Land, Environment and Climate Change: Challenges, Responses and Tools

Challenges, Responses and Tools

Land, EnvironmEnt and CLimatE ChangE

About this publicAtion

this publication provides an overview of some the most important land-related environmental and climate change problems that the world is facing. land, Environment and climate change offers an overview of the relationship between land tenure, land management approaches and the environment. this document identifies clear linkages between land, environment and climate change, moving from a scientific framework to a country level implementation framework. the implications this has in urban and rural areas are presented, and illustrated with 20 brief cases.

this global overview of key environmental and climate change issues related to land use, land administration, land management and land tenure offers timely material and land tools for land professionals, environmental practitioners, and planners. the report identifies opportunities, gaps and priority research areas and critical land tools for action at local, sub-national, national, regional and global levels. Readers will find in this publication action-oriented suggestions for new research, land tool development, advocacy, resource mobilisation, and coordination.

unitED nAtions huMAn sEttlEMEnts pRoGRAMME

shelter and sustainable human settlements Development Division

shelter branch (un-hAbitAt)

p. o. box 30030, nairobi 00100, Kenya

tel: +254 207623120;

Fax: +254 207624266

Website: www.unhabitat.org

HS/136/10E

ISBN: 978-92-1-132251-4

Land, Environment and Climate Change: Challenges, Responses and Tools

Copyright © United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT), 2010

HS/136/10E ISBN: 978-92-1-132251-4

Disclaimer

The designations employed and the presentation of the material in this publication do not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Secretariat of the United Nations concerning the legal status of any country, territory, city or area, or of its authorities, or concerning delimitation of its frontiers or boundaries, or regarding its economic system or degree of development. The analysis, conclusions and recommendations of this publication do not necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations Human Settlements Programme or its Governing Council.

United Nations Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT) P.O. Box 30030, Nairobi 00100, Kenya Tel: +254 20 762 3120 Fax: +254 20 762 3477 www.unhabitat.org

AcknowledgementsProfessor Stein Holden wrote the report under close supervision from Remy Sietchiping. The report was enriched by support and contributions from Sharif Ahmed, Clarissa Augustinus, Raf Tuts, Ulrik Westman and Humphrey Ngoiya (UN-HABITAT). Particular thanks go to the following contributors in the E-forum discussions: Abayomi Kurt, Ahmed Hassan, Aliyu Barau, Amjadpa Kalis, Belay Demissie, Carolyne Ouko, Dan Sullivan, David Harold Chester, David Jenkins, Douglas Pattie, Dr. Mohammed Abdur Razzak, Dwayne Erdmann, Edmundo Werna, Eugene Chigbu, Florah Ikawa, Geoffrey Payne, Iyenemi Kakulu, Jeffery J. Smith, Jennifer Whittal, John Stevenson, Joseph George Ray, Karl Fitzgerald, Marcel Rutten, David Jenkins, Douglas Pattie, Dr. Mohammed Abdur Razzak, Edmundo Werna, Eugene Chigbu, Florah Ikawa, Geoffrey Payne, Iyenemi Kakulu, Jeffery J. Smith, Jennifer Whittal, Jesse Ryder, John Stevenson, Karl Fitzgerald, Marcel Rutten, Max Hanee, Meltem Yilmaz, Nsamba-Gayiiya Eddie, Rachael Mrabu, Radhakrishnan Puthenveetil, Rita Rittenbergo, Robert Green, Rosemary Wachira, Ruqayya Garba Satomi, Soumya Dharmavaram, Tarrason Smith, Vera Agyenim-Boateng, and Wael Fahmi.

Photos by Remy Sietchiping, Stein Holden and Äsa Forsman

Principal authors: Stein Holden (Norwegian University of Life Sciences) and Remy Sietchiping (UN-HABITAT)

Contributors: Sharif Ahmed, Clarissa Augustinus, Raf Tuts and Humphrey Ngoiya of UN-HABITAT

Editing and layout: Robert Wagner, Britta Uhlig, Andrew Ondoo

Sponsors: Norwegian Government, Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency

Printer: UNON, Publishing Services Section, Nairobi, ISO 14001:2004-certified.

2010



3

Contents

Abbreviations 5

Foreword 6

Executivesummary 7

1.Introduction 11

1.1 overview of global and regional efforts on land and environment 12

1.2 Cities, land, and environment in climate change 15

2.Environmentalproblemsandconceptualframework 18

2.1 Key environmental problems 18

2.2 Conceptual framework 20

3.Environmentalchallengesandpossiblesolutions 26

3.1 neo-Malthusian poverty-environment traps 26

3.2 tenure insecurity in relation to urban expansion 27

3.3 tenure insecurity of poor slum dwellers 28

3.4 tenure insecurity and investment impacts 29

3.5 threats against tenure systems in pastoral and agro-pastoral areas 30

3.6 Land for the poor vs. land for bio-fuel and food production 31

3.7 the need for tenure reforms in areas with customary tenure. 32

3.8 Protect steep slopes from non-sustainable agricultural practices 34

3.9 Protect coastal zones and wetland areas 34

3.10 Consolidate fragmented land holdings 34

3.11 sustainable management of rented land 35

3.12 tree-planting has many benefits 37

3.13 Unequal land distribution, land degradation and inefficient land use 37

3.14 Protect settlements in threatened coastal areas and islands 38

3.15 Anticipate extreme weather events due to climate change 40

3.16 Avoid environmental damage in ‘frontier’ areas for new energy sources 40

3.17 the risk and consequences of elite capture of land reforms 42

4.Researchgapsandquestions 43

4.1 Key research questions 44

5.Keyprioritiesandpromisinglandtools 50

5.1 Land tenure reforms 50 5.2 Land rights records and registration 51 5.3 Land use planning 53 5.4 Regulation of land markets to achieve sustainable land use 55

ContEnts

4

LAnd, enviRonMent And CLiMAte ChAnge

5.5 Land management, administration and information 57 5.6 slum rehabilitation and resettlement 57 5.7 Land law, regulation and enforcement 57 5.8 Payment for environmental services 60 5.9 Payment of resource dividends 62 5.10 Participatory public works programmes 62 5.11 Collective action for enhancing environmental services 63 5.12 integrated rural and urban development 64 5.13 Urban slum tenure security provision and rehabilitation 65 5.14 Rescue plans for areas threatened by sea level rise and storm floods 67

6.Conclusions 69

7.References 72

Annex1.Conceptsinevaluatingalternativepolicies 78

TheGlobalLandToolNetwork 80

5

AbbReviAtions

abbrEviations

AUC AfricanUnionCommission

AfDB AfricanDevelopmentBank

CCCI CitiesinClimateChangeInitiative

CCRO CertificatesofCustomaryRightofOccupancy

DFPSIR DrivingForce-Pressure-State-Human Impact-Responseframework

DPIR DrivingForce-Pressure-Impact-Responseframework

EPLAUA EnvironmentalProtection,LandAdministrationand UtilizationAssociation

GEF GlobalEnvironmentalFacility

GHG Greenhousegas

GLASOD GlobalAssessmentofHumanInducedLandDegradation

GLTN GlobalLandToolsNetwork

GPS GlobalPositioningSystem

IPCC IntergovernmentalPanelonClimateChange

LAC landadministrationcommittee

LULUCF LandUse,LandUseChangeandForestry

MDG MillenniumDevelopmentGoals

MEA MillenniumEcosystemsAssessment

MTSIP MediumTermStrategicandInstitutionalPlan

PES Paymentforenvironmentalservices

REDD ReducingEmissionsfromDeforestationandforestDegradation

SUDNet SustainableUrbanDevelopmentNetwork

UNCCD UnitedNationsConventiontoCombatDesertification

UNCED UnitedNationsConferenceonEnvironmentandDevelopment

UNECA UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAfrica

UNEP UnitedNationsEnvironmentProgramme

UNFCCC UnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange

VLC VillageLandCertificates

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This publication examines the relationshipbetween land tenure, land managementapproaches and the environment in a world

thatisrapidlyurbanizingatthesametimeasclimatechangechallengesaregrowing.

Using 20 case studies, it focuses on the linkagesbetween land and the environment and how tomovefromascientificframeworktoacountrylevelimplementationframework.

Thestudiesincludeimportanttoolsforenhancementoflandrightsforthepoor,low-costlandregistrationand certification, as well as low-cost land useplanningandmapping.

Therearealsocasestudiesontheintroductionoflawsthatfacilitatebetterfunctioninglandrentalmarketsandthesustainablemanagementofrentedland.

This work further carries a global overview of keyenvironmental issues related to land use, landmanagement and land tenure – including thequestionofclimatechange.

We hope that this publication is a timely anduseful resource and tool for land professionals,environmentalpractitioners,andurbanplanners.

Dr.AnnaKajumuloTibaijukaExecutiveDirector,UN-HABITAT

ForEword

7

exeCUtive sUMMARy

ExECutivE summary

Thelion’sshareoflandresourcesis located in rural areas but,as of 2008, more than 50%

of the world’s population inhabiturban areas. Population growthand economic development causedrasticchangesinlanduseinmanypartsoftheworldandinstitutionalarrangementsneedseriousreformingto ensure sustainable use of theincreasingly scarce land resources.The effects of globalization are feltstronger with the threats of globalwarming,energyandfoodshortages,andmostrecentlythefinancialcrisisandglobalrecession.

Themainobjectiveofthisreportistoprovideascopingoverviewoftherelationship between land tenure,land management approaches andthe environment. The focus is onthe linkages between land andthe environment moving from ascientific framework to a countrylevel implementation framework.The implications thishas inurbanandruralareasarealsopresented.

Thereportcontainsaglobaloverviewofkeyenvironmentalissuesrelatedtolanduse,landmanagementandland tenure, including the issuessurrounding climate change. Thereportidentifiestheimplicationsofclimatechangewithregardtopolicydevelopment and implementationby governments and otherstakeholders.

Furthermore,itidentifieskeyoppo-rtunities,gapsandprioritieswherethe Global Land Tool Network(GLTN) and its partners couldadd value and take responsibility,including new research, tooldevelopment, advocacy, resourcemobilisation,andcoordination.

This report uses the DrivingForce-Pre s su re-St ate -Huma nI m p a c t - R e s p o n s e ( D F P S I R )framework,basedon thePressure-State-Response framework, as abasic element of the conceptualframework. It is important tounderstand the causes behindenvironmentaldegradationinordertoidentifysuitableresponses.

However,itmaynotalwaysbepo-ssibletoattacktherootcausesoftheproblems. In certain cases, diverseresponsesareneededbothtotackletherootcausesandgoforadaptationandmitigationstrategies.

The DFPSIR framework can serveasasimpleinterdisciplinarystartingpoint. It should thenevolve into abroaderconceptualframeworkthatcaptures essential elements of thefunctioningofsocio-environmentalsystems where market and non-market institutionsplay importantroles guiding resource utilizationand protecting and enhancinghumanwelfare.

Property rights are coredeterminantsforhowlandresourcesareutilizedandtheirwelfareeffectsare distributed through marketand non-market mechanisms.Similarly, the degree of marketdevelopment for natural resourcesas inputs in production and asessentialelementsoflivelihoodsandsafety nets for current and futuregenerations determine the needfor complementary non-marketinstitutions and regulations wheremarketsdonotworkproperly.

Diverse responses are needed both to tackle the root causes and go for adaptation and mitigation strategies

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This report builds on existingUN-HABITATwork and variousresearch undertaken in theareas of land, environmentaland climate change. From thiswork, a background documentwas developed and submitted forcomments and further enrichmenttoane-discussion.

Thee-discussionranontheGLTNwebsite from April to May, 2009.The e-discussion aimed at furtherenriching the background paperthat provided an overview of therelationship between land tenure,land management approaches andtheenvironment(includingclimatechangerelatedissues).Contributorsfromthee-discussionidentifiedandprioritisedkeyissuesandsolutions,based on suggested questions andresponses from the backgrounddocument.Prioritylandtoolswerealsoidentified.

Therefore,thefollowingmaincha-llenges,researchgapsandquestionsaswellasthepromisinglandtoolstoaddressthesetoolsaretheresultsof thorough research work andvaluable contributions from thee-discussion.

Themainenvironmentalchallengesare identified in chapter 3 andinclude:

• geographicalpoverty-environmenttraps

• tenureinsecurityundermininginvestmentincentivesandleadingtoenvironmentalmismanagementinurbanaswellasruralareas

• sharpincreasesindemandsforlandforfoodandbio-fuelproductioninareaswithweaklegalsystemsforprotectionoflandrights

• increasingpressuresoncustomarytenuresystemsthatareinneedofrevisions

• encroachmentinparticularlyvulnerableandvaluablehabitats

• increasingthreatsincoastalareasduetoseawaterriseandsevereweatherrisk.

• increasinglandfragmentationindenselypopulatedareas

• increasedactivityinlandrentalmarketsandshort-termmanagementstrategiesonrentedland

• deforestationandforestdegradationleadingtocarbonemissionsandlossofbiodiversity

• poorlandutilizationduetounequaldistributionofland.

• elitecaptureundermininglandreforms

Chapter 4 identifies importantresearchgapsandkeyresearchques-tions related to land, environmentand climate change. The researchquestions are linked to the mainenvironmentalchallengespresentedinchapter3.

Chapter 5 identifies key prioritiesandpromisinglandtoolsandcoversthefollowingareas:

• landrightsrecordsandregistration

• landuseplanning

• regulationoflandmarketstoenhancesustainablelanduse

• landmanagement,administrationandinformation

• slumrehabilitationandresettlement

• landlaw,regulationandenforcement

• paymentforenvironmentalservices

• participatorypublicworksprogrammesassafetynetsandasmeanstoinvestinenvironmentalconservation

• collectiveactionforenhancementofenvironmentalservices

9

exeCUtive sUMMARy

• provisionoftenuresecurityinurbanslums

• rescueplansforareasthreatenedbysealevelriseandstormfloods

Important tools for enhancementof land rightsof thepoor include:low-cost land registration andcertification, low-cost land useplanningandmapping,introductionof laws that facilitate betterfunctioning land rental marketsand sustainable management ofrentedland.

Design of Payment for EnvironmentalService (PES) schemes as a wayto create markets for resourcesthatare threatenedbydegradationand, consequently, also for theirmaintenanceandimprovement,canbecome important policy tools inthe future. However, this requiresinnovativedesignsandcarefulpilottesting before they are scaled up.The poverty of land users and thepoverty reduction effects of PESschemes will be important designconsiderations.

Productive safety nets are usefultools to conservenatural resourcesand enhance their productivitywhile at the same time providingemployment opportunities forpoor and vulnerable people. Thepotentialof suchproductive safetynets for urban slum rehabilitationshouldbefurtherexplored.

A progressive land and resourcedividend system, if introduced,may mobilize idle land from largeland and resource owners formore efficient use in countrieswith unequal land and resourcedistribution.However,tosucceeditiscrucialtoframesuchadividendsystem in apalatableway tobuildsufficient public support for itsintroduction. GLTN can takea leading role in piloting andpromoting the use and scaling upofsuchlandtools.

Rural development and urbandevelopment are closely linkedthrough migration, flow ofresources,economicempowerment,commodities and services. Theproblemofexpandingslumscannottherefore be seen as exclusively anurban problem as they are largelyfilled by immigrants from ruralareas. Slums may be comparedto a leaking boat: new migrantsflowinasearlierslumdwellersarerehabilitated or moved elsewhere.Theproblemcanonlybetackledatabroaderscalerequiringbothruralandurbandevelopment.

Sea level rise will be one of themostdifficultchallenges tohandlein certain coastal areas and islandstates.The industrializedcountrieshavelargelycausedtheproblemandshouldthussharetheresponsibilityforhelpingthepoorcountriesthatare severely threatened by climatechange effects. The outcome offutureinternationalnegotiationsonclimate change will set standardsand determine the amount ofresources that canbemobilized attheglobalscale.

Pro-poor land reforms in manycountries face serious constraintsfrom elite capture of reforms,resistanceagainstandpreventionofreforms that threaten the interestsof the wealthy landowners, andrent-seeking behavior leading toover-exploitationofresources.

International efforts are importantto enhance the transparency andaccountability in situations wherethe poor loose out. Recent large-scalelanddealsinAfricaandAsiainresponsetorisingbio-fueldemandand resulting food price increasesis an area where internationalorganizations can help poorcountries and local people in thenegotiations to develop contractsthatprotecttheirinterests.

Productive safety nets are useful tools to conserve natural resources and enhance their productivity

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Establishing better standards fortransparency and accountabilityand increased international pressuresand support to implement suchstandards will be important toreducelevelsofcorruptionandelitecapture.

To meet the Millennium DevelopmentGoal (MDG) goal 7, target 11to have achieved a significantimprovement in the lives of atleast 100 million slum dwellersby 2020, is a central concern ofUN-HABITAT.

This target must be seen inconnectionwiththefactorscausingrapid inflow of new migrants aswell as the fact that someof theseareas are in coastal zones that arethreatened by sea water rise andweather risk. Rural developmentand land reforms in rural areascancontributetoreducetheinflowof people and therefore be animportantpartofthesolution.

Similarly, rural development canbe seen as one of the means ofalleviating poverty and increasingincomes for both rural and urbanpeople. At the same time it mustbe an international responsibility,particularly for the countriesthat have contributed most tocarbon emissions toprovide fundsfor adequate compensation andalternative livelihoods for thepeople that are threatened by seawaterrise,droughtorfloodingduetoclimatechange.UNagenciescancontinue to take a leading role intheplanningofstrategiestotacklethisproblem.

Productive land use is essential to meet competing needs and demands. Cultivation on steep slopes in wollaita, southern Ethiopia.©S.Holden

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intRodUCtion

The lions’ share of landresources is located in ruralareas. Cities occupy only

2.8% of the earth’s land area, butas of 2008 more than 50% ofthe world’s population inhabiturban lands. Population growthand economic development causedrasticchangesinlanduseinmanypartsoftheworldandinstitutionalarrangementsneedcarefulrevisionsto ensure sustainable managementof the increasingly scarce landresources.Theeffectsofglobalizationarefeltstrongerwiththethreatsofglobal warming, energy and foodshortages, and most recently thefinancialcrisisandglobalrecession.

The underlying driving forces(including economic growth,technological changes, increasingpopulation pressure, and institutionalstructures) create pressures on theenvironment. Such pressures areparticularly severe in denselypopulatedareas.

However, lowpopulationareasarealsothreatenedbyextensivelandusepractices and contain vital naturalresources in form of biodiversityand carbon stocks. Destruction ofthese can have severe irreversibleimpacts on human welfare. Landresourcesarefundamentalforfoodproduction to meet human needs.The production capacity of theseland resources is threatened byvarious formsof landdegradation,conversion to non-agriculturalusesandsealevelriseduetoglobalwarming.

This again threatens the foodsecurity of millions or billions ofpeople, particularly those that arepoor and vulnerable. Their landentitlements for food productionand shelter are highly insecureand consequently so are theirlivelihoods.

There are urgent needs for actionat the global, national and locallevels to protect the increasinglyscarce land resources andparticularly the livelihoods of thepoor and vulnerable. Such actionshave to include both mitigationand adaptation responses to theenvironmental threats againsthumanwell-being.They alsoneedtodealwiththeunderlyingdrivingforces as well as the more directpressureson thenatural resources.The design of institutionalmechanisms for action is thus ofcentral importance and where theUN and UN-HABITAT haveimportantrolestoplay.

Themainobjectiveofthispublicationis to provide an overview of therelationship between land tenure,land management approaches andthe environment. The focus is onthe linkages between land andthe environment moving from ascientific framework to a countrylevel implementation framework.It contains a global overview ofkey environmental issues relatedtolanduse,landmanagementandland tenure, including the issuessurroundingclimatechange.Morespecificallythestudy:

1. introduCtion

Land resources are fundamental for food production to meet human needs.

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a) Reviewsexistingworkinthearea.

b) Identifiesthemainchallengesinlandmanagementandlandtenureapproachesandtheenvironmentalimplicationsincludingclimatechange.

c) Takesintoaccountpolicydevelopmentsandimplementationbygovernmentsandotherstakeholders.

d) Identifieskeyopportunities,gapsandprioritieswhereGLTNanditspartnerscouldaddvalueincludingnewresearch,tooldevelopmentandadvocacy.

e) Hasglobalcoveragedrawingfromexperienceinallregions.

The study uses a conceptualframework that integrates theDriving Force-Pressure-State-Human Impact-Response (shownin figure 1) framework. It buildson the Millennium DevelopmentGoalsandglobaloverviewsofland-related environmental problems,identifies the most important oftheseproblems,assesses thenatureof each of these with illustrativeexamples, and identifies theextentto which land tenure reforms can

play an important role to addresseachoftheseissues.

Furthermore, it identifies the keyareas where UN-HABITAT andGLTN can fill important gapsbasedon an e-discussionwithkeystakeholders.Heretheworkbuildson the UN-HABITAT Agenda,the GLTN Agenda, the GLTNpublicationSecureLandRightsForAll and the draft UN-HABITATstrategy on cities in climatechange.

1.1 oveRview of global and Regional effoRTs on land and enviRonmenT

Concernsaboutthelimitedcapacityof the global environment gainedglobalattentionwiththe“LimitstoGrowth” study in the early 1970sandthisboostedtheenvironmentalmovements around theworld.TheCommission on Environment andDevelopment (UNCED, 1987)had a profound impact on globalthinking on environmental issuesand tied these issues topoverty inlessdevelopedcountries.

Productive land use is essential to meet competing needs and demands. ©UN-HABITAT/RemySietchiping

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intRodUCtion

The seventh Millennium Develop-mentGoalaims toensureenviron-mentalsustainability.Itstargetsare:

• tointegratetheprinciplesofsustainabledevelopmentintocountrypoliciesandprogramsandreversethelossofenvironmentalresources,

• toreducebiodiversityloss,achievingby2010asignificantreductionintherateofloss,

• tohalve,by2015,theproportionofthepopulationwithoutsustainableaccesstosafedrinkingwaterandbasicsanitation,

• tohaveachievedasignificantimprovementinthelivesofatleast100millionslumdwellersby2020.

The Millennium EcosystemsAssessment (MEA) was launchedin 2001 to be completed in fouryearswithafocusonhowchangesinecosystemserviceshaveaffectedhuman well-being, how ecosystemchanges will affect people infuture decades, and what types ofresponses can be adopted at local,national,orglobalscalestoimproveecosystemmanagementandtherebycontributetohumanwell-beingandpovertyalleviation(WRI,2003).

United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) and UN-HABITAThavebeengivenspecialroles by the Secretary-Generalin the fields of environment andhuman settlements. These includemonitoring and assessment ofglobal and regional environmentaland human settlement trendsand early warning informationon environmental threats andcoordination of internationalcooperation and action related tothese(UN,1999).

The Secretary-General alsoestablished a Task Force onEnvironment and HumanSettlements to be chairedby UNEP (UN, 1998). TheTask Force recommendedcoordinated efforts by UNEPand UN-HABITAT in the areaof environment and humansettlements. The Secretary-General took the initiative toestablish an EnvironmentalManagement Group (EMG) toenhanceinter-agencycoordinationin the field of environment andhumansettlements.

WhileUN-HABITAThadacentralrolewhenthisinitiativewastaken,itappearstohaveamoremarginalrole in the 2008 stock taking ofcollaboration and coordination ofenvironmentalactivitiesintheUNsystem(UNEMG,2008).

In Annex 1 of this report UN-HABITAT is indicated in theparticular areas of environmentto assist local authorities withbasic urban services such as wastemanagement, water, sanitation,sustainable urban mobility andtransportation, and the urbanpoverty and environment nexusthroughcapacitybuilding,providingtechnical advice, guidelines, andtools. The EMG identifies “Land”as an inter-agency matter in itsTechnical Meeting in February2009(UNEMG,2009).

The EMG is considering a jointpublication that will highlight thebenefits of drylands for release in2010. The publication will guideUnitedNations-widecontributionstotheglobalpartnershiptoreverseand prevent desertification/landdegradation and to mitigate theeffectsofdroughtinaffectedareas,inordertosupportpovertyreduction,climate change mitigation andadaptation, and environmentalsustainability.

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The report will provide a guidefor public and private investments- supported by UN agencies - tocoherentlyrespondtoopportunitieswithinthemandateof the10-yearstrategicplanoftheUNConventionto Combat Desertification(UNCCD).

The major global initiatives,governing institutions and theirassociatedrolesare:

• theUNConventiontoCombatDesertification(UNCCD)isthebroadestandaddresseslanddegradationindrylandsareas.

• theFoodandAgricultureOrganization(FAO)and

• theInternationalFundforAgriculturalDevelopment(IFAD)bothaddressproblemsofsoilfertilityandfoodproduction.

• theSecretariatoftheConventiononBiologicalDiversityalsoaddresseslandissues.

• UNEPhasacoordinationroleandisinvolvedinmonitoringandassessinglanddegradation.

• UNDPisinvolvedinpromotingNationalActionProgrammes.

• UN-HABITATisinvolvedinlandmanagementissuesrelatedtourbanization.

The World Bank is a majorinternational player in the fieldof land and environment policieswith its influence on national andinternational policies and withits lending programs supportingland reforms, many developmentprogramswithlargeenvironmentalimpacts, and environmentalconservation programs like theGlobal Environmental Facility(GEF). The Bank launched a newland policy document in 2003(Deininger, 2003) signaling abroader approach to land policiesand land reforms with strongeremphasisonpovertyreduction.

The World Development Report2008 of the World Bank focusedon Agriculture for Developmentand had separate sections on landandenvironmentissues.

The Intergovernmental Panelon Climate Change (IPCC) is ascientific intergovernmental bodysetupbytheWorldMeteorologicalOrganization (WMO) and bythe United Nations EnvironmentProgramme (UNEP) in 1988 toprovide decision-makers with anobjective source of informationaboutclimatechange.

The first report of IPCC was thebasis for negotiating the UnitedNations Framework Conventionon Climate Change (UNFCCC)treaty.“TheroleoftheIPCCistoassessonacomprehensive,objective,open and transparent basis thescientific, technical and socio-economic information relevant tounderstanding the scientific basisof risk of human-induced climatechange, its potential impactsand options for adaptation andmitigation.Reviewsbyexpertsandgovernmentsareanessentialpartofthe IPCC process. The Panel doesnotconductnewresearch,monitorclimate-relateddataorrecommendpolicies”(IPCC,2004).

TheKyotoProtocolwasestablishedunder theUNFCCC treaty at theUnited Nations Conference onEnvironment and Development(UNCED), informally known asthe Earth Summit held in Rio deJaneiroinJune1992.Theprotocolwasadopted inDecember1997inKyoto,Japan,andenteredintoforcein February 2005. Kyoto includesdefined“flexiblemechanisms”suchas Emissions Trading, the CleanDevelopmentMechanismandJointImplementationasmechanismsforGHGreductions.

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intRodUCtion

The Kyoto Protocol requested anIPCCSpecialReportexaminingthescientificandtechnicalimplicationsof carbon sequestration strategiesrelated to land use, land-usechange, and forestry activities andrelevant Articles of the Protocol.Thisprovidedabasisfortreatmentof land use, land use change andforestry (LULUCF) activities andadopted definitions, modalities,rules and guidelines relating toLULUCF activities under Articles3,6and12oftheKyotoProtocol.

Reducing emissions from deforestationand forest degradation (REDD) hasemerged as a recent initiative thataimstoreducegreenhousegas(GHG)emissionsbyprovidingincentivestoindividuals, communities, projectsand countries (Angelsen, 2008).UNFCCC laid the foundationsforincludingREDDindevelopingcountries in the post-2012 climateprotectionregime.

The African Union Commission(AUC), the United NationsEconomic Commission for Africa(UNECA), and the AfricanDevelopment Bank(AfDB) havedeveloped a framework andguidelinesforlandpolicyandlandreforminAfricainordertoenhanceland rights, land productivity andthesecurityoflivelihoods.

The following section explains inmore detail what UN-HABITATisinvolvedindoingrelatedtoland,environmentandclimatechange.

1.2 CiTies, land, and enviRonmenT in ClimaTe Change

The least developed countries,small-island developing Statesand countries in Africa face themost difficult challenges andurgentlyneedtheassistanceof theinternational community in orderto successfully safeguard the livesand livelihoods of their peoples,while attaining their developmentgoals.

The UN-HABITAT strategy oncities in climate change identifiesthe key climate change adaptationchallengesfromanurbanperspectiveand highlights UN-HABITAT’srole and ongoing activities in thisarea.

Three-quarters of all large citiesare located on the coast. Mostof the world’s urban populationresides in vulnerable areas whichare ill-equipped for adaptation.One billion people are living inslums, and are likely to becomeenvironmental refugees (UN-HABITAT2008).Climateshocks,like storms, floods and droughts,arealsocausingpovertyandlargerinequity and require strongerglobal safety nets, adaptation andmitigationstrategies.

UN-HABITAT supports nationalandlocalauthoritiesintheireffortstocopewiththeimpactsofclimatechange.UN-HABITAT’s work onlocalizedclimatechangeadaptationbuildson15yearsofexperienceandactivities is responding to globaltrendsinurbanizationandpovertyreduction.

Buildingonthelongcollaborationthrough the Sustainable CitiesProgramme, UN-HABITAT andUNEParecommittedtoprovideabetter and wider range of servicesto local and national governmentsin the field of urban environmentthrough a Strategic PartnershipFramework (2008-2013). UNEPand UN-HABITAT will providea menu of services on agreedfocus areas and actions includingclimate change, urban air qualityand transport (UN-HABITAT,2008a).UN-HABITATwill focuson better integration of local andnational planning in adaptationandmitigationstrategiesrelatedtoclimate change with emphasis onparticipatory planning processesandtheneedsofpoorslumdwellerswho are particularly vulnerableandhave very limited resources toprotectthemselves.

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Furthermore,monitoringofclimatechangeinselectedcitiesandcapacitybuilding and knowledge sharingwillbecentralactivities.

Newinitiativesofrelevanceincludethe Cities in Climate ChangeInitiative (CCCI) and SustainableUrban Development Network(SUDNet). Other documentsthat will be defining prioritiesfor this study are the plannedhuman settlement report for2011 and the Agency MediumTerm Strategic and InstitutionalPlan (MTSIP 2008-2011)(UN-HABITAT, 2007). MTSIP2008-2011 gives priority to urbanpoverty and environment withreference to the MillenniumDevelopment Goals. It alsorefers to the 2004 evaluation ofUN-HABITAT which called fora sharpening of its programmaticfocus and the broadening of itsfundingbase.

UN-HABITAT should thereforeidentify a few critical areas of itsbroad mandates in order to havethegreatest impact.Basedonthis,six mutually reinforcing focusareas with recognized comparativeadvantage,were identified.Twooftheseareofparticularrelevancehere:focusarea3,promotionofpro-poorlandandhousingandfocusarea4,environmentallysoundbasicurbaninfrastructure and services. Whilefocusarea3coversbothruralandurbanareas,focusarea4isonlyforurbanareas.

Focusontheenvironmentinurbanareaswillparticularlyberelatedtoclimate change as an entry point.UN-HABITAT has been given aspecial responsibility for followingup the Millennium DevelopmentGoaltargettoimprovethelivesofat least 100 million slum dwellersby2020(UN-HABITAT,2008a).

urban slum on the waterfront, haiti. most of Port-au-Prince’s residents live in vulnerable areas. ©ÄsaForsman

17

intRodUCtion

Thereport isorganizedas follows.Chapter 2 provides a conceptualframework and the main land-related environmental challengesarepresentedinchapter3.Researchgapsandkeyresearchquestionsarepresentedinchapter4,followedbythe identification of key prioritiesandpromisinglandtoolsinchapter5. Conclusions are presented inchapter 6 and the references inchapter7.

Themethodsapplied inproducingthisdocumentincluded:

• reviewofalargeamountofinternationalscientificandpublicliteraturetoidentifythekeyenvironmentalproblems.

• identificationanddevelopmentofaconceptualframeworkthatcanserveasaninter-disciplinarytoolforlinkingthecomplexland,environment,andclimatechangeissuestotheirunderlyingcauses,theirconsequencesforhumanwell-being,andtherelevantactionstotackletheproblems.

• providecasestudyexamplesofthekeyland-relatedenvironmentalissuesthatneedtobeaddressed.

• identifykeyprioritytoolstobeusedtoaddresstheidentifiedissues.

• exposethepreliminaryfindingstoe-forumdiscussionstoimproveonafirstversionofthereport.

• incorporatecontributionsfrome-discussionsandothercontributors.

Basedonthisassessmentthereportusedaframeworktoidentifykeylandrelatedenvironmentalproblems.

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do you Know?

TheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange(UNFCCC), in its Article 1,defines climate change as: “achange of climate which isattributed directly or indirectlyto human activity that altersthe composition of the globalatmosphere and which is inaddition to natural climatevariability observed overcomparable time periods.”The UNFCCC thus makes adistinction between “climatechange” attributable tohuman activities altering theatmospheric composition, and“climatevariability”attributabletonaturalcauses.

desertification is defined bytheUNConventiontoCombatDesertification as “landdegradation in arid, semiaridand dry sub-humid areasresulting from various factors,including climatic variationsand human activities. Landdegradation is defined as thereductionorlossofthebiologicalor economic productivity ofdrylands. Drylands include drysub-humid, semiarid, arid, orhyper-aridareas.

This section provides anoverview of key globalenvironmental problems

(rural and urban) related toland as well as pressures on theenvironment, their underlyingcauses,theirlinkstohumanwelfare(impacts), and responses. This isbasedonareviewofalargeamountof scientific literature (see moredetailedcitationsbelow).

Amodified versionof theDrivingForce-Pre s su re-State -HumanI m p a c t- R e s p o n s e ( DF P S I R )framework is used as a part ofthe conceptual framework. It iscomplementedwithconcepts fromenvironmental and institutionaleconomicstostrengthenthebasisfordiscussion of relevant institutionalresponses.

Theadvantageofthisframeworkisitsflexibilitysuchthatitcaneasilybeadaptedtoawiderangeofissues,scalesandtimeperiods.Itdoesnotrequirealargesetofdefinitionsandhas a multi-disciplinary character.Themainweakness is that lackofrigor limits its analytical power.This is compensated by a set ofdefinitions of concepts used inenvironment and developmenteconomics to analyze land andenvironment-relatedpolicyissues.

2.1 Key enviRonmenTal pRoblems

Ruralandurbanareasareverydiversein terms of environmental as wellas socio-economic characteristics.Therefore the type and severity ofenvironmentalproblemsalsodifferconsiderably. Land degradation

is a broad concept capturing bothdegradationofvegetationandsoils.In arid and semi-arid areas itmaybe synonymous to desertification.The most important types of landdegradationareasfollows;

• Deforestation.ThisisaproblemprimarilyindevelopingcountriesbuthasalsobecomeaproblemineasternpartsofRussiaduetohighdemandinChinaandtheinabilitytocontrolillegaldeforestationthere.Deforestationisalsoamajorcontributortoglobalcarbonemissions.MuchofthetropicaldeforestationtakesplaceinrainforestareasinLatin-AmericaandAsia.

• Lossofbiodiversity.Thisproblemisassociatedwithdeforestationaswellaschangeswithinexistingfarmingsystems(lossofagro-biodiversity)duetochangesinthetypesofcrops,cropvarietiesandlivestockbreedskept.Climatechangeandincreasingpressuresinvarioushabitatsarealsocontributingfurthertotheselosses.

• Soilerosion.Soilerosionisparticularlysevereintropicalagriculturewherethenaturalvegetationhasbeenremoved,onslopinglands,whererainfallisintense,andsoilsareerodible.Itisassociatedwithdeclininglandproductivityovertimeandcanalsocausepermanentlossofarableland.Erosionalsocontributestosiltationofdamsandrivers.

2. EnvironmEntaL ProbLEms and ConCEPtuaL FramEworK

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enviRonMentAL PRobLeMs And ConCePtUAL fRAMewoRK

Rural and urban areas are very diverse in terms of environmental as well as socio-economic characteristics.

• Nutrientdepletion.Thisisacommonprobleminintensivelow-inputagricultureandcanalsoleadtolowerlandproductivityandexhaustionofsoilsbecausenutrientslostwithcropsandsoilsarenotreplaced.

• Soilacidification.ThisisparticularlyaproblemonsoilsthatareinitiallyacidicandwherecropcultivationandfertilizeruseleadtofurtheracidificationandwherelimingisnotusedtobringupthepH-level.Itcanalsoleadtodecliningcropproductivityandmakeitimpossibletogrowsomecrops.

• Salinization.Thisisapotentialproblemonirrigatedlandswhereevaporationofwaterleadstoahigherconcentrationofsaltsinthesoilsurfacetoalevelthatbecomestoxictocrops.

• Overgrazing.Toointensivegrazingcanalsoexhaustgrazinglandsandcauselossofsoilproductivityandthisisusuallyduetooverstockingofanimals.

• Soilandwaterpollution,duetoexcessivepesticideuseandotherpollutants,canbeaprobleminintensiveagricultureanddenselypopulatedareassuchasslums.Particularlyincountrieswheresuchemissionsarenotregulatedcarefully,likeinsomedenselypopulateddevelopingcountries,regions,citiesandperi-urbanareas.

• Habitatdestruction.Thisinvolvesenvironmentaldamagethatreducesthedifferenttypesofecosystemservices.

• Desertificationoccurswhenlanddegradationaffectslargeareasindrylands.

Urban areas also have several ofthe same types of land-relatedenvironmental problems with soil,waterandairpollutionasthemostsevere urban problems in manydevelopingcountries.

The severity of these land-relatedenvironmental problems variesgreatlyacrosslocationsandsodoesthevulnerabilityofthepeoplelivinginthedifferentlocationstotheeffectsof these environmental problems.Theseverityoftheeffectscanalsobedelayedtillcertainthresholdlevelsof degradation or accumulationhavebeenpassedandmaythereforebe ignored or underestimated bycurrent populations while futuregenerations will be badly affected.This is particularly the case forglobal warming where those whohave caused theproblem aremoreable to protect themselves thanthosewhoaremostseverelyaffectedbyclimateshocksandsealevelriseduetoclimatechange.

There have been three globalassessmentsoflanddegradation,thefirstbeingtheGlobalAssessmentofHumanInducedLandDegradation(GLASOD)in1990(Oldeman et al., 1990), the second being the studybyDregneandChou(1992)andthethirdbyLeperset al.(2005).Theseprovide rough estimates of theextent of land degradation whichisestimated tobebetween10and20%orbetween6and12millionsquarekilometersofthedrylands.

GLASOD was based on expertopinion only, with variability inqualityandextentofquantification.Dregne and Chou’s assessmentwasbasedonsecondarysourcesofvaryingquality.Leperset al.didnothavecompletespatialcoverageandwaslimitedto62%ofdrylands.

As stated by WRI (2005, p.19);“The shortcomings of theseavailable assessments point tothe need for a systematic globalmonitoring program, leading todevelopment of a scientificallycredible, consistent baseline of thestateofdesertification.”

The lack of such a system andbaselinedatamakesitimpossibletodistinguishandquantifythehumaninducedlanddegradationexceptin

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Box2.2.1: driving Forces:

economic growth

• Increasedconsumption

population pressure

• Highpopulationgrowth

• Immigration

externalities/market failures

• Missingmarkets

• Imperfectmarkets

Transaction costs/imperfect information

• Lackofawarenessofconsequences

• Lackofawarenessofopportunities

• Lackofcollectiveaction

opportunistic behavior (moral hazard, corruption)

• Policyfailures

• Inadequatelawsandregulations

• Lackoflawenforcement

• Inappropriatepublicexpenditurepriorities

• Inappropriatetaxesandsubsidies

a few case study areas where suchdataexist.Leperset al.findthattheAmazonbasin,SoutheastAsiaandSiberiaaretheareaswithmostrapiddeforestation.DrylandsdegradationismostrapidinAsia.Itisnotclearhow important the human factorhas been in the Sahel as the pastdroughts cannot be claimed to behuman-induced.Manyofthemostpopulated and rapidly changingcities are located in the tropics(Lepers et al., 2005).

2.2 ConCepTual fRamewoRK

The Driving Force-Pressure-State-HumanImpact-Response(DFPSIR)framework, based on the Pressure-State-Responseframework(OECD,1993), is used as a basic elementof the conceptual framework (seeBox2.2.1).A simplified versionofit is presented in Figure 1. Moredetailed content for each of theboxes follows in the numberedboxesonthefollowingpages.

ItexpandsfromtheDrivingForce-Pressure-Impact-Response (DPIR)framework used by the EuropeanEnvironmental Agency, andUNEP.Itgivesexplicitattentiontotheenvironmentalaswellashumanimpactsofpressurescausedby themore fundamental driving forces.Theessenceisthatthisisaflexibleframeworkthatcanbeadaptedtoawiderangeofissues,scalesandtimeperiods.

For the purpose of this report, itisflexible inscaleandtime frame,andistargetedtowardstheimpactson poor and vulnerable rural andurban populations. It is dynamicandfocusesonresponsesatdifferentlevels (local, national, regionalandglobal), andofdifferent types(technological,institutional).

TheDFPSIRframeworkmaytacklethe underlying driving forces, themore proximate pressure factors,the environment (natural resourcebase), or the human populationsmore directly. This makes it morepeople- and poverty-orientedthan the initial DPIR framework,emphasizing the interdependencebetweenenvironmentalandhumanhealthandwelfare(well-being).

Variants of it have been used toidentify key indicator variables forthe state of the environment. Themodifiedframeworkisusedforthatpurposealsoinanalyzinglandandenvironmentrelationsthatfocusonpoor and vulnerable populations.Thisisrelevantformonitoringandimpact assessment in relation toeffectsofthedrivingforcesaswellas responses, like use of variouslandtools.SuchindicatorvariablescouldalsobelinkeddirectlytotheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.

Someofthelimitationsofthesekindofbroad frameworks are that theydo not build on strong theoreticalfoundationsor applyvery rigorousmethods e.g. to test hypotheses orestablishcausalitybetweendifferentfactors.Theyratherdependonbasicsystem thinking in the biologicaland social sciences through someform of consensus-building onwhat are the key elements toinclude. To compensate for someofthese limitationswehaveaddedanenvironmentalanddevelopmenteconomicsperspective.

The components of the DFPSIRframeworkareasfollows:

Driving Forces are the underlyingfactorsinformofpopulationgrowth,technological characteristics andchanges, institutional (includingpolitical, market, cultural, social)structuresandchanges.

Many of the most populated and rapidly changing cities are located in the tropics.

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Land laws and land markets aretypical institutional factors thataffect land resources through howthey impacton landmanagement.There are typically nestedinteractions among these drivingforces.

Pressures are the activities thatfollowfromthedrivingforcesandthat have direct impacts on theenvironment.Suchpressurescouldbeforestclearingtoconvertlandforagriculturalproduction,conversionof agricultural land to other usesfor the expansion of cities, orpollution of land, water and airfrom industrial and other humanactivities. Pressures emerge fromthe incentive structures created bythedrivingforces.

State of the Environment can becaptured by assessing the stock ofnatural resources, the changes inthesestocksorvariousindicatorsofenvironmentalqualitylike,erosionlevels,nutrientstocksorflows,soilacidityor salinity,pollution levels,changes in areas or quantities ofcarbon, loss of species, or loss of

habitats. Global warming due toGHG emissions causes changes inairandwatertemperatures,sealevelrise and severity of storms, floods,anddroughts.

Human Impacts of the changesin the environment are measuredthrougha rangeof indicators, likepoverty status, food security orother measures of vulnerability,accessto landandotherresources,tenure security, market access,access to shelter and other basichumanneeds,accesstosafetynets,andthedegreeofempowermentorpoliticalinfluence.AtaggregatelevelthesearerelatedtotheMillenniumDevelopmentGoals.

Responses include responses atlocal, national and internationallevels. They can address theDriving Forces, the Pressures, theEnvironment or Human Well-being. The time perspective mayalso vary and can be short-termor very long-term. Categories ofresponses are classified indifferentways(seefigure1).

Drivingforces: demographic technology institutions

Responses:Policy responses, Adaptation, Mitigation

Pressures: Competing demands for land

HumanImpacts: increased vulnerability

StateoftheEnvironment: Land degradation, climate change

FIgURe1. the driving force-pressure-state of the Environment-human impacts-response Framework

source s. Holden

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Different typologies of responseshavebeenused(seeWRI,2005foranoverview).Itisusefultoclassifyfive main types of ecosystemmanagement: development,prevention,mitigation, adaptation,and rehabilitation. Responsesmay also be divided in legal,technological,economic,socialandbehavioral,andcognitiveresponsesalthough many of these categoriesareclearlyoverlapping.

Forexample,commandandcontrollegalresponsesthroughenforcementwith punishment like fines andimprisonmentalsocreateeconomicincentives. Market or incentive-basedeconomicresponsesalsoneedalegalfoundationbeforetheycanbeimplemented.Institutionsrepresenttherulesofthegame(North,1979)andhavebothlegalandtraditional(customary) foundations. New orincreasingenvironmentalproblemsrequire institutional innovation atmultiplelevelsanddimensions.

It is important to understandthe causes behind environmentaldegradation in order to identifysuitable responses. However, itmaynotalwaysbepossibletoattackthe root causes of the problems.In certain cases diverse responsesareneededbothtoattacktherootcauses and go for adaptation andmitigation strategies. The DFPSIRframework can serve as a simpleinterdisciplinary starting pointbut needs to be combined with abroaderconceptualframework.

Property rights are coredeterminantsforhowlandresourcesareutilizedandtheirwelfareeffectsare distributed through marketand non-market mechanisms.Similarly, the degree of marketdevelopment for natural resourcesas inputs in production and asessentialelementsoflivelihoodsandsafety nets for current and futuregenerations determine the needfor complementary non-marketinstitutions and regulations wheremarketsdonotworkproperly.

An environmental and institutional economics conceptual basis

An understanding of basicinstitutional structures and thefactors explaining these structuresandhoweasyit is tochangethemis important before choice ofappropriate interventions can bemade.Thisapplies inparticulartotheDrivingForcesintheDFPSIR-framework(seebox2.2).

Thesebasicconditionsareimportantdeterminants of human behavior,the existence or non-existence ofspecifictypesofmarkets, likelandmarkets and markets for varioustypesofenvironmentalservices,andnegativeenvironmentalexternalities(such as air or water pollution).For a basic understanding of theeconomics of rural organization.Useful references includeBinswangerandRosenzweig(1986),Hoff,BravermanandStiglitz(1993).Foranunderstandingofthechoicebetween alternative environmentaland natural resource policies, seeSterner(2003).

Annex 1 provides definitions ofbasic concepts used in evaluatingalternativepolicyinterventionsandtheircostsandbenefits.

Environmental problems related to land and the role of market interventions

Market failures as a cause ofenvironmental problems areparticularly severe in relation toland degradation in developingcountries and for inter-temporalproblems like climate change.ThisiswhatNicholasStern(2007)framed as “a problem of inter-temporal international collectiveactionwithmajoruncertaintyandlinkedmarketfailures.”

Box2.2.2: Pressures:

increased food demand and demand for land for agricultural production:

• Forestclearingforextensiveagriculture

• Burningandremovalofbiomass

• Inadequatefallowperiods

• Useoferosivecropsandcultivationsystems

• Inadequateinvestmentinsoilandwaterconservation

• Overgrazing

• Monocropping

• Overuseoffertilizerandpesticides

• Depletionofopenaccessresources

urban land use:

• Congestionandexpansionofslums

• Uncontrolledsettlement

global warming:

• Risingsealevel

The existence of market failures implies a need for policy interventions.

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The existence of market failuresimpliesaneedforpolicyinterventionsto internalize the externalitiescaused by these market failures.Existenceofhightransactioncostsand asymmetric information areimportantreasonsforimperfectionsinmarkets,includingnon-existenceofmarkets.

Interventionsthatcanreducethesetransaction costs and informationasymmetriesarethereforeimportantpolicyinstrumentstomakemarketswork better and also to reduceenvironmentalproblemscausedbythese. However, high transactioncostsmayalsoprotectenvironmentalresources like remote hilly forestareaswherenoroadsarebuiltandwhere it is therefore too costly toextracttheforestresources.

Establishment of market-likemechanisms may also be used tobetter protect the environmentwhere severe externalities exist.Establishment of payment forenvironmental services (PES) anddistributionoftradablequotassuchasforcarbonemissionsareexamplesof market-like mechanisms whereno markets previously existed andwhere this had negative externaleffects. Such mechanisms createprivate incentives for betterenvironmentalmanagement.

Another example is use of thepolluterpaysprinciplewhere thereis no market for the damage thatpollution creates and pollutersignoretheeffectsoftheiractivity.Bychargingthepolluter themarginalcost of pollution, an optimal levelof pollution may be established asan alternative or complementarymechanism to direct regulationof pollution and technology andresourceuseleadingtopollution.

Incaseswhenmarketmechanismsdo not work or are less efficient,non-market interventions may bepreferable.Suchinterventionscouldbe in form of direct regulationthrough prohibition of certainactivities, setting of standards fortechnologychoiceormanagement,orputtingrestrictionsonharvestingor pollution levels. Less restrictiveapproaches could be to providerecommendationsforbestpracticesand information about negativeconsequencesofnotfollowingsuchstandards. Cost-benefit analysesmay be used to compare thedifferentapproaches,however,wheninterventions have large effects itmaybenecessarytodevelopmodelstoestimatetherelativeperformanceofthealternativeapproaches.

Box2.2.3: state of the environment:

land:

• erosion

• Nutrientdepletion

• Compaction

• Acidification

• Pollution

• Salinization

• Lossofagriculturalland

• Lossofresidentialland

vegetation:

• Lossofbiomass(carbonemissions)

• Lossofbiodiversity

• Habitatfragmentationanddestruction

water:

• Lowwateruseefficiency

• Pollution

• Siltationofirrigationsystems

• Sealevelrise

soil erosion due to poor conservation, north shewa, amhara region, Ethiopia©S.Holden

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Property rights and environmental degradation

Non-existence of or unclear orincomplete specification of tenurerights are important reasons forthe existence of environmentalexternalities.Coordination failuresin relation to common propertyregimes are another reason forenvironmental damages. This ismorelikelytobethecaseinrelationto global commons (e.g. climatechange) than local commons(e.g. management of a communalforest).

Wherenopropertyrightsexist(res nullius)orwheresuchrightsarenotrespectedorenforced(leadingtode facto openaccess),excessiveresourceextraction may take place. Suchproblemsaremorelikelyinrelativelylowpopulationdensityareaswherecommon property is still thedominantregimeandareimportantreasonsforrapiddeforestationandlossofbiodiversity (inAsia,AfricaandLatin-America).

Establishment of private propertyrightsforsuchforestareasdoesnotalways lead to a well functioningmarket for forest land because oftherelativeabundanceofsuchlandandforests.Alternativemechanismsmaybeneededtocontrolsuchrapiddeforestation. Since deforestationis an important contributor tocarbonemissions(aboutonefifthofall emissions), reducing emissionsfrom deforestation and forestdegradation(REDD)indevelopingcountries is likely to be includedin the next global climate treaty.REDDisnotincludedintheKyotoProtocolundertheUnitedNationsFrameworkConventiononClimateChange (UNFCCC). It is a coreidea of REDD to reward thosewhoreduceemissionsbuttherearemultiple challenges related to theimplementation, monitoring andenforcementofsuchmechanisms.

Lackofclearlyspecifiedandsecureproperty rights may representan important constraint tomore sustainable and intensivemanagement of agricultural lands.Tenure insecurity can undermineincentives to conserve and investonlandtoenhanceitsproductivity.Land titling has been seen as theway to obtain private and secureproperty rights, however, landtitling programmes have moreoftenthannotfailedtoachievethisindevelopingcountries.

High costs, limited administrativecapacityandcorruptionhavecausedland titling programs to favor thewealthyattheexpenseofthepoor(Benjaminsen et al., 2009, Cotula et al., 2004). UN-HABITAT hasthereforeemphasizedidentificationof alternative low-cost and pro-poor land tools that canovercomethe problems of traditional landtitling,buildingonacontinuumoflandrightsperspective.Customarytenuresystemsmayprovidetenuresecurityinmanyplacesbutmayalsobeassociatedwithtenureinsecurityif they are not recognized by theformalsystemandiflandpressurescontribute to tougher competitionoverscarcelandresources.

Local power structures (politicaleconomy) influence how the landresources are distributed and thedegree of tenure security of landusers. Government interventionsthrough past and recent landreforms and policies have hadambiguous effects on tenuresecurity. These interventionsalso have consequences for landmanagement,landconservationandinvestmentswheretenureinsecuritymay lead to short-sightedbehaviorandmorerapidlanddegradation.

Land sales and land rentalmarkets affect land management,conservation incentives, otherinvestments and productivity.

Box2.2.4: human impacts: indicators for vulnerable groups - rural populations in

poor countries:

• Povertystatus

• Foodsecurity

• Nutritionalstatus

• Accesstohealthservices

• Accesstoanddistributionof

• landandotherresources

• Tenuresecurity

• Accesstocleanwater

• Accesstomarkets

• Accesstoeducation

• Accesstosafetynets

• Controloverlocalresources

• exposuretoclimatechangeandrisk

urban populations:

• Povertystatus

• Accesstobasicservices

• Healthstatus

• Accesstoshelterwithtenuresecurity

• Accesstoemployment

• Accesstosafetynets

• Influence/empowerment

Tenure insecurity can undermine incentives to conserve and invest on land to enhance its productivity.

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Forinstance,theprohibitionoflandsalesinmanycountriesisrelatedtothe fear of increasing landlessnessdue to distress land sales andaccumulationoflandinthehandsofafewfollowedbyexcessiverural-urbanmigration.Atthesametimeland sales may provide capital forstarting a business somewhere elseasawayoutofpoverty.

Short-termrentalcontractsaremorelikelytobeassociatedwithpoorlandmanagement and thismay lead toenvironmental degradation. Thereis a need to assess how incentivescanbecreatedformoresustainablemanagement of rented land sincerentalmarkets for landhavemanyotheradvantages likemaking landavailable for poor people at anaffordablecost.

Poverty affects ability to investin land and policies have to bedesigned to make the poor moreable to conserve their land. Theenvironmentalimplicationsofotherformsoflandtransfer(inheritance,expropriation, redistribution)should also be considered and arelikely to be context-specific. Moreresearch is needed to investigatesucheffects.

Development of appropriateinstitutions at national andlocal levels will be crucial forimplementationofnationalpoliciesandlocalactionsinresponsetothevarious environmental problems.Theneoclassicalargumentsforlandreformhavebeen to reduce tenure

insecurity, stimulate investment inland, enhance tradability of landresources(allowingtransferoflandtomoreefficientproducers)andtoallowlandtobeusedascollateral.

WiththeMDGs,landreformshaveincreasingly focused on povertyreduction and empowerment ofpoor and vulnerable groups. Thishas also lead to a focus on moreaffordable and scalable approachesto land reform. Some goodexamples of success stories haverecentlyemerged.Suchapproachesare, however, still in their infancywhen it comes to enhancing moresustainablelanduse.

Capacity-buildingwillbecrucialinorder to strengthen organizationalstructures for implementationof institutional innovations.Devolution of power andresponsibilities to local institutionswill also need to be accompaniedwith sufficient funding forimplementation.Equallyimportantwill be the development ofmechanisms to mobilize funds forsuchactioninparticularlypoorandvulnerablecountries.

International and global actionswill be particularly importantin relation to the global externaleffects from global warming. UNorganizations must take the leadto orchestrate global collectiveaction with support from otherinternational organizations andnationalgovernments.

Short-term rental contracts are more likely to be associated with poor land management.

Box2.2.5: responses:

local responses:

• Localcollectiveaction

• Newtechnologyadoptionandadaptation

state responses:

• Improvementoflawsandregulations

• Decentralizationofpower

• Allocationofgovernmentresourcesforaction

• Developmentofplansandstrategies

• Removalofpolicyfailures

• Correctionofmarketfailures

• Provisionofsafetynetsforpoorandvulnerablegroups

• Investmentinresearchandeducation

• Disseminationofinformationandcoordination

international responses:

• Coordinateglobalaction

• Mobilizefundsforactionwhereneeded

• Technicalsupport

tenure insecurity can undermine land markets and the productive use of land.©UN-HABITAT/RemySietchiping

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while key land-relatedenvironmental challengeswere identified in the

beginning of chapter 2, this chaptergoes into the more context-specificconditions under which theseenvironmental challenges occurandaffecthumanlivelihoods.

For each of the challenges a shortintroduction and overview isprovided. This is followed by oneor two case study examples toillustrate the issue and indicateactionsrequired.

3.1 neo-malThusian poveRTy-enviRonmenT TRaps

Denselysettledfarmingareaswithfood-insecure households andseverelanddegradationarefurtherstressed as pressure on the landand its resources increases due topopulation growth. Such areas arefound in many countries in Asia,AfricaandLatin-America.

Distressed lands with highpopulation densities and/or veryskewed land distribution limitsland access of large populationsthat still depend heavily on landresources for their livelihood.Continued population growth,technologicalstagnationandlimitedintensificationoptions,andlimitedoff-farmandoutmigrationoptionscreate poverty traps that lead tofurtherenvironmentaldegradation.Land fragmentation, expansion ofcrop production into steep slopes,pastoral areas and rangelandsexaggerates land degradation andlanddisputes.

This also leads to increasinglandlessness and undermining ofland as a safety net for the poor.Severe poverty and shocks due todroughts and other risks reinforcesurvival strategies and under-investment in environmentalconservation. High birth ratespredominantly occur where healthandeducation is low.This in turnresults from a negligent revenueraisingsystem.

Extreme land scarcity leads todisputesoverlandresources.Theseareascanalsobesensitivetopoliticalmanipulation that can easilyerupt into conflict. Skewed landdistributionsandethnicdifferencesfuel such conflicts, as in Kenya,ZimbabweandRwanda.Manycasestudies and global overviews existfromsuchlocations.

Thereisagrowingliteraturetryingto identify the causal mechanismsbetween resource access, resourcedegradation, population growthand population pressure, ethnicdiversity, property rights and landproductivity, market access andpolicies. The pressures on thenatural resources in these areasare increasing, and can causepermanent loss of productivecapacities as rehabilitation can bevery costly or impossible in manycases(WRI,2005).Theavailabilityof technological options andinstitutionalcapacitydeterminetherelevant responses to these severeenvironmentalchallenges.

3. EnvironmEntaL ChaLLEngEs and PossibLE soLutions

High birth rates predominantly occur where health and education is low.

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enviRonMentAL ChALLenges And PossibLe soLUtions

A case study from southernEthiopia is presented in Box 3.1.,wherepopulationdensitiesareveryhighandthereisstrongcorrelationbetweenhousehold size/numberofchildren and the level of poverty.High population growth, limitedaccess to off-farm employment ormigration opportunities, povertyand limited investment abilitymeansthatmostpeopleinthisareaare in a poverty-environment trap(HoldenandTefera,2008).

These areas are also very diversesuch that both the causes ofenvironmentaldegradationandthestatusoflandtenuresystemsareverydifferent.Thisimpliesthatthemostrelevantresponsesintermsoflandtenurereformswilldependontheselocation-specific characteristics ifland tenure reforms are a solutiontotheproblems.

For example, if land degradationis severe but not due to tenureinsecurity of land users but ratherpoverty,tenurereformmayneitherbeanecessarynorasufficientpolicyinstrument. It may be necessaryto provide alternative sources ofincomeandlimitpopulationgrowthintheareatobringpopulationintobalancewithlandproductivity.

3.2 TenuRe inseCuRiTy in RelaTion To uRban expansion.

UrbanexpansionisespeciallyrapidinmanylargecitiesintheTropics.Such urban expansion necessitatesconversion of agricultural land tolandforhousing,infrastructureandother public needs. All countrieshave laws and regulations whichallow expropriation of land forsuch purposes. However, there islarge variation in the strength ofthe rights for thosewho lose theirlands in such expropriations. Thisincludestherighttocompensation,andtheprinciplesdefiningthesizeandformofcompensation.

De facto rights are much weakerthan the de jure rights of thosewho loose their land. Such tenureinsecuritymaycauseillegalsalesoflandbeforeitistaken,orlosseswithlimited or no compensation. Lossof landwithoutcompensationalsomeanslossofalivelihood.

Typically, urban expansion alsomeans conversion of land fromagricultural to non-agriculturalpurposes. The environmentalimplicationsofsuchconversionwilldependonthetypeofagriculturalproduction before the conversionand the new type of land useafter conversion. Such land is alsotypicallyintensivelyutilizedduetoits favorable location in relation tomarkets.

Land values for non-agriculturalpurposes are often many timeshigher than values for agriculturalpurposes. Weak land rights meanthat the initialuser/owner receivesonly a small fraction of this landvalue and expropriation oftenmeansawealth redistribution thatincreasesinequityandpoverty.

The type and amount ofcompensation affects the choicesavailable to those who are evictedfromtheir land,whether they jointhe urban sector or search for analternative livelihood in a ruralarea. Such choices will also affecttheenvironmentalside-effects.

InChinaurbanexpansionhasbeenveryrapidinrelationtothestrongeconomic growth over the last 30years.Box3.2.describesacasefromChina where the land rights areweakandcompensationfor lossoflandhasbeensmall.

Box3.1: wollaita in southern Ethiopia

WollaitaisaverydenselypopulatedareainSouthernethiopiadepend-ing primarily on rain-fed agricul-turalproductionwithpoormarketaccess.Theagriculturalproductionconsists of annual (maize, sweetpotato) and perennial (enset, cof-fee)cropsandlivestockwithcrop-livestock synergies (Tessema andHolden,2008).

Nutrient mining and soil erosionare the main environmental prob-lems. Continued high populationgrowth (4%peryear)and lackofalternativesourcesof income leadto fragmentation into very smallfarms (0.25 ha or less), chronicfood insecurity and increasingdependenceonfoodaid.Thelanddistribution has been egalitariansince the 1975 land reform andfollowing land redistributions, butthesealsocreatedtenureinsecurityasonepossibleexplanationforlowlevelsofinvestment.

HoldenandYohannes(2002)foundthat resourcepovertyappeared tobe a more severe constraint forinvestment than tenure insecurityin the area. The implementationof low-cost land registration andcertification from 2004, includingjoint certification of women andmen, appears to have strength-ened tenure security of men andwomen.Thetraditionalpatrilinealinheritance system and patrilocalresidence system favors men butit appears that the joint certifica-tion and new land laws have inparticular strengthened the landrights of women. It also appearsto have reduced the frequency ofland border disputes (Holden andTefera,2008).

However, the introduction of aminimumfarmsizeof0.25haandtherulethatlandshouldbesharedupon divorce can be conflicting.It appears that this land reformdoes not represent a solution toof theextreme land shortageandland degradation via in terms ofsoil nutrient depletion mining.Solutions in form of improvedtechnology, off-farm employment,migration and population control/familyplanningarerequired.

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Valuation principles vary acrosscountries in relation to landexpropriation. The most commonprinciple used in relation tocompensationforexpropriatedlandis“fairmarketvalue”compensation.Thisrequiresthatthereisamarketfor land where such a “fair” valuemay be determined. Alternativeprinciplesusedarethereplacementvalueandtheincomecapitalizationapproaches.

In countries where land sales areprohibited or where land marketsare small or non-existent, it isdifficult to identify a fair marketvalue. Restrictions on land salestypically lead to suppressed landvalues. For productive land onecan alternatively capitalize the netproductionvaluebygettingthenetpresentvalueofanexpectedfutureincome stream. This also requiresidentification of an appropriatediscountrate.

International standards forcompensation have increasinglystipulated that the affected peopleshouldbecompensateduptoapointthattheyarenoworseoffaftertheexpropriation than before. Otherrightsoftheaffectedpartyincludetherighttoreceiveadvancednoticeand a fair hearing before the landcan be taken. The standards inmany developing countries fall farshortoftheseprinciples.

3.3 TenuRe inseCuRiTy of pooR slum dwelleRs in developing CounTRies

One of the motivations forpromoting land titling in urbanslumareasistomakecreditavailableto slum dwellers. In using theirland and houses as collateral, theidea is thattheycanupgradetheirhouses. However, credit requiresa secure incometo repay the loan.

Loss of land without compensation also means loss of a livelihood.

According toChina’s constitution, allurban land in cities is owned by thestate.Landintheruralandsuburbanareas is owned by collectives exceptfor those portions that belong tothe state.With theexpansionof theurbanboundary,thelandownershipistransferred fromthecollective to thestate.Thestatemaythusexpropriatethelandfromthecommuneandcon-sequently also compensate the com-mune. Compensation is determinedby the LandAdministration Lawandincludes a compensation fee for thecultivated land, and a subsidy forresettlementaswellascompensationfeeforgroundinvestmentsandyoungcrops.Landcompensationfeesforthecultivated land requisitioned shouldbe6-10 timesof theaverageannualoutput value in the three years priortorequisition.Therateofsubsidyforresettlementperpersonshouldbe4-6timestheaverageannualoutputvaluein the threeyearsprior to requisition

of the cultivated land. The total ofland compensation fees and subsidyfor resettlement shall not exceed 30times of the average annual outputvalue in the three yearsprior to req-uisition of the land. However, illegalland- takingsare themost importantreasonforlanddisputesinChina.

Theamountofcompensation,whichmaybea small share fractionof themarket value of land is paid to thelocal community and the amountreceivedbythefarmerswhohavelosttheirlandistypicallyonlyasmallshare(10-20%)ofthecompensatedamount(KeliangandProsterman,2007).

Much of the expropriated land is ofhigh agricultural potential and can-notbereplacedbyother landof thesamequality.Theconversiontypicallyleadstopermanentlossofsuchhighpotential agricultural land. This hasimplications for China’s ability to beself-sufficient in food production.

China’s population constitutes 22%of the world’s population, while thecountry has only 9% of the world’sarable land. This is not trivial for acountrythatlost15-30millionpeopledue to starvation less than 50 yearsago.

Loss of cultural heritage is anothereffect of the rapid urbanization inChina,althoughthestrongeconomicgrowth has also created an oppor-tunity to save more of this heritage.The rapid urban expansion createsmany interconnected environmentalproblems related to pollution of air,water and land. Careful long-termurban planning is necessary to dealwith these problems and to providesustainable livelihoods for the rap-idlyincreasingurbanpopulation.Suchmodern urban planning is new inChinaandneedsfurtherimprovement(Dayong,2004).

Box3.2: urban expansion in China

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Some recent studiesofurban landtitlingeffortsinsuchareashavenotprovided convincing evidence thatthis strategy works for poor slumdwellers(Payne et al., 2008).

The recent financial crisis alsodemonstratesthatthislinkbetweenfinancial and housing marketscanbe theAchillesheelofmarketeconomies when a combination ofrapidfallinhousingprices,increasein interest rates and increasingunemploymentcancreateadominoeffectofhugedimensions.Theriskoflosingone’spropertymakespoorpeople very reluctant to borrowmoney and leads to self-imposedcredit restrictions (Boucher et al., 2008).

Evictionofslumdwellershasbeenone of the approaches used toreduce or eliminate the expansionof slums. Box 3.3. provides anexampleofsuchaprogramthathaddrasticconsequencesforthepeopleaffected.

3.4 TenuRe inseCuRiTy and invesTmenT impaCTs

Economic theory emphasizesthat tenure security enhancesinvestment.However,therearefewstudies that have controlled theendogeneity of tenure security. Apositivecorrelationbetweentenuresecurityandinvestmentcouldalsobe explained by reverse causality;people invest more in order toincrease their tenure security(Sjaastad and Bromley, 1997; Besley, 1995; Braselle et al., 2002).

There have been few studies thathave effectively controlled theendogeneityoftenuresecuritywhenassessing the impacts of tenuresecurity on investment in land.Exceptions include Besley (1995)inGhana,Braselleet al. (2002) inBurkinaFasoandHoldenet al.(inpress)inEthiopia.

Direct measurement of tenuresecurity is also difficult along thecontinuum of rights. There existsno global overview of the degreeof tenure security and without abaseline it is also impossible tomonitor changes at a broad scale.Thelimitedanecdotalevidencethatexistsmakestargetingofprogramstoenhancetenuresecuritydifficultatbest.

Thereisaneedforstandardizationand scaling up efforts to makebroader assessments of the extentof tenure security and thus alsoidentify the potential need forinterventions.Itistoooftenassumedthat traditional or customarytenure rights are insecure. Closerinspectionhasprovidedevidenceofthe opposite (Jakoby and Minten,2007). There can also be largevariationintenureinsecurityacrosscommunities within a country(HoldenandYohannes,2002).

Land tenure reforms do notnecessarilyenhancetenuresecurity.Landtitlingprogramshaveactuallybeenfoundtohavehadtheoppositeeffect in many cases, especiallyfor the poor (Benjaminsen et al.,2009, Cotula et al., 2004). Landtitling programs can enhancetenure insecurity and underminetraditionallandrights,especiallyinthe hands of corrupt governmentsandbureaucrats(Bromley,2009).

InCameroonhouseholdswerenotwillingtopaythefullpriceoflandtitles, but theydemanded thefirststep of land border demarcation.This appeared to provide themwith sufficient tenure security asthesewererespectedatvillagelevel(Firmin-SellersandSellers,1999).

Box3.3: Forced eviction of slum dwellers in Zimbabwe

The Zimbabwean govern-ment launched the OperationMurambatsvina (Restore Order) in2005andevicted700,000peopleand destroyed about 92,500housing structures. It also had anOperation garikai (Live Well) thataimed tobuild20,000newhous-ingunitsin40days.Oneyearlateronly 3,300houseshadbeenbuilt(BBCNews,2007).Thepurposeofthese operations was to clean upthe cities, remove slum areas andillegalconstruction.

However,alargenumberofpeoplelost their homes and were notprovided adequate alternatives.Theyreceivedveryshortnotice,ornoneatalland lostmuchoftheirproperty.

TheoperationsviolatedZimbabwe’sandinternationallaws.Thechaoticapproach had very high humani-tarian, economic, and politicalcosts that worsened the crisis inZimbabwe. The mass evictionsinvolved relocating many of thevictims to farms and camps withinadequate water and sanitationfacilities. Other victims went torural areas or other urban areasto search for alternative housing,drivinguprentalpricesforhousing.Theoutcomewasthatpeoplewerelivingunderevenworseandmoreinsecure conditions than before.(http://www.issafrica.org).

Land titling programs can enhance tenure insecurity and undermine traditional land rights.

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3.5 ThReaTs againsT flexible TenuRe sysTems in pasToRal and agRo-pasToRal aReas

Seasonality and droughts causeavailability of fodder to varysubstantially both temporallyand spatially in semi-arid andarid pastoral areas. Mobility ofpastoralistsandtheirlivestockisanessentialelementoftheiradaptationto reduce risks, maximizeproductivity of their animals andto avoid or reduce overgrazingand desertification. Flexibilityof tenure systems is essential toallow such mobility of livestockwhich need to move throughareas of agriculturalists and agro-pastoralists.

Expandingagriculturalproductioninto such areas threatens thelivestock mobility and pastoralistlivelihoods and creates conflictsbetween pastoralists and farmers.Attempts to settle pastoralists andtheiranimalscanalsoleadtoover-grazing and desertification in andaroundtheareasofsettlementduetothemoreintensivelandusewhichgoes beyond the carrying capacityofthesystem.

Pastoralists’ land rights have weaklegalprotectioninmanycountries.Establishment of exclusive privatepropertyrightstoland,asisdoneinconventionaltitlingprograms,willalso typically threaten the rightsof pastoralists. There are thereforegood reasons towarnagainst landtitling in such areas. Alternativeways of formalizing land rightshelpstostrengthenpastoralists’landrights if flexible and overlappingrights are recognized, registeredand recorded, including the rightstokeepandusepathwaysthatallowlivestockmobility.

Box 3.5a provides an example ofa land reform that has reducedthe flexibility of movement oflivestockby changingplot bordersandremovingimportantcorridors.Box3.5bdescribesanotherexamplewhere land reformsand increasingland pressures have marginalizedpastoralists and reduced flexibilityinmovementofanimals.

Box3.4: Low-cost land certification in tigray, Ethiopia

The land redistribution policy thatwas implemented in ethiopiafrom 1975 in order to sustain anequitable land distribution andprevent landlessness also createdtenure insecurity.While thispolicywas officially scaled down by thenewgovernmentthattookoverin1991, several cases of redistribu-tionshavealsooccurredafterthis.A survey of households in Tigrayregionin1998revealedthatabout50% of the households expectedtoloselandduetolandredistribu-tions within the next ten years.Alsoalargeshareoftheremaininghouseholds expected to get moreland through such redistributions.Justafterthissurveylandregistra-tion and certification was imple-mentedinthisregion.

Follow-up surveys of the samehouseholds in 2001, 2003 and2006revealedthatmorethan80%of the households had receivedland certificates. Farm plot leveldata analyses revealed that main-tenanceofsoilconservationstruc-tureswasbetterandtreeplantingwas more common on plots withlandcertificates.Furthermore,aver-age land productivity was foundto be 45% higher on plots withland certificates after controllingforlandqualityandotherrelevantvariables.Theseresultswerefoundaftercontrollingforendogeneityoflandcertification(Holden et al., inpress).Female-headedhouseholdsthat received land certificates hadbecome more willing to rent outtheir land through sharecroppingcontracts,apparentlybecausetheyhavebecomemoretenuresecure.

Box3.5a:namaqualand, south africa

Namaqualandislocatedinthearidnorthwestern corner of NorthernCape Province close to theNamibian border. Annual rainfallis in the range of 100- 350 mm.Dryland crops may be grown insomeyearswhilesheepandgoatsare the main types of livestock.Communal grazing lands withoutfences hosted multiple herdswith kraaling (gathering animalsduring night time). A land reformwas introduced after Namibia’sindependence in 1994. Thisincluded a reform in communalareas.

Based on local referenda,communal property associationownership was chosen in mostareas.Rightstododrylandcroppingwere more individualized andthe reform therefore proceededby demarcation of these drylandcropping plots. It turned out thatthis exercise changed the plotbordersthattendedtobeirregularandwithpathwaysinbetween.Theexercise created straight borders,often eliminating the pathwaysbetween. It also appeared tostimulate fencing of plots. Thesechangesalso reducedthemobilityof grazing animals in eliminatingcorridors where animals couldpass. While strengthening tenuresecurity of individual plot owners,the reform reduced the tenuresecurityofthelivestockherdersthatuse thecommons (BenjaminsenT.A.,2008).

Formalizing land rights may help to strengthen pastoralists’ land rights if flexible and overlapping rights are recognized.

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Box3.5b: maasai land, Kenya

TheMaasaipastoralistshavealongtradition of migrating with theirherdstooptimizetheuseofscarcerangeland resources. The Kenyanland reform affected large areasof several semi-arid Districts inthe1960sand1970swhengroupranches were established aimingto reduce rangeland degradationand commercialize Maasai cattlekeeping. However, the effect wasto reduce the reciprocal accessarrangements while each of theranches was too small to hold allthe variability demanded from aflexibleandviableunit.

Inthe1980sawaveofsubdivisionof these group ranches followed,partly stimulated by the govern-mentpolicyandpartlyduetointer-naltenureinsecurity.However,thesubdivision has further restrictedmobilityandaccesstoresourcesforsecondaryrightsholders.Accesstoland has become more unequal.Womenandyoungmenhavebeenthe most marginalized. The youthhave lost the birthright of accessto common land and depend oninheritance from their father forbothlandandlivestock.

Land reform via group ranch-ing schemes has contributed toincreased vulnerability and lessflexibility in use of the drylandresources. It may also haveincreasedtheriskofenvironmentaldegradation (Meinzen-Dick andMwangi,2008).

3.6 land foR The pooR vs. land foR bio-fuel and food pRoduCTion

Thehighenergypricesthatemergedbetween 2005 and 2008 triggereda race for alternative sources ofenergy, including bio-fuels. Thislead to the expansion of energycropswhichalsoimpactedonfoodproductionandfoodprices.TheuseofmaizeforethanolproductionintheUScausedan increase in foodpricesaswell.

The growing concern about aglobalfooddeficitduetotherapidincrease in demands for food alsocontributed to the land race forfuel and food crops that suddenlyhit several African countries in2006-2008. Both internationaland national investors saw greatopportunities for profits in energyand foodproductionandacquiredlargechunksoflandthroughlong-termleasecontracts.

Such contracts were typicallyestablished without the localpopulations being fully informedand in countries where the legalland rights are unclear due to agap between national laws andcustomaryrightstoland.Box3.6aprovidesone exampleof this fromMadagascar.Suchgapsmaybeusedby investors as well as bureaucratswho see this as an opportunity tomakelargeprofits.

The poor who have been thetraditional users of this land riskalienation without compensation.Land that is under fallow may beperceived as being idle and notowned or controlled by anybody.Fallowing is, however, a necessaryelement of the rotation in manytropicallandusesystems.

The fallows are required forregeneration of soil fertility andelimination of pests and weeds.Fallowlandsarethereforeapartofcustomarylandsandlandrightsonthislandistypicallyclearlyspecifiedaccordingtolocalcustoms.

Box3.6a: Land allocation to daewoo Ltd. in madagascar

TheSouthKoreancompanyDaewooannouncedinNovember2008thattheymadeadealwiththegovern-ment in Madagascar to lease 1.3million hectares for production ofmaizeandpalmoil.SouthKoreaisthethirdlargestmaizeimporterinthe world. This is about one-thirdto one-half of all arable land inMadagascar. Daewoo did not payanything for the 99-year lease,but would provide employmentand invest in infrastructure in thecountry. Daewoo also consideredimporting labor fromSouthAfricafortheplantations.

Strong national and internationalreactions caused the plans to becancelled. Accusations of neo-colonialism and protests againstMadagascar becoming a SouthKorean colony came out verystrongandcausedthegovernmenttocanceltheplans.

The food and financial crises have turned agricultural land into a new strategic asset.

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Mappingof suchcustomary rightsdid typically not take place inrelationtotheallocationoflandforbiofuelexpansion.

Soaring food prices lead manycountrieswithfooddeficitproblemstolookforopportunitiesabroadtostrengthentheirfoodsecurity.Morecountriesprefer tobe in chargeoftheir own food production ratherthan relying on their liquid assetstobuyfood.

The food and financial crises haveturnedagriculturallandintoanewstrategicasset.Wellknownexamplesare South Korea, China, Libya,Qatar,SaudiArabia,MalaysiaandKuwait. China is farming land inAustralia, the Philippines, Laos,Kazakhstan,Myanmar,CameroonandUgandaandexploringoptionsforriceproductioninMozambique.Saudi Arabia has looked for landin Sudan, Ethiopia, Egypt andUkraine. Another example isQatar’s negotiations with theKenyagovernmenttolease40,000hectares of fertile uncultivatedgovernment land on Kenya’s coastneartheTanaRiverDeltaforfoodproduction.Inreturn,QatarwouldfundthebuildingofanewportinLamu(IFPRIPolicyBrief13,April2009).

Some of the land that hasbeen identified for such large-scale intensified food productionis ecologically fragile. Thereare considerable technical andeconomic difficulties related tomaking intensive productionsustainabledue to the topography,soil characteristics, erosive rainsand high investment needs. Suchconditionshave in thepastcausedenvironmentaldisasterandwasteofresources.Manyoftherecentlanddeals been hastily made and werenotbasedoncarefulplanningandproper assessment of the relatedhumanandenvironmentalrisks.

The conversion of these highpotential areas into commercial

production requires big privateinvestors and land tenure reformsthat give them sufficient tenuresecurity to be willing to expandtheiractivitiesintheseareas.

UkrainehascarriedoutlandtenurereformsinrecentyearswithsupportfromUSAID.Russia,Ukraine(seeBox 3.6b) and Kazakhstan haveabout23millionhectaresofarablelandthathavebeenunusedforfoodproductionsincethecollapseoftheUSSR.

This land can easily be broughtback into food production andwithoutanyenvironmentaldamageand isamong the most fertile soilin the world. What is needed isinvestment in basic infrastructure,machinery, human skills, marketstructuresandinputstoreleasethisproductionpotential.

3.7 The need foR TenuRe RefoRm in aReas wiTh CusTomaRy TenuRe

Customarylandrightsstillplayanimportant role in many countries,especially in Africa. Customaryland rights are location-specificandoftenflexible,overlapping,andincludeindividualaswellasgrouprights to use local land resources.They typically include disputeresolution mechanisms, e.g. theyare handled by local chiefs, andaccesstolandistypicallyrestrictedby kinship or ethnicity excludingoutsidersandrestrictinglandsales.Individualsbelongingtothegroupmaybeallocatedlandforindividual(family) use but if they leave theland unused it may go back tothe community (Ostrom, 2001;Platteau,1992).

Customary land rights havenot been acknowledged in theconstitutionandlandlawsinmanycountries. Recently there has beena trend towards recognizing andformalizing customary land rightsby integrating them into nationallaws.

Box3.6b: Land reform in ukraine

Ukrainegotitsindependencefromthe Soviet Union in 1991. Withabout50millionpeopleitwasoneofthelargestoftheformerSovietRepublics. The country has about42 million hectares of agriculturallandmostlybelongingtotheblackearthbeltofhighfertility.

Agriculturalproductiontookplacethrough large scale collectivefarms during the Soviet regimeandthe transition from a centrallyplannedtoamarketeconomyhasalso triggered a shift towards pri-vate property rights in land. TheOwnershipLawof1991recognizedprivate ownership in addition tothe traditional state and collectiveownershipand includedUkrainianresidents as well as foreign indi-viduals and legal entities amongthose entitled to own property inUkraine.Landwastransferredfromstatelandtocollectives,enterprisesand private ownership and landregistrationstarted.

International support fromSweden, Canada, USA and TheWorld Bank was received forestablishing cadastre and for landtitling. While technical skills andcapacity have improved there aremany institutional weaknessesand a long way to go before theagricultural land resources in thecountry can be efficiently utilized.While environmental risks are lowfor the agricultural land, defores-tation has caused the country tobecome dependent on importingwood(BondarandLilje,2002).

Libyahas proposed an agreementwith Ukraine to lease 247,000hectares of the black soil beltfor wheat production. In returnUkrainewouldgetaccesstoLibyanoil to reduce its dependence onRussiaforitsenergyneeds.Ifsucharrangements are implementedthisisanotherchallengeforongo-inglandreforminUkraine.

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Muchcustomarylandwasalienatedduringcolonialtimesaswellaslater.AnexampleistheestablishmentofmanytobaccoestatesinMalawi.

Thedemand for land is increasinginmostcountrieswherecustomarytenure predominates due topopulation growth, globalizationandpolicychanges(seesection3.6).Theseforcesalsoputthecustomaryland rights system under pressureandviewsdiffer as towhether thesystemisadequate tohandle thesechanges.

Landdegradationinvariousformsisalsoanincreasingproblemonlandundercustomarytenure.However,it is not clear what the mostappropriate actions are to ensuremoresustainablelandmanagementon customary land. Devolution ofpower and establishment of localland administrations are broadlyapplied as potential remedies fortheproblem.

Land grabbing and exclusion ofpoor andvulnerable groups is stillaproblemonlandundercustomarytenure, and is an increasingproblem in many places (Peters,2002).Protectionofthelandrightsof the poor is neither granted byland reforms nor by customarytenure systems when both typesof systems are controlled by thepolitical elite.Box3.7provides anexample of attempted land reforminMalawithatwasstoppedbythelocalchiefs.

Traditionally thechiefshadstrongauthority over the land resourceswithin their boundaries andwere also in charge of all conflictresolution but they did not haveto keep any records or provideany reason for theirdecisions.Thechiefswouldhavelostpowerunderthis new system and that was themain reason why the MalawianParliament stopped the proposedreform(Holden et al., 2006 ).

Recently there has been a trend towards recognizing and formalizing customary land rights.

Box3.7:Land tenure reform in malawi

Malawihasattemptedtointegratethe customary land tenure systeminto formal law. This started withtheNewLandPolicyin2002.

Thenewpolicyrecommendedthatcustomary land holdings shouldberegisteredasprivatecustomaryestates for entire communities,familiesandindividuals.Thiswasaresponsetogrowinglandpressuresand the evolution of customaryland ownership towards strongerindividualized rights. Registeredand titled land of this type wastohave full legal statusasprivatepropertythatcanbeleasedorusedassecurityforamortgageloan.

One of the challenges in Malawiwasthat thematrilinealsystemofinheritancedominatedinthesouthwhile the patrilineal inheritancesystemdominated in thenorthofthecountry.Thenewpolicycalledfor a change in inheritance lawsto allow the remaining spouse,childrenandespeciallyorphans toinherit their parentsproperty. Thiswas clearly against the customaryrules.

The new policy also aimed tobuild up local Customary LandCommitteesasawayto integratethe government and traditionalsystems of tenure. The proposalwas tomake the chiefs the chair-persons of these committees. Thecommittees would have a landclerkwhowouldkeeptherecords.Another important part of thenewlandpolicywastoestablishamore democratic and transparentconflict resolution mechanism informofdistrictlevelandtraditionalauthoritylevelLandTribunals,withVillage Land Tribunals as the low-est level. This was previously theresponsibilityofthechiefsandtheywerenowtobecomethechairmenofthesetribunals.

Box3.8: honduras, Central america highlands

MuchofCentralAmericaismoun-tainouswithforestedhillsidesthatareverysusceptibletoerosionandlandslides. In Honduras 75% ofthe land has slope greater than25%. Unequal land distributionforces small farmers to occupysteep hillsides and small valleys.Thehillsideshavebeendeforestedwheretheycultivatetomeettheirsubsistenceneeds.Overthelast50yearsexpansiveshiftingcultivationsystems have been replaced bymoreintensiveproductionsystems.

Agricultural land was typicallyregistered as communal propertyincadastralmapswhileallremain-ingforestedlandwasnationalizedin 1974. Official permission isrequired to cut down trees butthis is circumvented by selectivecutting (avoiding clear-cutting)andbyburningtheforest.Cuttingdead trees to establishpastures isallowed. From 1992 it was againpossibletoprivatizeforestlandandforest management plans wereintroduced (Kammerbauer andArdon,1999).

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3.8 pRoTeCTing sTeep slopes fRom non-susTainable agRiCulTuRal pRaCTiCes

Encroachment onto steep slopesis common in countries withmountainousandhillyterrain,highpopulationpressureand/orskewedland distribution in Asia, Africa,and Latin-America. Much of thisencroachment is associated withnon-sustainable land use practicesanddeforestationandleadstorapidlanddegradation.

The need to meet immediatebasic needs, lack of investmentcapacity and unavailability oftechnologies that both can satisfyimmediate basic needs and thesustainability requirement areexplanations for this type of rapidland degradation. Regulations arein place to prevent conversion offorest land to agricultural landbut such regulations are oftennot efficient or sufficient to stopdeforestationandlanddegradation.Box 3.8 provides an example ofencroachmentonsteepslopeswheresevere environmental degradationresultedandwhereinterventionsarenecessarytoreducetheproblem.

3.9 pRoTeCTion of CoasTal zones and weTland aReas

Expanded human activity, likedevelopmentofcities,expansionofshrimp farming, fishing, tourism,leisure and recreational activity,extractionofresources,agriculturalproduction, use of pesticides,inadequatedisposalof andcontrolof dumping polluting substancesinto coastal waters represent aconsiderable threat to coastalecosystemsandhabitats.

Mangrove forests and coral reefsare among the most threatenedecosystemsthatrequireactiontobeprotected. Rising sea temperaturesand some forms of pollution

contributetobleachingofcoralreefsthatarehabitatsforrarefishspecies.Box3.9describesthecomplexityofdesigningpropertyrightsincoastalzones to enhance environmentalprotection and facilitate efficientuse.

Coastal zones are also in veryhigh demand for recreational andhousing purposes and land valuesforpropertieslocatedbytheseaareextremelyhighmanyplaces.Therearealsoconflictsofinterestbetweenthepublicandprivateownersaboutthe access and use of beaches forrecreational purposes. Propertyregimes vary substantially andare often a combination of privateand public property that maybe overlapping. These increasingpressuresandtheexpectedriseinsealevelrepresentseverethreatstothecoastal zone resources, ecosystemsand habitats, private and publicproperty.

Carefulreformsofpropertyrightsregimes, laws and regulations willbe crucial to tackle thesenewandstronger pressures to minimizeirreversibledamageandprotecttheinterestsofdifferentgroups.

3.10 ConsolidaTion of fRagmenTed land holdings

Land fragmentation is anincreasing problem in countrieswithhighpopulationdensity,highdependence on agriculture andlimited off-farm opportunities.Accessinglandthroughinheritanceand distributing the land among(male)childrenisthemostcommonsystem in suchareas (PlatteauandBalland,2001).

Withhighpopulationgrowthsuchfragmentation can be rapid. Aninitial farm may consist of severalplotsofdifferentlandqualityanditis common then that each plot issplit to allocate the different landqualitiestothechildren.

Box3.9: Coastal property rights in England

The coastal property rights arebasedondividingthecoastalareainto four zones: terra firma, fore-shore,seabedandinternalwaters.Theforeshore,undercommonlaw,liesbetweenhigh-watermarkandlow-water mark, with terra firma(dry land) above it and sea bedbelow. Internal waters fall on thelandwardsideoftheterritorialseabaseline.Thehigh-andlow-watermarks are the medium high andlowtidesthroughtheyear.

The property regimes and rightsdiffer across the four zones incomplexways. Theyaregovernedbyacombinationofcommonlaw,modern law, statutory laws, localby-laws, and easements. Rightsin the terra firma zone above theforeshorepropertyregimesarepri-marilyguidedbymodernlaw.Theseareessentiallyfreeholdandvariousforms of occupational rights e.g.through leases of varying length,andconservationregimesinspeci-fiedareasofparticularvalue,suchasnationalparks,andenvironmen-tallysensitiveareas.

easements improve public access(useoffootpathsandcarriageways),but may also impose behavioralrestrictions.Mostof the foreshoreis vested in theCrownandpublicaccessrightsarestrongerfornavi-gation and non-commercial fish-ing.Thesepublicaccessrightsalsohave to be recognized by privateforeshoreowners.

TheseabedisthepropertyoftheCrownwherepublicaccessisgrant-edbutspeciallawsapplyinharborareas and Marine ConservationAreas.Seawaterrisewillobviouslyaffect the borders between thesezones andaquestion is how thatshouldaffectthepropertyregimes,particularly the terra firma that isconvertedtoforeshorearea.

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This reduces risk in subsistenceproduction systems.However, it isatacostofhavingtooperatemanydispersedandverysmallplots.

Land fragmentation that leads toless sustainable land managementis also a concern (Blaikie andSadeque,2000;NiroulaandThapa,2005).Thecombinationofpovertyand limitedoff-farmopportunitiesoften leads to more intensive soildepletion on very small holdings.This increases short-term returnsbutattheexpenseoffuturereturns.Such cultivation leads to lower(marginal) return to non-landresources,likelabor.

Householdsbecomemorereluctanttoinvestonsmalldistantplotsandmoreofthelandisoccupiedbypathswhen plots are small. Plot borderdisputes and spatial externalitiesare also more likely to occur withsuch small plot sizes due to themere length of plot borders. Poormanagement affects neighboringplots,e.g.whereimpropersoilandwater conservation and weedingpracticesoccur.

Althoughmanybelieveinconstantreturns to scale in smallholdertropicalagriculture,therecanbeaminimum size below which thereare economies of scale. This isparticularly true if eachhouseholdhasanumberofdispersedplots.Itisalsomorelikelytobetrueifplowingis done with bullocks rather thanwith hand hoes. Increasing landpressurehasalsoleadtoallocationof common property land toindividualhouseholdsasafirststeptowardfragmentation.

The frequently observed inversefarm size-productivity relationshipshows that small farms are moreproductive than large farms. Thishas been explained by higher costandlowermarginalreturntohiredlabor on large farms as comparedto that of family labor on smallfarms. However, extreme landfragmentation implies comparisonof relatively small and large

smallholdingsall farmedprimarilyusingfamilylabor.

South Asia is one of the regionsexperiencing severe landfragmentation. The number oflandholdings increased from 71million in 1971 to 89 million in1981 and to 107 million recently(Niroula and Thapa, 2005). InPakistan the number of holdingsincreased from 4.1 million to 5.1millionfrom1980to1990.Averageholdingandplotsizehaddecreasedby 17% and 8% in Nepal withan average of 4 plots per holding.The average distance from thehouse to the plots was 1.5 km insome mountain regions. Box 3.10provides details based on studiesoflandfragmentationandthefoodcropyieldimplicationsinChina.

Policy responses to landfragmentationincludeconsolidationofholdings, opening landmarketsto create efficient operationalholdings,restrictionsonminimumsize of holdings and promotion ofcooperativefarming.

3.11 The need To ensuRe susTainable managemenT of RenTed land

Land areas under rental contractshave expanded rapidly in variouspartsoftheworld.InEuropeandtheUSlargefarmstypicallyrentinlandfromsmallfarmsduetoeconomiesofscaleinmechanizedagriculture.Alargeshareofagriculturallandisrented in Europe, 63% in France,45% in Sweden, 40% in Norway,35% in UK, and about 30% inmanyothercountries (Ravenscroftet al.,1999).

Thereisalargeliteraturedocumentingthe efficiency implications ofalternative land rental contracts,includingfixedrent,sharecroppingand cost-sharing contracts. Fromsomeof these studies it is possibleto assess the implications for thesustainability of land use, but for

The combination of poverty and limited off-farm opportunities often leads to more intensive soil depletion on very small holdings.

Box3.10: Land fragmentation and food production in China

The commune system for agri-cultural production in China wasfoundedontheideathatthereareeconomies of scale in agriculture.This system collapsed and wasreplacedbythehouseholdrespon-sibilitysystemfromthelate1970s.

Landwasatthattimeallocatedtohouseholds based on householdsize (consumption need) and onlaborendowment.eachhouseholdreceived a share of different landqualityclassesinthevillagetoensureequity within villages. Typicallyeachholdingwasfragmentedintoa number of plots, with regionalvariations in the degree of frag-mentation.Thenumberofplotsperhouseholdvariesfromoneto20orevenmore.Anargumentforsuchaholdingstructureistoreduceriskbutthedegreetowhichthisisthecasehasnotbeenstudied.Unclearproperty rightsand restrictionsonlandmarketsalso limitedthepos-sibility of consolidation throughsuchmarkets.

Notsurprisingly,landfragmentationisfoundtohaveanadverseeffectonyieldsforvariouscropsinChina.This loss varies from 2 to 10%among crops for adding an addi-tionalplot.Completeconsolidationofplotsincreasedoutputby17,14and12%forwheat,riceandtubercrops.Overall, this isestimated tolead toa15% increase inChina’sannual food grain output or 71milliontonsofcerealoutput.Theremay be more to gain from landconsolidationthanfromincreasinglandholdingsize.Therecentprovi-sionof landcertificatesmayallowconsolidation through land rentalmarkets but further studies areneededtoassesstheeffectoflandrentalmarketsonlandfragmenta-tion and consolidation (Wan andCheng,2001).

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most of them this is not so clear.If intensity of production is loweronrentedlandthenthismayhaveambiguous effects on long-termlandproductivity.

The effects of land renting onsustainability of land use dependson how such contracts affectinvestmentsonrentedlandaswellasmoreshort-termlandmanagementpractices. Legal restrictions onrental arrangements can includerestrictions on the duration ofcontracts (maximum or minimumconstraints), the type of contracts(e.g. prohibitions of certain typesof contracts), area restrictions (e.g.the share of the farm that can berentedout),specificationofwhohasthe responsibility for conservingthe land, or land-to-the-tillerregulations.

Relativelylittleisknownabouttheenvironmental implications (i.e.sustainability of land use) of suchregulations. Theoretically, tenantswouldbemorewillingtoconserveandinvestonrentedlandiftheyhavelonger-termcontracts,butthereareways to enhance sustainability ofland use in short-term, renewablecontracts. It is also possible thatlandlordhouseholdshavesufficientincentivestoconservethelandtheyrentout.

Sharecropping has been associatedwith lower output and input usebecause tenants do not get thefull benefit of their input use.However, the empirical evidenceon this is mixed (Otsuka, 1988,2007, Holden et al., 2008). Astudy in the Philippines foundthat sharecropping contracts werepreferred in locations where landwas very fragile, while fixed rentcontracts were preferred wheresoil fertility was not a concern.Sharecropping could lead to lessintensive and less degrading landuse(Dubois,2002).

Kassie and Holden (2007; 2008)found in a study in Ethiopia thatsharecropping was associated withmore use of fertilizer and higherland productivity and attributedthistothreatofevictionwhichmorethan counteracted thedisincentiveeffect of sharecropping becausegood performance increased theprobability of contract renewal.Box3.11providesmoreinformationonanassessmentofthesustainabilityoflanduseonrentedlandinUganda.Withthe increasing importanceoftenancyinmanypartsoftheworldit is important to identify moreclearly the land use sustainabilityimplicationsofthis.

Box3.11: management of rented land in uganda

Oneof theobjectivesof theLandAct of 1998 in Uganda is to pro-motesustainablelandmanagementby formalizing the landmarket.Astudyusingfarmplotleveldatatoassess the long-term land invest-ments(soilandwaterconservation,trees,irrigation),intermediatetermpractices(fallowing,useofmanure,incorporation of crop residues,crop rotation), and short-termpractices(fertilizeruse,useofslashandburn)on landunderdifferenttenure, revealed some interestinginsights. Most of the rented landinthestudywasundershort-termcontracts (75% of the plots wereoncontractswithlessthan3yearsduration).

Long-terminvestmentswerefoundtobemorecommononpurchasedor inherited plots, while moreshort-termsubstitutestolong-termsoil conservation structures (drain-age channels vs. terraces) weremore common on rented land.Mulch, animal manure, compost,and household refuse was morecommonly applied on purchasedplotsthanonrentedplots.Fertilizerusewasmorecommononrentedplots. Slash and burn was morecommononrentedandborrowedplots.

When examining major soil nutri-ents,purchasedplotshadthelarg-estnutrientstockswhileborrowedplots had the lowest, and rentedplotswereinanintermediateposi-tion.Thiscould,however, indicatethat borrowed and rented plotstend toalreadybeofpoorer landquality,ratherthanrentingleadingtolowerlandquality(Nkonya et al., 2008).

Land areas under rental contracts have expanded rapidly in various parts of the world.

woodlots on small farms in north shewa, amhara region- Ethiopia.©S.Holden

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Box3.12: tree planting in the Ethiopian highlands

Deforestationisseverethrough-outtheethiopianhighlands.Therearealmostnonaturalforestsleftandtheyareunderseverepressure.Theyarebeingusedillegallyforcharcoalmaking, cut for firewood andotherpurposes.Animalmanure isincreasinglyusedforcookingwhilenutrient depletion and erosioncauseagriculturalyieldstodecline.Fertilizer use is low and far fromsufficienttoreplacethe lostnutri-ents. Restrictions on tree plantingonarablelandandtenureinsecurityduetopastlandredistributionpoli-cieshaveunderminedincentivestoplanttrees.eucalyptusandseveralotherfastgrowingtreespeciesarehighlyproductiveandprofitabletogrow.

However,thereisawidespreadfearthat eucalyptus species especiallycompetesforwaterandisnotcon-sideredsuitableasanagroforestrytree because of its suppression ofplant growth in the understory.Nevertheless, eucalyptus is themostpopulartreetoplantandhasbecome a very important sourceof income, building materials andfuel. If planted in small woodlotsonslopingandmarginallandsuchland could become much moreproductive and this could replaceerosive cropping. Removal of lawrestrictions and provision of moresecure property rights as well asother measures to stimulate treeplanting could therefore createwin-win benefits (Holden et al., 2004).

3.12 TRee planTing has many benefiTs

DeforestationandforestdegradationissevereinthetropicsaswellasinRussia due to increased demandsforenergyandlandforagriculturalproduction. This deforestationalso threatens biodiversity andcontributes a large share of globalGHG emissions. In energy scarceand densely populated rural areasanimal manure and crop residuesare increasingly used as a sourceof energy. This also threatens theproductivity and sustainability ofagriculturalproduction.

Stimulationoftreeplantingcanbeanimportantinstrumenttoreducedeforestation of natural forests,thus protecting biodiversity andenhancing the sustainability offarming systems,especially if treesare planted on steep slopes whereerosive cropping takes place. Treeplantingandforestpreservationareessential for renewing water tablesandsources.

Unclear property rights,incomplete or restricted propertyrights, cooperation failures undercommonpropertyregimes,marketimperfections and poverty areall explanations for insufficientincentives to plant trees. Theinstitutional failures in propertyrights regimes lead to tenureinsecurity which underminesinvestmentincentives.

Provision of more secure propertyrightsisanecessary(butnotalwaysa sufficient) condition to stimulatetree planting. Box 3.12 providesan example from Ethiopia whererestrictions on tree planting onarablelandsuppressedtreeplantingand therefore enhanced pressuresonnaturalforests.

3.13 unequal land disTRibuTion, land degRadaTion and ineffiCienT land use

Unequal land distribution isparticularlysevereinLatin-Americancountries where the land Gini-coefficientsareabove0.8.However,someAfricancountries,likeSouthAfrica and Zimbabwe, also havevery skewed land distributions.Atthesametimeitisarguedthattheinverse farmsize-landproductivityrelationship creates the possibilityof efficiency as well as equitygains from land redistributions(Deininger,2001).Therehavebeenmany land reform programs thatfocused on land redistribution, anagenda that also has been pushedbytheWorldBank.Manyoftheseprogramshavenotbeensuccessful,however. Some of the reasonsinclude:

• Unclear,incompleteorcollectivepropertyrightsonlyprovidedtothosereceivingland

• Favoringlargefarmswithsubsidizedcreditsformodernizationthuseliminatingtheinversefarmsize-productivityrelationship

• Neglectoftheneedforcomplementaryresources(includingskills)andmarkets(forcredit,inputsandoutputs)touselandefficiently

• Politicaltensionsandpowerstructuresthatworkedagainstsuchreformsreducingtheireffectsandincreasingtheircosts

The belief that land ownershipthrough private property rights tolandwouldleadtothedevelopmentof credit markets because landcanbeusedascollateral)hasbeendominantbutinmostcaseshasnotbeentrue.

Sharecropping has been associated with lower output and input use.

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Negotiatedlandreformshavebeenattempted that rely on voluntarylandtransfersbasedonnegotiationsbetween buyers and sellers andgovernments providing grants forthe buyers, to reduce the politicaltensions (Deininger, 2001). Box3.13 describes the experiencewith negotiated land reform inColumbia.

What should be the appropriatecounter-factual when evaluatingtheimpactsofsuchreforms?Froman efficiency perspective it couldbe the land use efficiency beforeand after redistribution on theredistributed land and on otherlandthatwasindirectlyaffectedbythe redistribution. When it comesto thewelfareeffects, these shouldinclude the welfare effects for thebeneficiaries receiving land ascompared to their situation beforeorwithoutthereform.

There could, however, also bepositive beneficial effects onothers in the area of origin ofthe beneficiaries if land pressurewas reduced there. This effect isimportantifthehighlandscarcityandpovertyleadtonon-sustainableland use practices. There could,

however, also be negative spill-over effects (externalities) in theneighborhood of the redistributedlandinformoftensionbetweenthenewcomers and those traditionallyliving there, including the oldownersoftheland.

Theintegrationintothesesocieties,the availability of public servicesgiven the increased demand forthese (e.g.access towater, schools,health,transport,conflictresolutionand shops) can have importantbearing on the overall success ofsuchprograms.

3.14 pRoTeCTing human seTTlemenTs in ThReaTened CoasTal aReas and islands

This issue is also closely linked tosection3.9.AccordingtoaSpecialReport on Emission Scenarios ofthe Intergovernmental Panel onClimateChange(IPCC)(Nicholls,2004)sealevelshavebeenestimatedto rise by 22 to 34 cm between1990 and2080.However, the risecouldbemuchlargerifpartsoftheGreenlandandAntarcticicesheetsmelt.

Box3.13:negotiated land reform in Columbia

The land reform in Columbia hasaimed at correcting the extremelyunequal landdistribution, increasethe productivity and enhance theenvironmental sustainability oflanduse,andreduceruralviolence.However,eventhoughlandreformsstartedintheearly1960stheydidnot change the land distributionmuch.

A new law was passed in 1994trying to push for more rapidredistribution through a moredecentralized and demand-drivenprocess. The law provided for a70% purchase grant, however, itdidnot solve theproblemofpro-viding capital for investments onthelandtoenhanceproductivity.Italso turned out that much of thelandofferedforredistributionwasofmarginalqualityandhardlysuit-ableforlandreformwhilesomeofthebestlandcontinuedtobeidleorunderutilized.Theprogrammealsoaffected landpricesandappearedtobenefittheoldlandownersmorethanthenewowners.

The capital shortage and creditconstraintsfacedbythebeneficia-riesleadtoatypicalsituationwherethey have planted perennials andvegetablesonasmallshareoftheirfarms. Meanwhile the remainingfarmlands were mostly managedas pasturewhichgave insufficientreturns topayfor thedebt (30%)that they had on the farm. Oneoptionwouldhavebeentogoforsmallerfarmsizesof2-5haratherthan the standard 15-16 ha. Thiswouldhavegivenamoreoptimalbalancebetween family laborandland(Deininger,2001).

Land degradation caused by overgrazing and lack of soil conservation, amhara region, Ethiopia©S.Holden

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Box3.14a: Flood threats in bangladesh

Bangladesh appears to be the most vulnerable among the countries withlargest populations in the risky zone as 40%of its area is in the zone and46% of its population lives there. This is also due to the severe poverty inthis country and the large population. The population that lives in thezone increased from 51 million in 1990 to 63 million in 2000 while theurbanpartof thispopulation increasedfrom12millionto15million in thisperiod,withhigherpopulationgrowthratesthanotherpartsofthecountry(McGranahan et al., 2007).

Box3.14b: Extreme flooding in mozambique’s coastal cities

In February and March 2000Mozambiqueexperienceditsworstfloodingin50years.ThecitiesofMaputoandMatolawereparticu-larlyaffected.Morethanonemillionpeopleweredirectlyaffected.Thewaterandsanitationsystemsweredisruptedandthiscausedoutbreaksofdysenteryandcholera (Douglas et al., 2008).Residents inMaputoperceived there to be less overallrainfallbut rarestormsseemedtohave become more intense. Theresultingdamagewasworseduetoinadequatedrainageinfrastructure,noorganizationtomaintaindrain-agechannels,managesewage,orevacuation and provide assistancetofloodvictimswhenfloodsoccur.National and local governmentsappeared unable to implementnecessaryactionandcommunitiesthemselves also appeared unabletoorganizeself-help.

Whileitisnot(yet)possibletolinksuch flooding directly to climatechange,climatechangeis increas-ingtheprobabilityofmoreextremefloodsoccurring.

At the same time there is a trendtowards population concentrationincoastalareasandparticularlyincoastal urban areas. This trend isalso driven by globalization withincreasing trade flows where thebulkofthetradeisshippedonboats.Nowhereisthistrendstrongerthanin China where the population inthe low elevation coastal zone hasincreasedfrom119millionin1990to144millionin2000.Theurbanshare of this population increasedfrom 56 million in 1990 to 78millionin2000.

It is concerning that continuedurbanization will draw largerpopulations into the low elevationcoastalzones.Atthesametimethepopulationconcentrationincoastalareas threatens coastal ecosystems.The Millennium EcosystemAssessment concluded that thecoastal ecosystems are among themost productive in the world butalso among the most threatenedby human settlements (Agardy et al.,2005).Largeareasofmangroveforest and coral reefs have alreadybeendestroyed.

IPCC Working group 2 hasfound that successful adaptationto climate change depends upontechnologicaladvances,institutionalarrangements, availability offinancingandinformationexchange(IPCC, 2004). The need for moreresearch and analysis of economicandsocial issues related toclimatechangewere alsohighlightedwithemphasis on a portfolio of actionsaimed at mitigation, adaptationand improvement of knowledge.Thosewiththeleastresourceshavethe least capacity to adapt andare the most vulnerable. On theother hand adaptation, sustainabledevelopment, and enhancement ofequitycanbemutuallyreinforcing.

Areas below 10 meters above sealevel cover2%of theworld’s totalland area but host 10% of thepopulation and 13% of the urbanpopulation.

Box3.15: southern african drought in 2007

“Hot, dry weather from Januarythrough March 2007 wilted cropsin southern Africa. The severedrought produced near-recordtemperatures that, combinedwith a lack of rainfall, causedextensivecropdamage,particularlyin western crop areas. In SouthAfrica, the anticipated yield fromthe corn crop dropped from tenmilliontonsinDecembertosixmil-lion tons inApril because farmerscouldn’tplantinthedryconditionsand many of the crops that wereplantedwiltedinthedryheat.Thelast South African drought of thismagnitudeoccurredin1992.”

(http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/NaturalHazards/view.php?id=18226)

Those with the least resources have the least capacity to adapt and are the most vulnerable.

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Small island states have 13% oftheir population and 16% of theirland in this zone. The countrieswith the largest population inthis zone areChina (144million),India(63million),Bangladesh(63million), Vietnam (43 million),Indonesia (41 million), Japan (30million), Egypt (26 million), USA(23million),Thailand(16million),and the Philippines (13 million)in year 2000 (McGranahan et al.,2007).

ThisshowsthatAsiancountriesarefacing the largest challenges. Theyhave 75% of their population inthe risk zone. Some small islandstates have more than 90% oftheir areas below 10 meters abovesea level, including Maldives,Marshall Islands,Tuvalu,CaymanIslands, Turk and Caicos Island(ibid.). Box 3.14a provides someadditional information on thepopulation at risk in Bangladesh.Box 3.14b provides informationabouttheeffectsofarecentfloodinMozambique.

3.15 inCReased pRobabiliTy of dRoughTs and eRRaTiC Rainfall due To ClimaTe Change

GHG emissions are likely toaffect rainfall patterns as well asmean temperatures with severeconsequences for agriculturalproduction in various parts ofthe world. Some recent climatemodelingassessmentsindicatethatthe Sahel droughts that occurredwere not due to human-inducedGHG emissions. Rather theyappear to have been caused by anatural variationwithwarming intheSouthernAtlanticrelativetotheNorthernAtlantic.

According to this study, GHGemissions are not likely to lead todrying in the Sahel in the period2000-2050butarelikelytoleadtoa drying trend in southern Africatogetherwithaprojectedwarming

of the Indian Ocean (Hoerling et al., 2006). These models predict agreeningoftheSahelinthe2000-2050period.

Some other models, however,taking into account other factors,like the increase in aerosols in theatmosphere,predictadryingintheSahelalsointhe21stcentury(Heldet al., 2005). However, none oftheexistingmodelscontainallthefactorsthatplayarole.Thedifferentmodelsgiveverydifferentoutcomesand are inconclusive about howglobal warming will affect rainfallpatterns. Box 3.15 describes therecentdroughtinSouthernAfrica,an area where the climate modelspredict a dryer climate in thefuture.

3.16 avoiding enviRonmenTal damage in ‘fRonTieR’ aReas foR new eneRgy souRCes

Naturalgasisapotentialsubstitutefor oil, coal and other sources ofenergy and reduces the amountof GHG emissions substantiallyif new, more efficient technologyis used. The potential natural gasresourcesintheworldarefarfromfully explored and require heavyinvestments but the dependencyon gas is increasing rapidly. Forexample,China’sheavydependenceon coal could be substantiallyreduced if the country invested inits natural gas resources that arefound mostly in the western partsofthecountryandoffshore.

High energy prices and increasingdemandsforfossilfuelshavetriggeredexploration for hidden resourcesin many new parts of the worldincluding deeper ocean regions,arctic areas, remote terrestrialareasanddeepersoillayers.Higherprices and new technologies havecreatedopportunitiesforeconomicextraction of new resourcesincluding oil from oil sands andnaturalgasfromshale.

Box3.16a: marcellus shale, appalachian basin, usa

TheblackMarcellusshalefromtheDevonianperiodcoverslargeareasof New York State, Pennsylvania,Virginia and Ohio. The shale isabout1-2milesbelowthesurfaceandvariesinthickness.Until2003geologists assumed that the shalecontained only small amounts ofnatural gas. However, using newmethodsofhorizontaldrillingandfracturing, substantial amounts ofgas could be extracted. New esti-matesoftheamountofgasintheshalewere250 timeshigher thanearlierestimates.

environmental concerns over theextractionfromtheseshaledepos-its focuson the large amountsofwater needed and their manage-ment, also onthe additives in thewaterusedforfracturingtheshale.The components added to thewater includea friction reducer, abiocide topreventgrowthofbac-teria, a gel to carry the proppant(material for ‘propping’ open thefractured zone) into the fracturesand other substances to ensurethat theproppant stays thereandsubstancestopreventcorrosionofthepipesinthewell.

The New York Department ofenvironmental Conservation iscurrentlyassessinghowto imposethe necessary safety measures tominimize the risk of pollution. Anew law was also introduced tocontrolwellspacing.environmentalregulation otherwise includes arigorouspermitprocess that takesinto account the location charac-teristics, the technology design,inspectionofimplementation,andenforcement of restoration whendrillinghasbeencompleted.

Higher prices and new technologies have created opportunities for economic extraction of new resources.

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Box3.16b:gas and oil exploration areas in Papua new guinea

Oilandgasexplorationandminingfor export started in Papua Newguinea intheearly1990s.Theoilandgasreservesandthepipelinesthatareneededfortransportationof the oil and gas are located onland that ismostlyunder custom-arytenure.Asmuchas97%oftheland in the country is under cus-tomarytenureunderthecontrolofcustomarygroups(clans).

Those affected by the miningindustry are paid royalties andequitydividendsderivedfromtaxesontheoilandgassales.Paymentsaremadetothelandgroups,calledIncorporated Land groups, on aregular basis. Two percent of the22.5% tax that the governmenttakesfromoilandgasprojects isdistributedtothelocalgovernmentandlandownersascompensationandasabenefitshare.

Problems arise as payments aremadetothelandgroupswhileitisnotalwaysclearwhattheappropri-ategroupsshouldbe.Newgroupsforminordertoobtainashareofthe royalties and dividends. Thegroupleaderstakealargeshareofthebenefitswhile thedistributionof benefits among members isunequalandunfair.Thesituationischaracterized by lack of represen-tation and involvement of groupmembers, lack of accountabilityand transparency, and inability ofthe groups to resolve their ownproblems. Leaders get away withtheir behavior and form allianceswithgovernmentofficials for jointbenefit(Koyama,2003).

Shale is theworld’smostcommonsedimentary rock. Althoughshale often contains gas, it is soimpermeable that until recently itwasnotpossibletoextractthegasinaneconomicway.Newtechnologyincludeshorizontaldrillinginshalelayers deep below the ground andhydraulic fracturing methods thathelp to release the gas from theshale.

These technologies, which weredeveloped inNorthAmerica,havelead to a gas rush when energyprices increased in areas withpotentiallyhigh shale gas reserves.TheseareasincludeNewYorkState,Pennsylvania,Texas,ArkansasandmanyotherstatesintheUSaswellas Alberta, Quebec and BritishColumbiainCanada.Thefinancialcrises and the following fall in oilandgaspricesmayagainmakesomeofthesereservesuneconomical.

There are environmental concernsrelated to possible pollution ofgroundwater, handling of largeamounts of water needed forthe fracturing, and the trafficand infrastructure needed onthe surface. Oil sand utilizationcreates a lot more damage on thesurface and therefore has moreenvironmental hazards. Box 3.16aprovides more information on theexploration of shale gas in theUSand the environmental hazardsinvolved.

There are several tenure-relatedissuesthathavecomeupalsowithgas exploration and production.The basic question is who has themineral rights for such resourcesdeep under ground. This variesacross countries but also withincountries. In the US the mineralrights typically accompany thesurfacerightsbutnotalways.

Owners of the property can sellthe mineral rights or the rights toexplore for minerals while theyalsotakearoyaltyonanyeventualproduction. Since explorationcompanies typically want access

toalargerareathantheindividualfarms and since the belowgroundhorizontal drilling can cut acrossproperties, property owners havemerged in groups to negotiatecontractswiththecompanies.Thishelps them to strike better dealswith thecompanies.There is largevariation in the contracts theyreceive both in terms of rate paidperacrefortherighttoexploreforgas and the percentage royalty onthe production afterwards (www.geology.com/). Box 3.16b is aboutoilandgasexplorationandcontractsinPapuaNewGuinea.

Thistypeofnaturalgasexplorationisnowspreadingquicklytootherpartsoftheworldwherelandandmineralrightsarelessclearlyspecifiedthanin the US and Canada and wherealsoenvironmentalprotectionisoflower quality. People with surfacerights (like farmers) are likely tobeaffectedbysuchprogramseventhough they do not have mineralrights.Therefore,itisimportanttofocusonthenationallawsthatarenecessarytominimizethepotentialenvironmental damage that thesemineral exploration operationscause.

Another frontier is offshore,including Arctic areas and deepseas.Newtechnologiesandhighoilandgaspricesmake such resourceextractionprofitable.Nation statestypically control the offshoremineralrights.Themidlineprinciplehasoftenbeenusedtodrawbordersbetweennations’offshorepropertyrights and agreements about thesebordershavebeenreachedformanyoffshore areas but there are stillsome gray zones, contested andunresolvedareas,forinstanceintheArctic.

Summer melting of the Arcticice sheet has caused Russiaand several other countries toposition themselves for resourceexploration and extraction in thisharshandvulnerable regionwhereenvironmentalrisksareparticularlyhigh.

It is important to focus on the national laws that are necessary to minimize the potential environmental damage.

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These areas are very rich in fishresourcesandmanyenvironmentalorganizations advocate prohibitionof all mineral exploration in suchvulnerableareas.Severalareashavebeendeclaredasconservationareasuptocertaindates.

The combination of improvementsin extraction technology, risingpricesforoilandgasandexhaustionof wells further south, generatespressure to open new areas inmore extreme locations. Highenergy demands and high pricesare prompting most countries toexplore for oil and gas reserves.Many of these countries lack thetechnical expertise and know-howto ensure environmentally soundpoliciesandpracticesforfossilfuelexplorationandextraction.

The risks of severe damages aretherefore high and internationalsupport is important to helpthese countries to establish betterstandards to minimize this risk.Accidentsinrelationtoextractionofthesedeepseaoilandgasresourceseasily lead to large oil spills thatthreatentheoceanicecosystems.

3.17 soCial and enviRonmenTal CosTs of eliTe CapTuRe of land RefoRms

Elite capture of land reforms hasoccurred inmanycountriesand isone of the important reasons whymany land titlingprograms fail tobenefit the poor. There is a highrisk that adjudication/registrationprocesses can be manipulated bytheelite,excludingpoorgroupsthatdependontheselandresourcesfortheirlivelihood(Platteau,1992).

The environmental impacts ofsuch reforms will depend onthe alternative options for thoseexcluded from their land and alsoon what those who take over theland do with it. Environmental

consequences need to be takenseriously where those excluded areforcedintomarginallandsandusenon-sustainable landusepractices.If they move to urban slums theymayalsoaddtotheproblemsthere.However,theycouldfindalternativeemployment opportunities andlivelihoodsthatdonotcompromiseenvironmentalquality.

Elite capture includes controllingorinfluencingthegovernmentwithlegal and illegal means, makinglaws or preventing new laws frombeing introduced or implemented.Itmaytakeplacecentrallyaswellaslocallyandisasignofweakand/ordysfunctional institutions. It mayinvolve appropriation of resourceslike land or minerals because oftheir high value such that takingoverorgetting theproperty rightsis the name of the game. It mayalso involve the appropriation alarge share of resource rents atthe expense of poor and marginalbeneficiaries. Box 3.17 details theconsequences of elite capture on alandtitlingprograminMali.

This ends the reviewof importantland and environmental issues.Many of them require furtherattention and action throughconcertedeffortsatglobal,regional,national and local levels.Thenextsection looks at identification ofimportant research gaps and keyresearch questions that will guidefutureresearchontheseissues.

Box3.17: Land titling in mali: for the wealthy and powerful only

Increasing population pressureand commercialization in the cot-tonzoneinsoutheasternMalihastriggered a process of conversionfrom inalienablecustomary tenureto various forms of alienable andexclusivelandholdings.

Informal land transactions havebecome common and land val-ues have increased rapidly. Landtitling ispossibleandtitlescanbeobtainedbutareextremelyexpen-siveandmaycostupto3000US$.This high cost makes obtaining atitle impossible for ordinary farm-ers.Theprocessisbureaucraticandsubstantial bribes are demandedbyofficials intheregionalgovern-ment. Land titles provide highertenure security, however, becauseit ismuchmoredifficult toexpro-priatetitledland.

On the other hand, untitled landis very insecure and can easily beexpropriatedfromtheusersasthestate is considered the owner ofsuchlandandverylittlecompensa-tion is paid. Such compensationisalsopaidonlyforanareaupto3.5ha.Thisleadslandholderswhofaceahighriskofexpropriationtosell the landata lowpricebeforeitistakenandtheytendtobeleftworseoffthanbefore.

Thelargestshareofthelandrentissiphoned off by the civil servants,urban authorities and the centralstate, while middlemen get asmaller share. With this systemformalization of land rights takesplaceat the timeof expropriationand the main beneficiaries of thissystem are the wealthy, powerful,well-informed and well-connected(Benjaminsenetal.,2009).

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ReseARCh gAPs And Key ReseARCh qUestions

This chapter identifiesimportant research gapsrelated to land tenure

and environment. The review ofimportantenvironmentalchallengesin the previous chapter revealsmany of these research gaps. Theglobaloverviewsof the extent andseverity of various environmentalproblems related to land tend tobe very broad, and are based ongeneralizations from case studiesand satellite images with limitedground-truthing.

Advanced technologies, like useof radar and laser technologies insatellites,willcontinuetostrengthenthe global land survey data bases.However, these databases mustalso be linked to socio-economicand other data to better analyzethe relationships mechanismsbetween environmental health,human well-being and behavior,and landpolicies at a global scale.Unfortunately, action cannot waitforallofthistobeinplace.

Considerable evidence has accu-mulatedshowingthatstandardizedapproaches, like land titling, haveoftenfailedtoachievetheintendedeffects(Deininger,2003).Likewise,manylandredistributionprogramshavenotbeenasefficientasexpectedincreatingamoreegalitarianlanddistribution.Attemptsatregulatinglandrentalmarketsandland-to-the-tillerpolicieshaveenhancedtenureinsecurityandthetransactioncostsin the land rental markets, andhavethereforeunderminedlanduseefficiency(Otsuka,2007).

These failed attempts were due toerrorsindesignaswellaserrorsinimplementation.Morecanbedoneto integrate the lessons from thedifferentexperiences.

Thereisaneedforgreaterhumilityin seeking solutions to importantenvironmentalproblemsandaboutwhatarethemostappropriatelandpolicies. As stated by de Janvryet al.(2001), they saw their book“Access to land, rural povertyand public action” as “an exercisein humility in identifying hugeknowledge gaps in efficientlydesigninglandpolicyreforms.”

Most of the debate about varioustypes of land reforms has beeneither for or against reform, andwithanemphasisonthesearchforcases thatcouldbeusedtodefendone view over the other. Ideologyhas also played an important rolein the politicized research agenda.However, a more pragmatic andcautious approach also appears tohavegainedgroundinrecentyears.This is reflected in the changes intheWorldBank’slandpolicies.

Someofthebasiclessonsare:

• Theimpactsofaspecificpolicymeasurearehighlycontext-specific,whatworksoneplacemaynotworkinanotherplacebecauseofthelargedifferencesinlocalcharacteristics.Carefulassessmentofthelinksbetweenenvironmentalandsocioeconomiccharacteristics,andidentificationofkeybottlenecksformoresustainablelanduseisthereforekeytosuccessfulpolicydesign.

4. rEsEarCh gaPs and KEy rEsEarCh quEstions

Standardized approaches, like land titling, have often failed to achieve the intended effects.

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• Thecauseofanenvironmentalproblemorthesolutionmaybeunrelatedtolandtenure,orthesolutionrequiresmuchmorethanatenurereformtosucceed.

• Manycasesaresuchthatitisnotpossibletobeveryconfidentaboutwhatworksandwhatwillnotwork.Suchcaseswillrequirecautioustestingofalternativeapproachesbeforeitisadvisabletoscaleupthesuccessfulapproaches.Itisthereforerelevanttodevelopandtestamenuofoptions.

• Severalpromisinglandtoolshavebeen,andarestillbeingdeveloped.Thesegivenewhopeandtheydeservetobecarefullytestedundervaryingconditions.Doingthisinasystematicwaywillhelpdevelopbetterrecommendationsaboutwhatworkswhereandwhatwillnotworkundercertainconditions.

Theworldisfullof“besser-wissers”who make a living out of sellingideasthathavenotbeensubjecttocareful scientific scrutiny. Againand again development agenciesarecheatedtoputtheirmoneyintobig projects that have a veryweakscientific basis. Still many wantto believe in the silver bullet thatworksagainsteverything.

The arguments are that we needaction, not more research, but thelack of systematic assessment ofall the mistakes made, and theunwillingness to set aside a smallshare of the budget to collectbaseline data that can be used formore robust impact assessments,undermines the possibility ofincremental learning and raisingthe quality of projects or policiesovertime.

4.1 Key ReseaRCh quesTions RelaTed To land and enviRonmenT

Alistofimportantresearchquestionsfollows,basedonthereviewinpart3ofthisreport.Theyareformulatedto be solution and action-orientedinrelationtoimportantknowledgegaps.TheywereusedtostimulateanE-discussionbyaskingparticipantstoreacttoeachquestionandshorttentativeanswerthatwasprovided.An extract on the E-discussioncomments are included followingeachoftheresearchquestions.

1. Can land tenure reforms eliminate the neo-malthusian poverty-environment trap?

No, but tenure reforms are partof a larger solution to break suchtraps.Noconsensusappearedfromthe contributionshere as thebasiccause was questioned, except thattheremostoftenexisttechnologicaland institutional solutions to suchtraps.

Researchliteratureisemergingthattestsfortheexistenceofpovertytrapsin relation to income poverty andassetpoverty.Marketdevelopmentand improved technologies aregood approaches to increase landproductivityandreducepovertyindenselypopulatedagriculture-basedeconomieswhere landdegradationdue to soil erosion and nutrientdepletioncauselowandfallinglandproductivity. Input subsidies haveagainbecomepopulartostimulatethiskindofdevelopment.

Market development and improved technologies may be the best approaches to increase land productivity and reduce poverty.

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2. Can the property rights of poor land users in peri-urban areas be better protected and compensated in cases of eviction?

Thisshouldbepossiblebutrequirespriority by national and localgovernmentsinlawmakingandthewaysuchlawsareimplementedandprovide legal backup to victims ofviolationsofsuchrights.

Therewasagreementthatevictionsshould not take place unless itwas clear that this was in thepublic interest. Laws should bedeveloped to define such publicinterests.Thepoorareparticularlyat risk of being evicted withoutproper compensation. The levelof compensation should be largeenough to prevent those evictedfrombeingworseoffafterevictionthanbefore. It shouldnotonlybeforthelandbutalsoallinvestmentsthathavebeenmade.Preferablytheyshouldbeprovidedwithalternativeland and livelihood opportunities.Adequate information andcompensation should be providedpriortoeviction.

3. Can tenure security be provided to slum dwellers to improve their access to basic services and create incentives for them to improve their property?

Yes, but this will require largeinvestmentsandmaybeinconflictwith other urban priorities forresource allocation. The rapidincrease in the number of slumdwellers and high environmentalrisks inslumsthreatenedbystormfloodsandsealevelrisemakesthisanissueofhighglobalsignificancerequiringcoordinatedinternational,nationalandlocalaction.

Thereisaneedtodefinemoreclearlywhat is meant by tenure security.For example, whether it is relatedto protection against eviction orprovision of legal rights to housesandwhatrightsshouldbeprovidedtonewentrantsbecausetheretendsto be a steady inflow of people.Basicservicesshouldbeprovidedtoallirrespectiveofwhethertheyweretenuresecureornot.

There is a need to define more clearly what is meant by tenure security.

tenure security for people in slums is an important step towards improving living conditions. ©ÄsaForsman

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It is clear that the slum problemis a big problem that needs to beprioritized.Towhatextentcantheissuebemadeglobalratherthanonlyanationalissue?Onesuggestionisto develop a blueprint approachthatcanprovideaguidelineforthewayforward.

Another perspective would beto understand the dynamicsof countries unable to provideadequate housing for all. Anothersuggestion is to focus on the lackof political will which causes toolittlefundingforbasicservicesandsecurelivelihoods.Itmightalsobeworth looking carefully into howto organize slum improvementsand prevention and facilitate thelinkages between local, nationaland international organizations.Aboveall,noneofthesesuggestionscan stand alone. A multi-trackapproach is needed to tackle slumconditionsatscale.

4. Can land tenure reform enhance tenure security where it causes poor land management and non-sustainable land use?

Perhaps, but careful assessmentis needed as many tenure reformprogramshavenothadtheintendedeffectsontenuresecurity.Thereisagrowingconsensusthatlandtenurereformsrequirebottom-upinvolve-ment in order to have the desiredeffects.There isa risk that reformsfromabovehavetheoppositeeffectof enhancing tenure insecurity.Moreresearchisneededtoidentifytheextentof tenure insecurityandto design tenure reforms that canenhancetenuresecuritywhere it islow.

5. is it possible to formulate flexible tenure systems for pastoral and agro-pastoral areas such that pastoral systems are sustained and conflicts reduced?

Alternatives are needed to theconventional titling approach,allowing flexible and overlappingland rights. Some promisingapproaches are being tested butmore research is needed to assesshow scalable and effective suchapproachescanbe.

6. Can national laws and international agreements be developed to protect the land rights of people living on land identified for large-scale food or bio-fuel production schemes?

Global standards are needed forenvironmental and human rightsprotectioninrelationtosuchlargeschemes. The countries with landresources that are inhighdemandfor such purposes need expertisein negotiating such large-scalecontracts to protect the rights ofpeople living in the selected areas,to have proper environmentalassessments, and to establish fairlong-term contracts for mutualbenefit.

7. is there a need for tenure reforms in areas with customary tenure?

This will depend on the localcircumstances and requires carefulstudy in each case as customarytenuresystemsareverydiverse,suchasthedifferencebetweenmatrilinealandpatrilinealinheritancesystems.Thecustomarytenurerightshaveinsomeplacesbeenunderminedandmay be in need of strengthening,revisionorevenreplacementiftheycannolongerhandlethechallengesfaced.

Land tenure reforms require bottom-up involvement in order to have the desired effects.

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Women’slandrightsareoftenweakunder customary tenure. This hasalso been the case in land titlingprograms that have attempted toreplace customary tenure systems.A cautious pilot-testing approachis recommended when assessingalternativesolutions.

There is a need for certain typesof reforms in customary tenure,especially of enhancing genderequity,making such systemsmoredemocratic, providing tenuresecuritytoall(includingwomenandchildren), and linking them morecloselywith theMDGs.There aremanyvaluableaspectsofcustomarytenurethatareimportanttokeep.

8. Can land laws be imposed to protect steep slopes and other fragile ecosystems?

Yes, this should be possible butenforcingsuchlawsmaynotbeeasy.Lawsandinternationalagreementswere seen as important but notsufficient. Even more important isthe agreement among the peoplethemselves and local authoritiesand organizations that have tosupport restrictions on land use.Suchresourcesmaybedepletedoutof necessity and then laws do nothelp. What is needed is guidanceand alternatives for the poor.Stimulation of collective actionand local leadership to conservesuch valuable resources may bethe most important. Payment forenvironmental servicesandcarbonsequestrationarenewtoolsthatcancreate incentives for protection ofsteep slopes. This requires furtherresearchandpilottesting.

9. what are the appropriate property regimes for environmental protection in coastal zones and for enhancing private and public environmental services?

Environmental conservation areasmust be set aside and protected.There is a need to balance privateandpublic interests.Seawater risewill require adjustments of theproperty rights regimes. This willrequirefurtherstudiestoinvestigatehow best to protect the interestsof the stakeholders involved andaffected.

10. should land consolidation be implemented in areas with very fragmented land holdings?

Consolidation should not beimplementedwithoutcarefulstudiesof the costs and benefits involved.Consolidation should preferablybesortedoutonavoluntarybasis,and could also be promoted byfacilitationof landrentaland landsalesmarkets.

11. is management of rented land less sustainable than management of owned land and are interventions required and feasible to achieve more sustainable management of such land?

Thisquestionneedsfurtherresearch.There have been few studies onthisandhardlyanystudiesontheefficiencyofalternativeinstrumentsto enhance more sustainablemanagement of rented land wherethatisneeded.

There are many valuable aspects of customary tenure that should be kept.

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Thereisariskthatthosemanagingrentedlandinvestlessinconservingsuch land than if they owned theland.Aslandrentingexpandsthereis a growing need for legislationthat protects rented land bysignaling clear responsibilities ofowners and tenants. Longer-termcontractsmayreduce thisproblemand very long-term contracts, i.e.99-year leases are treated almostlike sales. Enforcement of longer-term contracts may be an optionbut that may also reduce theflexibility advantage of short-termcontracts. Imposing sustainablemanagementrequirementsasapartofthecontractmaybeanalternativeapproach that should be tested indiverseenvironments.

12. Can tenure reforms be introduced to stimulate tree planting and thus reduce deforestation?

Such reforms may work wheretenure insecurity has discouragedtreeplanting.However,thisrequirescarefulassessmentineachcase.Thisshould be seen in relation to theneed for more systematic researchto identify the extent of tenureinsecurity at a broader scale andwhether it represents the key toexplain deforestation and lack oftreeplantingincentives.

13. Can land redistribution projects create win-win benefits by reducing environmental degradation and enhancing equity?

Needs assessments andenvironmentalassessmentsintargetareas are required to establish thecounter-factual conditions. Mostredistribution projects have failedto do so. Many redistributionprograms have been very difficulttoimplementsuccessfully,somoreresearchandpilot-testingareclearlyneeded. Solutions must alwaysmatchlocalconditions.

14. Can the property rights of people living in areas threatened by sea level rise be protected or be compensated if lost?

This will require global collectiveactiontoestablishaninternationalinsurance or compensationmechanism.Thisismainlyneededfor the most vulnerable poorpeople that are unable to protectthemselves. There is a need todevelop national and local rescueplans and alternative locations forresettlementwhereprotectionistoocostlyorimpossible.

People living along the coast are at risk of sea level rise. ©ÄsaForsman

The need for flexible tenure regimes may become even more important if global warming increases.

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15. Can better safety net programs be developed to protect against climate risks due to droughts, floods and heat waves?

This requires coordinated actionatglobal,nationalandlocal levels.Itmaybepossible tobuildon theWorldFoodProgramandalternativesafety net programs that provideemployment, food and other basicneeds in emergency cases throughfood-for-work,cash forwork, foodaid and rehabilitation programs.Environmentalrehabilitationcouldbeanimportantcomponentofsuchproductive safety net programs.Theneedforflexibletenureregimesmaybecome evenmore importantif global warming increases suchenvironmental risks. However,flexibility can also be a source oftenureinsecurity.

16. how can land tenure reforms protect the environment in frontier areas for resource extraction to meet global resource needs?

Improvementofnational laws andregulations is crucial to protectthe environment against excessivedamage as well as to ensure theprotection of national and localinterests and particularly thoseof the poor. The risk of resourcecurse is evident in many placesandstronginstitutionsarerequiredto avoid or reduce such problemsthat can have largenegative socialand environmental implications.However, establishing stronginstitutions that protect the rightsofthepoorandvulnerableiseasiersaidthandone.

17. how can elite capture of land reforms be prevented so that land reforms become more pro-poor and environmentally friendly?

Howeasyordifficultitistoachievethisdependsonthelocalandnationalpower structure. Internationalpressureandprogramswithdonorsupportmayhelp, ifwell-designedbaseline, monitoring, and impactassessment are implemented.Continued funding must alsodepend on positive environmentalandpro-poordesignsandimpacts.

Some donors have very weaksystems formonitoring, evaluationand impact assessment and hidebehind the convenient recipientresponsibility. When the realrecipients are corrupt bureaucratsandtheelite, rather thanthepoorand their environments that wereto be targeted, such an approachdoes not work. There are no easysolutionsandaverycautious step-wise approach with pilot-testing isrecommendable before eventualscalingup.

Thetwopossiblesolutionsweretheintroductionofa landceiling,andland taxation or dividend that isprogressive. Land value dividendsmaybemostappropriateincountrieswith well developed land marketsand systems for land valuation.Landdividendshavealsobeenusedin countries primarily with poorfarmersusingafairlyflatrate.Thebasicconstrainttotheintroductionofprogressivelanddividendsisthatland owners and the elite do notwant them. This may also be thecaseforthepolicydecision-makerswhoarelandowners.

This concludes the key researchquestions and provides a basis forprioritizing and identifying themost relevant policy tools in thenextsection,includingprioritiesforaction.

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This chapter identifies keypriority areas where landstakeholders could add

value aswell asdevelop land toolsthat could be used to enhancesustainable land management andhuman well-being. For instance,the Global Land Tool Network(GLTN)hasidentifiedsixareasforlandtooldevelopment:

i Landrightsrecordsandregistration

ii Landuseplanning

iiiLandmanagement,administrationandinformation

iv Landlawandenforcement

v Landtaxandvaluation

viCrosscuttingissues(GLTN,2006).Thisdivisionwillbeusedwhenreviewingrelevantlandtools

5.1 land TenuRe RefoRms

Land reform requires thoroughanalysis of each country’s specificsituationandmustbewidelyagreeduponbyvarious interestgroups inthelandsector.

Taxingoflandvalueswasidentifiedasacrucialinstrumenttomobilizeidle land and make it available tomore efficient and needy users.However,eventhoughintroducingsuchataxsystemseemsanoptimalsolution, there can be strongpoliticalconstraintsasitislikelytobeopposedbylandownersandtheelite.Thebeststrategywouldbetolook at the range of land relationtaxationsolutions.

In a broader urban perspective onpolicies and tools there are manyexamples of innovative, pragmaticandcosteffectivepoliciestoimproveaccess, land tenure security andpropertyrightsfortheurbanpoor.Information on these is alreadyin the public domain through thebi-annual World Urban Forum,the bi-annual World Bank UrbanResearch Symposia, the annualHabitat Awards, Dubai BestPractices, academic publications,bi-lateralandmulti-lateralagenciesandGoogle.

There may therefore be a need tofocusmoreonwhysofewoftheseareappliedorscaledupatabroaderscale. The reason may be that toomany of those in power benefitmore from the status quo thanfrom introducing such reforms.GLTN therefore needs to givepriority attention to the politicaleconomy within which landmanagement operates in order toidentify key constraints that needtobeaddressedtomoveforwardinspecificlocationsatagiventime.

Finally, although there are manytools that have been proposed forapplication in the urban setting,many of these have not beensystematicallytestedacrossarangeof heterogeneous urban localities.These promising tools need moresystematic piloting. Successfulpilots build a stronger basis forscalingup,ThismayalsobeanareawhereGLTNcanplayakeyrole.

5. KEy PrioritiEs and Promising Land tooLs

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Key PRioRities And PRoMising LAnd tooLs

A diagnostic typology approachmay be used to identify whetherthere isaneedforcertaintypesofland reform. This will be used toidentifythekeycharacteristicsthatimply both certain problems andcertainsolutions.

Examples of such characteristicsare:

1. Degreeofoveralllandscarcity

2. Skewedlanddistribution

3. Leveloftenuresecurityfordifferentlandholders

4. Degreeofdependenceonthelandforlivelihood(extentofexitoptions)

5. Whetherpro-poorreformsareintheinterestofthelocalandcentraleliteandpolicy-makers

6. Theextentofenvironmentaldegradationanditsshort-termandlong-termconsequences

7. Characteristicsoflandlawsandpossibilityoflawenforcement

8. Thedegreeoftransparencyandaccountabilityinadministrativesystemslocallyandcentrally

Ifcountriesthenaregroupedbasedon having similar characteristics,onemaylookforthebestsolutionsthere.

Transparency is the basis for lawenforcement. Thus, transparencyin landadministrationgoesa longway in sorting out issues providedthat proper laws have been putin place. Transparency can alsohelp to ensure that governmentofficialsdotheirjobefficientlyandreduceillegalactivity.Thisisaveryimportantareawhereeffortshouldbe concentrated to make a realdifference.

UN-HABITAT, in partnershipwith GLTN, and other traininginstitutions successfully developeda training programme ontransparencyinlandadministration.The programme was implemented

inAfricain2008andisscheduledto be expanded in Asia and LatinAmericaandbeyond.

Itisrecommendedthatmodulesontransparency should be built intoall training programmes on landadministration. Guidelines andbestpracticesshouldbeestablishedfor enforcement of transparency.Relatedtothisisalsotransparencyin land-related dispute resolutionsystems, like local courts or landtribunals having well documentedrecords of the treatment of courtcasesandhowcourtdecisionsbuildonthelaw.

5.2 land RighTs ReCoRds and RegisTRaTion

Low-cost land registration andcertification

This is an approach that may berelevantinpoorcountrieswithhighpopulationdensity,tenureinsecurityand land disputes contributing toenvironmentaldegradation.

Land registration and certificationmay be implemented in manydifferent ways and at varyingcosts. With the low-cost approachdescribed above and theconventional land titling approachastwoextremesitispossibletofindmultipleintermediatecombinationswith intermediatecost levels.Newtechnologies,likeGPS,newsoftwareand computers, high resolutionsatellite pictures, have opened upnew approaches that are cheaperto implement than conventionalregistrationandtitling.

If registration of individual farmsandparcelsistoodemanding,itisalsopossibletoonlyregistervillageborders and borders of communalland vs. private land and preparecertificates of customary land togroupsofusers.

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The approach is relevant in poorcountries with high populationdensity, tenure insecurity andland disputes contributing toenvironmental degradation. Itmay require technical capacitybuilding as well as institutionalstrengtheningbuttoalesserextentthan the conventional land titlingapproach and is therefore scalablewithamuch lowerbudget if thereislocalsupportforit.

The low-cost approaches havebecomemorediversifiedduetonewtechnologies lately but it is crucialtobalancethetechnologylevelwiththecostsandaffordability,technicalskillsandscalability.Therehasbeenastrongtendencytopreferahigherleveloftechnologythatistoocostlyand this has been at the expense

of affordability by the poor andscalability due to limited capacityandbudgets.

Before a country decides onwhether to apply the conventionallandsurveyingandtitlingapproachor low-cost land surveying andtitling/certification approach, oreventotitlelandatall,thecountryshouldbeclearontheobjectivesoftitling/certification.Istheobjectiveto enhance tenure security; toreducethefrequencyoflandborderdisputes; to stimulate investmentsintheland;tocreateincentivesforsustainable use of land and betterlandmanagement;toenhancelandproductivity; to activate the landmarket;tounlock‘deadcapital’ininformal urban settlements/slumsoracombinationofanyofthese.

ethiopia has successfully imple-mented land registration at a largescale with very limited funding. Thereformwasimplementedatregionallevel in four largest regions in thecountry. It beganwith Tigray regionin1998andtheotherthreeregionsfrom 2003. The objectives were toimprove tenure security, to promotebetter land management and largerinvestments, and to reduce conflictsover landboundaries. The approachfocused only on cultivated land butinvolved registrationofall cultivatedlandinonesweepingoperationandconsistedofthefollowingsteps:

• Thebasis of the reformwas theintroduction of a new federalland proclamation (in 1997) andnewregionallandproclamations.

• Four types of forms were used;Form 1 for collection of parceldata in the field, Form 2 wasthe registration book kept atcommunity (tabia) level, Form 3was the land certificategiven tothe owner, and Form 4 was forregistering transactions such asinheritance, redistribution andreallocation.

• Ineachregionyoungpersonswererecruitedandtrainedastechnicalstafffortheimplementation

• Landregistrationtypicallyinvolvedthe technical staff, the develop-ment agent, community repre-sentatives, and the land holderswalking the fields as a group,andrecordingthedataonforms.Information collected includedname of owner (head of house-hold), address, family size, timeof last landdistribution, numberof parcels, name of location ofparcels, fertility status of parcel,parcel size (local traditional wayofmeasuring),namesofownersof neighboring plots of the par-cel,andsignaturesofthepeoplerecordingtheinformation.

• Land borders were betterdemarcatedinsomecaseswherethat was needed, using localmaterials.

• The same information wasrecorded in the registry book inthecommunity.

• Land certificates in form of asingle page including the sameinformation were then issuedto households containinginformationaboutall theparcelsofthehousehold.

Box5.2: Low-cost land certification in Ethiopia

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Advantages of the approach usedin Ethiopia include the low costbecause no expensive technologywasneeded,onlypeoplewithverylimited training were used, stronglocalparticipationwasensuredandallparcelswereobservedinthefieldwithneighborspresentaswitnessesonownership,thelocationofparcelsandtheirborders.Eventualdisputeswereresolvedthereandthen.Caseswhere on-the-spot resolution wasimpossiblerequiredmorefollow-upwork.

The costs of this approach areextremely low when compared tostandard land titling approaches.In standard titling methods thepoor are often unable to obtainland titles unless the programmesare heavily subsidized, which goesbeyond what poor countries canafford. Disadvantages of the low-cost approach include lack of acomputerized landregistrysystem,lack of maps, more cumbersomeways to update and maintain thesystem, difficulties of extractingsummarizedinformation,lowlevelsof accuracy of plot measurement,and lack of geo-reference forparcels.

It is not obvious, however, thatthese limitations necessarily addtenure security and thereforewould lead to more sustainableland management and investmentandlessdisputes.Onthecontrary,research has documented that theapproach has; enhanced tenuresecurity,stimulatedinvestmentsandmaintenance of soil conservationstructures and land productivity,and has reduced the frequency oflandborderdisputes(Holden et al., 2008, 2009a).

Theapproachhasalsobeenpovertyneutral(HoldenandTefera,2008).Thishasnotbeenthecaseformoreexpensive land titling programs.Theexperienceshowsthatlow-costdoesnothavetomeanlowqualityandlowimpact,whereashighcostdoesnotguaranteehighquality.

Thenext step is to take adecisionon the level of surveying accuracywhich is desired to achievethe objective; this will in turndetermine the land surveying andtitling/certification approach.Cost implications are critical asaffordability and sustainabilityheavilydependson thecostof thetitling/certification.

Developingcountriesshouldadopta low-cost approach using theavailable low-cost technology. ThecasestudyofEthiopiaisaverygoodexample. Rwanda is implementinga certification exercise; Uganda ispiloting systematic demarcationon a small scale. Most important,these approaches are scalable,effectiveanddelivertheobjectives.Unfortunately many such projectsinAfrica‘die’atthepilotlevel.

5.3 land use planning

Thereisaneedforaninteractivelanduseplanningprocessbetweencentralandlocalauthoritiestoconsolidatenational and local priorities. Top-down land use planning may leadto very poor implementation atthe local level. Local commitmentcannot be taken for granted andbroad participation and local elitecapture can be difficult to avoid.This leadstotheexclusionofpoorand vulnerable groups who havenopowerandlowstatusinsociety.Ways of empowering the poorand vulnerable, including women,should therefore continue to be akeypriorityareaforGLTN.

UN-HABITAT (2008) notes that‘poor landuseplanningassociatedwith insecurity of tenure andincompletely specified land rightsalso leads to problems of airand water-borne pollution fromagriculturalandindustriallanduse.As a result, in densely populatedareas,thepooraremoreexposedtopollutionhazards.’

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Land use planning may beimplementedatdifferent levels.Ata local level it can potentially bean important tool in areas withoverlapping land rights and whereflexible tenure systemsareneeded,suchasinagro-pastoralandpastoralareas.Suchareasaresusceptibletoland use conflicts and organizedlanduseplanningmaybeawaytoget different stakeholders togethertosortoutconflictsofinterestandagreeonhowtosharetheutilizationofresources.

Preparation of land use maps anddocumentation of traditional userights may be useful to clarifyand strengthen the rights andobligationsofthedifferentparties.If environmental degradation andoverexploitation is a problem onpartoftheland,landuseplanningmay help to coordinate efforts toreduce the pressure and conservetheresourcesformutualbenefit.

This could lead to collectiveaction agreements, establishmentof monitoring systems, rules forutilization, and punishments/finesfor violations. Such local land useplanning should be strengthenedwith support from above but theresponsibilityshouldremainatthelocallevel.

Support may be needed on thetechnical side with maps andsome other equipment. Laws andregulations and an organizationalmodel for implementation withprinciplesandstandardsofconductare helpful. Such principles andstandards include transparency,representation of all relevantstakeholders,andrespectforagreedrules.Stilltherearemanychallengesrelatedtoimplementingalocallevelapproach. These are traditionalpower structures, conflicts, lackoftrust and respect, free-riding, andcrossingself-interests.Socialcapitalisneeded toget such an approachstarted. Initial success makes itpossibletobuildmoresocialcapital.

Someinitialsupportcertainlyhelpsthis. It is also important to setclear objectives within a realisticplan,useastepwiseapproachwithmilestonesthatareachievablewiththeresourcesandtimeavailable.

Thereisaneedforaninteractivelanduseplanningprocessbetweencentralandlocalauthoritiestoconsolidatenational and local priorities. Top-down land use planning leads tovery poor implementation. Localcommitment cannot be taken forgranted. Broad participation andlocalelitecapturearehardtoavoidand likewise the exclusionofpoorand vulnerable groups having lowsocialstatus.

Box5.3describesacaseinTanzaniaofsuccessfullocalland-useplanning.Thepilotstudywasimplementedbyagovernmentlandreformprogram,Mkurabita.SomeotheractorswereinvolvedintheHandenipilot.Theseincluded the Legal and HumanRights Centre and the TanzanianPastoralists,HuntersandGatherersOrganization.

Some of their conclusions on theexperience are summarized byMkulila(2006)andSundet(2008).They perceived that the attemptto “fast track” the process causedmore problems and contributedto land grabbing, partly due tomisinterpretation of the termcustomary right of occupancy,causing some to claim ownershipoflandwheretheirforefatherswereburiedwhilstsomeotherpeoplehavebeenonthelandforover30years.A group of Maasai women werealsoleftoutoftheprocess.Sundet(2008)alsoreferstoareportwhichstates that two local businessmenmanaged to gain access to 2000ha of land in the process, causingotherstohavebecomelandless.

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Still, Mkulila (2006) thinks thatthe Handeni experience withparticipatory land use planningis something to build on throughfurther modifications and testing.Participatory land use planning,if properly implemented, not onlyas a quick PRA activity but byestablishing more permanent localteamswithrepresentativesfromallkeystakeholdergroups,helpstosortoutorreducelandusedisputes.

First priority should be to scaleup comprehensive participatorylanduseplanningwiththeaimtominimize land use conflicts andprotecttherightsofallgroupsthatdependonthelandasalivelihood.Moresystematicpilotingisneededto improve upon the participatorylanduseplanningapproach.Properprofessional research should be

carried out to maximize learningfrom the pilot studies and morepilots should be implemented totestdifferentapproaches.

5.4 RegulaTion of land maRKeTs To aChieve susTainable land use

Landmarketregulationshavebeenand are still common in manycountries. These regulations servetoprotect the interests of those inpolitical power, and inother casesthey are introduced to protect thepoor against exploitation, or theyareintroducedbasedonanti-marketideologies.

Tanzania has achieved widespreaddemarcation of village borders.However,thenextstepofcreatingvil-lageLandUsePlansisaslowprocess.Local knowledge about land laws isvery limited with a few exceptionswhereprojectsandpilotstudieshavedisseminated information and imple-mentedlanduseplanning.

The approach applied a comprehen-siveparticipatoryprocess,establishingpermanent local land use planningteams with representatives from themajor stakeholder groups. It holdspromisetoreducethenumberoflanddisputesandmayalsohelptoprotecttheinterestsofweakergroups,includ-ingpastoralistsandwomen.However,thereisnoguaranteethatthiswillbethecase.Clearerprinciplesandguide-lineswillensuremoresuccessfullocalland use planning and managementand may be implemented as localby-laws.

ApilotstudyinHandenitestedafewinnovationsonlanduseplanningandregistrationinordertocomeupwitha more efficient methodology forimplementation of the Village LandActof1999.Asecondpurposewastogainfieldexperienceonimplementa-tion of the Act that would produce

proposals for the envisaged reformsin rural land management systems.HandeniDistricthadalreadypreparedtheDistrictLandUseFrameworkPlan.IthadalsoconstructedaDistrictLandRegistryandhadobtainedtheneces-sarycomputerandgPSequipment.

Theprojectwentthroughthefollow-ingsteps:

1. educatingthevillagecouncilsabouttheVLAandtrainingofthetechnicalteam

2. Boundaryadjudicationandsurveys

3. PreparationofVillageLandCertificates(VLCs)

4. ConstructionofVillageLandRegistries

5. PreparationofVillageLandUsePlansanditsby-laws

6. IssuanceofCertificatesofCustomaryRightofOccupancy(CCROs)

7. RegistrationofCCROs

8. Lessonslearnt:

9. Itisimportanttomobilizethevillageproperlytofullyparticipate

intheprocess.Itisimportantnottorushtheprocesstoomuch

10.Temporarystaff,e.g.Form4leavers,maybetrainedquicklysothattheycanimplementthistypeofsurveyworkastechnicalsupportstaff

11.establishmentofvillagebordersmaybechallengingandmayinvolvedisputeswithneighboringvillages

12.Issuingofvillagelandcertificates(VLCs)shouldbedecentralizedfromtheCommissionerofLandsandtoDistrictLandOffices

13.Villagesshouldthemselvestaketheresponsibilitytoestablishvillagelandregistries

14.establishmentofVillageLandUsePlansrequiresparticipationbyallrelevantstakeholdergroupsandpreferablytherelevantprofes-sionalstafffromWardlevel

Thelanduseplansneedtobeaccom-paniedbybylawsand it is importantthat the villagers are involved inapproving these to ensure that theydonotviolatethem

(Source: Claussen et al., 2008).

BOX5.3: village land use planning in tanzania

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Concerns about environmentalconsequences may call forregulation of land rental markets,particularly if the rental contractsare of short duration. Short-duration contracts can suppressinvestment incentives, leading tonon-sustainable land managementpractices.SomeevidenceofthathasbeenfoundinUgandabyNkonyaet al. (2008), however, the causemaynotalwaysbecleari.e.whetherlandownersprefertorentouttheirpoorly managed land, or whetherpoormanagementisaconsequenceof the land being rented out. Thisrequiresfurtherinvestigationunderdiverseconditionssincelandrentinghasbecome so commonand isonthe increase in many parts of theworld.

Land market regulations couldrequire longer duration contracts,requirethemtobeformalizedandclearlyshowwhoisresponsible forensuring sustainable management.Well-intended regulations do notalwayshavetheintendedeffects.Itisthereforenotusefultointroducethem unless there is a need and

if there is a need careful impactassessmentshouldbecarriedouttotesttheeffectsofsuchregulations.

Land rental markets have highpotentialinAfricawheremostlandisundercustomarytenureandisnotsurveyed.UnfortunatelyfewAfricancountrieshavestrategiestopromoteland rentalmarkets.Regulationofrural land rental markets shouldprovideinvestmentincentiveswithaviewtopromotingsustainablelanduseandmanagementpractices.

A well-regulated land rentalmarket creates incentives, mainlyconservation incentives for moresustainable land management.Short-termrentalcontractsaremorelikely to be associated with poorland management and this mayleadtoenvironmentaldegradation.

The regulation strategies shouldcreateincentivesby:

• requiringcontractstobeformalizedandtobeoflongerdurationtoenhancetenuresecurity

Capacity building, innovation and joint effort are important ingredients of success. ©UN-HABITAT/RemySietchiping

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• specifyingwhoisresponsibleforensuringsustainablemanagement

• providingalocalstructureforregisteringtheserentalcontacts

It may not be wise to uniformlyenforce registration of all landrentalcontracts.Itmaybebettertoofferregistrationasanopportunity.This would then be done in caseswhen there is limited trust amongthe parties, for example when thetenantisanoutsider.

5.5 land managemenT, adminisTRaTion and infoRmaTion

Nationalplansandregulationsarecriticallyimportanttoprotectlargeand valuable land resources thatare threatened by environmentaldegradationorareinhighdemand.This is also the case where thelivelihoodsoflargepopulationsareatriskduetoextremeweathereventsor sea water rise. Developmentof rescue plans, adaptation andmitigation strategies, monitoringand early warning systems arecrucialingredientstominimizetherisksandcosts.

For instance, GLTN and itspartners can play a coordinatingroletodeveloptoolsandcontributeto capacity-building througharranging short courses, andmobilizepoliticalsupport.

Challenges are particularly largeincertaincountrieswithverylargepopulations living in the coastalareas in some Asian countries.First priority should be given toproviding assistance to the mostvulnerable and poorest countrieswith the largest population underthreat. Bangladesh can be singledoutasthefirstprioritycountrythatwillneedassistance.

5.6 slum RehabiliTaTion and ReseTTlemenT

The case study from Zimbabwe(Box 3.3) is a striking contrast tothe example from Mumbai (Box5.6).The lattermaybe considereda better practice. One relatedchallenge is that slum areas thathave been evacuated or clearedquicklycanbefilledwithnewslumdwellers, leaving no improvementintheseareas.

Forced displacement of slumdwellers without adequatealternatives, resettlement optionsor compensations is the recipefor further social, economic andenvironmentlosses.Displacedurbandwellers tend to resettle on moremarginalandvulnerablesites.Theirsourceof andaccess to livelihoodsare often severely undermined.Upgrading and reconstructingdegradedurbanenvironmentssuchas slums is crucial in combinationwith providing good alternativeresettlementareas.

Development of low-cost andincremental approaches is key dueto the budgetary restrictions andthe large and growing number ofslum dwellers. More importantly,preventing and containing slumgrowth, especially on vulnerablelandscapes would provide long-termgains.

5.7 land law, RegulaTion and enfoRCemenT

Land laws are crucial tools forenhancing more sustainable landuse. However, land laws can alsobe ‘toothless’ unless enforced.Development of improved landlaws needs parallel disseminationofinformationaboutthecontentofthelawsinthelandadministrationsystem as well as other parts ofnational and local administrationsthathaveaninfluenceonlanduse(e.g. Ministries and Departmentsof energy, forestry, agriculture,transportation,andplanning).

Box5.6: resettlement in mumbai

Mumbaihasapopulationofmorethan10million,halfofwhich livein slums. More than 20,000 poorhouseholds were living risky livesalongtherailwaytracksinMumbaiin illegally built shelters. Theseshackswerewithin1-25metersoftherailwaytracks,withoutaccesstowaterandsanitation.Theattractionof low cost and short distance tosourcesofincomeoutweighedthedisadvantagesoftenureinsecurity,small space, riskofaccidents,andpoorbasicservices.Thecongestionofpeoplealongtherailwaytracksforces the trains to slow down,reducingthetransportationcapac-ityoftherailwaysystem.Accidentsarefrequentandthelackofsanita-tionforcesthehouseholdresidentstodefecateonthetracks.

The World Bank partly fundeda project to improve the railwaysystemandtoresettlerailwayslumdwellers.TheWorldBankresettle-ment guidelines help to protecttherightsoftheslumdwellersandrequire civil society participationin the formulationof the resettle-ment and rehabilitation plan. TheNationalSlumDwellersFederationwasalso representedandcontrib-utedtostronglocalparticipationintheresettlementprocess.

The sub-organization, the RailwaySlum Dwellers Federation, startedsavings schemes,organized them-selves into housing cooperatives,andnegotiatedaccesstolandandinfrastructure.Theybuilttheirownhousesusingamixtureoftheirownsavingsandloans.Affordablelow-cost standard houses weredeveloped. The resettlement wascombined with baseline surveysandmovementofpeopleingroupsof50households.Inoneyearabout60,000 households were resettledinto better accommodation withpiped water, sanitation andelectricity and without any policeinvolvement.Thisalsoimprovedtheefficiencyoftherailwaysystem.

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Furthermore, the public andland users themselves need to beinformed.Universitiesandrelevanteducation programs, researchinstitutions,landuserorganizations,NGOs,andlargeprivateenterprisesare all organizations that shouldhelpdisseminatesuchinformation.

In developing countries with poorinformation access and low levelsofliteracy,ittakesyearsbeforethecontents of new land laws reachlandusers,ifever,beforenewlawsarepassed.Thelanguageofthelawsis hard to understand for peoplewith limited formal education.Thenewlawshavetobetranslatedinto local languages before beingdisseminated. Popular formatsconveyingtheessenceofthelawmaybemore suitable fordisseminationthandirecttranslations.

Knowledge may often not be asufficientconditionforbehaviortobe regulated according to the law.Many land users may have strongmotivations to violate the law outof profit interests or even out ofnecessity.Thisisoftenthecaseforpoor and vulnerable groups whomust use scarce environmentalresourcesasasafetynet.

Well intended laws may in manycases have unintended effectswhiletheintendedeffectswerenotrealized.

Lawmakersoftenlackunderstandingof the local incentive structureswhich can be rather complex.Lawsthatwereintendedtoprotectsome user groups could have theopposite effect. Public hearings ofthecontentofnewlawsmayrevealimportantproblems.Pilottestingofthelawsinsomelocationsmayalsogiveinsightsaboutthelikelyeffects.Follow-up monitoring and impactassessment can also reveal theextenttowhichtheintendedeffectsareachievedorwhetherunintendedandunexpectedeffectsoccur.

New laws that are clearlycontradicting traditions andcurrentpracticemayrequirecarefulconsideration, follow-up andenforcementmechanismsinordertosucceed.Commandandcontrolvs.economic incentivesarealternativeorcomplementarymechanisms forenforcement.

It is not obvious what the mostappropriatemethodsofenforcementarebutpilottestingatasmallscalegivesvaluableinsightsbeforescalingup.Locallandadministrationsandland use planning committees atcommunity level play importantroles in the dissemination andenforcement of land laws andregulations. Box 5.7 providesan example of such interactiveregulation of land management inNorway.

Pikine, dakar; houses of residents being destroyed©UN-HABITAT

Box5.7: regulating autumn/winter plowing in norway

Pollution of lakes, streams andrivers due to erosion and nutrientleachingfromagriculturallandhasbeen a substantial environmentalproblem in Norway. Spreading ofanimalmanureonthelandduringthe winter was prohibited manyyearsago.Recentlytherehasbeenadebatewhetherageneralprohi-bition of plowing during autumnshould be introduced for slopingareas close to streams, rivers andlakes. Such plowing has been apreferredlandusepracticebymanyfarmers who plant winter wheat,the most profitable crop, or whowant to renew old pasture fields.Prohibitiongofthispracticewouldtherefore have negative economicconsequences for these farmersearnings. Farmers’ organizationsargue that there should be noprohibitionandthat it issufficientto disseminate information andthat would lead to a sufficientreduction of this kind of activity.They also argue that introductionofsuchaprohibitionwillonlyleadto more environmental bureau-cracy. Some local political partiesand environmental organizationsargueforintroductionofaprohibi-tionandenforcementbyreducingthe agricultural support to thosewho violate the prohibition. Theyopenthepossibilityofapplyingforexemption under certain condi-tions.

The final agreement made in oneregion between the local govern-ment and farmers’ organizationswas that farmers could cultivateupto40%oftheirlandareaifthisarea was flat and not exposed toerosion.Anadditionalrequirementwas to establish sufficient bufferzonesnear lakes, streamsand riv-ers. The agreement also includedcompensating farmers who suf-fered economic losses due to theprogram.

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Enhancement of sustainable landmanagement through laws andenforcementinEthiopia

The regional land proclamationsin Ethiopia include articles thatspecifythedutiesoflandusers.Anamendment came in 2002 to the1997 rural land use proclamationforTigrayregionthatprohibitsuseof plants which affect the fertilityof agricultural land but allows forplantingof eucalyptus, cactus andother perennials on sloping land.This proclamation replaced anearlieronethatprohibitedplantingofeucalyptusandcactusonarableland.

Theamendmentalsoincludedrulesforpunishmentincasesofviolation.Suchpunishmentswererelevantforhouseholds who do not conservetheirlandproperly,whoplantcropsthat affect the fertility of the landor other forbidden plants. Thepunishment was in form of cashfinesintherangeofUS$3–600.

A new rural land proclamationwas introduced in 2006 andprovided the basis for establishingland administration committees(LACs) in every community(tabia) and village (kushet). Thesecommitteesareunderdistrict levelEnvironmental Protection, LandAdministration and UtilizationAssociations(EPLAUA).

While the previous proclamationdidnotspecifyhowthelawshouldbeenforced,thenewLACsaregiventhisresponsibilityaccordingtothemost recent proclamation. Theproclamationwasfollowedupwithamoredetailedregulationin2007.The regulation provides details onthe composition of the LACs andtheir duties which include landadministration, land use planningand conflict resolution related tolandbasedonthelaw.

The LACs were established sorecently that it is too early toassess their impacts in terms ofimplementationofthelaw.Surveysin 2006 and 2007 revealed thatthe knowledge of the law wasvery limited for many aspectsof the law. The establishment ofLACs demonstrates a focus ondecentralized land administrationthat includes a legal backing forenforcing more sustainable landmanagement. The region also hasastrongtraditionof implementingsoil and water conservationthrough collective action in formof compulsory labor mobilizationand food-for-work programs.Such programmes have includedconservation of whole watershedsincludingprivateland.

The reasons for collective actionon private land include theneed for technical assistance indesigningappropriateconservationtechnologies,theneedtocoordinatestructures across farms, resolvedisputes and mobilize labor. Eachcommunity has an agriculturaldevelopment agent who is alsoinvolved in land administrationandcanhelpguidethework.Localconflictsaretypicallyresolvedwiththehelpoflocalconflictmediators.

Thiscanbeseenasagoodexamplewherenationallawshavecontributedto strengthened land tenure rightsthrough land registration andcertification which has stimulatedmoresustainablelandmanagementand investment (Holden et al.,2009b). The recent changes inthe law and establishmentof localLACs have provided a strongeradministrative system for lawenforcement.

This may be characterized as adecentralized, transparent andparticipatory land administrationapproach for enhancement ofsustainable land management.However,theapproachneedsfurthertesting and possibly refinement toassesswhetheritcanwork.

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Decentra l izat ion of landadministration and managementappears to be the answer butputting in place the decentralizedinstitutions and equipping themto deliver can be a challenge. Theother challenge is the customarytenure rules and practices overwhich statutory land laws areimposed. Enforcement in such anenvironmentbecomesatallorder.

5.8 paymenT foR enviRonmenTal seRviCes

Paymentforenvironmentalservices(PES)canbeseenasawayofcreatingmarkets where they do not existand therefore cause environmentalexternalities thatare sosevere thatthey require action. Establishmentof such mechanisms facilitates aninternalization of the externalitywhich may be seen as imposinga Pigouvian subsidy or tax whichreflects the actual environmentalcostsorbenefitsinvolved.

TheprinciplesofPESinclude:

(a)Thosethatprovidetheenviron-mentalservicegetpaidforit

(b)Thosethatbenefitfromtheservicepayforit

(c)Paymentsareconditional

(d)Participationisvoluntary

PES may be part icu larlyrelevant to apply in relat ionto spatial externalities, e.g. wheredeforestation in the uplands byone group of landholders affectsdownstream land users negativelythrougherosion,siltation,andmoreirregular water flows. Here, thedownstream landholders may bewilling to pay upland landholdersforconserving the forest to reducedeforestation and reduce thedownstreamdamages.

Reducing emiss ions f romdeforestationandforestdegradation(REDD) has emerged as a recentinitiative that aims to reducegreenhouse gas emissions byprovidingincentivestoindividuals,communities,projectsandcountries.This will require developmentof similar mechanisms to createincentives forcarbonsequestrationby establ ishing market-l ikemechanismstotradecarbon.

Some of the challenges involvedare:

• Howeasyisittoidentify,measureandmonitortheenvironmentalservices?

• Howeasyisittomobilizethebeneficiariestopay?

• Howeasyisittoidentifytheserviceprovidersandensurethattheyadjusttheirbehaviorandprovidetheserviceagreedupon?

Thelastquestionmayalsorelatetothe property rights arrangements.If the land rights are clear andexclusivefortheareasthatneedtobeconservedorplantedwithtrees,it may also be easy to establishcontracts that ensure enforcement.If ownership is group based, likefor communal forests or possiblyunder a customary tenure system,payment could go to the groupand the group could arrange thedistribution of payments itself aswell as utilize group arrangementsforenforcement.

How effective this would bedepends on the strength of thelocal institutions,thecommitmentand power of the local leaders,transparency and enforcementmechanisms. Here are potentiallysubstantial transaction costs andinformation asymmetries thatcan lead to moral hazard, rent-seeking, free-riding, corruptionandconflictsinenvironmentswithweakinstitutions.

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TheremaystillbeconfusionaroundthePESconcept, includinghow itcould be implemented. Questionsthataredifficulttoanswerinclude:whoisgoingtopay?Whoistobepaid?Howtodefine thepayment?Reservationsabout itsapplicabilityexistuntil these issuesareresolvedandpilottestinghasrevealedthatitcanwork.ApplicationofPESwillrequire a careful analysis in eachcasetoprovidetheanswerstothesequestions as well as setting up anadministrativemechanismtomakesuchmarketswork.

link between poverty and environment

Thereisacloselinkbetweenpovertyand environmental degradation.Environmental issues tend tobe relegated to the most poor aspeople struggle tomeet theirdailylivelihood. The environment isfurther compromised as peoplecontinue to depend upon trees toprovidefortheircookingfuelsinceother sources of fuel are beyondtheir reach. To meet the goal ofimproved environment needsthe incorporation of strategies tocombatpoverty.

In addition, there has to beconcerted effort to develop muchcheaper sources of domesticfuel, alternative cheap buildingmaterials, poles and material formaking furniture. Therefore,imposinganenvironmental taxonthe poor household cutting downtreesmaynotworkandcouldmakethingsevenworse.Thepovertyandbasicneedsofpeoplewillhavetobetakenintoaccountwhendesigningsmart PES schemes that can bothreduce poverty and protect thenaturalresources.

Box5.8aprovidesanexampleofasuccessful PES program in CostaRicaandBox5.8bprovidesanotherexamplefromChina.

CostaRica’sgovernmentservesasanintermediary,sellingenvironmentalser-vicessuchascarbonsequestrationandwatershedprotectiontodomesticandinternationalbuyers. The services areprovidedbyprivate landholdersundercontract. Incentive payments are provided for forest protection and naturalregeneration, sustainable forestmanagement,andplantationestablishment.Payments are made over a five-year period while the conservation commit-mentisfor15-20yearsandincludesestablishmentofamanagementplan.InadditionanewForestryLawprohibitsconversionof forest landsandmakespreparationofmanagementplanscompulsory.

Theprogrammestartedin1997andwasimplementedonabout95,000ha.Applicants to theprogrammust provide legal proof of landownership andprovideadetailedmanagementplan.Theserequirementsimposetransactioncostsonlandowners.Thesecoststendtobelargeronsmallareasthanonlargeareasduetoaninitialfixedcost.

Theresponsibility formonitoringandenforcement iswiththe local forestersbutexactcriteriaforcomplianceassessmentandpenaltiesincaseofviolationswerenotspecified.Thelargestpotentialdemandforthistypeofservicecomesfrom the Kyoto Protocol through the Clean Development Mechanism. TheCDMauthorizescreationofcertifiedemissionsreductionsthroughactivitiesindevelopingcountriesthatareboughtbydevelopedcountriestomeetnationalgHgemissionslimits.

OneofthemanyweaknessesoftheKyotoProtocolandCDMisthatadynamicbaseline,whichisabusiness-as-usualscenario,requiresthattheprogramcre-ateanimprovement(called“additionality”)ascomparedtothebaseline.Thisimprovementisnotrestrictedtotheactualareaofconservationbutshouldbeanoverallimprovementsuchthatso-called“leakeages”shouldbetakenintoaccount.Anexampleof“leakage” is increaseddeforestation inaneighbor-ingareabecausewoodcuttinghasbeenrestricted intheconservationarea.Leakagescouldalsobedue toeffectsonmarkets. Forexample, if thepriceoffuelwoodgoesupduetotheprojectthiscouldcreateincentivesformorefuelwoodextractionelsewhere(Chomitz et al., 1999).

Box5.8a: Payment for forestry environmental services in Costa rica

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Box5.8b: the sloping Land Conversion Program in China

The Sloping Land ConversionProgramme, also called the grainforgreen,wasintroducedin1999and is the largest land retirementprogram in the developing world.The environmental goals of theprogramaretoreducesoilerosionanddesertificationandtoincreaseChina’s forest coverby convertingsteep and marginal agriculturalland.Thegoal istoconvert14.67millionhaofcroplandtoforests,ofwhich4.4millionhawasonslopessteeper than25%. It coversmorethan2000countiesin25provincesin the country and has a budgetof 40 billion US$. By 2003 it hadretired7.2millionha.Itisalsothelargest‘paymentforenvironmentalservices’programinChina.

Theprogrammeusesapublicpay-mentschemebutwhereindividuallandholders can volunteer to par-ticipate.Subsidiespaidforconver-sionhavebeenbothincashandinkind.Thein-kindcompensationhasbeen in form of annual provisionofgrainsubsidyof1500-2250kg/haandfreeseedlingsworthabout90 US$/ha. The cash subsidy wasabout36US$/ha.Thesubsidieslastfor8yearsforecologicalforests,5years for economic forests, and 2yearsforplantingofgrasses.

Inthisprogrammeitisthegovern-ment that pays the subsidies. Nospecific baseline has been estab-lished for the programme exceptthe before conversion situation.Theprogrammewasimplementedusing a fairly top-down approachin terms of the choice of treesto plant, or what farm plots toinclude in the program. and par-ticipationwasnotalwaysvoluntary(Bennett, 2008).

5.9 paymenT of ResouRCe dividends

People who live in places needingland reform also tend to have anethicofsharing.Thereisthecustomof hospitality, even with strangers.Thereisthecustomoflendingaidtoarelativewhohashadamisfortune.Insomeplaces,extendedmembersofafamilybandtogethertobuyahouse.

Towinacceptanceoflandtaxesorlandduesor land-use fees, ithelpsto not stress the tax aspect, butstress the sharing aspect. That is,itmightmakesensetocouplelandtaxesorlanddueswithaland-rentdividend.Thatwouldhelpeveryoneunderstandthatlandvalueisavaluegeneratedbysocietyandbelongingto all society.Manyplaces alreadypayadividend:Alaskapaysanoildividend,andAspenColoradopaysa housing dividend. Paying thedividendwouldbenoharder thancollectingthetaxordues.

Inaplacethathasregisteredvoters,wherever people go to vote, thereeach month they could pay theirland dues and receive their “rentdividend”. Most people would getbackmore than theypay in, sincepoorpeopleliveonlocationsoflowvalue, but every region has a citywithareasofhighvalue.

Poor nations have used land taxesbefore,includingTaiwan,Jamaica,and Kenya. But they lost the taxbecausetheydidnotpayadividend.Nevertheless, if those placesmentionedcouldsolvethelogisticsofcollectionthensocanotherplacestoday,andwinpopularsupportbytying the reform to the custom ofsharing(www.geonomics.org).

5.10 paRTiCipaToRy publiC woRKs pRogRams as safeTy neTs

Food-for-work and cash-for-workprogrammes have been used bothas a safety net for poor and foodinsecure households, to provideemployment. They also supplylabour for public projects likeroad building and maintenance,construction of buildings, soiland water conservation, irrigationdams, and tree planting. Recentlythe productivity-enhancingprogrammeshavebeenrenamedasproductivesafetynet.

Public works programmes cantargetthepoorandneedywhoareunemployedorunderemployed,byprovidingthemfoodandincomeinexchange for their labor.Such lowlevelsofpaymentwouldthencausethe non-poor not to compete forsuchemployment.

However,suchprogrammesrequirecompulsory involvement if theprimary objective is to finish aninvestment project. The degree ofparticipationof local communitiesin the planning and organizationofsuchpublicworksprogramsalsovaries. Such investments are morelikelytogivelastingpositiveeffectsiftheyaredemand-driven.

Food-for-work programmes havebeen applied at watershed levelto enhance susta inable landmanagement and can have severaladvantagessuchas:

• Mobilizationoflabor(collectiveaction)forlabor-intensiveinvestmentsoncommonpropertylandandpossiblyprivateland.

• Coordinationofconservationofabiophysicalunitlikeawatershedwherethereareadvantagesofalandscapeapproach

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• Provisionoftechnicalsupporttoindividualfarmhouseholdsandtogroupsoffarmhouseholdsthatneedtocoordinatetheconservationinvestmentsacrossfarmborders

Goodlocalinstitutions,commitmentandsupportareimportantforsuchprograms to work well. A sourceof funding of the incentives (foodor cash) is also needed to ensurethe safety net dimension of theprogrammes.Ideally,theinvestmentscould enhance the productivityof the local land resources andthus reduce the vulnerability anddependency on such safety netsin the future. Tenure security andclearly identified property rightsare likely to be crucial to ensurelasting effects of such investmentprogrammes(Holden et al., 2006a).

Suchprogrammeshavemostlybeenusedinruralareas.Theirpotentialforupgradingofurban slumareasisworthexploring,especiallyiftheycreateemploymentforslumdwellersandupgradepublicservices.

International donors often providefunding for such programs thathelp in relief and emergencies.Disadvantagedandvulnerablegroups can be sustainablyrehabilitated through developingpubliclandswiththedonationfrominternationalcommunitiesthroughensuring employment, income,education, enterprise, productionandeconomicdevelopment.

Many food-for-work and cash-for-work programs in the past haveonly had short-term objectivesand had no lasting environmentaleffects. Local participation inidentificationofpriorityinvestmentandrehabilitationoptionsiscrucialto enhance the benefits from suchprograms.

The new productive safety netprogrammes should be moreeffective in this regard but carefulimpact a ssessments must beundertaken.

5.11 ColleCTive aCTion foR enhanCemenT of enviRonmenTal seRviCes

Collectiveactionmayberelevanttoprotectandenhanceenvironmentalservices. Such collective actionis more likely to take place whenthere are large negative effects ofinaction, while each individual’saction reduces significantly thenegativeeffectonhim/her-selfandonothers.Thisismorelikelytobethe case for some environmentalservicesandforcertaingroupsandpropertyrights.SeeBox5.11foradescriptionofgametheory.

There exist many successfulcollectiveactionexamplesatmicrolevel where communication andmonitoringiseasyandrelationshipsarepersonal.Thiscanalsoexplainwhy common property regimescontinue to exist in areas wherepopulation pressures are high andwheretherearemorebenefitsthandisadvantages related to collectivemanagement over individualmanagement.Thismaybethecasefor common grazing lands andcommunitywoodlots.

Importantgroupcharacteristicsthatenhance collective action are thelevelof trust among themembers,the group size, their history andtraditions for cooperation, thelevel of transparency, system forpunishment in case of violations,system for conflict resolution andthedegreeofsupportfromoutsideauthorities(government).

Box5.11: game theory and collective action

gametheoryhasbeenusedtoana-lyzemanykindsofcollectiveactionproblemsandhasrevealedthattheproblemismuchmorediversethantheone-periodprisoners’dilemmagame that was used by Hardin(1968) in his famous “Tragedy ofthecommons”paper.Thesevaria-tions include thepay-off structureinthegamewhichmaynotalwayscreate incentives to defect. Anexample is the “chicken game”where defection by some partiescreatesincentivesforotherstotakeaction. Another is the “assurancegame”wherecooperationbysomecreatesincentivesalsoforotherstocooperate.

examples of chicken games couldbetheorganizationofherdmobil-ityincommongrazinglandsortherelationship between head-endersand tail-enders in an irrigationscheme when it comes to main-tenanceof irrigationcanals. If theparties have the opportunity tointeractandthegame is repeatedmany times this also enhancesthechancesofcollectiveaction incaseswhenthepay-offstructureismorelikeinanassurancegameorprisoners’dilemmagame.

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The heterogeneity of the group insomecasesunderminescooperationwhileinothercasescertaintypesofheterogeneityenhancecollaboration.In cases where collective actionfails to work it may be better tospecify more individual propertyrights to enhance sustainable landmanagement.Itmayalsobedifficultto implement big investmentprojects, like building irrigationdams, purely based on collectiveaction. Such large investmentsrequire some additional fundingandincentivepayment(BalandandPlatteau,1996).

It is easier to promote collectiveaction in small rural communitiesthanlargeurbanslumareas.Otherforms of collective action may bepromoted in neighborhoods whenpeoplefeeltenuresecure.

Law, regulations and lawenforcement mechanisms are notenough in most countries. Moreimportant is consolidated andcoordinated action for ensuringquality and standard of urbanenvironmentalservices.

A strong urban environmentmonitoring agency is essential.Anindependent,powerfulandcapableurbanenvironmentprotectionforcecanbeestablished.

5.12 inTegRaTed RuRal and uRban developmenT

There are strong links betweenurban and rural areas throughfor instance migration as well asflow of resources, commoditiesand services. Rural and villagedevelopment is considered crucialtoreducetheinflowofmigrantstourbanslums.

Employment generation in bothrural and urban areas is the keyto further slum expansion. Landreforms can in some countries bethe key to employment generationin rural areas. Organizing slumdwellers at village or group leveland into cooperatives can be agoodwaytomobilizeparticipatorycollective action and training toimprove urban livelihoods andenvironmental management andthesamegoesforrurallivelihoods.

windhoek, namibia: City Councils face many challenges in managing peri-urban growth.©UN-HABITAT/RemySietchiping

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The fundamental problem is thelack of sufficient funding forinvestment in slum rehabilitation.A better tax system may in somecountries(wheresufficientsurplusesare generated) be an additionalsolution.Decentralizationofpowerand establishment of strong localadministrationsthatusetransparentand accountable processes tomobilizethelocalpeoplearethewaytogobuttherearemanyobstaclesatthelocalandmorecentrallevelsto such approaches. A focus onthepoliticaleconomyis,therefore,crucial.

Thereisaneedtobetterunderstandwhysomeruraldevelopmenteffortshave failed. For example, in KanoState in Northern Nigeria, therehas been wrong prioritizationof land resources development.The State has about 30 dams thatare underutilized. The neglect todevelop water resources for ruralcommunities is responsible for theovercrowding in Kano City. AreasinKanoStatewhoselandresourcesare developed for agricultural useshave the lowest rates of urbanmigrationandevenpoverty.

Develop rural areas and youreduce migration and poverty inboth urban and rural areas. Ruraldevelopmentalleviatespovertyandincreasesincomesforbothruralandurban folks rather than be viewedas away tocurburbanmigration.Development of non-agriculturalincome earning opportunities inruralareaswillbethekeytopovertyreduction.

Oneofthemainfactorscontributingto the growth of slums includeslackofadequateincomesforurbandwellerstoseekalternativehousingsolutions. The strategy towardsimproved or curtailed expansionof slums should include improvedincomesforthepoor.

5.13 pRoviding TenuRe seCuRiTy and slum RehabiliTaTion

Increasing populations in urbanareas makes is making it difficultto provide shelter and security oftenureforurbandwellers,especiallyfor the poor and other vulnerablegroups.Poorlymanagedrapidurbanpopulation growth in developingcountries often leads to a rapidgrowth of slums and increasingenvironmentalhealthproblems.

Severe environmental degradationis one of the common featuresin developing country cities.Insecure tenure in informal (oftenillegal) settlements makes it alsounattractiveforpoorhouseholdstoinvestinimprovingtheirtemporaryhousing arrangements and adoptsustainableenvironmentalpractices.Conventional titling programs insuchurbanareashaveoftenfailedtosolvemanyofthebasicproblemsandmayhaveforcedpoorslumdwellerstorelocateinenvironmentallyrisk-prone and hazardous locations,further exposing them to naturaldisasters.

It appears that legal pluralism ispreferable, combining ownership-based and rights-based approacheswhile taking into account theneeds of the poor, their financialconstraintsandthelimitedcapacityof urban land administrations.This also implies a continuum ofland rights, including freeholdtenure, leasing arrangements,public ownership, group tenure,and informal tenure arrangements(Payne et al., 2008).

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Many alternative approaches totitlingarebeingtested.Examplesoftheseare:

• Provisionoftemporaryoccupationallicenses,groupownershipbycommunitylandtrusts,andcompanyorco-operativeownershipandsubdivisionoflandtomembersinKenya

• SimpledocumentationofinformalsettlementsinEgypt

• CooperativehousinginSouthAfrica

• ProvisionofCertificateofRightstouseanddevelopstateownedlandinBotswana

• TemporarylandrentalinThailand

• RecognitionofillegalsettlementsinIndonesia

• RelocationofillegalsettlersbyprovidinglandtitlesonnearbylandinCambodia

• ProvisionofregisteredleaseholdsinsquattersettlementsinBrazil

Formal landlord-tenant prop-ertycontractsinBolivia(Dey et al., 2006)

Thereisalottolearnbyanalyzingthis large diversity of approachesand by piloting variants of themin other locations to assess thestrengths and weaknesses of each.Littleisknownabouthowtheywillaffect the urban environment andthecostsofimprovingit.

The question of slums is closelyrelated to housing/shelter rightsor land rights. This is an areaworthy exploring since its answerwill greatly contribute towardsachievement of one of theMillennium Development Goals.The other issue is the preferredstrategies for housing provisionfor purposes of creating a stockof affordablehouses for all. In theend legalizingand recognizing thecontinuumofrightsiscritical.

Forurbanslums,thegrouptenuremight provide a more progressiveapproach. This consideration isbasedonthefactthat it isquickerto create groups rights where thelaws already exist. In additionfinancing, training and labor iseasier to organize once a group ofpeopleareboundtogether.

Landsometimesbecomesaliabilityfor the poor owners who cannotafford the development cost. Thereformpolicycanadoptsupportiveoptions for sustaining poorpeople such as low-cost housingon rental or small installmentpayment system, enterprise orcredit financing, including asecured income and employmentscheme. Public owned lands canbe allocated for such projects andpublic-private partnerships can beusedtoimplementsuchprojects.

Forthedevelopingworld,provisionor enhancement of slum tenuresecurityshouldnottaketheformofconventionaltitling.

TheNamuwongoSlumUpgradingProject in Uganda is a classicalexample, like many other projectswhich failed toprovide securityoftenurethroughconventionalformaltitling. Most slum dwellers justsold thenewly acquired leaseholdsand invaded a wetland adjacentto the project area, creating aworse slum settlement in a fragileenvironment. Legal pluralism,implying a continuum of landrightsandinnovativeapproachestotenureregularization,andprovisionoftenuresecurityinslum/informalsettlementsarethebestoptionsforthedevelopingworld.

Uganda has contributed to therange of alternative, innovativeandflexible approaches to securityof tenure,by issuingcertificatesofcustomaryownership(equivalenttofreeholds)butwhichdonotrequirethe strict and costly conventionalsurveyingandtitlingprocedures.

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It isbecomingclear that localandnational governmental failure toprovideadequateandservicedlandforallsocialgroups,particularlythepoor,canonlyleadtomoreinformalsettlements in environmentallyfragileareas.

Slumareasthathavebeenevacuatedquicklycanbefilledwithnewslumdwellers,leavingnoimprovementintheseareas.Reconstructionintheseareasmay thereforealsobecrucialin combination with providinggood alternative resettlementareas. Development of low-costapproaches is crucial due to thebudgetary restrictions and thelargeandgrowingnumberofslumdwellers.

Slum dwellers centrally located inprime development land becomethetargetforevictions.Thetraumaof evictions of urban poor peopleis mainly attributed to the socialand economic disruption causedtothoseforcedtomovefromtheirinner city homes,whichwouldbeclearedforlanddeveloperstomakelarge profits by clearing the poorfrom inner city areas and holdingtheemptylandforspeculation.

In New Cairo City, provision wasmade for resettlement, but wastoofarfromurbanpoor’splacesofwork in greater Cairo’s inner cityareas.Whilst resettlementhousinglackedsufficientinfrastructureandservices, other upgraded low-costhousingprojectsoftenendedupinthehandsofmiddle-classgroups.

Slums are inseparable parts oftheurbanareas.Slumdwellersserve the city residents butdo not get entitlements.Their settlements are notrecognized as a State obligation.Therehabilitationofslumdwellersmust be a part of overall plannedurban development. Provisionsmust be made for reserving aportioninthecommunityfortheirrehabilitationonrentalorlowcostinstallmentbasis.

5.14 ResCue plans foR aReas ThReaTened by sea level Rise and sToRm floods

Particularly vulnerable areas withlarge poor populations that areunabletoprotectthemselvesagainstsealevelriseandstormfloodsneedinternationalandnationalsupport.Whether it is most appropriateto invest to protect their currentlivelihoods or to organizeresettlement in safer locationsdepend on the relative costs ofthe alternative solutions. This willdependontheexpectedsizeofthenecessary protective barriers thathavetobebuiltforprotection,thedistance to available alternativelocations for resettlement, the sizeofthepopulation,costsofbuildingsuitableresettlements,etc.

A long-term plan for gradualresettlement is preferable to anafter-disaster resettlement. Thelatterwillbemorechaoticandwillinvolve severe losses. In relation tosuchplannedgradualresettlement,thereareimportantpropertyrightsissues toberesolved.Thepropertyvalue of the properties lost mayfall significantly but there is alsoa risk that evacuated areas andhousesarelikelytobeoccupiedbyopportunisticsettlers.

In some cases it may be easy toidentify suitable locations forresettlement not too far from theevacuation areas. In other casesthis may be impossible, e.g. onsomesmallislandcountriesliketheMaldives.

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Further, it will be necessary toconcentratepeopleonmuchsmallerareas and provide alternativelivelihoodsthere.Carefulplanningand specification of clear propertyrightswillbeessentialtokeepsuchresettlementsundercontrol.

The financial costs will be veryhighandclearlybeyondwhatpooraffectedpopulations,communities,cities and countries can afford.Since the cause of the problem isalsoglobal,itisnecessarytodevelopaninternationalsystemforfundingof such large-scale operations.ThisisanareawhereUNagenciescould play an important role.Support will also be needed forbuilding professional capacityto tackle such large resettlementschemes. Organizing a network ofprofessional staff from threatenedcountriesandcitiesisanimportantfirststep.

The national strategic planningmechanismofthedevelopingworldmustemphasizetheadequaterescuepackage for the vulnerable anddisplaced population. Protectinglivelihoodsthroughprotectingland,waterandnaturalresourcesremainmoreimportantforsustainability.

National governments can adoptlarger scale development projectsin collaboration with businesscommunities, private sector andinternationalstakeholders.Inorderto achieve better allocation ofresources, cross-sectorpartnershipsshould be integrated in urbancoastalplanningpoliciesforclimatechangemitigationinitiativeswhichinvolvelocalpeople,landdevelopersandurbanplanners.

The links between climatechange, prioritizing land issuesin the UN system and combatingdesertification, land degradationanddroughtmustbeprioritizedinthepoliticalandpolicyspacebeingcreatedintheinternationaldebatesonclimatechange.

Joint appropriate synergisticresponses, inthebroader,coherentUN System, that simultaneouslyaddress land degradation andclimate change are essential.Priority should be given to soilhealth and enhancement of soilproductivity, particularly in thedrylands, with emphasis on waterresources development, rangelandmanagement and improvedlivestock production to handlethe vulnerability associated withland degradation and unreliableweather.

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ConCLUsions

This report has provided anoverview of some the mostimportant land-related

environmentalproblemsthattheworld faces in the 21st century.The lion’s share of the land underconsideration is located in ruralareaswhileatthesametime(from2008)morethan50%oftheglobalhuman population lives in urbanareas.

Globalization is causing countries,rural and urban areas, poor andrich people to be increasinglyinterdependent as demonstratedby the recent energy and foodpricehikes,thefinancialcrisis,andthe threats from climate change.Internationalcooperationtodevelopglobalsolutionstothesechallengeswillbeofutmostimportance.

The UN system and internationalorganizations must play a keyrole in helping build strongerinstitutionsatglobal,nationalandlocallevelstosupportmoreefficientand sustainable land and resourcemanagement.

This report has identified themost important land-relatedenvironmental challenges thatthreaten the livelihoods of poorand vulnerable populations in thedevelopingworld.Thesechallengesinclude land degradation due tosoil erosion, nutrient depletion,and deforestation, rising sea leveldue to climate change, weak landrightscausingtenureinsecurityandmarginalizationofpoorpeopledueto increasing demands for land,for food and energy production,extremeweathereventsintheformofdroughts,floods,andstormsthat

may become more frequent withglobalwarming.

Many research and knowledgegaps exist. For instance, moreresearch is needed to identify theprevalenceoftenureinsecuritythatcauses environmental degradation.Therefore the necessary solutionto theproblemmaybe landrightsreforms that enhance tenuresecurity. Land reforms have toooften ignored this issue, takingfor granted that their effectwouldbe strengthened tenure security.Reforms should be more specificaboutwhosetenurerightsaretobesecured.

Importanttoolsforenhancementoflandrightsofthepoorinclude;low-cost land recording, registrationandcertification,low-costlanduseplanningandmapping,introductionof laws that facilitate betterfunctioning land rental marketsand sustainable management ofrentedland.Therelevanceofthesetoolsandtheirexactdesignhas tobeconsideredandadjustedtolocalconditions. Pilot-testing should betherulebeforescalingup.

Political economy factors representthe most important constraint tosuccessful reform programmes.Pro-poor land reforms in manycountries face serious constraintsfrom elite capture of reforms,resistanceagainstandpreventionofreforms that threaten the interestsof the wealthy landowners, andrent-seeking behavior leading toover-exploitationofresources.

6. ConCLusions

70


International efforts are importantto enhance the transparencyand accountability of the keystakeholdersinsituationswherethepoor easily loose out. The recentlarge-scale land deals in Africanand Asian countries in responseto bio-fuel demand and resultingfoodpriceincreasesisanareawhereinternationalorganizationscanhelppoor countries and local people inthenegotiationstodevelopcontractsthatprotecttheirinterests.

Establishing better standards fortransparency and accountabilityand increased internat iona lpressureandsupporttoimplementsuch standards will be importantto reduce levels of corruption,elite capture, and “resource curse”outcomes.

Design of Payment forEnv i ronmenta l Ser v ic e (PES)schemesasawaytocreatemarketsfor resources that are threatenedby degradation and consequentlyalso for their maintenance andimprovement, can becomeimportantpolicytoolsinthefuture.However, this requires innovativedesigns and careful pilot testingbeforetheyarescaledup.

The poverty of land users andthe poverty reduction effects ofPES schemes will be importantdesign considerations. The climatenegotiationswillalsobeinstrumentalforthedesignaswellasfundingofsuchschemes.Itisobviousthatthedefinitionandenforcementoflegalresource rightswillplayakey roleinimplementingschemestoachievethe desired impacts. Transparencyand accountability will be crucialto control hazard and identifyimpacts.

Productive safety nets are usefultools to conservenatural resourcesand enhance product iv it y,whi le providing employmentopportunit ies for poor andvulnerable people. The potentialof such productive safety nets for

urban slum rehabilitation shouldbe further explored. Strong localparticipation in setting prioritiesas well as management of theprogrammes is likely to be crucialforsuccess.

A progressive land and resourcedividend system, if introduced,may mobilize idle land from largeland and resource owners formore efficient use in countrieswith unequal land and resourcedistribution.However,tosucceeditiscrucialtoframesuchadividendsystem in apalatableway tobuildsufficient public support for itsintroduction. GLTN can takea leading role in piloting andpromoting the use and scaling upofsuchlandtools.

Rural development and urbandevelopment are closely linkedthrough migration, f low ofresources, commodities andservices.Theproblemofexpandingslums cannot therefore be seen asexclusively an urban problem astheyarelargelyfilledbyimmigrantsfromruralareas.Slumsmaybeseenas a leaking boat: new migrantsflowinasearlierslumdwellersarerehabilitated or moved elsewhere.Theproblemcanthereforeonlybetackledatabroaderscalerequiringbothruralandurbandevelopment.

Sea level rise will be one of themostdifficultchallenges tohandlein certain coastal areas and islandstates.The industrializedcountrieshavelargelycausedtheproblemandshouldthussharetheresponsibilityforhelpingthepoorcountriesthatare severely threatened by climatechange effects. The outcome offuture international negotiationsrelated to climate change willset standards and determine theamount of resources that can bemobilizedattheglobalscale.

UN-H ABITAT/GLTN hascompetenceintheareasoflandrightsand land administration, land useplanning, landlawandregulation,

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ConCLUsions

and can contribute substantiallytowards more sustainable landmanagement by giving strongerfocus to this in its core areas ofcompetence. Environmental issuescanbe integrated systematically inallareasasacross-cuttingissue.

GLTN can contribute by furtherdeveloping low-cost approaches tolandregistrationandadministrationthat explicitly address the need toenhance sustainable land manage-mentandthatarefittedtothecapac-ity and needs in poor countries.Low-cost methods of enhancingtransparency and accountabilityshouldbedeveloped.Thisisanareawhichrequiresfurtherresearchandpilottestingbeforescalingup.

At the same time, UN-HABITATmay take special responsibility forsome of the most important newenvironmental challenges. ThisreportsuggeststhatUN-HABITATshould give first priority to findingsolutions to the threat of sea levelrise,wheremostcitiesandtownsarelocated,duetoclimatechange.Thisis a severe threat in some denselypopulatedandpoorcountries–likeBangladesh-andsmallislandstates.Itisclearthatthisisanareawherethe international community andespecially the richest countries thatgenerate the lion’s share of carbon

emissionshaveamajorresponsibilityin providing funds to compensatethosewhowilllosetheirlivelihoodsduetoclimaterisk.

UN-HABITATmayplayanimpor-tantroleinthedevelopmentofadap-tationstrategiesforthepoorestandmostvulnerablecountries,cities,andislands.Thedevelopmentof interna-tionalagreementsoncompensation,identificationofalternativelocationsfor resettlement, mobilization offunding,buildinglocalcompetenceandcapacitytohandletheproblemsin the countries facing the greatestthreat are some of the areas whereUN-HABITATcanmakeasignifi-cantdifference,particularlyincaseswhereresettlementisneeded.

Alternative livelihoods will haveto be identified butwhere theseenvironmental refugeeswill go is amajor question. Is alternative landavailable in the neighborhood orwill they have to look to the restof theworld forhelpandapply forimmigration somewhere? Shouldpeoplebemovedbeforecatastrophiceventsoccurinareasundergreatestthreatandwheregoodprotectionisimpossibleorextremelycostly?Thereport concludes that this shouldbe the main future challenge ofUN-HABITAT.

Extreme flood events will be more frequent as the planet heats up. ©UN-HABITAT/RemySietchiping

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ANNeX1. ConCEPts in EvaLuating aLtErnativE PoLiCiEs

Transactioncosts: Costs related to carrying out transactions. includes costs related to search, formation of contracts (negotiation), monitoring, and enforcement. high transaction costs can make it very costly or impossible to establish markets for certain environmental services.

Asymmetricinformation: Unequal access to information has important consequences for how an economy is organized. obtaining information is costly and information asymmetries can be exploited. this leads to moral hazard and adverse selection and is particularly important for the functioning of credit, insurance and labor markets. difficulties of collecting information which may be essential to monitor environmental management can be a basic constraint to better environmental management.

Moralhazard: the risk that the presence of a contract will affect the behavior of one or more parties. An example is the risk to an insurance company resulting from uncertainty about the honesty of the insured. Another example is corruption where officials do not perform their duties but allow illegal actions in exchange for bribes. Misuse of power can take many forms and have very severe consequences that can have severe environmental as well as human impacts.

Adverseselection: in a market where buyers cannot accurately gauge the quality of the product that they are buying, it is likely that the marketplace will contain generally poor quality products. the consequences of transaction costs and asymmetric information are that some markets do not exist, like missing insurance markets in some risky environments, rationing is occurring in other markets, like that for credit, and many prefer not to participate in markets because of entry barriers and price bands.

Marketimperfections: deviations from perfectly competitive markets. Perfectly competitive markets imply that there are no transaction costs and information asymmetries. Market imperfections include missing markets, markets with price bands, partly missing markets (rationing, seasonality), thin markets (imperfect competition), and interlinked of markets (e.g. share tenancy, barter trade).

Marketfailure: Market imperfections that cause inefficiency. in such cases it is possible to intervene (introduce a policy) such that efficiency can be enhanced in the economy implying that some can be made better off without making anybody worse off. not all market imperfections can be eliminated due to pervasive transaction costs, asymmetric information, non-rivalry and non-exclusiveness of public goods or bads. in a second-best world with transaction costs there are Pareto-irrelevant externalities and pervasive market imperfections.

Externality: failure of markets to form can be caused by undefined property rights. A deviation between private and social marginal costs/benefits, e.g. unpaid factors of production (like synergies between apples and bees production), public goods and bads (e.g. pollution). Can also be caused by economies or diseconomies of scale (Pigou).

Environmentalexternality:

this is an externality that causes a sub-optimal production of environmental services. the different types of land degradation that were presented in the beginning of chapter 2 are examples of environmental externalities.

Spatialexternality: Activities in one part of the landscape affect agents in another part of the landscape without compensation, e.g. deforestation by some agents in the hills cause siltation and floods for other agents in the lowlands.

Inter-temporalexternality:

Activities at one point in time have effects on others at a later point in time, e.g. ghg emissions leading to climate change or non-sustainable agricultural practices leading to future loss of land productivity.

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Pecuniaryexternality: this is an externality in form of a price distortion due to general equilibrium effects, e.g. population growth in or immigration to an area leads to increasing demand for land and increasing property values which make it harder to enter the property ladder.

Commonproperty: Property owned equally by all members of a group.

Publicgood: A product (i.e., a good or service) of which anyone can consume as much as desired without reducing the amount available for others (“pure” public good).

Congestiblegood: non-rivalry in consumption at low levels of demand and rivalry at higher levels. An example is traffic congestion when there are too many vehicles relative to the capacity of the road system.

Rivalry: Use/Consumption by one reduces what is available to others. non-rival goods = pure public goods.

Exclusiveness: Possibility of excluding others from use or consumption of a good/resource. non-exclusiveness is due to prohibitive high costs of exclusion for some goods/resources. this has implications for the introduction and enforcement of property rights. the high cost of fencing/dividing communal grazing lands to individuals may be an important reason for retaining such non-exclusive property regimes. fencing may also eliminate or reduce an important flexibility of a collective property regime that allows animal mobility.

Environmentalservices: this refers to qualitative functions of natural non-produced assets of land, water and air, including productive services (inputs in production), consumption and consumer services (clean air, residence, recreational services), and disposal services (sink for waste, pollution).

Paymentforenvironmentalservices:

this is a way to intervene where there was no market for environmental services, in other words, a way to internalize a positive environmental externality and enhance its provision or a way to reduce a negative environmental externality.

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The main objective of the Global Land Tool Network (GLTN) is tocontributetopovertyalleviationandtheMillenniumDevelopmentGoalsthroughlandreform,improvedlandmanagementandsecurityoftenure.

TheNetworkhasdevelopedagloballandpartnership.Itsmembersincludeinternationalcivilsocietyorganizations,internationalfinanceinstitutions,international research and training institutions, donors and professionalbodies.Itaimstotakeamoreholisticapproachtolandissuesandimprovegloballandcoordinationinvariousways.Theseincludetheestablishmentofacontinuumoflandrights,ratherthananarrowfocusonindividuallandtitling,theimprovementanddevelopmentofpro-poorlandmanagement,as well as land tenure tools. The new approach also entails unblockingexisting initiatives, helping strengthen existing land networks, assistingin thedevelopmentof affordable gendered land toolsuseful topoverty-stricken communities, and spreading knowledge on how to implementsecurityoftenure.

TheGLTNpartners,intheirquesttoattainthegoalsofpovertyalleviation,betterlandmanagementandsecurityoftenurethroughlandreform,haveidentifiedandagreedon18keylandtoolstodealwithpovertyandlandissuesatthecountrylevelacrossallregions.TheNetworkpartnersarguethattheexistinglackofthesetools,aswellaslandgovernanceproblems,arethemaincauseoffailedimplementationatscaleoflandpoliciesworldwide.

The GLTN is a demand driven network where many individuals andgroups have come together to address this global problem. For furtherinformation,andregistration,visittheGLTNwebsiteatwww.gltn.net.

thE gLobaL Land tooL nEtworK



About this publicAtion

this publication provides an overview of some the most important land-related environmental and climate change problems that the world is facing. land, Environment and climate change offers an overview of the relationship between land tenure, land management approaches and the environment. this document identifies clear linkages between land, environment and climate change, moving from a scientific framework to a country level implementation framework. the implications this has in urban and rural areas are presented, and illustrated with 20 brief cases.

this global overview of key environmental and climate change issues related to land use, land administration, land management and land tenure offers timely material and land tools for land professionals, environmental practitioners, and planners. the report identifies opportunities, gaps and priority research areas and critical land tools for action at local, sub-national, national, regional and global levels. Readers will find in this publication action-oriented suggestions for new research, land tool development, advocacy, resource mobilisation, and coordination.

unitED nAtions huMAn sEttlEMEnts pRoGRAMME

shelter and sustainable human settlements Development Division

shelter branch (un-hAbitAt)

p. o. box 30030, nairobi 00100, Kenya

tel: +254 207623120;

Fax: +254 207624266

Website: www.unhabitat.org

HS/136/10E

ISBN: 978-92-1-132251-4

Documents

Land, Environment and Climate Change: Challenges, Responses and Tools