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HABITAATINTL. Vol. 10. No. 3. pp. 79-89. 1986. Printed in Great Bntain.
(1197-39751x6 $3.00 + 0.00 Pergamon Journals Ltd.
Evolution of a Support Policy of Shelter - The Experience
of Sri Lanka*
DISA WEERAPANAt Ministry of Local Government Housing and Construction, Sri Lanka
INTRODUCTION
A survey of the housing scene in Sri Lanka during the last 10 years presents an interesting case study of the evolution of a conventional and centralised programme of public sector housing into a decentralised support policy which strengthens the communities’ initiatives in shelter. The process of rapid and deliberate change in the public housing policies over the last 10 years will be useful in a comparative study of the evolution of housing policies in developing countries. The new approaches which emerge at the end of this process appear to have brought about a radical change in the approaches to shelter and related issues in Sri Lanka.
The Million Houses Programme which is now under implementation provides a broad framework for incorporation of new perceptions and strategies in public housing. These new approaches seem to reflect the determination of the Government of Sri Lanka to address the larger issues related to shelter needs of the community through a set of realistic programmes which recognise the limited availability of resources.
The objective of this paper is to underline the salient features of this process. The paper is also intended to generate a discussion on the replicability of this approach in a wider context, particularly in the countries of the Third World. A word of caution at this stage may not be out of place. Due to the presence of a number of special characteristics, much of the experience in Sri Lanka may be unique. Since these characteristics have created in Sri Lanka a positive environment conducive to the development of rational shelter strategies, these factors should be given due weight in an evaluation of the replicability of the Sri Lankan experience.
DEFINITION OF THE PROBLEM OF SHELTER
Magnitude of the problem
The housing situation in Sri Lanka is less serious than in many developing countries. Recent studies have also shown that Sri Lanka has housed its people
*This is an edited version of a paper presented ai the International Symposium on “the Implementation of a Support Policy for Housing Provision”. held at the Development Planning Unit, London, in December 1985.
t Address for correspondence: Director, Policy and Planning, Ministry of Local Government Housing and Construction, Sethsiripaya, Sri Jayewardenepura Kotte, Battaramulla, Sri Lanka.
HA8 ,0:3-r 79
80 Dira Weerapana
faster than the growth of its population. in better quality structures than in many other countries. Despite these general improvements in the overall picture, Sri Lanka still faces a severe deficit in the supply of houses. A study which was undertaken in 1982 has shown that the annual deficit of housing in the country is around 140,000 units. The total estimated need for the period 1983-1992 is 1.5 million new units. In absolute terms the deficit in the rural sector is twice that of the urban sector. Table 1 gives an estimate of the housing needs of Sri Lanka by sectors. This deficit though small in numbers, is significantly large when compared with the size of the population of the country or when taken as a percentage of the available units. The problem of housing, the dominant feature of which is the shortage of numbers, is also complicated by a series of other factors common to most countries of the Third World such as congestion, lack of basic amenities and inadequacy of physical conditions.
Although the government, since independence, has made sincere efforts to reIieve the problem of housing in the island, these initiatives were constrained by a number of factors. The paucity of public sector resources available for investment in housing, limited capacity of the public sector delivery system, inability of the beneficiaries to pay for housing solutions provided by the government, were dominant amongst them.
Table 2 shows the results of a study carried out in 1983 on the ability of the population of Sri Lanka to pay for shelter. It indicates that even assuming that the people have a very high propensity to save for housing (lo-15%), only 50% of the urban population is able to afford a shelter solution costing US$770. The corresponding figure for the rural population was only 40%. An analysis of the cost of housing offered by the public sector housing programmes during this time shows that even the cheapest unit offered was priced beyond this level (with the exception of the limited upgrading option offered under the Slum and Shanty Upgrading Programme). It was interesting to note that even with a 100% subsidy on the cost of land they could reach only three solutions at the lower end of the cost scale. With this wide gap between the levels of affordability and the cost of provision, the strategies available to the government were extremely limited. In order to reach a large percentage of the population, housing had to be either heavily subsidised or highly innovative, so that some elements of expenditure could either be substituted or supplemented through individual and community effort.
POSITIVE ASPECTS
The problem of housing in Sri Lanka must also be viewed in the context of a number of favourable factors which positively support the public sector responses aimed at relieving it. The urban population in Sri Lanka has grown by only 1% per annum over the last 25 years. Even Colombo, the capital city, has been growing at a rate only marginally higher than that of the national population. This urban-rural balance has contributed significantly to ease the problem of housing in Sri Lanka.
Since 1953, Sri Lanka has moved towards achieving greater equality in income distribution. The income earned by the highest 10% of the population has fallen by almost a third and the share of income earned by the lowest 40% has increased significantly. These favourable trends in the distribution of income, together with extensive investments in the development of the rural economy of Sri Lanka, have contributed to improve the stock of rural housing in the country over the years. The sustained urban-rural balance and the extensive welfare and income support programmes of the governments since independence, have also enabled the release of additional resources for investment in housing.
Tab
le I
. E
stim
ated
hou
sing
nee
ds b
y se
ctor
ann
ually
: 19
83-1
987,
T
otal
: 19
88-1
992
1983
--
19
84
1985
19
86
1987
T
otal
19
83-1
987
Tot
al
1988
-199
2 T
otal
19
83-1
992
Urb
an
(a)
New
dem
and
(b)
Rep
lace
men
t (c
) B
ack
log
An
nu
al
nee
ds
Rur
al
(a)
New
dem
and
(b)
Rep
lace
men
t (c
) B
ack
log
An
nu
al
nee
ds
E’E
12
:055
103,
011
Tot
al n
eeds
14
0,51
9 14
2,97
6 14
5,48
5 14
8,04
9 15
0,67
0 72
7,66
9
31,4
73
31,9
45
5,29
0 5.
391
8,55
2 8,
552
45,3
15
45,8
88
61,0
35
62,2
25
22,1
14
22,7
78
12,0
55
12,0
55
95,2
04
97,0
88
32,4
24
32,9
10
33,4
04
162,
156
172.
100
334,
256
5,49
3 5,
597
5,70
3 27
,474
30
.000
57
,474
8,
552
8,55
2 8.
552
42,7
60
43,0
00
85,7
60
46,4
69
47,0
59
47,6
59
232,
390
245,
100
7177
.490
63,5
00
64,7
70
23,4
61
24,1
65
12,0
55
12,0
55
99,0
16
l!M
,990
317,
626
343,
Sl
I 66
1,43
7 11
7,40
8 13
6,00
0 25
3,40
8 60
,275
6W
OO
12
0,27
5
459,
309
539,
811
1,03
5,12
0
784,
911
1,51
2,61
0
Sour
ce:
PA
DC
O
Est
imat
e,
Sep
tem
ber
1982
.
82 Es0 Weerupana
Urban 1983 % of income Interest Amount available
Income range monthly income for housing Monthly amounts rate/term (Rupees)*
O-20% o-519 10% 30-59 30/o/30 yr 7.100-14.200 20-40% 592-892 12% 71-107 6%130 11.800-17.900 40-50% 893-1,079 15% 134-162 9%/25 15.900-19,000 50-60% 1,080- 1,295 15% 162-194 9%l25 19.300-23,100 6@-80% 1,296-2,208 20% 259-442 12%125 24.700-41.900 80-100% 2.209+ 25% 552-t 15%/20 41,900+
&rat O-20%
20-40% 40-50% 50-60% 60-80% 80-100%
O-458 8% 18-37 3%130 yr 4,300-8.800 459-684 10% 46-68 6%/30 7,700-l 1,300 685-789 15% 103-118 9%/25 12,300-14,100 790-935 15% 118-140 12%/25 14,100-16,700 936-1,364 20% 187-273 15%/20 17,756-25,900
1,365+ 25% 341+ 15%/20 26,600+
Source: DeVoy Report: 26. l US$l = Rs 26.00 at time of writing.
The per capita incomes of Sri Lanka also have recorded favourable trends of growth in recent years. If these trends continue into the future, they could improve the affordability of housing of all income groups.
PUBLIC HOUSING POLICIES SINCE INDEPENDENCE
Housing had no place in the public policies of Sri Lanka until the Second World War, except in the provision of a limited number of houses for certain categories of public servants. However, during the Second World War, the building materials available were diverted to support the war effort, by the British rulers. The consequent cessation of residential construction led to a war-time scarcity of housing. The growing discontent of the urban population over the increases in house rents compelled the colonial government to introduce legislation to regulate rents. The Rent Restriction Act of 1941 thus became the first piece of housing legislation in the history of the country. Following this, social legislation introduced to regulate the landlord-tenant relationships became the dominant feature of housing policies in Sri Lanka until 1977. This process reached a climax during the period 1970-1977, during which a number of radical and stringent regulatory laws were introduced. However, within the first few years after the introduction of regulatory legislation, the government was conscious of the serious disincentives it had on investment in housing. Therefore in 1953, in one of the earliest policy statements issued by a government in power on the subject of housing, the responsibility for the provision of housing to the middle and working classes was assumed by the government. The developmental role of the government in the field of housing evolved from this point. The governments that came into power thereafter, attempted to fulfil this obligation through increases in the allocation of resources and the creation of a network of public sector institutions for the implementation of a housing delivery programme. These attempts continuously increased the output of the public sector delivery system and reached the peak during the period 1977-1983, following the introduction of the “Hundred Thousand Houses Programme”.
Two aspects common to the conventional over-enthusiasm of the post independent governments of most countries of the Third World constitute the main weaknesses of the public sector shelter efforts during the period. (1) Public
Evolution of a Support Poiicy of Shelter - The Experience of Sri Lanka 83
policy overemphasised the need to regulate landlord-tenant relationships. (2) Governments interpreted their responsibility to improve the shelter conditions of the poor as one of delivering completed solutions through direct interventions.
Before 1977, social legislation dominated public sector housing efforts. During the period that followed, development functions assumed importance over regulatory functions in public sector housing policies.
The year 1977 was thus a turning point in the history of housing policies in Sri Lanka. During this year, the United National Party assumed office and with the appointment of the present Minister in charge of housing, the public sector housing efforts of the country reached a new peak. The Minister of Housing was later appointed to the office of the Prime Minister of Sri Lanka retaining the portfolio of housing. Housing had been high on the political agenda of the party during its campaign for power. The manifesto of the United National Party explicitly discussed the plans to introduce new programmes to improve the housing conditions of the people. With the assumption of power, the new government confirmed its political commitment to the improvement of shelter and the new Minister declared his intention to construct 100,000 housing units during the next 5 years. The officials were instructed to work out the details of the programme. This programme was a clear indication of the intentions of the government to assign priority to housing in the development policies of the government and its commitment to arrest the worsening trends of housing with a comprehensive programme of action.
The Hundred Thousand Houses Programme had 3 main components: aided self-help, direct construction, and housing loans.
Sub-programme
Aided self-help Direct construction SHousing loans
Units
50,~ 36,000 14,000
100,000
The commitment of the new government to the improvement of shelter has no parallel in the political history of the country. The following will underline the magnitude of its effort:
(1) the declaration of a programme to construct 100,000 houses during 1977-1982 when the total number of houses constructed by government during the preceding 7 years (1970-1977) was only 4,700;
(2) the massive increase in the allocation of public resources for housing, (1976, Rs 35 m approx. 1981, Rs 1,000 m approx.);
(3) in the First Medium Term Investment Programme of the government, Housing and Urban Development was identified as one of the three lead projects of the government along with the Mahaweli Accelerated Development Programme and the establishment of the Industrial Process- ing Zone;
(4) introduction of a new legal framework covering human settlement activities such as urban development, housing, environment etc;
(5) creation of new specialised institutions with wide powers e.g. Urban Development Authority (UDA), National Housing Development Authority (NHDA), New Housing Banks etc. to assist in the implemen- tation of new programmes;
(6) relaxing of untenable social legislation on housing; (7) improvement in the efficiency of the public sector delivery system,
(1970-1977,4,700 units, 1977-1982, 115,000 units).
84 Disa Weerapana
THE HUNDRED THOUSAND HOUSES PROGRAMME
The Hundred Thousand Houses Programme implemented during 1977-1982 was unique in its contribution to the development of housing policy in Sri Lanka. Besides being able to successfully achieve the very ambitious targets of the programme, its high visibility contributed to enhancing the importance and stature of the shelter efforts. Further the socio-political process it set in motion and the very important outcome of the presidential election and the referendum in which the government in power was re-elected for the first time in the history of Sri Lanka convinced the government beyond doubt that improved shelter was very much a political demand of the Sri Lankan society and should therefore be developed in its own interest. In retrospect however, the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme appears to be a hurried interpretation given to a sincere political statement of a government, rather than a programme that had been evolved out of good economic reasoning. The sharp contrast in the political outlook of the two governments, the speed with which the programme came to be announced and the inability on the part of the housing professionals to anticipate the thinking and vision of a new and a dynamic minister under rapidly changing circumstances, clearly made this task difficult. The target of providing 100,000 houses therefore came to be interpreted as an extension of a series of conventional solutions and as shown by experiences later, the programme was riddled with shortcomings and weaknesses that are inevitable in conventional shelter efforts. The following provides a short list of those weaknesses which are not discussed in detail as the experiences are similar in most countries:
- a conventional delivery approach; - unrealistic standards and high unit costs resulting in heavy subsidies; - undue rural bias; - inability to reach the desired target groups; - failure to recognise the need to improve the existing housing stock
(upgrading remained a small component); - did not recognise the importance of supporting community initiatives which
is the mainstream of supply of housing in Sri Lankan society; - lacked an appreciation of the overall needs of the society - e.g. private
sector housing, Mahaweli settlements, plantation housing, etc.; - failed to recognise the constraints on resources such as finance, manpower
materials etc. The future shelter policies of Sri Lanka were to a great extent influenced by
the positive as well as negative experience of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme. The negative experiences in particular, were significant in their contribution to change the shelter policies and programmes in the medium and the long-term. After 6 years of implementation, housing in Sri Lanka had gained recognition as a long-term programme in the development efforts of the government. The experiences of this programme therefore came to be assessed and evaluated on a long-term perspective. The lessons of experience were themselves forceful and comprehensive as the programmes implemented were large and extensive. These factors together contributed to increase the sensitivity and awareness of the issues and changed the attitudes of the housing professionals and the decision makers associated in the sector. They influenced the events that followed a great deal.
THE MILLION HOUSES PROGRAMME
This was the setting in which the Million Houses Programme (MHP) was introduced. The MHP was launched in 1984, as the second phase of the programme of intensive housing development, started with the Hundred
Evolution of a Support Policy of Shelter - The Experience of Sri Lanka 85
Thousand Houses Programme in 1977. The MHP however, represents a radical departure from the programmes of housing development attempted by any government in the past. The, perceptions of the problems and the principles on which the programme is structured differ significantly from those that governed the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme.
The MHP is a programme designed to support “a million or more” families to improve their shelter either through const~ction and upgrading or through the provision of better shelter services. In effect it is a programme of small loans implemented within the framework of a set of broad policies. These broad policies which limit the choice of strategies in terms of their feasibility and affordability to beneficiaries, provide a general framework for the development of a series of sub-programmes to cover the total shelter needs of the population. The basic difference in the two programmes was in the interpretation of the developmental role of the government in housing. This role which was perceived as one of supply of housing in the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme was interpreted to emphasise its role as an enabler in the MHP. This basic shift in policy engendered a series of radical changes and a new thrust in the shelter strategies of Sri Lanka. Of the number of sub-programmes which were intended to constitute the MHP, two are already being implemented, the Rural Housing Sub-programme, and the Urban Housing Sub-programme.
A series of other sub-programmes such as the Private Sector Housing Sub- programme, the Plantation Housing Sub-programme and the Mahaweli Settle- ment Housing Sub-programme have been identified and are now being developed. The MHP has not been specifically defined and therefore has the flexibility to accommodate any new sub-programme. The fact that it is not rigidly structured also provides the flexibility to incorporate on-going programme development.
All sub-programmes coming under the umbrella of the MHP are guided by a set of common principles and policies: minimum intervention by the govern- ment; affordability of standards and costs; recovery of total cost of solutions; phasing out of interest subsidies; supporting and strengthening of community and individual initiatives in shelter; freedom of beneficiaries to take key decisions related to options, standards and designs, choice of materials etc.; recognition of the process of incremental construction; participation of the community and community organisation at all stages of the process - selection of beneficiaries, housing loans, recovery of loans, house building etc. wherever it is possible.
Under each sub-programme, the beneficiaries are offered a package of options tied to a scheme of shelter loans which have to be repaid fully at a specified rate of interest. The interest is at present subsidised but the subsidy wiil be gradually phased out over the years. In the case of both Rural and Urban Sub-programmes the beneficiaries are selected through people’s organisations and arrangements
, are now being made to develop such organisations (e.g. Cooperative Thrift and Loans Societies) for the lending and recovery of housing loans. During its first year of implementation, the MHP has achieved its targets reaching an unprecedented number of families in its coverage.
The MHP, though in many ways an improvement upon any programme of housing implemented before, still has a number of weaknesses which need careful attention. Interest subsidies, weaknesses of the lending mechanism, poor recoveries, the heavy costs of administration, the delays in the development of other sub-programmes which have given the whole programme an undue rural bias, are a few of them. Some of these are of a serious nature and if left unattended could even undermine the basic philosophies on which the whole programme has been developed. All these matters however are being closely scrutinised and attempts are being made to overcome them.
86 Dlsa Weerapana
THE STAGES OF DEVELOPMENT OF MHP
The Hundred Thousand Houses Programme was due to end in December 1982. With the completion of this programme drawing near, there was a growing concern over the need to develop an alternative programme, for implementation during the next phase. Housing by this time had asserted its position in the Public Investment Programme and had also come to be accepted as a key activity of the development programmes of the government. The Medium Term Investment Programme of the government had agreed to continue the allocation of resources to housing at the same level, even during the next 5 years. The high visibility of the housing projects and their wide dispersion throughout the island had also improved political popularity of the programme.
At the same time, it was equally clear to everyone associated with the implementation of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme, that in its present form and content it could not be repeated during the next phase. Besides the shortcomings discussed above which were by now very clear to every person active in the field, investment in housing was also adversely affected half-way through the implementation of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme, by a clear shift in the budgetary policy, influenced by serious resource constraints and growing inflation. The government realised that it was overstretching the economy with an ambitious programme of development and the Ministry of Finance and Planning was already taking action to divert public sector investment from long-term projects to projects that could mature in the short- term.
The impact of these financial difficulties had been already felt in the housing sector. The resources identified for allocation to shelter activities in the national budget were pruned by almost 20% in 1981/82. On the recommendation of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) a ceiling was also imposed on the total resources invested in housing and urban development programmes during the next 5 years. Following this, the composition of the housing programme had to be changed, in order to make the realisation of the target of 100,000 houses feasible. The project mix was changed bringing about a considerable reduction of houses produced by high cost direct construction programmes (35,000- 18,000) and substantially increasing the number of units constructed by aided self-help (50,000 to 80,000). The conditions had not been visibly changed even by 1983, when the end of the first programme phase had drawn near.
It was clear that shelter programmes were not going to enjoy the high level of resources received for the earlier programme, during the next 5 year period. The new programme therefore had to recognise the reality of limited resources. This made the development of a realistic programme to cover this phase extremely important. The Ministry therefore took the initiative of appointing a Task Force with the approval of the Minister of Housing. The Task Force was assigned the responsibility of developing a Five Year Programme of Housing which could be adopted for implementation during the next programme period.
The Task Force was chaired by the Additional Secretary (Development) of the Ministry and consisted primarily of officials representing the agencies under the Ministry associated with the earlier programme and therefore had knowledge and experience on the subject. The only outside member was the Representative of the Ministry of Finance and Planning. The composition of the group and its size encouraged free and open discussion in an informal setting. The Task Force opted to examine issues through a series of working papers. The subject areas for examination were identified and individual members were requested to study a subject assigned to him and submit a working paper for the consideration of the members. Each paper was discussed in detail and an amended version was presented at a future meeting incorporating the decisions of the group. This
Evolurion of a Support Policy of Shelter - The Experience of Sri Lanka 87
helped the ideas of the group to change through the work and also to develop strategies as the meetings progressed. The Task Force met weekly on a fixed day at a fixed time and the minutes of the meetings were submitted to the Minister and the Secretary to the Ministry to keep them informed of its deliberations. Further, a brief reporting of the progress made by the Task Force was attempted at the regular meetings of the Minister with the senior officials and after two months of work the Task Force was invited to its first formal meeting with the Minister. The members desired such mid-point consultations to ensure that the final recommendations of the Task Force could be kept on an acceptable path. It also enabled the group to work out the details of their proposals with the assurance that their recommendations stand a good chance of being imple- mented. Experience has also shown that such consultations help to avoid much frustration. At this meeting, a general agreement was reached on a number of key issues, which helped in the development of a policy framework which provided the basis for a set of strategies which later came to be called the One Million Houses Programme.
- The government should only play a supporting role in the new programme. - The new programme should cover a larger number of families than the
earlier programme. - The resource allocation to housing will be lower than the allocations made
to the 100,000 Houses Programme. Therefore, the limited resources should be spread as thinly as possible over a larger segment of the population.
- The shelter solutions of the future should be affordable. - The cost of solutions should be recovered. - The incremental housing and the community and individual initiatives
should be supported. - Use of local technologies and local materials should be emphasised. Immediately after this meeting the Minister, declared his intentions to
construct a million houses under a new programme. The Task Force was assigned the responsibility to work out the details of this programme. The Million Houses Programme was developed within the framework of new policies and it became a vehicle to get official sanction to a number of politically difficult changes in housing policies.
Another important outcome of the meeting was the designation of 1983 as the “Year of Planning” by the Minister. The function of the year was to test out the feasibility of some of the programmes before they were taken up for wider application during the following years. The Task Force was requested to develop an operational programme of pilot projects for implementation during the year. The Task Force appointed a smaller working group to develop these pilot projects. The breathing space provided by the Planning Year proved to be extremely valuable in terms of pilot project and programme development, debate and consultation.
After the pilot projects were implemented on the basis of one in each electoral district throughout the island, the programme was tested more comprehensively in Anuradhapura District during the Planning Year. The Million Houses Programme was finally launched in January 1984. During the first year only the Rural Sub-programme of the MHP was implemented. The Urban Sub- programme was developed in 1984 and was introduced in 1985. The other sub- programmes are still in the process of being developed and will be introduced as and when they are ready for implementation.
THE TASK FORCE - REASONS FOR SUCCESS
In the final analysis the Task Force scored a major success in winning political acceptance for a package of policies, which totally transformed the shelter
88 Disa Weerapana
strategies of Sri Lanka. The new policy package would not have attracted political support in most countries of the Third World. The enlightened poltical approach and the abundance of the political commitment enjoyed by the shelter activities made this task in Sri Lanka easier. A brief reference to the other factors will also be useful, in an assessment of the replicability of the Sri Lankan experiences.
The housing professionals in Sri Lanka by this time, had been exposed to a high degree of sensitisation and their awareness and appreciation of the key issues related to shelter were high. As a result experiences in implementation were regularly discussed and critically evaluated. Most of these officials were associated in the Task Force and their ability ta articulate these issues with conviction helped to have them corrected in the new shelter policy. Their ability to understand and anticipate political thinking also helped the process. The greater degree of preparedness enabled the Sri Lankan professionals to give the political target of a million houses a rational and an objective interpretation in sharp contrast to the events that followed the declaration of the target of 100,000 houses, several years earlier. Their anticipation enabled them to face the political realities more positively. Recognising the political imperatives and reconstituting them into viable programmes are key stages in the process of shelter programme development. In Sri Lanka a fruitful professionai mediation within the broad political parameters had been achieved with a considerable degree of success.
The Task Force functioned with an understanding of the need for a quick result. Besides gaining the confidence of the Minister on the ability of the group to formulate a programme of action within the time limits specified, which was important to its success, it also came forward with a comprehensive progral~lme of pilot projects and early action programmes, to satisfy the immediate political need until the programme was fully developed. The group also established its credibility by successfully implementing the pilot projects. This helped to a great extent to overcome the initial scepticism generally found at all levels when changes as radical as those proposed are first attempted. The performance of the NHDA in the implementation of its pilot projects and the success of the Anuradhapura demonstration during the Planning Year, helped a great deal to overcome these difficulties and to gain confidence and support from every end.
The mid-point consultations with the Minister avoided much frustration and demoralisation which could have resulted from developing proposals which fail to win political acceptance. These consultations helped the group to separate the changes which are possible from those that are not and re-adjust its thinking on the basis of political thinking very significantly. Although the target af a million houses during the next programme phase was the brainchild of the Minister, and was declared on his own initiative, there is no doubt that in making the statement he had the strategies recommended by the Task Force in mind.
The political experience and personal convictions of the Minister who had great faith in the strength and effectiveness of the participation of people and the local technology also helped a great deal in this transformation of policies. The philosophy behind the new policies had a strong natural appeal to him. Even during the implementation of the Hundred Thousand Houses Programme, it was clear that the Minister strongly supported the Aided Self-Help component of the programme which was developed on the above lines, the success and the popularity of which may have strengthened his views further.
CONCLUSION
The experience in Sri Lanka is a practical example of an evolution of a realistic shelter policy, through an understanding relationship between the political
Evolution of a Support Policy of Shelter - The Experience of Sri Lanka 89
leadership and professionals. Professionals in most countries tend to point an accusing finger at the political leadership for the continuation of conventional approaches to shelter. The reasons inferred are the general lack of appreciation of issues and a dislike or disapproval of cost effective strategies.
This however belittles the role of the professionals in transforming political ideals into viable programmes for implementation. This allows a wide space for a number of key decisions to be taken. In normal circumstances, where there is no divergence of opinion over the end objective of both partners in the process, this mediation gives the professionals considerable freedom and opportunities to evaluate optional strategies.
The “space” could be made “wider” in actual practice, by developing the “right conditions” as demonstrated in the Sri Lankan case study. A clear understanding of the true political parameters, a continuous evaluation of experience and a willingness to learn, a “dialogue” - a sincere exchange of views between the political leadership and professionals through regular consultations, an ability to establish credibility by quickly transforming the ideas into a realistic programme of action and perhaps the quick and successful achievements of the pilot projects, certainly helped to give purpose and direction to the programmes and to a change of relationships between the state and the beneficiaries at the stage of professional mediation.
Sri Lanka is an extraordinary example of a country, where a highly motivated political leadership, impacts heavily on shelter decisions. Her unique achieve- ment in transforming a very conventional delivery programme for shelter into a realistic support based programme within a relatively short space of time, can therefore be attributed to the presence of these “right conditions”.
