Jay Smith French Revolution Agency and Ideas

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Between Discourse and Experience: Agency and Ideas in the French Pre-RevolutionAuthor(s): Jay M. SmithSource: History and Theory, Vol. 40, No. 4, Theme Issue 40: Agency after Postmodernism (Dec.,

2001), pp. 116-142Published by: forWiley Wesleyan UniversityStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2677990Accessed: 29-04-2015 15:40 UTC

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3/28

BETWEENDISCOURSEAND EXPERIENCE

117

Inrecent years, many historiansof the FrenchRevolutionhave

sought answers

to these questions

in

the bedrock of experience. Reacting against

both tradition-

al social explanations, which showed motivations springing

from seemingly

objective

class

positions,

and the revisionists'

political/linguistic

explanations,

which often deduced

agency

from

the logics internal

o

discourses, historiansof

pre-Revolutionary nd RevolutionaryFrancehave begun to emphasize the deci-

sive influenceof concrete

experiences

n

the lives

of

individualsand

groups.

This

new work is

based

on the

commonsense assumption

hat

sensitive

and

thorough

empirical analysis

of the lived

experiences

of the

past

will

enable historians of

political

action to

navigate

between the

equally unappealingalternatives

of

old-

fashioned

social

determinism,

on

the

one

hand,

and

newfangled

linguistic

deter-

minism, on the other hand.2

Contemplating

he

prospect

of

a

post-revisionisthistory

of

eighteenth-century

France, Vivian Grudercalled in 1997 for a new political history "closely cali-

brated o the

unfolding

of

events,

the

impact

of concrete

experience,"

a

form of

analysis

more sensitive to the

ways

in

which

"conceptspresent

n

discursive lan-

guage

.

.

. summed

up

and

crystallized multiple prior

experiences." Gruder

described

a movement

alreadyunderway,

or

as

Jack Censerobserved

in a

recent

review

article, many

historiansof the

Revolution are now attempting o leaven

their

analyses

of

"linguistic

constructions"

with

an interest

n

"social

conditions,"

"lived

experience,"

and the

weighing

of "real ife

opportunities."3 he examples

are numerous. William H. Sewell's analysis of the Abbe Sieyes's What is the

ThirdEstate? seeks to capture he text as both discursive artifactand as

"action

in a

social

world";

Paul Hanson's work

on monarchistpolitical

clubs

seeks to

show that

real

events and actions "political experience, that

is"-shaped the

discourse

of both Revolutionariesand

counter-Revolutionaries;

avid

Andress's

analysis

of

the

Champs

de Mars massacre

concentrateson the

political

elite's

misunderstanding

f

popular

dissent

and its

failure to

develop

a

vocabulary

hat

captured

and

responded

o the unrest of

1791.4

Despite

its renewed

appeal

to historians

of

eighteenth-century

rance,

howev-

er,

the

concept

of

experience

has

been

subjected

to

a critical

scrutiny

that

seems

2. Similarassumptionsobviously also lie behind the continuedattraction f

"microhistory" nd the

history

of

"everyday

ife."

See

the

insightful review article by

Brad

S. Gregory,

"Is

Small

Beautiful?

Microhistory

and

the History of Everyday Life," History and Theory38 (1999), 100-110. The

essay

discusses The

History of EverydayLife: Reconstructing

Historical

Experiences

and

Waysof Life, ed.

Alf Ludtke, transl. William Templer (Princeton: Princeton University Press,

1995), and Jeux

d'Echelles: La Micro-Analyseai 'Expirience, ed. JacquesRevel (Paris:Gallimard,1996).

3. Vivian Gruder,"WhitherRevisionism? Political Perspectives on the Ancien

R6gime," French

Historical Studies 20 (1997), 254; Jack Censer, "Social Twists and Linguistic

Turns:Revolutionary

Historiography Decade after the Bicentennial,"French Historical Studies

22

(1999), 146.

4.

William H.

Sewell, Jr.,

A

Rhetoric of Bourgeois Revolution:

The

Abbe

Sieyes and What s the

ThirdEstate? (Durham,N.C.: Duke University Press, 1994), 36; Paul R. Hanson,

"Monarchist

Clubs

and the Pamphlet Debate over Political Legitimacy in the Early Years of the French Revolution,"

French Historical Studies 21 (1998), 299-324, esp. 301; David Andress, "The Denial

of Social

Conflict in the French Revolution: Discourses around he

Champ

de Mars

Massacre,

17

July 1791,"

French Historical Studies

22

(1999), 183-209.

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4/28

118

JAY M. SMITH

only to intensify with

the

passing of years.5

n

the field of laborhistory,

or

exam-

ple, E. P. Thompson'snotion of "working-class xperience,"which he saw as the

crucible of workers' consciousness, spawned a complex

and

still

smoldering

debate aboutthe implicit dividing line separating xperience from consciousness

in cultural histories of the working

class.6

Historians of gender and sexuality

have similarly called into question the correlationbetween identityand the per-

sonal experiences typically assumed to have produced t. Joan Scott,

in a much-

cited article, trenchantlyobserved that since individual subjectsnever occupy a

neutralposition free of ideological constraintsand relations of power,

the mean-

ing of the experiences they construeand process is always dependent

on the per-

spectives, or subject positions,

that

they occupy.7 Meanwhile, post-structuralists

and studentsof narrativehave drawn attention o the retrospectiveconstruction

of

experience,

and the inclination of both individuals

and

groups

to read

their

pasts as coherent storiesbuilt aroundmeaningful, ife-alteringevents.8

This article responds

not

only to History and Theory'stimely

call for essays

examiningthe issue

of

agency

in

historical

analysis,

but also to currentsof dis-

cussion now swirling

about

my

own field of Old

Regime

and

Revolutionary

France. Like other dix-huitiemistes, ncluding many who celebrate the recent

5. For acute discussions of historians'ambivalent

relationship o the notion of experience since the

linguistic turn, see BarryShank, "ConjuringEvidence for Experience:Imagining a Post-Structuralist

History,"AmericanStudies 36 (1995), 81-92; MartinJay, "The Limits of Limit-Experience:Bataille

and Foucault," WorkingPaper 3.11, European Society and CultureResearch Group, University of

California at Berkeley (Berkeley, 1993); Miguel

A. Cabrera, "Linguistic Approach

or Return to

Subjectivism?In Search of

an Alternative

to Social

History,"Social History

24

(1999), 74-89; and

Michael Pickering,History,Experience,

and

Cultural

Studies (New York:St. Martin'sPress, 1997).

6. The literaturedevoted to

this

aspect of Thompson's

legacy is vast. For helpful reviews of the

main points of debate, see

Sean

Scalmer, "Experience

and Discourse: A

Map

of Recent Theoretical

Approaches o Labourand

Social

History,"

Labour History vol. no.? (1996), 156-168,

and

Marc W.

Steinberg, "Culturally Speaking: Finding

a Commons between Post-structuralism

and

the

ThompsonianPerspective,"Social History

21

(1996), 193-214. Also see

E. P.

Thompson:Critical

Perspectives,ed. HarveyJ. Kayeand Keith McClelland Oxford:Polity, 1990 ), andRethinkingLabor

History: Essays on Discourseand Class Analysis,ed. LenardR. Berlanstein Urbana,

ll.:

University

of Illinois Press, 1993).

7. Joan W.

Scott,

"The

Evidence

of

Experience,"

Critical Inquiry

17

(1991), 773-797.

See also

Judith

Butler, Gender

Trouble:

Feminism and the

Subversion of Identity (New

York:

Routledge,

1990); and Feminists Theorize

the

Political,

ed. Judith Butler and Joan W. Scott (New York:

Routledge, 1992). AlthoughI am sympathetic,andobviously indebted, o Scott's elegant and persua-

sive

argument,

n "The Evidence

of

Experience,"against

the foundationalism mplicit

in the

analysis

of

experience, her own emphasis

on the constitutive power of discourse

leaves little

space for

the

exercise of individual

agency.

The

present

article builds on and

supplements

Scott's

argument

n

its

attempt to conceptualize the space between discourse and experience, the space where individuals

weigh options and make moral

choices.

8.

See,

for

example,

Paul

Ricoeur,

Timeand

Narrative,

3

vols.,

transl.

Kathleen

McLaughlin

and

David Pellauer(Chicago: University

of

Chicago Press,

1984-1988), esp.

vol.

3;

idem,

"Life in

Quest

of

Narrative,"

in On Paul

Ricoeur: Narrative and

Interpretation,

ed. David Wood

(London:

Routledge, 1991); Douglas Ezzy,

"Lived

Experience

and

Interpretation

n Narrative

Theory:

Experiences of Living

with

HIV/AIDS," Qualitative

Sociology 21 (1998), 169-179; Mark Freeman,

Rewriting

the

Self: History, Memory,

Narrative

(London:

Routledge, 1993);

see also Freeman'sdis-

cussion of several

different

approaches

in

"Experience,Narrative,

and

the

Relationship

between

Them,"Journal of Narrative

and

Life History 8 (1998),455-466;

Donald Brenneis,"Telling

Troubles:

Narrative,Conflict and Experience,"AnthropologicalLinguistics30 (1988), 279-291.



5/28


119

"revivalof the social,"I yearn

for a new mode of analysis that can

account both

for

the

powerful

influence of

linguistic

structuresand for the

drama

of

personal

decision-making

and

sheer

historicalcontingency.9

But

unlike the historianswho

eagerly seek

an

antidote to the

perceived excesses of postmodernism,

I

remain

deeply skepticalof the analysis

of experience, which, thanks

n

partto the recent

groundswell of interest in solidly "social"phenomena, s now emergingas one

of the primaryalternatives o

discourse analysis in eighteenth-century

tudies.10

My

doubts

aboutthe concept

of

experience

derive

in

part

rom

the same concerns

that historiansof labor, gender,and narrativehave already articulated,

but I am

especially mistrustfulof the

tendency

to invoke

experience

as an

explanation

or

purposeful political action,

including

revolution.

I

argue

in

this article that

in

order o understand

ow

subjective

perceptions

of the world

get

transformed

nto

political agency,

historiansneed

to

resist

the

lure

of

the

category

of

experience

and adopt a new approachto the study of human consciousness, an approach

designed

to

penetrate

structuresof belief. Greater

appreciation

or the

ways

in

which

worlds

are

both sustainedand remade

through

beliefs

will

ultimatelyyield

more satisfying explanations of how and why people act politically, and

why

they sometimes even come together

to

make a

revolution.

9. The phrase s from Censer, "Social Twists and Linguistic Turns,"161.

10.

The

search for new alternatives o discourse analysis has also involved many historians and

social scientists sympathetic o at least some aspects of postmodernism, ncluding some who are fully

awareof the analyticaldeficiencies of the category of experience. Virtuallyall of the

new alternatives

they have articulated, owever, ultimatelyoppose language/culture o somethingostensibly more real,

thus creatingnew interpretivedilemmas. See, for example, GarethStedmanJones's

incisive critique

of Roger Chartier'scategories of "representation" nd "practice," n "The Determinist

Fix: Some

Obstacles to the FurtherDevelopment of the Linguistic Approach o History in the

1990s," History

Workshop ournal

42

(1996), 19-35, esp.

26-27. Stedman Jones

developed

further his line of criti-

cism

in

his

review

of

Les

Formes de l'experience:

une

autre

histoire

sociale, ed.

BernardLepetit

(Paris:

A.

Michel, 1995).

See Stedman

Jones,

"Une autre

histoire

sociale?,"

Annales: Histoire,

Sciences Sociales

53

(1998), 383-392.

RichardBiernacki's

attempt

o

distinguish

between "signs"

and

"practice" aises problems similar to those criticized by Stedman Jones. See Biernacki,"Language

andthe Shift from Signs to Practicesin CulturalHistory,"Historyand Theory 39 (2000), 289-3 10,

and

the

critical

commentaryby Chris Lorenz

in the same

volume, "Some

Afterthoughtson Culture

and Explanation n HistoricalInquiry,"History and Theory39 (2000), 348-363, esp. 359. The danger

in

tryingto

find

new ways to bridge

the

supposedgap between

lived

"reality"

nd its interpretation r

representation

s that the effort

inevitably perpetuatesunhelpful polarities

that divert attentionfrom

the central

problem

of consciousness. Kathleen

Canning,

for

example,

tries to

get

at the

culturally

conditioned

agency

of

working-class

women

by focusing

on

the

body,

"in both its discursive and

experiential

dimensions"

(Canning,

"Feminist

History

after the

Linguistic

Turn:

Historicizing

Dis-

course and

Experience,"Signs

19

[1994], 368-404, esp. 386).

William

H.

Sewell,

Jr. has

suggested

thatanalysisof social changemust incorporateboth "semioticexplanation"and"mechanicalexpla-

nation"

that

supposes

the

operation

of non-semiotic

logics ("demographic,

echnological, coercive,

institutional,

and

the like"); see Sewell, "Language

and

Practice

n

CulturalHistory:

Backing Away

from the

Edge

of the

Cliff,"

French Historical

Studies

21

(1998), 241-254, esp.

252. GabrielleSpiegel

has

similarly called for greaterattention o

the

"social logic of the text,"

as distinctfromits semiotic

logic ("History,Historicism,

and

the Social Logic

of the Text

in

the

Middle Ages," Speculum

65

[1990], 59-86).

These newer and subtler

oppositions

between

basic

realities

and

imaginative

con-

structions,

for all their

ingenuity,

still

manage

to cut short the

analysis

of

consciousness

and

the

process

of

interpretation.

n each of these

formulations,

he historian

s

spared

the trouble

of

pene-

trating

he

labyrinth

of the mind

because the productionof consciousness

is tracedback to phenome-

na

that supposedly possess self-evident causative implications.



6/28

120

JAY M.

SMITH

To clarify what

is

it at stake

in

historians'use of experienceas an analyticalcat-

egory,

the

article begins

with a

necessarily detailed

discussion of Timothy

Tackett's approach to the concept in his

influential book, Becoming a

Revolutionary."

Because of the force and clarity

of

the

argumenthe pursues,

Tackett'sanalysis of the developing conflicts between

deputies to the National

Assembly in 1789-1790 can be used to exemplify theexperiential urn hatmarks

much recentwork on the eighteenthcentury.After

identifying

he

problems nher-

ent

in

this new

orientation

toward

experience, the

article offers an

alternative

approach o the study of political consciousness,

an

interpretation

erived from

a

close readingof the words, and mind, of

a

single participant

n

the

revolutionary

drama, he lawyer Joseph-Michel-AntoineServan

(1737-1807).

I.

EXPERIENCEAS A

SOURCE

OF IDEAS:

THE EXAMPLE OF

BECOMING

A

REVOLUTIONARY

The ensuing discussion requires a preliminary

disclaimer.Although

I

focus on

what

I

consider to be an imperfectionof Becoming a

Revolutionary,my purpose

is not to

challenge the book's status

as a landmark

work. Becoming a Revolu-

tionarystands

as

a monument o careful research,and it

performed he overdue

task of

putting people-rather than ideas, discourses,and cultures-back at the

center of FrenchRevolutionary tudies. More

specifically,Tackett'sbook provid-

ed a

powerful empiricalchallenge

to the

common

claim that

nobles

and

wealthy

members of the thirdestate

formed

a

large

and

homogeneous elite

on the

eve

of

the Revolution. He

demonstrated, hroughanalysis

of

incomes and careers,

and

through the barbed comments of the deputies themselves, that differences

in

materialconditionsand cultural

perspectiveseparated

he

greatmajority

of noble

representatives

rom

the

great majority

of those

representing

he third estate.

At

the same

time,

he showed that

the

social

animositiesdividing the thirdestate from

the

privileged

orderswere laced with

uncertainty

nd

ambiguity.

For both of these

reasons-his

helpful

reassessmentof the

pre-Revolutionary

milieu the

deputies

inhabited,

and his

emphasis on the unpredictability of the Revolutionary

moment-Tackett's evidence has added fuel to the

many post-revisionistargu-

ments

being developed by

others

in

the

field, including

my

own.12

Becoming

a

Revolutionary

has

been unanimouslypraised by

reviewers,

it

received

a

presti-

gious prize

from the

AHA,

and it

unquestionablydeserves

its

wide acclaim."3

11. TimothyTackett,Becominga Revolutionary:TheDeputies of the FrenchNationalAssemblyand

the Emergenceof a RevolutionaryCulture 1789-1 790) (Princeton:PrincetonUniversityPress, 1996).

12. See, for example, Jay M. Smith, "Social Categories, the Language of Patriotism, and the

Origins of the French Revolution: The Debate over Noblesse

Commerqante,"

ournal of Modern

History 72 (2000), 339-374,

and

"Recovering Tocqueville's Social Interpretationof the French

Revolution:Eighteenth-Century ranceRethinksNobility," n Beyond Tocqueville:New Perspectives

on the Ancien

Regime,

ed.

Robert Schwartz

and

Robert Schneider (Newark:University of Delaware

Press, 2002).

both

of

which

present argumentsperfectly

consistent with Tackett's

indings.

13. The

book

received

the Leo Gershoy Award n 1997 as the best book

in

early-modemwestern

Europeanhistory publishedin 1996. Among the many glowing reviews see, for example, those by

Gwynne Lewis, Times Literary Supplement (February28, 1997), 30; William Doyle, Journal of

Modern History 69 (1997), 852; Alan B. Spitzer, Annals of the AmericanAcademyof Political and

Social

Science 566

(1999), 172;

and Sarah

Maza,

Journal

of InterdisciplinaryHistory

28

(1997),

112.



7/28

BETWEENDISCOURSEAND EXPERIENCE 121

One aspect of the book that requires close critical attention,however, is its

treatmentof the relationshipbetween consciousness and agency. In his introduc-

tion Tackett announced his frustrationwith the stale debate over whether the

Revolution had

had

"social" or "political" origins. The

time had

come, he

declared,to leave aside burdensomehistoriographical gendas and "to focus ...

on the Revolutionaryexperienceof the specific individualswho took part n and

embodied [the] Revolution. How did men and women become

Revolutionaries?"14 ackett explained that, because the book focused on the

rapidlychangingmentalityof the hundredsof deputieswhoreported o Versailles

in

May, 1789, only to find themselves remaking he nation

a

few weeks later,

his

was essentially

a

study

in collective

psychology.

It follows, insofar as possible, the transformation f the deputies' values and mode

of

thinking, . . .

In

so doing, however,

it makes the

assumption

hat culture s

'produced'not

only through ntellectualexperience,but throughsocial andpolitical experienceas well,

and that it is impossible to understandhow individuals 'read' their world without

a

full

delineationof the contours

of

theirlives.15

In otherwords, Tackettaimed to provide a balancedand measuredaccountof the

actual revolutionaryexperience,

an account that

would show why

the

revolu-

tionaries

behaved as

they

did

in

the heat

of

the initial battles of the Revolution.

To many specialists, the tone of Tackett'sprose, and his evidently reasonable

objectives,

came as a

welcome change.

In

contrastto

much

of the work of the

1980s and early 1990s, which focused on semiotic systems, ideological con-

structions,

and

the

many

dimensions of

representation,

Tackett's

analysis

seemed

to rest on

straightforward

vidence

and

refreshing

common

sense.

The initial

positive impression

s

continually

reinforced

by

the

author's

becoming

intellec-

tual

modesty

and

the

painstaking

esearch

hat

undergirds

his account.

The

atten-

tive

reader soon detects, however,

that

even

Tackett's

empirically grounded

argument

s

rooted

in a

set of theoretical

suppositions.By probing

those

suppo-

sitions, especially as revealedin Tackett'sanalysisof the developing animosity

between noble

and

common

deputies

in

the

spring

and summerof

1789,

I

hope

to

demonstrate that

his

method

of

connecting experience

to action

actually

obscures the

fundamental

ognitive processes

that lie behind

political

choice.

The basis for Tackett's

working assumptions

about the nature of

political

process

can be found in his

repudiation

of

discourse

analysis

and

the

fully

devel-

oped

revisionism

of

the

1980s.

In

opposition

to the now familiar

argument,

advanced

by

Frangois

Furet and

others,

that the

reign

of Terror

developed logi-

cally andineluctablyout of the Rousseauianrhetoricof the general will, Tackett

maintained hat the course of

Revolutionaryevents,

and the

mentality

that

made

those events

possible, grew

out

of

political contingencies specific

to the time.

Surveying

the attitudesand

early writings

of the

third-estate

deputies

who would

later embrace

Revolutionary deals,

Tackettobserved that

although"virtually

all

were familiar with some elements of the

Enlightenment,

..

little evidence

can

14. Tackett,Becoming, 7.

15. Ibid., 13.



8/28

122

JAY M. SMITH

be found before the Revolution of an oppositional ideology or 'discourse"';by

and

large they

were

practical

men

who

read

law, history,

and

science,

and

had no

inclination toward "abstractphilosophy."16On the eve of the Revolution their

political

culture "was

shaped less by books

and

essays

than

by

their

concrete

political

and

social

experience

under the Old

Regime."

7

They

went on to make

their ideological choices in light of "specific political contingencies and social

interactionswithin the Assembly and between the Assembly and the population

as a

whole."18

But

how

did these

various "concrete"

and

"contingent"phenom-

ena

actually

affect the

thinking

of the

deputies?

Tackettaddresses that

question

by outlining

a

two-stage process of coming-to-consciousness, a process that

looks plausible only

if

one accepts the propositionthat experience happens out-

side the mind and carries

nherentlyrecognizablemeanings.

Tackettunderstandably ees the Revolution as

a

transformative vent,

a

radi-

cal break with what came before, but because of the analyticaltraditionagainst

which he is reacting-what Gruderhas called "the argumentof discourse"-he

is anxious to establish that the events of the Revolution were not inscribedwith-

in the

political debates of

the

Old Regime.19Few of the future members of the

Constituent

Assembly,

he

writes,

"had

anticipated

he transformations hat were

about

to

take

place"

when

they convened

at

Versailles

in

May, 1789. "For the

great majority,

t

was only after May 5,

in

the extraordinarily reative process of

the Assembly itself, that a 'Revolution of the Mind' came about."20 his argu-

ment comes perilously close to tautology-the revolutionariesare made revolu-

tionaryby

the

revolution

that

they themselves

are

making-but

Tackett

narrow-

ly avoids the tautologicaltrapby evoking two

differentkinds

of experience, one

corresponding

o what

might

be called social

formation,

he other to immediate

sensory perception.21

The

key

to the

process

of causation

in

Tackett's

analysis

lies

in

the

convergence

of these two forms of

experience,

which become mutual-

ly reinforcing

and thus

culturallyproductive.

As one would expect, the formativeaspects of experience occupy

Tackett's

attention

n

the

chapters

devoted to

pre-Revolutionary

France.

Judging

from a

whole

range

of

objective measures,

the social

backgrounds

of the

deputies rep-

resenting

the third estate differed

markedly

from

the

social

background

of

the

privileged orders,

and

especially

that of the

nobility.

Tackett

begins

the book

by

filling

out the social

profiles

of the noble

and

commoner

deputies-incomes,

careers,dowries,

educational

evels, status,

nstitutional

affiliationsand he

goes

16. Ibid., 14.

17. Ibid., 305.

18. Ibid., 76.

19. Gruder,"WhitherRevisionism?,"247.

20. Tackett,Becoming, 307.

21. Tackett'sbifurcated reatmentof experience is strikingly similar to Wilhem Dilthey's analyti-

cal distinctionbetween Erlebnis (which

can

be translated oughly

as

"immediate ensory experience")

and Erfahrung ("knowledge gained from lived experience"), though Tackett makes no allusion to

Dilthey. For

discussion

of Dilthey's categories

see

Pickering,History,Experience,94-124;

Martin

Jay,

"Experience without a Subject: Walter Benjamin and the Novel," New Formations:

A

Journal of

Culture/Theory/Politics0 (1993), 145-155; andJay,"The Limitsof Limit-Experience," -6.



9/28


123

on to assert that the respective social worlds establishedby those objective para-

meters instilled in the deputies distinctive

values and habits of thought. After

assessing the backgroundsof the

noble deputies, for example, Tackett places

emphasis on their nearly universal

attachment o the military.

Even

if

a minorityof deputies

had

revolted

against militaryvalues, the

critical formative

years spentin the armedforces, from the mid-teensto the early twenties, invariablyhad

an

impact.Training

n

swordplay

and horsemanship,

n

militarydiscipline,

in

the ideals

of

honor,

hierarchical

ommand,

and devotion to the king,

all

left a stamp that would clear-

ly distinguish

he

corps

of

the Second Estate

from their colleagues in the Commons.It was

an influencethatwould stronglyaffect many membersof the Nobility

in

their fundamen-

tal

assumptions

aboutthe nature

of

society and

social

relationshipsdespite

the common

veneer of eighteenth-century urban culture which touched both Nobles

and

Commoners.22

Tackettsees proofof this instinctive attachment o the values instilledby experi-

ence

in the

political positions

later articulated

by

noble

deputies,

which

reflect-

ed,

he

says,

their

"underlyingpolitical

cultureand

the

military-aristocratic

thos

which informedthat culture."23

The deputiesof the thirdestate looked

less socially homogeneousthanthe

rep-

resentatives of the nobility, but Tackett argues that they, too, had come from

a

distinctive milieu that shapedtheirthinking

n

subtle ways. More

than half came

from the legal profession,

and at least two-thirds"had

probably

received training

in the law."24Most were respectableproperty owners, and "a substantialand

influentialsegment of the deputieshad acquiredpractice

in

collective politics

at

the

town, provincial,

and even

national

levels."25For the most

part

these were

deliberate,practical, responsible

men whose

writings

"alludedmore

frequently

to

history

and the

classics,

than to

reason

and the

general

will

or to Rousseau

and

Voltaire."

In

fact, they

later evinced little

interest in

the

various strands of

Enlightenmentdiscourse,

which seemed irrelevant to

the "concrete

problems

facing

them

in

the

Assembly."26

At

the outset of the

Revolution,

the

deputies

of

the thirdestate were conciliatoryandconservative-minded eformers,not angry

firebrands.

Tackett uggests, however,

that

n

some

respects

the

experience

of

living

under

the

Old Regime

had

prepared

he

deputies

of the third

estate,

at

some

vaguely

subconscious

level,

to

pursue

radical social transformation

when the

opportuni-

ty arose.

Because

they possessed

a

less exalted status

than most

members

of the

nobility

in the

pre-Revolutionary

social

hierarchy,

and

because

their

wealth,

though

often

considerable,placed

them well below the level of material

splendor

enjoyed by great aristocrats,

Tackett

nfers

that their lives involved "a

potential

for frustration

nd

tension."Ambitious

n

their

careers,

and

often desirousof

pos-

sessing

noble status for themselves

or their

progeny, many

future

deputies

con-

22. Tackett,Becoming, 34-35.

23. Ibid., 136. Italics

added.

24. Ibid., 36.

25. Ibid., 100.

26. Ibid., 65.



10/28

124

JAY M. SMITH

fronted n their daily routines the irreduciblesocial differences separating hem

from the establishednobility.Tackettassumes that awarenessof these differences

must have fostered discontent. "For some individualdeputies [their] ambiguous

social

standing

had

undoubtedlyengendered

a

sense of humiliation and anger

thatremainedclose to the surface."27 "deep-seated"

nti-aristocratic

itterness,

''engendered y the social and legal systemin which they lived," would affect the

political posture

of

representatives

of the thirdestate

in

ways

that most of them

did not anticipate.Feelings of jealousy, injustice, and bitternesswere "present n

the hearts"of many deputies of the thirdestate when they convened at Versailles

in

May, 1789, and this bitterness "was to be a central element . . . in the emer-

gence

of a

revolutionary

consciousness

within

that Estate at the

beginning

of

June 1789."28Although Tackett inds little evidence of revolutionaryconscious-

ness preceding the Revolution, a revolutionary consciousness sprang readily

fromthe frustratedminds of the thirdestate once political confrontationprovid-

ed the necessary provocation.

The experiences associatedwith theirrespective social formationshad impart-

ed to the

deputies

of the second and thirdestates certain

underlyingattitudes

a

commitment o honor

and

status for the

nobles,

largely unarticulated esentment

for the commoners. But

in

Tackett's

narrative, these attitudes hardened into

uncompromisingpolitical agendas only

after the

deputies endured

anotherkind

of

experience

in the

spring

and

summer of 1789, namely, the protracteddebate

over

voting procedures

n the

assembly.

Since the last weeks of

1788,

liberals

from all the ordershad been arguingfor a symbolic mergerof the three

estates,

common deliberations

n

the

assembly,

and

voting by

head rather han

by order.

All

of these key procedural ssues had been left unresolved by the king, and

many deputies

had

hoped to reach

a

workable compromise

at

the opening ses-

sions of the Estates-General.

Tackett

emphasizes

that the

deputies

of the third

estate, despite

their

high

hopes, found themselves confrontinga "cultureof intransigence"on the partof

thenobility.29 ProvincialandParisian, itled anduntitled,robe

and

sword, young

and

old,

the

great majority

of all Nobles were

aggressively

hostile to

the liberals

[of

the Second

Estate]

and

the

position they represented."30

he

political

choic-

es of the noble

deputies,

Tackett

writes,

"were determined ess

by

inter-estate

rivalries than

by

the

ideological positions

and culturalvalues shared

by

a

great

many

nobles at all levels

in

society.'"31

he

majority

remained

"deeply

convinced

of their

innate

superiority."They

were

"stronglypenetrated

with a

military,

even

feudal sense of honor and duty."One even finds them referring"to models of

noble

courage

and

chivalry

from the

past,"

and

using

a "chivalric

vocabulary

of

defending

one's honor and

proving

one's

loyalty

to the

king."32

Offended

by

the

27. Ibid., 46.

28. Ibid., 109-110.

29. Ibid., 132.

30. Ibid.,

134.

31. Ibid., 133.

32. Ibid., 136-137.



11/28


125

constitutionalclaims of the third estate,

and rallied by conservative

spokesmen

such as D'Antraigues

and

Cazales,

the great majority of the deputies of the

Second Estate stubbornly

defended the

prerogativesof their order and rejected

what they regarded

as unconstitutionalprocedural nnovations.

The deputies of

the third estate, accordingto Tackett, elt

frustrationand out-

rage in the face of the nobles' inflexibility.For some, the nobility's unexpected

obstinacy ed to a "wrenching xperience,

entailing

an

agonizing

re-evaluationof

a value

system

to

which

they had long

acquiesced."For others,noble stubborn-

ness "aroused ong-held

sentimentsof

animosity and resentment, eelings which

most had labored

to suppress in the name of unity, in the pious

hope that they

might now be regardedas equals."Tackett

contends that the

deputies' frustrated

hopes released "a deep-seated revulsion

for the years of

condescension and

scorn"

and

produced

an

"all-consumingpassion" to

win

recognition

of the third

estate's

rights.33

n the first

weeks

of

June, following

a month of fruitless

nego-

tiations carried out by committees of

the

three

orders,

the third estate moved

rapidly to constituteitself as the nation's

true representative

assembly. By the

morningof June17,

the

deputies

of the thirdestate had voted

overwhelmingly o

adopt the name

"National

Assembly"

and to assume sovereign powers once

reservedfor the

king. For Tackett, hese first two and a half

weeks

in

June repre-

sent

a

"dramatic

ransformation"

n thinking,a revolutionarymoment

"bornof

a

complex convergence

of

factors,

some long developing

androoted

in

the social

and

culturalstructures

of

the

Old Regime

and their consequenteffects on noble-

commonerrelations,

some relatedto the contingent

ack

of

leadership

and to

the

deputies'

immediate

experience

in the Estates-General nd the actions

and reac-

tions of ThirdEstate

and

Nobility"

in the weeks afterthe opening

session of May

5.34The converginglessons of experience

ultimatelyproduced

an awareness of

irreconcilabledifferencesand set the

thirdestate on an unanticipated

evolution-

ary

course.

For Tackett,then, the Revolution,and the antagonismsthat set it in motion,

should be

seen not as

a

discursive

event,

but as an event born of

experience-

both the

long-term

"social"

experience

of

status, wealth,

and career that

had

shaped

he

lives

of

the

deputies,

and

the immediate

"political"

xperience

of con-

frontation

n

1789.

For the

nobles,

their time

in

the schools

and

camps

of the

mil-

itaryhad left

a

"stamp,"

made

an

"impact,"

xercised

an

"influence"

hat,

Tackett

believes,

established

for

them a kind of default

ideology,

a

latent counter-revo-

lutionary

consciousness,

that the

political

claims of

the thirdestate

in

1788-1789

inevitablyactivated.At the sametime,the thirdestate'sposturetoward he noble

deputies

in

late

May

and

early

June

reflected not

so much "an intellectual

posi-

tion" but

"an instinctive and

visceral

antipathy"brought

to the

surface

by

the

deliberative

process

itself,

which served to

"crystallize

and

intensify

social

antagonisms,making many deputies

far

more

self-conscious

of those

antago-

nisms than ever before."35

The

revolutionary

consciousness

developed by

the

33. Ibid.,

144.

34. Ibid., 145, 147-148.

35. Ibid., 308.



12/28

126

JAY M. SMITH

third estate was a direct expression of immediate experience, a consciousness

reinforcedby half-suppressedmemories of earlierantipathies.

Historiansof eighteenth-century rancenow agree thatthe phenomenaTackett

seeks to capture through his focus on experience, such as vocational training,

material comfort, status anxieties, and the give and take of political debate,

deservemoreattention hanthey receivedin revisionist analysisafterthe 1970s.

Unfortunately, hough, Tackett'scommitment o experience as a discrete analyt-

ical

category-a category comprising "concrete"matter

that stands

apart

from

discourses, ideologies, and ideas-drives

him

inevitably toward

a

dubious

defi-

nition of consciousness. For Tackett,the function of consciousness is to record,

and eventually to distill, the meanings of experience. While merely recording

experience

that

is,

when the mind is

assimilating

more or less

unreflectively

he

externalrealities that

shape

it-

consciousness

is

partly suppressed

and

manifests

itself primarilyn culture.When actually distilling experience-that is, when the

mind

finally engages and pronouncesthe meanings derived from those external

realities-consciousness rises to the surface and leads to action.

Tackettcertainlyacknowledges the role of ideas in the development of a rev-

olutionary consciousness, especially after the deputies passed the point of no

return n

June 1789.36But by emphasizingthe decisiveness of the experience of

political conflict,

he

necessarily overlooks the intricate

nterior

process by

which

the

deputies workedthrough heir ideas and values, thus enablingthem to assim-

ilate the events of 1789, as well as earlier developments, to an evolving but

coherent

picture of

the

world.

As

Michael Oakeshottshrewdly observed,

in his

classic work on

experience

and

perception, experiences, whetherthey

take the

shape

of

encounters, events, developments, or routines,

do

not present

them-

selves to the

apprehending

mind in

splendid solation, announcing

heir

own

sig-

nificance

and

performing he work of the decipheringeye. Experiences acquire

their

meaning,

and

register

heir

existence, only through

heir

ncorporation

with-

in a

largerworld of related meanings,

a

world whose tenuous coherence

and

unity depends

on the active

thinking

of

the

interpreting gent.37

When

people

sort

through

the individual strandsof

word, deed,

and encounterthat constitute the

fabric of their

lives, they

confront these

phenomena

not

as

"concrete"materials

that

render

judgment unnecessary,

but

as half-formed

impressions

that

emerge

over the

conceptual horizon,

dim

silhouettes that

achieve

their

definition

only

through

the

process

of

filtering

and

ordering

that

necessarily

characterizes

all

thought.

The

key

to

uncovering the

connection between

consciousness

and

agency lies not in the analysisof experience per se, but in the processesof inter-

36. Tackett's econd chapterprovides

a

survey of the various ntellectual

nfluencesthathad helped

to shape the deputies' attitudesat the outset of the Revolution. But he suggests

that the very "com-

plexity and ambiguity of their outlook" prevented hem from being disposed in

any particulardirec-

tion before the Revolution began. Only

after

the

events

of spring

and summer1789, he observes,did

referencesto

the

philosopher begin to appear

n the

writings of

the

deputies (63-64).

37. Michael Oakeshott, Experience and its Modes [1933] (Cambridge:Cambridge

University

Press, 1966). "Judgment

and

experience are inseparable;wherever there

is

judgment

there is infer-

ence,

and

immediacyhas given place to mediation.

And

the

claim

of sensation to be, on account of

its immediacy,

a

form of experience

exclusive

of thought,

must be said to have failed" (17).



13/28


pretation that inevitably intersect the phenomena one regards

as the subject's

experience.38To go where the action is, and to find the motors

that drive histor-

ical change, the historianneeds to dissect the interpretivedispositionsthat deter-

mine how people engage, process, and learn from all that occurs

in their lives.

The analytical instinct to derive thought from forces external

to the subject,

such as discourse or experience, succeeds only in masking the creativity and

moral determination hat characterize he active human consciousness.

Tackett,

for example, assumes that because the deputies had apparently

not undergonea

previous "Revolutionof the Mind" that could be attributed o

a particular deol-

ogy,

"discourse" s ruled out as

an

explanation

for their actions, leaving

"social

and

political experience"as

the likeliest source

for

the third estate's impatience

in

1789.

But this

either-orchoice,

which focuses one's attentionoutside the

mind

of the subject, is misconceived. Interpretivedispositions are composed not of

discourses, butof constellations of beliefs, ideas, and values that are often frag-

mented, disconnected, composite, and even contradictory.

Unlike discourses,

which are defined by their structuralunity and which take shape

only when an

outside observer abstracts hem from the

processes

of

cognition

and

communi-

cation and reifies them

for

analytical purposes, interpretivedispositions

are as

untidy

and

unfixed

as

any

human

interaction,despite

the structures

hat

frame

them.

They

are

inherently dynamic

and

susceptible

to

change

because

they

reflect the multiple convictions

and commitments on which the subject bases

his/hersense of self, as well as the disparatebeliefs andassumptions hat inform

those commitments.

People

exercise

agency during every

"event"

or

"experi-

ence," including

the

fleeting

and the random

as well as

the dramatic

and the

enduring,

because their

interpretivedispositions

shift to meet

every contingency.

They

refine their inclinations as

their

beliefs interact

with

the

divergent

and

unsettlingpotentialities

of their

world, creating

a desire for moral coherence

and

the search for

a

new center

of

gravity

in the

layers

of their consciousness. This

inescapably cognitive process reflects

neither the instrumentaluse

of

putative

"discourses"

nor

the

"instinctiveand visceral" reactions to

supposedly

unmedi-

ated

experiences,

but the

subject's

creative

and

ongoing

reformulation

f values

andpriorities.

The revolutionaryargumentsof 1789 reflected

not a

suddenpolitical

awaken-

ing

but the

final,

and

momentous, rearrangement

f

conceptual

resources long

familiar o both

the

deputies

to the Estates-General

nd theirconstituents.Tackett

38. Cf. Stanley

Fish's useful

concept

of

"interpretive ommunities,"

as

developed

in

Is There

a

Text

in this Class? (Cambridge,Mass.:

HarvardUniversityPress, 1980).

Fish's critics are right thathe goes

too

far

in declaring that

texts

do not

exist

"prior o interpretation."

ish's interpreting ubject pos-

sesses a conceptual grid so coherent and self-replicating hat it resists

all

challenges

to its organiza-

tional principles, and therefore

has

no

real

need for contact

with a

world outside

itself. But the more

limited claim that emerges out of

Fish's discussion, namely, that interpretiveassumptionsare always

inescapable,both for groups and forthe individualswho comprise them, seems

incontrovertible.For

critical discussion of Fish's concept of interpretive ommunities, see Gerald

Graff, "Interpretationn

Tlhn: A Response to Stanley Fish,"

New Literary

History

17 (1985), 109-117,

followed by a reply

from Fish, "Resistance and Independence:

A Reply to Gerald Graff," 119-127.

See also Robert

Scholes, Textual

Power

(New

Haven:Yale University Press, 1985).



14/28

128

JAY M. SMITH

represents he attitudesof the deputies on the eve of the Revolution as a product

of the OldRegime's"socialand legal system," a naturaloutgrowthof the "social

and

cultural structures"of the age. For Tackett, the common deputies' angry

response to the nobility's defense of its prerogativeswas a sign of their resent-

ment againstthe "condescensionand scorn" hathad characterized heirrelations

with the Second Estate for many years.39But can the "system"or "structure" f

the

Old Regime really be creditedwith bestowing on futuredeputies of the third

estate

the "pious hope" that they would soon be regardedas the equals of the

nobility? How so? Systems and structures,no matterhow hierarchical,are never

inherentlyunfair,and experience of them thereforecannot simply be expected to

produceresentmentand indignation.What requiresclose attention s the process

that,

in

some minds,

had

renderedobjectionablethe claims associated with

the

existing social system. What had prepared he thirdestate, or at least some of its

representatives, o construe the nobles' assertions of their social superiorityas

"condescension and scorn?"

How,

within

the

context

of the

traditional

social

order,

did

spokesmen

for the

thirdestate ever come to believe thatthey were

enti-

tled

to equality? If many members of the third estate had harbored eelings of

"frustration," humiliation," nd "animosity" owardthe nobility for years, why

had

they not condemned

he

inequities

of

the system in greaternumbersand

with

greaterfrequency before 1789? How

can

their lingering respect for the institu-

tion of

nobility,

which

Tackett rightly emphasizes, be reconciled

with their

impassioneddenunciations

of

the society

of

orders

n

1789

and

after?

Toanswerall of these questions adequately,one would need to rewritethe his-

tory of pre-Revolutionarypolitical consciousness in France-an objective far

beyond

the

scope

of

a

journal

article.

In

the

pages

that

remain, however,

I want

at

least to

begin

the

task

of

scrutinizing

the

long-term thought processes

that

enabled the

future

revolutionaries

o

envision

peaceful

and

multilateral

political

reform, on the one hand, and to capture and articulatereasons for powerful

resentments,

on the other hand.

Especially pertinent

to

the dramaticconfronta-

tions of the

early

Revolution

are the diverse opinions concerninghierarchy,

ta-

tus,

and

the social

order

articulated

between

roughly

1750 and

1789.40

These

opinions, expressed by many

members

of both the second and third

estates,

and

written or

variouspurposes,make clear

the

contestation

hat

surrounded

he idea

of

nobility

in

the

years leading up

to the Revolution. The

variety

of

the

views

expressed, ranging

from

reactionary

assertions of noble

power

to bold affirma-

39. To supporthis account, Tackettcites many instancesof bitternessand resentmenton the part

of

the

deputies.

The

deputy

Jean-Gabriel

Gallot,

for

example, adopted

an

exceptionally

strident

one.

In a letter to his wife, he wrote of the noble deputies, "After their abominablebehavior, this noble

scum, with all their coats of arms, deserves to

be

humiliated" 109). The Lyon deputy Jean-Andre

P6risse Du Luc reportedconfrontingone of his fellow freemasons, a noble of conservative political

persuasion,with the declaration hat "hereditary obility was a political monstrosity" 110).

40. For indicationsof this ferment n social thought,see Smith, "Social Categories;" ohn Shovlin,

"Towarda Reinterpretation f RevolutionaryAntinobilism:The Political Economy of Honor

in

the

Old Regime", Journal of ModernHistory 72 (2000), 35-66; and Rafe Blaufarb,"Noble Privilege

and

Absolutist State Building: French Military Administration after the Seven Years' War," French

Historical Studies 24 (2001), 223-246.



15/28


tions of the equality of all citizens, make it difficult to believe that the future

deputies to the Estates-General could have entered the period of pre-

Revolutionary urmoil utterly unawareof the potential for intransigenceon the

part

of

their

political opponents.

Yet

the

open-endedness,

he

conceptualfluidity,

and the multivalency of the proposals communicated n the pre-Revolutionary

decades also suggest that the key issue that separated he deputies of the second

and

thirdestates-the natureof the differencebetween noble and non-noble sta-

tus-remained far from settled

in

most

minds

down to the early stages of

the

constitutional

crisis of

1788-1789.

The events of

1789

were

implicit

in the

polit-

ical

consciousness

of the

Old Regime, but

it

was only the

acceleratedreevalua-

tion of prioritiesand the

refinement

of varying

structures f

belief,

that made

the

conflicts of

that

year finally

unavoidable.

II. BALANCING IDEAS AND ENGAGINGTHE WORLD:

THEEVOLVINGMIND OF J.-M.-A. SERVAN

The writings of Joseph-Michel-AntoineServan provide an ideal point of entry

into the evolving political consciousness of the pre-Revolutionary nd Revolu-

tionaryyears. On the one hand, his own political trajectory

n

1788-1789 seems

to exemplify

the

process charted by Tackett.

A

champion of the constitutional

claims of the third

estate,

Servan

nitially sought

common

ground

with

the nobil-

ity before becoming embittered n December 1788.41Angered by what he clear-

ly perceived as noble arrogance,

he wrote a

series of pamphletsfiercely critical

of the Second Estate

in

1789,

and he

fully supported

he

revolutionary

nitiatives

in

June of that year.

In

other words, the path Servan followed

in

"becoming"a

revolutionary eems to have paralleled

that described

by Tackett

n his

analysis

of the

deputies

to

the Estates-General.But

on

the other

hand,

the evidence illu-

minating

Servan's life

and mind in the

years

before

1788

makes

it

difficult

to

attributehis radicalization ither

to

the

experience

of his own social stationunder

the Old Regime or to the experienceof political debatein 1788-1789. Although

Servan

clearly

identified

with the third

estate,

both as

an

authorand as a

politi-

cal

figure, he actually

came from a

Dauphinois family

of minor but

securely

established

nobility.42

As a

respectedmagistrate

n

the

parlement

of

Grenoble,

he

41. For an example of Servan's moderationbefore

late 1788, see Petit

colloque

limnentaire

ntre

Mr. A et Mr. B. Sur les abus, le droit, la raison, les Etats-Giniraux,

les parlements &

tout

ce qui

s'ensuit. Par un vieuxjurisconsulte allobroge (n. p., 1788). The interlocutorsof the pamphletappeal

to the conscience of both the

First and

Second

Estates and remainhopeful that the.privilegedorders

will see that the common interest demands an end to fiscal abuses.

42. Servan's father, he owner of a modest seigneurie, sent his two sons into the customarynoble

professions of the

law

and the military.Despite

being placed in the conventional career paths of the

socially ascendant,both

Servan and his

younger

brother,Joseph Servan de Gerbey, actually acquired

theirreputationsby thepen, calling for theenlightenedreformof theirown respective institutionsand

for the overall regeneration f

French

society. Both

became enthusiasticsupporters f the Revolution;

Servan de

Gerbey would go on

to serve as Ministerof War n 1792. For background, ee Biographie

universelle ancienne et moderne, ed.

Joseph-Frangois

Michaud,45 vols. (Paris:A. T. Desplaces,

1854-1865), 39: 139-142; Dictionnaire historique de la revolutionfrancaise, ed. Albert Soboul

(Paris:Presses

universitaires

de France, 1989), 981;

Dictionnaire Napoleion, d. Jean Tulard,

2

vols.,



16/28

130

JAY M.

SMITH

would have enduredvery little

condescension or

scorn in his pre-Revolutionary

professional life.

Moreover,analysis of his

intellectual evolution in

the decades

priorto the

Revolution shows that

neitherthe ideas nor the passions to

which he

gave

voice in

1789 derivedsuddenlyfrom the heatof

unexpected conflicts. The

political positions

he

articulated

n

the

early stages

of the

Revolution, though

clearly more radicalthananythinghe had producedbefore, grewnaturallyout of

the complex of ideas thathad filled his

mind and exercised his

attention or years.

He had earlier

refrained rom

pushing the most anti-aristocratic

mplications of

his moral assumptions

because

those assumptions had been

convoluted and at

least partially

conflicting. His

decision to press for full political

equality

in

1789

reflected the subordinationof

some of his beliefs, the

reformulationof others,

and

the

envisioning

of a

new

social

world whose coherence demanded

civic

equality.

To make sense of Servan's choices in 1789, one needs to understandhis

immersion

in

the moraldebatesand

conceptual

experimentation

hat

character-

ized the entire second half

of the eighteenth century.

Like many writers of the

1760s and

1770s,

Servan

sought

a

generalmoral reform of

French

society,

and

this desire

inspired

on his

part

sustained

contemplationof the

propercharacter-

istics of the citizen.

Alarmedby the egoism, lassitude,and

luxury he saw around

him,

Servan

tried

to inspire patrioticfeeling in the

French by

encouraging the

cultivationof

privatevirtue. "Private ife is a continual

esson

in

public

life,"

he

wrote in his

Discours sur les moeurs

(Discourse on Morals) of 1769.

Striking

a

distinctly

Rousseauian

chord,

Servan

asserted

that the citizen

who

developed

sound personalhabits

inevitably would

find that

"his own

heart

is his

legisla-

tor."43 ervan

hoped

to use the

medium of

print,

and the

"contagion

of the

imag-

ination,"

to

impress upon

all

well-intentioned men

(the

"honnetes

gens")

the

need for moral

self-discipline

and

civic

spirit.44

He assumed that the

revival of

moralrigor

and

French

patriotism

n a

corrupt ighteenthcentury

required,

above

all, stellarexamplesof rectitudeandselflessness thatreadersandcitizensat large

could learn from and emulate.

Also like

many

of his

contemporaries,

Servan

expressed

great

admiration or

the

exploits

of

patriots

from ancient

Greece

and

Rome.45

f

one could

only

trav-

el

through

ime to visit the households of

Aristides and

Cato,

true

"sanctuariies]

of

morals,"

one could

"contemplate

hese

great

and virtuousmen" and

cultivate

"the immortal desire of

imitating

them."46But Servan

preferred

to search

for

(Paris:Fayard,1999), 2: 766; Dictionnaire Historique et Biographique de la Revolution et de

lEmpire, 1789-1815,

ed.

Jean-Frangois-Eugene

Robinet,

2

vols.

(Paris:

Librairie

historique

de la

revolutionet de

empire, 1899), 2: 749.

43.

Joseph-Michel-Antoine

Servan,

Discours sur les moeurs

(Lyon:

Chez

Joseph-SulpiceGrabit,

1769).

44. Ibid. The audience of "honnetesgens" is identified

on p. 2;

the

"contagionof

the

imagination"

appearson p. 109.

45. For

a

useful

discussion of

the main

features of classical

republican hinking

in

Old

Regime

France, see Keith Michael

Baker, "Transformations f Classical

Republicanism

in

Eighteenth-

CenturyFrance,"

Journal of ModernHistory 73 (2001),

32-53, esp. 35-42.

46. Servan,Discours sur les moeurs, 30-31.



17/28


18/28

132

JAYM.SMITH

The implicit contrast, in Servan's thinking, between the spiritual nobility

acquiredthrough civic virtues and the legal

nobility acquiredby

birth

or

titles

emerges more clearly

in

a text written roughly

a decade after the Discourse on

Morals.

In

the later text,

a Discourse on

the

Progress of

Human

Knowledgepre-

sented to the Academy of Lyon

in

1781, Servan

continued o emphasize the need

to form virtuous and patriotic citizens. His

discussion of

what

he called "the

apprenticeship

f the

Citizen"

differed

in

subtle ways, however, from the argu-

ments advanced

n

the Discourse

on

Morals.

Good examples and conscious emu-

lation of

those

examples

still stood out as the indispensable ingredients of the

moral educationof the citizen, but Servan also drew attention o the mechanisms

of recognition

and

recompense

that

are necessary

to

sustain

the citizen's emula-

tion over time.

"In

a

state,"

he

wrote,

"the artof makingmen is also

that

of offer-

ing merit its just rewards."But "whathave we done

in

France?We have sought

to purchase

with

gold

what we should have rewarded

with

a glance of recogni-

tion; [consequently,]

he state has exhausted ts

treasury,

nd

qualities

of heartare

debased."51 ervanapplauded he king's decision to commission public statues

of some of France's

greatest

men-he

specifically

identified the noble

writers

and

jurists Fenelon, l'Hopital, d'Aguesseau,

and Montesquieu-because the

building

of

public monuments

revived a

highly

effective Roman practice.52The

ancientshad shown that "a

great character,

fter

observing

a

[hero

on

a] pedestal,

can no longer remain bound to the earth;he must raise himself to that higher

level, or die trying."53

ervan

feared, however,

that the

king's efforts would

not

bear

fruit

unless the

governmentdeveloped

a more

general strategy

for reward-

ing patriotic

emulation.

Within

the context of

this

broad discussion of

patriotism, elflessness,

and the

propermeans of rewarding hem, Servaneventuallybroached he relatedsubjects

of

law and

nobility. "Oh,

f

only

all

respectable

men

(gens

de

bien)

could

rely

on

a

body of

laws that

provide recompense

for virtue But where are these laws?"

Servan noted the other common subdivisions of jurisprudence, uch as martial

law, canon law, and criminal aw, and he expressed exasperationat the absence

of

what

he termed "remunerative

aw."

Imagine

One has to

create a

name for

the

most noble subject of

human

legislation

We

have

neither

he

word nor

the

thing.

All

across Europe

we have

signs

and

colors

that

prove

that a

man was born into

the

Nobility;

we have

others

that

prove

that he served

in

the

army;

we have othersthat

prove nothing

at all.

But

by

what

signs,

what

marks,

do

we rec-

ognize

the

enlightened

zeal of the

ecclesiastic,

the

vigilance

and

integrity

of

the

magis-

trate, heheroic valor of thesoldier,thegood faithof themerchant,he industryof the arti-

san,

the

talent of

the artist?

The

legal

marks

of nobility-parchments,

titles, epaulettes-were always

clear

and, moreover, frequently meaningless.

Other

"gens

de

bien," however,

fell

51. Servan, Discours sur le progre'sdes connoissances humaines en general, de la morale, et de

la legislation en particulier; lu dans une

Assemblie

publique de

l'Acadjmie

de Lyon (n. p.,

1781),

109-110.

52. Servan,Discours sur le

progris,

111.

53. Ibid., 109.



19/28


133

into a vast and undifferentiated rowd,

where "all merit s obscured,happymere-

ly to escape persecution,happier still to

avoid extinction."54Yet in spite of

the

flaws

in

the current ystem, Servanreported hat he could "hear he humanheart

cry out from

all

directions:Look at me, and I

will

do

well; praise me,

and I

will

do better." Servan

argued

that

the

king,

if he

wished to

command "citizens"

rather han mere "subjects,"must managecarefullythe signs of public esteem so

that

genuine

merit and

civic virtueswould receive the encouragement nd recog-

nition they needed. By dispensing

official honors widely, conspicuously, and

fairly, the king would inspire in his

subjects a "deliriousenthusiasm"and help to

provide "public nstruction" n the virtues

of citizenship.That last point deserved

emphasis, because "good public

education"

was

"the only plank left

amid the

universal shipwreckof morals"

confrontingFrench society.55

The Discours of 1781 can be seen as

an

elaboration

of

ideas first

expressed

in

the Discours of 1769. The ultimateobjective of both texts is to reformboth indi-

vidual morals and the broaderpolitical

cultureof

the

eighteenthcentury.Servan

hoped to replace luxury and egoism with civic spirit and virtue, and to that end,

he used both of his texts to highlightappropriate bjects of emulation or the con-

scientious citizen-ancient patriots,

statuesof greatmen,

and

the

heroic and

hon-

orable nobility of earlier centuries.

In

both of his

discourses, moreover,

Servan

looked past the standardcategories of

profession or estate to address

all

right-

minded citizens, the "honnetes gens"

in

1769, the neglected "gens de bien" in

1781.

In

short, the purposes and generalcharacteristics f the moral reform

that

Servancraved

changed

not at

all between 1769

and

1781;

the two

discourses

dif-

fered

only

in the

techniques

of

reform

that

they

recommended.

In

1769,

Servan

had encouragedself-examinationand patriotic

ntrospection.56 y 1781,

he had

become

persuaded

hat

the

"contagion

of the

imagination"

on

which he had ear-

lier based his hopes also needed

structural einforcement.Individualgood

will

and initiative

remained

important,

but

the

monarchy's

methods of

recognizing

excellence had

to change

to accommodate

he

broad

imperative

of

forming

vir-

tuous

and

patrioticcitizens. Whereas the Discourse

on morals worked from the

ground up by urging readersto strive for

a nobility of virtue

in

their

own

lives,

the Discourse on

the

progress of

human

knowledge

worked

from the other direc-

tion

and urged

the crown to

acknowledge formally

the

demonstrated

piritual

nobility

of the

patriot.

Given his

penchant

or inclusive

rhetoric,

and

his own

apparentability

to craft

a kind of

hybrid

moral

dentity,

how

should Servan'scontributions

o the debates

of 1789 be understood?Although he had previously shown no overt hostility

54. Ibid., 107.

55. Ibid., 124-125.

56. Moral self-reliance s one of the overriding hemes of the Discours sur les moeurs.

After detail-

ing the plentiful evidence of

modern

corruption, Servan lamented that

"all

the

wisdom of the

Government s

powerless

in

the face of evils so great. How unjustwe are We accuse

those who gov-

ern us [of moral failure],

and

yet

we fail

to see

that

their faults are

our own"

(52).

He had opened the

discourse

by distinguishing

morals

[moeurs]

rom mere positive law, which

he

claimed

had

only

lim-

ited effects on behavior."Morals,"he wrote, "are the true foundationof the prosperity

of Empires;

morals can accomplish anything,even without laws, but laws without moralscan do nothing" 2).



20/28

134 JAY M.

SMITH

towardthe Second Estate, his

writings of the

"pre-Revolution" stablished an

unmistakable nd

uncharacteristic hetoricaloppositionbetween the nobility and

commoners.In

one piece he identified

himself,

with

mock

humility,and

a

certain

disingenuousness,as a "mere

bourgeois."57Another

essay bore the title "com-

mentary

of a commoner."58 everalpamphletsdecried

the "dangerousaristocra-

cy" of the high nobility andmagistracy.59n a pamphlet hat addressed he polit-

ical

interestsof the thirdestate,

he expresseddisdainfor "thosewho dareto scorn

you."60

Servan's

steady

stream

of anti-aristocratic hetoric

in

1789

no

doubt

helps to

explain why he was chosen by two

different electoral districts of

Dauphine to represent the third

estate of his province at

the coming Estates-

General,

an

honorhe

politely

declined.6'What

explains

the

change

in

tone? Were

Servan's

fighting words

produced by the shock of political conflict?His pam-

phlets

certainly commented on

and responded to dramaticevents, such as the

declarationsof the second Assembly of Notables, and the Parlementof Paris's

announcementof its

support or the Notables' conservative constitutional

argu-

ments.

2

If one focused strictly

on the apparentpolitical

dynamics of the year

1789,

one could

well

interpret

Servan's heated

rhetoric

as

reflecting

a

change

of

consciousnessbroughtabout by

stunningevents and

unanticipated xperiences.

Butjust as

Servan's critique of

French

laws in

1781 had reflected his specific

and

personal

preoccupationwith the challenge of

cultivating citizenship

in an

age of

corruption, so

his

interventions

in

the constitutional debates of 1789

reflectedthe fermentationandevolution of his own thoughtson the political and

social order.Some

of the vocabularyemployed

in

his

argumentsmay

have been

providedby the immediate

issues that framed the

conflict-"aristocracy" and

"commoners,""despotism"

and

"abuses"-but the

perspective

communicated

n

Servan's

pamphlets

was

perfectly

consistent

with,

and had

obviously grown

from,

attitudeshe had

express

Documents

Jay Smith French Revolution Agency and Ideas