Developing United Nations Peacekeeping

The Brahimi Report

OCHA CIMIC Staff Course, Geneva 24/10/01

Developing United Nations Peacekeeping

A/55/305 report of panel on PKO (Brahimi) 21 Aug. 2000

Need for strategy and support

Need for robust doctrine and realistic mandates

HQs capacity for Inform. Mgmt and Strategic Analysis

Improved mission guidance and leadership

Rapid deployment standards and on-call expertise

HQs capacity to plan an support peace operations

Integrated Mission Task Forces

Adapting to the information age

Issues & Brahimi Recommendations

Establish Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) (15)

Amend Financial Rules & Regulations to facilitate rapid and full deployment within the proposed timelines (13(d))

Procurement Policies & Procedures

Maintain at least 5 mission start-up kits (13(b))

Mission Start-up Kit

Global Logistics Support Strategy

Recommended Measures IssuesRapid and effective mission deployment within the timelines of 30/90 days (13(a))

Integrated Mission Planning and Support

Global Logistics Support Strategy

Providing the right support in the right quantity, in the right place, at the right time, at the lowest net cost .

Our goal is to deploy a functioning mission HQ within 15 days and to achieve initial operational readiness of a mission within 30/90 days.

Pre-Brahimi Assumptions

Mission Headquarters Only

100 Personnel

90 Day Sustainment

Two Start-up Kits Approved

Approx $4.1 Million Each

Brahimi Assumptions

Three Complex Missions Per Year

• 3920 Total Mission Strength

– 3 Std Inf Btn (850) (100% Self-sustaining)

– Force HQ and 3 Sectors

• 90-180 day sustainment

• Modular approach

• Approx. $160M start-up kit / mission

Current Assumptions

One complex Peacekeeping Mission Per Year

Up to 10,000 Troops (25% Self-sustaining)

300 Substantive Staff, 1,000 MilObs/CivPol

1,000 Support (International/Local) Staff

& Capacity for a second mission HQs unit

Mission Composition

Complex

CIVPOL (100) CIVPOL (100) CIVPOL (100)

Level 3 MedicalUnit

Force Reserve Company

UNMOs (100) UNMOs (100) UNMOs (100)

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Infantry Battalion

Multi-role Engineer Unit

Military Police Unit 3

Military Police Unit 2

Level 2 MedicalUnit

Multi-role Engineer Unit

Logistics Unit

Mission HQ

SPOD Transit Camp APOD

FHQ Support Unit

Sector HQ Sector HQ Sector HQ

Military Police Unit

De-mining Unit

CIVPOL (100)

UNMOs (100)

UNMOs (100)

Aviation Unit

30 / 90 day Deployment Deployment Cost and Timelines as a Function of

Resources

Cost

Time (days)

High Readiness Brigade

Diversion of UN Resources

Improved Strategic Deployment Stock

Current status with COE and UNOE

30 60 90 150

Enhancing Global Logistics Support

OBJECTIVES :

Optimize Planning and Organizational Design

Provide Adequate and Trained Staff

Strengthen Strategic Capability

Policy & Procedures

Development of Guidelines

Revision of Manuals

Mission Planning & Liquidation Templates

Management & Organizational Structure

Congruent Field & HQs Structures

Integrated Support Services Structure (ISS)Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC)Joint Movements Control Center (JMCC)Joint Material Management Center (JMMC)

Two-Service FALD StructureCurrent Logistics & Communications ServiceNew Administrative Service, Including Peacekeeping Procurement

Material Reserve

Surface Transport Assetslight, medium & heavy vehicles

Communication Equipment

Office Automation Equipment

Common Supplies

Spare Parts

Housing and Infrastructure

Service Support Contracts

Information TechnologiesCommunicationsCommon Staff Supporte.g. food, water, accommodations, fuel

Mission supportTransport, i.e. land, air, seaMaintenance, i.e. vehicle, equipment, infrastructureWarehousingPort & Terminal operations

Human Resources

Management Training

Technical Training & Certification

Career Paths

Staff Mobility Authorized

Stand-by Staff Rosters

Stand-by Contractors / National Arrangements

Field-Personnel Management

Current Status A/55/977 report of S-G (Omnibus), 1 June 2001 A/55/1024 report of G-A Special Committee, 31 July 2001A/56/…., report of Advisory Committee (ACABQ), October 2001Support to Brahimi-report action, resourcing and staffingSupport to modular Strategic Deployment Stocks for Brindisi.Five critical elements:

Enhanced advance planningExpanded sources of recruitmentStreamlined recruitment proceduresEnhanced rapid deployment capabilitiesImproved systems for career development and training

(A/55/977 report of S-G (Omnibus), 1 June 2001 pp.2)

DPKO – OCHA: Brahimi Report

- UNDP, OCHA, UNHCR, OHCHR, DPI and several other departments, agencies , funds and programmes have an increasingly important role to play in planning for any future operation, especially complex operation, and need to be formally included in the planning process.

( -> Integrated Mission Task Force concept)

DPKO – OCHA: Omnibus Report

* The relationship between DPKO and OCHA is vital and must be improved - -

* Peacekeeping Operations should be mandated, designed and resourced to support -- humanitarian action –

* Close cooperation between DPKO and OCHA at all stages of mission design and planning

* OCHA and DPKO mutually support each other - - established humanitarian agencies can be a source of information and support to new PK-missions - -

DPKO – OCHA: Omnibus Report (cont)

* The nature and extent of cooperation - - in the field must depend upon the local context

* There may be places where UN humanitarian actors are incorporated into a PK-mission - -

* -- and others where a clear separation is vital –

OCHAs role is to act as bridge –

(A/55/977 1 June 2001, pp. 46 – 47)

Thank you ! Any questions…