Kim Kostere & Linda Malatesta - Maps, Models & the Structure of Reality - NLP in Psychotherapy (1990)(OCR)

Maps, Models and the Structure of Reality

NLP Technology in Psychotherapy

Kim Kostere Linda Malatesta

MefamorPhous Press Portland, Oregon

Published by

MetamorPhous PreSS P.O. Box 10616 Portland, OR 97210-0616

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be utilized in any form of by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the author.

Copyright 1990 by Kim Kostere and Linda Malatesta Cover Design & Editing by Lori Stephens Printed in the United States of America

Malatesta, Linda K. Maps, models, and the structure of reality: NLP technology in psychotherapy / Linda K. Malatesta, Kim M. Kostere p. cm. Includes bibliograt>hical references. ISBN 1-55552-007-3: $11.95 1. Neurolinguistic programming 2. Neurolinguistic programming-Case studies. I. Kostere, Kim M. II. Title RC489.N47M35 1989 616.89'I4-dc 20 89-36356

Appreciation is given for permission to reprint from the following publishers:

The Use of Symptoms as an Integral Part of Hypnotherapy by Erickson, M., Copyright 1965. Reprinted by arrangement with American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 2250 East Devon #336, DesPlaines, IL 60018.

Man's Search For Meaning by Frankl, V., Copyright 1959. Reprinted by arrangement with Beacon Press, 25 Beacon Street, Boston, MA 021 08.

A Teaching Seminar with Milton H. Erickson, M.D. by Zeig, J. (Ed.), Copyright 1980. Reprinted by arrangement with Brunner /Mazel Pulr lishers, 19 Union Square West, New York, NY 10003.

Zen Flesh, Zen Bones by Reps, P., Copyright 1939. Reprinted by arrangement with Charles E. Tuttle Publishing Co., Inc., Suido 1-Chrome, 2-6, Bunko-Ku, Tokyo,Japan.

Exploring The Crack In The Cosmic Egg-by Pearce,]., Copyright 1974. Reprinted by arrangement with The Julian Press, Inc., 225 Park Avenue South, New York, NY 10003.

Mind And Nature by Bateson, G., Copyright 1979. Reprinted by arrangement with E.P. Dutton, a division ofNAL Penguin, Inc., 2 Park Avenue, New York, NY 10016.

Solutions by Cameron-Bandler, L., Copyright 1985. Reprinted by arrangement with Future Pace, Inc., P.O. Box 1173, San Rafael, CA 94915.

Medicine Woman by Andrews, L., Copyright 1983. Reprinted by arrangement with Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022

The Doors of Perception by Huxley, A., Copyright 1954. Reprinted by arrangement with Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.

Steps To An EcololrY Of Mind by Bateson, G., Copyright 1972. Reprinted by arrangement with Harper & Row Publishers, Inc., 10 East 53rd Street, New York, NY 10022.

On Becoming a Person by Rogers, C., Copyright 1961. Reprinted by arrangement with Houghton Mifflin Company, 1 Beacon Street, Boston, MA02108.

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Innovative Hypnotherapy by Erickson, M., Zeig, J., Copyright 1980. Reprinted by arrangement with Irvington Publishers, Inc., 740 Broad-way, New York, NY 10003.

Problem-Solving Therapy, Second Edition by Haley, J., Copyrigh t 1987. Reprinted by arrangement with Jossey-Bass, Inc., 433 California Street, San Francisco, CA 94104.

Way of the Peaceful Warrior by Millman, D., Copyright 1980, 1984. Reprinted by arrangement with HJ. Kramer, Inc., P.O. Box 1082, Triburon, CA 94920.

Introduction To Linguistics by Wardhaugh, R., Copyright 1972. Reprinted by arrangement with McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1221 Avenue of the Americas, New York, NY 10020.

The Roots Of NLP by Dilts, R., Copyright 1983. Reprinted by arran-gement with Meta Publications, Inc., P.O. Box 565, Cupertino, CA 95015.

Provocative Therapy by Farrelly, F., Brandsma, J., Copyright 1974. Reprinted by arrangement with Meta Publications, Inc., P.O. Box 565, Cupertino, CA 95015.

Physics as Metaphor by Jones, R., Copyright 1982. Reprinted by arrangement with University of Minnesota Press, 2037 University Avenue Southeast, Minneapolis, MN 55414.

Reframing: Neuro-linguistic Programming and the Transformation of Meaning by Bandler, R., Grinder, J., Copyright 1982. Reprinted by arrangement with Real People Press, P.O. Box F, Moab, UT 84532.

Guru: Metaphors from a Psychotherapist by Kopp, S., Copyrigh t 1971. Reprinted by arrangement with Science and Behavior Books, Inc., P.O. Box 60519, Palo Alto, CA 94306.

The Structure Of Magic by Bandler, R., Grinder, J., Copyright 1975. Reprinted by arrangement with Science and Behavior Books, Inc., P.O. Box 60519, Palo Alto, CA 94306.

The Tao of Physics by Capra, F., Copyright 1975. Reprinted by arrangement with Shambhala Publications, Inc., Horticultural Hall 300 Massachusetts Avenue, Boston, MA 02115.

My Voice )ViII Go With You: The Teaching Tales of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. by Rosen, S. (Ed.), Copyright 1982. Reprinted by arrangement with W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110.

Change by Watzlawick, P., Weakland,]., Fisch, R., Copyright 1974. Reprinted by arrangement with W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110.

Uncommon Therapy: The Psychiatric Techniques of Milton H. Erickson, M.D. by Haley,]., Copyright 1973. Reprinted by arrangement with W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 500 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10110.

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Dedicated to

Pecos Bill

Crystal Pyramids

and

The Big Picture

Acknowledgements

We would like to gratefully acknowledge the following pioneers in the fields of psychology, philosophy, Neurolinguistic Programming, and science whose work laid the foundation for this book:

Harlene Anderson, Richard Bandler (co-founder of NLP), Gregory Bateson, Leslie Cameron-Bandler, FriyofCapra, Robert Dilts, Milton H. Erickson, Richard Fisch, Harold Goolishian, David Gordon,John Grinder (co-founder of NLP) , Jay Haley, Clark Moustakas, Fritz Perls, Cereta Perry, Virginia Satir,John Weakland, and Paul Watzlawick.

We are also grateful to the following people who have supported us throughout this project: Sandra Anderson, Walter T. Kostere, Gabriel Malatesta, Geraldine Malatesta, M. Diane Vincent, David Balding, Lori Stephens, Nancy Robinson, Karen Bos, Yvonne Warner,Jeanette Bow-man, Wanda Valeu, Debbie Malatesta, Carmen Hall, Terry Boortz, Angela Daniels, Nicola Malatesta, Mary Selep, Mary P. Hramiec, Ingrid Markwort, Kirsten Stewart,Joanne Lindensmith, Deborah Bright, Susan Porosky, Deborah Nagy,Jennifer Hall, Christian Zieminski, and Joseph Matthew Daniels.

Special thanks are given to The Center for Humanistic Studies in Detroit, Michigan for leading us into self-search and expanding our models of the world.

CONTENTS

Preface xi Introduction xiii

CHAPTER 1 - MODELING . 1 Logical Typing . . . . . . . 4 Universal Modeling Processes . 5 Levels of Modeling .... . 6 Minimum Requirements for a Model 13 The Primacy of Experience 14 The Structure of Reality 15 Internal vs. External . 17 Science as a Metaphor . 18

CHAPTER 2 - CHANGE 19 Modeling and Change 20 Presuppositions .... 20

CHAPTER 3 - RELATIONSHIP POSTULATES 23 Pacing and Leading . . . . . . . . . .. 24

CHAPTER 4 - LANGUAGE POSTULATES 31 The Meta-Model 31

~k~n M Distortion 35 Generalization 39 Questions 44

CHAPTER 5 - EVOLUTION POSTULATES 49 Description .... 50 Referential Index Shift 59 Time Projection 62 Paradoxical Intervention 66

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Exaggeration 74 Reframing . 77 Content Reframing 78 Six-Step Reframing 80 Contextual Reframing 85 Paradoxical Intervention

With Reframing . 88 Metaphor . . . . . 91 Metaphoric Reframing 97

CHAPTER 6 - ECOLOGY POSTULATES 103 The Ecology Frame 103 Reframing the Reframe 104

Reflections III Bibliography 113 About The Authors 117

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PREFACE

Where does NeuroLinguistic Programming come from? Upon what epistemological foundation is this profound technology of communication and change built? Kim Kostere and Linda Malatesta provide answers to these and other questions. The major strands of this exposition serve to make the foundation of modeling comprehensible to the general reader.

Certainly all practitioners ofNeuroLinguistic Program-ming should have the knowledge contained here thoroughly integrated into their every experience and be-havior. Without it, practitioners are merely performing recipes and violating the very tenets from which Neuro-Linguistic Programming springs. Such practitioners are held to criteria of right vs. wrong, correct vs. incorrect, and thus the map is wrongly perceived as the territory and our evolutionary progress is lost.

With the knowledge presented here, practitioners will know they can find their way through uncharted territory with the confidence that well-formed outcome, sensory experience and relevant feedback are true guides to suc-cessful change.

Leslie Cameron-Bandler San Rafael, California

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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in the mid 1970s, publications on the subject of NeuroLinguistic Programming have em-phasized therapeutic interventions, patterns for creating successful outcomes, and algorithms for change. Although these books have illuminated a path toward creating excel-lence in the areas of education, psychotherapy, business management and behavioral medicine, little attention has been placed on examining the philosophical foundation upon which NeuroLinguistic Programming rests. The pur-pose of this book is not to present new technology but instead to explicate the philosophical base and epis-temological assumptions which underlie this state of the art model of communication and change. In doing so, we have drawn from the fields of systems theory, physics, second-order cybernetics, phenomenology and linguistics. Also, this volume examines the pattern which connects Neuro-Linguistic Programming to Ericksonian psychotherapy, strategic/systemic psychotherapy and humanistic/existen-tial psychology. We, the authors, hope that the material contained within this exposition will provide the means by which a practitioner of NeuroLinguistic Programming can transcend the confines of everyday models of existence in order to enter into the realm of endless possibilities.

Linda Malatesta Kim M. Kostere

Bloomfield Hills, Michigan

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1

MODEUNG

In 1933, Alfred Korzybski published his classical work, Science and Sanity. Within this volume, Korzybski carefully described the relationship between a representation and that which it represents. To illustrate this concept, he used as a metaphor the relationship between a map and the territory it depicts. "A map is not the territory it represents, but if correct, has a similar structure to the territory, which accounts for its usefulness." (p. 58)

A representation is not what it represents; one is a symbol for the other. This distinction may seem insig-nificant on the surface. However, as we explore the process bywhich maps, models, and representations are built, it will become clear that the relationship which exists between map and territory, when examined in detail, has an effect on the very structure of reality as we know it.

A model is a symbolic representation that depicts struc-ture. Each one of us builds models or representations of the world, and it is by way of these models that we organize and communicate experience. It is through the process of modeling that the infinite variety of experience is or-ganized into a form that can be interpreted, understood,

2 Maps, Models, and the Structure of Reality

and utilized. Modeling is an integral part of our daily lives and is the way by which we transform the chaotic into the structured. Capra (1975) describes the role that modeling plays in physics:

In physics, the in terpretations of experimen ts are called models or theories, and the realization that all models and theories are approximate is basic to modern scientific research. Thus the aphorism of Einstein, "As far as the laws of mathematics refer to reality, they are not certain; and as far as they are not certain, they do not refer to reality." (p. 27)

A model, by its very nature, includes certain facets of experience and excludes others.

Physicists know that their methods of analysis and logical reasoning can never explain the whole realm of natural phenomena at once, and so they single out a certain group of phenomena and try to build a model to describe this group. In doing so, they neglect other phenomena and the model will therefore not give a complete description of the real situation. (Capra, 1975, p. 27)

A model is neither good nor bad, right nor wrong, but can be evaluated only as to its usefulness in making available specific outcomes. Models inherently provide both limita-tions and resources.

Newtonian (classical) and Einsteinian (modern) physics exemplify the development of two very different models that represent essentially the same territory. For many years, the model created by Isaac Newton provided the paradigm used in the study of physics. During the first three decades of this century, however, Einstein, Heisen-

Modeling 3

berg, and Bohr strayed away from the presUppOSItions accepted by Newton, and hence modern physics was born. Both the classical and modern models of physics are effec-tive in explaining certain phenomena and making possible various outcomes. Neither the classical nor the modern models are right, better, or correct; they are, however, different and therefore produce different outcomes. The difference between each model lies in its method of or-ganizing a description of the world and the presuppositions upon which it is built.

To illustrate these poin ts, let us look at one of the best known models in physics, Newton's "classical" mechanics. The effects of air resistance or friction, for example, are generally not taken into account in this model because they are usually very small. But apart from such omissions, Newtonian mechanics was for a long time considered to be the final theory for the description of all natural phenomena, until electric and magnetic phenomena, which had no place in Newton's theory, were discovered. The discovery of these phenomena showed that the model was incom-plete, that it could be applied only to a limited group of phenomena - essentially the motion of solid bodies.

Studying a limited group of phenomena can also mean studying their physical properties only over a limited range, which may be another reason for the theory to be approximate. This aspect of the ap-proximation is quite subtle because we never know beforehand where the limitations of a theory lie. Only experience can tell. Thus the image of classi-cal mechanics was further eroded when twentieth-century physics showed its essential limitations. Today we know that the Newtonian model is valid


only for objects consisting of large numbers of atoms, and only for velocities which are small com-pared to the speed oflight. When the first condition is not given, classical mechanics has to be replaced by quantum theory; when the second condition is not satisfied, relativity theory has to be applied. This does not mean that Newton's model is "wrong," or that quantum theory and relativity theory are "right." All these models are approximations which are valid for a certain range of phenomena. Beyond this range, they no longer give a satisfactory descrip-tion of nature, and new models have to be found to replace the old ones - or better, to extend them by improving the approximation. (Capra, 1975, p. 28)

At this point, it is necessary to clarify that in using a model to explain modeling, we are in fact creating a model which is also affected by the process of modeling. Modeling is recursive. Thus, we are faced with a paradox. "The map is not the territory," and the map created by this statement is also not the territory.

Logical Typing

The theory of logical types states that there is a discon-tinuity between a class of information and the members of that class. This theory is used to delineate levels of abstrac-tion and states that one logical level is about (meta-to) the logical level below it.

1. The class cannot be a member of itself nor can one of the members be the class, since the term used for the class is of a different level of abstrac-tion - a different logical type - from terms used for members. (Bateson, 1972, p. 202)

Modeling 5

2. The name is not the thing named but is of a dif-ferent logical type, higher than that of the thing named. (Bateson, 1979, p. 251)

To illustrate this point, Gregory Bateson (1972), in Steps To An Ecology of Mind, uses the content area offurniture in order to clarify the idea of logical typing.

Ifwe classify chairs together to constitute the class of chairs, we can go on to note that tables and lamp shades are members ofa large class of "nonchairs," but we shall commit an error in formal discourse if we count the class of chairs among the items within the class of nonchairs.

Inasmuch as no class can be a member of itself, the class of non chairs clearly cannot be a nonchair. Simple considerations of symmetry may suffice to convince the non mathematical reader: (a) that the class of chairs is of the same order of abstraction (i.e., the same logical type) as the class of non chairs; and further, (b) that if the class of chairs is not a chair, then, correspondingly, the class of non chairs is not a nonchair.

Lastly, the theory asserts that if these simple rules of formal discourse are contravened, paradox will be generated and the discourse vitiated. (p. 280)

Since the modeling process involves levels of abstrac-tion, the theory of logical typing is essential in under-standing the process of modeling.

Universal Modeling Processes

Bandler and Grinder (1975) describe in detail the three universal modeling processes: generalization, deletion,


and distortion, and the effects that these processes have upon the models or maps that we build.

Generalization is the process by which elements or pieces of a person's model become detached from their original experience and come to repre-sent the entire category of which the experience is an example. (p. 14)

Deletion is a process by which we selectively pay attention to certain dimensions of our exper-ience and exclude others. (p. 15)

The third modeling process is that of distortion. Distortion is the process which allows us to make shifts in our experience of sensory data. (p. 16)

Levels of Modeling

There are three levels of modeling that have a direct effect on our experience of the world. These levels of modeling could be described as layers which separate us from the world at large. They are: sensory experience, ex-perience of experience, and language.

Language Experience of Experience

Sensory Experience WORLD AT LARGE

Each level of modeling is meta-to the level of modeling which is the next logical level below it. The higher the model is in abstraction, the greater the distance between it and the world at large. For example: sensory experience is meta-to the world at large, experience of experience is meta-to sensory experience, and language is meta-to ex-perience of experience.

Modeling 7

1) Sensory Experience: The first level of modeling is sensory experience. Sen-

sory experience is synonymous with perception and is the means by which we make contact with the world at large. The act of perceiving takes the abundance of information available in the world at large and organizes it into visual, auditory, kinesthetic (the physical sensations of touch, emotion, and visceral sensations), olfactory, and gustatory sensations. Perception is the filtering system by which our sensory apparatus (eyes, ears, nose, mouth, and skin) takes information available in the world at large and converts it into a form which is compatible with the central nervous system. During the transformation process, the ongoing bombardment of information that exists in the world at large becomes categorized into images, sounds, feelings, smells, and tastes and is, therefore, altered from its original form. These sensory distinctions are not the product of our environment as such, but are instead the result of the coding that occurs in the central nervous system.

For instance, the linear nature of time may be totally the result of the central nervous system. All sensations are transmitted sequentially as a series of electrical impulses. This process could account for our experience of past, present, and future since each impulse is transmitted before or after the other. In other words, time as we ex-perience it may not exist in the world at large but instead be the result of the modeling process. Past, present, and future may all exist simultaneously in the world at large. Thus, the framework posed by linear time might be solely the product of our central nervous system.

The suggestion is that the function of the brain and nervous system and sense organs is in the main eliminative and not productive. Each person is at each moment capable of remembering all that has ever happened to him and of perceiving everything


that is happening everywhere in the universe. The function of the brain and nervous system is to protect us from being overwhelmed and confused by this mass of largely useless and irrelevant knowledge, by shutting out most of what we should otherwise perceive or remember at any moment, and leaving only that very small and special selec-tion which is likely to be practically useful. Accord-ing to such a theory, each one of us is potentially Mind at Large. But in so far as we are animals, our business is at all costs to survive. To make biological survival possible, Mind at Large has to be funneled through the reducing valve of the brain and nerv-ous system. (Huxley, 1954, pp.22-23)

2) Experience of Experience: The second level of modeling is experience of ex-

perience.

This level of experience involves the mental maps or models we make to organize and respond to our immediate sensory perceptions. Neurologically, these are representations resulting from the stimulation of networks of cortical cells and neurons that form complex branching and inter-connecting chains of causation in the brain. (Dilts, 1983, p.15)

Experience of experience includes that portion of in-ternal processing or thinking which occurs in primary sensory modalities. By primary sensory modalities, we mean pictures, sounds, feelings, tastes, and smells. Excluded from this level of modeling is internal dialogue because lan-guage, whether spoken out loud or experienced internally, is at a different logical level than primary sensory repre-sentations. Grinder and Bandler (1976) refer to the

Modeling 9

primary sensory modalities as representational systems. The five representational systems are as follows:

(V) Visual (A) Auditory (K) Kinesthetic (0) Olfactory (G) Gustatory

Representational systems and series of representational systems are the building blocks of experience of ex-perience. Human beings experience such phenomena as thinking, memory, imagination, and intuition as specific sequences of representational systems. For example, a man might experience a specific memory from childhood as an image of his grandmother's kitchen, the aroma of baking bread, and the secure feeling of being with grandma (the content). This example could be diagramed as: V-O-K (the model). Notice that this level of modeling does not em-phasize content but instead delineates form. The sequenc-ing of representational systems is a calculus for the way that a person organizes his/her experience and as such is not content dependent. The man described in the previous example might remember his first lover by seeing an image of her face, remembering the smell of her perfume, and feeling the love he had for her (the content). Again, the form is the same V-O-K (the model), but the content has shifted dramatically.

Our experience, at this level of modeling, is affected by the limitations of consciousness. George Miller (1956), in his article, The Magic Number 7t2, defines the limits of consciousness. Miller states that a person can only keep 72:2 chunks of information in conscious awareness at one time. Due to this limitation, we selectively focus on certain parameters of experience. Since we are present at each moment in time, with all of our sensory apparatus open to


experience, our brain records all sensory input. The limita-tions of consciousness, however, force us to focus on certain portions ofinternal processing. To return to the aforemen-tioned example, one could describe the man's memories of both his grandmother and his lover as follows:

In this diagram, the representational systems which are in conscious awareness are circled. The portions of ex-perience not circled are represented neurologically in the brain, however, not at a conscious level.

3) Language: Language, the third level of modeling, is a digital sys-

tem. By digital system we mean a series of symbols which stand for sensory representations. Language is not ex-perience. It is a representation of experience, and there-fore is ai a higher logical level than sensory experience and experience of experience. Words draw their meaning from the sensory representations to which they are associated. For example: the word "dog" is a symbol for a particular type of small animal. In order to understand this word, we search our experience of experience for a visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory, and/or gustatory sensation that is associated with the symbol (dog). The process of associat-ing language to sensory representations is known as transderivational search. The more abstract the word (e.g., love, power, sin), the more complex becomes the process of transderivational search. Transderivational search is a highly individualized process since words become attached

Modeling 11

to personal internal representations. In returning to the previous example, for some people the word "dog" will elicit an internal representation of a collie, while for others, the word dog may represent a poodle, a German shepherd, or a basset hound. This example illustrates the slippage that exists between language and experience.

Semantics is the branch oflinguistics that is devoted to the study of how words acquire their meaning. Transforma-tional grammar (Noam Chomsky) makes a distinction be-tween deep structure and surface structure.

Deep structure is the abstract structure, postu-lated as underlying a sentence, containing all infor-mation necessary for both the syntactic and semantic interpretations of the sentence. Surface structure is the grammatical relationship among words of an actually observed sentence. (Wardhaugh, 1972, pp. 207-220)

The surface structure is what is spoken (written), while the deep structure is the actual meaning of the sentence.

Language is the means by which we communicate with each other. It is through language that we are able to share ideas, memories, and dreams. Many of our cultural tradi-tions and biases, as well as intellectual and educational achievements, are preserved and handed down from generation to generation in the form of the written and spoken word.

Every individual is at once the beneficiary and the victim of the linguistic tradition into which he has been born - the beneficiary inasmuch as language gives access to the accumulated records of other people's experience, the victim in so far as it con-firms him in the belief that reduced awareness is the


only awareness and as it bedevils his sense of reality, so that he is all too apt to take his concepts for data, his words for actual things. (Huxley, 1954, p. 23)

The grouping of sensory representations, via language, helps create our individualized models of the world. Lan-guage is one way that we organize a world model.

Through cultural conditioning, the name label for a thing will become, over time, a specific inter-mediary, functioning between the sensory input and the finally created percept - that which is "seen." The acculturated person doesn't just "see the tree," for instance, but the tree-as-named. And through acculturation, a name doesn't simply denote. Lan-guage becomes seman tic, which means that the name or word carries with it the related attitude sets of that culture. This has far reaching effects.

Any object, symbolized or not, that has been labeled with a name, then has this mediation-efIect of semantics to funnel through before being cog-nized by the acculturated mind. Whether the sen-sory stimulus is from out-there, as with a tree, or internally generated, as with its symbolic form, the stimulus is channeled through the mediating act of "the tree as named," that is, language and its seman-tic overlay.

Jerome Bruner spoke of our "representing reality to ourselves" verbally in order to make metaphoric mutations of our representations and so change aspects of that reality. This is one of the uses of language and creative logic. But, through accul-turation, we don't employ language selectively -either as a tool for logic, or as communication. When language becomes semantic, and takes on negative and positive values beyond denotation,

Modeling 13

our homeostatic system reacts to the emotional undertones involved. Then we act on tangible sen-sory data, as well as our abstract creations, through our culture's value system. No longer do we interact directly with reality, neither a reality of the natural world, including other people, nor the reality of creations possible through creative logic. We inter-act with a "mediated reality" and consider the artifi-cial result our natural condition. (Pearce, 1974, pp. 45-46)

Many people process information (think) in the form of internal dialogue. Internal dialogue i~ the act of talking to oneselfin one's head. A person's internal dialogue is one of the ways that he/she maintains a particular model of the world. It is the ongoing stream of words in one's head that confirms and maintains a person's beliefs about the world in which he/she lives. The world, or to be more accurate a person's model of the world, is believed to be as it is because one convinces him/herself ofit through internal dialogue. Many forms of psychotherapy such as cognitive therapy, Rational Emotive Therapy and Transactional Analysis are aimed at changing a person's internal dialogue, thus changing his/her model of the world and the feelings and/ or behaviors that exist within this model.

Minimum Requirements for a Model

For a model to be well-formed, it must have the facility to describe both content and process. Content distinctions are the elements within a model that portray substance. Movement and the relationships between/among the various content are represented by process distinctions. An excellent example of a model that contains both of these essential distinctions is linguistics. In linguistics, words and


vocabulary (semantics) are the content distinctions while syntax delineates the rules of process that describe how the words may be arranged and combined.

The Primacy of Experience

Thus far in this book we have presented a model of modeling. There are two conclusions that can be drawn from this meta-model:

1. Human beings build models of the world.

2. People do not act directly upon the world at large but instead upon models of the world.

Since we can never directly encoun ter the world at large and our experience of the world is filtered through several levels of modeling, all experience is intersubjective. That is, experience is observer-dependent and the result of a co-existent relationship between the subject and the object. Experience consists of an ongoing "dance" between that which is perceived and the perceiver. The object perceived can never be isolated from the act of perception; they are one. This model emphasizes the uniqueness of all ex-perience. Thus, one can never be an "objective" observer; one can never "know" an objective reality.

Modern people tend to discount unfamiliar worlds by carefully distinguishing between them and their physical reality. Dream, myth, literature, even modern art are relegated to the realm of imagination and subjectivity, which is assumed to have no objective existence, no consistent physical properties, no logical, eternal, governing laws by which we may predict and control events. We may

Modeling 15

appreciate other subjective worlds, find them amus-ing, even derive wisdom from them, but we need not take them seriously or treat them as real and objective. The two realms are separate and distinct - the one exists as part of the mind, the other, altogether apart from mind.

By subjectivity I am not referring to the effects on scientific thought of the individual tastes, preferen-ces, and prejudices of scientists, which change with time, are influenced by peer pressures, and figure prominently in the formation of scientific paradigms. Rather, I mean the basic role that mind and the self play at some unfathomable level in the workings of the universe. Subjectivity in science has both a personal and an impersonal aspect, and fundamentally I mean it to refer to the dependence of the physical world on consciousness. Mind and matter are not separate and distant, but form an organic whole, in my view. To distinguish a subjec-tive from an objective viewpoint is ultimately il-lusory. (Jones, 1982, p. 10)

The Structure of Reality

The only reality is intersubjective reality; that is, each person's experience of the world is observer-dependent and, as such, true for him/her. Unfortunately, a concept that is central to many psychological theories is that of reality testing. Within this concept lie the presuppositions that there is an objective reality, this objective reality is knowable, and personal perception can be tested against this objective reality for accuracy.

An individual whose perceptions are not in line with the perceptions of the psychologist is often labeled as psychotic or schizophrenic. Contrary to the medical model,


which attaches a diagnosis to such a person implying sick-ness, another way to view this discrepancy is to identify that the psychologist and the client have differen t models of the world. Each of these models, being valid and true for the person involved, represent different maps for essentially the same territory. Different means different and does not connote right or wrong, good or bad, sick or well.

We have often wondered whether the difficulties en-dured by those people labeled as schizophrenic are the result of their experiences in nonshared reality or if the pain which they suffer is due to the fact that they live in a culture which makes few or no provisions for individual differences. People who lived in tribal societies and had models of the world that differed drastically from the con-sensus reality of other tribe members were often assigned roles that allowed them to use their differences in produc-tive ways. Those individuals, having different models of the world, often became shamen, medicine men/women, prophets, and seers and held highly-respected positions in the community. Our technological society, however, does not have a convenient place for differences; therefore, difference is often seen as sick and/ or crazy.

Central to the practice of psychiatry, psychology, and social work is the concept of diagnosis. By its very nature, diagnosis presupposes sickness, thereby placing the therapist in the role of curer and the client in the role of patient. The very act of diagnosing takes the ongoing process of experience and freezes it in time, thus convert-ing an ongoing, changeable process into a static, unchan-geable event.

When a therapeutic problem is defined as the social relationships of clients, a therapist must in-clude himself in the issue since he helps define the problem. To label a child as "delinquent" or as suffering from "minimal brain dysfunction," or to

Modeling 17

label an adult as an "alcoholic" ora "schizophrenic," means that one is participating in the creation of a problem in such a way that change may be made more difficult. A therapist who describes a family situation as characterized by "a dominating mother and a passive father" or "a symbiotic relationship between mother and daughter" has created problems, although the therapist might think he is merely identifying the problems put before him. The way one labels a human dilemma can crystallize a problem and make it chronic. (Haley, 1987, p. 2-3)

Internal vs. External

A fundamental difference between people who are considered "sane" in our society and those who are diag-nosed as "insane" is the ability to distinguish between "in-ternally" and "externally" generated experiences. To return to the logical levels of modeling presented earlier in this book, "internally" generated experience is synonymous with experience of experience and "externally" generated experience, with sensory experience. Due to the modeling process, both forms of experience take place intersubjec-tively. However, for most people, there is a qualitative difference between that which is perceived as being outside of ourselves and that which is experienced as occurring within our own minds.

To illustrate this point, let us take a person who is experiencing auditory "hallucinations," hearing voices coming from an electrical outlet. Upon closer investiga-tion, it may very well be that this person is indeed having an auditory experience but the experience is actually his own internal dialogue which he is attributing to some external source. This person is, therefore, unable to dif-ferentiate between language (internal dialogue) and sen-


sory experience (the sound of someone speaking to him). He is mixing logical levels of modeling. Most of us have experienced our own internal dialogue. However, this ex-perience is somehow qualitatively different from the ex-perience of hearing someone talk to us. This difference allows us to discriminate between the two.

Science as Metaphor

Over the last few hundred years, no model has gained more respect and credibility than science. In fact, science is surrounded by such an aura of infallibility that many people consider it to be "the ultimate truth." Modern science, the product of a particular paradigm known as the scientific method, is no more or less true than any other model. Since science is preserved, taught, and transmitted via language, one could conceptualize science as an elaborate metaphor. "Metaphor implies the creation of an idea or symbol, which not only stands for something else but, in fact, stands alone as a new evocation of meaning." Gones, 1982, p. 51) As in all models, the metaphor of science provides both resources and limitations, and can only be evaluated by the usefulness of its outcomes.

2

CHANGE

Change is a transItIon from one point to another. Change can be intentional as in a client seeking the help of a therapist, or it can occur quite unintentionally as in the case of St. Paul falling from his horse. Change can be a natural transition, for example, when a child enters puberty or a teenager matures to adulthood. However, in many cases, change requires a decision to change and some effort on the part of the person desiring the change.

There are two types of change. The first type is remedial change which is change initiated to fix or repair. This type of change is usually evidenced by the presence of emotional and/ or physical pain/discomfort. Here, change is imple-mented as a remedy for such pain. The second type of change is generative change and involves change for the sake of enhancing the person, evolving his/her being, and does not involve taking away discomfort. Generative change is not directed at taking away uncomfortable or undesirable symptoms, but instead is aimed at personal growth and the fulfillment of human potentials.

Change is often described in terms of positive and negative. The assignment of such distinctions to the change


process is futile and the value judgments imposed by this labeling seem to make more of a statement about the context in which the transition has occurred than the actual change itself.

Modeling and Change

The process of psychotherapy is aimed at change, be it remedial or generative. It is our belief that many of the limitations clients bring to therapy with the hopes of change are limits in their model of the world, not in the world at large. The process of therapy involves working with clients in order to facilitate the expansion of their world model, that is, to open new possibilities, to broaden the scope and depth of their world views, and to expand their models to include a wider range of options and choices.

Presuppositions

As in all models, our conceptualization of the change process has within it several presuppositions. These presup-positions are not necessarily "truths." They are, however, the basis upon which our model is built and as such they provide a useful way to proceed.

1) Resources: It is our belief that each person entering therapy al-

ready has within him/her all the resources needed in order to make the desired change(s). The role of the therapist is that of assisting the client in gaining access to and ap-propriately contextualizing these resources.

2) Flexibility: It is our belief that a choice is better than no choice. An

Change 21

essential goal in the therapeutic process is to assist the client to increase his/her choices and options. Clients who ac-quire a great deal of behavioral and psychological flexibili ty appear to fare better in day-to-day living. These people seem to be better equipped to "roll with the punches" and "bounce back" from life's "ups" and "downs." This presup-position is consistent with the law of requisite variety, a concept from systems theory. The law of requisite variety states that the component within a system or system within a group of systems with the most variability controls the system. (Ashby, 1956)

3) The Primacy of Experience: It is our belief, as stated earlier, that each person's

experience is true for him/her. All experience, due to the modeling process, is intersubjective. Both the client and the therapist enter into the therapeutic process not with a description of "reality" but with their own individualized models of the world. Through the process of developing a therapeutic relationship, the therapist and client co-create a consensual world view which includes within it both the presenting problem and the resources needed to imple-ment the desired change. That is, the presenting problem does not exist independent of the therapeutic context. It is through the process of therapy that the client and therapist co-create the problem as well as the solution. The present-ing problem and the potential solution exist in the realm of experience and, as such, are observer-dependent.

4) Adaptivity: It is our belief that a person makes the best choice

possible at each moment in time, given the resources which he/she has available. Aligned with this concept is the belief that a person, if given a better choice, will take it. Central to this presupposition is the idea that underlying each choice/behavior there exists a positive intent. This concept


describes the innate good and inherent movement toward self-actualization which lies within each person. Often the problems that a person brings into therapy are the results of decisions/choices made which have become frozen in time and, as such, are no longer appropriate - given the client's current resources and state of being. Thus, a once-adaptive behavior becomes maladaptive. Psychotherapy facilitates the process of opening up new choices and making new decisions, thereby expanding the client's model of the world.

5) Being and Becoming: It is our belief that human beings are constantly in

process. Life involves movement, transformation, and evolution. There are numerous levels of movement which lend credence to this presupposition, such as the move-ment among atoms and molecules at the atomic level, the constan t regeneration of cells at the physiological level, and the movement of heavenly bodies at the planetary level. A person and his/her world model are in a constant state of being and becoming. Our theory of change accepts this constant state of becoming, integrating it into the model and utilizing the movement to facilitate change.

6) Relativity: It is our belief that our model of growth and change,

like all models, is nothing more than a model; that is, our model is affected by the process of modeling and, there-fore, has within it inherent limitations and resources. We believe that it is important, when using this model of change, not to mistake the model for the person. All models are generalizations and each person is an individual.

RElATIONSHIP POSTUlATES

3

Cen tral to the practice of psychotherapy is the develop-ment of a therapeutic relationship which promotes and facilitates the change process. Rogers (1961) describes such a relationship as follows:

My interest in psychotherapy has brought about in me an interest in every kind of helping relation-ship. By this term I mean a relationship in which at least one of the parties has the intent of promoting the growth, development, maturity, improved functioning. improved coping with life of the other. The other, in this sense, may be one individual or a group. To put it another way, a helping relation-ship might be defined as one in which one of the participants intends that there should come about, in one or both parties, more appreciation of, more expression of, more functional use of the latent inner resources of the individual. (pp. 39-40)


The therapeutic relationship is marked by a sense of mutuality, of two human beings embarking on a journey together. This type of relationship is akin to what Buber (1937) refers to as an "I-and-thou" relationship. It is our belief that a therapeutic relationship does not consist of rigidly defined roles. A growth-promoting relationship in-volves two human beings, sharing experiences and walking down the path of change together.

Pacing and Leading

The first step in the development of a therapeutic relationship is that of establishing rapport. Pacing refers to the process whereby the therapist enters into the world of the client. This is accomplished by accepting the client's model of the world and joining the client at that model. The process of pacing involves an openness to and accep-tance of the world of the experiencing client. It is by entering into the client's world that the therapist can come to understand and know the client. Once havingjoined the clien t at his/her model of the world, the therapist can begin to assist the client in expanding his/her world view to include more options/choices. This process is known as leading.

There are a number of methods which can be used to facilitate the process of pacing and leading (Bandler, Grinder, 1979; Lankton, 1980; Cameron-Bandler, 1985; Kostere, Malatesta, 1985). Mirroring is a pacing technique in which the therapist directly adopts a portion of the client's ongoing analogue (non-verbal) behavior. There are several behavioral systems which can be used in mirror-ing. For example: a therapist can directly adopt the client's breathing rate and depth, body posture, and/or body movement.

Mirroring is a powerful tool that both facilitates a deep

Relationship Postulates 25

sense of rapport and allows the therapist to have an ex-perience of the client's experience. Mirroring is an effec-tive technique for entering into the client's model of the world. There are, however, situations in which the client is experiencing a great deal of physical and/or emotional pain. In those cases, the therapist may elect not to use direct mirroring but, instead, crossover mirroring. Crossover mir-roring allows the therapist to pace the client while main-taining his/her own physical integrity. In crossover mirroring, the therapist does not directly have an ex-perience of the client's experience, nevertheless can estab-lish rapport without feeling the client's pain. Crossover mirroring is a form of pacing in which the therapist matches anyone of the client's output channels with any output channel of a different system. For example: the therapist can pace the client by synchronizing his voice tempo with the client's breathing rate.

In both mirroring and crossover mirroring, once rap-port has been established, by either directly or indirectly matching the client's analogue behavior, the therapist can begin to lead the client by overlapping his/her behavior from the present state to the desired state. Once the feed-back loop of mirroring has been established and the therapist begins to alter his/her analogue behavior, the client will follow.

Descriptive pacing is a process whereby the therapist verbally feeds back to the client his/her verbal and/or analogue behavior. Pacing the verbal component of the client's behavior consists of feeding back the client's lan-guage, a technique that is similar to active listening. When descriptively pacing analogue behavior, the therapist delivers a verbal description of the client's readily observ-able ongoing behavior. Verbal and analogical descriptive pacing and leading can be used either independently or together in order to establish rapport and lead the client to the desired state. For example: a therapist might respond


to a client who is discussing his fears by stating, "As you sit there, gripping the arms of your chair, I can see the tight-ness of your facial muscles and the light perspiration on your forehead. I also hear you telling me that you are feeling fearful. I, however, want you to notice that your breathing is becoming deeper and more even and, as you continue to talk, realize that you are sharing with greater comfort."

The process of pacing and leading is not based on a cause-effect paradigm. During this process, the client and the therapist co-create a model of the world in which they co-exist. Pacing and leading could be represented metaphorically as follows: The therapist enters into the void to meet the client, the therapist joins the client in the darkness, and together they move toward the light.

The following case study, from the work of the late Milton H. Erickson, M.D., is an elegant example of pacing and leading.

George had been a patient in a mental hospital for five years. His identity had never been estab-lished. He was simply a stranger around the age of twenty-five who had been picked up by the police for irrational behavior and committed to the state mental hospital. During those five years he had said, "My name is George," "Good morning," and "Good night," but these were his only rational utterances. He uttered otherwise a con tinuous word-salad com-pletely meaningless as far as could be determined. It was made up of sounds, syllables, words and incomplete phrases. For the first three years he sat on a bench at the fron t door of the ward and eagerly leaped up and poured forth his word-salad most urgently to everyone who entered the ward. Other-wise, he merely sat quietly mumbling his word-salad to himself. Innumerable efforts had been made by


psychiatrists, psychologists, nurses, social service workers, other personnel and even fellow patients to secure intelligible remarks from him, all in vain. George talked only one way, the word-salad way. Mter approximately three years he continue to greet persons who entered the ward with an out-burst of meaningless words, but in between times he sat silently on the bench, appearing mildly depressed but somewhat angrily uttering a few minutes of word-salad when approached and ques-tioned.

The author joined the hospital staff in the sixth year of George's stay. The available information about his ward behavior was secured. It was learned also that patients or ward personnel could sit on the bench beside him without eliciting his word-salad so long as they did not speak to him. With this total of information a therapeutic plan was devised. A secretary recorded in shorthand the word-salads with which he so urgently greeted those who entered the ward. These transcribed recordings were studied but no meaning could be discovered. These word-salads were carefully paraphrased, using words that were least likely to be found in George's productions and an extensive study was made of these until the author could improvise a word-salad similar in pattern to George's, but utiliz-ing a different vocabulary.

Then all entrances to the ward were made through a side door some distance down the cor-ridor from George. The author then began the practice of sitting silently on the bench beside George daily for increasing lengths of time until the span of an hour was reached. Then, at the next sitting, the author addressing the empty air, iden-tified himself verbally. George made no response.


The next day the identification was addressed directly to George. He spat out an angry stretch of word-salad to which the author replied, in tones of courtesy and responsiveness, with an equal amount of his own carefully contrived word-salad. George appeared puzzled and, when the author finished, George uttered another contribution with an in-quiring intonation. As if replying the author verbal-ized still further word-salad.

After a half dozen interchanges, George lapsed into silence and the author promptly went about other matters.

The next morning appropriate greetings were exchanged employing proper names by both. Then George launched into a long word-salad speech to which the author courteously replied in kind. There followed then briefinterchanges oflong and short utterances of word-salad until George fell silent and the author went to other duties.

This continued for some time. Then George, after returning the morning greeting, made mean-ingless utterances without pause for four hours. It taxed the author greatly to miss lunch and to make a full reply in kind. George listened attentively and made a two hour reply to which a weary two hour response was made. (George was noted to watch the clock throughout the day.)

The next morning George returned the usual greeting properly but added about two sentences of nonsense to which the author replied with a similar length of nonsense. George replied, "Talk sense, Doctor." "Certainly, I'll be glad to. What is your last name?" "O'Donovan and it's about time somebody who knows how to talk asked. Over five years in this lousy joint" ... (to which was added a sentence or two of word-salad). The author replied, "I'm glad


to get your name, George. Five years is too long a time" ... (and about two sentences of word-salad were added).

The rest of the account is as might be expected. A complete history sprinkled with bits of word-salad was obtained by inquiries judiciously salted with word-salad. His clinical course, never completely free of word-salad which was eventually reduced to occasional unintelligible mumbles, was excellent. Within a year he had left the hospital, was gainfully employed, and at increasingly longer intervals returned to the hospital to report his continued and improving adjustment. Nevertheless, he invariably initiated his report or terminated it with a bit of word-salad, always expecting the same from the author. Yet he could, as he frequently did on these visits, comment wryly, "Nothing like a little non-sense in life, is there, Doctor?" to which he obviously expected and received a sensible expression of agreement to which was added a brief utterance of nonsense. Mter he had been out of the hospital continuously for three years of fully satisfactory adjustment, contact was lost with him except for a cheerful postcard from another city. This bore a brief but satisfactory summary of his adjustments in a distant city. It was signed properly but following his name was a jumble of syllables. There was no return address. He was ending the relationship on his terms of adequate understanding. (Erickson, 1965, pp. 57-65)

LANGUAGE POSTUIA.TES

4

As stated earlier, language is not experience. It is a model of experience. Even though language is not ex-perience, it is a powerful organizing tool which has a profound effect on our models of the world. Since much of the information communicated during the therapeutic process is done so verbally, this section is devoted to the linguistic components of the change process.

The Meta-Model

As previously mentioned, transformational gram-marians make a distinction in linguistics between surface structure and deep structure. We, as native speakers of the English language, have intuitions about the meaning of language. In many cases, these intuitions supply us with meaning (deep structure) which is not formally displayed in the surface structure. Since language is a model, it is affected by the three universal modeling processes: dele-


tion, distortion, and generalization. Often, the language that a client uses to describe his/her experience becomes detached from the experience. The meta-model is a series of formal linguistic operations designed to reconnect lan-guage to experience. (Bandler, Grinder, 1975; Lankton, 1980; Cameron-Bandler, 1985; Kostere, Malatesta, 1985) Although the meta-model operates on the linguistic level of modeling, intervention using the meta-model will have an effect On other parameters of the client's model of the world.

Deletion

Deletion is meaning in the deep structure that is miss-ing from the surface structure. The meta-model systemati-cally recovers the deleted material.

1) Simple Deletion: This form of deletion involves sentences in which the

verb has the potential of occurring with two noun phrases or argument nouns; however, only one argument noun is displayed in the surface structure of the sentence. In this case, the second argument nOUn has been deleted from the surface structure and can be recovered by using the meta-moo I'! 1.

Client: I'm happy. Therapist: With whom/about what?

Client: I feel angry. Therapist: At whom/about what?

Client: I don't know. Therapist: What specifically don't you know?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

I'm confused. About what?

I'm scared. Of what?

Language Postulates 33

2) Comparative Deletion: Comparative deletion refers to a situation in which a

client's sentence draws a comparison; however, the surface structure of the client's language does not indicate what is being compared.

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

She's happier. She's happier than whom?

John is more sensitive. John is more sensitive than whom?

He is the best. He is the best compared to whom?

Jenny is least threatening. Jenny is least threatening compared to whom/what?

3) Modal Operators: In many cases, the client's language will indicate that,

in certain situations, there is no choice. Since language is not experience, the lack of choice may not exist in the world at large but only in the client's model/language. By chal-lenging modal operators, the therapist expands the client's model to include more choices. There are two challenges for modal operators: "What would happen if you did (didn't)?" and "What stops you?"


Modal Operators of Necessity

The modal operators of necessity are: must, it's necessary, have to, should, need to, and have got to.

Client:

Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

I have to clean the house before my husband gets home. What would happen if you didn't?

I should finish this project by Friday. What would happen if you didn't?

I need to quit drinking. What would happen if you did/didn't?

Modal Operators of Possibility

Can 'tand it s impossible are examples of modal operators of possibility.

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

I can't quit drinking. What stops you from quitting? What would happen if you did?

It's impossible to talk to my boss. What stops you? What would happen if you did?

I can't concentrate on work. What stops you? What would happen if you did?

Each of the two challenges for modal operators will


offer the therapist a different type of information. The challenge "What stops you?", in most cases, allows the client to search into his/her personal history for an answer, while "What would happen if you did (didn't)?" has the client project experientially into the future.

Distortion

Distortion in natural language systems occurs when a person makes shifts in his/her linguistic representations. In this case, the person's deep structure is distorted from the world of sensory experience. These shifts often create an impoverished model of the world, thus restricting the person's options and abilities to act in the world.

1) Nominalization: The process whereby a verb is changed into a noun,

thus changing an ongoing process into a static event/ob-ject, is called nominalization. In many cases, once the process of nominalization has occurred, the client per-ceives the nominalized material as an unchangeable even t/ object instead of a changeable ongoing process. The process of nominalization is an example of distortion.

The decision is final.

In the above sentence, the word decision is a nominalization. It is a verb (decide) that has been changed to function in the sentence as a noun. In this case, there is possibly no reason why the client can't redecide about the issue except that he/she perceives the decision as an un-changeable event. It is the first task of the therapist to assist the client in changing the nominalization back into a process. Once a verb has been nominalized, much of the information concerning the process has been deleted. The


second task of the therapist is to recover the deleted material. The material deleted from the aforementioned example might be:

Who is deciding? Deciding about what? Deciding when? Deciding where? How specifically deciding?

To recover the deleted material, the therapist can use the meta-model questions listed in the section on deletion.

The way to test for nominalization is to examine the surface structure of the sentence and identify the words functioning as nouns. If you cannot imagine being able to reach out and touch the nouns, they are nominalizations. For example, you can touch a chair, a table, a car, men and women. However, you cannot touch love, frustration, mar-riage, fear and decision. Another test is to take the noun and place it after the phrase "an ongoing." If the phrase is logical, it is a nominalization.

Client:

An ongoing chair) An ongoing table) An ongoing car)

An ongoing love) An ongoing decision) An ongoing fear)

I want love.

Nouns

N ominalizations

Therapist: You want loving from whom?

Client: The decision is made. Therapist: What specifically are you deciding?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:


There is frustration in my life. What specifically is frustrating you?

My confusion is terrible. What specifically is confusing you?

In the English language, many words ending in ion are nominalizations and they can easily be changed back into verbs by using their ingform.

2) Cause and Effect: Cause and effect is a form of distortion in which a cHen t

claims that there exists a cause-effect relationship between two not necessarily-related events. This issue arises in the field of psychotherapy when a client claims that his/her emotions, attitudes, and/or behaviors are caused by another person or thing and that the client has no control over his/her response(s) in the situation. The meta-model response to a cause and effect violation is: How specifically?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

My husband makes me cry. How specifically does your husband make you cry?

My job depresses me. How specifically does your job depress you?

Debbie makes me angry. How specifically does Debbie make you angry?

3) Implied Causatives: Many times when the word "but" is present in the

surface structure of a sentence, a cause-effect relationship is implied even though it is not formally stated. Implied


causatives, like cause-effect statements, often connect two not necessarily-related events into a cause-effect relation-ship. This form of distortion can create limits in the client's model of the world. The meta-model challenge for implied causatives is to reverse the sequence of the cause-effect relationship and to verify that the reverse order is then accurate.

Client:

Therapist:

Client:

Therapist:

I would go back to school, but I have to support my family. Then, if you didn't have to support your family, you would go back to school. Right?

I don't want to beat my wife, but she always nags me. Then, if your wife didn't nag you, you wouldn't beat her. Correct?

Another option in challenging implied causatives is that of asking if the cause-effect sequence is always the case.

Client:

Therapist:

I don't want to beat my wife, but she always nags me. Do you always beat your wife when she nags you?

A third choice in challenging implied causatives consists of accepting the cause-effect relationship and asking the question: How specifically?

Client:

Therapist:

I don't want to beat my wife, but she always nags me. How specifically does she nag you?


4) Mind Reading: Mind reading is a type of distortion in which the client

claims to have information about another person's in ternal state (thoughts, feelings, attitudes, likes, and dislikes) without indicating the means by which the information was obtained. The meta-model response to challenge a mind reading statement is: How specifically?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client:

Therapist:

I know my wife loves me. How specifically do you know that your wife loves you?

I sense that he hates me. How specifically do you sense that he hates you?

I know that my husband is unhappy in our marriage. How specifically do you know that your husband is unhappy in the marriage?

Another method for challenging mind reading state-ments is that of asking the client to check out his/her assumption by asking the other person involved if the information gathered through mind reading is accurate. This process will begin to assist the client in using sensory experience during communication.

Generalization

In natural language systems, generalization is the process whereby an element in the client's surface structure has come to represent an entire category of information of which it is only one example. Generalization can cause a


loss of detail, thus creating an impoverished model of the world. This same modeling process can also account for a client's move from the specific to the general, thereby allowing an isolated experience to expand into a universal.

I) Lack of Referential Index: Lack of referential index occurs when a category of

objects/events is mentioned in the client's surface struc-ture; however, the client does not refer to a specific ob-ject/ event in sensory experience. Lack of referential index is an example of both deletion and generalization. The meta-model responses for lack of referential index are: Who specifically? What specifically? Which specifically?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

People are dangerous. Which people specifically are dangerous?

Women hurt me. Which women specifically hurt you?

They're trying to find me. Who specifically is trying to find you?

Boats are fun. Which boats specifically are fun?

2) Unspecified Verbs: Unspecified verbs are verbs in a sentence that do not

indicate a full description of the action taking place. The meta-model response to an unspecified verb is: How specifi-cally?

Client: Therapist:

My husband hurts me. How specifically does your husband hurt you?

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:


My boss frustrates me. How specifically does your boss frustrate you?

My children irritate me. How specifically do your children irritate you?

My mother bores me. How specifii;.ally does your mother bore you?

I know I'm tired. How specifically do you know you're tired?

I realize my mistake. How specifically do you realize . your mistake?

3) Universal Quantifiers: Universal quantifiers are those words that, as

generalizations, stand for an entire category of which one example is a representative. Examples of universal quan-tifiers are: all, always, every, everybody, nobody, and never. There are two ways to challenge universal quantifiers. The first way is to use exaggeration in order to bring forth a response that puts the generalization into a more ap-propriate perspective.

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Nobody loves me. You mean nobody in the entire world?

I'm always right. You mean always. every single time?


Client: All men stink. Therapist: Every last one of them?

The second way to challenge universal quantifiers is to challenge the quantifier as a lack of referential index.

Client: Nobody loves me. Therapist: Who specifically does not love you?

Client: I'm always right. Therapist: When specifically are you right?

Client: All men stink. Therapist: Which men specifically stink?

4) Complex Equivalence: Complex equivalence is a special case of generalization

in which the client equates a definition/meaning to a certain behavior or set of behaviors that is not necessarily true. Complex equivalence is similar to mind reading in that the client claims to have knuwledge of another person's internal state(s). In complex equivalence, how-ever, the client claims to have acquired this knowledge via sensory-based distinctions and the behavior mayor may not be an indicator of that internal state. There are two steps to challenging a complex equivalence.

1. Challenge the generalization by asking the client if the generalization is always true.

2. If the client agrees that the generalization is always true, switch referential index. In switching referential index, you hold the generalization constant. However, you change the role of the people involved. In most cases, this new generalization will not hold true and as such gives the therapist new information to explore.

Client:

Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client:

Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:


Transcript

When my daughter raises her voice ... she is angry at me. Does your daughter's raising of her voice always mean that she is angry at you? No. When specifically does it mean that she is angry at you?

Transcript

Jennifer frowns at me ... she is disappointed in me. DoesJennifer's frowning at you always mean that she is disappoint-ed in you? Yes. Does your frowning atJennifer always mean that you are disappoint-ed in her? No, that's a different situation. How specifically is that a different situation?

5) Lost Performative: Many times a client will make a statement that is indica-

tive of a personal belief system and will present it as though it is a universal truth. Lost performative refers to a situation in which a client takes a generalization about his/her model of the world and presents it as a generalization about the world itself. In the English language, information about who is making a statement is often deleted from the surface structure. At the beginning of each utterance, one could


put the statement "1 am telling you that" which would indicate, in the surface structure, who is speaking the sentence.

There are two ways to challenge violations of lost per-formatives: "Forwhom?" and "1 hear that you are telling me that." The purpose of these challenges is to have the client own the beliefs as personal truths and not as universal truths.

Client:

Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

Client: Therapist:

It's wrong to love two people at the same time. It's wrong for whom to love two people at the same time?

Relationships are painful. I hear that you are telling me that relationships are painful.

Drinking beer is natural. Drinking beer is natural for whom?

Questions Questions, in the context of psychotherapy, create a

framework for the change process. When working with clients, it is essential to ask questions that define the goals of therapy and gather the information necessary to imple-ment the desired change. The following questions are designed to elicit a full representation of the client's present state and desired state, and to facilitate the process of gaining access to the resources needed to achieve the desired outcome.

1) What are you currently experiencing? This question elicits information regarding the client's


present state. When using this question, as in all of the questions in this section, it is important to gather sensory-based descriptions.

2) In which context(s) are you having this experience? Delivered in order to gather additional information,

this question regarding the client's present state begins to contextualize the presenting problem.

3) What are the positive gains of your current ex-perience?

A question of this nature is designed to identify the positive intent involved in the present state and to incor-porate the satisfaction of the secondary gains into the desired change. By addressing the issue of secondary gains, this question begins to sort through positive intents in order to preserve personal ecology.

4) What specific change do you want for yourself? Within this question lies the presupposition that the

client wants to make a change and that the change is for him/herself. This question sets the initial goal(s) or out-come(s) for the therapeutic sessions. In order for a goal to be well-formed, it must be within the client's model of the world. A well-formed goal cannot be that of changing another person's behavior, attitude, and/or personality. Also, the goal must be stated in positive terms so as to indicate what the client wants for him/herself rather than what is not wanted.

5) What will having the change do for you? This question requires that the client consider what this

change will do for him/her. The effective use of this ques-tion insures that the change is valuable and will not nega-tively affect personal ecology. In addition, by using this question, a previously ill-formed goal can be transformed


into a goal that is well-formed. For example, a person whose desired goal is to be 10 years younger is presenting an ill-formed goal. However, by exploring what this change would do for him/her, this unattainable goal might be transformed into an attainable one, such as feeling more attractive, having a more positive self-image, or accessing more energy.

6) In which context do you want the change? A client may desire a change with little or no considera-

tion made to the exact context(s) in which the change is desired. It is important for the therapist to assist the client in making the changes necessary. It is of utmost impor-tance, however, that change occur only in the appropriate situations. Many times, changes are made which generalize randomly across numerous contexts in a hit-or-miss fashion. When change is implemented in this generalized manner, the change may be very appropriate in some of the contexts and totally inappropriate in others. The therapist, when precisely and clearly delineating the ap-propriate context(s), can implement change without nega-tively affecting the total-personal ecology of the client.

7) How will you know when you have made the change? This question requires that internal and/or external

indicators of change are established in the goal-setting process. The therapist can, by using the above question, elicit from the client (either by verbal description or direct behavior) the internal or external responses which allow the client to know that the goals are achieved. For example: the indicator may be a certain body sensation, body pos-ture, way of seeing the world, breathing rate or possibly the content of the client's internal dialogue.

8) What have you tried in the past in order to resolve your problem(s)?


This question further defines the problem as existing within the client's model of the world, thus, it indirectly assumes that the solution also exists within his/her world model. Also, this question elicits from the client informa-tion regarding past attempts at problem resolution. By gathering this information, the therapist can avoid trying unsuccessful treatment strategies over and over again. Un-successful attempts at problem resolution often create a meta-loop which further perpetuates and exacerbates the problem. For example: the person who becomes depressed may try to "pull" himself out of the depression. When this attempt to alleviate the depression fails, the person then becomes depressed about being depressed. The circular reinforcement of the symptom leads to further exacerba-tion of the symptom which in turn leads to the next level of symptom reinforcement. Thus, the loop, meta-loop and possibly meta-meta-Ioop are created. Information about failed past attempts at problem resolution assists the therapist and client in the development of a successful treatment strategy, which leads the client to the dissolution of the loop. (Fisch, Weakland, Segal, 1982)

9) What resource(s) do you need in order to make the change?

This question both presupposes that the client has the resources needed to make the desired change and assists the client to identify these resources.

EVOLUTION POSTULATES

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Evolution postulates are therapeutic interventions that facilitate the change process. These interventions are designed to assist the client to evolve from the present state to the desired state. Each of the postulates described in this section presuppose that rapport has been established and well-formed goals set. It is important that the use of these interventions are the natural outgrowth of the therapeutic experience and not just a series of techniques.

Once upon a time a tree grew in the Ravine of Lung Men - a tree as old as the memory of mankind. From its wood, a sorcerer made a harp. It was a magnificent instrument, beautifully made, and per-fect down to the very last detail.

The most famous artists came to play this harp; but however great their skill, all they could produce was a lot of discordant noise, not in the least pleas-ing to the ear.

As a result, the beautiful but unusable harp lay


idle for many long years among the treasures of the Emperor of China.

Finally Pay Ya came along. At his touch the harp came to life and produced beautiful sounds which called to mind the old tree's memories; the seasons, and Nature being reborn; the songs of the birds, and the fights of wild beasts; the falling rain and the silence of the ice; and the loves and joys and suffer-ings of all those who had lain beneath the tree or even walked in its shade.

When Pay Ya was asked how he had managed to tame the harp, he explained that instead of trying to impose his will upon it, he had left it free to choose its own theme; all he had done was follow this theme, and adjust himself to the harp, until he and it had become one single instrument; and thus they made their music together. (di Villadorata, 1974, p. 35)

Description

One of the most powerful tools of change is description. The very process of having a client describe fully his/her experiences has a profound effect on the client's model of the world. In order to explore the inheren t value of descrip-tion, we will differentiate between description and explana-tion. The process of description provides answers to questions involving the "What?" and "How?" of experience. "What?" refers to the textures and fabrics, that is, the stuff of which experience is made. "How?" is a question which elicits process information, particularly sequence. Explana-tion, unlike description, is made of causal inferences and often produces information about the cause of the cause of the cause. Causal-based meta-loops are frequently the result of "Why?" questions.

Evolution Postulates 51

Description is a means by which a client can expand his/her model of the world. This process opens up new possibilities, offers new options, and affords access to inter-nal resources. An important part of facilitating a client who is in the process of describing his/her experiences is work-ing with the client to include all facets of experience in the description. A description should include both thoughts and feelings, or to be more specific, the visual, auditory, kinesthetic, olfactory and gustatory parameters of ex-perience.

Description usually involves the use of language. As indicated earlier, language is not experience. It is a repre-sentation of experience. The process whereby words be-come connected to experience is called transderivational search. The process of description in and of itself generates subjective representations both for the client and the therapist. These representations, gained via description, call forth an extended model of the world. Thus, the process of description affords the client an opportunity to experience an enriched world model.

An important distinction to be made when examining the issue of description is that of meta-experience versus congruent experience. Often when clients describe their experiences, they do so from the vantage point of being in the experience. A description of an experience that is derived from being in the experience is known as a con-gruent description. Congruent description helps facilitate the client's experiencing of an experience as it is repre-sented. Often a client will begin a description with the portion of the experience that stands out foremost in his/her consciousness. As the description unfolds, includ-ing various facets of experience, the client will gain access to a fuller representation of his/her experience, thereby creating an extended model of the world.

Meta-description occurs when a client describes his/her experience from the vantage point of being an


observer. From this disassociated position, the client will describe his/her representation of the experience from a different perspective, thus creating a new experience which in turn leads to an expanded model of the world.

Congruent description tends to elicit experiences that are attached, via transderivational search, to the root ex-perience. In most situations congruent description, by facilitating the re-experiencing of portions of the root experience, opens up new possibilities for the client. There are, however, cases when congruent description is contrain-dicated. Such cases occur when the root experience is so overwhelming for the client that he/she is not willing to have a direct experience of the representation. Examples of these experiences might include rape, a severe beating, the death of a significant other, or a traumatic accident. In these situations, meta-description allows the client to have an experience of the experience which is disassociated from the root experience. The distance created by this disassociation allows the client to describe the root ex-perience from a new vantage point, thus creating a new experience. Meta-description allows the client to stand back, take a fresh look, and learn something new.

Transcript

Nick is a thirty-two year old married male who entered therapy with the stated problem of jealousy. The following transcript was taken from Nick's third therapy session and illustrates the use of congruent description in working with his jealousy.

Nick: I had a terrible week. Therapist: What are you currently experiencing?

Nick: I'm overwhelmed with jealousy.

Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick: Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

(Pause)

Nick:

Evolution Postulates 53

In what situations are you experiencing jealousy?

It seems like every time my wife leaves the house, I become paralyzed with jealousy. What specific change do you want for yourself?

I want my wife to stay home all the time. You mean every single moment of every single day?

No. What I mean is that I want her to either let me know exactly where she is going to be or take me with her. What would this do for you?

I would feel less fearful that she is with some other man. Since you can't change your wife, I wonder what it is that you want for yourself.

I want to feel secure. In what context do you want to feel secure?

I want to feel secure with or without my wife by my side. How are you feeling at this moment?

I'm feeling intense jealousy.


Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick:

Therapist:

Nick: Therapist:

Nick: Therapist:

Nick:

Will you begin to describe your experience of jealousy?

Well, I can feel the anxiety burning in my stomach. I feel tension in my chest and pressure around my face. I just feel real scared. My hands are feeling cold and clammy. I'm really having a hard time breathing. Are there any images that accompany those feelings?

I see my wife in the arms of another man. I picture her laughing and having fun with this guy. I hear her telling him that she loves him an

Documents

Kim Kostere & Linda Malatesta - Maps, Models & the Structure of Reality - NLP in Psychotherapy (1990)(OCR)