MEJ-Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen

The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen

April Longley Alley

The Middle East Journal, Volume 64, Number 3, Summer 2010,pp. 385-409 (Article)

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MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL M VOLUME 64, NO. 3, SUMMER 2010

DOI: 10.3751/64.3.13

The Rules of the Game: Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen

April Longley Alley

This article examines the dynamics of autocracy in Yemen through the lens of elite bargaining and decision-making inside networks of patronage. It identifies the informal rules of inclusion, exclusion, rewards, and punishments that guide elite behavior and traces changing patterns of patronage distribution since 1994. In doing so, it provides insights into the survival of the Yemeni autocracy, the ob-stacles to reform, and potential opportunities to avert an impending crisis.

Much has been written recently in the press, government documents, and academic literature on the immediate security, socio-economic, and political crises in Yemen.1 As such, the purpose of this article is neither to examine in detail the specific chal-lenges threatening the Yemeni regime, nor to predict what constellation of factors could overwhelm the central government and/or result in a widespread humanitarian crisis. Instead, it aims to take a step back from immediate destabilizing factors to explore the underlying organization of power in the country. More specifically, it will unpack the informal “rules of the game” that guide elite decision-making and bargaining within the domestic political context. In doing so, this article will provide insights into the survival of the Yemeni autocracy, the obstacles to meaningful reform, and potential opportunities to avert an impending crisis. It aims to contribute to the literature on the dynamics of autocracy and the study of informal institutions, while at the same time opening the black box of patronage politics for policymakers who engage the Yemeni regime on issues of political, economic, and security reform.

April Longley Alley is a research associate in the Center for Applied Strategic Learning at the National Defense University. The opinions expressed in this article are the author’s own and do not reflect the official policy or position of the National Defense University, the Department of Defense, or the US Government. Dr. Alley has published several articles on Yemen including: April Longley Alley, “Yemen: A Narrow Coun-terterrorism Lens,” in Daniel Brumberg, ed., In Pursuit of Democracy and Reform in the Greater Middle East: A USIP Study Group Report (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, January 2010), pp. 42-49; Marisa L Porges and April Longley Alley, “Camp Nowhere,” Foreign Policy Online, (January 15, 2010), April Longley Alley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “Southern Aspirations and Salih’s Exasperation: The Looming Threat of Secession in South Yemen,” The Middle East Institute: Viewpoints, No. 11 (June 2009); April Longley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “Fighting Brushfires with Batons: An Analysis of the Political Crisis in South Yemen,” The Middle East Institute: Policy Brief (February 2008); April Longley, “The High Water Mark of Islamist Politics? The Case of Yemen,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 240-259. The author would like to thank the Fulbright Fellowship for its support of re-search contributing to this article. She would also like to thank Dr. Daniel Brumberg, Dr. Saadaldeen Talib, and Abdulghani al-Iryani for their comments on previous drafts.

1. For information on the southern secessionist movement, the Huthi conflict, al-Qa‘ida in the Arabian Peninsula, and the socio-economic crisis, see: Stephen Day, “The Political Challenge of Ye-men’s Southern Movement,” Carnegie Papers, No. 108 (February 2010); Human Rights Watch, “In the Name of Unity: The Yemeni Government’s Brutal Response to Southern Movement Protests,”

[Continued on next page]

© Middle East Institute. This article is for personal research only and may not be copied or distributed in any form without the permission of The Middle East Journal.

386 M MIDDLE EAST JOURNAL

ThE ORGAnIzATIOn OF POwER AnD InFORMAl InSTITUTIOnS

On paper, Yemen has an elected parliament and president, a multi-party system, an independent judiciary, and the framework for a democratically elected local govern-ment. In reality, however, these institutions do not produce or transfer political power. Instead, power and wealth are produced and transmitted through a highly informal, yet deeply patterned web of tribally- and regionally-based patronage relationships.

To understand the dynamics of the Yemeni autocracy, one must look beyond writ-ten laws and formal democratic institutions to the informal rules of the game that gov-ern political behavior. In an attempt to operationalize the study of informal institutions, Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky suggest that “at a minimum” scholars must an-swer three basic questions: “First, what are the actors’ shared expectations about the ac-tual constraints they face ... Second, what is the community to which the informal rules apply ... and third, how are informal rules enforced?”2 This article will loosely follow Helmke and Levitsky’s framework. Drawing on extensive fieldwork,3 it will first iden-tify the relevant community to which the informal rules of patronage politics apply. It will then identify actors’ shared expectations of the rules that guide political behavior. Outlining these “rules of the game” will clarify what political actions are acceptable and which are considered crossing “red lines” in the Yemeni context. The discussion of red lines will highlight the extent to which demanding political or economic reforms, especially those that encourage institutional formalization and democratic accountabil-ity, are a radical departure from the status quo. Next, it will address the consequences or punishments associated with breaking the rules of the game. These punishments,

[Continued from previous page](December 2009); April Longley Alley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “Southern Aspirations and Sa-lih’s Exasperation: The Looming Threat of Secession in South Yemen,” The Middle East Institute: Viewpoints, No. 11 (June 2009); April Longley and Abdul Ghani al-Iryani, “Fighting Brushfires with Batons: An Analysis of the Political Crisis in South Yemen,” The Middle East Institute: Policy Brief (February 2008); International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Defusing the Saada Time Bomb,” Middle East Report, No. 86 (May 27, 2009); Sarah Phillips and Rodger Shanahan, “al-Qa‘ida, Tribes and Insta-bility in Yemen,” Lowry Institute for International Policy, (November 2009); Sarah Phillips, “What Comes Next in Yemen? Al-Qaeda, the Tribes, and State-Building,” Carnegie Papers, No. 107 (March 2010); Articles by Gregory Johnsen in: CTC Sentinel, Special Issue, Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, (January 2010); Barak Barfi, “Yemen on the Brink? The Resurgence of al Qaeda in Ye-men,” Counterterrorism Strategy Initiative Policy Paper, New American Foundation, (January 2010); Mark Katz, “Yemen and the ‘War on Terror,’” Orient, Vol. 51 (Feb. 2010); Ginny Hill, “Yemen: Fear of Failure,” Chatham House Briefing Paper, (November 2008); Christopher Boucek, “Yemen: Avoid-ing a Downward Spiral,” Carnegie Paper, No. 102 (September 2009); A.M. Exum and R. Fontaine “On the Knife’s Edge: Yemen’s Instability and the Threat to American Interests,” Policy Brief, Cen-ter for a New American Security (2009); Jeremy Sharp, “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations,” Congressional Research Service, (January 13, 2010); Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Yemen,” (April 2010); Staff Paper, “Fragility and Extremism in Yemen,” Stabilizing Fragile States Project, Bipartisan Policy Center, (February 2010); and Barbara K. Bodine, “Yemen: Primer and Pre-scriptions,” Prism: A Journal of the Center for Complex Operations, Vol. 1, No. 3 (June 2010).

2. Gretchen Helmke and Steven Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Re-search Agenda,” Perspectives on Politics, Vol. 2, No. 4 (December 2004), p. 733.

3. The article is a product of approximately 16 months of fieldwork in Yemen conducted between September 2005 and October 2009.

PATRONAGE POLITICS IN YEMEN M 387

or enforcement mechanisms, are often “subtle, hidden, or even illegal.”4 Finally, the article will conclude with a brief analysis of the changing patterns of patronage inclu-sion and exclusion since President ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih consolidated power throughout Yemen after the 1994 civil war.

To some extent, this article is an exercise in simplification. The informal institu-tion of patronage politics is a product of a complex game of elite bargaining between Salih and his clients. While one can identify a set of informal rules that guide and set bounds for elite behavior, these rules are under constant negotiation as actors engage in boundary testing to improve their strategic positions. Furthermore, it is important to note that no actor in this game, including the President, has perfect information with which to navigate the political arena. Certainly Salih makes mistakes as he attempts to manipulate patronage distribution in ways that preserve his authority. Clients also mis-calculate their own strength, the availability of coalition partners, and the President’s preferences. In sum, the game is far from a well-rehearsed play in which actors know and perform their parts. The following pages may give the impression that the system is more coherent, transparent, and means-ends efficient than it is in practice. In the inter-est of clarity and parsimony, much of the messiness has been excluded to effectively highlight important core dynamics.

A BRIEF hISTORICAl nOTE

Salih’s rule has been based on an informal system of patronage politics since he became President of North Yemen in 1978.5 Yet, the neopatrimonial system6 has developed and expanded over time. The roots of neopatrimonialism in Yemen can be traced to Salih’s ability to co-opt and control the armed forces.7 Upon taking office, the President immediately began to place his close relatives and members of the Sanhan tribe to which he belongs in powerful military-security positions. In addition to coup-proofing the military-security apparatus through family and tribal appointments, Salih also worked to incorporate influential social elites, particularly tribal shaykhs, into net-works of patronage through direct payment, the distribution of government posts, and, eventually, access to the private sector.

Patronage extending from the President, however, occupied only a fraction of the larger political economy. During the late 1970s and early 1980s, labor remittances from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states bypassed state coffers and accrued directly

4. Helmke and Levitsky, “Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda,” p. 733.

5. Until unification in 1990, Yemen was divided into the Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). In this article “Yemen” should be taken to mean “North Yemen” unless otherwise specified.

6. Neopatrimonialism is a mode of organizing public authority “in which the customs and patterns of patrimonialism co-exist with, and suffuse, rational-legal institutions.” Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle, Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), p. 62.

7. Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1992), p. 396. Snyder argues that the initial power base of most neopat-rimonial regimes is the military.


to Yemeni citizens. The remittance economy created a powerful, independent private sector with limited ties to the ruling regime in Sana‘a.8 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia was intimately involved in the tribal politics of North Yemen and distributed large sums of money directly to loyal shaykhs, particularly in the border region.9

The mid-1980s brought a sea change in the political economy that fundamentally altered the nature and scope of patronage politics. In 1986, the international price of oil fell by half, marking the beginning of the end for Yemen’s remittance-based economy. Almost immediately, foreign aid, primarily from oil-rich Gulf states, fell from over 90% of the national budget to only 2%, and remittances dropped 40% from their peak in 1981.10 During this time, the central government in Yemen took dramatic steps to increase direct taxation and regulate the private sector. Of particular importance was the state’s strict regulation of imports. State control of import licenses radically altered the nature of Yemen’s business class and the traditional role of tribal elites. Salih issued import licenses to favored shaykhs who then sold the licenses to traditional merchants for a profit. In this way, dozens of tribesmen entered the business community while the traditional business houses rose and fell based on their willingness to cooperate with the President and the new tribal business elite.11 At the same time, the power and influence of the Military Economic Corporation (MECO), a state-run organization originally established to provide subsidized goods to soldiers, expanded dramatically. MECO, today known as the Yemeni Economic Corporation, received lucrative access to commodity and private sector imports, “producing in effect monopolies of the kind sold by Europe’s kings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.”12 The organization also became involved in land acquisition, a process that infuriated many landowners and further enriched those with presidential connections.13 In short, around this time, patronage networks extending from the President became a central part of the produc-tion and transfer of power.

The decline of the remittance economy in the mid-1980s allowed the state to control a greater portion of national wealth through intervention and regulation. It is also important to note that, in 1984, the American company Hunt Oil discovered oil and

8. For an explanation of the impact of the remittance economy on processes of state formation as well as the development of state-business relations see: Kiren Aziz Chaudhry, The Price of wealth: Economies and Institutions in the Middle East (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1997).

9. Saudi Arabia has a long history of direct involvement in Yemeni domestic affairs. The Kingdom has long standing ties with prominent shaykhs in northern Yemen, including the al-Shayf family from al-Jawf and the al-Ahmar family from Amran. Today, Saudi Arabia continues to provide salaries directly to tribal shaykhs. Although the extent of Saudi Arabia’s engagement with tribal clients is dif-ficult to gauge, interviews by the author with numerous Yemeni shaykhs indicate that Saudi influence has ebbed and flowed over time. After the border agreement between the two states was signed in 2000, part of the informal agreement was for Saudi Arabia to draw down its direct involvement with the tribes. However, Saudi influence may once again be on the rise as the Kingdom acts to contain threats from al-Qa‘ida and the Huthi rebellion.

10. Chaudhry, The Price of wealth, p. 269.11. The transformation of state-business relations was verified by numerous interviews conducted

by the author between September 2006 and September 2007. This transformation is also addressed by Chaudhry, The Price of wealth.

12. Paul Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), p. 159.

13. Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen, p. 162, p. 166, p. 167.


gas in northern Yemen in commercial quantities. The discovery of oil and gas radically changed the structure of the economy as foreign currency began to accrue directly to the state — as opposed to private citizens. In fact, soon after the discovery of oil and gas, annual revenue projections for the North were comparable to the lost remittance revenue (approximately $600–700 million).14

The energy sector is a lucrative source of state revenue and patronage resources for the President. Currently, oil revenues comprise 90% of the country’s export rev-enue and approximately 75% of the central government’s budget.15 These revenues fi-nance the lion’s share of government spending, including the salaries of civil servants and the military. In addition, the President is able to distribute access to oil conces-sions, as well as the right to sell the Yemeni government’s share of extracted crude oil, to prominent clients.16 Moreover, patronage related to the oil sector is not limited to domestic production. While Yemen exports crude oil, it is a net importer of diesel fuel. In 2008 alone, the World Bank estimated that petroleum subsidies, largely for diesel, cost Yemen approximately $3.5 billion or 12% of gross domestic product (GDP).17 While difficult to verify, those with knowledge of the energy market suggest that most of this diesel is never sold on the domestic market. Instead, the most privileged clients (the President’s family and a handful of others) are allowed to buy subsidized diesel and then sell it for a profit on the international market. Much of this is smuggled to the Horn of Africa.18 In sum, domestic oil production and diesel subsidies marked a dra-matic expansion of state resources, and by extension, networks of patronage extending from the President.

In addition to increased economic control, the President was also able to ex-pand patronage through the General People’s Congress (GPC). Salih established the GPC in 1982 as a quasi-party institution, or umbrella organization, that incorporated a wide array of social groups and political tendencies. The GPC portrayed itself as an explicitly non-partisan, nationalist organization, which had as its goals “state build-ing, democracy, constitutional rule, modernization, and ‘building military and security institutions.’”19 In reality, the GPC was a successful move by the state to co-opt the material resources and political reach of a network of civil society organizations known

14. Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen, p. 161. According to Dresch, this estimate does not in-clude declining foreign aid.

15. Franz Gerner and Silvana Tordo, Republic of Yemen: A natural Gas Incentive Framework (For-mal Report 327/07, Energy Sector Management Assistance Program, World Bank, 2008).

16. Interview by the author with a member of the GPC, Sana‘a, Yemen (July 2007). Interview by the au-thor with a Yemeni technocrat, Sana‘a, Yemen (August 2007). In 2006, the Republic of Yemen’s Ministry of Oil and Minerals estimated that the government’s share of exported crude brought in over $4 billion in annual revenues. Ministry of Oil and Minerals Statistics Technical Committee, “Oil, Gas and Minerals Sta-tistics: 2006, Annual Bulletin, Issue No. 6,” (Sana‘a, Yemen: Ministry of Oil and Minerals, 2006), p. 37.

17. Yemen Economic Update, World Bank (Summer 2008), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTYEMEN/Resources/310077-1098870168865/YEU-Summer08.pdf.

18. Sarah Phillips, “Cracks in the Yemen System,” Middle East Report On-line (July 28, 2005), http://www.merip.org/mero/mero072805.html. Diesel smuggling was also verified in numerous off-the-record interviews and qat chews that the author conducted/attended between September 2005 and September 2006 and the summer of 2007.

19. Sheila Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen: The Political Economy of Activism in Modern Arabia (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), p. 38.


as Local Development Councils (LDCs).20 LDCs thrived during the 1970s and early 1980s as a result of the remittance economy and were the primary source of develop-ment projects, especially in the countryside. The GPC built upon and co-opted these grassroots organizations on behalf of the central government. LDC elections served as the basis for the GPC’s national level organization, the Permanent Committee. In 1982, for example, LDC elections produced 700 delegates to the GPC’s Permanent Com-mittee and the President then appointed 300 additional delegates.21 In its current form, elections for the Permanent Committee are still partially determined by local elections and partially by presidential appointment.

From its conception, the GPC became an important component in the patronage system. On one hand, the Permanent Committee, and more importantly, the organiza-tion’s top executive committee, the General Committee, became a source of political patronage that the President could distribute to loyal clients. On the other hand, GPC membership became a sign of loyalty to the regime and an expected part of reciproc-ity if one intended to be included in other forms of patronage. In fact, Sheila Carapico notes that in the 1980s, membership in the GPC was a “prerequisite” for other types of political and civil service appointments.22 By the end of the 1980s, elites throughout North Yemen began to view networks of patronage around the President as the main locus of political and economic competition.

In 1990, unification between North and South Yemen initiated a brief period of democratization. This opening was more the result of hasty unity rather than any real commitment to democracy on the part of regime elites, yet nascent democratic insti-tutions survived the tumultuous process of unification and the subsequent civil war. After the North defeated the South in 1994, the period of democratization ended and Salih worked to extend neopatrimonial rule throughout the country. Yet formal demo-cratic institutions, particularly the Parliament and the multi-party system, became an entrenched part of the political landscape, producing new resources and constraints for both the President and his elite clients.23 The details of the patronage system discussed below apply roughly to the post-1994 period of Salih’s rule.

TO whOM DO ThE InFORMAl RUlES APPlY?

The rules of the game apply to the political elite in Yemen. Here, political elites are defined as: “national level agenda setters, figures who wield regular and substantial influence over a country’s political system.”24 This broad category is comprised of sev-eral overlapping groups, most prominently: tribal elites, religious leaders, traditional merchants, and technocrats. Tribal elites refer to the population of historically impor-tant tribal shaykhs, mostly from northern Yemen, who command the allegiance of tribes

20. Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen, p. 33.21. Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen, p. 38.22. Carapico, Civil Society in Yemen, p. 142.23. For an analysis of Yemen’s weak democratic institutions and their impact on political bar-

gaining, see: Sarah Phillips, Yemen’s Democracy Experiment in Regional Perspective (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008).

24. Jason Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization (Cambridge: Cambridge Uni-versity Press, 2007), p. 12.


or tribal groupings. For the purposes of this discussion, it also includes new shaykhs who have essentially been created by the regime, as well as the President and his family from the Sanhan tribe.25 The category of religious leaders refers to Islamists associated with the Muslim Brotherhood or with the Salafi movement. It also includes prominent Zaydi sayyids — those claiming descent from the Prophet Muhammed through his daughter Fatima and her husband ‘Ali — who maintain significant social respect and influence.26 Traditional merchants are primarily Shafi‘i27 businessmen who acquired their wealth in the agricultural regions of middle Yemen and through the markets of Aden during the British occupation. Some traditional merchants also hail from the governorate of Hadramawt; however, many of these business families left Yemen and now live in Saudi Arabia or Indonesia. Finally, technocrats refers to elites with the edu-cation and expertise necessary to manage a modern state and a 21st century economy.28 These individuals are often from urban backgrounds and many come from respected qadi [judge] families.

These categories in some ways obfuscate a more complex empirical reality. The anthropologist Paul Dresch argues that, in the 1990s, the traditional categories used to describe the Yemeni elite, such as “merchant, shaykh, officer, and modernist,” have “finally collapsed.” As evidence, in 1997, President Salih — an “army [and tribal] man par excellence” — became a partner in Hayl Sa‘id Enterprises, the best known of Ye-men’s industrial and commercial companies.29 Indeed, the categories used to define Yemeni elites have never been mutually exclusive and have become more fluid in re-cent years. Now, for example, one is hard pressed to find a shaykh who does not also consider himself a businessman. The details of identity formation and change are far beyond the scope of this analysis.30 Recognizing the reality of multiple and shifting identities, this article will use the categories above because they reveal important pat-terns of inclusion and exclusion in the patronage system.

Specifying the RuleS of the game

According to Juan Linz, one of the defining characteristics of autocracy is that “a leader or occasionally a small group exercises power within formally ill-defined limits but actually quite predictable ones.”31 This is indeed the case in Yemen. Under the Salih regime, several unwritten rules shape the incentive structures of elite actors.

25. The President and his close family are not traditional shaykhs. They entered the ranks of the elite through the military.

26. Zaydism is a branch of Shi‘a Islam. Not all sayyids are part of the political elite. Some are well-educated and politically influential, while others are poor, uneducated, and politically marginal.

27. Shafi‘is are Sunni Muslims who adhere to the Shafi‘i school of Islamic jurisprudence. The majority of Yemenis are Shafi‘i, while the largest minority are Zaydi.

28. United States Agency for International Development (USAID), Yemen Corruption Assessment, (Burlington, VT: ARD, Inc., September 25, 2006), p. 5.

29. Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen, p. 201.30. For an excellent analysis of identity categories in Yemen from a constructivist perspective, see:

Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2008), pp. 148-185.

31. Juan Linz, Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Pub-lishers, 2000), p. 159.


These rules, or guiding principles, constitute a set of expectations that are shared by the President and elite clients alike.

It is important to note that the rules outlined below are guidelines rather than rigid laws. What makes this system a viable strategy of rule is a degree of uncertainty and flexibility. Clients in this system have an idea of what kind of (and how much) patronage they can expect to receive, but they cannot be certain that they will ac-quire the expected benefits. Further, even when elites are temporarily excluded, the patronage system is fluid, making future incorporation or greater access possible. Uncertainty and insecurity often discourage reform coalitions because it is difficult for elites to evaluate not only their own status in patronage networks, but also the status of potential coalition partners. There is no simple formula to predict how a certain type of elite will be included in patronage networks. Nor is there a transpar-ent formula for the distribution of rewards and punishments. This section simplifies a complex political reality; it intentionally sacrifices some nuance to highlight the core dynamics at work.

guiding pRinciple #1: patRonage iS diStRibuted bRoadly

Yemen is an inclusive, as opposed to an exclusive, patronage system. Yemeni elites of all types expect some form of inclusion, and the President is generally willing to oblige. In fact, Salih has consistently chosen co-option, compromise, and divide-and-rule tactics over exclusion and direct confrontation. Ultimately, Salih is not a sul-tanistic dictator who manipulates the political arena relatively free of social constraints. Indeed, he operates in an environment where the state has a limited monopoly of vio-lence and where social forces are relatively strong. Direct confrontation with armed tribes or even an aggressive posture towards historically important families would be a risky gamble, both militarily and politically, for the President. Therefore, while Salih may rearrange patronage ties to balance domestic alliances, radical exclusion of the po-litical elite, particularly the tribal elite, is not an option if he wishes to remain in power. Given the social and political limitations on Salih’s rule, and the relatively wide circle of clients that support his regime, the style of rule in Yemen is solidly neopatrimonial as opposed to sultanistic.32

According to Dresch, “talk of ‘family rule’ misrepresents the problem. Far from restricting illicit wealth to small circles of kin or colleagues, the government proved ecumenical … [It is] ordinary Yemenis [who] … simply do not have access to much of the national wealth.”33 The inclusiveness of the patronage system is indeed elite in nature, and in most cases the average Yemeni sees little material benefit. In fact, the al-Ahmar family’s tribal area, as well as Salih’s own Sanhan region, are strikingly un-derdeveloped. These two families are at the heart of political and economic access, yet wealth and power has a limited trickle-down effect. The elite nature of the system has over time become a serious point of vulnerability. As economic conditions deteriorate

32. For a detailed explanation of Sultanistic regimes and their relationship with neopatrimonial-ism, see: H.E. Chehabi and Juan Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 7-9.

33. Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen, p. 204.


for the average Yemeni, the gap between “haves and have nots” and between ruler and ruled seems to be widening. In this situation, feelings of relative deprivation and resent-ment, particularly in major urban centers and in the former South Yemen, could provide a ready-made resource for political entrepreneurs who may wish to rally popular dis-sent against the regime in Sana‘a.

While the average Yemeni citizen is excluded from benefits, inclusion is the norm and exclusion is the exception for the political elite. A striking testament to the inclu-sive nature of the system is Salih’s treatment of the former leaders of South Yemen. Af-ter the 1994 civil war, Salih declared amnesty for all but a handful of southern leaders and, in recent years, he has called for much of the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP) leader-ship in exile to return to the country. For example, prior to the 2006 presidential elec-tion, Salih encouraged two prominent southern politicians, Salem Salih Muhammad and ‘Abdul Rahman al-Jifri, to participate in political life. He even appointed Salem Salih as a presidential advisor and as head of a committee dealing with land disputes and other grievances in the south.34 Salih’s attempt to incorporate former enemies into patronage networks is purely instrumental. Since the civil war, Salih has distributed patronage in ways that have maintained the appearance of Southern participation in the government, while at the same time reinforcing and encouraging regional and ideologi-cal cleavages among southern elites.35 However, his attempt to co-opt southern leaders is certainly evidence of flexibility and inclusiveness. Even those who have engaged in open insurrection may be included in the fold.

The inclusiveness of Yemen’s patronage system has certainly contributed to its longevity. Most prominent elites, whether they are aligned with the ruling GPC or members of the formal opposition, receive some type of benefit and therefore have some interest in preserving the status quo. This ecumenical distribution has until re-cently hindered the development of a radical or moderate opposition with the desire or capacity to effect regime change.36 However, the principle of broad inclusion is currently threatened on a number of fronts. On one hand, the regime’s resource base is shrinking, particularly as declining oil revenues undermine the central govern-ment’s budget.37 On the other hand, the President has made a conscious decision to narrow patronage distribution around his family, especially his son and nephews.

34. Longley and al-Iryani, “Fighting Brushfires with Batons,” p. 7.35. Steven Day, “Barriers to Federal Democracy in Iraq: Lessons from Yemen,” Middle East Pol-

icy, Vol. 13, No. 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 124-131. According to Day, immediately following the civil war, the President relied on a political alliance with individuals from Abyan and Shabwa. When members of this alliance began to voice discontent and organize for greater local political participation, the President began to encourage the return of former YSP exiles.

36. For an analysis of how varying degrees of patronage penetration affects transitions from neo-patrimonialism, see: Richard Snyder, “Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships,” Comparative Politics, Vol. 24, No. 4 (July 1992), pp. 379-399.

37. If current trend lines continue, Yemen’s existing oil reserves will be entirely exhausted in the next 10-12 years. Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU), “Country Report, Yemen” (August 2009). The 2010 budget estimates that hydrocarbons will account for less than 60% of total income (historically they have accounted for over 70%), yet, according to the EIU, “Yemen is still clearly over dependent on a diminishing asset.” Moreover, despite pressure to reduce subsidies, the government will spend an estimated $1.5 billion on the fuel subsidy in 2010. Economist Intelligence Unit, “Country Report: Yemen,” (April 2010), p. 11.


In addition to these two destabilizing trends, the President has also been unable to effectively co-opt a group of grassroots leaders who are organizing the southern pro-test movement, or the hirak, in the territories of the former South Yemen. In sum, a dwindling resource base, the perceived narrowing of patronage distribution around the President’s family, and the existence of a significant number of grassroots lead-ers outside of the patronage paradigm, pose significant challenges to future regime stability.

guiding pRinciple #2: eliteS muSt accept incluSion

When an elite is offered patronage, he is expected to either accept or lobby for a better position. Rejecting patronage is unacceptable because it challenges the very organization of power around the President.38 By accepting inclusion, elites become de-pendent on and obligated to Salih. When elites are financially and or politically vested in the regime, they risk losing their privileged positions if the organization of power is altered. Moreover, by joining the patronage game, elites can be discredited as “corrupt” if they seek to criticize the regime publicly or reform the political economy on which it rests.

A prominent diplomat summarized the dilemma of inclusion by describing it as “a double-edged sword,” especially for genuine reformers who wish to democratize the system. Given the weakness of the political opposition and the consolidation of power around the President, one must be included in patronage networks to be in a position to effect change. However, once included, elites are partially implicated in the system, and they perpetuate the very organization of power they wish to alter.39

A small handful of elites reject inclusion completely and remain outside of pa-tronage circles. Their numbers are small, even within the formal opposition, and they suffer financially and politically for their decision. For example, within the most pow-erful opposition party, the Yemeni Congregation for Reform (Tajamma‘ al-Yamani li al-Islah, or Islah), prominent leaders such as Muhammad Qahtan and Dr. Muhammad al-Sadi seem to have avoided patronage co-option completely. Men like these enjoy social respect for their decisions; however, their ability to effect change is limited by their distance from decision-making circles and by the fact that direct patronage ties permeate the rest of their party.40

Understanding this principle is important for policymakers interested in encour-

38. Rejecting patronage does not bode well for elites. In approximately half a dozen cases, the author closely observed elites as they rejected patronage, faced significant harassment, and then even-tually accepted the money or position that was being offered in the first place. A few prominent members of the opposition, the press, and civil society do reject patronage inclusion completely, and in doing so, they make themselves vulnerable to a wide array of political, economic, and physical harassment.

39. Interview by the author with a prominent diplomat, Sana‘a, Yemen, September 2007.40. Hizb al-Islah was formed in 1990. It is a diverse party, which contains a variety of overlapping

groups and tendencies: tribal, Salafi, Muslim Brothers, etc. Some members of the party are part of a genuine political opposition, while others are part of the regime. For more information regarding the diverse membership of Islah and its evolving relationship with the regime, see: Jillian Schwedler, “The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity,” in Quintan Wikorowicz, ed., Islamic Activism: A Social Movement Theory Approach (Bloomington &

[Continued on next page]


aging political and economic reform in Yemen. Most Yemenis who are in a position to effect change are part and parcel to the patronage system. As such, they incur signifi-cant risk by challenging the status quo. More importantly, if they pursue reforms too aggressively, they risk losing the very political influence they need to effect reform in the first place.

guiding pRinciple #3: the type and degRee of patRonage diStRibution iS not Random.

Under the wide umbrella of patronage inclusion, one finds significant variation in both the degree and type of patronage extended to elites. In distributing patronage, the President considers a variety of factors, including the type of elite under consideration (tribal, technocrat, merchant, etc.), an elite’s grassroots influence and proven loyalty, and the tactical needs of balancing tribal, family, and regional alliances. Some elites are deeply embedded in patronage networks with privileged access to the most influential political positions or the most lucrative government contracts. Others are only loosely included, drawing less financial and/or political gain from their patronage position. Beyond degree, there are also distinctions based on the type of patronage. One way to parse the various types is to distinguish between military/security, public sector, private sector, and political patronage. The boundaries between these categories are blurred and overlap in practice. For example, a rigid distinction between the private and public sec-tors in Yemen is misleading as “private enterprise” is often dependent upon privileged access to government contracts or nonproductive, rent-based activities. Moreover, an individual may receive multiple types of patronage. While imperfect, these categories help to organize and identify patterns of distribution and inclusion.

For any given elite, there is essentially a range of acceptable patronage relation-ships that are mutually understood. This range is flexible, and may shift, but both parties have a rough understanding of where it lies. When an elite receives patronage within an acceptable range, conflict is usually avoided. When an elite lobbies for positions outside of what the President believes to be appropriate, or when the President does not extend patronage that meets expectations, conflict will usually follow. It is important to note that conflict is an invariable result of this system. Even when elites’ access falls within an acceptable range for them, they often lobby for more access. As long as their actions stay within the informal patronage paradigm, and they do not cross red lines, bargaining is an accepted part of everyday politics.

There are distinct patterns of distribution associated with the type of elite under consideration. When asked to explain the distribution of patronage, some suggest that

[Continued from previous page]Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2004); Jillian Schwedler, Faith in Moderation: Islamist Par-ties in Jordan and in Yemen, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); April Longley, “The High Water Mark of Islamist Politics? The Case of Yemen,” The Middle East Journal, Vol. 61, No. 2 (Spring 2007), pp. 240-260; Lisa Wedeen, Peripheral Visions: Publics, Power, and Performance in Yemen, pp. 159-160; Amr Hamzawy, “Between Government and Opposition: The Case of the Yemeni Congregation for Reform,” Carnegie working Paper (Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for In-ternational Peace, November 2009).


the President follows a loose division of labor based on elite identity.41 According to this perspective, Salih views different types of elites, particularly tribal, technocratic, and traditional merchant elites, as possessing different skill sets, which make them suit-able for certain types of roles in the government and the national economy. Tribal elites are the most versatile group and can be found in almost any part of the patronage equa-tion. Since Salih gained control of the country in 1978, he has systematically privileged tribal interests. However, as will be discussed in more detail, “the tribes” are far from a monolith. There is a hierarchy of power within the tribal system that determines which shaykhs receive the most patronage.42

In comparison to powerful tribal interests, technocrats and traditional merchants receive a narrow portion of patronage. Given their financial clout and technical exper-tise, it would be dangerous for the President to exclude these groups en masse, but he has a great deal of leeway to demote or exclude these individuals based on their behav-ior.43 Considering their skill set, traditional merchants are generally included in private sector patronage, and are occasionally incorporated into political patronage when their business expertise is needed. Technocrats are usually assigned positions in the govern-ment bureaucracy or the ruling party, while they are generally excluded from prominent positions in the military/security complex. Most likely, this is done to avoid a coup coalition between technocrats and any disgruntled factions in the military. Again, the division of labor discussed above identifies broad patterns of inclusion. There are, of course, exceptions and variations.

In addition to making distinctions based on these categories, the President ac-counts for an elite’s personal popularity and social influence. Elites who maintain deep connections and loyalties with the population are potentially dangerous and cannot be ignored. They are generally deeply included in patronage networks and are rarely fully excluded, unless they engage in open insurrection. Popular leaders capable of rally-ing an armed following are particularly dangerous. While Salih has made progress in expanding central government authority, the state still does not possess a monopoly on violence. In this environment, the President generally seeks to co-opt shaykhs with strong ties to their tribesmen.

A Presidential advisor suggests that the incorporation of tribal elites into the pri-vate sector was a deliberate attempt to change the nature of a shaykh’s connection with his tribe.44 Before the 1980s, tribal involvement in business was unusual because it was considered shameful for tribesmen to engage in commerce. Now, the majority of young shaykhs are also businessmen. Some Yemenis openly worry that some combination of business interests, party affiliation, and movement to cities is changing, and possibly weakening, the relationship between shaykhs and their tribesmen. Whether or not this is the case, shaykhs’ involvement in business creates dependencies on the state and potentially provides disincentives to interfering with the patronage status quo.

The importance of grassroots support is certainly not limited to shaykhs. The

41. Interview by the author with a Yemeni technocrat, Sana‘a, Yemen, September 2006. Interview by the author with a member of the GPC, Sana‘a, Yemen, July 2007.

42. USAID, Yemen Corruption Assessment, p. 3.43. USAID, Yemen Corruption Assessment, p. 5.44. Interview by the author with a member of the GPC’s General Committee, Sana‘a, Yemen,

August 2007.


President is also careful to extend patronage to religious leaders who could potentially rally the population against the regime. The language of Islam is a powerful mobiliz-ing tool in Yemen and those who control religious discourse are influential political players. For example, even as the President began a systematic exclusion of Islah from prominent positions in the government after 1997, he maintained ties with many of their most prominent leaders. The tribal wing of Islah, represented by Shaykh ‘Ab-dullah Bin Husayn al-Ahmar, maintained their patronage connections. Even among the Muslim Brothers and the Salafi component, many popular leaders remained in the patronage fold largely because of their social clout.45 In sum, while the party was of-ficially marginalized, Salih was careful not to alienate socially popular leaders.

Proven personal loyalty to the President also influences patronage distribution. Before Salih gained power in 1978, Yemen was riddled with military coups and politi-cal assassinations.46 As such, the President has always placed a premium on loyalty, especially among military/security officers. One prominent example is the current head of the Political Security Organization (PSO), General Ghalib Ghamish. Approximately one year after Salih became President, there was a coup attempt led by supporters of former President Ibrahim al-Hamdi. At that time, Ghamish was an officer in the Military Police. He refused to support the coup, leaked the plot to Salih, and was con-sequentially jailed by Hamdi supporters. After the coup attempt failed, Ghamish was richly rewarded for his personal loyalty with the position of head of the PSO.47

Finally, elites receive patronage based on tribal, family, and regional affiliations. Salih is skilled at balancing a complicated array of tribal, family, and regional interests, and individuals are often pawns in a larger strategy of divide-and-rule politics. From a tribal perspective, the President distributes patronage after considering the relationship between various confederations, tribes within confederations, and individual members within prominent tribal families. In Yemen, there are three main tribal confederations: Hashid, Bakil, and Madhaj. The first two are the strongest politically and militarily, and they hail from the rugged mountain highlands of northern Yemen. The Madhaj con-federation is located in middle Yemen. Shaykhs in this confederation are historically weaker; therefore, their incorporation is done on an individual basis depending on the strength of tribal affiliations.48

Hashid, the confederation of the President, is generally privileged over the other two. Within Hashid, the President is from a small tribe called the Sanhan (which resides in the Sanhan region). The Sanhan is systematically favored, especially in military/security patronage. As a whole, Hashid is comparatively easier to control because it is organized hierarchically. Until his passing on December 29, 2007, Shaykh ‘Abdullah

45. A prominent example is Shaykh ‘Abd al-Majid Zindani. Zindani has a large stake in Yemen’s fishing industry and many Yemenis suspect that his market share increased after the 2006 elections when he broke rank with Islah and supported Salih. During the elections, Salih also promised finan-cial support for Zindani’s Iman University.

46. The two Presidents preceding Salih, Ibrahim al-Hamdi and Ahmad al-Ghashmi, were both assassinated.

47. Interview by the author with a prominent politician with ties to the military establishment, Sana‘a, Yemen, Fall 2006.

48. Identity in the Madhaj confederation is particularly complex, as many traditional businessmen loosely associate with this grouping.


al-Ahmar was the leader (shaykh of shaykhs) of the Hashid confederation. ‘Abdullah was instrumental in Salih’s rise to power and he essentially ruled in coordination with the President beginning in 1978. With ‘Abdullah’s support, the loyalty of Hashid re-mained secure. Now that ‘Abdullah has passed, the hierarchical cohesion of Hashid is less clear. ‘Abdullah’s eldest son, Sadiq al-Ahmar, is now the official leader, but Sadiq is no ‘Abdullah (lacking the charisma and the political, historical, and tribal clout of his father) and has, at times, been overshadowed by his two brothers, Hamid al-Ahmar and Husayn al-Ahmar. The relationship between ‘Abdullah’s sons and the Hashid con-federation, as well as their relationship with the President’s family, is still in flux and will more than likely remain this way until issues of Presidential succession — and the realignment of patronage distribution — are resolved.

Bakil, compared to Hashid, is more complicated. This confederation is numeri-cally larger and more decentralized. Bakil does not have one clear leader who can be incorporated and then subsequently used to control subordinate shaykhs. Instead, the confederation contains several historically prominent tribal families that vie for power. These include but are not limited to Abu Luhom, Abu Ras, Shayif, and Ghadir. In general, Salih is careful to incorporate all major players, but he uses patronage strate-gically to check the power of potential leaders. Moreover, several marriage relations and direct business ties bind various parts of the Bakil confederation to the President’s family. The President’s daughters have married into the Duwayd family, a prominent Bakil clan from the Khawlan region just east of Sana‘a. The most prominent business ties to Bakil are probably through the Rowayshan family, another tribal family from the Khawlan region.

While Bakil shaykhs occupy prominent positions, they are keenly aware of the decentralized nature of their confederation. Moreover, given that the President hails from Hashid, there is an underlying sense of resentment in Bakil that they are not as fully incorporated as their Hashid counterparts. In the words of a Bakil tribesman from the Khawlan, “Bakil is the tribe of the GPC. Hashid is the tribe of the President.”49 In other words, Bakil is superficially included in networks of influence, but real power lies with Hashid.

In addition to balancing tribal confederations and tribes within a confederation, Salih also strategically distributes patronage within the most powerful tribal families. In the same family, one brother may be given a position in the military, one access to lucrative private sector contracts, and still another may receive a prominent political appointment. The sons of the late Shaykh ‘Abdullah al-Ahmar have multiple points of access to the patronage system. For example, Hamid al-Ahmar is deeply embedded in private sector patronage, while Husayn, Hemyar, and Hashem are included through the ruling party and/or the military/security apparatus. Hemyar is now the Deputy Speaker of Parliament and Hashem is a member of the Republican Guard. This type of distribu-tion ensures that families have multiple points of dependency on the existing power structure and allows the President to pressure one member of the family by threatening their relatives.

The divide-and-rule tactics discussed above apply outside of the tribal system as well. Salih balances important technocratic, religious, and merchant families in a

49. Interview by the author with a GPC tribesman from Khawlan, Sana‘a, Yemen, July 2006.


similar manner. Additionally, he also considers the importance of regional affiliations. Regional affiliation is particularly important in the former South Yemen where, since the civil war, southerners have complained of economic and political marginalization. The President’s response to southern discontent has generally been to promise reform, while co-opting prominent southern leaders. A select few southern merchants are in-cluded with northern tribal businessmen in networks of private sector patronage. More-over, several cabinet positions are informally reserved for southern politicians. Among these posts, two ministerial positions (usually including the minister of oil and miner-als) and the position of prime minister are generally awarded to the oil-rich governorate of Hadramawt in southern Yemen.

In addition to cabinet positions, southerners also occupy several symbolic po-litical appointments. Until resigning in early 2008, Ja‘afar Basalih from Hadramawt was one of the four members of the Parliamentary Presidium. ‘Abdullah al-Bar from Hadramawt is the Deputy Speaker of the Shura Council [Consultative Council, the “up-per house” of Yemen’s Parliament]. The current Vice President, ‘Abdu-Rabbu Mansour Hadi, is a southerner from Abyan. While Salih has been careful to include southerners in visible political posts, their appointments have often been used as a divide-and-rule tactic aimed at fragmenting the southern elite and, for the most part, the positions are symbolic. Cabinet ministers and prominent party members, whether they are from the south or north, do not necessarily have the authority to pursue reform or to influence policy. Power comes with proximity to the President, or with raw power, and southern-ers as a rule do not have this kind of access or influence.

Insofar as the President deliberately places elites into patronage networks, the four factors explored above (elite identity, grassroots strength, proven loyalty, and tribal, family, and regional affiliation) seem to guide his decision-making process. In numerous interviews with Yemeni elites, clients pointed to these factors as they sought to explain their own place in networks of patronage. Of course, intentionality does not tell the entire story of patronage distribution. The President cannot micromanage the entire system. Moreover, he makes mistakes and does not have perfect information regarding each elite client. This being said, the four factors above constitute a set of shared expectations concerning how patronage should be distributed.

guiding pRinciple #4: in RetuRn foR patRonage, eliteS muSt pRovide a mini-mal level of SuppoRt foR the authoRity of the pReSident and the coRRupt political economy that SuppoRtS hiS Regime.

There are numerous possibilities surrounding the specific “payments” or recipro-cal favors clients provide the President in return for patronage. A governor may turn a blind eye to alcohol or gun smuggling by the army in his governorate. A shaykh may be asked to ignite a conflict against another shaykh whose power is threatening to the President. For a merchant, repayment may include anything from contributing to a presidential re-election campaign, as happened in 2006, or taking a member of the President’s family or another powerful tribesman as a business partner.

While the details of reciprocity vary, in return for inclusion, all elite clients are expected to provide a minimum level of loyalty to the President and the political econo-my that supports his rule. If the elite has a social following, they must also try to ensure


the political quiescence of their constituency. In sum, they can take no action that either violently or non-violently threatens the highly personalized nature of power around Salih. This includes everything from organizing a coup to building formal institutions with the capacity to limit executive authority.

While loyalty to the President may seem constraining, it actually provides for a great deal of room to maneuver. Elites may lobby for greater access to political power and material wealth as long as they stay within the framework of the informal patron-age system. They may use backroom negotiations with the President or his close fam-ily to gain greater access or achieve some reforms. In behind-the-scenes negotiations, elites may engage in a variety of tactics that include blackmail, bribery, or appeals to tribal and family alliances. Shaykhs may even rally their tribesmen in Sana‘a or, in some cases, block roads and interfere with government control of a tribal area in order to gain bargaining leverage. All of these actions are an acceptable part of bargaining in Yemen’s informal, tribal system. Elites are also permitted to critique prominent mem-bers of the government and the GPC publicly. However, they must always stop short of crossing “red lines” by making credible threats or taking actions that attenuate the personal discretion of the executive and/or undermine the corrupt political economy that supports the regime.

CROSSInG “RED lInES”

Red lines limit the range of acceptable behavior for elites as they vie for better positions in patronage networks or as they seek to reform the political system. They preserve the nerve center of the regime by protecting the highly personalized authority of the President and the patronage system that supports his regime. Red lines are not rigid markers and they change over time. Yet, their positions at any given moment are generally understood by political elites.

Some red lines are more obvious than others. Certainly by any intuitive defini-tion a military coup, open insurrection, or other mass mobilization of citizens aimed at dividing the Yemeni state or toppling the regime constitutes crossing a red line. Those supporting the Huthi rebellion in Sa‘ada, for example, clearly crossed a red line by engaging in open insurrection against the central government. This article, however, is interested in other actions and credible threats that are less dramatic and violent but still threaten the highly personalized organization of power. Here, red lines will refer to the limits set by the regime for the use of formal political institutions, such as Parlia-ment, the parties, the courts, and the media. Defectors, or those who cross red lines, go beyond acceptable boundaries for the use of formal institutions by taking action and/or making credible threats that could infuse weak, formal institutions with rational-legal authority.

A defector is not synonymous with a genuine democratic reformer. Defectors may be democrats; however, they may simply be using the threat of building formal institutions to reposition themselves in patronage networks. Equally important, not all reform-minded elites qualify as defectors. Defection is inherently risky. At a mini-mum, it will draw the ire of the President or clients who benefit from the status quo. At worse, it could result in physical harassment and complete exclusion from patron-age networks. Many elites, particularly technocrats and some southern politicians, are


reformers in the sense that they would support and benefit from institutionalization and also democratization of the political arena. They talk of reform to researchers and foreign diplomats, and they eagerly reveal the inner workings of the Yemeni autocracy when given the opportunity. Yet, they stop short of making credible threats to change the system.

The same is true for many reform-minded individuals in the ruling party. Since the GPC’s 2005 conference in Aden, a distinction has developed between “reformers” and the “old guard.” Reformers verbally support democratic and/or economic reforms and they often work with foreign governments as well as non-governmental organiza-tions (NGOs). A diplomat who worked closely with this group described the situation in this way:

Given that corruption and personalism are so deeply entrenched in Yemeni politics, what reformers do most often is broker deals between forces that push for reform and [that maintain] the status quo in a regime that does not wish to change. For example, the reformers broker deals between the US or the donor community and Salih … reformers are also able to mediate between the regime and the opposition parties. They are not staunch [supporters of the] GPC and therefore they have some sympathies with the opposition. They are able to soften the blow of polarization when the opposition calls for change. In doing this, they are able to bring about some gradual reforms.50

As this account suggests, reformers in the GPC work behind the scenes in ways that could prepare the playing field for democratic development and genuine economic re-form in the future. However, they stop short of aggressively strengthening democratic institutions and curtailing the power of the President. These elites are not defectors. They are joiners rather than followers. They constitute a moderate bloc within the GPC that could defect if reforms were initiated and gained political traction.

While there are significant disincentives for defection, the Yemeni system is dy-namic and elites are constantly testing the boundaries of acceptable behavior. On rare occasions, elites who are part of the patronage paradigm cross red lines, opening the door for institutional adaptation and change. One prominent example of defection from within the patronage system occurred during the presidential and local council elec-tions of 2006 when Hamid al-Ahmar crossed a red line for acceptable use of electoral institutions. Hamid is a member of Islah and the son of the late shaykh of shaykhs of the Hashid confederation. He and his family are intimately connected to patronage networks and privilege. Yet, during the election, Hamid tested the boundaries of politi-cal opposition by aggressively throwing his political and financial weight behind the opposition candidate, Faysal Bin Shamlan. While the majority of elites in the Joint Meeting Parties (JMP) opposition stayed within acceptable boundaries of opposition behavior, Hamid openly and aggressively criticized the President in public forums. More importantly, Hamid utilized his family’s prominent tribal position to threaten the President’s support in the Hashid confederation. One of the most widely publicized and controversial moments during the election campaign occurred when Hamid, along with his brothers, organized a massive rally in the governorate of Amran in support of the

50. Interview by the author with a prominent diplomat, Sana‘a, Yemen, June 2007.


JMP opposition.51 Amran is in the heart of Hashid territory and the rally amounted to nothing less than a direct challenge to the President.

Hamid’s words and actions in support of the JMP, and specifically of Shamlan, threatened the nerve center of the President’s authority. Yet many Yemenis were, and are still, skeptical of Hamid’s motivations, pointing out that he is part of the corrupt political economy. Many in the opposition and the ruling party claimed that Hamid’s bold opposition was a reaction to the al-Ahmar family’s gradual exclusion from patron-age access prior to the election and that it was designed to force the President to make concessions. In fact, soon after the elections, Hamid’s political rhetoric softened and rumors spread that an informal agreement was reached between his father and Salih to re-establish political and economic power sharing.

After a period of quiet, Hamid again returned to the forefront of the opposi-tion. In a controversial interview on August 5, 2009 on Al-Jazeera, the Shaykh boldly criticized the President for turning the state into a family business. He then called on Salih to resign, paving the way for a transfer of power.52 Inside the JMP, Hamid is now a prominent spokesman for Islah and a vocal proponent of a National Dialogue to ad-dress, among other things, the concentration of power in the hands of the Executive. Whatever Hamid’s motivations — whether they be a desire to better his economic/political access or a chance to become Yemen’s next strongman — the impacts of his defection on the Yemeni political arena are still unfolding. It is yet to be seen whether his actions will provide an opportunity for genuine reform or whether they will simply produce a reshuffling of existing patterns of distribution.

Other instances of defection are less visible than Hamid’s, but still reveal po-tential opportunities for reform. For example, several Members of Parliament (MPs) have utilized an otherwise weak and ineffective institution as a forum to expose and challenge government corruption. Most famously, in 2003 and 2004, a small group of MPs worked to expose and prevent the government’s plans to sell Oil Block 53 well under market value. On December 9, 2005 these activists, along with others, formed a group of seventeen MPs known as Yemen Parliamentarians Against Corruption (YemenPAC).53 Since 2005, YemenPAC has been active in drafting new anti-corrup-tion legislation, establishing an anti-corruption commission, aggressively questioning government ministers, and exposing and investigating instances of grand corruption.54 While the new anti-corruption law and the anti-corruption commission are defunct in practice and pose no immediate threat to the regime, YemenPAC as an organization is more menacing. It offers a forum where like-minded MPs can coordinate their reform efforts, and it is a potential base for coalition building in the future.

51. Yasser al-Mayasi, “Salih Attacks Opposition as Campaigning Reaches Climax,” Yemen Times, Issue 979, Vol. 14, August 7-September 10, 2006.

52. Interview with Shaykh Hamid al-Ahmar, al-Jazeera.net, August 5, 2009, http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B84C7C27-D3E8-40B9-8360-3D32893EF20A.htm.

53. YemenPAC is a member of the Global Organization for Parliamentarians Against Corruption, or GOPAC. GOPAC is a non-profit, non-governmental organization established in October 2002 in Ottawa, Canada. For more information on the activities and chapters of GOPAC see: http://www.parlcent.ca/gopac/index_e.php.

54. Interview by the author with a former Yemeni parliamentarian, July 22 and 25, 2007. Interview by the author with members of YemenPAC, July 29, 2007.


Instances of defection are rare and in most cases they have failed to gain mo-mentum because vested interests in the status quo, tribal and political rivalries, and distrust between potential reformers stymie coalition building and reform momentum. Moreover, the motivations of defectors vary. In some cases, elites use defection as a bargaining chip to reposition themselves in networks of patronage. Regardless of the motivations behind them, moments of defection are potential junctures for institutional change and adaptation that deserve examination by scholars and policymakers seeking to understand continuity and potential change in Yemen’s autocracy.

PUnIShMEnTS AnD EnFORCEMEnT MEChAnISMS

If patronage politics in Yemen is truly rule-governed, there must be enforcement mechanisms or consequences for breaking the rules of the game. Both the President and his elite clients have incentives to abide by the rules. If the President fails to extend patronage broadly, he risks angering large groups of elite clients who may then unite in opposition to remove him from power. Moreover, if the President fails to extend pa-tronage around certain rules of distribution, he risks angering powerful actors who are individually capable of rallying military, political, and/or ideological resources against his regime. Clients who refuse to accept patronage inclusion, lobby for patronage in-clusion beyond an acceptable range, engage in open insurrection, or who cross red lines by building formal political institutions, can face an array of physical, economic, and political sanctions. Punishment can be both individual and collective in nature. An individual may be punished directly or through the exclusion, harassment, or demotion of family members.

Military/security clients are particularly susceptible to the threat of physical violence or even death. These clients are simply too close to the nerve center of the President’s power to be allowed to defect without severe and swift retribution. As such, the history of Salih’s rule is littered with the deaths of top military/security personnel suspected of disloyalty. Usually they are the victims of strange “accidents.” A promi-nent example is the late military commander Muhammad Isma‘il al-Qadi. Muhammad Isma‘il was killed in a mysterious helicopter crash in 2001 after he reportedly objected to the President’s decision to groom his oldest son, Ahmad ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, for the presidency.55 Military/security clients are not the only elite at high risk of sanction by physical violence. Brave members of the opposition, the press, and civil society who have rejected patronage inclusion make themselves vulnerable to brutal attacks and harassment. By refusing to accept patronage, these elites subject themselves to the full gambit of regime retribution.

For non-military/security clients, physical abuse is possible; however, they are more likely to face financial sanction. One tribesman included in public sector patron-age described the system of punishment in this way:

The President is unique from other Arab autocrats in that he rarely resorts to vio-lence as a form of punishment. Instead, he brings enemies to his side and prevents

55. Interview by the author with a Yemeni journalist, Yemen, Summer 2007. Also confirmed by several journalists and political analysts in Sana‘a, Yemen, Summer 2007.


dissention by using money. In a few cases, violence has been used against hopeless cases. These hopeless cases reject any compromise or deals with the President. Those who hold powerful positions in the government will be punished if they criticize the regime [the President and his close family] directly by losing their high position and the many material extras that come with the high position. They will not be physically threatened and will still maintain a minimum salary with the government. The President does not like to break ties completely.56

Financial sanctions can come in many forms. It may be obvious, as is the case with losing employment or being denied government contracts, or it may be more subtle, as when the President works through third parties to create financial chaos. For example, problems may mysteriously arise at a private bank; a landlord may deny access to prop-erty; services may be cut off to a business or home; or land may be stolen by a powerful shaykh. The protection of assets in Yemen is ultimately related to raw power and con-nections with the President, not to an objective legal system. Without the appropriate connections, or the physical strength to protect assets, personal property is vulnerable. In this environment, the President can punish a client by simply allowing others to prey upon his possessions.

Financial punishments are often combined with political sanction. Clients who are included in the upper echelons of the GPC or appointed to other prominent political positions are susceptible to an array of punitive measures. Sanctions threaten not only their personal access to power and wealth, but more importantly for some, they threaten an elite’s control of grassroots constituencies. Political appointments and prominent po-sitions in the ruling party allow elites access to government resources, which can then be redistributed down the patronage chain. While the personal wealth of some elites is financially independent of domestic patronage, they still depend on access to the state to maintain their own web of clients. In these cases, the loss of a party position may diminish grassroots popularity. In addition to denying access to state resources, other punishments include igniting tribal feuds, supporting other tribal shaykhs or families in an elite’s district, blackmail, or spreading rumors in the press.

One frustrated technocrat complained that he is “watched at all times” by the Po-litical Security Organization (PSO).57 According to him, his phone and e-mail are mon-itored and some of his guards work directly for the PSO. These complaints are typical of the political elite in Yemen, even among prominent shaykhs. The PSO is notorious for spying, gathering blackmail material, and spreading misinformation. Whether or not the reach of political security is as comprehensive as Yemenis suggest, the fear of this organization is real and it provides a deterrent to defection.

As the above paragraphs indicate, all elites, including powerful shaykhs, have vulnerabilities and can be punished for breaking the rules of the game. Yet, some are more vulnerable than others. Technocrats and traditional merchants are particularly susceptible to all types of punishment because they are largely unable to defend them-selves. However, given their skill set, these groups often possess an exit option that allows them to thrive outside of the country. Instead of suffering financial and possibly

56. Interview by the author with a tribesman included in public sector patronage, Sana‘a, Yemen, July 2007.

57. Interview by the author with a Yemeni technocrat, Sana‘a, Yemen, July 2007.


physical abuse, elites in these categories often choose to build a life outside of Yemen. It is important to note that crossing red lines does not always result in immedi-

ate retribution. If a defecting elite is powerful within an important tribe or constitu-ency, instead of alienating the defector, Salih may try to re-incorporate him into a more lucrative or prestigious part of the patronage arrangement. Punishment may also be withheld in cases where the President derives tactical benefit from an individual or a group crossing red lines. For example, in some cases, reform-minded technocrats have successfully institutionalized isolated pockets in the bureaucracy. While Salih does not want these pockets to spread, their success often provides him with a useful example of “reform” to show the international community, and in some cases they provide critical services to impoverished citizens. This is the case with the Social Fund for Develop-ment. The Fund is a transparent, efficient government agency that is outside the patron-age paradigm. The potential threat it posed to the status quo was outweighed by the positive attention it drew from international donors and the success it had in providing services to Yemeni citizens. Now it is an isolated pocket of rational-legal authority in an otherwise personalized and inefficient bureaucracy.

ChAnGInG PATTERnS OF PATROnAGE

Over time, shifts have occurred in patterns of inclusion and exclusion as a result of changes in both the strategic concerns of the President and the changing demands of clients. The following section will review several important sea changes in patronage distribution. These shifts have altered the names at the top of the patronage equation as well as the type of patronage distributed to powerful players. In general, changes have re-invented networks without altering the organization of power. Yet, these shifts draw attention to emerging tensions and weaknesses in Yemen’s autocracy.

The first major sea change in patronage networks since 1994 has been the politi-cal exclusion of the main opposition party, Islah. From 1990 to 1994, Islah worked in a close partnership with the GPC against a common adversary, the Yemeni Socialist Party (YSP). Then, following the YSP’s defeat in the civil war, Islah ruled in coalition with the GPC from 1994 until the parliamentary elections of 1997. After the civil war, however, the relationship between the two parties gradually changed. In the absence of competition from the YSP, Salih feared the growing electoral strength and grassroots appeal of Islah, particularly from the ideological core of the party, the Muslim Broth-ers. Consequently, he set out to neutralize Islah as an effective political organization. As part of the ruling coalition, Islah was assigned difficult service ministries, including the Ministries of Health, Supply and Trade, Electricity and Water, and Education. Many in Islah and the media suspected that these appointments were meant to dampen the party’s popular appeal by setting Islah ministers up for failure.58 After the GPC won enough seats in the 1997 parliamentary elections to govern without a coalition partner, Islah’s alienation from prominent political positions was complete. In addition to deny-ing Islah members prominent public sector and political appointments, the President also successfully coaxed Islah businessmen into his camp. According to one member of

58. Schwedler, “The Islah Party in Yemen: Political Opportunities and Coalition Building in a Transitional Polity,” p. 218.


Islah, “businessmen join the GPC because it helps their business run smoothly. If they stay with Islah, they receive only friendship and respect.”59 Faced with this scenario, many changed party affiliation to protect their assets.

It is critical to note that the President did not exclude members of Islah across the board. In fact, while Islah as a party was excluded from political access, individuals with strong family or personal ties to the President retained their favored positions. The status of Shaykh ‘Abdullah and his family remained secure. ‘Abdullah continued in his position as Speaker of Parliament and his sons continued to receive access to favored positions in the GPC and to lucrative private sector patronage. Salafis and Muslim Brothers with marriage ties to the President’s family or with deep tribal connections also maintained their access. In other words, many of Islah’s top leadership remained well connected, even as Salih attenuated the potential influence of the party as an or-ganization.

A second important sea change has been a shift on the demand side of the pa-tronage equation. The incorporation of tribesmen into private business in the 1980s produced a new generation of young shaykhs who grew up with and expect private sec-tor patronage. This new generation battles to protect their personal investments and to ensure competitors do not encroach on their privileged access to private sector spoils. These clients are particularly interested in securing access to the oil/gas sector, govern-ment construction projects, and to the real estate market.

The rise of private sector patronage as the new patronage du jour for a whole generation of shaykhs creates a new set of opportunities and constraints for Salih. On one hand, these shaykhs are more financially dependent on the regime than their fathers had been, and are therefore more likely to provide political loyalty as long as their con-tinued inclusion is secure. On the other hand, the demand for private sector patronage access raises the issue of scarcity and the desperate need to grow, not simply divide, the economic pie. While in the long term access to productive sectors of the economy (as opposed to non-productive, rent-based sectors such as oil/gas) may provide incen-tives for businessmen to support reforms that strengthen the rule of law, transparency, and the protection of assets, in the short term, patronage access to the private sector is stifling economic growth and much needed foreign investment. International observers and domestic critics of the regime argue that serious economic reform is needed, par-ticularly in the area of fighting corruption, to grow the economy so that the government can survive once its scarce oil resources are exhausted. Yet, these reforms are easier said than done in part because the regime is built on a web of patronage alliances. Despite warnings of an impending financial crisis, the regime and the elites it supports continue unabated in their predation of national resources.60

The third sea change is the emergence of an influential grassroots leadership in the former South Yemen that is operating almost entirely outside of networks of patronage extending from the capital. As mentioned earlier, Salih has strategically incorporated southern elites into symbolic political positions and sometimes into lucrative economic patronage networks. Yet, this strategy failed to address growing popular discontent in

59. Interview by the author with a member of Islah, Sana‘a, Yemen, August 2006.60. For an analysis of endemic corruption and the challenges of reform, see: Robert Burrowes,

“Yemen: Political Economy and the Effort against Terrorism,” in Robert I. Rotberg, ed., Battling Ter-rorism in the horn of Africa (Baltimore: Brookings Institution Press, 2005), pp. 141-172.


the former South Yemen where citizens have taken to the streets — and in some cases taken up arms — to protest what they perceive as economic, political, and even cultural marginalization. The hirak (the southern protest movement), began in the spring of 2007 and continues in an escalated form today. At its heart, the movement is an indict-ment of Salih’s mode of rule, which relies on elite patronage, corruption, divide-and-rule politics, and the manipulation of regional and tribal identities. Over time, the crisis has become increasingly intractable as unfulfilled promises by the government and cycles of violence have augmented grievances and distrust. Given current levels of ani-mosity, and the decentralized, grassroots nature of the hirak’s leadership, it is unclear whether co-opting individual leaders is a sufficient strategy for quelling the movement. Ultimately, the regime’s ability to either co-opt and/or crush the hirak is tied to the larger political economy as well as to other security challenges in the country. Follow-ing the February 2010 ceasefire in Sa‘ada, the regime has engaged in an increasingly brutal campaign to quash the southern movement. While it is unclear how or when the conflict will be resolved, the presence of a large group of influential leaders operating outside the patronage paradigm constitutes a serious threat to regime stability.

Finally, the fourth and arguably the most important shift in patronage networks since 1994 has been the consolidation of power around the President’s close family. While patronage access is still spread relatively broadly, over time the President has consolidated a greater proportion of patronage in the hands of his relatives, particularly his son and nephews. Consolidation of top military/security positions has been most dramatic. In 1999, the President’s eldest son, Ahmad ‘Ali ‘Abdullah Salih, was appoint-ed head of the twenty-thousand-strong Special Republican Guard Forces tasked with protecting the President. Within the same organization, Ahmad’s cousin, Tariq Muham-mad ‘Abdullah Salih, gained control of the immediate special guard unit protecting the President.61 Since then, two young nephews have risen to prominence: Yahya Mu-hammad ‘Abdullah Salih is now Chief of Staff of the Central Security Forces and his brother, ‘Ammar Muhammad ‘Abdullah Salih, is the Deputy Director of the National Security Bureau.

Relationships within the Sanhan are a source of constant speculation and rumor. Ahmad Salih, General ‘Ali Muhsin al-Ahmar (Commander in the northwest region), Yahya Salih, ‘Ammar Salih, and other members of the family control distinct sections of the military/security apparatus, which often act as competing fiefdoms as opposed to a coordinated bureaucracy. Since 1999, Yemenis have speculated that the relation-ship between Ahmad and ‘Ali Muhsin could turn sour, even violent, when the issue of succession comes to fruition. Those close to presidential circles claim that when the President initially gained power, there was an agreement within the Sanhan that ‘Ali Muhsin would rule after Salih. In practice, however, most Yemenis speculate that Salih is grooming Ahmad for this task. The succession battle within the Sanhan is often used to explain many of the country’s ills. For example, a common narrative is that the war in Sa‘ada was, at least in part, an intra-regime struggle: possibly an attempt by Salih to weaken ‘Ali Muhsin and/or an attempt by ‘Ali Muhsin to strengthen his political/military hand.62

61. Dresch, A history of Modern Yemen, p. 202.62. International Crisis Group, “Yemen: Defusing the Sadaa Time Bomb,” p. 15.


In addition to dominating military/security patronage, the President’s family is also rapidly entering the business realm. To name only a few examples, Tawfiq Salih Salih, the President’s nephew, is head of the state-owned Yemen Tobacco Company. One of the President’s son-in-laws is the head of Yemenia Airways. Another son-in-law, this one from the Duwayd family, ran a large cement factory in the governorate of Am-ran and is currently serving as the governor of Amran. Today, the family is involved in everything from gun smuggling, fishing, shrimping, and construction, to oil and natural gas. They are also acquiring an increasingly larger percentage of the country’s valuable real estate. One Yemeni observer explained the shift towards business in this way:

After twenty-seven years in power, Salih is now trying to push the younger genera-tion into business rather than politics. Salih is shrewd. He knows that in the long term, if his sons and relatives dominate politics it will be dangerous for them … in general he allows his kin group to dominate the money and the military while leav-ing meaningless government positions [bureaucratic as well as party positions] to the rest of society.63

The concentration of patronage in the hands of Salih’s close relatives is creating deep pockets of resentment throughout the country. In the south, southerners resent the fact that northern military men, particularly from the Sanhan clan, are appointed to their governorates to ensure domestic security. Equally important, southerners bitterly resent the Sanhan’s (and northerner’s in general) appropriation of valuable property following the 1994 civil war. Throughout the country, talk of “family rule” is common in political qat chews and gatherings.64 Moreover, technocrats and career politicians la-ment the narrowing of advisory circles around the President. One presidential advisor pointed out that “in the past, Salih had a strong group of advisors around him that he would listen to — men like Shaykh ‘Abdullah bin Husayn al-Ahmar, Yahya Mutawail, and ‘Abdul Karim al-Iryani … now the President does not listen to his advisors any longer … he surrounds himself with his young nephews.”65 Echoing this sentiment, another advisor says that “when Salih originally came to power, he had many allies with him, now he is alone.”66 The general mood of resentment against Salih’s sons, nephews, and cousins is summarized nicely in a play on the Arabic letters making up the word Sanhan: Sawfa nahkumukum hata Akhir nafas. In English: “We will rule you until your last breath.”67

The consolidation of military power, coupled with the Sanhan’s increasing domi-nance of public/private sector patronage, has left several prominent tribal families, espe-cially the Ahmars, worried that they are being excluded from their rightful inheritance. Prior to the 2006 elections, for example, Hamid al-Ahmar’s access to the oil sector was curtailed, and his privileged position in the telecommunications sector was challenged

63. Interview by the author with a tribesman from middle Yemen, Sana‘a, Yemen, Winter 2006.64. While this was the case in 2005-2007, the author noticed an increasing frustration over “family

rule” or the “state as a family business” in two separate trips to Yemen, one in August 2009 and the other in October 2009. The topic was a common theme in qat chews in Sana‘a as well as Aden.

65. Interview by the author with a presidential advisor, Sana‘a, Yemen, August 2009.66. Interview by the author with a presidential advisor, Sana‘a, Yemen, October 2009.67. Interview by the author, Sana‘a, Yemen, June 2009.


by government-encouraged competition.68 Moreover, his brother Husayn al-Ahmar lost a prominent position as a member of the GPC’s General Committee.69 The demotion of the al-Ahmars, along with other prominent shaykhs, has ignited a series of political battles with the President aimed at redrawing the boundaries of appropriate patronage distribution. It has also set the political stage for an intense battle over who will control political and economic resources after Salih. In sum, while the patronage system has proven to be flexible and durable thus far, it is riddled with weaknesses and tensions. These tensions are likely to be inflamed as resources are depleted and as the issue of presidential succession draws near.

COnClUSIOn

This article has outlined the informal rules of the game that govern patronage pol-itics in Yemen. It has argued that while formal political institutions are weak, politics in Yemen are deeply patterned and rule governed. In fact, four guiding principles structure elite behavior and decision-making. First, patronage is distributed broadly. Second, elites must accept some form of patronage inclusion. Third, patronage is not distributed randomly. When making decisions regarding the degree and type of patronage distribu-tion, the President considers the type of elite under consideration, an elite’s grassroots popularity, proven loyalty, and finally an elite’s position in regional, family, and tribal alliances. Fourth, in return for material benefits, clients must provide a minimum level of support for the President and the corrupt political economy that undergirds his re-gime. Elites who threaten the personalized authority of the President, either violently or by making credible threats to strengthen formal institutions, are subject to an array of political, financial, and physical sanctions. Informal institutions produce powerful incentives for elites to remain loyal to the status quo and compelling disincentives for working individually or collectively to radically alter the existing political economy. Yet, in the face of vested interests and significant disincentives, defectors — with vary-ing degrees of interest in a more accountable, transparent, and formalized political system — do exist. On rare occasions, elites have assumed significant risk by crossing red lines to pursue economic and political change.

Unfortunately for President Salih, and even more for impoverished Yemeni citi-zens, the organization of power that has buttressed regime stability in the past is now a menacing liability, impeding the reforms necessary to ensure the future viability and unity of the state. As a shrinking pool of resources is focused more narrowly on the President’s kin, political tensions and defection will likely increase. In this environ-ment, it is unclear whether elite defection and popular dissent will coalesce in a way that produces peaceful, constructive reform. At this most critical juncture, understand-ing the resources, incentives, and motivations of potential defectors, as well as potential tipping points for collective action, will be a critical factor in gauging regime dynam-ics.

68. Interview by the author with a high ranking member of the GPC, Sana‘a, Yemen, July 2007. Interview by the author with a Yemeni oil consultant, Sana‘a, Yemen, August 2007. Interview by the author with a prominent Yemeni businessman, Sana‘a, Yemen, Fall 2006.

69. It is important to note that the relationship between the al-Ahmar brothers and the President is fluid. Access is continually negotiated and it often varies between brothers.

Documents

MEJ-Unpacking Patronage Politics in Yemen