ideologia, stabilità e coesione nel pcus

8/12/2019 ideologia, stabilit e coesione nel pcus

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PETER RUTLAND*

The Search for Stability:Ideology Discipline and the Cohesionof the Soviet Elite

In the last three years Soviet politics have been in a state of apparent turmoil, with theappearance of unprecedented phenomena such as a relatively free press, competitiveelections, and parliamentary institutions. These developments are usually discussed interms of their implications for the future, with much speculation as to the likely successor failure of perestroika. Understandably enough, in the rush to focus on the new anddifferent, many commentators have switched their attention away from the dull andunchanging. However, our own research has convinced us that despite the excitingchanges at the apex of the Soviet political system, the actual institutions through whichthe CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) exercises its control over society haveremained substantially intact. This paper seeks to understand the organizational prac-tices through which the CPSU h as b een able to maintain its position as a ruling party inboth the Brezhnev and post-Brezhnev eras.

We attempt to examine the role of the CPSU through the prism of modern elitetheory, which argues that elite cohesion is the vital precondition for political stability,and that in times of change (for example, the transitions to democracy in southernEurope and Latin America) the success of the process hinges upon the forging of aconsensus within the political elite at an early stage. This analytical approach is inmarked contrast to theories which explain stability and transition in terms of, say, aregimes popular legitimacy.

The CPSU seems to have developed a set of procedures which have proved highlyeffective in securing elite cohesion. Most of these procedures are well-known: theconcept of a vanguard party, democratic centralism, and the nomenkluturu system. How-ever, the crisis in power and cohesion which the CPSU is currently experiencing suggeststhat we should look more closely at these structural features of the CPSU, in order tounderstand to what extent the party can reform its organizational practices whilepreserving itself as the dominant political actor.

Our account begins with a reiteration of the point that the party itself recognizes eliteunity as the key to their role. This is both an ideological and an organizationalphenomenon (one category blurs into the other). On the ideological side, we brieflysurvey the role played by ideology in cadre selection, looking at the network of ideo-logical training institutions within the party, and the efforts to enforce ideologicalcriteria through the nomenkluturu system in order to promote the political unity of thevarious decision-making elites in the USSR. There have as yet been few concretechanges in the way the nomenkluturu system itself operates. All we offer in addition to

* The research for this article was completed thanks to grant no. 803-16 from the National Council forSoviet and East European Research.STUDIESIN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISM VOL. XXIV, No. 1, March 1991, 25-570039.3592/91/01 0025-33 03.00 0 1991 University of California


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26 S~unr~s IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISTSprevious accounts is our own estimate of the total size of the full-time party apparatus(c. 100 000) and of the total number of positions on the nomenkhturu (c. 1.9 million).

Finally, on the organizational side we review the party discipline campaigns of thepast decade, and suggest that despite a dramatic rise in dismissals the mechanisms usedto maintain party discipline have shown surprising continuity from the period ofstagnation through to the period of perestroika.

The Theoretical BackgroundOne of the most distinctive features of the Soviet political system has been its stabi l i ty, inthe specific sense that leadership succession has been fairly smooth and the system hasnot seen extensive political violence since the 1930s and 1940s. Since 1986 of course wehave seen indications of a breakdown in this stability (communal violence, strikes, andinstitutional reforms of a radical nature). How is one to account for the stability of the1953-1985 period, and what are the chances that the current leadership will be able toregain such a degree of stability?

In addressing such issues most commentators have focused on elite-mass relations.Huntingdon laid down the groundwork in the 1960s by talking of the Leninist one-partysystem being a successful formula for the institutionalization of conflicting socialinterests. G. W. Breslauer subsequently advanced a model of welfare state authori-tarianism to explain the quiescence of the Brezhnev era.2 In all of S. Bailers work theconcept of legitimacy seems pivotal to his interpretation of the stability of the Sovietregime. In an influential article P. Hauslohner has tried to carry the analysis forwardto the post-1985 period, seeingpemtroika as an attempt to renegotiate the social contractbetween the state and the people.4

In our view these approaches exaggerate the importance of popular attitudes when itcomes to explaining system stability in the USSR. Only in certain fairly extremecircumstances-military defeat, or an economic crisis involving food shortages, pricerises, and a sudden fall in living standards-will popular attitudes become an influentialfactor, and even in those circumstances it is how the elite itself responds to these pres-sures from below that will be decisive in determining regime survival or regime collapse.

Instead of looking at elite-mass relations, we will be working within the frameworkof elite theory, as recently re-interpreted by Higley and Field.5 The assumption is thatfor any type of political system (democratic, authoritarian, or socialist) politicalprocesses within the ruling elite itself are the key to understanding regime stability andregime change. The vital precondition for stability is the preservation of elite cohesion.Stability is only threatened when a fragmented elite starts to mobilize sections of themass public behind their respective positions. If the political elite acts in unison, deploy-ing the enormous powers of the modern state for the purpose of keeping the existingsystem intact, success is usually assured (short of foreign intervention or a complete

1. S. Huntington, Poli ti cal Order n Changing .%& ti es (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968).2. G. W. Breslauer, On the adaptability ofsoviet welfare-stateauthoritarianism, in K. W. Ryavec, ed.,So&l Society and the Commun ist Par g (Amherst, Mass: University of Massachusetts Press, 1978).3. S. Bialer, Slalins Successors London: Cambridge University Press, 1980).4. P. Hauslohner, Gorbachevs social contract, Sovi et economy, Vol. 3, No. 1 (1987), pp. 54-89.5. G. Lowell Field and J. Higley, El t urn London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980); also J. Higley andM. G. Burton, The elite variable in democratic transitions and breakdowns, Amencan Sociol ogical Reuiew ,

Vol. 54 (1989), pp. 17-32.


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I deology, Di sci pl i ne, and th e Cohesion of th e Soviet El i te 27breakdown in public order). The key to regime stability in the USSR would thus lie inan understanding of the unique processes by which the CPSU seeks to preserve itscohesion as a ruling elite.

One answer is to suggest that the Soviet elite is held together by nothing more thansimple self interest. According to the mafia models of K. Simis and of I. Zemtsov theUSSR is nothing more than a kleptocracy, with ruling groups united solely by theirmutual enjoyment of privileges. We find these arguments persuasive, for, as we shallsee below, in the past two years in the Soviet press there has emerged extensive evidenceof corruption to corroborate the recollections of these former offtcials. However, as ageneral theory of the functioning of the Soviet elite the mafia model remains inadequate.Judging by the available evidence, it seems that only in the Caucasus and Central Asiais corruption institutionalized and all-pervasive. The recent Soviet press has also yieldedcounter-evidence to the mafia thesis, for example claiming that regional party officialsdo not enjoy access to special clinics and shops, and that in regions where such specialfacilities did exist they are being converted to public use.7

Moreover, in all types of political system leaders enjoy privileges both legal andillegal. Corrupt networks need to operate within a given politico-economic structure(dynastic, military, democratic, or socialist) and are parasitical upon it. A pure klepto-cracy, operating without any other organizational or ideological framework, is difficultto imagine, and would be highly unstable. The USSR does not yet seem to have reachedthis stage, although it is possible that it may be heading in this direction.

Elite Cohesion in the CPSUThe greatest threat to elite cohesion in the USSR probably comes at the very highestlevel: within the Politburo itself. Stalin and Khrushchev, as individual agents, clearlyhad a great impact on the institutional structure of the CPSU. There is a paradox here:the Soviet elite is so centralized that a feud among the partys top leaders can endangerthe stability of the whole system. One approach to the question of elite cohesion wouldthus be to analyse faction fighting at Politburo level. We are more interested in themechanisms used to secure cohesion of the Soviet elite at levels below that of the Kremlinleadership.

Suffice it to suggest that the greatest threat to elite cohesion in the USSR probably liesin the considerable accumulation of power in the hands of Gorbachev. Up to a certainpoint this was functionally necessary for elite cohesion, in order to create a consensus forreform within the Politburo. However, the old Brezhnevites have by now been removedfrom the Politburo, yet Gorbachev still continues to accumulate power vis-a-vis hisPolitburo colleagues (and seems to be trying to institutionalize his power through theoffice of President).

The cohesion of the CPSU rests on a twin foundation: organizational coherence and

6. K. Simis, USSR: Secrels ofa Conup SO&Q London: Dent, 1982); I. Zemtsov, The Zriva~e L;fe ofthe SouictElite (New York: Crane Russak, 1985).7. For example, interviews with the first secretaries of: Grodno obkom, Argumenty ifa@ (AZF), No. 20May, 1988), p. 1; of Latvia, AZF, No. 27 (July, 1988), p. 2; Ulyanovsk obkom, Ulynnowkayapravda, August

6, 1988, p. 2; of Kiev gorkom, Vechernii Kiev, June 23, 1988, p. 2. According to Moscow News, No. 37,September 11, 1988, p. 2, special shops in Georgia have been eliminated, and hundreds of party/state guesthouses in Azerbaidjan, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan handed over for public use.

8. We will not pursue this subject here, as it is covered by others better qualified than the present author.


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28 STUI,IES IN COMPAKATIVE COM vJUN:rSMideological unity. The most distinctive feature of the strategy adopted by a Leninistparty to secure elite cohesion is the attempt to create a uniform world view for allmembers and activists. The establishment of a uniform party ideology provides both arationale for elite cohesion and a set of distinctive organizational practices throughwhich elite cohesion can be operationally secured. Merely following through theroutines associated with explaining and applying the official ideology provide aframework of activity which provides coherence for the CPSU as an organization.

Most academics writing on the subject treat Soviet ideology as a body of ideas. Ourconcern here, however, is with the structure of ideological institutions rather than thecontent of the ideology itself. Rather than exploring to what extent it is intellectuallycoherent, or accurately reflects Soviet reality, our approach looks at ideology in termsof its functional utility for the Soviety elite. This is not to imply that the intellectualincoherence of Soviet Marxism does not matter, nor that its divergence from reality isnot important: we will simply not be addressing those issues here.

In terms of Western debates about the role of ideology in society, we are following R.Wuthnow in concentrating on ideology as it is embedded in social institutions, ratherthan as a subjective reflection of social reality (as in the Durkheimian tradition).Alternatively, in the context of public choice theory, we are treating ideology as a devicefor overcoming the free rider problem: it may be easier to secure collective action byinsisting on adherence to abstract principles rather than building a coalition of self-interested agents.

To stress the role of ideology in Soviet politics is nothing new: it is as old as Leninism,older therefore than the Soviet state itself. The distinctive role of ideology was one of thecentral tenets of the Totalitarianism paradigm. In their rush to distance themselves fromthis perceived relic of the Cold War, commentators have tended to avoid discussion ofthe discredited models central elements, including the role of ideology and thevanguard party. There is a danger here of throwing out the baby with the bathwater.

In the context of comparative politics, we see the attempt to impose an official partyideology as being the single most important factor governing Soviet elite unity. Very fewpolitical elites around the globe have succeeded in developing such an elaborate andcomprehensive ideology justifying their rule: most rely upon some inchoate invocationof national interest and the uniqueness of a given people. Mexicos PRI, with therevolution as its reference point, probably comes closest to the ruling communist parties.We make no claims as to the degree to which individual party members internalizecommunist values: we merely note that the official ideology provides the concepts andlanguage for political discourse in the public domain.

However, we should not treat ideology as some sort of secret formula, a magic keywhich unlocks the kingdom of power. Ideology alone cannotguarantee elite unity. Thus,for example, in Yugoslavia the political elite happily use Marxist language, but is deeplydivided along regional/ethnic lines.

Some might suggest that under Gorbachev the CPSU has started to shed its commit-ment to a unique world view, and is moving towaards a more pragmatically basedapproach to social reality, in which performance matters more than formal invocationof ideological dogma. This is too broad a subject for the confines of this paper, but thefollowing two points should be made. First, the internal institutional structure of the

9. R. Wuthnow, State structures and ideology, American Soczolq~zcalReuzeiu, Vol. 50, No. 6 (Dettmher,1985), pp. 799-821.


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I deology, Di sci pl i ne, and the Cohesion of th e Souiet El it e 29

CPSU which we analyse has not yet been significantly reformed. Changes have comewhere the party interfaces with society ~~~sno~~ n the press, more autonomy for thesoviets, looser controls over the economy), but not within the party itself.

Second, Gorbachevs impact has mainly been to bring out certain new and not-so-new ideas in the CPSUs rhetorical arsenal (the human factor, all-European home,leadership by political methods, etc.), with the intention of reinvigorating-notabandoning-the partys world view. He is trying to alter the content of the ideologywhile preserving its structural role in the Soviet political system. Thus before the July,1989, plenum Gorbachev argued that there is a crisis-not of the party, but of its oldfunctions, and that while reforming the party we also want to strengthen it.However, the party always and everywhere was formed and continues to work as aninstrument in the struggle for power.13

It remains to us to explain the concrete strategies through which the CPSU seeks topromote and maintain its unity and capacity to rule.

The Principle of Ideological and Organizational UnityIn the USSR study of the ideological and organizational principles of the CPSU isknown as scientific communism.* Soviet writings on this subject do not seek to dis-tinguish between ideological and organizational factors, since the organizationalprinciples of the CPSU are themselves central themes in the partys ideology. Theideology is not merely a statement about the world at large: it is above all a statementabout the role the party sees itself playing in that world. The most important ideologicalattribute ispart i inost (party-mindedness): a recognition of the historic role being carriedout by the party. To display ~~7~~~~~~~hus involves ideological commitment: it does notsimply mean being a good member of the organization.

Thus it is our contention that CPSU ideology is essentially refexive in nature: the keycategory is understanding the leading role of the party. This recursive ideology can betraced back to its Hegelian roots (recall Hegels concern with the central epistemologicaldilemma: how do we know what we know?). It is also uppermost in Marxs philosophicalapproach: what matters to Marx is not abstract speculation as to what the real interestsof the workers are-what matters is that the workers must achieve self-realization, andmove from a class-in-itself to a class-for-itself. Lenins concept of the vanguard party isbut an extension of this focus on the role of the agent in history.

In order to play this unique role, so central to its own ideology, the CPSU must be ableto act as a unified agent. Thus party ideologues lay the heaviest emphasis upon theprinciple of organizational unity. Kommunis t editorials argue that the unshakeableideological and organizational unity of the party is the most important source of itsstrength and invincibility; while E. Bugaev tells us that the greatest objectivecapacity of the working class compared to all other classes in history is its capacity for

IO. Observations based in part on interviews with journalists at .%rfynu.~u ahizn in November, 1988.11. The reader is referred to the six volume collection of speeches M S Godxzcheo: Izbrannye rechi i stati(Moscow: Politizdat, 3987-1989). Th e overall impression from these volumes is still overwhelminglyidrological rather than pragmatic. Note also that the volumes include an index/concordance (rare for Sovietmonographs) which enables functionaries to locate usable quotes (for example on the human factor).

12. Parpzaya rhizn, No. 15 (1989), pp. 5, 16 (hereafter Pz).IS. M. Gorbachev, Perestroika raboty partii, PZ, No. 15 (1989), p. 5.14. As summarized, for example, in A. M. Rumyantsev (ed.) Nauchn_yi kanmunirm {dmm] (Moscow:

Politizdat, 4th edition, 1983).


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30 S-ruur~,s IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISMorganization. l5 The central organizational principle expressing party unity is, ofcourse, democratic centralism. Kommunis t argues that this principle is subject to thefiercest attacks by the CPSUs international enemies, and that it is one of the lawsgoverning the life of the CPSU that must never be broken, no matter what thecircumstances.i6

The basic principles of democratic centralism are given as:(a) the electivity of all party organs from bottom to top;(b) periodic accountability of party organs before their party organizations, and

before higher organs;(c) strict party discipline and the subordination of the minority to the majority;(d) the decisions of higher organs are absolutely obligatory for lower organs;(e) collectivity in the work of all party organizations and leading organs, and the

personal responsibility of each communist for the fullilmcnt of his duties andparty tasks. I7

The fifth point is new, being added to the party rules in 1986. It refers, we may suggest,not just to the need for collective leadership at Politburo level, but also to the stronglycollegial style of decision-making in all party and state bodies. Collegiality means thatall interested parties should be consulted, and that decisions should be made by a largegroup of people rather than a small group, since, in Lenins words, this lessens thechances that relations between individual members could affect the political line.*

We are dealing, then, with a highly centralized political institute, designed toimplement what is historically necessary (as interpreted by the current leadership). Theconcept of democratic centralism does not really deserve the near mythic status whichit is occasionally granted. As M. Waller points out, it was never clearly defined byLenin, either in the pre-1917 period or at the crucial 10th Party Congress in 1921.The subordination of the minority to the majority is a routine formula with littlemeaning when minorities are not allowed to exist in any meaningful sense within thepartys ranks. Thus party textbooks prefer to phrase the operational principles of theparty in broader terms-for example, one text listed the following principles as shapingthe organizational life of the CPSU:O publicity (&snost); discipline; democracy;collegiality; criticism and self-criticism; and unity of ranks. Note that the term glasnostwas in standard usage before Gorbachev infused it with new meaning. The text explainsthat unity of ranks refers to the ban on factions introduced in 1921. This is describedelsewhere as playing an exceptionally important role in the history of the CPSU.21

While emphasizing party unity, the CPSU recognizes that excessive stress on unitymay deter the introduction of fresh ideas, may prevent genuine feedback on per-formance, and so on. Thus at least in theory democratic centralism should involve adynamic tension between opposing elements: democracy and discipline, unity of ranksand criticism. Also the principle of collectivity under democratic centralism specifies theneed for personal accountability, since collegial decision-making leaves too many oppor-tunities for individuals to shirk responsibility.

15 Kommunist, No. 17, 1985, 3-16; No.p. 6 (1984), 53. (hereafter Km).16. Km, No. 18(1981), 7, 13.p.17. 1JrtauKPSS(Moscow: Politizdat, 1986), p. 12, No. 19.18. Quoted in Kom, No. 6 (1984), 58..19. M. Wailer, Democraticentralism (New York: St. Martins, 1981).20. V. Ya. Bondar, Leninskaya partia: Partia nowgo tipa (Moscow: Politzdat, 1983), p. 3021. Km, No. 9 (1978), 118..


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I deol osl y, Di sci pl i ne, and the Cohesion of th e Soviet E li te 31Ideological Training Within the CPSUIt is generally agreed that while certain sections of the Soviet population had an abstractcommitment to the ideals of communism in the 192Os, this idealism eroded with theonset of Stalinism. Loyalty, conformity, and patriotism were rewarded; independenceand idealism discouraged. By the 196Os, it seems, there were few communistbelievers left in the society, outside the ranks of the very young and the very old. By1989, Gorbachev himself talked of an ideological vacuum in Soviet society, andargued that the key to perestroika is overcoming the crisis in ideology. Z An editorialin Kommunis t said that social apathy and doublethink were widespread amongsections of the nations youth.

The dominant motive for participation in political life in the USSR is realism, eitherselfish-to promote ones own career-or more altruistically to try to improve decision-making in ones workplace. The decision to join the CPSU became a routine one formany categories of personnel: indeed, the decision was usually made for them, in thatpeople were almost always invited to join rather than volunteering themselves.24According to one gorkom secretary some party organs can no longer remember thetime when workers asked to join the party on their own initiative.* One newspaperletter writer bluntly stated that honest people in the party stand out like white crows;another that of course we have principled communists-those who are pensioners,who have nothing to lose, and are not afraid.6 With the relaxation of pressures to jointhe party in the last few years, there has appeared an hitherto unknown phenomenon-voluntary resignations, and on a large scale.27

Soviet society of the 1960s and 1970s thus seemed increasingly schizophrenic, withpolitical participation in the ruling party built around an ideology which had lost itsmotivational power. Western and CmigrC scholars have advanced various theories toexplain the contradictory nature of popular beliefs in the era of developed socialism,where the official ideology has ceased to have any popular appeal.*s

It is not our concern here, however, to investigate mass beliefs in the USSR. Ratherwe want to focus our attention on the role of ideology within the party itself, particularlyfor the nomenklatura officals and full-time party apparatchiki, and to a lesser extent for the3-4 million activists who work under them. Even though the party was losing the battlefor mass beliefs, they continued to devote a massive amount of resources and attentionto the construction of a system of ideological training for leading party and managerialofficials.

By the early 1980s there was mounting evidence of the atrophy of Soviet ideology,even within the social science and political schools which train the officials and activists.Teachers complained that students had only an uncertain grasp of even the most basicconcepts of scientific communism, and that despite a 1976 decision to increase the timedevoted to Marxism-Leninism in all higher education programs virtually no practical

22. PZ, No. 15 (1989), p. 16.23. Km, No. 5 (1988), p. 6.24. Based in part on interviews conducted with former party activists in Israel in April-May, 1989. Press

discussions ofthis issue flourished in 1989, e.g. Leninskaya prauda, June 8, 1989, p. 2.25. Ul yanouskaya pravda, August 5, 1988, p. 2.26. Ur alski i r abochy, May 5, 1988, p. 2; May 25, 1988, p. 3.27. Leninskaya prauda, July 6, 1989, p. 2; Souetska_ya ibi r, August 18, 1989, p. 2.28. V. Zaslavsky, The Neo-Stal in ir t State (Brighton: Harvester Press, 1982); C. Lane, Th e Ri tes ofRulers.

Ri tual in nd ustr ia l Soczety, he Souzet Case London: Cambridge University Press, 1981); V. Shlapentokh, SovietPubli c Opini on and deolqy (New York: Praeger, 1986).


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32 STUDIES IN COMPARA~.IVE COMMUNISMsteps had been taken by 1979.2 A Central Committee (CC) CPSU decree of 1981spoke of major shortcomings in the training of social science teachers; and a parti-cipant at a party conference at Moscow State University in 1983 complained that socialscience classes were boring and du11.30A political party which sees organization as the key to political power, but whichcannot find anybody to write textbooks describing its organizational role, is clearly indeep trouble. Yet this is precisely the situation in which the CPSU finds itself. In1983 -1985 the journal Partynuya zhizn ran a competition for new textbooks for partystudies courses.31 They failed to find a winning manuscript in any of the four majorcategories (Marxism-Leninism, social policy, economic policy, and methodology).None of the 5000 ruble first prizes (equal to two years average salary) were awarded.In the Marxism-Leninism category the submissions were so poor that they did not evendistribute any of the 1000 ruble consolation prizes. In the meantime, other textbooksproduced for party studies courses were described by one authoritative reviewer aslacking in fresh ideas or new thoughts.32 A similar abortive competition for apen-portrait of The Contemporary Communist was run by the Uzbek partyjournal-with no prize awarded. 33 The frankest confession of ideological bankruptcycame from the Hungarian party leader K. Grosz, who confessed that when I was thehead of the CC propaganda department, I explained a great deal that I failed to under-stand myself. 34

We cite this evidence not to imply that ideology can be discounted as a factor in Sovietpolitical life, rather we wish to remark that the party sees this ideological decay as a threatto its organizational cohesion, and has made repeated efforts over the past 20 years tostem the tide. Perestroika can thus be seen as part of an established tradition of trying toreinvigorate the ideological superstructure of the CPSU, to give a new meaning to itsleading role in society.

The party does not content itself simply with selecting cadres through the nomenklaturasystem who are thought to have the correct political qualities and outlook: these officialsmust also be subject to a system of ideological hardening (io einuyuzukulku) through thenetwork of party training institutions created for this purpose. These political schoolsdate back to the 1930s. The system was frequently reorganized, and developed in arather chaotic fashion. By 1965 there were more than 60 different programs in opera-tion. In that year the structure of schools was rationalized, and was carefully reviewedin Central Committee decrees of 1967, 1972, 1976, and 1978 (twice).37 At the lowestlevel, attendance at a short course (two weeks to one month in duration) is obligatoryfor all leading party and soviet cadres once every two years.s Some party organiza-

29. For a teachers complaint, see the letter from V. Fetisov in Kom, No. 4 (1983), pp. 10-14. Kommunistlater omplained that no reply to this criticism had been received from the Ministry of Higher Education (Kom,No. 11 (1983), p. 127). On the 1976 decree, see letter from academic D. Episkopov in Kom, No. 8 (1979),p. 119.

30. Kom, No. 14 (1982), pp. 3-6; No. 13 (1983), p. 28.31. PZ, No. 6 (1983), p. 48; No. 4 (1985), p. 79.32. Review by F. Petrenko in Vof~nxy i~torzi KPSS, No. 12 (1985), pp. 126-134.33. PZ Uzbekisw~a, No. 12 (1986), p. 86.34. Moscow News, No. 35, July 10, 1988, p. 8.35. F. G. Krotov, Shkola ideinoi zakalki: istorzja Marksirtko~Letzinskogo obrazouoniya u KPSS (Moscow:

Politizdat, 1978).36. Voprosy is&i KPSS, No. 4 (1977), p. 68. (hereafter Vop ist KPSS).37. KPSS u rezolyutsyiakh i resheniyakh (Moscow: Politizdat, eighth edition, 1973-84), Vol. 9. pp.

215-221; Vol. 11, pp. 160-163; PZ, No. 18 (1976), pp. 12-19; No. 13 (1978), pp. 3-5; No. 7 (1978), p. 3.38. VU/I irt KPSS, No. 9 (1983), p. 20.


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I deol ogy, Di sci pl i ne, and th e Cohesion of th e Soviet El it e 33

tions, such as Bashkir obkom and Moscow gorkom, have tried to make them arequirement for all managers on their nomenklatura too.3g The curriculum for thesecourses, according to the 1976 CC CPSU decree, should comprise: the leading role ofthe party (54 hours); Marxism-Leninism (42 hrs); the economic strategy of the party(34 hrs); and international themes (20 hrs). * They are usually run by Universities ofMarxism-Leninism, and are usually operated out of the House of PoliticalEnlightenment under the local obkom. These obkom schools (each obkom now appearsto have one) also run shorter courses for local officials and rank-and-file partymembers.41

For more senior officials there are longer courses at one of the Higher Party Schools(VPSh). There are two VPSh run directly by the CC CPSU (in Moscow and Leningrad)and 21 other VPSh in various republics and obkomy.42 These schools are mainlydesigned for cadres headed for a career in the higher party apparatus. In 1967 the CCCPSU issued an instruction that all leading officials of oblast soviet executive com-mittees and the chairmen of all district and city soviets should go through courses at aVPSh.* In 1978 the CC CPSU overhauled the regional VPSh, on the grounds thatthey were insufficiently connected to life. 44 In addition to 2-4 year full-time courses,they could now offer 3-5 year part time courses, previously only available by corres-pondence from the Moscow VPSh. 45 In 1978 the CC reorganized the central trainingschools, unifying their leadership under the Academy of Social Sciences (AON), asort ofcentral Committee think tank set up in 1953. The AON is supposed to be thepride of the party education system and with a staff of 440 teachers, it has doubled itsenrollment since 1986. However, according to a 1989 report, 70 per cent of thegraduates are still inadequately trained in the organizational principles of the party.47

Despite these reforms, the party leadership remained dissatisfied with the partyeducation system. A 1981 CC CPSU decree on the subject declared that the system stilldoes not fully answer lifes demands.48 Yet more plans for reorganization were issuedin 1984 and 1987, with the Politburo remarking in 1986 on the need for serious workto improve the party-political education of leaders.4g Perestroika has thus seen aredoubling of efforts to use the political training machinery to inculcate the new reformmentality in party cadres-it has not meant the dismantling of this ideologicalapparatus.

It is unclear exactly how many officials have passed through a system of party

39. PZ, No. 11 (1980), p. 29; No. 19 (1981), p. 60.40. PZ, No. 18 (1976), pp. 12-19.41. For the history of these schools, see Krotov, op. cit., note 35 and Vop ist KPSS, No. 12 (1982),

pp. 98-106.42. PZ, No. 13 (1978), pp. 3-5. Apart from the republic capitals, these schools are located in Gorky,Novosibirsk, Rostov, Saratov, Khabarovsk, Odessa, and Sverdlovsk.

43. Souety narodnykh deputatooc Spmochnik (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), p. 40.44. PZ, No. 13 (1978), pp. 3-5.45. Ibid. The 2 year (full) and 3 year (part-time) courses are for cadres who are under 40 years old andalready have a degree. The longer courses are for cadres with only secondary education, and the age limit for

them is 35.46. PZ, No. 7(1978), p. 3; VopistKPSS, No. 12(1982), pp. 98-106; PZ, No. 18(1978), pp. 5-11; PZ, No. 8(1979), pp. 27-32.47. IzvestiasK KPSS, No. 4 (1989), pp. 10-14, text of a CC CPSU decree on AON.48. PZ, No. 12 (1981), pp. 9-11.49. Ekonomicheskaya Gazeta (EC), No. 44 (1984), p. 2; Pravda, No. 15 (1987), p. 1; EG, No. 27 (1986), p. 3.

The schools are also very unpopular with the population at large (see report on reader survey in Krasoyarskyrabochy, May 29, 1989.


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education either at obkom schools or at one of the VPSh. Soviet sources give figuresranging from 187 000 to 248 000 graduands for the period 1946-1978.50 16 000 peoplewere reported as passing through all the VPSh between 1968 and 1978. In theUkraine between 1972 and 1982, for example, according to one report 1400 cadres weretrained in the VPSh and 20 000 in obkom schools. 52 Still, the number of senior partyofficials who have been through a VPSh is far from being a majority. One sourcementioned that only 16 per cent of gorkom industry department chiefs had been througha VPSh.3 Of the 97 obkom first secretaries in a sample we compiled based on bio-graphies available as of 1989, 40 per cent had been through the CC CPSU VPSh (upfrom 30 per cent of the 1981 sample). The VPSh seem to have something of a remedialfunction, particularly for those officials from non-Russian republics and ASSRs whohave had no prior higher education.

Mention of the remedial aspects of party education brings us to our final point. Itmight have been assumed that with the dramatic improvement in the educational levelof party cadres which has occurred over the last 50 years (see Table l), the need for party

TABLE 1. Percentage of Party Secretaries at Various levelsWho Hold Higher Education.

1939 1956 1983Obkom, republic 28.6 86.1) 99.0Gorkom, raikom 4.9 25.7 99.8Primary party organization 4.7 If.4 60.3

education would evaporate. However, despite this rise in general education, the partyleadership has continued to struggle to maintain the influence of the political educationsystem.

What conclusions can be drawn from this survey of the party education system? Onthe one hand, party officials at all levels continue to devote considerable time and energyto tightening up ideological training: it remains part of the arsenal of strategies adoptedby the leadership to promote elite cohesion. It would presumably be difficult for writerswho stress popular legitimacy as the main constraint on the Soviet elite to explain whyso much energy needs to be devoted to political indoctrination within the party. Also,there is as yet little evidence that pewstroik has led to any slackening of mphasis on therole of ideological reliability within the CPSU-it has merely added a new bank ofconcepts and slogans to be inculcated and reproduced.

On the other hand, the continuing dissatisfaction with the level of ideological com-petence voiced in the party press suggests that this strategy alone will not suffice. Thusover the last seven years we have seen a new emphasis on discipline campaigns as adevice for policing party unity.

50. Lqb st KPSS, No. 11 19Sl), 71;_ No. 12 1982), p. 10051. PZ, No. 13 1978), 3..52. Kom, No. 1 1982), 47..53. Vop ist KPSS, No. 8 (1981), 14..


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I deology, Di sci pl in e, and th e Cohesion of th e Soviet El it e 35The Mechanics of omen k l a t u r aThe nomenklatura is of course the procedure through which party committees superviseappointments to key positions in economic, governmental, and cultural institutions.The basic mechanism is well-known, and seems to have changed little since its inaugura-tion in the 1920s.54 Our study can however supplement the standard accounts withsome information about the size of the nomenklatura which we have culled from the partypress of the last decade.

We may begin by looking at the size of the full-time party apparatus itself. Onlyfragmentary data are published on the number of full-time workers in specific partycommittees; J. Hough estimated around 100 workers for the average obkom (regionalparty). The only specific numbers we could find were 65 staff in Pskov and Khorezmobkomy (serving party memberships of 70 000 and 28 000 respectively), 164 in Donetsk(336 000 members), and an average of 107 in the six Belorussian obkomy (average103 000 members).55 The raikom (district) departments are relatively small: 5-6workers in the organization and agitation departments, 3-5 in the industry and agri-culture departments, implying a total of 15-30 staff for the average raikom.56 Thisaccords with Houghs estimates for a typical gorkom (city party committee) of 25, andM. Voslenskys raikom estimate of 20-40. 57 A g ain, only a few specific figures werefound in the course of our reading: 34 staff in the Kuntsev raikom in Moscow (serving23 000 party members); or 14 workers in rural raikomy in Ulyanovsk and Omsk.58

A rough projection of the total size of the party apparatus of the late 1970s is shownin Table 2. Apart from the figures for Kaluga and Krasnodar, we have extrapolated

TABLE 2. Estimates of Size of Party Apparatus, Various Regions.1 2 3

Total partySize of apparatus membership Ratio of (1) to (2)

Moscow 2000 1 100 000 1:550Vologoda 500 91 000 1:180Pskov 450 70 000 1:155Orlov 400 63 000 1:158Orenburg 650 134 000 1:205Kaluga 600 91 000 1:152Sverdlovsk 1100 240 000 1:218Krasnodar 1300 315 000 1:240Sources: Column (1)-A. V. Chernyak (ed.), Tovarishch instruktor (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), p. 7, 8;Partynayazhizn, No. 18(1984), p. 3; No. 20(1982), p. 20; No. 16(1978), p. 22; No. 17 (1981), p. 35; SouetrkayaKuban, July 7, 1989, p. 2. Column (2)~-estimate derived from the number ofdelegates the region sent to the26th Party Congress, where there seems to have been one delegate per 3500 party members. Delegates arelisted in 26 syezd KPSS. Stenograficheskii otchet (Moscow: Politizdat, 1981), Vol. 3, pp. 289-529.

54. B. Harasymiw, Nomnklatura: the Communist Partys recruitment system, Canadian Journal ofPolitical Science, Vol. 2 (1969), pp. 493-512; M. Voslensky, Nomenklatura (New York: Doubleday, 1984).55. J. F. Hough and M. Fainsod, How theSoviet Union is Governed (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard UniversityPress, 1979), p. 495; PZ, No. 18 (1984), p. 3 for Pskov figure; Khorezm-taken from Spisok obonmtovUr~enchskoi gorodskoi telefonoi seti (Urgench: Izd. obl. gazet, 1980); on Belorussia--Kom, No. 4 (1988),pp. 86-89; Done&k-PZ, No. 16 (1989), p. 59.

56. Raionny, op. cit., p. 129; p. 152, pp. 199-234. SeealsoPZ, No. 2(1977)pp. 25-32; No. 2(1979), p. 45;No. 6 (1977), pp. 37-45; No. 27 (1983), p. 42.

57. J. F. Hough, TheSoviet Prefects (Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1969), p. 23; Voslensky,op. cit., note54, p. 94.

58. PZ, No. 14 (1981), p. 52; No. 5 (1979), p. 49; No. 3 (1978), p. 67.


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from the number of party instructors in the region, as reported in the Soviet source.(Instructors usually make up at least half of the party apparatus under a given com-mittee). The seven non-Moscow regions all have membership/staff ratios of l/150 to11240, while the Moscow apparatus seems to be half the size of that in other regions.There are plausible explanations for this apparent discrepancy: it could be thateconomies of scale call for a smaller apparatus in Moscow, with its million plus partymembers; there may be direct supervision of primary party organizations (PPOs) inministries, etc. by CC CPSU departments; or the stong PPOs in Moscows institutesand factories may share more of the work of raikomy than in other cities. An average ofall the ratios in column three of lable 2 results in an estimate of 82 000 full-time partyworkers in the USSR (a ratio of l/230, taken out of 19 million party members). IfMoscow is excluded from the calculation, then the estimate is 100 000 (a ratio of l/190).In comparison, the Komsomol across the whole of the USSR is reported as having a full-time staff of 100 000.

We can now move on to nom enk lu tu r positions outside the party apparatus. Cadrework remains extremely important for local party organizations. There is strictadherence to Lenins idea that one must not allow the most important state positionsto be filled by anyone except the ruling party. Thus, for example, in accounts ofparty work the number of detailed references to party influence over managerialclecision-making significantly increases when discussion turns to cadres policy. Thisapplies, for example, to a textbook on party work in enterprises; or to the articlespublished weekly by directors in Ekonomicheskayagazeta. The latter very rarely refer tothe party at all: when they do, it is usually with reference to cadre selection.

lhere is considerable variety in the range of posts covered by the nomenkluturu of localparty committees in different regions. This is because each partkom decides for itselfthe posts it will supervise. Within the party, however, raikom and gorkom instruc-tors are not usually on the obkom list, nor are the partkom secretaries offarms. As fornon-party positions, we learn for example that social science teachers are on raikom lists,while heads of social science departments are monitored at obkom level (inSverdlovsk). I4 There are occasional specific examples of partkomy deciding to add ordelete posts from their supervision. Vinnitsa obkom chose to add farm chairmen to theirlist in 1977; Bryansk obkom moved to include the chiefs of agro-mechanization teams(PMK); Voronezh obkom instructed its raikomy to start supervising the appointment ofall farm brigade leaders; Vyselkov raikom dropped brigadiers and put in hospital wardheads,

This fluidity makes it rather difficult to arrive at any reliable estimate of the totalnumber of posts covered by the nomenklutury or party committees at different levels.Fairly rapid changes can occur e.g. Ulyanovsk obkom cut 400 positions from its 1963

59. Moskomky komsomolet~, cited in RL no. 392, September 2, 1988, p. 12. Another comparison would bcwith the Hungarian party, which has 4042 staff for 830 000 members--a ratio of 1 to 207. (AIF, No. 36(September, 1988), p. 4).

60. Quoted by V. Shcherbitsky, in Kum, No. 1 (1982), p. 34.61. P. A. Rodinov (ed.), Partiinaya rabota u usloviakh proimodstuennykh obedineny (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984),

ch. 15. For xamples ofdirectors mentioning the party in connection with cadres policy, xc EC, No. 44 (1980),p. 8 and No. 1 (1981), p. 9.62. PZ, No. 6 (1979), p. 41.63. A. V. Chernyak (ed.), Touarishch mtruklor (Moscow: Politizdat, 1984), pp. 45, 108.64. V. G. Chufarov (ed.), Deyatelnostpurtiinykh qanizatsy Urala (Sverdlovsk, Uralsky G.U., 1976), p. 91.65. VopistKPSS, No. 1 (1979), p. 14; PZ, No. 4(1986), p. 38; No. 7 (1979), p, 45; EG, No. 38 (1985), p, 5;

Sovctskaya Kuban, July 5, 1989, p. 2.


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Idea&y, L)iscipline, and the Cohesion of the &Get EliteTABLE 3. Reports of Size of Nornenklatura, Various Regions.

37

1Obkom

2 3 4Obkom, raikom Total party Ratio of (2) to (3)

and gorkom membership (%)KrasnodarSverdlovskRashkirNovosibirskKarakalpakUlyanovskI,\;ovVinnitsa.Wovosibirsk

3600---

1963171914001500

40 000 325 000 1220 000 240 000 823 000 210 000 1115 000 154 000 10

6 500 28 000 24- 98 000 n.a.- 126 000 n.a.- 105 000 n.a.- 154 000 n.a.Sourcrs: Coiumns (1) and (2)--K o~~~~~~~, Pjo. 17 (1986), p. 32; No. 11 (1983). p. 58; ~~~~~~~~u~~~~R. No. 20(1978), p. 42; No. 7 (1981), 12. 27; No. 19(1978), p. 42; No. 8(1981), p. 46; PZtizbekistana, No. 6(1982), p151; CoprosystoriiKPSS, No. 1 (1979), p. 14; Sove~skaya Sibir, August 18, 1988, p. 1. Column (3)-see TableOne for details.I Ihr figures for Krasnodar are for 1986. The figure for Bashkir is for 1978. In 1984 it was reported ashuing only 17 500 on its total nvmenkla~ura (Vqfrq &rii KPSS, 198415, p. 37).

I>Ost nomenklatura between 1976 and 1978. However, combining six separate reportsgives us Table 3. The final column in this table shows a fairly consistent ratio (8-12per cent) between the size of all nom~nkl~tz~~y in a given region and the number of partymembers, with Karakalpak as an outlyer. A 10 per cent ratio applied to the CPSU as awhole would give 1.9 million posts on the regional nomenklatury, to which should beadded the lists of republican and national Central Committees. Moldavia for exampleis reported as having 1432 on its CC nomenklutura in 1988.7 Thus our estimate is morethan double M. Voslenskys 750 000 figures, but is in line with a comment ofCC CPSUsecretary Kapitonov that there are several millions of persons in the reserve lists ofthe CPSU.s

Under ~&re~troik~ the nomenkL~tura system has become partially open to public dis-cussion and scrutiny, and has on occasion come under strong attack. See for example thecollection ofletters under the rubric The costs of the nomenkluturu , where one readerremarks that one finds reports in virtually every daily paper that some party organs aredefending obvious degenerates, swindlers, bribe-takers, and thieves. There is alsoopen reference to the perceived privileges enjoyed by nomenklaturu members (see note 7above). However, a radical dismantling of the nffmenk~atura system has not yet beenbroached.

Beginning with the 19th party conference in June, 1988; there has been a drive to cutdown on party intervention in decision-making by economic and soviet organs. Thismanifested itselfin the mergingoffunctional departments in regional party committees?and a campaign to cut the number ofposts on regional nomenklaturu by up to a half, withthe size of the full-time party apparatus itself reduced by up to one-third.O 7000 jobs

66. PZ, No. 19 (1978), p. 42.67. AiF, No. 37 (September, 1988), p. 2.68. Voslensky, op. cit., note 4, p. 94; PZ, No. 4 (198O), p. 19. Kapitonovs comment is confirmed loosely

by a report that the rcservc in Novomoskovsk gorkom stands at 800, compared to a nomenkfatura of 670. PZ,No. I2 (1980), p. 54.

69. Km, No. 5 (1988), pp. 42-3.70. For example, Krasnodar kraikom cut its nomenklatura from 3600 to 1300~Souetskaya Kubnn, July 7,

1989, p. 2.


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38 STUDIES IN COMPARAWVE COMMUNISMwere cut in 1988 (i.e. 8 per cent by our calculation), including 700 in CC CPSU; someobkomy have cut staff by one third. However, the precise impact of these changes onthe leading role of the party remains unclear. The staff may have been cut, but thedemands being made on party committees as yet remain unaltered. There is someevidence that the moves are aimed at decentralizing party activity from the CCs andobkomy to the level of the district parties.72

The Role of Ideology in Cadre SelectionWhen party officials exercise their influence over the appointment of leading officials innon-party institutions through the nomenklatura, what are the principles governing theirinterventions? The party does not simply select the best person for the job: therewould hardly be a need for a separate political nonenklaturu system if that were the case.Rather, the party wants to select appoinmes who will be both competent and politicallyreliable. (Personal loyalty, i.e. nepotism, will also of course play a large role.)

Party attitudes towards the recruitment of professionals is riven by several con-tradictions. On the one hand, the party is worried that the lack of popular appeal of theideology means that people only join for careerist reasons. In the words of author D.Cranin, The healthy desire to make a good career forces people to join the party notout of lofty sentiments, but in order to climb up the ladder.79 Educated professionalsare more interested in building a career than are blue-collar workers, so there is a dangerthat the party will be swamped by white collar recruits and will lose its ties with theshopfloor. There are worries that too many technocratic and bureaucratic tendencieshave crept into the party. 74 Brezhnev complained to the 26th Congress in 1981 that anumber of specialists coming into the party apparatus from industry do not havesufficient political experience, and sometimes bring administrative-economic methodsinto the party organs.75 This theme was repeatedly echoed by other party leaders(including E. Ligachev) over the next few years.

On the other hand, the party wants to recruit members of elite groups in order toharness their expertise and keep control over key decision-makers. Over the years therewas a widespread feeling that the best party worker is an engineer.77 They do nothowever wish to recruit members ofthese groups purely on the basis of self-interest. Thiswould dilute the cohesion of the party, turning it into a mere vehicle for competingprofessional interest groups. It would also exacerbate the problems of corruption whichalready dog the party elite.

The party seems to think that the solution to this problem lies in encouraging workersto join the CPSU and play an active role so as to balance out the influence of profes-sionals. The problem is that workers do not wish to join. Currently 45 per cent of partymembers are offtcially workers, although as this figure is based on employment when

71. Izwstia TsK, No. 4 (1989), p. 24; Sou~~s~a9aK&an, July 12, 1989, p. 2.72. These observations based partly on interviews with editors at Par~ynqw t&n, November, 1988. For adiscussion of the partys role in the economy, see P. Rutland, Party control of economic management in theUSSR, in P. Hauslohner and D. Cameron (eds.), ?he Pohttcs ofEconomic Reform in the USSR (forthcoming).73. Trust breeds respnnsibility, Moscow Nws, No. 25, June 19, 1988, p. 9.

74. V. Shcherbitski, first secretary of the CP Ukraine, in Kom, No. 1 (1982), p. 34.75. Kom, No. 4 (1981), p. 58.76. Ligachev-PZ, No. 18 (t983), p. 15; other examples include PZ, No. 6 (198I), p. 11, 26; Km, No. 7

(1985), p. 68; Kj~m, No. 14 (1986), p. 44.77. PZ, No. 11 (1989), P. 35.


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Ideolo~gy, Discipline, and the Cohesion of he Souiet Elite 39,joining the party, the actual number is less than one in three.* Party committees oftenresorted to recruitment quotas (only letting in one specialist for each five new worker-members, for example), although this is recognized as counter-productive in the longrun by local party officials. 79 There has been a determined effort to draw workers intoservice on party committees: between 1975 and 1985 the number of workers andpeasants on party committees at workshop level doubled (although in obkomy they onlyrose by 15 per cent).sO

Another way in which the contrary expectations of the party manifest themselves incadre policy is the dichotomy between reds and experts-the feeling that nomen-klutura appointments may favor ideological purity or political loyalty at the expense ofadministrative or technical competence. It is commonly held that this dichotomy was atransient phenomenon of the 1920s and 1930, when all the technical speciaiists wereproducts of Tsarist society. Now that the USSR has trained new generations ofspecialists of its own, the gulf between red and expert should no longer be of great socialsignificance, or at least so the argument goes. s1 The official Soviet line is to insist thatthere is no major problem here, that there is an organic unity of partiinost andcompetence. s2

Evidence on the seriousness of the red/expert dichotomy in the USSR today is frag-mentary and not decisive. (The present author has tried to examine this problem intnore detail e1sewhere.s) Party saturation of leading professionals is extensive, butthere are also popular prejudices to the effect that the really competent do not need tojoin the party, and that interventions by party officials interfere with expertdecision-making.s4

One way of exploring how the criteria of competence and political reliability arebalanced in practice is to look at the way cadre attestations are run. The basic patternis for cadres to collect detailed evaluations on their competence and political reliabilitykharakhteristiki) from relevant party and state bodies. Some of these reports go into extra-

ordinary detail-in one instance, for example, asking for the employment records of thecandidates dozen nearest relatives.* Since the 1960s there has been an effort toformalize cadre selection in party and non-party bodies through the introduction ofpoints systems, where a panel reviews the qualities of candidates according to a set listof rriteria.s6 Attestations are used not only to fill vacant slots, but also to review all thestaff in an organization.

The introduction of cadre attestations was not solely a result of the partys desire totighten up the ideological monitoring of the nom~klut~ru (although this was one of theirmotives). There was also a desire to emulate Western corporations and put personnelrecruitment on a scientific basis. Whatever the motives behind its introduction.

78. PZ, No. 12 (1989), p. 25.79. Survey of 1140 Moscow activists reported in Km No. 9 (1988), pp. 31-35; also readers letters on the

subject reviewed in PZ, No. 11 (1989), pp. 47-52.80. AIF, No. 28 (July, 1988), p. 1.81. As argued for example, in J. F. Hough, Souie~ Leadership in lianritzon (Washington, DC: Brookings,

1980), p. 26. A less sanguine view is to be found in J. R. Azrael, M anaperial Powernnd.S~~ne~ofilics (Cambridge.Mass: Harvard University Press, 1966).82. The lirsr secretary of Murmansk obkom in Vop ist KPSS, No. 11 1977), p. 27.

83. P. Rutland, op. cit., note 72.84. Frankly expressed in a letter from a Ministry ofAviation Industry official, V. Selivanov, in Prazxia, May

2, 1988.85. PZ, No. 13 (I989), p. 47.116. On their introduction, see EG, No. 5 (1980), p. 1 .


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40 STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISMattestation has served to more deeply institutionalize the role of party officials in cadreselection. 87

It has stressed that party organs should actively participate in the process, and notjust routinely approve selections. ** The political dimension to the process is clearlyillustrated if one studies the list of qualities being assessed in the candidates. In oneLeningrad handbook for example, 10 of the 30 plus qualities to be evaluated areexplicitly political in nature. 8g The selection is entitled Purt i inost , and includes suchattributes as communist convictions and ability to educate workers in the spirit ofMarxist-Leninist ideas.

Attestations have been an instrument in the perestroika campaign, being run for partymembers as well as nomenklatura cadres. go For example, they were used by Gorbachevprotege G. Kolbin in Ulyanovsk (Kolbin was later given the job of cleaning up theKazakh party). g1 Fresh instructions on attestations issued by the CC CPSU in Septem-ber, 1987, inserted new qualities into the ideal profile, such as the ability to break withstereotyped thinking.g2

The Role of Elections in Cadre SelectionOne method of cadre selection which has drawn increasing attention since Gorbachevsspeech to the January, 1987, CC plenum is competitive election of cadres, and therelated practice of discussing cadres in open public meetings.93 Electivity is now thenorm, but not compulsory, for cadre selection in both party and non-party bodies.

In the past the party statutes did not specifically exclude multiple candidates (article24), and before 1961 there were quite often multiple candidate elections for party posts.Then, however, the 50 per cent minimum vote rule was introduced, and one-candidateelections became standard practice. g4 As far as party elections are concerned, openpublic discussion of candidates was introduced in regions such as Krasnodar andGeorgia in 1982 and 1980 respectively, with a view to attacking the corruption andfavoritism in appointments which seem to have been rife in those regions.g5 In Georgiait was reported that these discussions in some relatively rare cases even led to theselection of internal candidates in place of the nominee of the local raikom.g Outsidethe party, competitive elections began to appear as a device to select industrial directorsin the 1960s. and attracted renewed attention from 1982 on.97

87. For an example ofcriticism ofthe repressive natureofattestations, seeAIFNo. 19uune, 1988), p. 3.88. EC, No. 51 (1980), p. 11.89. P. C. Yemshin and A. A. Godunov, Metodi ka ot senki delouykh moralno-pol it icheskikh kachestu ukouodit elei

i $vtsiali stou sotsial isti cheko~o roizuodstv a (Leningrad: L.G.U., 1971), pp. 22-5.90. Vostochno-sibi rskaya Pravda, May 15, 1988, p. 1.91. Km , No. 2 (1985), p. 49.92. Kommunist Ukrainy No. 5 (1988), p. 29.93. On these developments, see E. Teague, Is a party purge in the offing? Radi o Li bert q R esearch 96185,

March 22, 1985; and Changes in party rules under consideration, RL 442/84, November 19, 1984; andThe Soviet Union experiments with electoral reform RL 69/87, February 22, 1987.94. G. Popov, The linchpin of inner-party democracy, M oscow News, No. 37, September 11, 1988,

p. 12.95. Kom, No. 4 (1985), p. 33; PZ, No. 2 (1980), pp. 31-6. Gorbachev later reported that 200 out of 8500cadres in Krasnodar krai had been rejected after open meetings discussing their candidacies (Pravda, January

1, 1987, p. 3).96. PZ, No. 21 (1980), p. 33.97. For example, in the Kommutator plant in Latvia in 1983, and a Voronezh engineering works in

1985-Pravda, May 8, 1983, p, 1; PZ, No. 5 (1985), pp. 27-30; Kommuni st Sovetskoi La& i, No. 7 (1985),pp. 60-66.


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Ideolop, Discipline, and the Cohesion of h oviet Elite 41This democratization of cadre selection is meant to supplement, but not replace,

party control of the nomenklatura. The move to supplement control from above withcontrol from below represents dissatisfaction and distrust with the way local partyorgans supervised cadre selection in the past. In the words of one party official, the ideais to move from military to democratic discipline.. 98 Thus it is premature to arguethat this innovation heralds the break-up of the numenk~at~ra system. The point of intro-ducing new methods is to reinforce, not displace, the partys leading role in society.q

We should beware of importing notions of liberal democracy to our understanding ofGorbachevs plans for democratizing the party. In the Western pluralist tradition,democracy means choice between alternative policies: in the Soviet tradition, it is seenas a device to provide better information to the party Ieadership. Democracy is not anend in itself, but is a means towards the better realization of the partys policies. Choice,in as much as it features in Soviet democracy, is over personal attributes, not policyalternatives. In most cases the electors are offered a choice between Tweedledum andTweedledee. Candidates are often carefully selected to be from similar social back-grounds. For example, in their election meeting speeches the two candidates for the postof second secretary o Ryazan gorkom were at great pains to express their agreement onpolicy issues. lo0

There are many complaints in the local press that elections of plant managers arerigged, with comments such as Why are they making us play at democracy? Every-thing was known in advance.0 In Pavlodar gorkom officials tried to arrange for alocal construction plant to elect one oftheir instructors as PPO secretary, by the unsubtletactic of making sure the favored internal candidate was left off the ballot.2

The electoral system is carefully structured to facilitate such manipulation fromabove. The system is built around a multi-stage hierarchy of indirect elections-forexample, a raikom bureau will be elected from a conference of delegates from PPOs,rather than by a direct vote of the PPO membership. This leaves ample opportunity forsuperordinate party committees to engineer their desired outcome. For example, theRolog gorkom elected a new secretary in five stages: (1) 18 nominations were solicitedfrom PPOs; (2) the gorkom bureau selected four from this list; (3) at the gorkomconference each candidate had to pass a separate vote (by scoring at least 50 per cent) toget on the ballot (4); (5) as only one candidate passed stage 4, she was deemed elected.lo3

A further example is the procedure governing the election of PPO secretaries. lo4 AtPPO level there is a secret ballot (or should be according to the rules). However, if a PPOmeeting votes out the nominee for secretary, according to the official instructions therehas to be another vote, this time by show uf ands, to confirm acceptance of the secretballot. If the negative voters do not have the courage to vote no in the open, then thefirst ballot is rejected, and there has to be another secret ballot for the same candidate.Why do they have this bizarre double voting system, first closed, then open? Why notsimply have open voting, as in elections to party positions above PPO level? Presum-

98. I. Polozkov, first secretary of Krasnodar kraikom, in Souefskaya Kuban, July 12, 1989, p. 2.99, fzues&, July 6, 1988, p. 1.100. Pr~okskuyu~rffuda, April 14, 1988, p. 1.101.

25,VahernyKiieo, June 21, 1988, p. 1; also Y~h~~v~~ravda. May 21, 1988, p. 2; ~70ol~o~rradskuyaprauda,May

1988, p. 3; Yoslucbffo-s~bjrs~~proudn, May 25, 1988, p. 2; Souetskaya Sib+, April 4, 1988, p. 2.102. PZ, No. 3 (1989), p. 37. Due to protests from the floor during the PPO conference the internal

candidate was included. and won.103. Kalininskayapravda, May 24, 1988, p. 2.104. PZ, No. 2 (1976), p. 43.


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42 STUIHES IN COMPARATIVE COMMUNISMably, the idea is that the party leaders wish to elicit information from party membersabout their opinions (for example, that they are dissatisfied with a certain PPOsecretary) without conceding to them any power to alter the situation.

There is concern that these electoral procedures should not weaken the nomenklaturasystem-for example, by alienating losing candidates. Party committees are instructednot to allow losers to drop out of party work, but to retain them on the nomenklaturareserve for placement elsewhere.

It is difficult to predict how increased popular influence will affect issues such as com-petence versus political connections. It could be for example that workers actually preferwell-connected partypadrones to reform-minded technocrats who may threaten the statusquo in their enterprise. One Uzbek author explained that The two secret principles ofYou for me and me for you and The state will not miss it ne obedneet) cement therelationship between leaders and subordinates, meaning that workers and managerscollude in defrauding the state.

Despite these qualifications, if election of managers and soviet chairmen takes firmroot it could alter the balance of power between party and state cadres, since unelectedparty secretaries would be facing officials blessed with the legitimacy of having beenelected by their workers or constituents. This seems to have been the motivation behindGorbachevs controversial proposal to the 19th party conference to merge the posts offirst secretary of the local party and chairman of the local soviet, since this would meanparty bosses being exposed to direct election by the general public. lo7 The proposal wasconfusing because it was combined with an insistence that party organs should desistfrom detailed supervision of the running of local soviets As yet no concrete steps ha\rebeen taken to implement the proposal.

The March, 1989, Peoples Deputy elections showed that attempts to controlelections do not always work, and that even heavily controlled elections can become achannel for popular will. This is probably why even elections of the limited typedescribed above are far from being the norm which Gorbachev called for inJanuary,1987. For example, the loo-person CPSU slate for the new Congress of PeoplesDeputies was filled from a list of 100 candidates, although negative votes were recorded(Gorbachev got 12 against, and Ligachev 78, out of 641 votes cast at the plenum).sThe election ofdelegates to the 19th party conference in 1988 was also tightly controlled,with most obkom bureaus putting up for election at a specially convened plenum thesame number of candidates as there were scats available. In some regions there weremore candidates than places, and in some exceptional cases there were even successfulrebellions against the initial selections. )

In the 1988 local party election campaign one half of workshop and PPO secretarieswere elected from multiple candidates, and in 1987 15 per cent of raikom and gorkomfirst secretaries. 3275 PPO secretaries were voted out in these campaigns (less than 1 percent of the total number), although there are reports of high negative voting in some

105. H. Kudashin, 0 razvitil vnutripartiinol demokratii na etaptr perestroiki, Aauchnykommunrzm. No.6 (1988), pp. l-18.106. G. Pakhmetova, in PZ Uz6e&tana, No. 12 (1986), p. 67.

107. Explained in article by CC CPSU official I. Shvets in Prauda, September 28, 1988, p. 2; point aboutc)pposition made in G. P


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I deology, Di sci pl in e, and th e Cohesion of the Soviet El i te 43

regions (25-44 per cent).iiOThe standard pattern for most cadre selections inside and outside the party remains

non-electoral. It is more common to run cadre competitions (konkursky), where rivalcandidates are advanced and discussed in open public meetings, but the final decisionremains with the party committee rather than through an election.

The relative lack of faith in open elections as a means of cadre selection is evidencedby Gorbachevs revival of Khrushchevs device of compulsory turnover rules. (Why notleave it up to the electorate?) Lobbying for such a rule change began in the party pressin late 1985, but no action was taken at the 27th Congress (either because Gorbachevlacked the power, or because he did not at that stage think it necessary). l New instruc-tions issued in August, 1988, mandate a minimum 20 per cent turnover of partycommittees at each election, and a maximum of two terms in office for elected officials(excluding the Politburo). These rules will come into force after the next party congress,scheduled for 1991 .l*

Still more radical proposals have been surfacing in the party press-for example callsto impose a compulsory retirement age on party officials, is to allow the reintroductionof organized factions within the party (banned since 1921), or at least to permit thetabling of alternative platforms. ii4 These suggestions have not yet been formally con-sidered by official party bodies, however.

The most dramatic steps forward in political liberalization-the increased pressfreedom and the emergence of a quasi-parliament-have thus come outside the party.There is a widespread feeling that, in the words of one Siberian party official, thedemocratization of the party is lagging behind the democratization of society. Apublic opinion survey in 1989 revealed that only 30 per cent felt free to criticize theirPPO secretary, 15 per cent their raikom secretary and 8 per cent their obkom secre-tary. The CPSU remains an elite body.

Our general conclusion would be that control over cadre selection has not proved tobe a foolproof device for ensuring elite cohesion beyond the ranks of party officials-asevidenced by the problems of recruitment, reds versus experts, and the need to resort tocompetitive elections. However, it has been highly effective in preserving the monolithicunity of the party itself and preventing overt challenges to its monopoly of politicalpower. Experiments with electivity have not yet caused a decisive change in the way theparty runs itself.

Party Discipline Campaigns and Elite CohesionParty discipline campaigns are not usually analysed from the standpoint of elitecohesion. They are typically seen as a device by which a party leader seeks to remove

110. D. Mann, Results of 1988 CPSU report and election campaign, RL, No. 83, February 13, 1988.1987 figure from Umlskyrabochy, June 5, 1988, p. 3. Negativevoting: e.g. Vladimiroblast--PZ, No. 10(1989),p. 37.

111. For example, in Kom, No. 17 (1975), pp. 79-81; No. 18 (1985), p. 62.112. AZF, No. 36 (September, 1988), p. 1.113. A Moscow party members poll found 80 per cent in favor of an age limit of 60 for local and 65 fornational leaders-E. Teague, Th e party conference: Reform of CPSU on the horizon? RL, No. 276, June23, 1988.114. V. Suslin, in PZ, No. 16 (1989), p. 11; S. Dzarasov, in APN article reprinted in Kaliniskaya prauda,


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44 SHJ~~ES N COMPARATIVE COMMUNISMopponents and advance supporters, within a patron-client model of party life. Partydiscipline is also seen as a way of trying to improve regime performance: less corruptionis thought to mean better decision-making and more resolute implementation of partypolicies.The perspective adopted here is rather different. We are looking at discipline cam-paigns as a device to preserve the organizational integrity of the CPSU, by ensuring thatits rules are being followed and that individuals violating party requirements are calledto account. This is not that far-fetched an interpretation of the role of discipline drive?in party life: after all, it is the primary explanation CPSU officials themselves advancefor these campaigns. It may also be the case that the campaigns have importantimplications for faction-fighting among the elite, or for policy implementation, but thesedimensions will not be explored here.

The idea of discipline as a factor integral to our understanding of the modern worldis not of course confined to the CPSU: recall the work of M. Foucault. Commonsense suggests that the purpose of discipline is to bring about a better society, OIadminister punishment to guilty individuals. In contrast Foucault argues (in the contextof Victorian prisons) that disciplinary procedures serve mainly to sustain an organizedstructure of power. This applies very neatly to the case of the CPSU.

It was former KGB chairman Yu. Andropov who put the discipline theme center stagein Soviet politics shortly after his accession to the post of General Secretary inNovember, 1982, and the theme has received renewed emphasis under Gorbachet,. Insociety at large this meant a crackdown on worker indiscipline and white collar crimeunder Andropov, while under Gorbachev it meant the draconian anti-alcoholcampaign. As far as the party is concerned, since 1982 we have seen determined effortsto use internal party procedures to call corrupt and incompetent leaders to account, Thedevices used have been the traditional procedures of the CPSU-periodic criticism andself-criticism sessions of party leaders before the committees and conferences whichappointed them, and submission to re-election. The most visible sign of this policy hasbeen the massive turnover of elite groups e.g. 108 out of 150 obkom first secretariesleaving office between 1982 and 1987. Is This all seems in marked contrast to theBrezhnev period, when trust in cadres and stability in cadres were the watch-words, and only some 5 to 8 obkom first secretary positions turned over each year(although 23 changed hands in 1978).

The initial impression would therefore be that the 1982-1987 period represents aradical break with the Brezhnevite strategy for elite cohesion. However, despite theremarkable elite turnover, we do not in fact detect any profound alteration in the tech-niques the CPSU uses to maintain organizational cohesion. The Andropov andGorbachev campaigns show considerable continuity with the tactics of party manage-ment deployed in the Brezhnev era: perestroika has not yet percolated through to the innersanctums of the party.

The most striking elements of continuity which we will draw out in the narrativebelow are as follows:First the whole discipline campaign has been planned and orchestrated from above, for

117. M. Foucault, &c@ine and Puntsh (New York: Pantheon, 1977).118. ,J. F. Hough, Gorbachev consolidating power, Pruhlem~ qf Communum, Vol. 36, No. 4 uuly, 1987),

pp. 21-43. Set also 1. Gust&on and D. Mann, Gorbachevs first year: Building power and authority, in/r~h/ems OJ Communism, Vol. 35, No. 3 (May, 1986), p, l-19; a1c1heir articlr Gorhachcvs next gamblein Problems qf Communtsm, V(lI. 36, No. 4 (July, 1987), pf~. l-20.


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I deol ogy, I l i scip l i ne, and th e Cohesion of the Soviet El i te 45

the purpose of achieving goals set by the national party leadership.Smnd, the procedures used for promoting the discipline campaign have proved remark-

ably stable over time. The Committee of Party Control (CPC) and the PartyRevision Commission, with their local affiliates (partkommissi i) , have played a leadingrole in the campaign, and appear to retain the structure laid down by Brezhnev morethan 20 years ago. The arsenal of devices is familiar: press criticism; critical CCCPSU decrees; and activation of party reporting/election meetings as for a criticismof local leaders.

Th i rd , the campaigns have usually followed a distinct geographical pattern, hittingselected areas hard to serve as examples to the rest of the country, and then movingon to other regions. This approach gives the central party leadership a chance tocarefully oversee the process, deploying the scarce personnel of the Organization andParty bork department of the CC CPSU ( w o are sent out to attend key republicanand obkom piena) to ensure that the campaign is not treated in a formalistic fashion.Empty formalism would be the most likely outcome of a broad national campaign-that, or confusion and fragmentation. Power considerations may also be involved:the General Secretary may lack the votes in the Politburo to force a simultaneouscampaign in all regions and republics.Let us trace through the Andropov and Gorbachev discipline campaigns to illustrate

the structural continuities from the Brezhnev era (not that this would be much consola-tion to the Brezhnevites being eased out by these techniques).

The Andropov campaign really began before Brezhnevs death. Andropov took overthe post of secretary for ideology following Suslovs demise in May, 1982. Already in-July, 1982, an article by the deputy head of the Party Control Committee (PCC) set thetone, criticizing relatively senior officials such as an obkom secretary in Novosibirsk anda deputy prime minister in the Turkmen SSSR, not to mention a clutch of RSFSRministers.

Over the following two years around half-a-dozen areas were singled out for thoroughclean-ups: Uzbekistan and Moldavia, and obkomy such as Krasnodar, Saratov,Rostov, and Kalmykiya. * For example, 80 per cent of all raikom and gorkom secre-taries were replaced in Krasnodar krai. *I Some of the target areas (e.g. Krasnodar andTambov122) were continuations of campaigns begun under Brezhnev, Outside thesetarget areas, in 1983 the general discipline campaign within the CPSU was fairlysluggish. For example, the nationwide PPO elections produced only the usual minisculenumber ofsecretaries voted out or warned that their work was unsatisfactory (97 out of385 0001~3).

Things got a little more serious towards the end of 1983, with the CC CPSU Juneplenum passing a milestone decree on the partys ideological work-although this wasaddressing agitprop among the general public rather than intra-mural discipline.24New, tighter instructions for the conduct of party business were issued in November,

119. Article by I. Gustav in ZZ, No. 1.5 (1982), pp. 13-22.120, Souetskaya Rossia, April 9, 1983, p. 4; PZ, No. 15 (1983), pp. 9-13; No. 1 (19841, pp. 21-5; Vo,b irt

KISS, No. 12 1984). pp. 14-27.12 1. Moscow ews No. 13, April 5, 1987, p. 6.122. Pmda, November 26, 1983, p. 3. Tambovs first secretary had been dismissed in 1978 for serious

shortcomings in agriculture (Praudo, December 3, 1978, p. 2). I nvestigations of bribery began in Krasnodarin 1976, and led to 150 arrests 1980-82 (he ?iK, No. 4 (1989), p. 39).

123. PZ, No. 4 (1983), pp. 12-17.124. ZZ, No. 13 (1983), pp. 35-41.


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I deoloQ, Di sci pl i ne, and th e Cohesion of th e Soviet El it e 47

could ease up. No, comrades, history does not give us such an opportunity, particularlynot at the present time.134 However, Gorbachevs emphasis was on changing thepersonnel rather than contemplating structural change. One of his earliest innovationsin political rhetoric was the emphasis on the human factor (used as early as a March,1983, speech35). Time was to show that merely changing personnel would not sufficeto put the USSR onto a new course.

Subsequently, attention focused on the round of party election meetings held in therun up to the 26th congress, which was to take place in February, 1986. Gorbachevargued that there must be no place for eulogies and compliments.13j A Kommunis teditorial darkly noted that life has repeatedly confirmed the simple-but extremelyimportant-truth, that the party strengthens itself by purging its ranks. Thisphrase was originally used by Lenin in a frontispiece to What i s to be done?, althoughSoviet printings have omitted the phrase since the 1950s.

The party election meetings in 1985-1986 proceeded with a considerable amount ofopen criticism by delegates from the floor, and frank confession of errors by officials upto obkom level. One raikom secretary remarked that in 20 years in the party I do notrecall such activism.13s In a whole range of obkom plena criticisms were levelled atnamed officials of the obkom bureau-typically, one or two obkom secretaries and oneto three department heads. In Rostov, censure reached up to touch the obkomsecond secretary, and in Gomel the first secretary himself was criticized, albeit only forallowing other peoples errors to accumulate.t4

The process did not proceed without opposition. In November, 1985, Ligachev feltobliged to defend the new course laid out at the April, 1985, plenum against (nameless)critics who felt that it showed weakness and that it was ill-advised given the state ofinternational tension.4

The same pattern was to be repeated in the next cycle of obkom report/electioncampaigns in late 1987.42 The CC CPSU resolution opening the campaign called forresolute self-criticism, and urged higher officials to attend the meetings of lower com-mittees to see that this was done-a clear indicator as to the top-down nature of theprocess.t4 Only three obkom first secretaries were replaced in the course of thecampaign, and only one of them (from Chardzhou in Turkmen SSR) was explicitlyremoved for personal failings. Twenty obkom secretaries (i.e., other than first secre-tarics) and 20 500 PPO secretaries were removed during the campaign.44

Regiona l Puyes: Some Cases.In Kazakhstan an entrenched network of corrupt officials built up under the rule of D.Kunaev (first secretary since 1964). The pressure on Kunaev to start cleaning up the

134. PZ, No. 11 (1985), p. 6.135. M. Gorbachev, op. cit. nctte1 Vol. 1, p. 356.136. Kom, No. 7 (1985). p. 13.137. Km, No. 13 (1985), p. 7.138. Km, No. 5 (1986), p. 54.139. For example, this was the pattern in Amur, Zaporozhe, Mordovia, Tselinograd, and Dagestan-PZ,

No. 1 (1986), pp. 56-69; No. 3 (1986), pp. 36-9, 40-3, No. 2 (1986), pp. 23-6.140. PZ, No. 2 (1986), pp. 19-22; No. 4 (1986), p. 55.141. Km, No. 16 (1985), p. 79.142. Ably analysed in D. Mann, Party report and election campaign winds down, RL, No. 59, January

27, 1988.143. Prauda, October31, 1987, p. 1.144. PZ, No. 22 (1988), p. 8.


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48 STUDIES N COMPARATIVE COMMUNISMrepublic began even under Brezhnev. Between 1981 and 1986 500 officials on therepublic nomenklatura were dismissed, including two obkom first secretaries (Chimkentand Alma Ata) and one in three of the gorkom and raikom first secretaries.i4 Twoformer heads of Kzyl Ordinsk obkom were reproached for family protectionism eventhough one of them had been promoted to be president of the republic (and subsequentlydismissed). Kunaev was criticized by name for complicity in the cover-up. To thesurprise of Western observers, he was not ousted at the 27th congress, but clung topower until December, 1986.

Ma.jor Kazakh officials were convicted of serious crimes. For example, in 1986 aformer transport minister was jailed for 13 years, and the head of administrative affairsfor the Kazakh CC jailed for 8 years for embezzlement. 141There were many complaintsthat party committees in the region were reluctant to punish transgressors.147 Typical isthe case of the Beskaragai raikom first secretary who lost his job but was given a lastchance as a kolkhoz chairman. He continued to abuse office for personal gain,however, and was sacked-but even then the raikom did not expel him from theparty.14s Even the USSR Procurator, V. Kalinichenko, later admitted that the net ofcorruption spread so wide and so deep that it was simply impossible to prosecute all thoseinvolved without completely emasculating the republics industry andadministration. 14-

In Uzbekistan outright corruption was an even more severe problem than inKazakhstan. By 1986 the clean-up which began in June, 1984, saw 40 of 65 obkomsecretaries in the republic replaced, and 9 of the 13 obkom first secretaries. TheUzbek republic was run as a virtual private fiefdom by S. Rashidov and his cronies (oneof whom in the Fergana valley ran a private prison). Moscow left the republic aloneso long as the cotton harvest reports were favorable. Judging by the Uzbek party press ofthe period attention focused upon monitoring economic performance to the exclusion oforganizational and disciplinary issues (even by the bland standards of the party press ofother republics). 152 There was some opposition to Rashidov within the party, but suchpeople were dismissed or shunted sidewise-into diplomatic positions, for example. Thesystem started to unravel after the death of Rashidov in 1983, revealing that nepotism,bribery, and the buying and selling of party offices had flourished on a massive scale.The clean up was initiated by Moscow, with a special team being sent from the CCCPSU in 1984. National officials such as Eltsin were dispatched to keep up the pressurein 1985. Ye The purge is thoroughly described by M. Musakhanov (first secretary of

145. PZ, No. 5 (1986), pp. 17-20; K. Sultanov, Rabota s rezervom kadrov, PZ Kazakhstana, No. 7(1986), p. 44, 49. A. Sheehy, Foremost Kazakh writerA. Suleimenov in trouble?, RL, No. 115, March 24,1987.146. RL, No. 63 (1988), p, 11;alsoOgonyok, No. 16 (1987), p. 6, RL, No. 414, October 16, 1987, p. 2.

147. B. Brown, Cleanup in Kazakhstan encounters resistance, RL, No. 313, July 30, 1987148. PZ Kazakhswm, No. 9 (1986), p. 93.149. AIF, No. 36 (September, 1988), p. 6; see alsoV. Loshak Expurgation, Mucow News, No. 17, April

26, 1987, p. 8.150. PZ, No. 1 (1986), pp. 28.151. See interview with new first secretary of the Uzbek CC, R. Nishanov, in AIF, No. 38 (September,1988), p. 5; and Literaturnoyagareta, January 20, 1988, p. 7.152. See for example Rashidovs report to the 20th Congress of the Uzbek party in 1981-PZ Uzbekistana,

No. 2 (1981), pp. 8-53.153. PZ Uzbekis&ma, No. 1 (1986), pp 9-13. At the 21 Uzbek party congress first secretary

Usmankhodzhaev stated that the purge was only possible thanks to the intervention and help from the CCCPSU-PZ Uzbekistana, No. 2 (1986), p. 9.


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I deology, Di sci pl in e, and th e Cohesion of th e Soviet El i te 49Tashkent obkom, 1970- 1985) in a 1988 interview from his prison cell. 154 In the first yearone in three nomenklatura cadres were dismissed. 155 In 1986-1987, six obkom firstsecretaries, four republic CC secretaries, the republic prime minister, and 80 000 otherofficials were prosecuted. 156 The former first secretary of Bukhara obkom A. Karimov,was removed in 1984 and subsequently sentenced to death in 1987 for bribe taking. It wasrevealed that he had close links with Brezhnevs son-in-law Y. Churbanov, first deputyminister of interior since 1980, who was himself tried for bribe-taking in 1989.57

Even after the purge began, it was hard to discern from the pages of the Uzbek partyjournal that anything had changed. It carried reports on regional plena where officialswere dismissed at Moscows instigation, but the bulk of articles continued to stress thecritical situation with regard to the grain and cotton harvests. Testimony to the sluggish-ness of the Uzbek apparatus to clean its own stables is the fact that the two top officialsof the Uzbek CC partkommissiya were fired, together with a host of top judicial officialsfor colluding in the imprisonment of a teacher who reported abuses by his superiors.58

As in Kazakhstan, the purge was so thorough that there were few reliable cadres leftto fill the empty places. Some replacements lasted only a few months before being firedfor abuse of office, and the party is now even turning to non-party members to fillresponsible position.t5 Another batch of ministers was fired in early 1988, and in 1989the new President of the Uzbek Supreme Soviet was removed after only one year forprotecting the relatives of disgraced leaders. 160 The Uzbek purge is clearly not a one-offcleaning after which order is restored: rather it has become a continual fact of life, wherepurged officials are recycled to lower positions, and both they and their replacements inh hg er office continue to transgress party norms.

October, 1986, saw the CC CPSU launching a clean-up of Turkmenistan, whose firstsecretary (M. Gapunov) had been quietly retired in December, 1985. The clean up inTashauz oblast saw the fall of the heads of the regions obkom, soviet, trade unions,police and procuracy. 161

Moldavia was, according to one commentator, the private fiefdom of its first secretaryI. Bodiul, where grass couldnt grow without his permission. 162 The republicsformer second secretary was implicated in the Uzbek corruption and sacked. 163

In a stormy Armenian CC plenum in December, 1987, a welter of accusations ofcorruption were levelled against K. Demirchyan, who had hung on as first secretarysince 1974. 164 Other delegates tried to shout down the accusations, despite an interven-tion from the CC CPSU

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ideologia, stabilità e coesione nel pcus