment. Boats must go to or near the shore to unload,thus affecting the reaction time in case of an ambush.Landing operations may be difficult because of unfavorablecharacteristics along the banks. Transported troops shouldbe assigned firing positions on board their vessels fordefense against ambush. The transported units shouldposition the maximum number of crew-served weapons onboard to engage enemy on the near bank or both banks of thew a t e r w a y .

(2) Combina tions of blocking, a tt a cking, and screening ta ctical

actions can be devised by the counterguerrilla force utilizingthe m obility of nava l forces (river assa ult groups) a nd a irassault units. Teamwork between ground forces movingalong river banks, and supporting naval craft f irepower andfloa ting a rtil lery, can result in successful operat ions a gainstguerrilla forces in water areas.

(3) The am ount of time required for plan ning increases wit h the

size of the force involved. Planning should be as detailed astime permits, but quick reaction is necessary to capitalize on

current intelligence.

Planning includes:(4)

(a ) Reducing all planning facets of embarking anddebarking of troops and equipment to SOP.

Integrating and combining plans for US, allied, andhost country military forces and civilian agencies.

(b)

(c) Facilitating command and control means to unify

command and coordination of fires and other support.(d) Reducing rehearsals to a minimum, based on habitual

employment; reducing activities to SOP; reducingequipment and logistical requirements.

Obta ining deta iled int elligence from t he populat ionand civilian police.

(e)

(f ) Obtaining information on currents and tides atH-hour, beach conditions, and conditions of banks orshores for exit routes.

(5) Crew-served weapons transported on water craft must be in

position at all times to engage guerrilla ambush forces.

3-57. Foot and air movement.

a . Foot movement. Dismounted movements by small units areplanned and conducted using the principles for patrolling; for

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lar ger units, t he principles for movement to conta ct w ill apply(FM 7-8, FM 7-10, and FM 7-20).

b . Air movement. Air movements are an integral part of counter-

guerrilla opera tions. The principles governing security of suchmovements are contained in FM 7-10, FM 7-20, and FM 90-4.

3-58. Border operations.

a . While operat ions to control borders a re norma lly a civi liansecurity agency mission, the brigade may be required toparticipate in these operations by reinforcing or assumingresponsibility for border surveillance and control.

b. Brigades conducting or supporting consolidation or strikeoperations may become involved in border control activities. Insome cases, the scope and combat requirements of controlling aborder may make border operations more a tactical than a civilian

security force problem, and may require the conduct of successive

strike operat ions by the briga de in its a rea of opera tions.

(1) Purpose. Border control operations require effectivemeasures to secure extensive land border or seacoast areasa nd t o preclude communicat ion a nd supply opera tions (toinclude aerial resupply) between an external sponsoringpower and guerrilla forces.

(a ) Concept. In P ha se I insurgency, opera tions in bordera reas a re normally a function of police, customs, a ndother government organizations. Armed and paramili-

tary forces may assist these organizations, particularlyin remote areas. In Phases II and III, denial of external

suppor t for the insurgency may require combatoperat ions in border a reas. These operat ions r equireclose coordination and cooperation between the armedforces , paramil i tary forces , and a l l governmenta gencies involved. Ph ysica lly sealing th e border ma ynot be possible since it could require the commitment of

more government forces and materiel than overallna tional resources permit. Since placing forces an dbarriers at all possible crossings or entry sites maybeimpossible, priorities should be esta blished. Na tur a lbarriers must be used wherever possible. Using patrols,

sensors, and obstacles in selected areas increases theeffectiveness of na tur a l bar riers. B a rrier a nd denia loperations are established after careful considerationof the threat, the environment, and the location of theinfiltrator’s probable targets and methods of oper-a t i o n .

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FM 90-8

(b )

( c )

(d)

Organization. Na tional border forces ma y be com-posed of border police and guards and may includeparamilitary forces and regular armed forces withsupporting or direct responsibility for portions of the

international border.

Command and control. Border operations areplann ed, directed, a nd supervised from the na tionallevel. Auth ority to conduct these operat ions m a y bedelegated to subnational and other area commanders.

Structuring. Border task forces are tailored unitsdesigned to meet requirements in their assigned areas.

They should contain sufficient combat support andcombat service support elements to support operations

for extended periods.

(2) Operations.

(a ) Restricted zones or friendly population buffer zonescan be established if needed. Either of these operations,

which could require relocating many persons, must becarefully planned. Although armed forces may assist,civil authorities normally are responsible for planningand carrying out a relocation program. Forced relocation

is held to a minimum. The 1949 Geneva Conventionsprohibit forced population resettlement unless there is

clear military necessity.

(b) While specific portions of an international land borderor shoreline maybe placed under effective surveillance

and control by use of static security posts, reserveforces, ground and aerial observers, electronic listening

posts, and patrols, the continuous surveillance andcontrol of an extensive land border or shoreline isdifficult. Since it may not be possible to place brigadeforces at all the crossing or landing sites, a prioritysystem for the sites requiring military forces isestabl ished.

(3) Surveillance. Continuous and detailed surveillance isrequired to determine infiltration and exfiltration routes and

support sites, frequency and volume of traffic, type oftransportation, number and type of personnel, amount and

type of materiel, terrain and traffic conditions, and theprobable location of base areas and sanctuaries. Surveillance

and control of extensive coastal areas normally require theuse of coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline, coordinatedoffshore patrols, aerial surveillance, strategic observationposts along the shoreline, and an effective system of

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FM 90-8

licensing and identifying friendly military and civilianw a te rc r a f t .

(4 ) Military operations. Border units establish operational

support bases at battalion and company levels to directoperations. Aviation, signal, engineer, and fire supportaugmentation usually is required. These are normally found

in the brigade support base if not augmenting subordinateunits.

(5) Border control methods. Two operational concepts forthe control of extensive land borders are the restricted zoneand the friendly population buffer.

(a ) Restricted zone. Under this concept, an area ofpredetermined w idth a long t he border is declar ed arestricted zone. Appropriate proclamations are issuedto the population so that everyone understands that

any individual or group encountered in the zone will beconsidered as an element of the guerrilla force,paramilitary force, or similar organization. So far aspracticable, the restricted zone is cleared of vegetation

and other obstacles to observation over the area.Earth-moving equipment may be used for this purpose.

Defoliants, if authorized, may also be used for thispurpose, but this should be considered when no othermethod is feasible. Since the clearance of the zone

along the entire border is normally not feasible, apriority of areas for clearance is usually necessary. Therestricted zone is controlled by the use of ground and

a eria l observers, electr onic sensor devices, listenin g

posts, pa trols, mines, and obsta cles. It is prefera blethat these activities be conducted by host country civilpolice and paramilitary forces to economize on theavailable regular armed forces’ combat power whichcan be better utilized in tactical operations.

(b) Friendly population buffer. The civilian population

in the area of operations is redistributed as necessaryto ensure that all civilians residing near the border are

sympathetic to the host country government. This may

enta il the screening of all persons sett led along theborder, relocation of those persons of doubtful sympathy,and supplementary resettlement of the border area

with friendly elements of the civilian population. Thisconcept provides a potential informant net along theborder, i t provides friendly local civilians for employmentin self-defense units to control the border area, and it

denies potential civilian contacts and houses of refugefor use by the guerrillas in border-crossing activities.

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FM 90-8

Relocation of civilians is a sensitive legal and politicalissue and should be undertaken with host countryauthority in compliance with host country law. USpersonnel should not be actively involved. US relocation

activities in an international conflict environmentmust comply with applicable provisions of Geneva

Conventions IV. Relocation operations must be pre-ceded by detailed economic, social, psychological, andpolitical preparation so the socio-economic stability ofthe area is not endangered by the shifts in population.The conduct of these operations without such preparationcan result in such undesirable effects in t he ar ea a spolitical instability, extensive unemployment, inequitiesin land distribution, inadequate public utilities,inadequate housing, and intermingling of populationwith conflicting religious beliefs and social mores.

(6) Waterline borders. In addition to use of restricted zonesand friendly population buffers, as discussed above for landborders, th e surveilla nce and contr ol of extensive coasta lar eas a nd shorelines norma lly require the use of :

(a )

(b)

(c)

(d )

(e)

(f)

Coordinated ground patrols on the shoreline.

Coordinated offshore sea patrols of the shoreline andriver delta areas.

Reinforcing aerial, visual, and photographic surveillance

of the offshore waters and the shoreline.

Observation posts along the shoreline in the vicinity of

river mouths, ground lines of communication, andaccessible portions of the shoreline.

An effective system of licensing and identifying allfr iendly mili tary and civil ian watercraf t using theoffshore waters.

Effective, centr a lized control an d coordina tion of a llthese activities.

(7) Sanctuaries. G uerril las ma y establish base cam ps andconduct cross-border operations from countries adjacent tothe host country . They wil l take advantage of an internat ionalboundary to launch operations or evade pursuit with

impunity. Commanders operating in border areas mustrespect the sanctity of international boundaries, but theycan conduct combat operations against the guerrilla forceonce it crosses back over the border. Ambush patrols are anexcellent means of dealing with guerrillas who attempt touse an internat ional border a s a sanctuary.

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FM 90-8

3-59. Urban operations.

a . Operations in an urban environment require different emphasisan d different t echniques tha n t hose in rur al a reas. The presence

of many people and the characteristics of the area influence bothinsurgent and government operations. During Phases I and II,

these areas are usually unfavorable for guerrilla operations.Guerrillas will not normally f ight in these areas; however, otherinsurgent elements in the urban areas may incite rioting, use

terrorist t a ctics, or seize portions of the city a nd key fa cilities.Armed forces may be required to reinforce police in combattingriots and disorders provoked by the insurgents. Tacticaloperations may be necessary if the guerrillas take direct action to

seize urban areas or critical installations within them. This mayoccur in smaller urban areas during Phase II, and may occur inlarge urban areas in the later stages of Phase III. (FM 90-10discusses tactical operations in urban areas. FM 19-15 discussescivil disturbances.)

b . The population density requires emphasis on the use of nonlethal

weapons and the careful use of weapons of destruction when force

is necessary. The application of “minimum essential force” tominimize loss of life and destruction of property requires detailed

planning, coordination, and control.

c . Covert insurgent activity is extensive in urban areas. Thegovernment must emphasize intelligence and police operations to

counter clandestine organizational, intelligence, logistical, and

terrorist activities. IDAD operations in urban areas maybe partof a consolidation campaign.

d . Urban areas are critical and require a continuing IDAD effortwhether or not they are included in a specific campaign. Military

forces should part icipate in ID AD planning a nd opera tions inurba n a reas dur ing all pha ses of insurgency to be prepared toassist other national security and law enforcement agencies ifsituations requiring military forces develop.

(1) Operational environment. The characteristics of anurban area normally include:

(a) A large, concentrated population.

(b) Government facilities.

(c) Industrial complexes.

(d) Communications facilities.

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(e) Transportation terminals.

(f) Storage facil i t ies .

(g) Food markets.



FM 90-8

(h) Medical facilities.

(i) P ublic ut ilities.

(j) Educational centers.

(k) Ethnic, religious, and economic groups.

(l) Ma n-ma de feat ures (multist ory buildings and subter-ranean facilities).

(m) Police force, paramilitary force, and other law en-forcement agencies.

(2) Government activity. Urban areas need more government

functions and services than rural areas. This requires moreand possibly larger government organizations for operations.The a ctivities a nd ca pabilities of a ll government a genciesshould be considered in planning and executing IDADoperations.

(3) Subversive activities. A subversive element intent ondestroying t he government ma y st ra in the capa bili t ies of

local authorities. The insurgents will attempt to exploit local

civilian organizations by subverting their goals andobjectives. They will try to place them in opposition to thegovernment. Terrorist activities and psychological operationswill take place along with covert insurgent organizational ,intelligence, and logistical operations. Police, internalsecurity, and other government organizations will be highpriority targets of the insurgents.

(4) Operations. Operations require careful planning andcoordina t ion, par t icular ly those opera t ions involv ing

a pplicat ion of force. Milita ry forces designa ted t o provideassistance, if needed, make plans and prepare to implementthem. Military forces must be able to communicate withpolice and other agencies involved in the operations. Theymust collect and have readily available detailed informationon area characteristics and crit ical instal lations.

(5) Tactical operations.

( a ) Tactical operations may be required inside or near anurban area to defeat an insurgent attack. Any insurgent

at tempt to seize and hold a n urba n a rea w i ll probablyinvolve operations in nearby areas as well . When thepolice and other internal security forces can cope withthe a t tack inside the urban area , mi l i tary forces canbest part icipat e by establ ishing security ar ound theurban area and by denying the insurgent reinforcement

or support. When military forces are required toreinforce police or defeat insurgent forces inside t he

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FM 90-8

urban area, operations must be closely controlled andcoordina ted. Milita ry forces should be w ithdr a w n a ssoon as police forces can handle the situation.

(b) When an urban area has been seized by insurgentforces, an evaluation must be made from both a tactical

and psychological perspective whether to recapture itusing major military force or using other techniques.The amount of force and the specific techniques to beused to recapture the area are decided based on theprobable psychological impact on the enemy, noncom-

batant civilians, and friendly troops; the safety ofcivilians and friendly troops; the destruction ofbuildings; and the military forces available. Theprinciple of “minimum essential force” will help reduce

casualties in the noncombatant civilian population.

(c ) Riot control munitions can be used against targets sothat mili tary forces can close with and capture theenemy w ith minimum injury to the noncombat an ts .Operations may be in the form of assistance to civilian

police. In any event, military operations must becoordinated with the civilian police. (For informationon combat in fortified and built-up areas, see FM 90-10and FM 90-10-1.)

Documents

Counterguerrilla Operations - Ch3