KursK: A Study i n O p e r a t i o n a l Art

by

M a j o r K e r r y K . P i e r c e Engineer

School o f Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s U.S. Army Command and Genera l S t a f f C o l l e g e

' Fort L e a v r n w o r t h , Kansas

20 May 1987

Approved f o r p u b l i c r e l e a s e ; d i s t r i b u t i o n i s u n l i m i t e d .

67-3054

~

School of Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s Monograph Approval

Name of Student : Unc-Ka r c r u i a r r e T i t 1 e of Monograph : K u ~ ~Bct ~ h - ~

Approved by:

Monograph D i r e c t o r -__________l______l___-------_--_-D i r e c t o r , School of Colonel R ichard H a r t S i n n r e i c h , M.A. Advanced M i l i t a r y S t u d i e s

J&---&iy--- -------- _________D i r e c t o r , Graduate Degree P h i l i p J. Brookes, Ph.D. Programs

aAccepted t h i s -__-- day of

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ABSTRACT

KURSK: A STUDY IN OPERATIONAL ART. by MAJ Kerry K. Pierce, USA, 47 pages.

This monograph examines the practice of operational art from the perspective of the Kursk Campaign of July-October, 1943. The study begins by presenting the German and Russian campaign plans as examples of two different m.thods of achieving a desired end state. Each plan's vision of the future was heavily influenc.d by the nature of the strategic situation and the personal ities of the two principal artists: Adolph Hitler and Marshal Georgi i Zhukov. These two lead.rs had vastly diff.rent understandings of strat.gic possibil ities, time-space dimensions of the battlefield, and the means required to achi.v. th.ir d.sired end stat.s. Th. succ.ss of Zhukov's campaign plan was directly r.lated to his I inkag. of appropriate means and methods toward a d.sired end state, while Hitler's failure repres.nted a failure to do likewise. Th. monograph also us.s Kursk to examine s.v.ral theor.tical concepts of war. Thes. include the r.lativ. strength of off.ns. and defens., culminating points, the art of combinations, use of r.serves, and the cent.r of gravity.

The Russian d.cision to d.fend first against an expect.d German offensive is an excellent example of the us. of operational art. Acting on the information of the LUCY espionage n.twork, Zhukov constructed his campaign around an unpr.c.d.nt.d tactical d.f.nsiv. system in an effort to destroy the G.rman armor.d formations as th.y attacked toward Kursk. He intended to initiate his counteroffensive at the point where the German panzer coPps had been so attrited that th.y would not be able to prevent a Russian onslaught which would exp.l all G.rman forces from the Donetz Basin. German operational fleXibility, which had b••n the hallmark of their pr.vious campaigns, was el iminat.d by Hitler's centrally devised and executed plan, reducing commanders such as Manst.in and Mod.l to m.r. tactical actors. In the .nd the Russian victory was a complete one: tactical, operational and strategic. It also secur.d the strategic initiative for the remaind.r of the war.

Table o f Contents

Page

Sect ion I. I n t r o d u c t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Sect ion 11. S t r a t e g i c S i t u a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Sect ion 111. The Campaign P lans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Sect ion IU. P repara t i on - The Means A v a i l a b l e . . . . . . . . . . 13

Sect ion U. The Qerman Of fens ive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Sect ion U1. The F l a s h i n g Sword o f Vengeance . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Sect ion U I I . Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Figures:

1. Eastern Theater o f War - M a r c h 1943 . . . . . . . . 36 2. Army Group South s i t u a t i o n - March 1943 . . , , , . 37 3. Russian defenses a t Kursk . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 4. Qerman o f f e n s i v e p l a n (ZITADELLE) . . . . . . . . . 39 5. N i n t h firmy’s a t t a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40 6. Four th Panzer Army‘s a t t a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 7. Operat ion KUTUZW . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 8 . Operat ion RUMYFlNTSN . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43

Endnotes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

B i b l i o g r a p h y . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

'How many people do YOU th ink even know where Kursk i s ? I t ' s a matter o f profound ind i f fe rence t o the wor ld whether we ho ld Kursk or not. I repeat my question8 Why do we want t o attacW i n the East a t a l l t h i s year?' H i t l e r ' s r e p l y was: 'You're qu i te r i g h t . Whenever I t h ink o f t h i s a t tack my stomach tu rns over.' 1

SECTION I : INTRODUCTION

From the perspect ive of western accounts of the Second World War KursR

i s synonymous w i t h the war's la rges t tank b a t t l e . Far more than a s ing le

c lash of armor, however, the Kursk campaign endured over a pe r iod o f two

months, i nvo l v ing over two m i l l i o n ccinbatants, s i x thousand tanks, and f i v e

thousand t a c t i c a l a i r c r a f t . When i t had run i t s course the s t r a t e g i c

scales w e r e t ipped i r r e v e r s i b l y i n favor o f the Soviet Union. Never again

would Oermany maruhal the necessary reserves t o exercise the s t r a t e g i c

i n i t i a t i v e i n the East. Just as important f o r the Red Army, b l i t z k r i e g was

defeated t a c t i c a l l y f o r the f i r s t t i m e on the f i e l d s of Kursk, thereby

paving the wry f o r Russia's f i r s t successful sumer of fens ive. For these

reasons i t i s Kursk not S ta l ingrad which holds the a t t e n t i o n of Soviet

h i s t o r i a n s a8 the dec is ive tu rn ing po in t i n the Eastern Theater o f War.

I n the study o f operat ional a r t , Kursk has much t o o f f e r i n te rms of

both planning and execution. I n the fo l l ow ing na r ra t i ve we w i l l por t ray a

c lear dichotomy i n the campaign plans of the two b e l l i g e r e n t s t o the extent

t ha t t a c t i c a l means and events w e r e l i nked u l t i m a t e l y t o a s t r a t e g i c end

s ta te . I n the f i n a l analys is the campaign's outcome i t s e l f provides the

d e f i n i t i v e judgment on the ef fect iveness of each plan. We w i l l a l so be

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a b l e t o eva lua te the two p r i n c i p a l a r t i s t s o f the a c t i o n f rom the

pe rspec t i ve of p l a n n i n g and conduct o f o p e r r t l o n s amid the f o g and f r i c t i o n

o f war. F i n a l l y , Kursk p rov ides an e x c e l l e n t l a b o r a t o r y i n wh ich t o t es t

severa l t h e o r e t i c a l concepts o f war i n c l u d i n g the r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f

o f fense and defense, c u l m i n a t i n g po in ts , the a r t o f canb ina t i ons , use o f

reserves, and the center o f g r a v i t y .

SECTICN 11: SllWTEGlC SITMTICN

By l a t e March 1943 the Eastern Theater o f War had s e t t l e d i n t o r e l a t i v e

i n a c t i v i t y . The s p r i n g thaw accompanied by oceans o f mud c e r t a i n l y

c o n t r i b u t e d t o the r e s p i t e , b u t so too d id the exhaust ing events o f the

p r e v i o u s w i n t e r . The Red Army’s w i n t e r o f f e n s i v e wh ich sea led the f a t e o f

Paulus’s 6 t h Army a t S t a l i n g r a d achieved tremendous t e r r i t o r i a l gains, bu t

ended d i s a p p o i n t I n g l y ,

S t i l l l e a r n i n g t h e i r ope ra t i ona l c r a f t , the S o v i e t s had aga in

overextended themselves l o g i s t i c a l l y and f e l l p r e y t o the opera t i ona l

a g i l i t y o f German armored format ions. F a i l u r e i n the end stemmed from

overconf idence and an i n a b i l i t y t o match t a c t i c a l resources t o ope ra t i ona l

ends. The German coun te ro f fens i ve o f February n o t o n l y i n f l i c t e d heavy

l osses on Sov ie t tank u n i t s , b u t a l s o succeeded i n r e c a p t u r i n g much o f the

l o s t t e r r i t o r y , i n c l u d i n g the c i t i e s o f Kharkov and Belgorod. I t was

ev iden t t h a t the German Army, and Manstein in p a r t i c u l a r , s t i l l occupied

the o p e r a t i o n a l h i g h ground and c o u l d s t i l l i n f l i c t d e v a s t a t i n g d e s t r u c t i o n

desp i te the S t a l i ng rad setback.

The s t a b i l i z e d Eas tern Fron t i n March 1943 s t r e t c h e d f r a n Leningrad i n

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the nor th t o the Sea o f Azov i n the south, a distance of 2,000 m i l e s . One

o f the most d i s t i ngu ish ing features throughout i t s length was the massive

Kursk s a l i e n t t h rus t i ng some 140 m i l e s i n t o the German zone and extending

nor th t o south 170 m i l e s . (see f i g u r e 1, page 36) H i s t o r i c a l l y s a l i e n t s o f

t h i s k i n d comnanded a great deal o f a t ten t i on ; Kurek would prove t o be no

exception. For the Germans i t presented the oppor tun i ty t o destroy

overextended armored forces! on the other hand the Russians saw i t as a

possible launching po in t f o r a renewed o f fens ive . The a t t r a c t i o n was

evident, but i t would requ i re outside events and s i t u a t i o n s t o push the

adversaries t o actual operat ions there,

For many reasons 1943 loaned as a year o f dec is ion f o r H i t l e r and

Qermany. The expected l oss o f Tun is ia would draw the campaign i n North

A f r i c a t o a d isappoint ing close. A t the same t i m e , events i n Ruseia w e r e

severely s t r a i n i n g the A x i s a l l i ance . Heavy losses t o Rumanian and

Hungarian a r m i e s presented H i t l e r ' s a l l i e s w i t h a s t rong argument t o

approach the Soviets f o r some way out o f the carnage. Mussol in i wanted h i s

ba t te red forces returned t o I t a l y i n response t o th rea ts C l 0 6 ~t o home. 2

OKW expected a new A l l i e d o f fens ive i n the West, e i t he r i n the

Mediterranean (Qreece or I t a l y ) or perhaps a cross channel invasion. To

make mat ters worse the A l l i e d a i r campaign had reached a po in t where i t s

impact on domestic l i f e could no longer be ignored. Despite these ominous

fac to rs , Qermany was s t i l l able t o concentrate her m i l i t a r y e f f o r t i n the

East. I n f a c t , over 75 percent o f a l l Qerman forces - 161 Div is ions - was

s ta t ioned i n Russia. There was s t i l l t i m e , i n H i t l e r ' s l og i c , t o defeat the

Russians before tu rn ing west t o deal w i t h the B r i t i s h and Americans. The

question f o r considerat ion was how best t o accomplish t h i s end.

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Because o f the l osses o f t he p r e v i o u s year , Germany found i t s e l f i n the

p o s i t i o n o f s t r a t e g i c defense. W i t h i n t h i s c o n t e x t two o p t i o n s f o r

o f f e n s i v e opera t i ons were a v a i l a b l e . I n the words o f Manste in one course

of a c t i o n was a preempt ive a t t a c k , "on the forehand" , aimed a t d i s r u p t i n g

Russian p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r a summer o f f e n s i u e by d e s t r o y i n g t h e i r ope ra t i ona l 3

reserves . T h i s o p t i o n wou ld have t o be c a r e f u l l y p lanned t o take i n t o

account the reduced means a v a i l a b l e t o the Wehrmacht. The a l t e r n a t i v e which

Manste in p r e f e r r e d was t o a l l o w the Russians t o launch f i r s t and s t r i k e 4

them, "on the backhand", w i t h concen t ra ted mob i l e fo rces . Manste in had

a l ready demonstrated the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f t h i s new k i n d o f mob i l e r e a c t i v e

defense i n the de fea t o f Sov ie t f o r c e s around Kharkov i n February. Qerman

i n t e l l i g e n c e i n d i c a t e d t h a t the Russians were indeed p l a n n i n g an o f f e n s i v e

whose o b j e c t i v e was the d e s t r u c t i o n o f Army Group South. To be success fu l

i n the de fens ive o p t i o n , however, Manste in r e q u i r e d the freedom t o g i v e up

ground w h i l e conduct ing a f l u i d mob i l e campaign f r a u g h t w i th some r i s k .

Regardless o f the choice, he f e l t t h a t the d e s i r e d end s t a t e would be

o p e r a t i o n a l and s t r a t e g i c s ta lemate, p r o v i d i n g the b a s i s f o r a n e g o t i a t e d

end t o the war i n the East.

Jus t as he had i n 1942, H i t l e r r e j e c t e d even the n o t i o n o f ced ing

t e r r i t o r y a l ready purchased w i th Qerrnan b lood. Th is , coupled w i t h the hope

t h a t a m i l i t a r y s o l u t i o n c o u l d be ob ta ined i n Russia, l e d t o H i t l e r ' s

choice o f the o p e r a t i o n a l o f f e n s i v e o r forehand o p t i o n . H i s reason ing

c e r t a i n l y i l l u s t r a t e d the b l e n d i n g o f h i s pe rspec t i ve b o t h as p o l i t i c a l

leader and m i l i t a r y commander i n c h i e f .

F i e l d Marshal K e i t e l , Ch ie f o f S t a f f o f OKW, perhaps best encapsulatedS

the reasons f o r Opera t ion ZITADELLE , the r e d u c t i o n o f the Kursk s a l i e n t .

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I n response t o Guderian‘s ques t i on as t o why H i t l e r wanted t o a t t a c k a t a l l 6

i n 1943, he remarked, ‘We must a t t a c k f o r p o l i t i c a l reasons.” Wi th the

i m p o s i t i o n o f the 30 January a u s t e r i t y programs i n Germany under the l a b e l

o f ’ t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n ’ , the home f r o n t was beg inn ing t o f e e l the b i t e o f

war f o r the f i r s t t i m e . H i t l e r no doubt f e l t t h a t the c l o c k was r u n n i n g on

the p e r i s h a b l e commodity known as morale. I t was c e r t a i n l y e a s i e r t o

demand s a c r i f i c e when the pe rcep t ion was one o f v i c t o r y r a t h e r than

de fea t . Even f u r t h e r , the image o f the Wehrmacht had been d e a l t a s e r i o u s

blow a t S t a l i n g r a d . An i n v i n c i b l e m i l i t a r y was e s s e n t i a l n o t o n l y f o r

b a t t l e f i e l d r e s u l t s , b u t t o h o l d the waver ing A x i s together and t o c o n t r o l

conquered t e r r i t o r i e s . The su res t way t o r e s t o r e t h a t p r e s t i g e was a

c rush ing m i l i t a r y v i c t o r y rem in i scen t o f the g l o r y days o f b l i t z k r i e g . Yet

f o r a l l these r a t i o n a l reasons, H i t l e r a l s o added a somewhat i r r a t i o n a l

i n f a t u a t i o n w i t h the economic s i g n i f i c a n c e o f the Donetz Basin. Convinced

t h a t German occupat ion o f t h i s r e g i o n seve re l y hampered Russia’s i n d u s t r i a l

p roduc t i on , he r e f u s e d t o cons ider any p l a n which would g i v e back the area

w i t h o u t a f i g h t , even i f some opera t i ona l %uccess c o u l d be achieved. I n

the f i n a l a n a l y s i s , t h i s i n t rans igence which had hampered Manstein’s

p rev ious w i n t e r campaign was t o f a c i l i t a t e the causal cha in o f events

l e a d i n g t o ZITADELLE.

The key concern, then, was where t o a t t a c k . Kursk d r e w the a t t e n t i o n o f

OKH l i k e a magnet. I n a d d i t i o n t o the o p p o r t u n i t i e s a f f o r d e d by a s a l i e n t

o f t h i s k i n d , i n t e l l i g e n c e presented an assessment o f numerous enemy

armored u n i t s which had been h a l t e d i n t h e i r t r a c k s by the s p r i n g thaw.

These f o r c e s were vu lne rab le apparen t l y t o the k i n d o f o f f e n s i v e env i s ioned

by H i t l e r .

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7

I n March 1943 the German army was no longer the same army t h a t conducted

the campaigns o f 1941 and 42. To be sure the ‘ t o t a l m o b i l i z a t i o n ’ e f f o r t

d i d p rov ide raw numbers almost equal t o the peak German s t r e n g t h achieved

e a r l i e r on the Eastern F ron t , bu t numbers alone were dece iv ing . U n i t s were

s h e l l s o f t h e i r former se lves ! c a s u a l t i e s had sapped n o t o n l y s t r e n g t h b u t

exper ience; b u t wors t o f a l l the armor s i t u a t i o n was grave. I n an e f f o r t

t o m a i n t a i n the same number o f panzer d i v i s i o n s , u n i t tank s t r e n g t h had

been a l l w e d t o f a l l r epea ted ly . From the 1940 d i v i s i o n a l s t r e n g t h o f 350

tanks, the 1943 German panzer d i v i s i o n conta ined o n l y 27, w i t h enough s e l f

p r o p e l l e d guns, o r SPs, t o f i e l d 80 t o t a l armored ueh ic les . I n f a c t , by

January, 1943 o n l y 493 se rv i ceab le tanks were a v a i l a b l e on the e n t i r e 8

Eastern F ron t .

The Wehrmacht c o u l d s t i l l r e l y on super io r t a c t i c a l combined arms

o rgan iza t i ons , more opera t i ona l command and s t a f f f l e x i b i l i t y , and leaders

o f the ca l . iber o f Manstein. I n the t h i n k i n g o f the Army Group South

Commander, however, t h i s c a l c u l u s p o i n t e d toward mob i l e defense, no t the

massed o f f e n s i v e ordered by H i t l e r .

1943 a l s o presented the Sov ie ts w i t h some d i f f i c u l t dilemmas and

choices. The r e c e n t l y completed o f f e n s i u e , a l though i n i t i a l l y success fu l ,

l e f t many l i n g e r i n g doubts as t o the opera t i ona l s k i l l o f the Red Army.

Y e t , o f f e n s i v e o p p o r t u n i t i e s c e r t a i n l y ex i s ted . Army Group South l a y

vu lne rab le f o r the nex t o f f e n s i v e round. I f i t c o u l d be c u t o f f frm Army

Group Center and crushed aga ins t the Black Sea, i t s d e s t r u c t i o n would

f a c i l i t a t e the s t r a t e g i c co l l apse of the e n t i r e German defense, opening a

r o u t e a l l the way t o Oermany i t s e l f . (see f i g u r e 2, page 37) On the o the r

hand, S t a l i n f u l l y expected the Germans t o open an o f f e n s i v e o f t h e i r own.

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A f t e r a l l , had they n o t done so i n each preceeding summer? I t was inherent

i n the s p i r i t o f the Wehrmacht, i t s d o c t r i n e , and i t s commander, A d o l f

H i t l e r .

The means a v a i l a b l e t o STAUK4 f o r the next campaign season l e f t much t o

be des i red . Yet t o prove i t se f i n the summer, the Red Army had shown some

improvement i n t a c t i c a l capabi i t y , bu t s t i l l c o u l d n o t be reckoned as

s k i l l f u l as the German f o r c e s . Fu r the r , i t had lea rned f i r s t hand the

p o t e n t i a l d e s t r u c t i v e c a p a c i t y o f a b r u i s e d bu t no t beaten Wehrmacht,

p a r t i c u l a r l y under the a g i l e d i r e c t i o n o f a Manstein. On the p o s i t i v e s ide

c o u l d be counted an i nc reas ing tank p roduc t i on which would s h o r t l y reach

one thousand per month and a f l o o d o f Lend Lease t r u c k s which would

e v e n t u a l l y a l l o w the Red Army t o mo to r i ze most o f i t s i n f a n t r y u n i t s .

A l l these concerns no doubt i n f l uenced p lanners a t STAUKA, b u t u n l i k e

the s i t u a t i o n i n the German s t r a t e g i c command, the Russians enjoyed a

d i s t i n c t advantage. By 1943 S t a l i n had deueloped such a degree o f

conf idence i n h i s Deputy Supreme Commander, Marshal Zhukov, t ha t he was

w i l l i n g t o l e n d a f a r g rea te r scope o f ope ra t i ona l and s t r a t e g i c l a t i t u d e

than H i t l e r a f f o r d e d t o any o f h i s subord inates. The hero o f Leningrad,

MOSCOW, and S t a l i n g r a d , Zhukov commanded n o t o n l y S t a l i n ' s respec t b u t more

impor tan t l y , h i s approval .

F o l l o w i n g the setbacks around Kharkov i n February, S t a l i n sent Zhukov t o

the Cent ra l F ron t t o s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n and p rov ide him w i t h a

d e t a i l e d r e p o r t o f the area. Zhukov s u h i t t e d a thorough ly reasoned and

i n t e l l i g e n c e suppor ted assessment i n a memo dated 8 A p r i l . I n i t he

accu ra te l y eva lua ted the weakened German s i t u a t i o n which i n d i c a t e d t h a t

f u t u r e o f f e n s i v e s i n the Lower Don, Uolga and N o r t h Caucasus areas w e r e

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un l i k e l y .

The b u l k o f German opera t i ona l reserves , p a r t i c u l a r l y panzer d i v i s i o n s ,

were concent ra ted near Kharkou, O r e l , and Belgorod. T h i s l e d Zhukov t o

conclude t h a t the Germans would conduct an o f f e n s i v e i n t h i s area w i t h the

o b j e c t i v e o f reduc ing the Kursk s a l i e n t and d e s t r o y i n g the Cen t ra l ,

Voronezh, and Southwestern Fron ts . Zhukov ended h i s memo w i t h a

c o n t r o v e r s i a l y e t p e r c e p t i v e recommendation.

1 cons ider i t unwise t o launch a p reven t i ve a t t a c k i n the nex t few days. I t would be b e t t e r i f we f i r s t wore the enemy down w i t h our defenses and des t royed h i s tanks, and o n l y then, a f t e r hav ing moved up f r e s h reserves, went over t o a general Of fens ive and f i n a l l y des t royed h i s main fo rce . 9

Al though much o f Zhukou’s p lan obv ious l y r e l i e d on the i n fo rma t ion

a v a i l a b l e f rom t a c t i c a l i n t e l l i g e n c e and the marshal ’s own i n t u i t i v e

powers, h i s t o r y muddies the waters s l i g h t l y as t o the u l t i m a t e causal

r e l a t i o n s h i p i n the Russian campaign p lan . By t h i s t ime i n the war STAUKA

had almost instantaneous access t o the i n t e n t i o n s o f the Qerman h i g h 10

command through an espionage network known as LUCY. L a t e r i n the

p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r KursK we know the Russians had almost c m p l e t e d e t a i l s o f

the a t t a c k p l a n , bu t a t t h i s e a r l y date i t i s no t known how much LUCY had

p rov ided or the ex ten t t o which i t i n f l uenced ZhuKou’s 8 A p r i l es t imate .

SECTION 1 1 1 8 THE cA).(mio)JPLANS

Zhukov was r e c a l l e d t o Moscow on the 11 th o f A p r i l t o prepare a p l a n f o r

- 8 -

the upcaning opera t i on . He canp le ted i t i n a u i n g l e n i g h t w i t h the

ass is tance o f h i s Chief o f S t a f f General Uas i leusky . S t a l i n ' s approval o f

t h e i r e f f o r t s on the 13 th , however, d i d no t end the debate as t o the best

course o f ac t i on . T h i s would cont inue among the sen io r ranks w e l l i n t o

June, by which t i m e the S o v i e t s knew the f u l l d e t a i l s o f ZITADELLE.

Zhukou's p l a n env iu ioned the defense o f the Kursk s a l i e n t conducted by

two f r o n t s . (see f i g u r e 3 , page 38) OInRral Rokossovsky's Cent ra l F ron t i n

the no r the rn sec to r and General U a t u t i n ' s Uoronezh F ron t in the south were

t o prepare s t r o n g a n t i t a n k defenses i n g rea t depth t o erode the armored

s t r e n g t h o f the a t t a c k e r . These were e s s e n t i a l l r i n f a n t r y o rgan iza t i ons

w i t h a s i n g l e tank army each t o a c t as mob i le reserve . To the r e a r o f

these f r o n t s Zhukov concent ra ted the s t r a t e g i c tank rese rves o f the Sov ie t

Union under the banner o f General KOnRU'S Steppe F ron t . A l though Steppe

F ron t was earmarked f o r the coun te ro f fens i ve phase, i t would a l s o be

prepared t o a s s i u t i n the defense o f Kursk and r e a l o f f any German

pene t ra t i ons . I t i s a f u r t h e r mark o f S t a l i n ' s conf idence i n h i s Deputy

Supreme CUranandeP t h a t he a l lowed the p o s i t i o n i n g o f these c r i t i c a l asses ts

away from Moscow.

Once the de fens ive phase had achieved s u f f i c i e n t a t t r i t i o n o f German

armor, a massive Sov ie t coun te ro f fens i ve would commence. To the n o r t h

Cent ra l F ron t i n con junc t i on w i t h Brransk and Western F r o n t s would launch

i n t o the Ore1 pocket . South o f the s a l i e n t Uoronezh, Southwestern and

Steppe F r o n t s would a t t a c k i n t o the Belgorod-Kharkov s e c t o r . The campaign

was designed t o achieve the e l i m i n a t i o n o f a l l German t roops eas t o f the

Dnieper R ive r and e s t a b l i s h the c o n d i t i o n s f o r a general o f f e n s i v e a l l

a long the Eastern F ron t . Ex tens ive USR o f p a r t i s a n s was planned i n o rder t o

- 9 -

gather i n t e l l i g e n c e and sabotage the bu i l dup o f Qerman resources i n t o Ore l

and Kharkov.

Zhukou h i m s e l f went t o the Cent ra l F ron t t o coo rd ina te the ac i u i t i e s o f

the no r the rn th ree f r o n t s , w h i l e General Uas i l evsky was sent t o m t r o l the

three f r o n t s t o the south. T h i s p r a c t i c e o f e s t a b l i s h i n g a temporary

g roup-o f - f ron ts command known as a ' s t r a t e g i c d i r e c t i o n ' was used by the

Sov ie ts a t bo th Moscow and S t a l i n g r a d and i l l u s t r a t e d t h e i r d e s i r e f o r

u n i f i e d s t r a t e g i c c o n t r o l . As we s h a l l see s h o r t l y the German p l a n

s u f f e r e d from a lack o f such u n i t y . Zhukov's l o c a t i o n w i t h Cent ra l F ron t

i n d i c a t e d h i s b e l i e f t h a t the main Qerman e f f o r t would come f rom the

n o r t h . I n t h i s he was mistaken. T h i s one e r r o r i n p l a n n i n g was t o have

f a r reach ing impact on the Russian campaign, e s p e c i a l l y the synch ron iza t i on

o f the coun te ro f fens iue phase.

Under the d i r e c t i o n o f Qonera l Z e i t z l e r the e s s e n t i a l e lements f o r a

German s p r i n g o f f e n s i u e w e r e e s t a b l i s h e d by March and con ta ined i n

Operat ions Order Number F iue. Army Qroups A and N o r t h were ordered t o

defend i n sec to r w h i l e Army Qroups South and Center were d i r e c t e d t o form

s t r o n g tank armies on e i t h e r s ide o f the Kursk s a l i e n t . Fu r the r d e t a i l s

w e r e t o f o l l o w . The p lann ing e f f o r t s o f OKH cu lmina ted i n H i t l e r ' s

Operat ions Order Number S i x on 15 A p r i l . The aim o f t h i s Operat ion, code

named ZITADELLE, was, " t o e n c i r c l e the enemy f o r c e s deployed i n the Kursk

area by one a t t a c k i n g army each from the areas o f Belgorod and south o f

O r e l , and a n n i h i l a t i n g them through a concen t r i c a t tack . . . . I t must g i v e u s 1 1

the i n i t i a t i v e f o r s p r i n g and summer."

To implement ZITADELLE Colonel-Qeneral Model's N i n t h Army o f Army Qroup

Center would a t t a c k towards Kursk from the n o r t h w h i l e General Hoth's

- 10 -

Four th Panzer Army and General Kempf’s Army Detachment would s t r i k e from

the south. (see f i g u r e 4, page 39) I t was t o be b l i t z k r i e g a l l ouer again

w i t h n a r r w concent ra ted p e n e t r a t i o n s f o l l o w e d by deep e x p l o i t a t i o n ,

enc i rc lement , and a n n i h i l a t i o n .

The problems w i t h ZITADELLE w e r e numerous e s p e c i a l l y when c o n t r a s t e d

w i t h the scope o f the Russian p lan . Leaving as ide the ques t ion o f adequate

means f o r the moment, Operat ions Order S i x reads more l i k e a t a c t i c a l p l a n

than a campaign. Very l i t t l e freedom o f a c t i o n was g iven t o the army

commanders as t o auenue o f a t t a c k or scheme o f maneuver. H i t l e r c l e a r l y

s t a t e d t h a t h i s o b j e c t was the se i zu re o f the i n i t i a t i v e , bu t t o what

ends? The post-envelopment phase o f the opera t i on was vague a t bes t ,

g i v i n g Manstein and Kluge uery l i t t l e guidance f o r t h e i r own p lann ing .

Beyond d e s t r u c t i o n o f the Cent ra l and Voronerh F ron ts , ZITADELLE m e r e l y

h e l d ou t the p o s s i b i l i t y o f c o n t i n u i n g w i t h Operat ion PANTHER, an o l d p l a n

f o r advancing i n t o the r e a r o f Southwestern F ron t , o r perhaps a renewed

t h r u s t t w a r d s Moscow. Even i f the envelopment w e r e success fu l , however,

OKH had a l l o c a t e d i n s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s t o make any fo l low-on phase

p l a u s i b l e . The p l a n f a i l e d n o t o n l y t o l i n k concep tua l l y these separate

t a c t i c a l events i n t o a coherent whole, b u t a l s o t o p rov ide some reasonable

e v a l u a t i o n o f the s u i t a b i l i t y o f the means a v a i l a b l e .

From the t a c t i c a l pe rspec t i ve the p lanners assumed many o f the same o l d

s te reo types o f the Russian s o l d i e r . Breakthrough would be e a s i l y ob ta ined

and the Russians would f l e e i n d i s a r r a y as always. A t Kursk, howeuer, the

Germans would meet a f a r more competent and determined foe .

The success o f ZITADELLE depended on s u r p r i s e and speed o f execut ion,

bu t i n fo rma t ion fran the LUCY network was even then making a shambles of

- 1 1 -

any form o f decept ion e f f o r t . F u r t h e r , the a t t a c k was env i s ioned f o r A p r i l

b u t no assessment was made as t o the impact o f any de lay . The most g l a r i n g

m i s s i o n o f a l l , however, was the absence o f a u n i f i e d commander. The

method o f ZITADELLE was t o be a coo rd ina ted a t t a c k by two army groups, Yet

no one o the r than H i t l e r h imse l f was charged w i t h o v e r a l l c m r n d . T h i s

l ack o f u n i f i e d o p e r a t i o n a l f ocus was t o c r e a t e problems r i g h t f rom the

beginning. Opera t iona l combinat ions, u n l i k e those executed w i t h i n the

Russian s t r u c t u r e , w e r e t o be conducted by the s t r a t e g i c commander i n East

Pruss ia , no t on the b a t t l e f i e l d .

A t t h i s p o i n t i n the s t o r y i t i s wor th c o n t r a s t i n g the v i s i o n and

a n t i c i p a t i o n o f the b a t t l e f i e l d by the two key o p e r a t i o n a l commanders.

Based on good i n t e l l i g e n c e , the opera t i ona l p i c t u r e p a i n t e d by German t roop

d i s p o s i t i o n s , h i s knowledge o f the opponent, and h i s own i n t u i t i o n , Zhukov

c o r r e c t l y assessed n o t o n l y the c u r r e n t s i t u a t i o n b u t the f u t u r e course o f

events as w e l l . He proposed a concept o f ope ra t i ons t h a t remained

e s s e n t i a l l y unchanged throughout the p e r i o d o f p r e p a r a t i o n t h a t cu lmina ted

i n a f i n i s h e d campaign p lan . A t the same t ime he cont inued t o adJust the

d e t a i l s t o account f o r h i s opponent's a c t i v i t i e s . H is de te rm ina t ion t o

pursue the chosen course o f a c t i o n desp i te the o p p o s i t i o n o f h i s own

m i l i t a r y s t r u c t u r e i l l u s t r a t e s an e s s e n t i a l i n g r e d i e n t o f the opera t i ona l

a r t . Aga ins t t h i s s tands H i t l e r who adopted a p l a n o f a c t i o n which lacked

an a p p r e c i a t i o n o f h i s own means and a r e a l i s t i c v iew o f the b a t t l e f i e l d .

I t was a p l a n which assumed an almost s t a t i c environment and a pass ive

adversary who would n o t a l t e r the l o c a t i o n o f h i s mob i l e fo rces . As de lays

s e t i n and the mount ing s t r e n g t h o f the Russian defenses became obvious t o

a l l , OKH even cons idered two a l t e r n a t e p lans . Both env i s ioned a more

- 12 -

i n d i r e c t a t t a c k i n t o the s a l i e n t and as such, o f f e r e d b e t t e r chances f o r

success. H i t l e r , however, endorsed ZITADELLE. T h i s k i n d o f de te rm ina t ion

i s no t a v i r t u e f o r the opera t i ona l commander! i t i s obs t i nacy and o f t e n

proves d i s a s t r o u s . I n a sense H i t l e r b e l i e v e d t h a t the o p p o r t u n i t i e s o f

March, f o r which adequate means d i d n o t e x i s t , would s t i l l be a u a i l a b l e

when Germany c o u l d marshal the resources, Thu t r u e opera t i ona l a r t i s t does

n o t t h i n k i n such l i m i t e d dimensions. U n f o r t u n a t e l y f o r the Germans, t h i s

f lawed beg inn ing was the source o f profound d i s j o i n t e d n e s s and u l t i m a t e

f a i l u r e a t Kursk.

IU: PREPARCITIW - THE HEMS M I L A B L E

The months t h a t passed between the f o r m u l a t i o n o f campaign p l a n s and the

ac tua l b a t t l e were seen by bo th ope ra t i ona l c m a n d e r s as t i m e spent t o

t h e i r own advantage. ZITMELLE r e q u i r e d massive human and m a t e r i a l support

o f which i n s u f f i c i e n t q u a n t i t i e s w e r e a v a i l a b l e i n A p r i l . Zhukov a l s o

needed t i m e t o cons t ruc t the k i n d o f defenses which would b leed the Germans

w h i t e .

Thanks t o the e f f o r t s o f A l b e r t Speer, the German economy was s t i l l

growing i n 1943. I n f a c t , p roduc t i on l e v e l s s tood a t 126 percent o f the

p rev ious year ’s t o t a l s . Medium tank produc t ion , f o r example, was more than 12

double t h a t o f 1942. These f i g u r e s c e r t a i n l y seemed t o p ran ise an a b i l i t y

no t o n l y t o rep lace the losses o f 1942, b u t a l s o t o increase the armor

s t r e n g t h o f the panzer d i v i s i o n s . A d d i t i o n a l l y , new weapons systems w e r e

j u s t beg inn ing t o r o l l o f f the assembly l i n e s i n g rea t q u a n t i t i e s . I n the

end i t was the l u r e o f q u a l i t a t i v e s u p e r i o r i t y which caused the successive

- 13 -

13 de lays i n D-Day. H i t l e r b e l i e v e d e a r n e s t l y t h a t the new Pzkw V (PANTHER),

Pzkw V I (TIGER) and FERDINAND SP would t i p the armor sca les d e c i s i v e l y i n

h i s fauo r , w h i l e new ground a t t a c k a i r c r a f t such as the Focke Wulf 190 A

and Henschel 129 would dominate the sk ies .

OKH a l l o c a t e d 50 d i v i s i o n s t o the Kursk o f f e n s i v e , o f which 16 w e r e

armored. Account ing f o r one t h i r d o f the e n t i r e German s t r e n g t h on the

Eastern F ron t , t h i s f o r c e i nc luded 900,000 s o l d i e r s , 2,700 tanks, 10,000

guns and some 2,000 a i r c r a f t . U n i t s were f i l l e d t o o r g a n i z a t i o n a l

requi rements and e x t e n s i v e l y t r a i n e d i n such tasks as breach ing Sov ie t

m i n e f i e l d s and f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . I n the v i e w o f General uon M e l l e n t h i n ,

"There had been s u f f i c i e n t t i m e t o make thorough p r e p a r a t i o n f o r the 1 4

a t t a c k ."

From an opera t i ona l perspec t iue , H i t l e r ' s p r e p a r a t i o n s f o r the b a t t l e o f

Kursk revea led severa l f l aws . He had repea ted ly demonstrated h i s

b r i l l i a n c e as a s t r a t e g i c t h i n k e r beg inn ing w i t h the P o l i s h campaign o f

1939. The e a r l y v i c t o r i e s o f Germany can be a t t r i b u t e d , i n f a c t , t o

H i t l e r ' s s t r a t e g i c understanding o f h i s adve rsa r ies r a t h e r than t o any

overwhelming a b i l i t y o f the Wehrmacht. Y e t , i n t r a n s l a t i n g s t r a t e g i c

guidance i n t o an opera t i ona l rea lm and conduct ing ac tua l m i l i t a r y

campaigns, H i t l e r ' s a b i l i t i e s d i d him l i t t l e good. He c o u l d n o t grasp the

b a t t l e f i e l d impact o f de lay and became f i x e d upon o n l y one inpu t t o

ope ra t i ona l design. T h i s was i n the form o f new technology. Almost a l l

t he de lay between the o r i g i n a l date f o r ZITADELLE and the eventual one can

be a t t r i b u t e d t o tank p roduc t i on , mechanical problems w i t h new models and

de lays i n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n t o the f r o n t . To be sure many o f these new

systems were e x c e l l e n t , b u t as w i t h any i n i t i a l p roduc t i on l i n e , numerous

- 14 -

f l a w s needed t o be s o r t e d o u t . Opera t iona l exper t s l i k e Manste in

recogn ized t h a t the t r a d e o f f between more TIQERS and more t i m e f o r the

defender t o prepare d i d no t j u s t i f y w a i t i n g . I t was a l l a m a t t e r o f

r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h . I n the end Manstein‘s v i e w o f the f u t u r e b a t t l e f i e l d ,

n o t H i t l e r ’ s , was the more c o r r e c t i n terms o f a l l the f a c t o r s i n v o l v e d i n

ope ra t i ona l a r t .

F i n a l l y , H i t l e r demonstrated no a b i l i t y t o adapt t o changing o p e r a t i o n a l

r e a l i t i e s . His method remained v i s c e r a l l y r o o t e d i n the b e l i e f i n

technology and the r a c i a l s u p e r i o r i t y o f h i s SS u n i t s . To t h i s p o i n t i n

the c o n f l i c t the Qerman method o f war fa re had been c l e a r l y s u p e r i o r a t bo th

the t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l l e v e l s . B l i t z k r i e g was a proven winner . Y e t ,

as w i t h every age, adve rsa r ies tend t o copy success o r f i n d ways o f

degrading i t . The t r u e opera t i ona l genius c o n t i n u a l l y eva lua tes events and

analyzes h i s t o o l s t o see i f they must be adapted. Manste in , perhaps mor

than anyone e l se , embodied t h i s a b i l i t y . He adapted t o a mob i l e defense n

the w i n t e r o f 1942-43 t o counter the Sov ie t o f f e n s i v e , proposed the

i nnova t i ve ’backhand op t ion ’ f o r the 1943 campaign which most c l o s e l y

matched means w i t h ends, and as we s h a l l see adopted an i nnova t i ve armor

t a c t i c i n the Kursk o f f e n s i v e . H i t l e r d i d no t possess the same v i s i o n o r

a b i l i t y . The lesson i n ope ra t i ona l a r t i s c l e a r : the b a t t l e f i e l d

environment i s ext remely dynamic and the success fu l o p e r a t i o n a l comnander

must con t inuous ly analyze h i s methods, means a v a i l a b l e , and ends, always

s t r i v i n g f o r the most e f f e c t i v e combinat ions.

As the Germans marshaled t h e i r armor, the Russians were f e v e r i s h l y

p r e p a r i n g t h e i r defenses. A l l the w h i l e LUCY kept d e f i n i n g the s p e c i f i c s

o f the Qerman p l a n and s i m p l y i n g t h e i r task. Dur ing the t ime between A p r i l

- 15 -

and J u l y Zhukov was a b l e t o c o n s t r u c t a defense whose t a c t i c a l depth was

unprecedented. W i t h i n the Cent ra l and Voronezh F r o n t s the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s

extended t o a depth o f 110 m i l e s . I f the Steppe F ron t and Don R ive r t o i t s

r e a r were included, the Kursk s a l i e n t was 180 m i l e s deep consist in^ o f 8

de fens ive b e l t s . To e s t a b l i s h t h i s STAUKA had amassed 20 percent o f i t s

t o t a l manpower, 36 percent o f i t s tanks and SP5, and 27 percent o f i t s

combat a i r c r a f t i n an area which occupied o n l y 13 percent o f the t o t a l 1s

s t r a t e g i c f r o n t . When the Qermans d i d a t t a c k they would be i n f e r i o r t o

t h e i r opponents in every ca tegory o f combat power.

Frwn the pe rspec t i ve o f the t h e o r e t i c a l concept o f ' cen ter o f g r a v i t y ' ,

the Russian defensos aimed d i r e c t l y a t degrading the German's source o f

ope ra t i ona l power. Zhukov's o r i g i n a l choice of a l l o w i n g the Germans t o

a t t a c k f i r s t was made w i t h keen understanding o f the power o f German panzer

fo rmat ions . I n p rev ious encounters where German armor and Russian armor

met head on, the aduantage went t o the Qermans. Wi th the i n t e n t i o n s o f

ZITADELLE f u l l y known t o him, however, Zhukov was ab le t o dev ise a campaign

which would no t o n l y a t t a c k the Qerman center o f g r a v i t y d i r e c t l y , bu t a l s o

s h i e l d h i s own u n t i l he was ready t o unleash i t . I n t h i s con tex t the Kursk

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s can be seen as an example o f the opera t i ona l use o f

obs tac les .

The Russians c e r t a i n l y used obs tac les t o enhance the e f f e c t i v e n e s s o f

t h e i r weapons, de lay the advance o f German u n i t s , and screen t h e i r own

movements, a l l o f which w e r e t a c t i c a l uses. Zhukov, however, a l s o employed

them i n a fundamenta l ly d i f f e r e n t fash ion . Much o f the p l a n n i n g f o r the

de fens ive b e l t s was done by Zhukov and Uas i l evsky i n a top-down approach.

The idea was t o use obs tac les t o r e s t r i c t German opera t i ona l combinat ions,

- 16 -

c rea te opera t i ona l maneuver o p p o r t u n i t i e s f o r Russian tank reserves , and

ga in t i m e which c o u l d be measured i n days i ns tead o f hours. Even as e a r l y

as the 8 A p r i l Memo, Zhukov a r t i c u l a t e d c l e a r l y the aim o f d e s t r o y i n g

German armor w h i l e a l s o p r o t e c t i n g h i s aun. Because the Germans chose t o

a t t a c k i n t o the Kursk s a l i e n t a long avenues which were defended by the mass

of Russian fo rces , they a l lowed t h e i r cen ter o f g r a v i t y t o be a t tacked

d i r e c t l y . The e n t i r e focus o f the Russian e f f o r t s centered on the Qerman

armored fo rmat ions , t o the near t o t a l neg lec t o f the i n f a n t r y .

The hear t o f the Sov ie t defense, then, l a y i n i t s a n t i t a n k p o s i t i o n s and

zones. These combined arms r e g i o n s cons is ted o f a n t i t a n k guns, a r t i l l e r y ,

mor ta rs , i n f a n t r y , and mob i le engineer obs tac le detachments. Supported by

thousands o f m i l e s o f a n t i t a n k d i t c h e s and trenches, and m ino i e l d which

were s i x t imes the d e n s i t y o f those which p r o t e c t e d Moscow i n 941 the

emphasis o f the defense was on armor a t t r i t i o n . U n i t s a t a l l eve 5

pursued an i n t e n s i v e t r a i n i n g program which focused on immedia e

coun te ra t tacks and the best t a c t i c s t o des t roy armor.

A l l t h i s a c t i v i t y was c a r r i e d ou t under a v e i l o f secrecy which the

Germans c o u l d n o t pene t ra te . As the launch date approached, OKH had

inc reas ing euidence o f the Sov ie t bu i l dup , b u t the f u l l ex ten t o f Zhukov’s

p repara t i ons remained hidden. There w e r e no l o y a l p a r t i s a n s behind Russian

l i n e s t o p rov ide such v i t a l i n fo rma t ion t o the Germans. The presence o f

Steppe Front was a v i r t u a l unknown as evidenced by the opera t i ona l sketches 16

o f Manstein i n h i s book Lnrf-llirfncias

- 17 -

SECTIW V: THE Q E H OFFENSIVE

Fran the s t r a t e g i c aspect Z i t a d e l l e was t o be a v e r i t a b l e 'death r i d e ' f o r v i r t u a l l y the whole o f the o p e r a t i o n a l rese rve was t o be f l u n g i n t o the supreme o f f e n s i v e . 17

The f i n a l date f o r D-Day, 5 J u l y , was e s t a b l i s h e d a t a s u r p r i s e meet ing

o f the p r i n c i p a l commanders a t Rastenburg, East P russ ia on 1 J u l y . Manste in

had b e l i e v e d a l l a long t h a t excess ive de lay would f a v o r the defender, bu t

on t h i s day o n l y Colonel-General Model o b j e c t e d s t renuous ly t o the

i n i t i a t i o n o rde r . The N i n t h Army Commander had brought d e t a i l e d a e r i a l

photography which revea led the e x t e n t o f Russian defenses, b u t the Fuhrer

would n o t be de ter red . H i s v i s i o n o f the end-state f o r the campaign had

become t o t a l l y detached f rom the r e a l i t y o f the r e l a t i v e means a v a i l a b l e

and the na tu re o f h i s opponent. Desp i te the d i f f i c u l t i e s ahead, H i t l e r

ma in ta ined almost m y s t i c a l f a i t h i n the a b i l i t y o f h i s panzer d i v i s i o n s ,

p a r t i c u l a r l y the SS fo rmat ions , t o conduct the k i n d o f s w i f t and v i o l e n t

p e n e t r a t i o n which had been the norm on every o ther summer o f f e n s i v e .

On the f o l l o w i n g day STAUW Knew o f the imminent a t t a c k thanks t o LUCY.

A l l f o rward u n i t s were a l e r t e d t o expect the Germans t o i n i t i a t e t h e i r

o f f e n s i v e s o m e t i m e between 3 and S J u l y .

The ZITADELLE p l a n env is ioned a s imul taneous a t t a c k by two t i t a n i c

armored f o r c e s which would q u i c k l y p inch o f f the Kursk s a l i e n t . Y e t , on

the eve o f combat the c o n d i t i o n s t o achieve t h i s coo rd ina ted e f f o r t had no t

been es tab l i shed . The German coun te ro f fens i ve which ended i n February

stopped j u s t s h o r t o f an area o f h i g h ground on the southern p a r t o f the

- 18 -

s a l i e n t . General Hoth, cwrmander o f the Four th Panzer Army, had t o secure

t h i s Key t e r r a i n be fo re D-Day i n o rder t o s i t u a t e s p o t t e r s f o r h i s

a r t i l l e r y u n i t s . Consequently, he ordered an a s s a u l t on the h e i g h t s t o

beg in on the a f te rnoon o f 4 J u l y . Despi te the warn ing g iven by STAUVKA, the

Russians defenders w e r e s u r p r i s e d by Hoth’s a t t a c k . By m i d n i g h t the h i g h

ground was secured. There remained p r e c i o u s l i t t l e t i m e , however, t o s o r t

ou t the u n i t s , coord ina te a r t i l l e r y a c t i o n , and prepare f o r the main a t t a c k

which was scheduled t o beg in i n a few hours. A d d i t i o n a l l y , any hope o f

o p e r a t i o n a l s u r p r i s e was gone.

Why d i d the Qermans no t se ize t h i s o b j e c t i v e weeks be fo re J u l y ? T h i s i s

c e r t a i n l y one o f the many examples o f the loose ends which tend t o occur i n

the execut ion o f such a d e t a i l e d campaign p l a n i n the absence o f an o v e r a l l

ope ra t i ona l commander. I t was a theme which was t o plague the Qerman

e f f o r t s throughout the days t o f o l l o w .

Colonel-Qeneral Model’s n o r t h e r n a t t a c k was p lanned t o t raue rse the

obv ious Orel-Kursk avenue.(see f i g u r e 5, page 40) O f h i s f o u r corps

p a r t i c i p a t i n g i n the opera t i on the 47th Panzer Corps was des ignated as the

main e f f o r t . I t s m iss ion was o pene t ra te the l e f t f l a n k o f 13 th Army and

race f o r Kursk and the eventua l i nk -up w i t h Hoth’s f o r c e s from the south.

Suppor t ing r o l e s were assigned t o 41st Panzer Corps, 46 th Panzer Corps and

23rd Army Corps. The 41st would a t t a c k the main p o r t i o n o f 13 th Army and

b lock any Russian f o r c e s moving f r a the eas t . L ikewise the 46th was t o

pene t ra te the r i g h t f l a n k o f 70th Army, swing w e s t and b lock mob i l e tank

reserves , The 23rd Army Corps was ass igned the l i m i t e d bu t c r u c i a l task o f

s p l i t t i n g the 13 th and 48th b r m i e s and secu r ing Maloarkhangelsk. T h i s would

e f f e c t i v e l y b lock the r o u t e s which Russian opera t i ona l rese rves would take

- 19 -

i n t r y i n g t o s top 47 th Panzer Corps.

To oppose the Germans General Rokossovsk~ echeloned h i s f o r c e s i n g rea t

depth a long t h i s avenue. 13 th Army which was ar rayed i n two de fens ive

b e l t s would bear the b r u n t o f the main e f f o r t w h i l e 2nd Tank Army was

l o c a t e d t o the r e a r in a reserve echelon. (see f i g u r e 3 , page 38)

Known more as an exper t i n defens ive t a c t i c s , Model o rgan ized h i s a t t a c k

f o r c e s a long t r a d i t i o n a l b l i t z k r i e g l i n e s . I n f a n t r y d i u i s i o n s would open

up r o u t e s i n the m i n e f i e l d s and breach f o r t i f i c a t i o n s i n o rder t o a l l o w

panzers d i v i s i o n s t o e x p l o i t i n the enemy‘s r e a r . He a l l o c a t e d n ine

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s and one panzer d i v i s i o n i n the f i r s t day’s a t t a c k .

Beginning a t 0730 w i t h a massive a r t i l l e r y p repara t i on , the N i n t h Army

a t t a c k covered a f ron tage of 28 m i l e s . Supported by FERDIMDS and TIGERS

i t managed t o f o r c e a p e n e t r a t i o n o f 5 m i l e s by the end o f the day. T h i s

was f a r s h o r t o f expec ta t i ons as o n l y the 46th Panzer Corps achieved i t s

f i r s t day’s o b j e c t i u e s . To make m a t t e r s worse, even i m i t e d success came

w i t h a h i g h p r i c e . Massive Russian a i r suppor t , a r t i l e r y , and deadly

a n t i t a n k f i r e took a heavy t o l l on German armor. Model l o s t over 100 tanks

and SPs on J u l y 5 a lone.

On the 6 t h Model dec ided t o c m i t two o f h i s reserve Panzer D i v i s i o n s

i n the 47th Corps sec to r i n the hopes o f advancing l i m i t e d success i n t o a

Qenera l pene t ra t i on . These u n i t s c o l l i d e d w i t h a Russian coun te ra t tack

ordered by Rokossovsk~, d i s r u p t i n g the German p l a n f o r the remainder o f the

day.

By the end o f 6 J u l y two c r i t i c a l events were t a k i n g shape which would

determine the outcome on the no r the rn sec to r . F i r s t , 2nd Panzer D i v i s i o n

had reached the h i g h ground n o r t h o f the v i l l a g e o f Olkhovatka and was

- 20 -

h a l t e d by 2nd Tank Army w i t h i t s tanks i n hul l -down p o s i t i o n s . The ensuing

b a t t l e f o r these d e c i s i v e h e i g h t s and Olkhovatka i t s e l f was t o dominate the

e n t i r e e f f o r t s o f bo th s ides . Secondly, i t became obvious euen a t t h i s

e a r l y date t h a t 23rd Corps c o u l d n o t cap ture Maloarkhangelsk. I t s d i v i s i o n s

had exhausted themselves and w e r e now ordered by Model t o defend t h e i r

c u r r e n t p o s i t i o n s . T h i s meant t h a t Russian reserves were unhampered i n

t h e i r a b i l i t y t o move f rom east t o west . Zhukou took f u l l advantage o f

t h i s freedom o f movement and q u i c k l y t r a n s f e r r e d s u f f i c i e n t f o r c e s t o the

Olkhovatka b a t t l e f i e l d .

The focus o f Model's a s s a u l t s f rom 7 J u l y u n t i l the 10 th was the twenty

m i l e f r o n t between Ponyr i and Teploye. By now he had commited f i v e o f h i s

seven panrer d i u i s i o n s . Each t i m e t h a t a gap opened i n the 13 th and 70 th

Armies' defenses the re was always a Russian coun te ra t tack t o seal i t o f f .

Rokossousky wa5 s k i l l f u l l y moving h i s scarce o p e r a t i o n a l rese rves t o t h i s

d e c i s i v e p o i n t i n the no r the rn b a t t l e w h i l e Zhukov o r c h e s t r a t e d the

s t r a t e g i c reserves . BY 9 J u l y 41st Panzer Corps a c t u a l l y secured n o r t h e r n

p o r t i o n s o f Pony r i , bu t the urban f i g h t i n g t h a t ensued resembled the

carnage o f S t a l i n g r a d . Model had requested a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s from Kluge and

d i d r e c e i v e the 10 th Panzer Grenadier and 8 t h Panzer D i v i s i o n s , bo th o f

which were c m i t t e d t o the r i d g e l i n e b a t t l e .

Massive Russian coun te ra t tacks on 10 J u l y marked the end o f N i n t h Army's

o f f e n s i v e and the beg inn ing o f a s low agon iz ing re t rog rade . Model's l a s t

o f fens i ve at tempt occur red on the evening o f 10 J u l y when a two d i v i s i o n

a t t a c k f a i l e d . Rokossovsky now ordered a genera l a t t a c k by h i s e n t i r e

F ron t t o push Model's t i r e d f o r c e s back t o t h e i r s t a r t p o i n t s . T h i s was

a150 the day when the Western and Bryansk F r o n t s were po ised t o i n i t i a t e

- 21 -

t h e i r own o f f e n s i v e .

As the s i g n s o f a Russian o f f e n s i v e presented themselves, Kluge ordered

Model t o s w i t c h t o the de fens ive . Model was f o r c e d t o use h i s l a s t

remain ing rese rves t o b lock Sov ie t pene t ra t i ons , severa l o f which w e r e

stopped by massed a r t i l l e r y f i r e alone.

I n the southern sec to r Hoth and Kempf had severa l d i s t i n c t advantages

over Model. I n the f i r s t p lace the S o v i e t s w e r e i n some doubt as t o the

exact r o u t e o f . a t t a c k the Germans would take. There was the obv ious r o u t e

across the Pse l R i v e r t o Oboyan, o r the r o u t e no r theas t t o Korocha, o r

f u r t h e r south from Volchansk t o Novy-Oskol. (see f i g u r e 3, page 38)

A d d i t i o n a l l y , Manste in had two separate armies t o commit, 4 t h Panzer and

A r m y Detachment Kempf. A l l t h i s tended t o f o r c e U a t u t i n t o d isperse h i s

mob i l e f o r c e s t o cover a l l the op t i ons . He employed 6 t h Guards Army on the

Oboyan approach and 7 t h Guards Army a long the Korocha avenue. 1 s t Tank

Army was p laced beh ind 6 t h Guards t o p r o t e c t Oboyan which V a t u t i n b e l i e v e d

would be the most probable d i r e c t i o n o f the German main e f f o r t . The 69th

Army occupied a second echelon de fens ive p o s i t i o n beh ind 7 t h Guards.

Manste in u t i l i z e d h i s armor i n a d i f f e r e n t f a s h i o n than Model and

employed a novel t a c t i c . R e a l i z i n g t h a t h i s f o r c e was i n f a n t r y poor he

op ted t o mass h i s armor i n smal l wedge- l ike fo rma t ions o f g rea t d e n s i t y .

He hoped t o achieve ouerwhelming s u p e r i o r i t y a t the p o i n t o f a t t a c k and

q u i c k l y b u l l through the f o r t i f i c a t i o n s . A l though losses were bound t o be

heavy, Manste in was persuaded t h a t he would save armor i n the l o n g run .

For a l l Manstein’s p l a n n i n g and innova t ion the southern a t t a c k almost

m e t d i s a s t e r be fo re i t even began. A c t i n g on the LUCY in fo rma t ion , the

Sov ie t A i r Force marshaled a massive preemptive a i r s t r i k e on the German

- 22 -

a i r f i e l d s around Kharkov. Such an a t t a c k would have c r i p p l e d the L u f t w a f f e

on the ground and thereby s e r i o u s l y degraded the a i r suppor t so c r i t i c a l t o

the ground fo rces . Manstein 's a i r was saved, however, by technology and

the i n i t i a t i v e o f subord ina tes . The Germans had deployed an e a r l y

genera t ion rada r known as F r e r a around t h e i r a i r f i e l d s and i t p rov ided

e a r l y warn ing o f the Russian a i r s t r i k e . L u f t w a f f e commanders q u i c k l y

assembled f i g h t e r wings and rose t o meet the Russian bombers. Thanks t o

Freya the Germans no t o n l y saved t h e i r own a i r f o r c e f rom d e s t r u c t i o n , b u t

so dep le ted the Sov ie t a i r f o r c e s t h a t the s k i e s over the southern sec to r

belonged t o the L u f t w a f f e f o r the f i r s t few days.

By 0500 on the 9 t h o f J u l y Manstein 's armored juggernaut s t r u c k the 6 t h

Guard's Army and 7 t h Guard's Army. The main e f f o r t was made by the 48th

Panzer Corps and 2nd SS Panzer Corps which would s t r i k e on p a r a l l e l axes

toward Kursk. Army Detachment Ksmpf c o n s i s t i n g o f two corps would p rov ide

f l a n k s e c u r i t y f o r Hoth's fo rces . (see f i g u r e 6, page 4 1 ) Coupled w i t h

overwhelming a i r s u p e r i o r i t y , t h i s impress ive armor a t t a c k achieved a l l

o b j e c t i v e s s e t f o r the f i r s t day's b a t t l e .

On the Russian s ide V a t u t i n q u i c k l y assessed the t h r u s t toward Oboyan as

the main o b j e c t i v e and began t o move h i s f o r c e s acco rd ing l y . He o rdered

1 s t Tank Army t o cover the c i t y w h i l e o the r mob i l e f o r c e s concent ra ted f o r

a coun te ra t tack . Even as e a r l y as the f i r s t day S t a l i n began t o consider

the t r a n s f e r o f ope ra t i ona l reserves t o V a t u t i n . As the e x t e n t o f

Manstein 's o f f e n s i v e became c l e a r e r , the Sov ie t leader t r a n s f e r r e d f i r s t

the 27 th Army and then the 9 t h Guards Tank Army t o the Voronerh F ron t .

Steppe F ron t Commander Konev was f u r i o u s a t t h i s piecemeal c m i t m e n t o f

h i 5 command, bu t i t was t o prove d e c i s i v e i n the f i n a l a n a l y s i s .

- 23 -

A t t h i s p o i n t i n the a c t i o n an i n t a n g i b l e f a c t o r f rom the moral domain

o f b a t t l e began t o i n f l uence events and cause more than a l i t t l e

u n c e r t a i n t y f o r the Sov ie ts . Us ing h i s own i n i t i a t i v e General Hoth d e v i a t e d

fran the campaipn p lan . He knew from h i s reconnaissance i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t

the Sov ie t defenses were echeloned i n s t r e n g t h on the r o u t e he was

scheduled t o take. I n s t e a d o f do ing the obvious, Hoth dec ided t o deal w i t h

the Russian s t r a t e g i c reserves f i r s t be fo re moving n o r t h t o l i n k up w i t h

Model's N i n t h Army. The t e r r a i n t o the r e a r o f Uoronerh F ron t d i c t a t e d t h a t

any tank reserues moving f rom the eas t would have t o t r a n s i t the narrow gap

a t Prokhorovka. I t was here t h a t he e l e c t e d t o order SS Panzer Corps once

the p e n e t r a t i o n o f 6 t h Guards Army was achieved.

O v e r the nex t f e w days the s i t u a t i o n i n the southern s e c t o r was bo th

f l u i d and u n c e r t a i n f o r the Russians. BY the evening o f 7 J u l y SS Panzer

Corps captured the v i l l a g e o f T e t e r v i n o , the l a s t major town be fo re

Prokhorouka. A t t h i s p o i n t two key opera t i ona l d e c i s i o n s w e r e made, one by

U a t u t i n and one by H i t l e r , which were t o have l a s t i n g r a m i f i c a t i o n s . As

4 th Panzer Army moved t o the no r theas t , a gap began t o develop between i t

and A r m y Detachment Kempf. From the beg inn ing General Kempf had exper ienced

d i f f i c u l t y i n p e n e t r a t i n g the 7 t h Guards Army defenses. I n t o t h i s gap,

U a t u t i n now ordered 69 th Army, h i s second opera t i ona l rese rve . T h i s was t o

prove ex t remely impor tant as i t guaranteed t h a t Kempf would be slowed even

f u r t h e r . The second key d e c i s i o n was taken by H i t l e r on the 7 t h and 8 t h o f

J u l y . I n response t o Model's u rgen t reques ts f o r more fo rces , H i t l e r

dec ided t o s h i f t much o f Manste in 's a i r t o the n o r t h e r n s e c t o r . Hoth's

l o s s o f a i r s u p e r i o r i t y occur red a t the c r i t i c a l j u n c t u r e o f the southern

b a t t l e . Unhampered by overwhelming German a i r power, the Sov ie t a i r f o r c e

- 24 -

appeared i n g r e a t e r s t r e n g t h which f o r c e d Hoth t o slow h i s advance toward

Prokhorovka. Given the euenta l outcome, any de lay would have been l e t h a l t o

the German e f f o r t s .

T h i s perhaps more than any o ther i n c i d e n t demonstrates the disaduantage

o f n o t hav ing a u n i f i e d opera t i ona l commander. By the 7 t h o f August i t was

obv ious t h a t Model would no t achieve a qu ick p e n e t r a t i o n towards Kursk; h i s

b a t t l e c o u l d o n l y be one o f a t t r i t i o n . On the o the r hand, Hoth had n o t

o n l y succeeded i n p e n e t r a t i n g the f i r s t de fens ive b e l t , bu t was a l s o

proceeding on a course o f a c t i o n which promised t o g a i n a favo rab le e a r l y

d e c i s i o n w i t h Russian tank fo rces . H i t l e r remained r o o t e d t o the l e t t e r o f

the p lan : a double enuelopment. One c o u l d argue t h a t a u n i f i e d commander

on the ground would have seen the o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n the south and dec ided t o

r e i n f o r c e success r a t h e r than draw f rom i t . C e r t a i n l y the removal o f

Hoth's a i r cover was one o f the key dec i s ions i n the southern b a t t l e .

BY the morn ing o f 9 J u l y 48th Panzer Corps was h a l t e d 10 m i l e s f r o m

Oboyan i n f r o n t o f the Pena r i v e r . I t had succeeded i n occupying the

a t t e n t i o n o f 1 s t Tank Army and a l lowed SS Panzer Corps t o push f o r

Prokhorouka aga ins t euer i nc reas ing pressure. S t a l i n , howeuer, was qu ick

t o subord ina te 5 t h Guards Tank Army t o U a t u t i n . Over the nex t th ree days

t h i s armored u n i t would moue 250 m i l e s from i t s assembly area t o

ProKhorouka.

The 10 th o f J u l y wau an anx ious day f o r the Russians. BY t h i s t i m e ,

however, U a t u t i n had a c c u r a t e l y assessed Hoth's i n t e n t i o n s and adv ised

S t a l i n t h a t the Germans w e r e heading f o r Prokhorouka. He planned a

desperate coun te ra t tack on a l l f l a n k s o f the p e n e t r a t i o n u s i n g 9 t h Guards

Army and Sth Guards Tank Army.

- 25 -

SS Panzer Corps reached the Prokhorovka area on the evening o f 11 J u l y

b u t by t h i s t i m e the Russians had been ab le t o s t a b i l i z e the s i t u a t i o n .

5 t h Guards Army had moved i n t o de fens ive p o s i t i o n s e a r l i e r i n the morn ing

w h i l e two o the r armies were moved i n t o the KursW area t o i nsu re t h a t no

l i n k - u p would occur . Sth Guards Tank Army concent ra ted throughout the day

between the P s e l and Donetz R ive rs . The o n l y unknown was whether o r n o t

Kempf c o u l d a r r i v e i n t i m e t o p a r t i c i p a t e i n the nex t day's a t t a c k . La te

i n the evening Marshal ZhuKov a r r i v e d a t Uoronezh f r o n t t o assume o v e r a l l

command o f the opera t i on .

Hoth in tended 12 J u l y t o be the day o f dec i s ion . I f Kempf's 3 r d Panzer

Corps c o u l d a r r i v e on the Prokhorovka b a t t l e f i e l d he would be s t r o n g enough

t o de fea t t h e S o v i e t tank f o r c e s and s t i l l have t i m e t o swing n o r t h f o r

Kursk. SS Panzer Corps a t tacked i n t o the gap w i t h approx imate ly 600 tanks

i n i t i a t i n g the l a r g e s t tank b a t t l e o f the war. General Rotmis t rov 's 5 t h

Quards Tank Army p i c k e d almost the same i n s t a n t t o en te r the gap f r o m the

eas t w i t h 850 tanks. I n the melee t h a t ensued l a r g e u n i t c o n t r o l broke

down complete ly . The speed and weight o f the Russian a t t a c k overwhelmed

the Qermans, g e t t i n g a t c lose range where the advantage o f the TlQER tank

was 1ost . Al though Kempf's 3 r d Panzer Corps secured a s u r p r i s e br idgehead over the

N o r t h Donetz p r i o r t o dawn on the 12th, i t was unable t o reach the

b a t t l e f i e l d i n t ime. BY 2100 hours Rotmis t rov o rdered h i s f o r c e s back i n t o

de fens ive p o s i t i o n s , l e a v i n g the b a t t l e f i e l d t o the Germans. Both s i d e s

s u f f e r e d losses i n the neighborhood of 300 tanks each, b u t the r e l a t i v e

loss t o Hoth was f a r g rea te r . H is SS Corps was exhausted and Rotmis t rov

s t i l l ma in ta ined a cons iderab le tank f o r c e . 3 r d Panzer Corps d i d j o i n Hoth

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on the nex t day, bu t any chance o f q u i c k l y d e f e a t i n g the Russian

o p e r a t i o n a l reserves was gone,

On the 13 th o f J u l y H i t l e r c a l l e d a conference o f h i s Army Group

Commanders a t East Rastenburg t o announce the end o f ZITADELLE. Three days

e a r l i e r the A l l i e s had launched an invas ion o f S i c i l y and i n d i c a t i o n s were

t h a t the I t a l i a n s had l i t t l e stomach f o r res i s tance . The Fuhrer wanted t o

beg in s h i f t i n g fo rces , n o t a b l y the SS Panzer Corps, t o I t a l y . There w e r e

a l s o e a r l y s i g n s t h a t the S o v i e t s were beg inn ing t h e i r own o f f e n s i v e . I n

f a c t , on the 12 th Zhukou launched h i s Western and Bryansk F r o n t s I n t o the

O r e 1 pocket . Manste in urged H i t l e r t o a l l o w h im t o cont inue w i t h Hoth's

a t t a c k i n the south. The Army Group South commander was convinced t h a t he

was d e s t r o y i n g v i t a l Sov ie t o p e r a t i o n a l reserves . A s w i t h h i s o r i g i n a l

assessment o f Russian f o r c e s a v a i l a b l e , Manste in 's i n t e l l i g e n c e was

erroneous. Steppe F ron t s t i l l had th ree uncommitted armies.

On J u l y 17 H i t l e r o rdered the w i thdrawal o f SS Panzer Corps i n

p r e p a r a t i o n f o r i t s d i spa tch t o I t a l y . For a l l i n t e n t s and purposes

ZITADELLE was over . Hoth d i d cont inue h i s ope ra t i ons i n the south and was

n o t h a l t e d u n t i l the 23rd, bu t a l l t e r r i t o r i a l ga ins w e r e q u i c k l y

surrendered as the f u l l ex ten t o f the Sov ie t coun te ro f fens i ve became

ev iden t .

SECTlaJ V I : THE FLASHINB SWORD OF VENQWCE

Zhukov had env i s ioned t h a t the p lann ing f o r h i s g rea t coun te ro f fens i ve

would proceed c o n c u r r e n t l y w i t h the de fens ive b a t t l e . He planned f o r a

s imul taneous a t t a c k i n bo th the n o r t h and south, bu t i n t h i s he was

- 27 -

f r u s t r a t e d by the d i s j o i n t e d execut ion o f ZITADELLE and h i s own e r r o r i n

i d e n t i f y i n g the German o p e r a t i o n a l cen ter o f g r a v i t y . Hoth’s s tubborn

e f f o r t s i n the south t o t a l l y occupied the Steppe F ron t and made i t

impossib le f o r General Konev t o p l a n and execute h i s r o l e i n the

coun te ro f fens i ve u n t i l the German t h r e a t was ex t i ngu ished .

Code named Opera t ion KUfUZW, the n o r t h e r n o f f e n s i v e commenced on 12

J u l y . I t i n v o l v e d u n i t s f rom Western, Bryansk and Cent ra l F r o n t s and was

designed t o c u t o f f the O r e l s a l i e n t and des t roy the German N i n t h Army and

2nd Panzer Army. I n t h i s e n t i r e area the Germans o n l y had f i v e rese rve

d i v i s i o n s . Aimed a t a c h i e v i n g depth, Sov ie t f o r c e s were arranged i n

columns o f two o r th ree echelons and suppor ted by mass a r t i l l e r y . (See

f i g u r e 7, page 42)

H i t l e r p laced the 2nd Panzer Army under Model‘s command on the 13 th o f

J u l y . A l though the Russians were ab le t o s u r p r i s e the Germans i n the O r e l

s a l i e n t , Model’s de fens ive e x p e r t i s e and the s t r o n g German f o r t i f i c a t i o n s

which had been cons t ruc ted over a p e r i o d o f two years p revented a complete

breakthrough.

The Russians w e r e a l s o r e d i s c o v e r i n g the f r i c t i o n i n v o l v e d w i t h

employing massive fo rma t ions . As the tempo o f the f i g h t increased they

were n o t ab le t o Keep enough u n i t s engaged. The combinat ion o f poor

weather, a g i l e German w i thd rawa ls and t r a f f i c jams on t h e i r own s ide kep t

most o f t h e i r t roops from the b a t t l e f i e l d s . BY the 18 th o f August the

Germans had completed t h e i r wi thdrawal t o the Hagen L i n e which extended

across the neck o f the Orel s a l i e n t . T h i s marked the end o f the Sov ie t

coun te ro f fens i ve i n the n o r t h . The two German armies w e r e indeed b lood ied ,

hav ing l o s t the equ iva len t o f 14 d i u i s i o n s , bu t Model had succeeded i n

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f o rm ing a v i a b l e de fens ive p o s i t i o n and f r u s t r a t i n g the grand aim o f the

KUTUZW p l an.

South o f the Kursk s a l i e n t Manste in was d e a l i n g w i t h a d i f f e r e n t

problem. On the 19 th o f J u l y the S o v i e t s achieved a br idgehead over the

Mius R i v e r which, i f expanded, c o u l d th rea ten the e n t i r e southern f r o n t .

H i t l e r r e j e c t e d any reques t t o f a l l back t o a s h o r t e r l i n e a long the

Dnieper which would have f r e e d up v i t a l mob i l e reserves . Ins tead, H i t l e r

a l lowed Manste in the use o f SS Panzer Corps t o e l i m i n a t e the br idgehead.

The Germans a t tacked on 30 J u l y and were ab le t o push the S o v i e t s o f f the

west bank, b u t the Panzer Corps was withdrawn as ’soon as the s i t u a t i o n was

s t a b i l i z e d . H i t l e r ’ s obsession w i t h the t h r e a t t o I t a l y p revented him f rom

see ing the opera t i ona l and s t r a t e g i c danger on the Eas tern Fron t . T h i s

e r r o r caused the con t inued opera t i ona l misuse o f SS Panzer Corps and kept

i t ou t o f a c t i o n d u r i n g some o f the most c r u c i a l f i g h t i n g o f Manstein’s

defense o f the Kharkov area.

As no ted e a r l i e r , General Hoth‘s a t t a c k was h a l t e d on the 23rd o f J u l y .

The S o v i e t s then began t h e i r b u i l d u p f o r the southern o f f e n s i v e known as

Opera t ion RWWWTSEV. The p l a n c a l l e d f o r cons iderab le r e o r g a n i z a t i o n due

t o the i n t e r m i n g l i n g o f Uoronezh and Steppe F r o n t s d u r i n g the de fens ive

phase. Uoronezh F ron t was ass igned the m i s s i o n o f punching a ho le through

the German defenses and e x p l o i t i n g t o the southwert w i t h two tank armies.

They would o u t f l a n k KharWov f r cm the nor thwest . Steppe F ron t was t o take

Belgorod and cont inue toward Kharkov from the south, thereby t y i n g down

Army Detachment Kempf and e v e n t u a l l y comple t ing the enc i rc lement o f

Kharkov. (See f i g u r e 8, page 43)

The S o v i e t s were indeed c o n f i d e n t and t h e i r p lann ing r e f l e c t e d i t . They

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enjoyed an advantage o f a lmost f o u r t o one i n every combat category. Whi le

General Hoth had o n l y f o r t y percent o f the armor w i t h which he began

ZITADELLE, the S o v i e t s had been ab le t o double t h e i r 5 J u l y tank s t r e n g t h

through replacements. Y e t s e r i o u s d e f i c i e n c i e s e x i s t e d i n the f o r c e s

ass igned t o RUMYANTSN. They were exhausted f rom weeks o f d i f f i c u l t

f i g h t i n g and personnel l osses had n o t been made up. The Germans, a l though

b a t t e r e d , had q u i c k l y gone over t o the defense and had formed a l i n e o f

f o r t i f i c a t i o n s two b e l t s deep.

The Russians a t t a c k e d on 3 August w i t h 5 t h and 6 t h Guards Armies. They

achieved a deep p e n e t r a t i o n by noon and U a t u t i n commit ted h i s two tank

armies. Steppe F ron t was somewhat s lower , bu t by l a t e a f te rnoon i t t o o had

sent i n i t s mob i l e co rps t o e x p l o i t a breach. BY the 5 t h o f August

Belgorod f e l l . By 7 August the o f f e n s i v e had achieved ouer 60 m i l e s ,

opening a gap o f 35 m i l e s between 4 th Panzer Army and Army Detachment

Kempf . Manste in r e a l i z e d the t h r e a t t o h i s e n t i r e FIrmy Group and wanted t o

w i thdraw t o the Dnieper R i v e r , bu t H i t l e r would hear none o f i t . He

ordered Kharkov defended a t a l l cos t . 11 th Army Corps, c o n s i s t i n g o f s i x

i n f a n t r y d i v i s i o n s , was ordered i n t o the c i t y . Manste in knew t h a t i f

U a t u t i n and Konev c o u l d reach the Dnieper R i v e r they c o u l d c u t o f f K l e i s t ' s

Army Group A i n Crimea and des t roy 17 th Army. F u r t h e r , i f Kharkou were

e n c i r c l e d , which seemed l i k e l y , 11 th Corps would a l s o be l o s t .

A t t h i s p o i n t t he re w e r e two p a r a l l e l b a t t l e s be ing waged, one around

Kharkov and one between Manste in and h i s Fuhrer . Manste in cont inued t o urge

OKH t o a l l o w h im t o evacuate the Donetz Basin i n o rder t o sho r ten h i s

f r o n t , or t o p rov ide him w i t h a d d i t i o n a l f o r c e s . H i t l e r promised more

- 30 -

f o rces , bu t they never came. A l l the w h i l e Manste in conducted a desperate

ope ra t i on t o save h i s 11 th Corps and prevent the S o v i e t s from reach ing the

Dnieper . For a l l p r a c t i c a l purposes Manstein’s o n l y rese rve was the 3 r d

Panzer Corps which had been employed t o he lp e l i m i n a t e the Mius

br idgehead. The t i m e l y r e t u r n o f t h i s c r i t i c a l u n i t p revented the l i n k u p

o f Konev’s and U a t u t i n ’ s fo rces .

A l though some s t a b i l i t y was achieved around Kharkov, the second h a l f o f

August saw the e n t i r e Eastern F ron t explode i n a ser ies o f Russian

o f f e n s i v e s . I t was Foche‘s 1918 o f f e n s i v e a l l over again as the Germans

w e r e pa ra l yzed by success ive c r i s e s across the f r o n t . T h e i r freedom o f

a c t i o n was des t royed and t h e i r rese rves exhausted. H i t l e r was so

preoccupied w i t h the general s i t u a t i o n t h a t he c o u l d do l i t t l e more than

express h i s d i sp leasu re when Manstein evacuated Kharkov aga ins t o rde rs on

the 22nd. The German leader f l e w ou t t o meet w i t h Manste in a t U i n n i t s a ,

Ukra ine on 27 August. He again promised more f o r c e s which would be

t r a n s f e r r e d from Kluge, bu t renewed Ruseian a t t a c k s i n Army Group Center’s

a r e a the nex t day canceled the move. As l a t e as 3 September w i t h the

e n t i r e Donetr Basin i n the balance, H i t l e r s t i l l r e f u s e d t o a l l o w r e t r e a t .

Kluge and Manste in even at tempted t o persuade h im t h a t he c o u l d no longer

a c t as bo th s t r a t e g i c and opera t i ona l c m a n d e r i n the eas t . They adv ised

h im t o appo in t a commander i n c h i e f f o r the eas tern thea te r and c rea te a

Great General S t a f f t o coord ina te a l l wart ime a c t i u i t i e s . A l l t h e i r

e f f o r t s were t o no a v a i l .

The a l l i e s invaded I t a l y on 3 September and H i t l e r f i n a l l y agreed t o a

w i thdrawal beh ind the Dnieper R i v e r on the 15th. Any hope o f a Great

’Eastern Wal l ’ a long t h i s r i v e r , however, were dashed by numerous Russian

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br idgeheads on a b road f r o n t i n e a r l y October. The Germans had ignored the

need t o c o n s t r u c t such a de fens ive l i n e i n the p rev ious year and they now

s imp ly had too f e w mob i le rese rves t o e x t i n g u i s h a l l the f i r e s . The c l imax

came on 6 November w i t h the f a l l o f K iev. The g rea t summer campaign o f 1943

was over . Dur ing the month-long pause which f o l l w s d , the Russians

conso l i da ted t h e i r ga ins and brought up b r i d g i n g i n p r e p a r a t i o n f o r a

massive c r o s s i n g o f the Dnieper.

SECTION U I l r CONCLUSIONS

A t f i r s t g lance the Kursk campaign d i d no t appear t o be as g rea t a

debacle f o r the Germans as S t a l i n g r a d . There was no army which was

surrounded and e v e n t u a l l y l o s t . Y e t the r e a l i t y was t h a t Kursk had f a r

reach ing opera t i ona l and s t r a t e g i c s i g n i f i c a n c e . From the s t r a t e g i c p o i n t

o f v i e w the i n i t i a t i v e had s h i f t e d permanent ly. The Sov ie t Union recovered

much o f i t s p o p u l a t i o n base which had l i v e d under German dominat ion i n

1942, and her i n d u s t r i a l base was now beyond the range o f L u f t w a f f e

bombers. T h i s meant t h a t the weight o f p roduc t i on would favo r the S o v i e t s

more and more i n the months ahead. For i t s p a r t Germany c o u l d no longer

rep lace the looses i n personnel and equipment on the Eas tern F ron t . Wi th

the a l l i e d l and ings i n I t a l y H i t l e r would have t o s h u f f l e h i s d w i n d l i n g

resources between two f r o n t s . Germany would n o t a t tempt another o f f e n s i v e

i n the eas t u n t i l the i l l - a d v i s e d opera t i on t o r e l i e v e Budapest i n June,

1945.

O p e r a t i o n a l l y and t a c t i c a l l y the Red Army gained immense conf idence as a

r e s u l t o f i t s v i c t o r y a t Kursk. I t had taken on the bes t t h a t Germany had

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t o o f f e r on ground o f the Wehrmacht‘s choosing and d e c i s i v e l y de fea ted the

b l i t z k r i e g s t y l e o f war. I t was as much a moral and s p i r i t u a l v i c t o r y as a

mater ia1 one.

What does Kursk have t o t e l l the s tudent o f o p e r a t i o n a l a r t about the

r e l a t i v e s t r e n g t h o f o f fense and defense? Zhukov made a d e l i b e r a t e choice

t o defend which begs the ques t i on as t o why any c m a n d e r who has super io r

resources would e l e c t t o do so. H i s t o r y i n d i c a t e s t h a t he made a w ise

s e l e c t i o n , b u t severa l o f the f a c t o r s i nvo l ved i n the Russian campaign p l a n

were unique. Rare l y does a c m a n d e r have complete and accura te

i n f o r m a t i o n o f the i n t e n t i o n s o f h i s adversary. LUCY p rov ided the Russians

w i t h unprecedented i n t e l l i g e n c e i n t h i s regards. Zhukov a l s o r e a l i z e d t h a t

once he knew o f the enemy p l a n he c o u l d take advantage o f severa l

t h e o r e t i c a l advantages o f the defender. These inc luded knowledge o f the

t e r r a i n t o be defended, the a b i l i t y t o r e i n f o r c e the t e r r a i n w i t h

obs tac les , and the a b i l i t y t o reduce f r i c t i o n by dep loy ing the u n i t s be fo re

the b a t t l e . When we add h i s l ack o f t o t a l conf idence i n the Red Army’s

t a c t i c a l and o p e r a t i o n a l a b i l i t i e s , the d e c i s i o n t o defend makes g rea t

sense.

A l l t h i n g s be ing equal the defense i s t h e o r e t i c a l l y s t ronger than the

o f fense accord ing the C lausewi tz . When the enemy en joys c e r t a i n advantages

such as a b e t t e r t a c t i c a l system o r more accomplished o p e r a t i o n a l

commanders, the defense takes on even g r e a t e r appeal. Kursk c e r t a i n l y

v a l i d a t e d the s t r e n g t h o f the defense, e s p e c i a l l y the aspect o f the

‘ f l a s h i n g sword o f vengeance’. There can be no ques t ion t h a t the impact o f

KUTUZW and R U M Y N S E V was g rea te r because o f the a t t r i t i o n o f Berman armor

d u r i n g the de fens ive phase. On the o ther hand the Germans, had they

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adopted Manstein 's 'backhand op t ion ' , shou ld have been ab le t o cause the

Russian o f f e n s i v e cons iderab le d i f f i c u l t y . I n t h e i r panzer corps they had

the i d e a l o p e r a t i o n a l t o o l t o s t r i k e a t Sov ie t a t t a c k i n g concen t ra t i ons as

they had done e a r l i e r i n February.

I t would be easy t o argue t h a t the Germans had exceeded t h e i r o f f e n s i v e

c u l m i n a t i o n p o i n t be fore ZITADELLE even began. The Russians had c e r t a i n l y

amassed s u f f i c i e n t resources w i t h which t o i n i t i a t e a t h r e a t e n i n g o f f e n s i v e

by the summer, r e g a r d l e s s o f German a c t i v i t y . A l though the Germans c o u l d

have b l u n t e d such en opera t i on , the growing m a t e r i a l imbalance made f u t u r e

Russian o f f e n s i v e s more l i k e l y w i t h i nc reas ing chances f o r success. There

s imp ly were n o t enough Qerman rese rves on the e n t i r e Eastern F r o n t t o s top

the k i n d o f theater-wide a t t a c k s the Russians mounted i n CIugust o f 1943. On

the o the r hand the S o v i e t s p robab ly had n o t y e t reached t h e i r de fens ive

c u l m i n a t i o n p o i n t when they i n i t i a t e d t h e i r coun te ro f fens i ve . The longer

Manste in and Model were a l l w e d t o impale t h e i r armor on the Russian

defenses the more advantages went t o the defenders. H i t l e r would have

c a l l e d o f f the o f f e n s i u e i n any case due t o the S i c i l y i nvas ion and h i s

d e s i r e t o s iphon o f f f o r c e s f o r the w e s t . A11 t h i n g s considered ZhuKov

probab ly i n i t i a t e d Operat ion KUTUZOU a t the r i g h t t ime w i t h Operat ion

RWYANTSN more dependent on the r e o r g a n i z a t i o n o f h i s two defending

f r o n t s . Given h i s e r r o r i n p r e d i c t i n g the German's main e f f o r t and the

r e s u l t i n g f o r c e a l l o c a t i o n s , i t s imp ly was n o t p o s s i b l e f o r Zhukov t o

synchronize bo th o f f e n s i v e s .

I n comparing the p r a c t i c e o f ope ra t i ona l a r t , Zhukov demonstrated a f a r

g rea te r grasp o f the e s s e n t i a l s than h i s counterpar t , Adol f H i t l e r . I n

e v e r y aspect o f ope ra t i ona l p l a n n i n g and execut ion, ZITADELLE r e f l e c t e d

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above a l l e l s e , r i g i d i t y . I t was r i g i d i n i t s v i s i o n o f the b a t t l e f i e l d ,

the opponent, and the combinat ions o f f o r c e s t o be employed. The Germans

p a i d d e a r l y f o r t h i s l ack o f f l e x i b i l i t y i n the form o f wasted resources.

Zhukov d i s p l a y e d f a r g rea te r v i s i o n and f l e x i b i l i t y i n h i s c r e a t i o n o f the

Russian campaign. He took f u l l advantage o f the LUCY i n t e l l i g e n c e , bu t

e s t a b l i s h e d a de fens ive combinat ion which remained capable o f d e a l i n g w i t h

unexpected enemy success, w h i l e a t the same t i m e a l l o w i n g f o r a r a p i d

t r a n s i t i o n t o the o f f e n s i v e . He c l e a r l y understood the va lue o f h i s own

center o f g r a v i t y , Steppe F ron t , and developed a de fens ive s t r u c t u r e which

n o t o n l y p r o t e c t e d i t , bu t d i r e c t l y i n f l uenced the Qerman opera t i ona l

cen te r o f g r a v i t y , the concent ra ted panzer corps.

I f H i t l e r had p a i d a t t e n t i o n t o h i s stomach ins tead o f h i s w i l l ,

ZITADELLE might have been a defens ive opera t i on o f the k i n d urged by

Manstein. The f i n a l r i g i d i t y which c o n t r i b u t e d t o the Qerman downfa l l ,

however, may have been inherent i n the v e r y system o f Nazism. I t s s e l f

p roc la imed s u p e r i o r i t y g r e a t l y i n h i b i t e d the a b i l i t y t o conceive o f

any th ing l e s s than aggress ive o f f e n s i v e a c t i o n . R e l i g i o u s - l i k e f a n a t i c i s m

o f t h i s k i n d tends t o purge any n o t i o n o f a f l e x i b l e approach t o

ope ra t i ona l a r t and almost guarantees f a i l u r e i n the l o n g run . The

opera t i ona l a r t i s t must remain f r e e o f abso lu te dopnat ic p r i n c i p l e s ,

whether they be t a c t i c a l o r s t r a t e g i c , and u t i l i z e h i s s k i l l s w i t h i n the

con f ines o f a b a t t l e f i e l d dynamic which demands i n t e l l e c t u a l f l e x i b i l i t y .

- 35 -

FIGURE 1

36

31

Legend A . A r m y TFI- Tnnh A r m y

F I G U R E 3

3 8

39

q - q I I iII

Y 3\.

// \ I

I /*.

. I

FIGURE7

FIGURE 8

ENONmES

1 Heinz Guderian, Pmzerleldar, (New York, 19521, p. 309.

2 O.K.W. o r Oberkommando der Wehrmacht was the Supreme Command o f the Armed Forces o f Germany.

3 E r i c h von Manstein, Lphf-Yi r t&ns, (Navato, C a l i f o r n i a , 1982 [ o r i g i n a l copy r igh t 195811, p. 446.

4 I b i d . , p. 445.

5 Z i t a d e l l e i n E n g l i s h i s C i t a d e l .

6 Guderain, op. c i t . , pp. 308,309,

7 O.K.H. o r Oberkommando der Heeres was the Army High Command. H i t l e r had a l o n g r u n n i n g d i spu te w i t h OKH stemming f rom t h e i r o b j e c t i o n s t o the Poland and France campaigns. Throughout the course o f the war H i t l e r g r a d u a l l y t r a n s f e r r e d the r e s p o n s i b i l i t y f o r v a r i o u s t h e a t e r s o f war from OKH t o OKW. He l e f t o n l y the Eastern F ron t under the d i r e c t c o n t r o l o f OKH, b u t w i th h i m s e l f as the commander o f ope ra t i ons there . There was no supreme s t a f f which c o u l d d i r e c t the o v e r a l l war e f f o r t and p rov ide i npu t t o the fo rma t ion o f Grand S t ra tegy . I t was i n e v i t a b l e t h a t OW and OKH shou ld c l a s h on t h e i r ideas o f war p r i o r i t i e s and the a l l o c a t i o n o f resources t o the v a r i o u s thea te rs . I t was an i n e f f i c i e n t system, b u t i t s u i t e d H i t l e r ’ s temperment and h i s conf idence i n h i s own a b i l i t i e s as bo th s t r a t e g i c and opera t i ona l cmmander, e s p e c i a l l y i n the East .

8 Robert I c k s , E m o ~ ~ ~ l ~ Y - B a t f l t l n s , 1972), 162.(Garden C i t y , p .

9 Georgi Zhukov, M a . s b a l l b u Y & ~ ~ n k s . i ~ U l s s , (New York, 1969 [ o r i g i n a l copy r igh t 19651), pp. 209,210.

10 Geof f rey Jukes, ~llc~~s-1ha-~lahh,nf-8cmnrl 19681,(New York, pp. 45-47.

1 1 I b id . , pp. 38,39.

12 I b i d . , p. 41.

13 Pzkw or Panzerkampfwagen i s German f o r tank.

14 F.W. von M e l l e n t h i n , Eanrac-Bafflas, (Norman, 195.51, p. 219.

- 44 -

15 0 . A . Koltunou, 'Kurski The Clash o f Armour,' H i s t ~ ~ y S f - l l u Sncnnd-Wocld-Wac ( 1 9 7 3 , p . 1381.

16 Manstein, op. cit., p . 444.

17 Mellenthin, op. clt., p . 215.

- 45 -

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