ECPRGraduateStudentConference2014(Innsbruck)PublicAdministration(S22)‐TheOrganisationofWickedPolicyProblems(P094)

PanelChair:DovileRimkutePanelDiscussant:AnneK.Krueger

Governingwickedproblems:Theroleofself‐organizinggovernanceinfostering

theproblem‐solvingcapabilitiesofpublicsectororganizations

Inorder to copewithsuchwickedproblemsas climatechangeandpoverty,problem‐

solving capabilities need to be cultivated in policy‐ and decision‐making and service‐

delivery.Therefore,stakeholders,includingpublicofficialsaswellascitizens,shouldbe

involved inorder tomakeadequateuseof theirknowledge, skills and resources.This

paper theoretically conceptualizes how governance mechanisms can be innovatively

usedtothisend. Inagovernanceframework,wecombineexistingconceptsandideas,

notably inNewPublicGovernance andPublicValueManagement,withorganizational

theory and the concept of knowledge governance. It is shown that neither classical

authoritativegovernance(i.e. regulatoryandsupervisorymeasuresas inanauthority‐

based Weberian bureaucracy) nor output‐based governance (i.e. financial and

performancemeasuresas in competition‐orientedNewPublicManagement) isable to

tackle wicked problems alone. Neither motivates public officials and/or citizens to

constructivelyparticipateindecision‐makingortoinvesttheirknowledgeandskillsin

co‐producingpublicservices.Instead,adequateself‐organizinggovernancemechanisms

in policy‐making and service‐deliverymay usefully complement existing authoritative

and output‐based governance mechanisms. We further show how self‐organizing

governance requires a minimum of common understanding between participants as

well as their willingness to co‐operate. These behavioral antecedents can also be

influencedbyadequateconditionsandself‐organizationitself,andthuscircumventthe

detriments of the Weberian bureaucracy and New Public Management in fostering

problem‐solvingcapacities,tacklingwickedproblemsandthuscreatingpublicvalue.

MichèleMornerGermanResearchInstituteforPublicAdministrationSpeyer

GermanUniversityofPublicAdministrationSpeyer

Reinhard‐Mohn‐InstituteofManagementandCorporateGovernance,Universityof

Witten/Herdecke

ManuelMisgeldGermanResearchInstituteforPublicAdministrationSpeyer

GermanUniversityofPublicAdministrationSpeyer

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1. Introduction

"Look,I'venottamedthewholeproblem,justthegrowl;thebeastisstillaswickedasever."

(Amanagementscientistbeinghonest;Churchman1967:B‐142)

Wickedproblemshavebeendebatedforsometimewithinvariousdisciplines,including

business and public administration, policy science, ecology, health, employment and

education,although theiroccurrencecanbedatedbackeven further (Roberts2000:2;

Batie2008:1176).Theterm,coinedbyRittelandWebber(1973),refers to the fieldof

policy‐anddecision‐makingandstrategicplanning.Wickedproblemsarecharacterized

by ambiguous or uncertain settings in which unstructured, multi‐causal

interdependencies dynamically evolve. At the border between social‐economical,

ecologicalandtechnicalsystems,deviationsfroman‘optimalstateofaffairs’canneither

beclearlydefinedintheirexactcauses,effectsorsolutionsnorultimatelybesolved–in

contrast to trivial problems. Put pointedly, “we cannot solve wicked problems […]

becausewecannotknowwhattodo”(Grint2010:170).Thismaybethecaseinclimate

change, energy production, genetic engineering, malnutrition/obesity, immigration,

integration and refugee policies, poverty, unemployment, environmental pollution,

propertyandviolentcrime,orunequalopportunitiesforminoritygroupsandsoforth.

Associated problems can be characterized as intractable or incorrigible, since they

involve causal relations that “are numerous, interrelated, and difficult to identify.”

(Bueren et al. 2003:193). Further, various social actors perceive, interpret and assess

wickedproblemsdifferentlyandveryoftenhavedifferentinterestsincopingwiththem.

Accordingly,copingwithwickedproblemsisnottrivialandrequirescertainstrategies.

Respective authors (Rittel and Webber 1973; Australian Public Service Commission

2007;Batie2008;Buerenetal.2003;Termeeretal.2013:2;Fischer1993;Ludwigetal.

2001) show that a post‐modern problem‐solving method is necessary which has to

includethedifferentinvolvedactors.However,concreteevidenceastohowexactlythis

problem‐solvingmethodshouldbeorganizedremainsunclear.Here itmakessense to

connecttotheconceptofknowledgegovernancefromorganizationaltheory.Knowledge

governanceaimsto findorganizationalsolutions for fosteringorganizationalproblem‐

solvingcapacitiesthroughthecreationanduseoforganizationalknowledge(Frostand

Morner2005).Thelatterincludestheideasandskillsoforganizationalparticipantsthat

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have to be combined and leveraged in collective bundles (Grant 1996; Nahapiet and

Ghoshal 1998). This makes cooperation and coordination between participants

necessary,whocontributetheir ideasandexperiences(KogutandZander1992;Grant

1996; Teece at al. 1997). In this context governing knowledge means fostering the

creation, sharing and use of knowledge resources and processes in firms (Frost and

Morner2010;GrandoriandKogut2002;Fossetal.2003;Foss2007;TurnerandMakhja

2006).Therespectiveauthorsshowthatthoseprocessescannotbeenforcedbutrequire

acertainwillingnessandabilitybytheparticipantstocooperate,andthereforehaveto

include aspects of self‐organizing governance.We connect to that streamof literature

and show that problem‐solving capacities for coping with wicked problems can

accordinglybefosteredorhinderedbytheuseofdifferentgovernancemechanisms.

The paper is structured as followed: In Section 2 below, we show which possible

strategies canbe identified in order to copewith or rather ‘tame’ (Rittel andWebber

1973: 160) wicked problems. As complexity and contested conceptions or value

conflicts existing in this context cannot be sufficiently met by single actors or

organizations, we look at building and cultivating collective problem‐resolving

capabilities that involve using, creating and sharing knowledge aswell as consensus‐

finding via public dialogue. Section 3 focuses on the adequate use of the different

governancemechanisms.Itoutlinesthemaintypesofgovernancemechanismsandlinks

them with paradigmatic institutional arrangements in the public sector, taking

motivational and cognitive aspectsofparticipants into consideration:First, the classic

Weberian bureaucracy in which authority‐based governance via rules and personal

supervision is upheld. Second, output‐based governance mechanisms via prices and

performance indicators predominant in New Public Management are identified. And

third, we discuss whether self‐governance via subtle forms of (clan) control in

socialization mechanisms favors the cultivation of wicked problem‐resolving

capabilities. We show that elements of self‐governance help to foster vertical and

horizontal collaboration and coordination in policy‐ and decision‐making and

implementation inNewPublicGovernance aswell as in PublicValueManagement. In

Section4,weshowthatinrelationtoproblem‐resolvingcapabilities,copingwithwicked

problems requires the cognitive aswell asmotivational compatibility of participants:

Publicofficialsandcitizensneedontheonehandtocognitivelyunderstandeachother

andontheotherhandtobemotivatedenoughtoplayapartinconstantly(co‐)creating,

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sharingorusingknowledge.InSection5wedrawashortconclusionofthearguments

developedinthispaper.

2. Approachingwickedproblemsbyacceptingcomplexity

Thefirststepincopingwithwickedproblemsistoaccepttheircomplexity–evenifthey

are defined in different ways. In the following we first outline the most relevant

definitions of wicked problems (see section 2.1) before we outline the different

strategiesthathavebeendevelopedtoapproachthem(seesection2.2).

2.1Definingwickedproblems

Rittel and Weber (1973) enumerate a list of characteristics for describing wicked

problems:Awickedproblemcannotbeformulateddefinitivelyorfullyunderstood.Also,

itcannotbeeasilydiscontinued–solutionattemptshavenostoppingrule.Solvingthe

problem objectively or in a right or wrongway is impossible (no ‘one‐best‐answer’).

Furthermore,evaluatingortestingsolutionattemptscannotbeultimatelyaccomplished.

Experimenting with solution attempts is consequential (trial and error without a

‘restart‐button’) and risky. Additionally, neither an exhaustively describable set of

alternativesolutionsnorpredominant(identical)communalitiesbetweentheproblems

exist (uniqueness).Moreover, the authors suggest that an incremental policy – oneof

smallsteps–cannotguaranteeoverall improvement,because itmissesthebigpicture

andoftenleavesthenatureoftheproblemunchanged(RittelandWebber1973:160et

sqq.;Rittel1972;seealsoConklin2005). Inanutshell,wickedproblemsareproblems

thatare“complex,unpredictable,openended,orintractable”(HeadandAlford2013:2).

Theyarenotethically‐speakingmalignant,evilorvicious,buttheyarewickedbecause

of a high resistance to resolving them (Australian Public Service Commission 2007:3;

Termeeretal.2013:2).

Moreover, wicked problems are partly socially constructed, i.e. various social actors

perceive, interpretandassessinterdependent,complexanddynamicissuesdifferently,

sothatthenatureoftheproblemisnotagreedupon.Theperceptionoftheproblemand

its underlying causes depend on one’s view of how to resolve it, and vice versa. “It

attracts varying interests and perspectives constantly juggling for recognition and

acceptance.” (FitzGibbon and Mensah 2012:2). Or, as Head and Alford put it, many

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problemsare“markedbydeep‐rooteddisagreementsaboutthenatureandsignificance”

(2013:5)ofthesechallengesandtheirpolicysolution.

Some authors differentiate between trivial and wicked problems by using two

dimensions: complexity and uncertainty as one, and value conflicts or controversial

resolvingstrategiesas theother. In thecaseofwickedproblems,bothdimensionsare

highlyrated(DurantandLegge2006:310;Baoetal.2013;Batie2008;HeadandAlford

2013:2 et sqq.): They are highly complex (or their causes uncertain) and at the same

timepoliciesforresolvingthemarehighlycontested.Consequently,solvingthemisby

definitionimpossible;theycanmerelybe‘tamed’orcopedwith.

2.2Strategiesforcopingwithwickedproblems

AccordingtoRittelandWebber(1973)therearetwomainapproachestotamingwicked

problems: a professional bureaucratic and managerialistic approach (a); and a

postmodernapproach(b):

(a)Aprofessional,bureaucratic,managerialisticapproach:Thisapproachisengineering‐

basedandrepresentsacyberneticprocessofgovernance that iscontinuouslyadapted

andcorrectedinordertoalignthesteps inplanning(strategyandimplementation)to

thestriven‐forgoals.Technocraticexpertscountercomplexitywithanevidence‐based

policy and further research andprofessionalization (Head andAlford 2013:3 et sqq.).

RittelandWebberhoweverquestionthiskindof“expert‐drivenrationalcomprehensive

planning” (Head and Alford 2013:3). They doubt that the so‐called modern‐classical

modelofplanningisabletocopewithwickedproblems.Theybelievethat,althoughthis

kindofrational‐orientedparadigmcanfixscientificandengineeringproblems,itcannot

beappliedtodiversesocietalsystemsinwhichproblemsareinterpretedandoutcomes

valueddifferently(RittelandWebber1973:159etsqq.).Incontrasttotrivialproblems,

complex, vast and intractable wicked problems require more than the standardized

resolutiontechniquesofamechanisticsteeringmodel.

(b) A postmodern approach: The so‐called postmodern approach (Rittel and Weber

1973) accepts that wicked problems cannot be solved effectively when approached

individually or by a single organization. Since the issues dealt with are

“multidisciplinary, interorganizationalandmultidimensional” (Durant2011:293), their

‘taming’ requires the consideration of different disciplines and dimensions. However,

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very often the complexity of wicked problems is underestimated: The participants

simply do not know that other disciplines and dimensions exist – each defining the

problem from another perspective. Instead they assume that everyone else has to

interpret the problem identically. Other perspectives which do not fit into their own

definition of the problem are interpreted as ‘garbage’ (Cohen et al. 1972) since the

respectiveothersseemnottobeabletounderstandtheproblem.

Inordertocopewithwickedproblemstheircomplexityhastobeaccepted.Forcoping

withe.g.terrorismandorganizedcrime,whichinvolvevalueconflictsanduncertaintyor

complex interdependencies, a collaborative effort is essential and implies interactions

between various parties. Ideally, all affected stakeholders who perceive the problem

differentlyandarethereforesearchingfordivergentanswers,havetobeinvolvedinthe

problem‐solving process. Only by integrating them and their knowledge, skills,

resources, and perspectives (Batie 2008:1187) canwicked problems be ‘tamed’. This

extends to the civic involvement, political participation and co‐creation (Bueren et al.

2003; Emerson et al. 2012) across horizontal and vertical boundaries of agencies,

jurisdictionsandthepublic,for‐profitandnon‐profitsectorsandcivilsocietyasawhole

(seeAgranoffandMcGuire2003).

Thus, theformermentionedprofessionalbureaucraticandmanagerialistapproachhas

tobeenrichedwithadialogue‐basedapproachthatisabletofosterthecreation,sharing

anduseof the respective stakeholders’ knowledge, skills andperspectives. It requires

responsive, flexible and citizen‐centered government that fosters public deliberations,

participation and discursive engagement (Durant and Legge 2006:310 et sqq.). We

extendthisapproachinthefollowingsectionsandenrichitwithresultsfromknowledge

governanceinorganizationaltheorytohighlighttheimportanceof“self‐governance”.

3. Governingwickedproblems

How can knowledge creation, sharing and use as well as consensus‐finding between

different participants be governed in order to cope with wicked problems? Put

differently,howcanthesecollaborativeactivitiesbeeffectivelycoordinatedinorderto

reach the commongoal?This constitutes a central question in knowledge governance

(Grandori1997)andorganizationalcontrol(Ouchi1980;Eisenhardt1985).Wetransfer

themainresultstothecontextofcultivatingdifferentcapabilitiestocopewithwicked

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problemsthattranscendsocial,technicalandecologicalrealms,anddefineitassteering

the “process that influencesdecisions and actionswithin theprivate, public, and civic

sectors”(O’Learyetal.2006:7).

According toOuchi (1979), three typesof steering levers, or governancemechanisms,

can be identified. Ouchi (1979) argued that it is not only authority‐based governance

mechanismsincludingrulesorsupervisioninaWeberianbureaucracy(3.1)andoutput‐

basedgovernancemechanisms including prices and indicators (3.2) that can influence

decisionsandcoordinateactions.Self‐organizinggovernance(3.3)toocanhaveaneffect,

with the latter becoming increasingly important for fostering knowledge creation and

enhancing problem‐solving capacities (Frost and Morner 2010). This again is an

important part of coping with wicked problems, whereas output‐based or authority‐

basedgovernanceareoflimitedusehere.

3.1 Authority‐basedgovernanceinWeberianbureaucracy

PublicadministrationistraditionallydominatedbyWeberianprinciplesofauthorityand

rule‐based governancemechanisms. It is suited for standardized and repetitivework

tasks and traditionally characterized by predictable careers for public employees and

equitable treatment by rule‐of‐law. The bureaucrat is expected to implement policies

neutrally consistent with legal requirements and to follow budgetary or procedural

standards(Andersenetal.2012).Thisisenforcedbyrules,directivesandlawsthatset

goals and limits for certain behaviour and conduct that need to be monitored or

regulatedbyacentralized(andlegitimate)authority(MarchandSimon1958;Lawrence

andLorsch1969).Theauthority‐basedgovernancemechanismscanbesubdividedinto

direct (personal, hierarchical) supervision or into general (impersonal) rules and

adherentenforcements(Weber1922).

Since authority‐based governance in aWeberian bureaucracy concentrates on setting

rules and procedures and monitoring compliance, it significantly limits “the

opportunitiestothinkexpansivelyaboutpolicyissuesofthetypethatmightbethrown

up to wicked problems” (Head and Alford 2013:9). Strictly interpreted tasks and

authoritynotonly leadtoa functionalfragmentationofpublicsectororganization,but

also toa lackofresponsiveness towards thecomplexneedsofcitizens.Astheprivate,

public, and civic sectors need to dealwith “multiple, overlapping, interconnected […]

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problems” (Weber andKhademian2008:336) that exceedpolicy areas, the spheresof

organizational activities and jurisdictions, and confined hierarchical and authoritative

structuresareoverwhelmedbysuchcomplexityincopingwiththeseproblems.

Furthermore, authority‐based governance implies a high level of understanding and

judgeability by those who supervise or establish and enforce the rules, i.e. by the

monitoring agents (Ouchi 1980).Otherwise itwould be impossible to supervise or to

regulatecorrectly,or toestablishadequate regulationandensurecompliance.Thus, if

publicofficialshaverecognizedtheexperienceandexpertiseoftherespectiveprocesses

andinteractions,theyshouldbeabletoadequatelyjudgepolicyanddecision‐makingas

wellasknowledge‐intensivecollaboration(FrostandMorner2010).

However,thereisadangerofarational‐technocraticplanningmodel,astheknowledge

seems“objective”. In thiscase,participatorypolicy‐anddecision‐makingarerendered

disposable (Nabatchi 2010:380 et sqq.), with less room left for creativity, discursive

participationandpublic learning.Veryoften in the caseofknowledgecreation,public

officials aren’t included in the process and are unable to judge it. In these cases,

authority‐basedgovernance fails to copewithuncertaintyandvalueconflicts. Instead,

other forms of governance need to be established that are better able to encourage

government and citizens to collaboratively create knowledge and foster a consensus,

withoutengaginginpatronizingormeddlingbehaviour.

3.2 Output‐basedgovernanceinNewPublicManagement

Asa response to the challengesofpurely authority‐basedgovernmental interventions

and the bureaucratic organizational design of the state, a more market‐oriented

approachhasbeen introducedaround theworld. It aimsat reducing the inefficiencies

that monopolistic forms of service provision implicate and which are dominated by

producer interests or the citizen as a recipient of orders. In general, the reform

paradigm commonly known as New Public Management “seeks to dismantle the

bureaucraticpillaroftheWeberianmodeloftraditionalpublicadministration”(Stoker

2006:45).Itstressestheimportanceofoutput‐basedgovernancemechanisms.Theyare

primarily based on output‐measures i.e. prices or numericmeasurementswhich give

incentives for individual behaviour leading supply and demand to an equilibrium.

Citizens are understood as clients whose needs are the focus of public management.

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Breaking up state service‐provision monopolies and implementing private‐sector

management techniquesbothaimatsavingmoney, improvingperformance,becoming

responsivetoclients’needsandthusbeingmoreeffectiveinprovidingpublicservices.

Furthermore, New Public Management is characterized by autonomous organizations

(public or private). Their clients decide upon economic transactions bilaterally, but

organize the input, transformation processes and related behaviour and actions

unilaterally.Itismainlytheoutputandthepriceofgoodsandservicesthatisrelevant

(Ouchi1979;Merchant1985;Merchant1989;Stoker2006).

Output‐basedmechanisms are based on prices and a numericmanagement approach

thatissuitablefortrivialproblems.Forthese,standardizedorcanonicalprocessesand

solutions are available andmeasurable by their usefulness. Examples are “identifying

thecosteffectivenessofdifferentcroppracticestoreducesoilerosion;ordetermining

thecostsandbenefitsofexpandinganirrigationproject”(Batie2008:1177).Pricescan

giveacleardirectiontoindividualsandincentivizethemtoefficientlyallocateresources

and transform them into goods and services that are demanded. Relevant issues are

known and uncontested, so that the production process is clear‐cut and can be

standardized accordingly (see Ouchi 1979; Merchant 1985; Merchant 1989; Stoker

2006;NoordengraafandAbma2003).

Two main arguments, however, can be raised against output‐based mechanisms for

cultivatingproblem‐resolvingcapabilities.First,“onlycollectiveengagementcanhopeto

address the problem” (Grint 2010:171), and this cannot be fostered solely by price

mechanismsandeconomictransactions.Itisinsteadbasedoncooperativebehaviour,its

output is hard to trace, and the individual share in creating it cannot be evaluated or

measured.Incontrast,output‐basedgovernancemechanismstendtoencourageutility‐

maximizing strategies that canbe followedby internalizing benefits and externalizing

costs, leading to uncooperative behaviour that hampers collective engagement.

Individualinterestsandcollectiveinterests(e.g.anequitableandsustainablesupplyof

resources) contradict one another. This is prevalent in situations in which direct or

indirect costs and the benefits of goods and services are not borne or shared

proportionatelybythepartiesinvolved.Marketfailurescanbeidentifiedinparticularin

thecaseofexternalities.Here,thepositiveornegativeeffectsandoutcomesassociated

with producing, supplying and consuming (public) goods and services spill over onto

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third parties. Consequently, the collectively‐valued outcome of their consumption or

provision isnotcongruentwiththeiroutput– theyareeitherunder‐suppliedorover‐

used.Inthiscontextofmarketfailures,prices‘lie’,i.e.theygivedistortedsignals“about

their real value, confounding the communication between consumers and producers”

(Donahue 1991:18). Furthermore, the individually‐valued divide between output and

outcome is contested, as individual and collective interests depend on the individual

perspectiveor time‐horizon. In order tomake aprofit, exploitingnatural resources is

individually rational for a short period of time, but from a collective perspective

unsustainable in the long run. There is a trade‐off between individual rational utility

maximizing and collectively‐responsible conduct. Such a conflict of values cannot be

solved by output mechanisms alone. An example of this so‐called tragedy of the

commonsisoverfishingthateventuallyleadstoacollapsingecosystem.Also,free‐riding

heavyindustryrefrainsfrominvestmentinairfilters,thusexternalizingthecostsofair

pollution at the expense of public health and climate change – a ‘super wicked

problem’(seeOstrom1990;Stern2006;Hardin1968;Levinetal.2012).

Second, the numeric approach of output-based governance methodologically tends to distort

complexity and ambiguousness because it unidimensionally formulates or specifies the

problem as if it were trivial and well-defined, one that needed to be rationally solved,

perpetuating a fallacy of control. However, inthecaseofcomplexissuesthataredifficult

to answer and which are contested and ambiguous, “the use of facts and figures or

indicators has limited value” (Noordegraaf and Abma 2003:866). Accordingly, New

Public Management fails to tackle ambiguous and contested (solutions to) problems

insofar as it follows a linear approachof scientificmanagement.AsDurant andLegge

suggest, a governance system that “relies primarily on market, technocratic, and

objective scientific rationality as the primary formof persuasion is problematicwhen

wickedproblemsare involved” (2006:328).Theauthorsexemplify that for thecaseof

genetically‐modified food production, which is a complex as well as value‐laden,

controversial issue (Durant and Legge 2006). Consequently, deficiencies in governing

wickedproblemsareperpetuated.

Inastructuralperspective,NewPublicManagementhasbeencriticisedforitsfocuson

disaggregation,competition,andincentivization.Thisisaccompaniedbyhorizontaland

vertical coordination problems, partly because of the rising number of public sector

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organizations.Thus, even fewer capabilities, synergies and cross‐cutting strategies for

copingwithuncertaintyandvalueconflictsseemtobeavailable.Forboundary‐spanning

andcomplexsocialproblems,achievingaconsensusandbuildingtrustandlegitimacyis

necessary but neglected byNewPublicManagement (Dunleavy et al. 2006;Bao et al.

2013:446).

3.3 Self‐governanceinnetworked,whole‐ofandpublic‐valuegovernance

Mechanismsthatrelyoncontrolandmonitoringtendtodiminishcreativity,discursive

participation and public learning in knowledge‐intensive work settings which is

urgentlyneededforcopingwithwickedproblems.Therefore,self‐governancebecomes

crucial forsteering inthesecontexts. Itdiffers fromoutput‐basedandauthority‐based

governancemechanisms insofaras itreliesonsubtle formsofcontrol thatcanalsobe

foundinsocializationprocesses(onasocietalorpoliticallevel)orinprofessions(ona

sectorallevel).

In self‐organizing governance no clearly‐defined authority is to be found – rather,

decentralizedpersuasionandmutualmonitoringdominateself‐governing(Kirsch1996,

Adler 2001). Coordination can be achieved without exogenous interference. Self‐

organization is another fitting term for this mode of governance. Central to it are

mechanismsthatfocusonhowtocreatecommonconsent, forexamplebydeliberative

decision‐making that ideally involves all the persons concerned (Romme1996; Elster

1998;Nabatchi2010).

The concept of Public Value Management also makes use of mechanisms that

characterize self‐governance (Maynhardt 2009:192 et sqq.). “It rests on a fuller and

rounder vision of humanity thandoes either traditional public administration or new

publicmanagement.”(Stoker2006:56).Similarly,networkandcollaborativegovernance

andtheapproachofjoined‐uporwhole‐ofgovernmentaremeanttomeetthechallenges

of New Public Management, i.e. of overcoming governance problems resulting from

atomized organizations (Alford and Hughes 2008; Christensen and Lægreid 2007).

Networkandcollaborativegovernanceisneitherauthority‐basednoroutput‐basedand

thereforemayfosterknowledgetobeused,sharedandcreated(WeberandKhademian

2008:337etsqq.;RethemeyerandHatmaker2007:630etsqq.).Or,asBeningtonputsit

in theperspectiveofpublicvalue: It “recognizes the importanceof the laborofpublic

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professionalsandmanagersintheco‐creationofpublicservice,throughtheinteraction

betweenproducersandusersandotherstakeholders,forexample,ineducation,health,

and criminal justice” (2009:236). At the same time, Public Value Management as a

reform paradigm is intended to ensure that the inefficiencies and red tape that may

occur inaWeberianbureaucratic top‐downcontrolareaverted(VeenstraandJanssen

2012).

In order to substantiate the concept of self‐governance, we take a look at the policy

issues insocial‐ecologicalsystemsthat“havepowerfulreciprocal feedbacksandactas

complexadaptive systems” (Folkeet al. 2005:443).Here, the tragedyof the commons

showscomplexandcontestedcollective‐actionproblems:Participantsaretemptednot

tocontributetothecooperationeffortthatisneededtoachieveacommongood.Neither

government nor private ownership as governance structures seem to suffice for

planning and building e.g. irrigation systems constituting common‐pool resources

(Ostrom 2011). Instead, adaptive, self‐organizing processes that involve various

stakeholders participating or working together are better suited, especially with

“community‐based systems of resource management tailored to specific places and

situations” (Folke et al. 2005:448). So far many different examples have been

highlighted (Folke et al. 2005): Olsson et al. (2004) examined a Swedish‐Norwegian

policyinitiativetosecurethenoblecrayfishpopulation(APNC),fundedbytheEuropean

Commissions Interreg program. The population was endangered because of a fungal

diseaseaswellasanimbalancedecosystemcausedbyoverexploitationandacidification

stemmingfromairpollutionfromcentralEurope.Thepolicyinitiativetocopewiththis

problem involved polycentric collaboration across organizational levels, including

municipalities, economic, agricultural and fishing associations, national agencies and

environmentaldepartments.Theauthorspointtosimilaritieswithanothercasestudy:A

broadperspectiveon several connected issues in a social‐ecological systemwasused,

multiple actors were involved in the process, and knowledge related to these issues

cultivatedinorganizationsandinstitutionsandsharedinsocialnetworks.Inthecaseof

Sweden,thedecision‐makingauthoritywasdecentralizedtolocalfishingassociationsby

national legislation, whose members monitored the ecosystem. With this self‐

governance approach, capabilities “dispersed across a set of loosely connected actors

[…] at different levels” (Olsson et al. 2004:87)were developed in order to copewith

complexityanduncertainty.

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Asthiscaseshows,output‐basedandauthority‐basedgovernancemechanismsarenot

obsolete in self‐governance. Likewise, the authors conclude that this “self‐organizing

process[…],facilitatedbyrulesandincentivesofhigherlevels,hasthepotentialtomake

the social–ecological systems more robust to change” (Olson et al. 2004:87).

Accordingly,amixofgovernancemechanismshastobeputinplace.Theirinterplayis

complexastheydependonamultitudeoffactors.

4. Behavioralantecedentsin(self‐)governingwickedproblems

Asdiscussedintheprevioussection,eachofthethreegovernancemodeshasadifferent

coordinating effect on how complex, uncertain and controversial issues that deviate

fromanoptimalstateofaffairscanbedealtwith.Wepointedoutthatgovernmentneeds

to cultivate knowledge capabilities and strengthen its responsiveness to the general

public. These capabilities are crucial in order to resolve value conflicts and reduce

complexity anduncertainty.More specifically, it is important to create, share anduse

knowledge collaboratively between public officials and citizens and also to engage in

dialogue‐based or participatory consensus‐finding. In networked and cross‐sectorial

arrangements, the effective use of self‐governance is crucial but very demanding

becausemultiplefactorsdeterminingtheextentoftheinvolvementofpublicofficialsas

wellascitizensneedtobeconsidered(Nabatchi2012:699sqq.).Ifcitizens,groups,and

organizations are incapable or unwilling to be engaged partners in the collaborative

governance process, self‐organization fails to tame wicked problems (Emerson et al.

2011:2;Morse2012).Referringtoorganizationtheory inthefollowing,wespecifythe

two behavioral factors that enormously impact the functioning of the self‐governance

processes (the following text stemspartly fromMorneret al. 2010;Frost andMorner

2010; Morner and Misgeld 2013): the cognitive compatibility of the involved actors,

representing their cognitive capability for mutual understanding (4.1), and their

willingnesstocooperate(4.2).

4.1 Thecognitivecompatibilityoftheinvolvedactorsasaprerequisiteforself‐governance

Cognitivecompatibilitymeansthedegreetowhichthecognitivepatternsoftheinvolved

participantsarecompatibleandthustheyareabletounderstandeachother,aswellas

respectiveevents, contextsandenvironments (Rumelhart1980; SimsandGioia1986;

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Barr et al. 1992). Whether cognitive patterns are compatible or incompatible

significantly affects how collaborators and participating citizens tend to cooperate in

policy‐anddecision‐making. Ifpatternsdifferbecause, forexample,participantsdon’t

usethesamelanguageorhavedifferentworldviews,interestsandhabits,theyarelikely

to perceive, interpret and evaluate situations in diverging ways. Then, consensus‐

making is impeded,whichcounteractscopingwithwickedproblems(HeadandAlford

2013:7).Fordiscussingcomplexpolicyissuesandvalueconflictsinthecontextofthese

problems,differentpatternscanbeseennotonlyaschallengesbutalsoasopportunities.

Two main effects of dissimilar cognitive patterns can be identified as beneficial for

copingwithcomplexity:Ontheonehand,conflictinginterpretationschemesmayresult

inanenrichedbodyofknowledgeandpubliclearning.Fromthispointofview,cognitive

dissimilaritiestendtobroadenpublicofficials’orparticipants’perspectivesandwaysof

thinking. Individuals are able to consider or to better understand various options in

policy‐ anddecision‐making (Eisenhardt et al. 1997;Head andAlford2013:13 et sq.),

and the set of policy alternatives can be more fully detected. Accordingly, new

knowledge canbe created throughdiscursivedecision‐making that is fruitful if public

officials as well as citizens can contribute equally with deviating ideas, concepts and

understandings.Thus,thescopeanddepthoftheknowledgeobtainedcanbewidened,

deepenedorenriched,andthismayleadtobettercopingstrategies.Withsimilarresults,

innovation research states that diverse knowledge repositories are needed so that

individualsareabletorecognize,assimilateandusenewandrelevantinformationand

also create knowledge. For example, for public private partnerships or in network

governance, a transfer of knowledge, skills and routines and also cross‐boundary

learningareseenasimportantaspectsofself‐organization(KivlenieceandQuelin2012;

WeberandKhademian2008;KoppenjanandKlijn2004:6et sqq.).On theotherhand,

similarcognitivepatternscanleadtoan‘in‐groupbias’.Inthiscase,possibleeffectscan

includesomeinformationordecisionoptionsnotbeingunderstood,notbeingtakeninto

considerationorsimplyoverlooked.Becauseofanin‐groupbias,lessknownindividuals’

contributionsareundervaluedandtheiropinionsnotheard.Also,expertsandpeersina

technocratic planning model may become less capable of using knowledge about

interests and values or of implicit, tacit, practical or contextual character. This

knowledge may stem from outside, local resources, particularly from citizens’ needs,

experiences and perspectives (Batie and Schweickhardt 2009:29; Jentoft and

15

Chuanpagdee 2009:554 et sq.; Head andAlford 2013:3;6 et sqq.). Thus, being able to

cooperaterequiresmaintainingabalancebetweencognitivedissimilarityandsimilarity,

betweenahighernoveltyvalueandlowermutualunderstanding(Wuytsetal.2004:3).

A certain cognitive compatibility or overlapping of cognitive patterns is therefore

needed so that a shared understanding (Nooteboom 1992; Nooteboom 1999) and

reduced uncertainties can be reached. Then, coping with wicked problems via self‐

governancemaybecomepossible.

4.2 Thewillingnesstocooperateoftheinvolvedactorsasaprerequisiteforself‐governance

Asecondprerequisiteforthefunctioningofself‐governanceisthattheinvolvedactors

be willing to cooperate. As mentioned before, coping with wicked problems needs

collectiveengagementthatisbasedoncooperativebehaviorandinteraction(Buerenet

al.2003:195etsqq.).AccordingtoOstrom(2000),most individualsareusuallywilling

to cooperate under certain circumstances. The most important factor influencing

willingness to cooperate is whether others are expected to cooperate or not.

Accordingly,thewilltocooperateisreciprocalinnatureandindividualsrateeachother

on how actively they intend to cooperate (or freeride) in the policy‐ and decision‐

makingprocess.Thusthewillingnesstocooperatecanmutuallyintensify(negativelyor

positively) and end up in an upward or downward spiral effect (Osterloh 2007). In a

downwardcooperativemomentum, collective irrational, opportunisticbehavior looms

largeasagentstendtoincorporateconductalignedtovaluesdominatedbyself‐interest

andextrinsicmotivation.Thisleadstoasocialdilemmaandexacerbatesthetragedyof

thecommons:Collaboratorsorparticipantscounteractthegroupoutcomeswhichthey

arestrivingfor.Theresultmaybeadeadendofnon‐cooperation,whichself‐evidentlyis

less preferred collectively and individually than a situation in which conditional co‐

operators show pro‐social collective behavior (Williamson 1985; Dawes 1991; Miller

1992; Frost andMorner 2005). A downward spiral can be triggered by crowding‐out

effects if extrinsic motivators are fostered or patterns of extrinsic motivation

strengthened:Collaboratorsorparticipantsaccordingly tendtoevaluate theirpossible

actionsonhowrewardscanbeachievedandsanctionsavoidedinsteadofsatisfyingthe

need to collaborate or participate for its own sake. Joint‐action in order to follow a

commonintereste.g.forbettercopingwiththetragedyofthecommons,islesslikelyas

collaborators or participants behave competitively in the logic of self‐interest,

16

maximizing instead of cooperating (Christensen 2005; Mooney et al. 2007).

Consequently, cooperative activities that are important for decision‐making, such as

knowledge sharing, are impaired since decision‐makers are afraid of losing their

competitiveadvantage(Osterlohetal.2002).Insettingsthataredominatedbyextrinsic

motivation,socialdilemmasoccurandparticipantsandcollaboratorsarecompelledto

counteract the common interest and public good. Thus, self‐organization may fail to

build capabilities in order to cope with collective problems. In contrast, intrinsically

motivated agents striving to cooperate can positively influence policy‐ and decision‐

making processes. They can build up trust, shared motivation and commitment in a

value‐centered public management. These are important for a positive collaborative

dynamic and even catalyze the collective engagement needed for copingwithwicked

problems(AnsellandGash2008;Emersonetal.2012;Baoetal.2013:453etsqq.).

5. Conclusion

Thispapertheoreticallyconceptualizeshowdifferentgovernancemechanismsareable

to‘tame’wickedproblemsinthepublicsector.Inordertodothis,wefirstidentifythe

characteristicsoftwodimensionsoftheseproblemsinparticular.Wedescribethemas

inherentlycomplexintheirscaleofuncertaintyandvalueconflicts,andshowthatthey

can only be tackled if their complexity is accepted and the involved stakeholders are

includedintheproblem‐solvingprocessthroughparticipatoryprocessesandpractices.

Referringtoorganizationaltheoryandtheconceptofknowledgegovernance,wepoint

out that output‐based governancemechanisms (e.g. prices and indicators) as well as

authority‐basedgovernance(e.g.rulesandsupervision)arerarelysuitedtocopingwith

uncertainty, complexity and value conflicts. They need to be complemented by self‐

governance, so that collective engagement and cooperation in policy‐ and decision‐

making is fostered.This is congruentwith anetwork governance approach or public‐

valuemanagement perspective that stresses the facilitative, enabling and partner‐like

role of public officials. However, involved participants and collaborators need to be

(motivationally) willing and (cognitively) able to interact for consensus‐finding and

sharing, using and creating knowledge. Only then does adequate ‘taming’ of wicked

problems‘seempossible.

17

Our paper contributes to research in the field of public management by specifying

governance‐relatedantecedentsforcopingwithwickedproblems.Wealsocontributeby

transferringresultsfromorganizationalandmotivationaltheoryaswellastheconcept

of knowledge governance into public management. We focus on how governing

collaborative arrangements can be aligned with consensus‐finding and knowledge‐

creation,sharinganduse.Additionally,weshowhowmotivationalandcognitiveaspects

ofparticipantsshouldbeconsideredinthisconnection.

Further research gaps can be identified. The interactions between differentmodes of

governance and how they contribute to building trust, legitimacy and accountability

need to be examined in network governance settings (Christensen et al. 2013). The

mechanisms’mutualinterplayneedstobeanalyzedinrelationtohowtheycomplement,

substituteandhindereachother,andwhether thishelps incopingwithuncertainties,

complexities and value conflicts. Finally, empirical evidence will be very helpful in

advancingourframeworkforgoverningwickedproblems.

18

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