UNITED NATIONS AND PEACEKEEPING

Kimberly Mitchell

Introduction

CA J """'mg'0 Bd,,",y,,"', ",hoi"" that great powers have special responsibilities for maintaining

peace and security can be traced back to antiquity" (Bellamy, Williams and Gri£lin2004). There had been efforts at institutionalizing international cooperation, first through the League of Nations, and then through the United Nations. This need for greater international cooperation came on the heels of the two devastating world wars where it was established that there was a need for an organization that would prevent the reoccurrence of a global conflict of such magnitude.

The international community, namely those who had united against the Axis powers, were the same ones targeted to support the idea for the creation of such a noble institution. It was hoped that these same countries would remain united in the face of future aggression; hence the term 'United Nations.' They were to remain united in the common purpose of the preservation of peace and the prevention of aggression. This was to be achieved through the operation of the six (6) main UN bodies and later on, through the addition of subsidiary organs to aid the (six) 6 main bodies. These main bodies are the Security Council , the main body charged with the maintenance of international peace and security; the General Assembly, the main deliberative organ of the organization, the

International Court ofJustice, the main judicial arm of the UN, The Economic and Social Council, The Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat, headed by a Secretary General. The main objective of the organization has been to "save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... " (UN Charter, Preamble).

This paper argues that the UN has not been an effective and efficient international peacekeeper and thus has been unable to fulfil this objecti ve stated above. The paper thus aims to highlight the failure of the United Nations in its role as international peacekeeper. But the very nature oftoday's highly volatile environment, due in part to the high pace of globalization and the quick tum over of technology, demonstrates that there is still need for the United Nations.

Failure of Liberalism

The United Nations is founded upon the democratic peace theory whereby all its operations are conducted in a liberalist fashion. What this means is that peacekeepers await the consent ofbeIligerent parties before intervening. They also subscribe to a position of impartiality and the minimum use of force. Entire missions are hung in the balance, where often the result is that the missions are called off because peacekeepers are unable to achieve their objectives. Why? Because peacekeepers are unable to act because of the fact that missions are founded upon liberalism; whereby belligerents can choose to forego any sort of intervention by the United Nations.

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An overriding factor for the failure of the UN to effectively deal with conflict situations can be explained by the fact that the organization made no real attempt to address the principal causes of conflicts which have historical roots in the destabilization of peripheral countries by the core. The attempt of the UN, thus to 'fix ' these conflicts via liberalist means i.e., the setting up ofliberal democracies would not work. Even if the UN succeeds in creating some sort ofliberal democracy, it is only temporary; conflict will ensue once again because the root causes for the conflicts were never actually dealt with.

Peacekeeping Operations

Traditional peacekeeping is founded upon the " ... ' holy trinity' of consent, impartiality and the minimum lise of force" (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004). It" ... is intended to assist in the creation and maintenance of conditions conducive to long-term conflict resolution by the parties themselves, often in conjunction with international mediation" (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 95). This type of peacekeeping grew out of the Cold War period where the UN was basically trying to carve out a name for itself in the area of peace and security.

The underlying theory to which peacekeeping subscribes is that of the democratic peace theory which is " ... based on the observation that democratic states do not wage war on each other" (Bellamy, Williams and Griffm 2004). According to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, "Peacekeeping tries to maintain stable peace by promoting and defending liberal political and economic practices." So basically what can be inferred from this is that the more democracy and liberalism is spread across the world, the less the probability of war taking place becomes. But because the UN is so focused on spreading democracy and liberalism,

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little is actually done to deal with the root causes of problems. This is a main reason why peacekeeping operations are unable to hold up in the long term.

Thus traditional peacekeeping has not been able to accomplish its own goals nor accomplish wider tasks. It has also been unable to 'actively promote conflict resolution ' (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 109). According to Bellamy, Williams and Griffin, " In many cases, traditional peacekeeping operations have not culminated in the former belligerents concluding a lasting peace settlement as envisaged by the theory of this type of operation." (ibid.) Instead, traditional peace­keeping has been accused of causing more conflict than good. Traditional peacekeeping has been seen as " ... far from encouraging long­term conflict resolution, [instead it has) been accused of entrenching conflicts and solidifying partitions" (ibid.).

Another problem inherent in traditional peacekeeping operations is its dependence on the consent of the party/parties who are causing conflict. Iffor whatever reason, these parties refuse to cooperate, where does this leave the UN? How are they supposed to intervene if the parties refuse to give consent and refuse to cooperate (?); hence the failure of the organization's founding doctrine of democratic peace. For example, in the case of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization's (UNTSO) operation in the Middle East in 1948, the UN was unable to accomplish its mission simply because all the parties involved in the conflict repeatedly violated the 1949 General AnnisticeAgreements.

According to Andrezej Sitkowski: " ... instead of preventing the local conflict from escalating, the UN helped to turn it into a major

international conflagration. The UN made an international war for Palestine inevitable because it introduced the concept of partition in an area that was already engulfed in a civil war. It also failed in bringing this war to an end, despite the deployment of several military missions in the Middle East theatre" (Sitkowski 2006: 39).

Another example of the UN's traditional peacekeeping operations' inability to accomplish its goals can be taken from the United Nations Emergency Force I (UNEF I) operations in Egypt. Here, UNEF I had to leave the Middle East because there was continued animosity between Israel and Egypt which eventually led to war in 1967. And yet another example can be taken from the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) where the operation had to change its mandate because of the Turkish invasion of 1974. Thus the cornerstone of traditional peacekeeping, mainly the ' holy trinity' really did not enable the UN to be effective.

The end of the Cold War ushered in cautious optimism for the organization. This allowed for more space to manoeuvre since the super-power rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union had come to an end. It was during this period that the United Nations suffered its most disastrous failures in Somalia, Bosnia, Rwanda, and Angola Millions of people lost their lives under the UN's watch and/or protection. In the case of Rwanda, the United Nations failed to act; the result, the slaughter of 800,000 people in 100 days. The Force Commander, Dallaire received important information regarding the plans of the Interahamwe milita to force the UN Belgian contingent to withdraw and to kill every twenty minutes, 1000 persons. It was also disclosed that there was a weapons cache that was ready and waiting to be distributed.

This information was relayed to UN headquarters, where the Secretariat was quick to disapprove of Dallaire's intentions toward dealing with the situation. He intended to seize the arms and protect the informant, but this was met with disapproVal. The main concern was to ensure that there was no use of force on the part of the UN peacekeeping operation in Rwanda. So basically, the UN was forewarned that there was a plan to possibly exterminate the Tutsi but decided to sit on the matter for a good three months before the actual event took place. An inquiry into the matter found" ... 19 documents that mentioned either plans for destabilization or the likelihood of large-scale massacres in Rwanda" (Bellamy, Williams and Griffin 2004: 114). The UN was therefore more concerned with ensuring that they did not get caught up in the fighting than with protecting the lives of those who were slaughtered by the Hutu.

The United NationsAssistance Mission in Rwanda (UNAMIR) could do nothing as it looked on from close range in the field. The Security Council refused to budge on the issue of changing the mandate or sending in reinforcements . It is ironic that a body charged with the maintenance of peace and security was not able to take an active role in diffusing this situation, " .. .It should be clearly understood, however, that while UNAMIR may provide advice/guidance for the planning of such operations, it cannot, repeat, cannot take an active role in their execution" (Traub 2007: 59). So what could the United Nations do? This is therefore a prime example of the UN's inept and inefficient nature in dealing with complex crisis missions such as the case of Rwanda. It is therefore fair to say that the UN has not been able to adequately fulfil its role as international peacekeeper.

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The case of Bosnia has been described as that" ... which demolished every bright hope ofthe post-Cold War moment and came very close to demolishing peacekeeping itself' (Traub 2007: 45). In 1991, while army troops slaughtered civilians, the then incoming UN Secretary General, Boutrous-Ghali actually made the comment that "Yugoslavia is a European problem; let the Europeans deal with it" (Traub 2007: 46). How could the Secretary General make such a comment; as the main representative of the body charged with maintaining peace and security? It was only because of the Europeans' refusal, particularly the British and the French, to send in their own troops to deal with the situation and their subsequent calls for the UN to intervene, that a UN observer group was sent in. But again nothing could be done since this group was lll1armed and therefore did not have the capacity to diffuse the situation. The Security COlll1cil was informed that "in its present phase the conflict is [not] susceptible to the UN peacekeeping treatment" (Traub 2007: 46).

The Observer mission was now expanded to include infantry and was now known as the United Nations Protection Force (former Yugoslavia) (UNPROFOR). The mission was now charged with enforcing a resolution that called for the establishment of safe havens arolll1d Serebrencia, which according to UNPROFOR's officials on the grolll1d, was an'lll1enforceable' policy. Whilst this was happening, Boutrous­Ghali continued to let his displeasure be known. Imagine the incoming Secretary General of the United Nations, telling desperate people, who view the UN as their last hope, that they" ... have a situation that is better than ten other places in the world .... 1 can give you a list" (Traub 2007: 47).

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How could he have expected the organization whose main objective is to maintain peace and security, to simply walk away because the situation was 'relatively' better than in other places? Once again the ugly beast had reared its head. The UN was doing what it did best: being inept and inefficient. This is one clear instance where the UN failed miserably in their role as international peacekeeper. According to David Harland, a former chief political officer to the force commander ofUNPROFOR, "The Secretariat was the dog that didn't bark .... they were hearing about the atrocities, they knew how bad it was, they knew there were alternatives, but they didn't bark" (Traub 2007: 49).

The situation in Darfur was no different. While a UN official kept sending reports of the deteriorating situation in Darfur, there was no response, only " ... a terrible silence ... we received no political guidance from headquarters" (Traub 2007: 242). The problem was seen to be that of humanitarian access and not ethnic cleansing. While villagers were being slaughtered and homes and crops burned to the grolll1d, the problem was believed to be that of a lack of humanitarian access. According to James Traub (2007) in his book, The Best Intentions ... all that was issued on the matter was a 'presidential statement' that expressed 'deep concern' about the situation.

It took drastic action on the part ofKaliga, a UN official on the ground in Sudan, by airing his views on the situation through the BBC, for the international community and the UN to react. All the while villages burned, agricultural lands seized, women raped and persons killed. The organization was created "to save succeeding generations from the scourge of waf .... to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the hurnan person .... " (UN

Charter, Preamble) but instead it was failing to do so.

It must be clear that there have been successes, though marginal at best. But where the organization was sorely needed to act and carry out its role as international peacekeeper in the situations described above, it failed miser­ably. Thus it goes back to the failure ofliberalism to address the failings of peacekeeping that the organization is inept and inefficient in its operations. The organization has also been criticized as being corrupt, fraudulent and wasteful. Evidence for this can be taken from the mismanagement of the UN's Children's Fund in Kenya back in 1995 where the organization lost close to $10 million, and close to $4 million was stolen from the UN's headquarters in Somalia. Attention shall now be placed on the operation of the oil-for-food programme, the biggest UN corruption scandal to date.

The Oil-For-Food Programme

This programme was created to mitigate the effects of the sanctions that were put in place against Saddam Hussein's regime. It was an attempt to ensure some level of health and nutritional standards for the Iraqi people. It allowed Iraq some leeway in selling some of its oil to buy vital goods. Iraq was allowed to sell up to $1.6 billion worth of oil for a period of 6 months. The money from this had to go to a special UN controlled account to ensure that it did not end up in Saddam's hands, and that its use would be for humanitarian purposes only. The Iraqi government was not supposed to gain access to cash that could be used to buy prohibited goods and weapons. Unfortunately it did not quite work out this way.

In one instance, the Iraqis tried to bribe the then Secretary General Boutrous-Ghali to

" ... ensure that he was more flexible" and would take steps to "ease the conclusion" of oil-for­food negotiations" (Traub 2007: xxxvii). This however did not work. But the very conceptual basis of the Oil-for-Food Programme allowed for corruption to take place. The programme gave Iraq the freedom to choose whomever they wanted to sell oil to, as well as the freedom to choose from whom they would buy humanitarian supplies.

This meant that Iraq was able to side with business partners who would have been able to relax or influence the removal of the sanctions against them. These countries were namely Russia, China and France, and because they were allowed this leeway, Iraq was able to receive secret 'under-the-table' payments from their chosen business affi Ii aleS. Exactly what the program was trying to guard against. A major failure of the programme was therefore, its lack of foresight in positioning effective measures to prevent Iraq from" . . . cheating the program with the assistance of companies eager to obtain and retain Iraq's business" (Traub 2007: 27).

Writing in the Nation, Joy Gordon (2004) noted that" ... the bulk of the illicit transactions were 'government to government agreements' between Iraq and a few other countries, for trade outside the OFF program." The result: Iraq earned an income of$7.5 billion. The largest of these arrangements was with Jordan, out of which Iraq was able to gain revenue of $4.5 billion. The question arose as to why nothing was done to stop this. The fact of the matter was that the Security Council, whose main influential permanent member, the United States of America, voted against any action being taken. Why? Because Jordan was America's closest Arab ally. Thus, this choice given to Saddam gave him both economic and political leverage

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to aid in the advancement of his broader agenda: the removal of the UN sanctions against Iraq.

There were also UN officials that were directly involved in this whole fiasco. One such person was Jean Bernard Merimee, who was one of the principal persons involved in the establishment of the program. Merunee received 2 million barrels of oil worth almost $30 million while he was still a UN official serving as the Special Advisor on European matters to the Secretary General. He was neither the first to receive nor the last. Beneficiaries of oil allocations spanned from all member countries of the UN: Italian officials, South African officials, a British Parliamentarian, and even a Vatican priest.

The oil-for-food progamme was a world­wide corruption scandal. Instead of empowering the UN to help make the programme work the way it should, member countries engaged in deals to receive' cuts' from the illicit oil transactions carried out by the Iraqi government. Once again, narrow self-interests won out, so much for a 'United Nations.'

Saddam's oil-for-food contracts were used to purchase illicit weapons, fill his own pockets and buy the friendship of countries that were strategically placed to vote against the UN sanctions on Iraq. But this was not enough. There have also been claims that some of that money was used to fund terrorist groups, namely Al Qaeda. This claim came from the fact that some of the companies with which Saddam did business had links to terrorist groups. This was leveled at one company in particular which was deemed to have had" ... close ties to a Liechtenstein trust that has since been designated by the UN itself as "belonging to or affiliated withAl Qaeda."

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The next blow came when it was discovered that the Secretary General's son, KojoAnnan was also implicated in the scandal through his employment with Cotecna, a company that was vying for the contract for the oil-for-food programme. The company later went on to win the award, under questionable means with reference to the fact that it was never mentioned that the son of the Secretary General was employed with the company. It was also never mentioned that this same son was also directly involved in helping the company secure the UN contract. Also never mentioned was the fact that the head of the company was under investigation for" ... the allegedly corrupt payments he directed for the benefit of Pakistan's Benazir Bhutto" (Traub 2007: 54).

Thus the UN Security Council failed to halt Iraq's smuggling and other corrupt activities where the oil-for-food programme was concerned. The program was therefore destined for corruption since the United Nations failed to have a system in place that should have been able to deal with infringements made by Iraq to the program. In their quest for capital accumulation, which turned out to be the overarching goal in this program, the United Nations, (since it was its very own member countries that participated in the illicit activity), demonstrated that the same capital accumulation and the pursuit of narrow self-interests would always trump any so called 'collective good' for all.

Thus once again, it has been proven that the organization has been inept at being able to administer the program effectively; inefficient at conducting investigations and the whole administration of the oil-for-food program, and corrupt where the very culprits responsible for the corruption came from within the UN membership, and included, the UN's own top officials .

UN Reform

There is no doubt that UN reform is needed; especially in an increasingly complex world where the threats are no longer confined to the traditional actors: states. The world has drastically changed since the birth of the United Nations. The rapid evolution of technology and the rapid pace of globalization have ensured that the traditional methods of peacekeeping and the old ways of dealing with issues can no longer be employed. This highly globalized environment necessitates radical change within the UN if the organization is to be successful in tackling current conflict situations. Hence the following reforms have been highlighted.

Redefinition of National Interests: Cure to the Legacy of the Peace of Westphalia

One of the main chronic illnesses with which the United Nations suffers, is that of the pursuit of narrow self interests. The preamble of the Charter of the United Nations speaks of "We the people of the United Nations determined to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war ... " a clear indication that the organization was meant to serve the collective interest of its members as opposed to individual state interest. The original plan for the UN to have its own army was never realized; each member state unwilling to give up a little of its sovereignty for the greater good.

It is no secret that the United States is the most influential member of the Security Council, and often, many a resolution could not be passed due to the fact that it was not within the interests of that state; case in point: the numerous resolutions regarding Israel's treatment of the Palestinians were vetoed approximately 35 times by the United States. It is therefore, high time that the UN return to a place of a " remarkable

generation ofleaders and public servants ... who were pragmatic idealists more concerned about the future of humanity than the outcome of the next election; and [who 1 understood that fmding solutions to post-war problems was much more important than being popular with one or another part of the American electorate" (Weiss 2009: 130).

It is therefore imperative that there is a redefinition of national interests to ensure an effective and efficient international peacekeeper, capable of maintaining peace and security. Many states have also been critical of the United States' role as the 'world's policeman. ' But many of them have been unwilling to step up and provide military support. Therefore another factor that needs to be taken into consideration for the proper functioning of the UN is for other members to be willing to "bear more of the international military burden" (Weiss 2009: 131).

Improvement in Human Rights

Traditionally, only states have been recognized as subjects of international law and so, because people were not seen as subjects of the law they were unable to have their voices heard. But an example can be taken from the European Court of Human Rights, where European citizens were allowed to petition The European Commission on Human Rights.

For this to occur, in the United Nations, there needs to be greater political will and greater commitment on the part of member states to the protection of human rights. More emphasis should also be placed on "Dealing with viola­tions of human rights as a precondition for peacekeeping" (UN A 2008). The organization also needs to be careful in its selection of countries to head the human rights commission. Thus far, a number of nations guilty of gross

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human rights violations not only made up the membership of the Commission but also chaired it

Strengthening Capacity ofthe UN

It is no secret that the UN lacks the capacity to respond to large scale humanitarian and crisis situations. This has been proven time and again in several of the organization's peacekeeping and humanitarian efforts. It is therefore imperative that the organization work together with not only non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but with governments and inter-governmental organizations as well, to ensure that missions launched can successfully fulfill their mandates.

Improved Theory and Doctrine of Peacekeeping

It has been demonstrated, over and over, that the old theory upon which peacekeeping is founded the democratic peace theory and its

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underlying adherence to liberalism, has not allowed for the proper functioning of the United Nations. The organization's doctrine of consent oflocal parties, impartiality and use of force only in self defense, has been seen in past operations to hamper the fulfillment of mission objectives. It is therefore imperative that there be a search for a proper theory and doctrine of peacekeeping that will address all the issues that the current theory and doctrine has been unable to do; one which will allow for the effective and efficient working of the organization in all its operations.

The listofUN reforms then, is by no means exhaustive. The reforms presented above were meant to introduce the topic of reform; as well as stimulate thinking on the failings of the organization, in the hope of creating new and improved solutions that will make the organiza­tion more effective. For despite its many failings as an international peacekeeper, the organization is still relevant in today 's world and as such, deserves another chance at proving its worth.

References

Bellamy, Alex, Paul Williams and Stuart Griffill. 2004. Understanding Peacekeeping. BBC News: UN Troops face child abuse claims. http://www.news.bbc.co.ukl2lhilamericasl6195830.stm.

Gordon, Joy. 2004. "UN Oil for Food 'Scandal. '" http://www.thenation.comldocI20041206/gordon.

Sitkowski, Andrzej. 2006. UN Peacekeeping' Myth and Reality. Westport, Conn: Praeger Security International.

Traub, James. 2007. The best intentions: Kofi Annan and the UN in the era of American world power. PicadorlFarrar, Straus and Giroux: New York.

UNA. 2008. Refonrung the UN for the 21 st Cetntury. http://action-for-un-renewal.org.ukI .. .Ireforming_the_un_fof_21 st_ century. pdf.

Weiss, Thomas. 2009. What s wrong with the Uniled Nations and how to fix it. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.

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