Military History Map of 1854-1890 - Atlas of the Sioux Wars, Part 2

7/31/2019 Military History Map of 1854-1890 - Atlas of the Sioux Wars, Part 2

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Map 17. Converging Columns, 1 April9 June 1876

Gibbonscolumnfromthewestwasnextintothefield.GibbonchosetogatherhiswidelyseparatedcompaniesatFortEllis.AccompanyinghimonhismarchfromFortEllison1Aprilwere4companiesofthe2dCavalryRegimentand5companiesofthe7thInfantry Regiment, comprising a total of 450 men. After marching down theYellowstoneRiverandbrieflyhalting atCampSupply to improvehis sustainmentcapability,GibbonarrivednearthemouthofTullockCreekon20April.ItwasherethatCrooksmovementsfartothesouthaffectedGibbonsactions.SinceCrookdidnotplanto take to the field again untilmid-May, Terry orderedGibbon to halt until hismovementscouldbecoordinatedwiththeothercolumns.Thus,Gibbonwaitedathiscampbetween21Apriland9May.

Inthis19-dayperiod,Gibbonsentoutseveralreconnaissancepatrols,mostofwhichfoundnotraceoftheSioux.However,inattemptingtotrackSiouxhorsethieves,on16MayGibbonsremarkablechiefofscouts,LieutenantJamesH.Bradley,pinpointedthelocationofamajorIndianvillageontheTongueRiver.OnlearningofBradleysfind,GibbonorderedhiscommandtomarchdowntheYellowstone,crosstoitssouthbank,andattack the village.Unfortunately,Gibbonsmenproved unequal to the taskofcrossingtheYellowstone.Afterunsuccessfuleffortslasting1hour,Gibboncanceledboththemovementandtheattack.Followingthisabortiveattempt,GibbonreportedtoTerry

neither

Bradleys

finding

nor

his

own

failure

to

cross

the

Yellowstone.

Meanwhile,

thislargeSiouxvillagecontinuedtosendpartiesofwarriorstoharassGibbonscampuntil 23May,when all contactwith the hostile Indians ceased.Again, itwas theenterprisingBradleywhofoundtheSioux,thistimeonRosebudCreek.Onceagain,GibbonreportedneithertheIndiansharassmentnorBradleysdiscoveryoftheRosebudcamp.

DuringGibbonsmovements, inclementweather had delayed the departure ofTerryscolumnforthefield.Intheinterim,Terrybusilycollectedsuppliesandplannedrivertransporttosupporthisoverlandmarch.TheriverroutewastofollowtheMissouri

Rivernorthwest,thenturnsouthwestuptheYellowstone,andendatGlendiveDepot.Atlast,on17May,TerrysoverlandcolumndepartedfromFortAbrahamLincoln.Hisforceconsistedof12companiesofthe7thCavalryRegimentunderthecommandofCusterand3companiesofinfantry.Terryscolumntotaled925men.

Throughamisreadingofintelligence,TerryexpectedtofindtheIndiansalongtheLittleMissouriRiver,fartotheeastofwheretheyactuallywere.DiscoveringnoIndiansattheLittleMissouri,hemovedfartherwest,campingonBeaverCreekon3June.Here,TerryreceivedadispatchfromGibbon(dated27May)thatvaguelyreferredtosightingsofhostile Indiansbutgaveno specificdetails and skepticallydealtwithBradleysdiscoveryonlyinapostscript.Becauseofthisdispatch,TerryturnedsouthonBeaverCreek and resolved to travel west to the Powder River. To facilitate his furthermovement,heinstructedhisbaseforceatGlendiveDepottosendaboatwithsuppliestothemouthof thePowderRiver.Reaching thePowderRiver late on 7 June,TerrypersonallywentdownstreamtotheYellowstonethenextday,hopingtoconsultwithGibbon.HewaspleasantlysurprisedtofindseveralcouriersfromGibbonsforceattheriver.Here,hefinallygainedtheintelligencethatGibbonhadnotheretoforereported.Terrynowtookpersonalcontrolofbothcolumns.

Meanwhile, Crook assumed direct command of the Bighorn andYellowstoneExpeditionatFortFetterman.CrookhaddrawntogetheranimpressiveforcefromhisDepartmentofthePlatte.LeavingFortFettermanon29May,the1,051-mancolumnconsistedof15companiesfromthe2dand3dCavalry,5companiesfromthe4thand9thInfantry,250mules,and106wagons.Grouard,anexperiencedscoutwhohadworkedwithCrookonearliercampaigns,rodeaheadofthecolumntorecruitCrowwarriorsasscouts.On2June,inspiteofthepoorweather,CrookpushedhisforcenorthwardtothesiteofFortReno,supremely confidentthathewouldredressReynoldsprevious failureonthePowderRiver.Atthispoint,Sheridancouldfinallysaythatallthreecolumnswereinthefield.


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FT SHA

June

V LtBradley on 16 May

CDC

FT W

FT BENTON

Missouri River

FT LARAMIE

FT FETTERMAN

FT RENO

(Abandoned)

FT PHIL KEARNY

(Abandoned)

FT CF SMITH

(Abandoned)

FT ELLIS

SiouxAssiniboine

Reservation

Devils Lake

Reservation

Crow

Reservation

FT BUFORD

FT TOTTEN

FT PECK

WYOMING

TERRITORY

MONTANA

TERRITORY

DAKOTA

TERRITORY

Red Cloud Agency

Spotted

Tail

Agency

Crow Creek

Agency

Cheyenne River Agency

Standing

Rock

Agency

Crow

AgencyVirginia

City

Bozeman

Sun River

Missouri River

Misso

ur

iRiver

MissouriRiver

NiobraraRiver

JamesR

iver

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

Grand River

CannonballRiver

HeartRiver

SheyenneRiv

er

Mussel

shellR

iver

Yellow

stoneR

iver

Little

BighornR

iv e r

Ton

gue

River

PowderRiv

er

Bigho

rnRiver

Little

PowderRiverB

ighorn

Mountain

Black Hills

LittleM

issouri

JamesRiver

Arickaree, Mandan,

Gros Ventre

Reservation

IDAHO

TERRITORY

Rocky

Mountains

PowderRiv

er

CAMP BAKER

North Platte River

TERRY

1 April9 June 1876

Camp

Supply

912 April

Powder River

Depot

Glendive

Depot

April

2528

April 30

May 5May

1216

May

1720

May

2124252829

May 30

June 3

June

47

21 April9 May

1419 May

20 May4 June

8 June

710 June

3 June

2 June

Departed

29 May

6

illage found by

Tongue

River

Rosebu

d

Creek

River

SHAW

FT BENTON

MissouriRiver

FT LARAMIE

FT FETTERMAN

FTRENO

(Abandoned)

FTPHILKEARNY

(Abandoned)

Crow

Reservation

Great Sioux

Reservation

FT RANDALL

FT ABRAHAM LINCOLN

FT BUFORD

FT TOTTEN

FTPECK

WYOMING

TERRITORY NEBRASKARedCloud Agency

Spotted

Tail

Agency

Lower Brule Agency

CrowCreek

Agency

CheyenneRiver Agency

Standing

Rock

Agency

Sun River

Missouri River

Misso

ur

iRiver

MissouriRiver

NiobraraRiver

White River

JamesR

iver

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

GrandRiver

CannonballRiver

HeartRiver

SheyenneRiv

er

Mussel

shellR

iver

Yellow

stoneR

iver

Little

BighornR

iv e r Ton

gue

River

PowderRiver

Bigho

rnRiver

Little

PowderR

iver

Bighorn

Mountain

BlackHills

LittleM

issouri

JamesRiver

Arickaree, Mandan,

GrosVentre

Reservation

IDAHO

TERRITORY

Rocky

Mountains

PowderRiv

er

North Platte River

TERRY

GIBBON

Powder River

Depot

Glendive

Depot

April

2528

April30

May5May

1216

May

1720

May

2124

2528

29

May30

June 3

June

47

17

1419 May

20May 4 June

8 June

710June

3June

2June

Departed

29May

Departed

1 April

Departed

17 May

6 June

s

5 June

s

5June

Village found by LtBradley on16 May

Village found by Lt

Bradley on 27 May

Movement of Main

Indian Village

CDC

NTerrys

Suspected Winter

Roamer Location

Tongue

River

Rosebu

d

Creek

River

Reconnaissance

Miles

0 50 100 150

Converging Columns1 April9 June 1876

Army

Movement

CROOKCROOK


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Map 18. Crooks Advance to the Rosebud

WhenCrookarrivedattheruinsofFortReno,Grouardandthescoutswereabsent.Manyof theCrowbraveshadbalkedatservingwith theArmy,andonlyextensivenegotiationsandGrouardsofferofsubstantialrewardswouldeventuallyconvincethemtojoinCrook.ThedayafterarrivingatReno,CrookscolumnheadednorthwithouttheIndianalliesandcampedthenightof5JuneontheabandonedsiteofFortPhilKearny.LackingGrouardsguidinghand,theexpeditionsoonbecamelost.On6June,mistakingtheheadwatersofPrairieDogCreekforLittleGooseCreek,Crookledhiscolumndownthewrongwatercourse.Thenextday,CrookscommandmovedtotheconfluenceofPrairieDogCreekandTongueRiver,whereitcampedforthenext4days.Atthistime,severalBlackHillsprospectorsaskedforpermissiontotravelwithCrookscolumn.Withinaweek,Crooksciviliancontingentgrewtoapproximately80men.On9June,Sioux or Cheyenne warriors raided the encampment on the Tongue River. Fourcompanies of Crooks cavalry quickly repulsed the attackers. Although Crookscasualtieswereinsignificant,theattackwasevidencethattheIndianswereintheareaandpreparedtofight.

Finally,on11June,Crookledthecolumn11milesbackupPrairieDogCreek,then7miles tohisoriginaldestinationat theforksofGooseCreek(present-daySheridan,Wyoming),whereheestablishedapermanentcamp.Astheofficersandmenenjoyedtheexcellent

hunting

and

fishing

in

the

area,

Crook

prepared

for

the

final

phase

of

the

campaign.On14June,Grouardarrivedwith261ShoshoneandCrowalliestojointhe

expedition.BasedonintelligencefromGrouard,Crooknoworderedhisentireforcetolightenitselfforaquickmarch.Eachmanwastocarryonly1blanket,100roundsofammunition,and4daysrations.ThewagontrainwouldremainatGooseCreek,andtheinfantrywouldbemountedonthepackmules.Theinfantrymen,manyofwhomwerenoviceriders,receivedonlyadaystrainingonthereluctantmules,muchtothedelightofthecavalryspectators.

At0600on16June,Crookledhisforceofmorethan1,300soldiers,Indians,andcivilians out of the encampment atGoose Creek.MajorAlexander Chambers 5companiesofmule-mounted infantryorganized into2smallbattalions led themaincolumn.LieutenantColonelWilliamB.Royallscavalryfollowedtheinfantry.His15companiesofcavalrywereorganizedinto4battalionseachcommandedbyaseniorcaptain:AnsonMills(3dCavalry),GuyHenry(3dCavalry),FrederickVanVliet(3dCavalry),andHenryNoyes(2dCavalry).Theciviliancontingent,organizedintoanauxiliarybattalioncalledthePackersandMiners,broughtuptherear.TheShoshoneandCrowalliesmovedtothefrontandflankofthecolumn.CrossingtheTongueabout6milestothenorth,thecolumnproceededdownriveruntilearlyafternoon,whenitturnedwestandcrossedthedivide to theheadwatersofRosebudCreek.At1900, the leadelementsoftheforcereachedasmallmarshyarea,nearthesourceoftheRosebud,andbivouacked.


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Map 19. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Sioux and Cheyenne Attack, 0800 to 0830

On17June,Crookscolumnrouseditselfat0300andsetoutat0600,marchingnorthwardalongthesouthforkofRosebudCreek.Againtheinfantrytooktheleadbutweresoonpassedbythefastermovingcavalry.TheholidayatmospherethatprevailedsincethearrivaloftheIndianscoutson15Junewassuddenlyabsent.TheCrowandShoshone scoutswereparticularly apprehensive.Although thecolumn hadnot yetencounteredanysignofIndians,thescoutsseemedtosensetheirpresence.Thesoldiers,ontheirpart,wereapparentlyfatiguedfromthepreviousdays35-milemarchandtheirearlymorningreveille,particularlythemule-ridinginfantry.

At0800,Crookstoppedtoresthismenandanimals.TheCrowscoutsreportedevidenceofSiouxandrecommendedthatCrookkeepthecolumnconcealedinthevalleywhiletheyexaminedthearea.Althoughhewasdeepinhostileterritory,Crookmadenospecialdispositionsfordefenseandonlypostedafewpicketsinthehillstothenorth.Thetroopsmerelyhaltedintheirmarchingorderandtookadvantageoftheopportunitytobrewmorningcoffee.ThebattalionsofMillsandNoyesledthecolumn,followedby

CaptainFrederickVanVlietsbattalionandMajorAlexanderChambersbattalionofmule-bornefootsoldiers,CaptainGuyV.Henrysbattalionandaprovisionalcompanyofcivilianpackersandminersbroughtuptherear.

AfewoftheCrowandShoshonewerewellaheadofthecolumnsearchingfortheIndian

village;

fortunately,

the

allied

Indians

that

stayed

with

the

column

remained

alert

whilethesoldiersrested.Severalminuteslater,thesoldiersincampcouldhearthesoundofintermittentgunfirecomingfromthebluffstothenorth.Atfirst,theydismissedthenoiseasnothingmorethanthescoutstakingpotshotsatbuffalo.Astheintensityoffireincreased,ascoutrushedintothecampshouting,Lakota,Lakota!TheBattleoftheRosebudwason.MajorGeorgeRandallandhisCrowandShoshoneauxiliariesquicklyreinforcedthethinArmypicketlinenorthofthecamp.By0830,theSiouxandCheyennewerehotlyengagedwithRandallsIndianallies.HeavilyoutnumberedandsupportedbyonlyafewArmypickets,theCrowandShoshonewarriorswereslowlypushedbacktowardthecamp,buttheirfightingwithdrawalgaveCrooktimetodeployhisforces.


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Map 20. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crooks Counterattack, 0830 to 0930

InresponsetotheIndianattack,CrookdirectedhisforcestoseizethehighgroundnorthandsouthofRosebudCreek.HeorderedVanVliet,withCandGCompanies,3dCavalry,tooccupythehighbluffstothesouth.VanVlietscaledthehilljustintimetodriveoffasmallbandofSiouxapproachingfromtheeast.Inthenorth,thecommandsofChambers(DandFCompanies,4thInfantry,andC,G,andHCompanies,9thInfantry)andNoyeswiththreeofhiscompanies(B,E,andICompanies,2dCavalry)formedadismountedskirmish lineandadvanced toward theSioux.TheirprogresswasslowbecauseofflankingfirefromIndiansoccupyingthehighgroundtothenortheast.Toaccelerate theadvance,CrookorderedMills tocharge thisgroupofhostileswithaportionofhisbattalion(A,E,andMCompaniesofthe3dCavalry).LieutenantColonelWilliamRoyall,Crooks second in command, supportedMillswith another threecompanies(B,I,andLofthe3dCavalry).MillsmountedchargeforcedtheIndiansto

withdrawnorthwestalongtheridgeline,notstoppinguntiltheyreachedthenextcrest(nowcalledCrooksRidge).Here,Millsquicklyreformedhiscompaniesandledtheminanothercharge,drivingtheIndiansnorthwestagaintothenexthill(ConicalHill).MillswaspreparingtodrivetheIndiansfromConicalHillwhenhereceivedordersfromCrooktoceasehisadvanceandassumeadefensiveposture.

Royall,aftersupportingMillsinitialcharge,movedtothewestendofthefieldtoopposeIndians thatwereattackingtherearofCrookscamp.HisforceconsistedofHenrysreducedbattalion(DandFCompanies,3dCavalry)andthethreecompaniesbroughtfromtheeastendofthebattlefield.Royalladvancedrapidlyalongtheridgelinetothenorthwest,finallyhaltinghisadvanceneartheheadofKollmarCreek.


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20

MillsMills

3Vliet

4 & 9

D, F, C

D, F

Henry3

A, E, M

3Mills

Noyes

B, E, I(Dismounted)

2

9

G, H

2Dewey

A

C, G

Van

2Swigert

D

Moore

Packers & Miners

B, I, L

Royall3

Crooks Counterattack

0830 to 0930


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Map 21. The Battle of the Rosebud: Crooks Dilemma, 0930 to 1030

ChambersandNoyesledtheirforcesforwardandsoonjoinedMillsontopoftheridge.ThebulkofCrookscommand,nowjoinedbythepackersandminers,occupiedCrooks Ridge. Establishing his headquarters there at approximately 0930,Crookcontemplatedhisnextmove.

CrooksmostpressingconcernwasthatRoyallsdetachmentwasamilefromthemainbodyandinsomedangerofbeingcutoffanddestroyed.Sensingthisvulnerabilityandexploitingtheirsuperbmobility,theSiouxandCheyennewarriorsshiftedtheirmainefforttothewestandconcentratedtheirattacksonRoyalls troopers.Crook,recognizingthedanger,wantedRoyalltowithdrawtoCrooksRidge.However,theorderdeliveredtoRoyall directed that he extend his right until he connectedwith the rest of thecommandatCrooksRidge.Inreply,RoyallsentonlyBCompanytojoinCrook.Thatonecompanydidnothingtocoverthe1-milegap.Instead,itsignificantlyreducedtheforceRoyallhadavailabletodefendhisexposedposition.Heshouldhavewithdrawnallfivecompanies.HelaterdefendedhisdecisionandclaimedthatheavypressurefromtheIndiansmadewithdrawingtheentirecommandtoorisky.

InadditiontothedangertoRoyalls command,Crookfacedasignificantdilemma.HisinitialchargessecuredkeyterrainbutdidlittletodamagetheIndianforce.The

bluecoatsassaultsinvariablyscatteredtheIndiandefendersbutdidnotkeepthemaway.Afterfallingback,theSiouxandCheyennewarriorsreturnedtosnipeatthesoldiersfromlongrange.Occasionally, singlewarriorsorsmallgroupsofIndiansdemonstratedtheir valorby charging forward and exchanging a few close-range shotswith thetroopers;whenpressed, the Indiansspedawayon theirnimbleponies.Crooksoonrealizedhischargeswereindecisive.

Castingabout for away to defeat his elusive opponent,Crook returned to hisoriginalcampaignplan.SincetheIndianshadbeenfightinghimwithunprecedentedtenacity,itsuggestedthattheymightbefightingtodefendtheirfamiliesinanearbyvillage.Thus,CrookdecidedtoadvancedowntheRosebudValleywherehehopedtofindthehostileencampmentandforcetheenemytostandandfight.Atabout1030,CrookorderedMillsandNoyestowithdrawtheircommandsfromthehighgroundandprepareforanattackontheIndianvillagepresumedtobesomewheretothenorthontheRosebud.Toreplacethecavalry,CrookrecalledVanVlietsbattalionfromthesouthsideoftheRosebud.


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21

iIn

dan

s

Indians

nIdian

s

3Andrews Moore (Packers & Mine rs)

I ()

4 & 93Royall

3 D,F, C2

HQ Crook

NoyesD, F, L Meinhold3

Mills B, E, IBA, E, M 2

Swigert

DScouts

Crow &3 ShoshoneFoster

I ()

9

G, H

2Dewey

A

Indians

Crooks Dilemma

0930 to 1030

3Van Vliet

C, G


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Map 22. The Battle of the Rosebud: The Strike for the Village, 1030 to 1130

Onemiletothewest,Royallssituationcontinuedtodeteriorate.Royalltriedtowithdraw acrossKollmarCreek,but found the Indiansfire too heavy. Instead, hewithdrewsoutheastalongtheridgelinetoamoredefensibleposition.InanattempttofurtherisolateandoverwhelmRoyallsforce,alargegroupofIndianschargedboldlydownthevalleyofKollmarCreek,advancingallthewaytotheRosebud.ThefortuitousarrivalofVanVlietscommandcheckedtheIndiansadvance.CrookthenorderedhisCrowandShoshonescoutstochargeintothewithdrawingwarriorsflank, throwingthehostilesintogreatconfusion.

TroubledbythefirefromIndiansonConicalHillandtocoverMillsmovementintotheRosebudValley,CrookorderedChambersinfantrytodrivetheSiouxaway.Thefoot

soldierspromptlyforcedanenemywithdrawal,buttolittleavail.Itwasarepetitionofthesameoldpattern;thesoldierscoulddrivetheSiouxawayatwill,buttheycouldnotfixanddestroythem.

Atabout1130CrooksentanothermessagetoRoyalldirectinghiswithdrawaltoCrooksRidge.However,hedecidednottowaitforRoyallsreturnanddirectedMillstoexecutehisdriveforthevillage.HecouldonlyhopethatMillsadvancedownthevalleywouldbesuccessful.


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22

Indians

Indi

ans

India

ns

Indians

3

Moore (Packers & Miners)

Meinhold

4 & 9 B

D, F, C93

Royall HQ Crook

G, H ScoutsI, L

Crow & 2Shoshone Noyes3

HenryA, B, D, E, I

D, F3Mills

A, E, M

The Strike for the Village

1030 to 1130 3Van Vliet

C, G


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Map 23. The Battle of the Rosebud: The End of the Battle, 1130 to 1330

MillsadvanceonthesuspectedIndianvillagedidnothingtosuppresstheIndians.CrooksassumptionaboutthepresenceofanIndianencampmentprovedtotallyfalse;therewasnonearbyIndianvillage.ThemostimportantconsequenceofMillsactionwastoleaveCrookwithoutsufficientforcetoaidRoyallandhishard-pressedcommand.WhileMillsmadehiswaydowntheRosebud,Royallssituationgrewworse.

Atapproximately1130,Royallwithdrewsoutheastwardasecondtimeandassumedanewdefensiveposition.Fromhere,hehopedtoleadhiscommandacrossKollmarCreekandrendezvouswithCrook.Meanwhile,theSiouxandCheyenneassailedhimfromthreesides,growingeverbolderintheirattacks.Observingthesituationfromhisheadquarters, Crook realized that Royallwould need help in extricating himself.Consequently, CrooksentorderstoMillscancelinghisoriginalmissionanddirectinghimtoturnwesttofallontherearoftheIndianspressingRoyall.

At approximately 1230, Royall decided he could wait no longer and beganwithdrawinghistroopersintotheKollmarravinetoremounttheirhorses.Fromthere,hismenwouldhavetoracethroughahailoffirebeforereachingtherelativesafetyofCrooksmainposition.As theybegan their dash, theCrow and Shoshone scoutscounterchargedthepursuingenemy,relievingmuchofthepressureonRoyallsmen.Twocompaniesofinfantryalsoleftthemainpositiontoprovidecoveringfirefromthenortheast side of the ravine. In spite of this gallant assistance,Royalls commandsufferedgrievouscasualties.Nearly80percentofthetotalArmylosses(10killed,21wounded)intheBattleoftheRosebudcamefromRoyallsfourcompaniesofthe3dCavalry(9killedand15wounded).

While the last ofRoyallsmen extricated themselves,Mills digested his newinstructionsfromCrook.SinceMillscommandhaddrivenoffasmallpartyofSiouxnearthebendintheRosebud,itapparentlyledhimtobelievethattheIndianvillagewas

nearby.HewantedtocontinuetheattackonthesuspectedIndianvillage,butobeyedhisorders.MillsclimbedoutofthecanyonandproceededwestwardtowardConicalHill.

MillsarrivedtoolatetoassistRoyallswithdrawal,buthisunexpectedappearanceon the Indiansflankcaused theSiouxandCheyenne tobreakcontactand retreat.Concentratinghismountedunits,CrooknowledthemuptheRosebudinsearchofthenonexistentIndianvillage.However, thescoutsrefused toenterthenarrowcanyon,forcingCrook toabandon thepursuit.TheBattleof theRosebudwasover.By thestandardsofIndianwarfare,ithadbeenanextremelylongandbloodyengagement.NeverbeforehadthePlainsIndiansfoughtwithsuchferocity,andneverbeforehadtheyshownsuchawillingnesstoacceptcasualties.TheSiouxandtheCheyenneleft13deadonthefieldandCrazyHorselaterstatedthattheIndianlosseswere36killedand63wounded.Theirsacrificewasnotinvain.Concernedforhiswounded,shortonsupplies,andshakenbytheIndiansferocity,CrookreturnedtohiscamponGooseCreek.HisShoshonialliessoondepartedwhentheysawCrookhadnointentionofcontinuingthefight.

Crooksreportofthebattle,dated19June,reachedSheridansheadquarterson23June (remarkably fast considering the technological limitations of the day). In hismessage,heclaimedvictorywithrespect tohisretentionof thebattlefieldbut thenacknowledged that he lacked the resources to continue without re-supply andreinforcements.HestoppedshortofestimatingthenumberofIndiansthatopposedhiscolumn,buthedidstatetheyweresufficientlydeterminedandstrongenoughtofightforseveralhoursagainsthis1,300-mancolumn.SheridanforwardedthemessagetoTerrythatsameday.Unfortunately, CrookswarningthattheIndiansweredeterminedtofightdidnotreachTerryuntil30June,5daysaftertheBattleofLittleBighorn.CrookandhiscommandstayedatGooseCreekfor7weeksawaitingreinforcements.TheyplayednoroleinthemomentouseventsatLittleBighorn.


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23

Indi

ans

Indian

s

IndiansIndians

Moore (Packers & Miners)

3Meinhold

4 & 9 B

D, F, C

HQ Crook

Scouts

9 Crow &Shoshone

G, HG,G, HH

3Royall

D, F, I, L2

Noyes

3A, B, D, E, I Mills

A, E, M

The End of the Battle

1130 to 1330


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Map 24. Terrys Campaign, 1024 June

Unaware of Crooks activities but armed with the information furnished byGibbons messengers, Terry finally had specific, if somewhat stale, intelligenceregardingtheIndianlocationswhichhebelievedtobesomewhereonRosebudCreek.Thisnewinformationcalledforneworders,whichTerryissuedon10June(seemapA).MajorMarcusA.RenoofCusterscommandwastotakesixcompaniesofcavalryonareconnaissance

of

the

valleys

of

the

Powder

River,

Mizpah

Creek,

and

Tongue

River

and

confirmthattheSiouxhadnotmovedtotheeast.Undernocircumstanceswashetoventurewestof theTongueRiver soasnot toalarm the Indiansbelieved tobeonRosebudCreek.Renowas tofinishhisreconnaissanceat themouthof theTongue,wherehewas torejoinCusterand therestof the7thCavalryRegiment.FollowingRenosreconnaissance,Terryintendedtodrivesouthwardinparallelcolumns,CusterscavalryontheTongueandGibbonspredominantlyinfantryforceontheRosebud.Afterascending theTongue foranappropriatedistance,CustersmoremobilecommandwouldturnwesttowardtheRosebudanddescendthatcreekpushingtheSiouxtowardGibbonsforce.

WhileRenofailedtoscoutallofMizpahCreek,heessentiallyfollowedTerrysordersuntil15June.AfterdescendingtheTongueRiverforonly8miles,hethendecidedtoturnwesttoinvestigateenemysignsontheRosebud.AlthoughhedisobeyedTerrysdirect

instructions

by

advancing

up

the

Rosebud,

Reno

was

able

to

determine

that

Terrysplanofparallelcolumnswould notwork; the Indians hadalready traveledbeyondtheareaencompassedbyTerryspincermovement.

TheinformationgeneratedbyRenosreconnaissancecausedTerrytoformulateyetanotherplan(seemapB).WhileallofhisforcesgatheredatthemouthoftheRosebud,he designed a secondpincermovement similar to the first.Terryswritten ordersprovided full latitude for Custer to diverge from them; paradoxically, they alsoenumeratedaspecificsetofinstructionsforCustertofollow.WhetherCusterdisobeyedordersisacontroversythatcontinuestothisday.TerrysordersdirectedCustertoascendtheRosebudandfollowthetrailoftheIndians.IfthetraildivergedfromtheRosebudtothewest,hewas,nonetheless,tocontinueupthatcreektoensuretheIndianswouldnotescapetothesouth.NeartheheadwatersofRosebudCreek,CusterwastocrossthedivideintotheLittleBighornRiverdrainage.Meanwhile,GibbonsforcewastomoveuptheYellowstoneRiver,turnsouthuptheBighorn,andestablishitselfatthemouthoftheLittleBighorn.

On21June,Custerdepartedwithhisregimentof12companies(652men).Shortlythereafter,Terry andGibbon led the remaining forces, 4 cavalry companies and 5infantrycompanies(723men),westwardalongtheYellowstoneontheirroutetothemouthoftheLittleBighorn.EachofthesetwocolumnsfollowedTerrysplantotheletter

until

the

evening

of

24

June.


16/51

YellowstoneRiver

Tong

ueRiv

er

Muddy

Creek

Rosebu

dCreek

Tullo

ckCreek

S a r

p y

C r e e k

ArmellsCreek

Lam

eDeerC

reek

Reno

CreekOtterCreek

Pumpkin

Creek

Mizpah

Creek

11

June

12

June

13

June

14

June

15

June

16

June

17

June

18

June

811 June

1923

June

1720

May

2124

May

1617

June

19 June

Davis

Creek

Map A (Terry s First Plan)

47 June

30 May 3 June

1214 June

16-

Powder

River

YellowstoneRiver

Little

Bighorn

R.

Little

Bighorn

R.

Tong

ueRi

ver

Rosebu

d Cree

k

Tullo

ckCreek

S a r

p y

C r e e k

ArmellsCreek

Lam

eDeer

Creek

Reno

CreekOtterCreek

Pumpkin

Creek

Mizpah

Creek

11

June

12

June

13

June

14

June

15

June

16

June

17

June

18

June1720

May

2124

May

1617

June

19 June

Map A (Terrys First Plan)

Muddy

Creek

Davis

Creek

Powder

River

Crooks

Goose Creek

Camp

CUSTER

TERRY-

GIBBON

Davis

Creek

Muddy

Creek

17 June15 June

Presumed

location of

IndiansUpper Rosebud

Camps found by

Gibbon in late May RENO

YellowstoneRiver

Little

BighornR

iver

Tong

ueRiv

er

Muddy

Creek

Tullo

ckC

reek

S a r

p y

C r e e k

Arm

ellsCreek

LameD

eerCreek

OtterCreek

24

June

811 June

1214 June

15 June

1617 June

Y

Davis

Creek

Map B (Terrys Second Plan)

47 June

Davis

23

June

22

June

24

June

23

June

22

June

23

CDC

Reno

Creek

Rosebu

dCreekB

igh

orn

Riv

er

Reno

N

21 June21

ellowstoneRiver

Little

BighornR

iver

Tong

ueRi

ver

Muddy

Creek

Tullo

ckCreek

S a r

p y

C r e e k

Arm

ellsCreek

Lame

Deer

Creek

OtterCreek

24

June

811 June

1214 June

15 June

1617 June

TERRY-

GIBBON

Creek

Map B (Terrys Second Plan)

47 June

2426

June

Crooks

Goose Creek

Camp

Presumed

location of

IndiansUpper Little Bighorn

CUSTER

Abandoned Camps

found by Reno in

mid June

24

1923

June

Gibbons

assigned

blocking

position

0 25 50

Miles

Terrys Campaign1024 June

Renos reconnaissance

TerryGibbon

Custer

Indian village

Abandoned Indian village site

Planned movement

June

22

June

24

June

23

June

22

June

Creek

Rosebu

d Cree

kBigh

ornRiv

er

June


17/51

Map 25. Custers Approach to the Crows Nest

At1945on24June1876,CustercampedatwhatisnowtheBusbyBendofRosebudCreek.Throughoutthatdaysmarch,he,hissoldiers,andhisscoutshadseenincreasingsignsoftheSiouxvillage.StillunclearwaswhethertheIndianshadcontinueduptheRosebudorhadturnedwesttowardtheLittleBighornRiver.At2100,fourCrowscoutsreturnedtocampwithnewsthattheSiouxtrailledwestwardoutoftheRosebudValley.Custer

now

faced

adilemma.

Terrys

orders

directed

him

to

continue

up

the

Rosebud

to

its head, then turnwest toward theLittleBighorn.Through thismaneuver,TerryintendedtotraptheIndiansbetweenCustersforceandGibbonscolumn.Ontheotherhand,continuinguptheRosebudentailedseveralrisks:possiblediscoverybyIndianscouts,thelossofcontactwiththeIndianvillage,andthepossibilityofleavingGibbonsforcetofighttheIndiansalone.Afterweighinghisoptions,CusterchosetomaintaincontactbyfollowingtheSiouxtrailoverthedivide.

At2120,Custersenthischiefofscouts,LieutenantCharlesA.Varnum,toanaturalobservationpointcalledtheCrowsNesttopinpointthelocationoftheSiouxvillage.WhileVarnumwasabsent,CusterdecidedtomovehiscolumnatnighttothedividebetweenRosebudCreekandtheLittleBighornRiver.Hisforcewouldthenhidetherethroughoutthedayof25JuneinasmallpocketnestledatthebaseoftheCrowsNest.Thatevening,heplannedtoapproachthevillage,assumeattackpositionsbeforedawnon26June,andattacktheIndiansatfirstlight.

At0030on25June,CusterledhissoldiersoutoftheBusbyBendcamptowardthedivide.Afteraslow,dusty,anddisagreeablenightmarchlastingnearly3hours,hehaltedhiscolumnaboutanhourbeforesunrisetocookbreakfast.At0730,CusterreceivedamessagefromVarnumattheCrowsNest.AlthoughVarnumhadnotpersonallyseensignsoftheSiouxvillage(nowintheLittleBighornValley),hisIndianscoutsclaimedtohave

seen

it.

Unwilling

to

act

without

making

his

own

observations,

Custer

and

asmall

partyleftat0800fortheCrowsNest,whileRenobroughttheregimentforward.

DuringVarnumswaitforCusterattheCrowsNest,hisscoutssawtwogroupsofhostileIndiansthatappearedtonoticeCusterscolumn.CusterreachedtheCrowsNestat0900,but likeVarnum,hewasunable to identifyanysignsof theSiouxvillage.VarnumsIndianscouts,however,convincedCusterofitspresenceintheLittleBighornValley.Thescoutsfurtherarguedthatthecolumnsmovementhadbeencompromisedand thata stealthy approach to the villagewasnow impossible.Custer adamantlyrejectedthisadvicewhileattheCrowsNestanddecidedtocontinuewithhisplantohidetheregimentandattackatfirstlight.


18/51

3500

35003

500

3500

4 0 0 0

4 0 0 0

4250

4250

37503750

4000

4000

3750

3750

3750

3750

Roseb

ud

Roseb

udCCre

ek

reek

00

India

n

India

nTrail

Tra

il

25

Davis

Davis CCr

eekreekDavis

Davis

CCreekreek

Custers Approach to the Crows NestCuster

Indian Trail 7 Main ColumnMiles

SCT 7 Army Scouts Custer1 2 31 2 3

4000 Elevation in Feet

NSix Sioux seen Custer and the Main Column

24

th

HeadwatersHeadwaters 1945: Main column arrives Busby Bend 7of Tof ullockTullock 25th

CreekCreekBusby Bend Camp

0030: Main column departs Busby Bend camp SCT 7 0325: Main column arrives at Halt 1 (hard tack box

lost en route)Varnum and the Scouts 0415: Main column cooks breakfast

2120: Scouts depart Busby Bend camp for 0800: Custer leaves for Crow s Nest

24th 0730: Custer receives and reads Intel on village

Crow s Nest 0845: Main column departs Halt 1

25th 0900: Custer arrives at the Crow s Nest 0250: Varnum and scouts arrive at Crows

Nest

0340: Scouts sight Sioux village from

Crows Nest (13 miles to the west) 0500: Scouts sight main column s breakfast

smoke40004000

0520: Varnum sends courier to Custer

0540-0900: Various sightings of Sioux from Varnum

the Crow s Nest Halt 1

40004000

Custer

o Sioux seenTw

west of divide37503750

Custers Decision

Hide main column at the Crows NestAttack at first light, 26 June

40004000

3750

3750

Village sighted 1342504250Planned Regimental Hide Position

miles to the west 4420X4420X

4250 45004250CDC4500 CDC


19/51

Map 26. Custers Approach to the Little Bighorn

DuringCustersabsence,RenohadmovedthecolumnforwardtoapositionjustnorthoftheCrowsNest.Onhisreturn,Custerlearnedofafurtherthreattohisforcessecurity.Duringthenightmarch,oneofthepackmuleshadlostpartofitsload.Thedetail sent to retrieve it discovered several hostile Indians rummaging through itscontents.ThesoldiersfiredontheIndians,scatteringthembutnotkillingthem.Coupledwith

the

observations

of

Varnums

scouts,

this

latest

breach

of

security

forced

Custer

to

discardhisoriginalplanforastealthyapproach.Insteadofconcealinghiscommandthroughout the day of 25 June, hewould have to approach and attack the villageimmediately. Ironically,noneof the Indianswhospotted thecolumn reported theirfindingstothevillageuntilafterthebattle,butCusterhadnowayofknowingthat.

At1050,Custergatheredhisofficersanddetailedhisnewplanandtheorganizationofthecolumn.Hedirectedeachcompanycommandertoassignonenoncommissionedofficerandsixmentoaccompanythepacktrain.Thecompanieswoulddepartintheorderinwhichtheyfinishedpreparationstomove.Thetroopersresumedtheirmarchat1145,withCaptainFrederickW.Benteenscompanyinthevan.Theyhadnotproceededmorethanone-halfmilepastthedividewhenCusterorderedanotherhalt.There,hereorganized his command into fourparts: Benteensbattalionwith D, H, and KCompanies (120men);RenosbattalionwithA,G, andMCompanies (175men);CustersbattalionwithC,E,F,I,andLCompanies(221men);andCaptainThomasM.McDougalls augmented company (B)with thepack train (136men).Custer now

detachedBenteen,orderinghimtoscoutsouthwardtodeterminewhethertheIndianswereescapinginthatdirection.AssoonasBenteenconcludedthattheIndianswerenotescaping,hewastorejointhecommandasquicklyaspossible.Meanwhile,CusterandRenocontinuedtheiradvancedownwhatisnowRenoCreek,withCustersbattalionontherightbankandRenosontheleft.

Benteenbeganhisreconnaissanceenthusiastically,butaftercrossingaseriesofridgeswithout finding any trace of the Indians, he concluded that hewasbeingdeliberatelyexcludedfromthefight.Asaresult,helosthisprevioussenseofurgency.Inthemeantime,CusterandRenohadproceededdownRenoCreekuntiltheyunitedontherightbankatalonetepeecontainingthebodyofawarriormortallywoundedintheRosebudfight.Atthetepee,CustersscoutsreportedthattheycouldseetheSiouxponyherdandIndiansrunninginthedistance.At1415,CusterandRenodepartedthelonetepeelocationatatrotandadvancednearly3milestoaflatareabetweenRenoCreekanditsnorthfork.There,moreSiouxwereseen,twoofwhomrodetoahilltogivethealarm.CusternoworderedRenotofollowRenoCreektotheLittleBighorn,fordtheriver,andassaultthefleeingvillageinamountedcharge.CusterpromisedRenothathewouldsupporttheattackwiththeremainderofthecommand.AfterRenosdeparture,CusterbrieflyfollowedRenostrail,reachingthenorthforkofRenoCreekat1500.There,hereceivedaseriesofsurprisingreportsfromRenoindicatingthattheIndianswerenotrunningasexpected.Onceagain,Custerwasforcedtorevisehisplans.


20/51

3500

3500

3500

3500 3

500

3500

3500

3500

35003500

3500

3500

32503250

3250

3250

32503250

37503750

3750

3750

37503750

3750

3750

4000

4000

4250

4250

45004500

RenoRenoCrCreek

eek

No

NoNam

Nam

eeCre

Creeekk

(Valley

(Valley

33))

Valley

Valley

22

Valley

Valley

11Dav

isDav

isCCree

kree

k

Ridge

RidgeBB

Ridge

Ridge

CC

Ridge

RidgeAA

Reno

Reno

Little

Little

Bighorn

Bighorn

RRiver

iver

Custer

Reno CusterX

1400: Main column passes Morass

X

1400: Main columnpasses Morass

1432: Benteen rejoins Custer

Custers Approach to the Little Bighorn26

MilesIndian village Custer and Reno

0 1 2 3

4000 Elevation in Feet Benteen

Lone Tepee No Name Creek & Morass Halt 31415:

oMain column passes Lone Tepee 1205: Main column arrives Halt 31212: Columns separate Halt 2The Flats oScouts report Sioux in Little Bighorn route 1232: Pack train passes through 1007: Main columnValley 1437: Benteen halts at Morass to Halt 3 arrives Halt 2

1445: Boston Custer passes Lone Tepee water horses1020: Lost pack report

1512: Benteen passes Lone Tepee 1437: Boston Custer passes1035: Custer rejoins

1532: Pack Train passes Lone Tepee Morass Custers Decision at Halt 3 1050: Officer call1457:

Custers Decision at the Lone Tepee Columns separate 1145: March resumedoBenteen departs MorassMovement to contact 1200: Crosses divideReno lead (at trot) oPack train arrives Morass

(at walk)Movement to contact 1517: Pack train departs MorassLone TLone epeeTepee Custers Decision at Halt 2

Movement to contact(at walk)

Scouts leadReinforced pack train

N Halt 3Little BighornValley

The Flats

1443: MorassMorassoCuster and Reno vicinity of the FlatsoScouts report village is fleeingo Scouts report village is fleeing

1451: Custer waters horses at North Fork1453: Reno waters horses at Little Bighorn River

3250

3250

Halt 2Halt 240004000Custers Decision at the Flats BenteenBenteen

The DivideThe Divide(Hasty Attack)Reno pursue and bring to battle fleeing villageCuster support Reno

The Flats Benteens AdvanceBenteens GuardAdvance Guard

1501: Scouts and Adjutant Cook report at Ridgeat CRidge C High groundHigh aboveground above

Sioux Attacking Reno the Crows Nestthe Crows Nest

13 MilesCDCCDC

7


21/51

Map 27. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Renos Attack in the Valley, 1500 to 1533

AfterreceivinghisinstructionsandleavingCusterforthelasttime,RenocrossedagaintotheleftbankofRenoCreekandfollowedthestreamtoitsconfluencewiththeLittleBighornwherehebrieflystoppedtowaterthehorses.Fiveminuteslater,RenosbattalionfordedtheLittleBighornanddeployedintoalineacrossthevalley.Forthefirsttime,RenocouldseetheedgeofwhatnowappearedtobeanenormousIndianvillage.

At 1503,Reno ordered hismen to advance down the valley.As their horsesacceleratedtoafasttrot,severalofficersandmenintheadvancinglinecouldseetroopersfromCustersbattaliononthebluffstotheeastbeyondtheLittleBighorn.TheycouldalsoseeaswarmofIndianwarriorsgatheringatthesouthernedgeofthevillage.Atthesametime,RenosIndianscouts,whoinitiallyformedtheleftflankofhisline,veeredwestwardtowardtheIndianponyherdonthebenchabovetheLittleBighorn.TheirtaskwastodriveoffasmuchoftheherdaspossibletopreventtheIndiansescape.At1513,officersandmeninthecharginglineonceagainsawsoldiersonthecrestofthehillacrosstheLittleBighorn.SeveralofRenosmenlatertestifiedthattheycouldclearlyseeCusterwaving his hat to the line of horsemen in the valley.Within a fewminutes,Renoconcludedthat,withoutimmediatesupport,his135-manforcecouldnotattackthroughthevillageandhopetosurvive.

At1518,Renoorderedhismentodismountandformaskirmishline.Oneofeveryfour

troopers

was

designated

to

hold

the

horses.

While

the

horses

were

secured

in

astand

oftimberontherightflankoftheline,theremaining95menspread400yardsacrossthevalleytothelowbluffonthewest.Withinminutes,theentirelinewasunderpressurefromhundredsofwarriorsspillingoutofthevillage.

Meanwhile,ontheothersideoftheriver,Custerwasfacedwithasituationthatimposedachangeofplans.FromtheordershehadgivenReno,itappearsthatCusteroriginallyhadintendedtoreinforceRenoschargeinthevalley.OnbeinginformedthattheIndianswerefightingratherthanrunning,hemayhavefeltheneededtosupportRenobyattackingtheSiouxvillagefromadifferentdirection.WhilehehopedatanymomenttoseeBenteenscommandridingintosight,theurgencyofthesituationmeanthecouldnotwait.Consequently,Custerturnedhisbattalionnorthwesttofollowthebluff

lineontherightbankoftheLittleBighornRiver.Apparently,hewasseekingaccesstotheriverfartherdownstreamtomakeaflankattackonthevillage.

CustersforceclimbedtothecrestofRenoHill,wherehegainedhisfirstglimpseofthevalley.HecouldseeRenoscommandstillmakingitschargeandcouldviewthesouthernedgeofthelargestIndianvillageanyoftheveteransoldiershadeverseen.Infact,thevillagecontainedupto1,000lodgesand7,120people,includingapproximately1,800warriors.ThesightofsomanyfightingwarriorsconvincedCusterthatheneededBenteens command and the extra ammunition on thepack train immediately.HedetachedSergeantDanielKanipetofindMcDougall,commanderofthepacktrain,withthemessagetomovethetrainhurriedlycross-country:Ifpacksgetloose,dontstoptofix them,cut themoff.Comequick.BigIndiancamp,andanaddedpostscriptforBenteen,ifseen,tocomequickly.ButhehadnotimetowaitforBenteenandthepacktrain;hehadtocontinuehistreknorthwest.JustbeyondRenoHill,hedescendedintoCedarCouleestillattemptingtogainaccesstotheriverandhopingthathisapproachwouldbeshieldedfromtheIndiansview.

Halting the command at abend in the coulee,Custer rode to the high groundoverlookingthevalley(possiblySharpshooterHillorWeirPoint)withseveralscoutsincludingMitchBoyerandtheIndianscout,Curly.Fromthehighground,thesmallpartycould

see

that

Renos

command

had

dismounted

and

was

forming

askirmish

line.

If

Renocouldholdhisposition,Custerscommandmightgainenoughtimetobecomeengaged.Fromthehighground,CustercouldalsoseethatCedarCouleejoinedanotherravine(MedicineTailCoulee)whichwould,atlast,givehimaccesstotheriver.

From thehighground, it ismost likely thatCusteralso saw the dustcloudofBenteensbattalionandthepacktraindescendingRenoCreek.HeleftCurlyandBoyeronWeirPointtowatchRenosfightandthenrejoinedhiscommand.Aftersendingatrumpeter,JohnMartin,withanothermessage forBenteen tobring theammunitionpacksforward,heledthecommanddownCedarCouleeandintoMedicineTailCouleetoattack.


22/51

27The Battle of the

Little Bighorn

Renos Attack in the

Valley1500 to 1533

Army Movements

Messenger

Army Scout

Movements

Indian Attacks

Village

Skirmish Line

3450 Feet

3400 Feet

3350 Feet

3300 Feet

3250 Feet

3200 Feet

3150 Feet

3100 Feet

Miles

1/4 1/20


23/51

Map 28. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Losing the Initiative, 1533 to 1553

Inthevalley,Renostrooperswereoutnumberedfivetoone.Threatenedwithbeingflankedandoverwhelmedonhisleft,at1533Renoorderedthelinetowithdrawintothetimber.Inthetrees,Renotriedtoformaperimeterusinganoldriverbankasanaturalbreastwork.However,theareawastoolargeforhissmallcommandtosecure.Inlessthan30minutes,thewarriorsworkedtheirwaythroughthebrushandthreatenedtosurroundRenoscommand.Thetimberwasagooddefensiveposition.However,Renosmost serious concernwas that some of his companieswere also running low onammunition,andtheonlyremainingsupplywaswiththepacktrainsomewheretotherear.Renowasquicklycomingtothedecisionthatheneededtoleavethetimberandfindtherestoftheregiment.

InCedarCoulee,CusterwasunawareofRenosdeterioratingsituation.HisprimaryconcernwastogethisbattalionoffthehighgroundandintothefighttosupportReno.He

more than likelyintendedtoattackdownMedicineTailCoulee into thevillage,thefrontierArmysacceptedtacticofhittingavillagefrommultiplesidestocausesurpriseandpanic.Atapproximately1549,Custerreceivedavaluableupdatefromhisyoungerbrother,BostonCuster.Bostonhadabandonedhisassignmentwiththepacktrainandriddenforwardtojoinhisbrotherforthefight.TheyoungerbrotherwouldhavebeenabletoinformhisbrotherthatthebacktrailwasopenandconfirmthatBenteenhadjoinedCustersroute.Bostonmayalsohavebeenabletoverify thatRenowasstillheavilyengagedinthevalley,aconfirmationforCusterthattherewasstilltimetomoveagainstthevillagesflank.


24/51

28The Battle of the

Little Bighorn

Losing the Initiative

1533 to 1553

Army Movements

Messenger

Army Scout

Movements

Indian Attacks

Village

Army

Defensive

Perimeter

3450 Feet

3400 Feet

3350 Feet

3300 Feet

3250 Feet

3200 Feet

3150 Feet

3100 Feet

Miles

1/4 1/20


25/51

Map 29. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Disaster in the Valley, 1553 to 1627

Renossituationinthevalleywascritical.TheIndiansthreatenedtosurroundRenoandsoonsetthewoodsafire.Inresponse,Renoorderedhismentomountandmoveupstreamwheretheycouldcrosstohighgroundontheeastbank.At1553,Renoledtheretreatoutofthetimber,butthemovementquicklydegeneratedintoarout.Manymendidnotreceivetheorderorwereunabletowithdrawandwereleftinthetimbertofightinsmallpocketsorhideuntiltheycouldescape.ThosewhomadeitoutofthewoodswereforcedtocrosstheLittleBighornatanarrow,deepfordthatcausedthemtocluster.Meanwhile,theIndiansvigorouslypressedtheirattack,inflictingheavycasualtiesonthepanic-strickensoldiersstrugglingtoreachsafetybeyondtheriver.At1610,thefirsttroopsreachedthehillthatwouldlaterbearRenosname.Morethan40deadand13woundedtroopersattestedtothebloodyfightinginthevalley.Seventeenofficersandmenremainedtemporarilyhiddeninthetreeswestoftheriver.

CurlyandBoyer,thescoutsthatCusterleftbehindonthehighground,witnessedRenosdisastrousretreat.Knowingtheimportanceofthisinformation,thetwoscoutsdescendedWeirPointtorendezvouswithCusterscolumn.Custer,havinglearnedfrom

BoyerandCurly thatRenos forcewas inserious trouble,knew thathehad toactimmediately.ApparentlyintendingtodistracttheIndiansathisendofthevillage,Custersplithisbattalionintotwoparts:EandFCompanies(76men)underthecommandofCaptainGeorgeW.YatesandC,I,andLCompanies(134men)underCaptainMylesW.Keogh.HesentYatescommanddownMedicineTailCouleetothefordtomakeafeintagainstthevillage.CusterledtheremainderoftheforceupthenorthsideofMedicineTailCouleetoLuceRidge.Fromthere,KeoghsthreecompaniescouldsupportYatesshouldhegetintoserioustrouble,andatthesametime,CustercouldwaitforBenteens battalionandthepacktrain.

Yatesmadehischarge toward the riverand startled thevillage.Briefly,as theIndiansrecoveredfromtheirsurprise,Yatescommandwasabletofireacrosstheriverrelativelyunopposed.TheIndianssoonrallied,however,andsomebegantopressureYatesfrontallywhileothersascendedMedicineTailCoulee.FromhispositiononLuceRidge,Custersmenpouredaheavyvolleyoffireintotheadvancingwarriors.


26/51

Pack7

Train

1627 29The Battle of the

Little Bighorn

Disaster in the Valley

1553 to 1627

Army Movements

Messenger

Army Scout

Movements

Indian Attacks

Village

3450 Feet

3400 Feet

3350 Feet

3300 Feet

3250 Feet

3200 Feet

3150 Feet

3100 Feet

Miles

1/4 1/2

Tptr. Martin

Meets Benteen BENTEEN

(1558)

1604

1620

1610 Benteen 7

Reno 7 Renos Total Losses:

40 KIA and 13 W

17 Missing

RETREATKeogh FORD(Custer) 7

CUSTER1616

Boyer Update (1604)Boyer Update (1604)

Boyer & Curly

(1553-1558) Retreat to the High Ground

(1553 - 1610) 29 KIA and 5 W

1618

RENOYates 7

0


27/51

Map 30. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Weirs Advance and Reno Hill

Havingsufferedgrievouslossesinthevalley,RenowithdrewhismentothebluffsontheeastbankoftheLittleBighorn.TheSiouxpursuedthembriefly,butby1630,mostofthewarriorshadbrokencontactwithRenoandmovedofftoassistinthefightagainstCustersforce.BenteensbattalionandthepacktrainsoonjoinedRenoatopthebluffs.Fromthere,theycouldhearheavyandcontinuousfiringtothenorth.WhileRenoandBenteenponderedtheirnextmove,CaptainThomasB.Weirinitiatedanadvancebymostofthecommandtoahighpoint1miletothenorthwest.Althoughthisprominence(nowknownasWeirPoint)offeredanexcellentviewofthesurroundingterrain,thecavalrymenlearnedlittleaboutCustersfate.Tothewest,theycouldseethevalleyoftheLittleBighornfilledwithtepees.Tothenorth,theycouldseedistanthillsandridgesshroudedindustwithoccasionalglimpsesofIndiansinthedustcloudridingaboutandfiring.TheydidnotrealizetheywerewitnessingCustersdestruction(seemap31).By1710,mostofthefiringhadceased.NowdustcloudsappearedallovertheareaastheSiouxandCheyennewarriorsconvergedontheremainderofthe7thCavalry.ItappearsthatneitherRenonorBenteenprovidedanyoveralldirection to thecommand; thecompanycommandersdecidedindependentlytofallbacktotheoriginalpositiononthebluffs.LieutenantEdwardGodfrey,commanderofKCompany,sawthedangerofadisorderlyretreatand,onhisowninitiative,actedastherearguard.By1810,RenoandBenteenhadtheirbattalionsbackonthebluffsandhadformedaperimeterdefense.Animalsandwoundedmenweregatheredinacirculardepressioninthecenteroftheposition.TheIndiansrapidlysurroundedthebluecoatsandbeganlong-rangesnipingatRenosmen.Whilevexing, theIndiansfirecausedfewcasualties,and thesoldiersfirepowerstoppedallenemycharges.Darknessfinallystoppedthefightingat2100.WhiletheIndianswithdrewtothevillagetocelebratetheirgreatvictory,thetroopersstrengthenedtheirpositionwithimprovisedtools.

ThefightingatRenoHillwouldpersistforthenext2days.Onthe26ththeIndianscontinued their long-rangesniping,supplementedbyoccasionalcharges.This time,Indianfireinflictedconsiderablymorecasualties.(Onthehill,Renolost48menkilledandwoundedonthe26th,comparedtojust11onthe25th.)ImprovedIndianfiremayhavepersuadedBenteentoconductsomelimitedcounterattacks.SeeingalargebandofIndiansmassingnearthesouthendofhisposition,heledHCompanyinachargethatquicklyscatteredtheattackers.BenteenthenpersuadedRenotoorderageneraladvanceinalldirections.ThisattackalsosucceededindrivingtheIndiansbackandgainedsomerelieffromenemyfire,butthereliefwasonlytemporary.Asthesunroseandthedaygrewwarmer,thelackofwaterbecameaseriousproblem,especiallyforthewoundedmenlyingwithoutcoverinthehotMontanasun.ApleafromDr.HenryR.Porter,the7thCavalrysonly survivingphysician,promptedBenteen to seekvolunteers togo forwater.Coveredbysharpshooters,apartyofsoldiersmadeitswaydownwhatisnowcalledWaterCarriersRavinetotheriverandsucceededinbringingwaterbackforthewounded.

Bylateafternoon, theSiouxandCheyenneappeared tobelosing interestinthebattle.Frustratedbytheirinabilitytofinishoffthebluecoatsandapparentlysatisfiedwithwhattheyhadalreadyaccomplished,theIndiansbegantowithdraw.Whilesomewarriorskeptthesoldierspinneddown,theIndiansinthevalleybrokecampandsettheprairiegrassafiretohinderpursuit.Atapproximately1900,Renosmensawthehugebandmove upriver toward a new campsite in the BighornMountains.Althoughunmolestedfollowing theIndianwithdrawal,Renostayedinhishilltoppositionthenightofthe26th.Thefollowingmorning,TerryscolumnarrivedandinformedRenoandBenteenofCustersfate.


28/51

30The Battle of the

Little Bighorn

Weirs AdvanceWeirs Advance

andandReno HillReno Hill

Army Movements

Army

Defensive

Perimeter

Indian Attacks

Village

3450 Feet

3400 Feet

3350 Feet

3300 Feet

3250 Feet

3200 Feet

3150 Feet3100 Feet

Miles

1/4 1/2

Reno Hill Defensive Perimeter

(1810, 25 June to 1030, 27 June)

Hospital Area

Ammo Arrives(1719, 25 June)B Co & Pack Train

ArriveA, B, G, and pack train Pack

7 (1725, 25 June)march to join Weir Train

(1752, 25 June) A Ammo MulesB 7

McDougallG

D

Reno marches to join Weir7 Water Carriers Ravine

(1740, 25 June)A,B,G K (26 June)

M

B

Benteen marches to join

Weir

(1723, 25 June)

Benteen 7

H, K, MWeir leaves to 25 June 1876

find Custer THE DECISION TO ADVANCED 7 (1705, 25 June) Heavy firing heard in Custers

Weirdirection (1625)

Custer Hill (3 Miles) Reno and Benteen regroup on

Reno Hill (1627-1652) Reno sends courier to speed up

ammo mules (1652) Custer volleys heard (1655)

THE DECISION TO RETREAT Last Heavy Firing Heard from

Custers Fight (1710 1712)

Weir observes end of fight(1725)

Companies see Sioux coming to

attack (1735)

Reno, Benteen, and Co H return

to Reno Hill (1800)

Cos D, M, A, B, G and pack trainreturn to Reno Hill (1802)

Co K arrives at Reno Hill (1810)0


29/51

Map 31. The Battle of the Little Bighorn: Custers Last Stand

AsYatesbegantowithdrawupDeepCoulee,Custersawthenecessityofreunitinghiscommand.WhileYatesascendedDeepCoulee,CusterleftLuceRidgeandcrossedbothNye-CartwrightRidgeandDeepCouleetothereunionpointnearCalhounHill.After the five companies rejoined onCalhounHill, thepressure from the Indiansintensified.Atthispoint,BoyerconvincedCurlytoleavethedoomedcommandwhilehestayedwithCuster.AfterCurlysexit,descriptionsofCustersfightarenecessarilyconjecture.However,theaccountsbyRichardA.Fox,JohnS.Gray,andGregoryF.Michnoofferreasonablehypothesesaboutthebattlefromthispointandarebuttressedby thephysicalevidence: theplacementofbodies, the locationofartifacts, Indiantestimony,andtheterrain.

OneofthemostplausibletheoriesisthatCustercontinuedoffensivemovement,butdelayedmakingadecisivethrustwhilehewaitedforBenteens arrival(seemapA).Tosupportthismaneuver,hepositionedKeoghswing(CompaniesC,I,andL)atCalhounHillasarearguard.Yateswing(CompaniesEandF)thenmaneuveredfurthertothenorth to threaten thenoncombatantswhohadcollectednearSquawCreek.CustersmovementswereinitiallymadewithoutseriousoppositionfromtheSiouxortheirallies;ittooktimeforthewarriorstorepositionfromtheirfightinthesouthagainstRenotothenewthreatatthenorthendofthecamp.

CalhounHillwas agooddefensiveposition.From this dominant location, thesoldiers fire controlled the Indianmovement upDeep Ravine. Lieutenant JamesCalhouns(Custersbrother-in-law)CompanyLandatleastoneplatoonofCompanyCskirmishedwiththeIndiansforabout45minutes.However,thesurroundinggroundwasverybroken,givingtheIndiansamyriadofconcealedapproachesfromwhichtolaunchattacks.Themountingpressureonthesoldiersultimatelyoverwhelmedtherearguardandforcedthesurvivorsoffthehillintheonlyreasonabledirection,northwestalong

whatisnowcalledCusterRidge.KeoghsICompanyoccupiedasupportpositiontotherearofLCompanyandwasprobablyoverrunbeforeitcoulddeploy(seemapB).

Meanwhile,CustersothertwocompaniescontinuedtheattacktowardthevicinityoftheNorthFord(seemapA).Custerprobablyaimedatcorrallingalargenumberofthenoncombatants thatwouldhavecaused thewarriors toholdback infearofcausingfurtherthreattotheirwomenandchildren.AlthoughthenumberofwarriorsopposingYatesbattalion,atfirst,wasnotsignificant,itappearsfromIndianaccountsthattheywereuncharacteristicallyaggressive.Insteadoffightingarearguardandshepherdingtheirfamiliesoutofharmsway,theymaneuveredagainstYatesbattalion.Morethanlikely,CusterdecidedthathistwosmallcompanieswereinsufficienttoovercomethelargenumberofnoncombatantsandturnedbacktolinkupwithKeoghswingtowaitforBenteen.

YateswingfoughtaseriesofrearguardactionsbackupCemeteryRidgetowardCustersHillagainstincreasingpressureasmorewarriorsabandonedthefightagainstRenoandmovednorthtoopposeCuster.ItappearsthatthecollapseoftheCalhounHillpositioncausedasimilardisintegrationofYateswing.ThemajorityoftheremainingsoldiersincompaniesEandFretreatedtoLastStandHill(seemapB).AsmallnumberofsurvivorsfromKeoghswingjoinedthem,butagainstsuchenormousoddsnoamountofgallantrycouldhavesavedthecommand.AstheIndiansswarmedaboutCusterssmallforce,theintensepressureforcedsomeofthementowithdrawsouthwesttowardDeepRavine,formingwhathasbeencalledthesouthskirmishline.Fromthere,thefewremaining troopers fled in isolation andwere cut down, oneby one, until no oneremainedalive.Custersbattlewasover,butthelegendofCusterslaststandwasonlybeginning.


30/51

CusterR

idge

g

CemeteryRid e

The Battle of the Army Movements Map BWhere They Fell

Little Bighorn Indian Attacks2000 Feet 31Indian Noncombatants Custer and Staff

Custers Last Stand Village Company F LAST STAND HILLCusters Force

Collapses

(17201750)1750)

Companies I and C

Company E

DEEP CALHOUN HILLRAVINE

Company LPortion Company C


31/51

Map 32. The Sioux Dispersal, JulySeptember 1876

News ofCusters debacle at theLittleBighornparalyzedCrooks andTerryscolumnsforoveramonth.ThegreatSiouxcampdispersedshortlyafterthebattle.MostofthebandswithdrewtothesouthwesttowardtheBighornMountains,satisfiedwiththeirgreatvictory.Afterafewweeksofcelebrationinthemountains,themajorbandsheadednortheastonto theplains.SittingBullsband traveledtothenortheast,LongDogspeopleeventuallymovednorthwest,andCrazyHorsespeoplereturnedeastwardtotheBlackHills.

WiththepossibleexceptionofCrazyHorsesband,whichlaunchedafewsmall-scaleraidsagainstminersintheBlackHills,theSiouxandCheyenneappearedtohavelittle interest in continuing the fight. Most of the Indians assumed that theiroverwhelmingvictoryoverCusterwouldcausetheArmytogiveupthecampaignatleastforatime.TheinactivityofCrookandTerryfollowingthebattleseemedtosupportthisview.Ofcourse,thedisasterattheLittleBighornwouldhavepreciselytheoppositeeffectontheUSArmysintentions.

BothCrookandTerrycalled forand receivedsubstantial reinforcements.TheyfinallygotunderwayagaininearlyAugust,butonlyafterIndiantrailsintheirrespectivevicinitieshadagedamonthormore.On10August,thetwoforcesmetalongthebanksofRosebudCreek,afterinitiallymistakingeachotherfortheenemy.Thetwocommanderscombined theiralreadyponderous columns into a single expedition andproceedednortheastdowntheTongueRiverValley.ThishugehostquicklyexhausteditsrationsandhaltedalongthePowderRivertoawaitadditionalsupplies.

Withtheircommandspartiallyre-supplied,thetwocommanderscouldnotagreeonhownexttoproceedandworkedoutaroughcomprise.Basically,TerrywouldfollowtheIndiansmovingnorthdeeperintohisDepartmentofDakota,andCrookwouldfollow

thoseIndiansmostlikelytoturnsouthtowardhisDepartmentofthePlatte.Crooksetoutdueeaston22Augustinonelastattempttosalvagesomethingfromthecampaign.By8September,Crookhadsucceededonlyinexhaustingandnearlystarvinghistroopers.Butonthemorningof9September,asmalldetachmentcommandedbyCaptainAnsonMillsfoundasmallIndianvillageatSlimButtesandpromptlyattackedit(seemapB).Millstroopers inflictedfewcasualties,butsucceededincapturingthecampandasmallbutwelcomesupplyofbuffalomeat.Thatafternoon,600to800warriorsfromCrazyHorsesbandcounterattackedCrooksnowconsolidatedforceofabout2,000effectives.Althoughbadlyoutnumbered,theSiouxoccupiedthehighgroundandfoughtCrooksexhaustedmentoastandstill.Followingthisinconclusiveengagement,CrookmadenoefforttopursuetheIndiansbutconcentratedsolelyongettinghiscommandbacktoaregularsupplysource.On13September,CrookfinallyobtainedsuppliesfromCrookCityintheBlackHills,endinghismensordeal.Meanwhile,TerrysforceproceedednorthtotheYellowstone,pursuinganothercoldtrail.TerryencounterednoIndiansandquicklygaveupthechase.AdetachmentunderRenobrieflypursuedLongDogsbandnorthoftheMissouri,butsoonabandonedtheeffortandproceededtoFortBuford.

Perhapsthemostimportantdevelopmentsofthecampaigntookplacefarfromthesceneofaction.ShockedbynewsoftheBattleoftheLittleBighorn,CongresspassedtheSiouxappropriationbill,which forced theSioux tocede their remaining landsandwithdraw

to

aspecified

reservation

on

the

west

bank

of

the

Missouri.

At

the

same

time,

SheridandealtharshlywiththeagencyIndians,confiscatingalloftheirweaponsandponies.Withoutgunsorhorses,theagencyIndianscouldnolongerreinforcethehostilebands.

FT PECK FT BUFORD


32/51

Misso

MissouurriiR

ivRiveerr

HeartHeartRRiiver

ver

Sheyenne

SheyenneRive

Riverr

Musse

Musselshelshel

lllRRii

verver

YYeello

wstone

llows

tone

Riv

Rivee

rr

LLiittttle

le Bi

Big

hg

hor

orn

nRRiv

e r

iv e r ToTo

ngngueue

BiBigh

orgh

ornn

RRiivverer

Little

Little

PPoowder

wderRRiiver

ver

Roseb

Roseb

uuddCCreeree

kk

LLiittttleleMMiissssoouurriiRRiviveerr JamesJames

RiRiverver

OtOttteerrCCrreeekek

Po

Powd

wderer

River

River

Win

WinddRiver

River

Belle

Belle

FourcheFourche

River

River

CannonCannonbballallRRiveriver

Missour

MissouriiRRiviverer

B

i

B

ighor

ghorn

nMMoun

ountain

s

tains

c cR. R.

NorthernPa ifi

Rock

Rockyy

MMoun

ountai

tainnss

FT PEASE

TERRITORYTERRITORY

3100

Feet3075Feet

3225

Feet

3200

Feet

3275

Feet

3250Feet

3050Feet

3025Feet

3000Feet

FT PECK FT BUFORD

Map AMap A Devils LakeFT BENTONReservationMissouri RiverMissouriRiver

FT TF T OTT ENTOTTENSun River

32LONG DOGFT SHAWSITTING BULL

MONTANAMONTANA Bismarck

TERRYTERRYFT ABRAHAM LINCOLN

CAMP BAKERCAMPBAKER FT RICE

(Abandoned)DAKOTA

TERRITORYStanding

Rock

Agency

NGrand River

Bozeman 10 August

CRAZYFT ELLISCrow FT CF SMITH

HORSE(Abandoned)Virginia AgencyCity

Moreau River

Cheyenne River Agency

Powd

erRiver

Powd

erRiver

Crook

SITTING BULL CityBlackFT PHIL KEARNYCRAZY HORSE Hills(Abandoned)

Battle of Slim ButtesLONG DOG Crooks column reinforces Mills at noon9 September

MilesCROOK

0 1/4 1/2IDAHO

TERRITORY 3 US3 US Mills early morning attack NorthMillsMills

PonyHerd

The Sioux Dispersal Crooksafternoon

JulySeptember 1876 attacksFT FETTERMAN Gap Creek Fleeing

Crooks Column IndiansSiegeLaramie MountLaramie ainsMountains

RavineTerrys Column

Indian Movement WYOMINGWYOMINGTERRITORTERRIT YORY

Indian FightsCrazy Horse counterattacks

Miles Map B late afternoonCDC

0 50 100 150


33/51

Map 33. The Battles of Cedar Creek and Dull Knife, OctoberNovember 1876

WhileCrookandTerrynolongerpursuedtheIndians,ColonelNelsonA.Miles,commanderofthe5thInfantryRegiment,establishedacantonmentatthemouthoftheTongueRiverand,inaccordancewithorders,continuedoperationsagainsttheSioux.InearlyOctober,a largecoalitionofHunkpapa,Miniconjou,andSansArcunder thedirectionofSittingBullmovedwestfrom theLittleMissouriRiverValley into theregionbetweentheGlendiveandTongueRiverCantonments.On11and15October,theyskirmishedwithMilessupplytrainsinthevicinityofSpringCreek.Soonaftertheskirmish,MilesgainedintelligenceonSittingBullsmovementsandmarchednortheastwiththe5thInfantry,approximately500strong,tointercepttheSioux.HisfootsoldiersmarchedhardandovertooktheSiouxneartheheadwatersofCedarCreekon20October.Thatday,andthenext,MilesandSittingBullnegotiatedbetweenthelines.SittingBulldemanded thatallwhitemen leave the region,andMilesdemanded that theSiouxsurrenderandreporttotheagencyneitherwaswillingtocompromise.MilesbrokeoffthenegotiationswhentheSiouxbegantobreakdowntheirvillageandmoveaway(seemapB).Atfirst,bothsidesmaneuveredwithoutshotsbeingfired,butwhentheIndianssetfiretotheprairiegrasstoscreenthevillagesmovement,thesoldiersopenedfire.Approximately400to600warriorsattemptedtodelaythesoldiers.However,thesteadyadvanceofthesoldiersforcedthevillageintoahastywithdrawalandtheabandonmentofsignificantquantitiesofcampequipmentandsupplies.

Milespursued the village for two days. During the Indian retreat, the largeencampmentbrokeintotwogroups.SittingBull,withanestimated240peopleand30lodges, headed north, and another 200 ormore lodges retreated south toward the

YellowstoneRiver.Miles caught upwith the large group on 27October. SeveralMiniconjouandSansArcchiefsnegotiatedasurrenderwithMiles.Inthelongrun,onlyabout40lodgesactuallyreportedtotheagency;theremaindermovedupthePowderRiverandjoinedwithCrazyHorsesband.ThoughdisappointedthathehadfailedtocaptureSittingBull,MileshadseverelydamagedSittingBullsIndiancoalition.

WhileMiles

harassed

the

northern

bands

with

only

500

men,

Crook

launched

a

massiveexpeditionfromFortFettermanon14November.Hislargecolumnincludedelementsof the2d,3d,4th,and5thCavalry,and4th,9th,14th,and25th Infantry.Altogether,Crookhadabout1,500Regulars,400Indianscouts,andabout300civiliansresponsiblefor168supplywagonsand400packmules.On22November,hisscoutslocatedalargeCheyennevillageatthebaseoftheBighornMountains.TheprincipalchiefsofthevillagewereDullKnifeandLittleWolf,withabout200lodgesand400warriors.CrookorderedColonelRanaldMackenzietotakeallthescoutsand10troopsofcavalry,about1,100men,andmakeastrikeforthevillage.On24November,thedetachmentmadeadifficultnightapproachmarchandattackedearlyonthemorningof25November,achievingcompletesurprise(seemapC).TheCheyennefledfortheirlives, leaving theirponies, tepees, and food.Having exposed theCheyenne to theelements,CrookreturnedtoFortFettermanandletfreezingtemperaturesandstarvationfinishthejobofsubduingthehostiles.DespitetheseriouslossesattheDullKnifebattle,theCheyennerefusedtogiveupthefightandstrugglednorthtojoinwithCrazyHorsesbandofSioux.ItwouldnowbeuptoMilestofinishthecampaign.

FT PECK


34/51

MissouriRiver

FT RENO

(Abandoned)

FT PHIL KEARNY(Abandoned)

FT PEASE

(Abandoned)

FT BUFORDFT PECK

MONTANA

TERRITORY

Missouri

River

MusselshellRiver

Yellowstone River

Little

Big

hornRiv e r

PowderRiver

Little

Pow

derRiver

Rosebud

Creek

Black Hills

LittleMissouri

OtterCreek

Powder

River

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

Grand River

Cannonball

FT CF SMITH

(Abandoned)

Deadwood

Crook

City

Tong

ueRiv

er

TONGUE RIVER

CANTONMENT

GLENDIVE

CANTONMENT

Bighorn

CANTONMENT

MILES

11 and 15 October 1876

(Spring Creek)

Map A

MissouriRiver

FT FETTERMAN

MONTANA

TERRITORY

Red Cloud Agency

Spotted

Tail

Agency

Missouri

River

MusselshellRiver

Little

Big

hornRiv e r

PowderRiver

Bigh

orn

River

Bigh

orn

River

Little

Pow

derRiver

Rosebud

Creek

BlackHills

LittleMissouri

OtterCreek

Powder

River

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

GrandRiver

Cannonball

Deadwood

CROOK

Crook

City

Tong

ueRiv

er

Bighorn

Mountains

Bighorn

Mountains

GLENDIVE

CANTONMENT

MILES

SITTING BULL

Miles

Crook

Indian Fights

Miles

Crook

Indian Fights

Miles

Crook

Indian Fights

Miles

1501500 50 100 150

The Battles of Cedar Creek and Dull KnifeOctoberNovember 1876

N

11 and 15 October 1876

(Spring Creek)

North

SCTSCT

6000Feet

5750Feet

6250Feet

6750Feet

6500Feet

5500Feet

SCTSCT

SCTSCT

GordonGordon

MauckMauck

Route of Cheyennewithdrawal

The Dull Knife Battle25 November 1876

0 1/4 1/2

Miles

0 1/4 1/2

Miles

RedFork

Powder River

Cheyenne

rearguardfight

Map C

Routes of Indianscout attacks

Route of cavalryattacks

FleeingCheyenne

x00 Feet

Battle of

Cedar Creek21 October 1876

0 1/2 1 NorthNorth

3200

Feet

3150

Feet

3250

Feet

3300

Feet

3100

Feet

3050

Feet

3000

Feet

EastF

orkCedar

Creek

Sitting Bulls

Village

5A 5A

5B 5B

5C 5C

5I 5I

5K 5K5E 5E

5F 5F

5H 5H

5G 5G

5D 5D

Route of Sioux

withdrawal

Army

pursuit

Map B

33Miles

Army attacks

Sioux delayingactions

Sioux delaying

actions


35/51

Map 34. The Fort Peck Expedition, NovemberDecember 1876

Miles,duringtheCedarCreeknegotiationswithSittingBull(2021October),hadwarnedtheSiouxthathewouldcontinuethecampaignagainstthemthroughthewinteriftheydidnotsurrender.Holdingtruetohisword,Milesmaintainedhischaseofthenorthward-bound Siouxwith steadfast determination. Setting out on 5November,MilestroopsbeganasearchfortheremnantsofSittingBullsband in theexpansebetweentheYellowstoneandMissouriRivers.Unlikeotherunits,thesoldiersofthe5thInfantrywerethoroughlyconditionedandequippedfortheirwintercampaignontheharshNorthernPlains.MilesmarchednorthtoFortPeckontheMissouriRiverbutfailedtofindtheelusiveSittingBull.

AtFortPeck,Milesre-suppliedhiscommandandmadepreparationstocontinuethewintercampaign.Hedividedhiscommandintothreecolumnsandproceededtocombthe countryside again.On 7December, a detachment under Lieutenant FrankD.Baldwin,operating underextremewinter conditions, locateda recently abandonedIndiancamponPorcupineCreekanddesperatelysoughttocatchthefleeingSioux.HeneededtocatchthembeforetheycouldcrossthefrozenMissouriRivertothesouthbank.NearBarkCreek,BaldwinsinfantryclosedwiththeSiouxandskirmishedwiththeIndianrearguardjustminutesaftertheirfamilieshadcrossedtheriver.TheskirmishwithSittingBullswarriorscontinuedforseveralhours,and,atonepoint,Baldwinevenpushed one company across theMissouriRiver.However, the grueling chase andexcessivecoldhadexhaustedBaldwinssoldiersandhedecidedtoreturntoFortPeckforsupplies.AlthoughBaldwinhad failed todefeatSittingBull,hehad forced the

Indians into a continuing movement that was fatiguing the Indian families andexhaustingtheIndianponies.

ThetenaciousBaldwinre-suppliedhissmallcommandofabout150menatFortPeckandthenbegancollectinginformationfromreservationIndiansonSittingBullslocation.On10December,helearnedthatSittingBullwaslocatedtothesoutheast,moving

toward

the

Yellowstone

River.

He

sent

word

to

Miles

and

then

mobilized

his

troopstoresumethechase.Thedeepsnow,roughterrain,andbittercoldtookitstollonBaldwins troops;at timesup to40menwere riding in thewagonssuffering fromexhaustionand frostbite.On18December,atabout1300,BaldwincaughtupwithSittingBullsvillagecampedalongAshCreek (seemapB).Thevillagecontainedapproximately122lodgesandcouldhavefieldedasmanyas240warriors.However,mostofthewarriorswereouthunting,andBaldwins threesmallinfantrycompaniesinamatterofminutesoverrantheentirevillage,capturingmostofthecampequipageand60ponies.

Baldwinre-outfittedhismenfromthevillagesupplies,burnedwhathecouldnotcarry,andthenmadethedifficultmarchtotheTongueRiverCantonment.SittingBullspeopleweredestitute.Theyhadlostmostoftheirlodgesandthemajorityoftheirwinterfood supply.The Indians hadalso lostabout20percentof theirponies, and thoseremainingweredyingofhunger.ToescapeMilesandhisinexhaustiblewalkheaps,SittingBullandLongDogwouldeventuallyleadtheirpeopleintoCanada.

MFT BUFORDFT PECK M


36/51

MissouriRive

r

FT RENO(Abandoned)

Missouri

River

HeartRiver

Little

BighornRiv e r

PowderRiver

Little

PowderRiver

Rosebud

Creek

LittleMissouri

OtterCreek

Powder

River

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

Grand River

CannonballRiver

FT CF SMITH(Abandoned)

Tong

ueRiv

er

TONGUE RIVER

GLENDIVECANTONMENT

Bighorn

CANTONMENT

Map A

MissouriRive

r

FT FETTERMAN

FT BUFORD

NEBRASKA

SpottedTail

Agency

Missouri

River

HeartRiver

Little

BighornRiv e r

PowderRiver

Bigh

orn

River

Little

PowderRiver

Rosebud

Creek

Black Hills

LittleMissouri

OtterCreek

Powder

River

FT MCPHERSON

Moreau River

BelleFourcheRiver

Cheyen

neRive

r

GrandRiver

CannonballRiver

FTCF SMITH(Abandoned)

Deadwood

Crook

City

Tong

ueRiv

er

Bigh

orn

Bigh

orn

Mountains

Mountains

GLENDIVECANTONMENT

The Fort Peck ExpeditionNovemberDecember 1876

0 50 100 150

Miles

Miles

Indian Fights

N

MONTANA

TERRITORYMusselshellRiver

MusselshellRiver

FT PEASE(Abandoned) Yellowstone River

CANTONMENT

FT PHIL KEARNY(Abandoned)

7 December 1876

(Bark Creek)

Sitting BullsVillage

5

Baldwin

Sioux Fleeing

s

Baldwins attack

As hC

r e

e k

AshCreek

NorthNorth

3100Feet

3150Feet

3050

Feet

Battle of

Ash Creek18 December 1876

Miles

Battle of

Ash Creek18 December 1876

0 1/4 1/2

Miles

34

Map B

3000Feet

2950Feet

Baldwinsadvance


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Map 35. Final Actions, JanuaryMay 1877

HavingknockedSittingBullandthoseIndianbandsnorthoftheYellowstoneRiveroutofthewar,MilescouldnowredirecthisattentiontowardCrazyHorseandthebandssouthoftheYellowstone.Ironically,earlierinDecember,thesesamebandshadbecomediscouragedbecauseoftheharshweatherandthedefeatoftheCheyenneattheDullKnifebattleandwereactuallyconsideringsurrender.However,Crowscoutsmurderedtheirpeacedelegationastheywereapproaching theTongueRiverCantonment,andCrazyHorseusedtheincidenttoemboldenhispeopletocontinuetheirresistance.Thewarchiefinitiatedanactivecampaignofharassmentagainstthecantonmenttolurethesoldiersintoachase.HisplanwastolureMilesuptheTongueRivervalleyandambushhiscolumn.On29December,MilesacceptedthechallengeandmarcheduptheTongueRivervalleytomakeastrikeagainstCrazyHorsesvillage.Heestimatedthatthevillage,reinforcedwith the refugees from theDullKnife fight, numberedpossibly 3,000inhabitantswithmaybe600to800warriors.MilesfoughtseveralskirmisheswiththeSiouxinhismarchuptheTongueRiverandopenlyacknowledgedthattheIndiansweretrying to lure him into an ambush.Nevertheless, he was confident that his 350disciplined infantrycouldovercome theoddsagainst them.On7January1877,hisscoutscapturedasmallgroupofCheyennewomenandchildren.HeencampedhismenthatnightnearaprominentbuttefullyexpectingtheSiouxtoattackthenextday.Thenextmorning,with three feet of snow on the ground,CrazyHorse attackedwithapproximately500 to600SiouxandCheyennewarriors (seemapB).CrazyHorseneededamajorvictorytoencouragehisdisheartenedpeople.Bothsidesmaneuveredtogaintheadvantage,andMilesusedhisartillerytobreakuptheconcentrationofwarriors.Blizzard-like conditions hampered visibility, and, aswithmost Indianwarbattles,

casualtieswerelight.Steadilyworseningweatherforcedbothsidestobreakcontactatmidday.TheSiouxretreatedtotheirvillage20milestothesouth,andMilesreturnedtotheTongueRiverCantonment.TheBattleoftheButtewasCrazyHorseslastbattle,andhe had failed to deliver the victory hispeople needed.MilesandCrook spent theremainder of thewinter sendingmessengers to Crazy Horse topersuade him tosurrender.AlthoughCrazyHorseandhisbandheldoutuntilspring,starvationandexposurecausedmanySiouxtodriftbacktotheagencies.

InlateApril1877,aSiouxchiefnamedLameDeervowednevertosurrender.Heandhisbandwith51MiniconjoulodgesseparatedfromCrazyHorseandmovednorthtohuntbuffalo.Havingbeenreinforcedwithelementsofthe2dCavalry,MileslearnedofLameDeersmovementandagainmobilizedhisforcesforthechase.Ironically,Milescolumn containedmanyprominent Sioux and Cheyenne warriors, who had onlyrecentlysurrenderedandwerenowservingasscoutsfortheArmy.MilesscoutsfoundLameDeersvillageonatributaryofRosebudCreekandMileslaunchedasurpriseattackearlyinthemorningon7May1877,inflictingacrushingdefeatontheIndians(seemapC).Histroopscapturednearly500poniesandsome30tonsofmeatandkilledat least 14warriors includingLameDeer himself.CrazyHorse and hisband hadsurrendered thedaybefore theLameDeerFight.Even thoughSittingBullandhisfollowersmanagedtosurviveinCanadaforatimeanddidnotfinallysurrenderuntil19July1881,theGreatSiouxWarwasover;alltheSiouxwithintheUnitedStateswerenowconfinedtothereservation.

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Final ActionsN JanuaryMay 1877

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IV. Wounded Knee, 1890

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Map 36. The Ghost Dance

In the late 1880s the Western Plains tribes grew increasingly discouraged over theirconfinement to the reservations and the disappearance of their traditional cultures. APaiute prophet named Wovoka delivered a message of hope that prophesied of a futurefree from the influence of the white man. He preached a philosophy of nonviolence andpromised that the Great Spirit would bring back the buffalo. His followers danced a slowshuffling dance that invited the return to life of dead Indians; thus, it became known as

the Ghost Dance.

The once powerful Teton Sioux, who had dominated the northern plains from 1850to 1876, were especially bitter and discouraged. They had lost all access to the UncededTerritory which became the states of Montana (1889) and Wyoming (1890). Their GreatSioux Reservation (see map 13) had been broken into several smaller reservations andthey now laid claim to less than half of what they had controlled in 1876. Militant leadersamong the Teton Sioux capitalized on their peoples discontent and the generalacceptance of the Ghost Dance to preach a violent overthrow of the white man. They alsopromised that sacred ghost shirts would protect them from the soldiers bullets.Government officials feared an impending uprising on both the Pine Ridge and theRosebud Reservations. Nearby settlements demanded that theArmy provide protection.Therefore, President Benjamin Harrison ordered the War Department to contain thesituation and position troops at agencies. The Army in turn used railroads to move unitsto the region from posts scattered across the nation; a major deployment that included

elements of the 1st, 2d, 7th, and 8th Infantry, and the 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th Cavalry.

The Sioux were at odds among themselves over how to proceed and divided into twofactions. The friendlies wanted no trouble, and the hostiles (or militants) preached that

the whites must be driven from Indian land. In December 1890, some of the hostile ghostdancers gathered in the northwest corner of the Pine Ridge Reservation. They numberedapproximately 500 to 600 men, women, and children. Bands of threatening Sioux alsobegan to be identified on other reservations. Notably, Sitting Bull, at the Standing RockReservation, and Big Foot, at the Cheyenne River Reservation, refused to cooperatewith agency officials.

Major General Nelson A. Miles, now commander of the Military Division of theMissouri, hoped to avoid violence and initiated negotiations with the Pine Ridgemilitants. He also ordered the arrest of Big Foot and S itting Bull to contain the spread ofmilitant activity on the northern reservations. However, the death of Sitting Bull, killedby Indian policemen attempting to arrest him, further inflamed the situation. Themilitants at the Pine Ridge Reservation were more emboldened than ever to resist.Without their leader, the majority of Sitting Bulls Hunkpapa band abandoned themilitant cause, but a few joined with Big Foot.

Though previously aligned with the militants, over time Big Foot came to recognizethe futility of any armed struggle and began to build a reputation as a peacemaker amongthe other bands and local Army commanders. The friendlies at Pine Ridge Reservationasked him to come to Pine Ridge to help calm the situation. Big Foot and his band usedthe cover of night and quietly slipped away for Pine Ridge. Unfortunately, Miles failed

to recognize Big Foot as an emissary for the fr iendlies on his way to mollify the hostilityat Pine Ridge. Mistaking him, instead, as an advocate for the militants, Miles tookpersonal charge of the situation and directed the 6th and 9th Cavalry to block Big Footsmovement to Pine Ridge.

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36The Ghost Dance


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NEBRASKA

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North Platte River

Rapid City

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Documents

Military History Map of 1854-1890 - Atlas of the Sioux Wars, Part 2