Murdoch on the Sovereignty of Good 2

volume13,no.1 january2013

How Are Thick

Terms Evaluative?

Brent G. KyleUnited States Air Force Academy

© 2013 BrentG.KyleThis work is licensed under a Creative Commons

Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 3.0 License. <www.philosophersimprint.org/013001/>

I. Introduction.

Many influential ethicists of the twentieth century turned theirattention to thick concepts, like courageous, dishonest, and generous (Murdoch1971;Foot1958;Hursthouse1995).Someethicistsevenurgedustostopfocusingasmuchonthinconcepts,likegoodandwrong,andtoexpandor shiftourattention towards the thick (Anscombe1958;Williams1985;Lovibond1983;Platts1979).Butwhatisthesupposedsignificance of thick concepts? Very briefly, thick concepts are saidto combine descriptive and evaluative elements and have therebyprovidedfocalpointsforaclusterofrelatedissues,suchaswhetherthereisafact-valuegap,whetherevaluativelanguageistruth-apt,andwhethertheevaluativecanbereducedtothedescriptive.

Butcriticshaverespondedbydownplayingtheimportanceofthickconcepts within ethics, and they’ve done so by arguing that thickconceptsarenotgenuinelyevaluative(Brower1988)or,similarly,thatthick terms do not express evaluative meanings (Blackburn 1992).SimonBlackburn, forexample,hasdeclared that thick terms“areofnogreat importanceto thetheoryofethics”,andhehasdonesobyarguingthatsuchtermsdonothaveevaluativemeanings(1992,285).

Contrary to thisskepticism, I shallargue that thick terms indeedhaveevaluativemeanings (section II). I call this theSemanticView.Proponents of this view have provided very little argumentativesupport in its favor. But an argument is certainlyneeded, since theSemantic View is by nomeans obvious and has been attacked onmanyoccasions(e. g.,Blackburn1992;Brower1988;Väyrynen2009).Although space prohibits discussion of all of these attacks, I shalldefendtheSemanticViewagainstPekkaVäyrynen’srecentchallengearisingfromobjectionablethickconcepts(sectionIII).

WhatexactlyisatissuebetweenthosewhoaffirmandthosewhodenytheSemanticView?Mostethicistsarewillingtograntthatthickterms are somehow associated with evaluations, but they tend todisagreeaboutwhatexactlythisrelationshipis.Theissuefordebateisnotwhetherbuthowthicktermsareassociatedwithevaluations.Forexample,isathickterm’sevaluationpragmaticallyassociatedwithit?

ImprintPhilosophers’

brentg.kyle How Are Thick Terms Evaluative?

philosophers’imprint –2– vol.13,no.1(january2013)

In the next section, I advancemy positive argument for this claim.TheparentheticalqualificationwithintheSemanticView—i. e.,“Manythickconcepts(ifnotall)…”—willbeexplainedinduecourse(sectionII.5).InsectionIII,Itakeuptheissueofobjectionablethickconcepts.

II. An Argument for the Semantic View.

II.1 Good and Bad in a WayMy argument for the Semantic View is an inference to the bestexplanationofcertain linguisticdata.Afterpresenting thisdata (II.1andII.2),IproposeaninstanceoftheSemanticViewasmyfavoredexplanation (II.3) and then proceed to reject various alternativeexplanationsofthatdata(II.4).

Thelinguisticdatainquestioncruciallyinvolvestwothinevaluativeconcepts—namelytheconceptsgood in a wayandbad in a way.Theseconcepts are often employed in ordinary conversation. Supposeyou’reultimatelyagainstthenewhealthcarebill,butyounonethelessbelieveithascertainmerits.Inthiscase,youmightdefenditagainstanuncharitableattackbysaying

You’rerightthatthebillshouldberepealed.ButIwanttopointoutthatitisgoodina way—itwilllowerinsurancecostsinthelongrun.

Heretheconceptgood in a wayisemployedinaratherordinaryway;similarthingscanbesaidforbad in a way.Inwhatfollows,Iwillinquireintoexactlyhowtheseconceptsarerelatedtothethick.

Manythicktermsseemtobearacloserelationshiptoeithergood in a wayorbad in a way.2 Butit’snotobviouswhatexactlythisrelationshipis.Attheveryleast,itseemsthatthetypicalutteranceofmanythick

adoptthepermissivepolicyoftakingallsemanticandpragmaticrelationsasgenerallyacceptable.

2. Apossibleexception,involvingmultivalentthickterms(e. g.,‘eccentric’and‘kinky’),isdiscussedinsectionII.5.

Oristheevaluationsemanticallyassociatedwithit?TheviewIshalladvanceisaspecificversionofthelatter.

Justhowisthissemanticrelationshiptobecharacterized?Onewayto formulate the SemanticView is to say that sentences containingthicktermshaveevaluativetruth-conditions.Or,similarly,wemightsay that thick concepts conceptually, analytically, or semanticallyentail evaluative contents. It makes little difference which of theseformulationswechoose.So,Ishallfixonthefollowing:

Semantic View: Many thick concepts (if not all)conceptuallyentailevaluativecontents.1

1. Twoassumptionsoughttobeaddressedbriefly.First,theSemanticViewas-sumesthereisasuitablewayofdistinguishingbetweenevaluativeandnon-evaluativecontent.Butphilosophers likeFoot,Murdoch,andWilliamsarecommonlybelievedtohaveusedthickconceptstounderminesuchadistinc-tion (seeMillgram1995 fordoubtsabout this attribution).Nevertheless, itwillmakenodifferencetothesubstanceofmyargumentwhetherweacceptthisdistinction.TheSemanticViewcanbereformulatedinawaythatdoesnotassumeadistinctionbetweenevaluativeandnon-evaluativecontent:

ModifiedSemanticView:Manythickconcepts(ifnotall)conceptuallyentailthecontentsexpressedbythinterms.

Thethick/thinterminologyistypicallyacceptedbythosewhorejectthedis-tinction between evaluative and non-evaluative content (e. g., see Jackson1998,135–36,andWilliams1995,240).Inprinciple,itshouldbepossibletodrawadistinctionbetweensuchtermswithoutcommittingtoadistinctiononthelevelofcontent.MyargumentsinthispaperwillsupporttheModifiedSemanticView just as effectively as they support theoriginal formulation.Thus, itwillmakenodifferenceto thesubstanceofmyargumentwhetherweacceptadistinctionbetweenevaluativeandnon-evaluativecontent,sincethereisasuitablereformulationoftheSemanticViewthatdoesnotrelyonanysuchdistinction.

And second, the Semantic View also assumes a controversial rela-tion—conceptualentailment.Inthispaper,Idonotdefendthisrelation,butIalsodonotrelyonanyoftheweightierassumptionsthatareoftenassociatedwithit—e. g.,thatitisbestunderstoodintermsofsynonymy,orthatconcep-tual truths are an epistemologically privileged class (seeWilliamson 2007,48–133,forarecentcriticalsurvey).Furthermore,it’sworthemphasizingthattherearealsoskepticsaboutnearlyallofthelinguisticrelationsappealedtobyalternativeviews.Manyhave tried to reduceoreliminate relations likeconventional implicature(Bach1999)andpresupposition(AtlasandLevin-son1981;Wilson1975).Nevertheless,forthepurposesofthispaper,Ishall



problemwith the present explanation. The connectionbetween (1)and(2)isneitherreinforceablenorcancelable.

Let’s begin with reinforceability. The basic idea is thatconversational implicatures can normally bemade explicit withoutawkward redundancy (Sadock 1978, 295). I can reinforce the aboveimplicaturebysaying ’Somestudentsattended,butnotall‘,andthisdoesnotsoundodd.Butnothingsimilar is true for therelationshipbetween(1)and(2).Considerthefollowingattempt:

(3) ?Nancyisgenerous{and/but}she’sgoodinaway.3 This soundsawkwardand redundant.So, it seemsunlikely that theconnectionbetween(1)and(2)isreinforceable.

The second main feature of conversational implicature iscancelability(Grice1989,44).Intypicalcontexts,thefactthatIutter‘Some students attended’ gives you reason to conclude that I alsomeantoconvey ‘Notallstudentsattended.’But this implicaturecanbecanceled—inothercontexts,youmayhavenoreasontodrawthisconclusion.SupposeIsay,‘Somestudentsattended;infact,allofthemdid.’ Inthiscase,myadditionof ‘infact,allofthemdid’cancelstheimplicature associatedwith the first part. Andmy utterance seemsnormal. But again, nothing similar is true regarding the connectionbetween(1)and(2).Consideranattemptatcancelationthatparallelstheaboveexample:

(4) #Nancyisgenerous;infact,she’snotgoodinanyway.

This sentence seems highly odd, unlike the previous exampleof cancelation. So, although (1) implies (2) in some sense, thisrelationship appears tobeneither cancelablenor reinforceable.Wethereforecannotexplainthisconnectionbyappealtoconversationalimplicature.

3. When ‘?’ appears before a sentence, this signifies that the sentence is atleastsomewhatodd.Andwhen‘#’appears,thissignifiesthatthesentenceishighlyodd.

termscommitsthespeakertoaclaiminvolvingeithergoodinawayorbadinaway.Forexample,anutteranceof‘Nancyisgenerous(loyal/kind/courageous)’tendstocommitthespeakertotheclaimthatNancyisgoodinsomeway.Similarly,anutteranceof‘Nancyisrude(lewd/brutal/unkind)’typicallycommitsthespeakertotheclaimthatNancyisbadinsomeway.Ofcourse,inneithercaseisthespeakerobviouslycommittedtothestrongerclaimthatNancyisgoodorbadoverall,butthespeakeriscertainlycommittedtotheweakerclaimthatsheisgoodorbadinsomewayorother.

Tobringthisrelationshipintoperspective,let’sfocusonthethickterm‘generous’andconsideritsrelationshipto‘goodinaway’.Asjustnoted,itseemsclearthatatypicalutteranceof

(1) Nancyisgenerous.

commitsthespeakertothetruthof

(2) Nancyisgoodinaway.

Buthowdoweexplainthisconnection?AsI’llargue,theconnectionisbestexplainedbytherelevantinstanceoftheSemanticView.Thatis,wecanbestexplainthisbyclaimingthat(2)isaconceptualentailmentof(1).ButbeforeIstatemyreasonsforacceptingthis,it’susefultoseethefaultsofanotherpotentialwayofexplainingthisconnection—namelyconversational implicature. As we’ll see, the shortcomings of thisexplanationrevealtheadvantagesoftheSemanticView.

II.2. Conversational ImplicatureIf a sentence S1 conversationally implicates S2, then S1 (or the factthat someone utters S1) normally gives the hearer a defeasiblereason to conclude that the speaker also means to convey S2. Forexample, my utterance of ‘Some students attended’ normally givesyoureasontoconcludethat Ialsomeantoconvey ‘Notallstudentsattended.’Typically,however,theconnectionbetweenS1andS2canbereinforcedandcanceledwithoutoddity.Andthis isprecisely the



entailedbythefirstpart,andthat’swhy(4)seemssoodd.Thus,SV-Generousexplainsallthedatawe’veseenthusfar.

SV-Generous treats ‘generous’ and ‘good in a way’ similarly tohow we typically treat ‘bachelor’ and ‘unmarried’. And it’s worthemphasizing that there is further linguistic data to support thiscorrelation.Inparticular,thefollowingconjunctionseemshighlyodd:

(5) #Nancyisgenerous,andshe’snotgoodinanyway.

And(5)seemsnearlyasoddas

(6) #Jackisabachelor,andhe’snotunmarried.

Andmuchlikethatof(6),theoddityof(5)cannotbesolelyattributedtoeitheroneofitsconjuncts.Afterall,theseseemtobequitenormal:

(7) Nancyisgenerous.

(8) She’snotgoodinanyway.

Since (7) and (8) are felicitous in their own right, it follows thatneither conjunct within (5) is by itself responsible for the overallinappropriateness of (5). Clearly it’s something about theircombinationthatstrikesusashighlyodd.AndSV-Generousexplainsthis by allowing us to claim that the conjunction of (7) and (8)generatesacontradiction.5

5. Instead of SV-Generous, canwe simply hold that generous a priori entailsgood in a way(withoutholdingthatthisentailmentisconceptual)?Itappearsnot—thisweakeralternativedoesnotadequatelyexplaintheawkwardnessoftheabovesentences.Forexample,ifwemerelyclaimthatthefirstpartof(5)apriorientailswhatthesecondpartdenies,thiswouldnotbyitselftelluswhy(5)isawkward.Thisisbecausethereneedbenoawkwardnesswhenonedenieswhatisapriorientailedbythefirstpartofone’sutterance.Considermathematicalstatementslike

(i)85menand48womenattended,andtherewerenomorethan123menandwomencombined.

Thefirstpartofthissentenceapriorientailswhat’sdeniedbythesecondpart.Butthesentenceitselfseemsfelicitous.Thefactthatsentences(3)–(5)areinfelicitoussuggeststhattheyaresomehowlinguisticallyimpermissible,

II.3. The Semantic View of ‘Generous’AlthoughIwillconsiderotherrivalexplanationsinamoment(sectionII.4), I first want to show that the problems for the conversationalimplicature explanation are easily handled by a particular instanceof the Semantic View. Since good in a way is clearly evaluative, thefollowingwouldbeaninstanceoftheSemanticView:

SV-Generous: The thick concept generous conceptuallyentailsgood in a way.4

Thisviewstraightforwardlyexplainstherelationshipbetween(1)and(2)by claiming that (1) conceptually entails (2). Buthowwell doesSV-Generousexplainthesentencesthatledustorejecttheappealtoconversationalimplicature?

SV-Generous easily explains the fact that (3) seems awkward.According to SV-Generous, the second part of (3) is conceptuallyentailedbythefirstpart.Thus, thesecondclause is redundant,andthat’swhy(3)seemsodd.Whydoes(4)seemsohighlyodd?AccordingtoSV-Generous,thesecondpartof(4)contradictswhatisconceptually

4. It shouldbenoted thatSV-Generousdoesnotentail the controversial the-sisthatthedescriptionandevaluationofgenerouscanbe“disentangled”(seeMcDowell[1981]fortheseminalpaperonthis).NothingaboutSV-Generousentails thatwecouldexhaustivelystate thedescriptive(ornon-evaluative)contentofgenerous.Neitherdoesitentailthatwecouldexhaustitsevaluativecontent,sincegood in a wayneednotbeseenasitsonlyevaluativecontent.

Ontheotherhand,somepeoplemayholdasemantic-typeviewabouttheevaluationassociatedwith‘generous’butrejectmysuppositionthat ‘gener-ous’inheritsitsevaluationfromanassociatedthinconceptlikegood in a way.Onthisview,thickevaluationissuigeneris.Thisalternativeviewdeservesseriousconsiderationinitsownright,butitremainsunclearhowsuchaviewcan explain the data discussed in this paper regarding the connection be-tween‘generous’and‘goodinaway’.IfIamrightthatSV-Generousprovidesthebestexplanationof thatdata, then itappears that thisalternativeviewdoesnotadequatelycharacterizethewayinwhich ‘generous’ isassociatedwithevaluation.Moreover,asInoteinsectionII.5,thesamegoesforotherthick terms like ‘courageous’, ‘murder’, ‘brutal’, and ‘kind’.However, in thatsection, I concede thatmyoverall argumentmaynot apply tomultivalentthick terms(e. g., ‘eccentric’, ‘kinky’,and ‘unorthodox’).So,myargument inthis paper allows for the possibility that this alternative view could claimsomesignificantterritorywithintheclassofmultivalentthickterms.



GasStationContext

Traveler: “IsthereawaytogetfromIthacatoNewHaven?”

Gas Station Clerk:“Yes,thereisaway—justheadeastonHighway17.”

BusStationContext

Traveler:“IsthereawaytogetfromIthacatoNewHaven?”

Bus Station Clerk: “Unfortunately, there’s not any way.You’llhave to take thebus intoNYCand then take thetraintoNewHaven.”

Thebusclerksays“there’snotanyway”,whilethegasclerksays“thereisaway”.Butitseemsplausiblethatbothoftheirutterancescouldbetrue.6 Relativetodifferentcontexts,theirutterancesexpressdifferentpropositions. The bus clerk is asserting that there’s noway by bus,whereasthegasclerkismerelyassertingthatthereisawaybycar.

Ingeneral,whenweutterthatthereis(orisnot)awaytodosuchand such, we are very seldom asserting that there is (or is not) alogicallypossibleway.Typically,thescopeoftheutteranceisrestrictedbyacontextualparameter—inthiscase,aquantifierdomain.Here’sonewayofrepresentinghowtheaboveutterancesareassociatedwithdomains:

‘Thereisaway’istruerelativetoacontextCifandonlyifthereissomewaywwithinthedomainprovidedbyC.7

6. Undersomepragmaticviewsofcontext-sensitivity,wemustsaythatthebusclerk’sutteranceexpressesa falseproposition,buthecommunicatessome-thingtruenonetheless.Inwhatfollows,Iassumeasemantictheoryofcon-text-sensitivity,accordingtowhichtheycanbothsaysomethingtruerelativetotheirowncontexts.(SeeStanleyandSzabó[2000]foradiscussionofthesetwoviews.)Myassumption,however,willmakelittlesubstantivedifferencetowhatIgoontosay.Therearewaysofrephrasingmyclaimssoastoreflectapragmaticviewinsteadofasemanticone.

7. Thismodelisprobablytoosimplistictohandlemorecomplicatedquantifierexpressions.Butitwillsufficeforcurrentpurposes.SeeStanleyandSzabó

Atthispoint, itwillbeobjectedthatwecanenvisioncontextsinwhichanutteranceof(5)wouldnotseemodd.Imaginethatthespeakerof (5) is someone like Ebenezer Scrooge who disvalues generosity.Or,tomaketheexamplemorevivid,imaginethatScroogeutters(5)withinacommunityofspeakerswhoalsodisvaluegenerosity.Withinthis context, it seems possible for Scrooge to utter (5) felicitously.Theproblem is that SV-Generous initially seems topredict that hisutteranceof(5)wouldexpresssomethingcontradictory.

ThisobjectioncanbeavoidedonceweclarifySV-Generousintherightway.Ineffect,SV-Generousassertsthattheconceptexpressedby‘goodinaway’isconceptuallyentailedbygenerous.Butit’smisleadingto speak about the concept expressedby ‘good in away’, since thisphrase expresses many different concepts in different contexts ofutterance.AsIwillsuggest,Scrooge’sutterancecanbeexplainedifweclarifySV-Generousinawaythatismindfulofthiscontext-sensitivity.Letmefirstexplainhow‘goodinaway’iscontext-sensitiveandthenmoveontotheneededclarificationofSV-Generous.

The primary mechanism responsible for the context-sensitivityof ‘good in away’ is the constituent expression ‘away’. To see this,considertwocontextswhere‘away’occurs:

andSV-Generousholdsthatthisimpermissibilityissemanticinnature.Butthe apriority of these sentencesdoesnot seem tohelpout in explainingtheirinfelicity.

Onemightobjectbypointingtocertainapriorifalsesentencesthatareawkward.Consider

(ii)?Nancygivesmuchtimeandmoneytopeopleinneed,andsheisnotgoodinanyway.

Forthereasonsstatedabove,myreplyisthattheawkwardnessof(ii)oughttobeexplainedbyothermeans(asidefrommerelycitingapriorientailment).Ultimately,wemaywishtoconcludethatthecomplexconceptgives much time and money to people in needconceptuallyentailsgood in a way,providedtherearenobetterwaysofexplainingtheawkwardnessof(ii).Iamnotopposedtothispotentialconclusion.Thosewhorejectthepossibilityofconceptualentailmentsfromnon-evaluativetoevaluativesentencesmightbetroubledbythisconclusion.ButIaminnowaycommittedtorejectingthispossibility.



Withthisclarifiedversioninmind,letusnowreturntothemainobjection.DoesthisviewpredictthatScrooge’sutteranceof(5)mustbecontradictory?Itcertainlydoesnotpredictthis,providedwespecifytherelevantcontextsintherightway.SV-GenerousClarifiedpredictsonly that (5) expresses a contradictionwithin select contexts. But, aslong as Scrooge’s context is not among those selected, the view inquestion does not predict that he would be expressing somethingfalseorcontradictory inuttering(5). Inotherwords, thisviewneednotholdthatthefirstpartof(5)conceptuallyentailswhatthesecondpartdenieswithin Scrooge’s context.

But what are the select contexts mentioned in SV-GenerousClarified? This can be answered if we use our linguistic data asa guide. If sentences like (3)–(5) soundoddwithin a given contextC, thenwe shouldfindaprincipledwayof includingC among therelevant contexts. Similarly, if those sentences are felicitous withinsomecontextC*,thenweshouldfindaprincipledwayofexcludingC*fromtherelevantcontexts.Itisfarbeyondthescopeofthispapertofullyspecifytherelevantclassofcontexts,9 butIthinkitisclearthatwecouldhaveaprincipledwayofspecifyingthisclass.Forexample,let’ssupposethat(3)–(5)areawkwardwithinallcontextsexceptthoseinwhichapersonlikeScroogeisthespeaker.Inthiscase,weshouldhold that the relevant class includes all and only those contexts inwhichthespeakerisnotpresumedtodisvaluegenerosity.Nodoubt,this is oversimplified, but the basic strategy should be clear: first,wefindadistinctive featureofall thecontexts inwhich (3)–(5)are

beinggood.Thatis,ifweallowalllogicallypossiblewaystocountaswaysofbeinggood(e. g.,beinggoodforuseinaphilosophicaldiscussionongood-ness),thenitmightbeconceptuallytruethateverythingisgoodinsomewayorother.SeeThomson (2008, 10) for anargument for this.However, thisdifficultycanbeavoidedifweholdthattheselectcontextsincludecontextswithrestricteddomains(aswellasunrestrictedones).

9. This ispartlybecausethecontextsarenumerousbutalsobecausethere isboundtobedisagreementanduncertaintyaboutwhether(3)–(5)arefelici-touswithincertaincontexts.

Underthismodel,thebusclerk’sutterancecanbetruerelativetohiscontext,evenifthegasclerkisrightabouttherebeingawayofgettingtoNewHavenbycar.Travelingbycarisawaythatisnotcontainedwithinthedomainofthebusstationcontext.

Somethingsimilarcanbesaidfor‘goodinaway’.Whenweutterthatthereis(orisnot)awayinwhichAisgood,weareveryseldomassertingthatthereis(orisnot)alogicallypossibleway.Hereagain,the utterance is restricted by being contextually associated with aparticulardomain:

‘Aisgoodinaway’istruerelativetoacontextCifandonlyifthereissomewaywwithinthedomainprovidedbyCsuchthatAisgoodinw.

Underthismodel,thesentence‘Sheisgoodinaway’mightbetruerelative tosomecontextsand false relative toothers,dependingonwhichwaysofbeinggoodarecontainedwithinthedomainofeachcontext.

These considerations motivate a particular way of clarifying SV-Generous,onethatismindfulofthecontext-sensitivityof‘goodinaway’. Insteadof referring to concepts, this clarifiedversion refers tosentenceswhosetruth-valuescanberelativizedtocontexts:

SV-Generous Clarified: The sentence ‘A is generous’conceptually entails that ‘A is good in a way’ is truerelativetoselectcontexts.

Toput this inaslightlydifferentway,wecansaythat,wheneverapersonisgenerous,itfollowsconceptuallythatthereisaselectclassofcontextualdomainseachcontainingawayinwhichthatpersonisgood.8

(2000,248–58)foracritiqueofthissimplemodelandadevelopmentofadifferentsemanticmodel.

8. Thisviewmightbe trivially true ifwe selectonly contexts thathaveunre-stricted domains—i. e., domains that contain all logically possibleways of



generosity.Thus,SV-Generousisabletoexplainthelinguisticdatathatwe’veencountered.

II.4. Two Rival ExplanationsSo far, we’ve seen that SV-Generous can explain the relationshipbetween (1) and (2), and can also predict the oddity of (3)–(5).Conversationalimplicaturedoesnotadequatelyaccountforthisdata.InordertosolidifymycaseforSV-Generous,Inowarguethattwoofthemorelikelyalternativehypothesesfailtoexplainparticularpartsofthisdata.Thefirstalternativeappealstoconventionalimplicature;thesecondappealstopresupposition.

II.4.a. Conventional ImplicatureThe relation of conventional implicature differs from conceptualentailmentinthattheformerisdetachable.Moreprecisely,asentenceS1carriesIasaconventionalimplicatureonlyiftherecouldbeanothersentenceS2thatistruth-conditionallyequivalenttoS1butdoesnotcarry I as an implicature.10 Nothing similar is true for conceptualentailment. Conventional implicatures are triggered by particularlexical items or linguistic constructions. For example, it’s plausiblethat‘Smithhasn’tarrivedyet’conventionallyimplicatesthatSmithisexpectedtoarriveandthatthisimplicatureistriggeredspecificallybytheword‘yet’.Otherconventionalimplicaturesaresaidtobetriggeredbywordslike‘but’,‘so’,‘even’,‘still’,‘damn’,and‘therefore’,aswellasappositivesandparentheticalconstructions.

AsanalternativetoSV-Generous,wemaythenwishtoexplaintheconnectionbetween(1)and(2)byclaimingthat(2)isaconventionalimplicaturetriggeredbytheword‘generous’asitoccursin(1).Let’scallthisexplanationCI-Generous.Thisexplanationmayalsobeabletoaccountfortheoddityof(5),sinceconventionalimplicaturescannot

10. R.M.Hareseemstobelievethattheevaluationsassociatedwiththicktermsare detachable (Hare 1963, 188–89).AndBlackburn’s example of ‘fat’ and‘fat↓’appearstobeacasewheretheformeristhedetachedcounterpartofthelatter(1992,290;1998,95).

awkward,andthenwespecifythattherelevantclassincludesallandonlythecontextsthathavethisfeature.

Most likely,theselectcontextswillexcludeallcontextsinwhichthe relevant conversational participants are presumed to disvaluegenerosity.Butisitadhoctoexcludethesecontexts?Isthisexclusionmotivated solely by the need to explain Scrooge’s utterances? No.Thereareindependentreasonsforholdingthattherelevantcontextswill have domains that don’t contain the ways of being good thatconversational participants are presumed to disvalue. To see this,considersentence(8):

(8) She’snotgoodinanyway.

The truth-value of an utterance of (8) can depend on whatconversational participants are presumed to disvalue. For example,supposeweareinacontextinwhichit’sknownthatallconversationalparticipants disvalue being a good thief (e. g., because we all havecontemptforthievesingeneral).Inthiscontext,itseemsthatIcouldtruthfullyutter(8)eventhoughthepersonI’mreferringtoisagoodthief. This is because the domain of our context does not containbeingagoodthiefamongthewaysofbeinggood.Beingagoodthiefisoutsideourdomain,preciselybecausewe’represumedtodisvaluethiswayofbeinggood.Thus, it is independentlyplausible that therelevant contexts have domains that do not contain the ways thatconversationalparticipantsarepresumedtodisvalue.Moreover,sinceitistakenascommonknowledgethatScroogedisvaluesgenerosity,itisnosurprisethatcertainofhiscontextualdomainsdonotcontainthewaysofbeinggoodthatareassociatedwithgenerosity.

If the above is correct, then the felicity of Scrooge’s utteranceof (5) poses no problem for the clarified version of SV-Generous.When understood properly, this view predicts that (5) expressessomething false and contradictory inmost contexts. But it allowsforthepossibilitythat(5)mightbetruerelativetocertaincontextsin which conversational participants are presumed to disvalue



reinforceable.14And thismeans thatCI-Generousdoesnotby itselfpredicttheinfelicityof(3).15

14. ProponentsofCI-Generousmight resistmyobjectionby trying toexplainawaythefelicityof(9a–d).Inparticular,theymightclaimthateachboldfacedwordisambiguousinthatitcancarrydifferentimplicaturesindifferentcon-texts.Forinstance,thefirstpartof(9d)can,insomecases,implicatethatthespeakerhatesmowing the lawn,but inothercases, itcan implicate that thespeakerhatesthe lawn itself.Thus,theproponentofCI-Generousmaywishtoexplainthefelicityof(9d)byinsistingthatitssecondclauseisnotcompletelyredundant,becauseitclarifiestheambiguityofthefirstclauseandtherebyaddssomethingnew.However,thistypeofexplanationfailstoexplainthefelicityof(9d),becauseitincorrectlypredictsthatthefollowingshouldalsobefelicitous:

?Iwenttothebank,andIwenttoaplacethatdealswithmoney.

Theboldfacedwordinthissentenceisambiguousbetweenriverbanksandfinancial institutions,but the secondclauseclarifies that thefirst clause isaboutfinancialinstitutions.Thesecondclausethereforeaddssomethingnewin the sameway thatwas attributed to the second clause of (9d). But theexampleprovidedherestillseemsawkward.Thefelicityof(9a–d)thereforecannotbeexplainedawayassuggested.

15. Itmightbecontendedthat,althoughsomeconventionalimplicaturesarere-inforceable,therearewell-definedtypesofconventionalimplicaturesthatarenot—andperhapstheinfelicityof(3)canbemodeledafterthoseparticulartypes.Forexample,ithasbeenarguedthatparentheticalconstructions,likethefollowing,triggernon-reinforceableconventionalimplicatures—‘LanceArmstrong,the cyclist,battledcancer.’AccordingtoChristopherPotts(2007,668),thissentencecarriestheimplicaturethatLanceArmstrongisacyclist.Andthisimplicatureisobviouslynotreinforceable,asshownin(i):

(i)?LanceArmstrong,thecyclist,battledcancer.Andheisacyclist.

However,itisclearthattheinfelicityof(3)cannotbemodeledafterthatof(i).AsPotts(2007,671)pointsout,sentence(i)retainsitsredundancywhenthatsentenceistransposed.Bytransposing(i),weget

(ii)?LanceArmstrongisacyclist—he,thecyclist,battledcancer.

And(ii)seemsjustasredundantas(i).But,unlikethatof(i), theinfelicityof(3)doesnotsurvivetransposition.Bytransposing(3),wegetaperfectlynormalsentencethatdisplaysnoredundancy:

(iii)Nancyisgoodinaway—she’sgenerous.

becanceledwithoutoddity.Forexample,itwouldseemoddinmanycontextstosay‘Smithhasn’tarrivedyet,andnooneisexpectingher’.

ThemainproblemwithCI-Generousisthatitdoesnotleadustoexpecttheawkwardnessof(3):

(3) ?Nancyisgenerous,{and/but}she’sgoodinaway.

It is distinctive of conceptual entailments that they are notreinforceable—they cannot normally be made explicit withoutawkwardredundancy.11 So,SV-Generouscorrectlypredictstheoddityof (3). But linguists are highly reluctant to claim that conventionalimplicaturesarenotreinforceable.12Andthisisforgoodreason.Noticethatmanyparadigmaticexamplesofconventionalimplicaturescanbereinforced:

(9) a.Smithhasnotarrivedyet,butheisexpected.

b.EvenBill passed the test, andhewasamong the leastlikely.

c.Sophieisababy,butshe’squiet,andmostbabiesarenotquiet.

d.It’smyturntomowthedamnlawn,andIhatemowingthelawn.

In each example, the boldfaced words trigger the implicaturesstatedexplicitlyintherightmostclause.13 Buteachof(9a–d)soundsnormal. Thus, it appears that many conventional implicatures are

11. Anexceptiontothisisdiscussedbelowwithregardtosentence(10).

12. Potts (2007,668)claims that the implicatures triggeredbysomeparticularconstructionsarenotreinforceable,butheshiesawayfromthegeneralclaim.Seefootnote15fordiscussionontheseconstructions.

13. Itispossibletoquibbleoverwhethertheimplicaturesarestatedexactlyasthey should be. But I doubt verymuch that the appropriate changeswillmakeadifferencetowhatIsayhereandbelow.Forexample,(9b)couldberephrasedas‘EvenBillpassedthetest,andthatwassurprising/unexpected’withoutcreatinginfelicity.



Does rhetorical opposition explainwhy the above examples ofconventional implicature in(9a–d)are felicitous?Atbest, itwouldaccountonlyforthefelicityof(9a),leaving(9b–d)untouched.Theconcession/affirmation structure required for rhetoricaloppositionisnotpresentin(9b–d).Thiscanbeseenfromthefactthatthereisnoneedfora‘but’connectivebetweenthefirstandsecondclausesof(9b–d).

In short, we’ve seen that certain paradigmatic examples ofconventionalimplicaturesarereinforceable.Idonotclaimthatallarereinforceable—onlythatsome are.Andthisisenoughtoestablishthatanappeal toconventional implicaturedoesnotby itselfpredict theinfelicityof(3).Thus,unlikeSV-Generous,itseemsthatCI-Generouscannotadequatelyaccountforallthedatawe’veencountered.

II.4.b. PresuppositionCanweappealtopresuppositiontoexplainthisdata?Presuppositioncanbeunderstoodintwogeneralways.18 First,itmaybeunderstoodintermsofaspeakertakingapropositionforgranted(i.e.,assumingitstruth)inmakinganutterance(Stalnaker1970).Forexample,inuttering

(11) SmithregretsthathedrankPabst.

thespeakerclearlytakesthefollowingforgranted:

P:thatSmithdrankPabst.

A second way of understanding presupposition is in terms ofbackgroundingaproposition.Considerthefollowing:

(12) Smith,whodrankPabst,isfeelingill.

(12) clearly implies P in some sense, but it does not take P forgranted—afterall,(12)mightconveyPascompletelynewinformation.Still,thereisalegitimatesenseinwhich(12)seemstobackgroundP.Thebasicideaisthatasentence,suchas(12),canconveyanumber

18. SeeChierchiaandMcConnell-Ginet(1990,281–83)forageneraldiscussion.

It might be thought that SV-Generous falls prey to the sameobjection that I’ve raised against CI-Generous. In particular, onemightpointoutthatthereareexamplesofconceptualentailmentthatsoundfelicitouswhenreinforced.ConsideranexampleadaptedfromHorn(1991):

(10)Bushwonbyasmallmargin,butwinhedid.

Inthisexample, thefirstclauseconceptuallyentails thesecond,butthewhole sentence seems perfectly felicitous.Does thismean thatSV-Generous falls prey to the same objection raised against CI-Generous—i. e.,thatitdoesnotleadustoexpecttheinfelicityof(3)?

No.Thedifferenceisthatthereareestablishedwaysofaccountingforthefactthatsentenceslike(10)arereinforceable,withoutpredictingthat (3) should be reinforceable. But no similar account seems inthe offing for (9a–d). For instance, LaurenceHorn has argued thatsentenceslike(10)areinstancesof“rhetoricalopposition”.Inassertingthefirst clause, the speakermakesa concession (e. g., she concedesBush’s relative lack of popularity). But in the second clause, thespeakeraffirmssomething“ontheoppositesideoftheargumentativeoremotiveledger”fromwhatwasconcededinthefirstclause(Horn1991, 334). This concession/affirmation structure is signaled bythe fact that a ‘but’ connective (or similar device16) is necessary forits felicity—replacing ‘but’ with ‘and’ makes (10) infelicitous. Thisconcession/affirmation structure, according to Horn, explains whysentences like (10) are felicitous.17 But it clearly does not predictthat(3)shouldbesimilarlyfelicitous,since(3)lacksthisconcession/affirmationstructureandinvolvesnorhetoricalopposition.

Thesecondclauseof(iii)isnaturallyheardasexpandinguponthefirstclause.Thus,when(3) is transposed, its redundancydisappears.Therefore, there-dundancyof(3)cannotbemodeledafterthatofparentheticalconstructionslike(i).

16. Similardevices include ‘nonetheless’, ‘just the same’, ‘be that as itmay’, or‘despitethis’.

17. Forasimilarexplanation,seeWard(1988,191).



(13) SmithdoesnotregretdrinkingPabst.

(14) Smith,whodrankPabst,isnotfeelingill.

Butnothingsimilar is true for (1). It isclear that thenegationof (1)doesnotpresuppose(2).Moreprecisely,thefollowingstatement,

(15) Nancyisnotgenerous

clearlydoesnottakeforgrantedorbackgroundthepropositionthatNancyisgoodinaway.Andthisseemstrueforanycontextofutterance.

Alternatively,itmightbeclaimedthattherelevantpresuppositionof(1),aswellas(15),isoneofthefollowing:

Q:thatpeoplewhoareliberalingivingandsharingaregoodinaparticularway.

R:thatifNancyisliberalingivingandsharing,thenshe’sgoodinaparticularway.19

Andsince thecombinationof (1)witheitherQorRwouldplausiblyentail(2),thismighthelpusexplaintheconnectionbetween(1)and(2).

IdoubtverymuchthatthereareanycontextsinwhichQorRaretriggeredaspresuppositionsbytheword‘generous’.20 Butlet’ssuppose,forthesakeofargument,thatthisdoesoccurinatleastsomecontexts.Forexample,let’ssupposethatwhenIutternegationslike‘Nancyisnotgenerous—she’sgreedyandselfish’,IhavetherebypresupposedoneofQorR.Evenso,thisassumptiondoesnothelpusexplaintheoddity

19. Thesuggestionthat(1)maypresupposeeitherQorRisapossibilitythatIhave looselymodeled after some claims thatVäyrynen (2012)makeswithregardto‘lewd’.Hedoesnotexplicitlyacceptapresuppositionaccount,butthisviewisimplicitinhisdiscussion.

20.The attempted justification for this claimwouldmost likely appeal to thebehaviorofobjectionablethickconceptsinnegations,modals,disjunctions,and conditionals (seeVäyrynen 2012). But, as I argue in section III,we al-readyhavewidelyacceptedpragmaticmechanismsforexplainingthisbehav-ior(e. g.,negativestrengtheningandclausalimplicature)withoutpostulatingthatQorRarepresuppositions.

of different propositions, some of which are the main message orpointoftheutterance(i. e.,theforegroundentailments),whileothersarebackgrounded(Levinson1983).Themainmessageof(12)isthatSmithisfeelingill,whereasPismerelyconveyedasbackground.

Forpresentpurposes,wecansimplytakethedisjunctionofthesetwoviewsasanecessaryconditionforpresupposition.Moreprecisely,aspeakerpresupposesapropositionPinutteringasentenceonlyifsheeitherbackgroundsPortakesPforgrantedinmakingthatutterance.

How does this help us explain the datawe’ve encountered?Aninterpreter’sacceptanceofanutterance’spresuppositioncanactasapreconditionforthefelicityofthatutterance.IfyoubelievethatSmithneverdrankPabst,youmightfinditoddforsomeonetouttereither(11)or(12).Butitisworthnotingthatpresuppositionsmayoccurinsomecontextsanddisappearinothers.Forexample,in(11),thefactiveverb ‘regrets’ triggersPasapresupposition,butthatpresuppositiondisappears in other contexts where that verb is used—e. g., ‘Smithdoes not regret drinking Pabst, because he never did!’ But inmostcontexts, that verbwill trigger the relevant presupposition. In sum,the presupposition-based explanation of our data would state thatthe thick term ‘generous’ triggers a presupposition in at least somecontextsandthatthisallowsustoexplaintheconnectionbetween(1)and(2)aswellastheinfelicityof(3)–(5).

I shallargue that the infelicityof (5)cannotbeexplained in thisway.But,inordertoassessthispotentialexplanation,wemustbeclearonwhatpresuppositionsmightconceivablybetriggeredbytheword‘generous’.Inparticular,whatistheputativepresuppositionof(1)?

Forstarters,wecannotplausiblyclaimthat(1)directlypresupposes(2). This is because the connection between (1) and (2) lacks oneof the distinctive features of presupposition—“constancy undernegation”(Huang2007,67).IftheutteranceofanaffirmativesentenceSpresupposesapropositionP,thenwetypicallyexpectthatasimplenegationofSwillalsopresupposeP.Forexample,thenegationsof(11)and(12)—appearingrespectivelyas(13)and(14)below—bothseemtopresupposethatSmithdrankPabst:



particularclaimaboutasinglethickconcept(i. e.,generous),whiletheSemanticViewisageneralclaimthat’ssupposedtobetrueofmanythickconcepts.HowdowegetfromSV-GeneroustothemoregeneralSemanticView?

For the sakeof simplicity, the above argumenthas focusedonlyondatainvolvingthethickterm‘generous’.Butthereareparalleldatainvolvingother thick terms.Forexample, in theaboveargument, itwasnotedthat(3)seemsawkwardlyredundant.Butthesamegoesforotherpositivethickterms,like‘kind’and‘courageous’:

(16) ?Jonesiskind,{and/but}he’sgoodinaway.

(17) ?Smithiscourageous,{and/but}he’sgoodinaway.

Moreover, negative thick terms, like ‘murder’ and ‘brutal’, exhibitsimilarbehaviorwithrespect toadifferentevaluativeconcept—bad in a way:

(18) ?Thatwasamurder,{and/but}itwasbadinaway.

(19) ?Thatisbrutal,{and/but}it’sbadinaway.

(16)–(19)seematleastsomewhatodd.AndthisisjustwhatwewouldexpectiftheSemanticViewweretrueof‘murder’,‘brutal’,‘kind’,and‘courageous’. On this view, (16)–(19) seem odd because they areredundant:theirfirstconjunctsconceptuallyentailwhattheirsecondconjunctsassert.

Anotherimportantdatumusedintheaboveargumentisthefactthat(5) ishighlyodd,eventhougheachof itsconjuncts isperfectlynormal. But similar claims seem true regarding ‘kind’, ‘courageous’,‘murder’,and‘brutal’:

(20)#Jonesiskind,andhe’snotgoodinanyway.

(21) #Smithiscourageous,andshe’snotgoodinanyway.

(22)#Thatwasamurder,anditwasnotbadinanyway.

(23)#Thatisbrutal,andit’snotbadinanyway.

of (5).The reason is that there aremanynormal contexts inwhichneitherQnorRarepresupposedbyusesof‘generous’,butinwhich(5)wouldstillsoundodd.Toseethis,let’sfocusononeparticularcontextinwhichaspeakeruttersthenegationof(1):

Bob: “Nancy is highly controlled in her giving andsharing,andthat’swhatmakesherfiscallysmart.Sheisnot generous. But she’s not selfish either. I admire herapproachtofinances.”

ItseemsclearthatBob’sutteranceofthenegationof(1)doesnotimply,letalonepresuppose,eitherQorR.Inparticular,thereisnosenseinwhichBobhastakenQorRforgranted,noristhereanysenseinwhichhehasconveyedQorRasbackground.Thus,itseemsunlikelythatanyofthesepropositionsarepresupposedbyBob’suseof‘generous’inthisparticularcontext.Thetrouble,however,isthatthecontextjustdescribedisoneinwhich(5)wouldsoundodd.Forexample,imaginethatBob’sinterlocutor,Sue,respondstohimasfollows:

Sue: “I disagreewith you, Bob.Nancy is generous, andshe’snotgoodinanyway.”

Here,Sue’sutteranceof(5)isclearlyinfelicitous.Andthismeansthattheoddityof(5)outstretchescontextsinwhichpropositionslikeQorRarepresupposed(ifthereareany).Afterall,thecontextjustdescribedisonewherethosepresuppositionsareabsentwhiletheoddityof(5)remains.Thus,it’shardtoseehowanappealtopresuppositioncouldexplaintheinfelicityofsentenceslike(5).

II.5. Generalizing the ArgumentItlooksquiteplausiblethatSV-Generousprovidesthebestexplanationof the data we’ve seen. I’ve not surveyed all possible explanations,but I’ve shown that themain contenders are unable to explain theinfelicityofoneoranotherof(3)–(5).Thus,IthinkthereisgoodreasontobelievethatSV-Generousistrue.However,SV-Generousisavery



thantakingastandonthisissue,letmeinsteadassertthefollowingconditional: If slurs are thick terms, thenwe’ve seen no automaticreasontoextendtheSemanticViewtocoverthem.Inparticular,theargumentIhaveadvancedinfavoroftheSemanticViewreliesondatalike(18)–(19)and(22)–(23).Butit’sdoubtfulthatsimilardatawillbeavailableforallslurs.Forexample,thesentence‘Dr.Kisagringo,andhe’snotbadinanyway’strikesmeasinfelicitous,butitsinfelicitymaybewhollyattributable to thefirstconjunct, ‘Dr.K isagringo.’Thus,whether or notwehave reason to extend the SemanticView to allthicktermsmaydependonwhetherweincludeslursamongthethick.IdonotdenythattheSemanticViewistrueofslurs—Imerelyclaimthatmyargumentdoesnotclearlyestablishthis.

And second, considermultivalent thick terms (e. g., ‘unorthodox’,‘eccentric’,‘quirky’,‘kinky’,and‘grotesque’).21 Roughlyspeaking,theseare thick terms that are commonlyused to evaluatebothpositivelyandnegatively,perhapsindifferentcontexts.22DothesetermspresentaproblemfortheargumentIhaveadvanced?Thefirstthingtonoteisthatthephenomenonofmultivalenceisperfectlycompatiblewiththeviewthatall thickconceptsconceptuallyentaileithergood inawayorbad in away. Ingeneral, a concept canbeused toevaluate,say, negatively, even if it conceptually entails good in away—e.g.,‘Jonesisagoodthiefandthereforenottobetrusted.’Wecouldevensuppose,forthesakeofargument,thatboththepositiveandnegativeevaluationsofamultivalentthicktermareconceptuallyencoded(i.e.,partofitsmeaning).Eventhissuppositionisperfectlycompatiblewiththeviewthatall thickconceptsconceptuallyentaileithergood inawayorbadinaway,becauseitispossiblethateachmultivalentthick

21. Thanks to an anonymous referee for reminding me of multivalence andpointingouthowmyargumentmaynotextendtosuchterms.

22. Thisroughaccountofmultivalencemightbesobroadastoincludetoomanythicktermsasmultivalent,butnothingofsubstanceinthispaperwillrelyontheaccount.Forasustaineddiscussiononmultivalence,seeVäyrynen(2011).Ashenotes,thepositiveandnegativeuseofthesetermsismeanttobere-strictedtoliteralusage(2011,4).

(20)–(23)seemhighlyawkward,eventhougheachoftheirconjunctsisperfectlynormal.And this too is justwhatwewouldexpect if theSemanticViewweretrueofthesethickterms.Accordingtothisview,(20)–(23)soundhighlyoddbecausetheyarecontradictory:theirsecondconjunctscontradictwhattheirfirstconjunctsconceptuallyentail.

Thisbringsuptwoimportantpoints.Thefirstisthatitlooksliketheargumentadvancedregarding‘generous’willapplywithequalefficacytotheseotherthickterms—‘murder’, ‘brutal’, ‘kind’,and‘courageous’.The rival explanations discussed earlier would be inferior to therelevantinstanceoftheSemanticViewforthesamegeneralreasonsthatwerebroughtupwith regard to ‘generous’. So,wehave strongreasontobelievetheSemanticViewisalsotrueofthesethickterms.

The second point is that the five thick terms discussed hereinarearepresentativesampleof thethicktermsthatareeitherpurelypositiveorpurelynegative(i. e.,notmultivalent).Wethereforehavegoodreasontothinkthatmanyotherthicktermsarelikelytoexhibitsimilarbehavior.Inparticular,it’slikelythatmanyotherpositivethickterms (e. g., ‘loyal’, ‘chaste’, ‘wise’, ‘honest’, etc.) arealso semanticallyassociatedwithgood in a wayandthatmanynegativethickterms(e. g.,‘lewd’,‘rude’,‘liar’,‘dishonest’,‘unkind’,etc.)aresemanticallyassociatedwithbad in a way.ThenumberofthicktermstowhichtheSemanticViewappliesseemstoexpandoutquitesignificantly.Iconclude,then,thatwehavegoodreasontoaccepttheSemanticView—manythickconcepts,ifnotall,conceptuallyentailevaluativeconcepts.

TheSemanticView,asI’vestatedit,extendstomanythickterms,althoughI’veleftopenthepossibilitythat itmightnotextendtoall.ThispossibilityisleftopenprimarilybecausethestyleofargumentIhaveadvancedinsupportoftheSemanticViewmaynotapplywithrespecttoatleasttwokindsofterms.

First, consider slurs (e. g., ‘kraut’, ‘gringo’, ‘tart’, etc.). There is noconsensusaboutwhetherslursshouldcountasthick.Someethicists,suchasR.M.Hare (1963,25)andMarkRichard(2008, 14),havenoqualmsaboutincludingthemamongthethick.Others,likeJonathanDancy(1995,264)andAllanGibbard(2003,300ff),arehesitant.Rather



regardtoasizeablegroupofthickterms,includingmanyofourvirtueandviceterms(e.g., ‘courageous’)aswellasotherimportantmoralexpressions(e.g., ‘murder’).NowthatIhavepresentedmycaseforthe SemanticView,we can consider howwell this view stands upagainstopposition. Inthenextsection, IdefendtheSemanticViewagainstthemostrecentcritiquebyPekkaVäyrynenstemmingfromobjectionablethickconcepts.

III. Objectionable Thick Concepts.

Väyrynen(2009)hasarguedthattheuseofobjectionablethicktermswithincertaincontextsshedslightonthequestionofhowthicktermsare associated with evaluations. And he thinks this data stronglysuggests that theseevaluationsarenotsemanticallyassociatedwiththick terms. But what are objectionable thick concepts? And howmighttheybeaproblemfortheSemanticView?

Very roughly, objectionable thick concepts are concepts thatembody values that ought to be rejected. The concept lewd, forexample, seems to embody the view that overt sexual behavior issomehowbad.Butmanypeoplebelieve this evaluativeperspectiveoughttoberejected.So,itappearsthatlewdisacandidateforbeinganobjectionablethickconcept.Ineffect,thequestionofwhetheragiventhick concept actually is objectionable depends on the potentiallycontroversial questionofwhether its associated values ought to berejected.So,there’smuchroomfordebateaboutwhichthickconceptsare actually objectionable. Concepts like lewd, chaste, blasphemous, and sexually perverse are commonly seen as paradigmatic examples,althoughsomemightdisputewhetherthesearereallyobjectionable.Nonetheless, speakerswho in fact reject the values embodied by agiventhickconcept(whetherornottheyshould)tendtoexhibitsomeinteresting linguisticbehavior.For thesakeofsimplicity, I’ll refer tothesespeakersasobjectors.

conceptconceptuallyentailsbothgoodinawayandbadinaway.23 Thiskindofmultivalenceisnotunprecedented:ifliarisanegativelyevaluativeconcept,thengoodliarwouldlikelyfitthismoldofhavingbothpositiveandnegativeevaluationsconceptuallyencoded.

It isonethingtoshowthattheSemanticViewisconsistentwithmultivalence,butit’sanothertoshowthatmyargumentfortheSemanticView can be applied tomultivalent thick terms. And unfortunately,the argumentmaynot apply, because the analogous linguistic datamaynotbeavailablewithregardtosomemultivalentthickterms.Forinstance,itseemsfelicitoustoutter’Maxisunorthodox,andhe’snotbadinanyway’,andthesameistrueifwereplace‘bad’with‘good’.Ifthisisright,thenthetypeofargumentIhaveadvancedwithregardto‘generous’couldnotbeappliedto‘unorthodox’.Thissituationmaynotexistforallmultivalentthickterms,butit’slikelytobemoreprevalentamongthembecauseourusageofsuchtermsmaynottypicallyimplyanyoneofourtwomainevaluativeconcepts—goodinwayandbadinaway.Thus,it’spossiblethatthetypeofargumentIhaveadvancedwouldnotapplytosomemultivalentthickterms,becausethetypeoflinguisticdataIhavereliedonisnotavailable.However,justaswithslurs,IdonotdenythattheSemanticViewistrueofmultivalentthickterms—Ionlyclaimthatmyargumentdoesnotclearlydemonstratethisforsomesuchterms.

In short, slurs and multivalent thick terms are two potentialexceptions to theSemanticView.Theremaybeothers.Thenotionofathicktermisnotwell-defined(asillustratedbythedisagreementabout whether slurs are thick). And so it isn’t surprising that wefindimportantlydifferentclassesoftermsgroupedtogetherasthick.Nonetheless,IhavearguedthattheSemanticViewisplausiblewith23.Oneattemptatexplainingthephenomenonofmultivalenceistoholdthat

thisview isnotmerelypossiblebut true.Thiswouldnotexplainall typesofmultivalence,however, since it still needs tobeexplainedhow theuseof somemultivalent thick termscan loseavalence inagivencontext.Forexample,someusesoftheterm‘kinky’arenothingbutnegativeandcarrynopositivevalencewhatsoever.Whatthenhappenstothepositivevalenceinthiscontext?Thisisdifferentfromthebehaviorof‘goodliar’,whichappearstocarrybothevaluationsinallcontexts.



ThebasicthoughtbehindVäyrynen’sclaimisthis:Ifwhatthechastity-objector rejects is located within the truth-conditions of (24), thentruth-conditional negation of (24) should be a perfectly acceptablewayofexpressingherdisagreement(Väyrynen2009,448).Thisbasicthought is initiallyattractive, and ithasbeenacceptedbyothersaswell.MattiEklund(2011,34)makesasimilarpointaboutobjectionablethickterms:

…[I]fwhatwasobjectionableaboutthevaluewordswasamatteroftruth-conditionalcontent,thenonecouldwelluse thewords even if one finds them objectionable: itisjustthatonewouldnotassertofanythingthatoneofthesewordsappliestoit.

Eklund’s claimhere is slightlymoregeneral thanVC,but the sameidealiesbehindthemboth.TheSemanticViewseemstopredictthatobjectorsshouldbewilling touseobjectionable thick terms innon-affirmativesentences,like(25).

IfVCwerecorrect,itwouldspellserioustroublefortheSemanticView. As noted, chastity-objectors are not typically willing to applytruth-conditionalnegationto(24).Inotherwords,theyarenotwillingtoassert(25).Butthisdatum,incombinationwithVC,entailsthat(ceterisparibus) the evaluative content is notpart of the truth-conditionsof(24).26 Therefore,itdoesn’tseemthattheSemanticViewwillbetrueof‘chaste’.Moreover,Väyrynennotesthat,sinceanythickconceptcan,inprinciple,beregardedasobjectionable,hisargumentwillapplytootherthickconceptsaswell(2009,449).So,Väyrynen’sargumentthreatenstoposeamoregeneralproblemfortheSemanticView.

thentheevaluativecontent“doesn’tseemtobe”partofthetruth-conditionsof‘Aischaste’(2009,448).

26.Technicallyspeaking,thisargumentdoesnotshowthatthereisnoevaluativecontentwithinthetruthconditionsof‘chaste’,butonlythattheonerejectedbythespeakerisnotpartofthoseconditions.Butforallthatmatters,theremightbemultipleevaluativecontentsassociatedwith‘chaste’.Ishallignorethispossibilityinwhatfollows.

Objectorsareoftenreluctanttousethethicktermstheyregardasobjectionable.24 Ofcourse,wemayexpectthatsomeonewhorejectsthe values embodied by chaste (i.e., a chastity-objector) would behighlyreluctanttoutteranaffirmativesentenceofthefollowingform:

(24)Aischaste.

Thistypeofsentenceclearlyendorsesthekindofvaluesrejectedbythe chastity-objector. What is surprising, however, is that chastity-objectorsarealsoreluctanttoutterthenegationof(24)—namely

(25)Aisnotchaste.

Their unwillingness to assert (25) is initially puzzling, since it’splausiblethatchastity-objectorsshouldtake(25) tobetrue. It looksasifthesenegationsalsoendorsethekindofvaluesrejectedbythechastity-objector.

Väyrynenthinksthereluctanceofchastity-objectorstoassert(25)presentsaproblemfortheSemanticView.Inparticular,headvancesthefollowingclaim,whichIshallcallVC:

VC: Ifthosewhorejecttheevaluativecontentassociatedwith chaste are not willing to apply truth-conditionalnegation to (24), then, ceteris paribus, that evaluativecontentisnotpartofthetruthconditionsof(24).25

24. Itisworthpointingoutthatsomepeoplewillbereluctanttoemploycertainthick terms even if theywholly accept the associated values. For example,manypeoplewhobelieve thatpremarital sex iswrongwouldnonethelesswanttoavoidusingtheword‘fornicate’.Somethingsimilarcanbesaidforahostofthicktermslike‘sacrilegious’,‘holy’,‘pure’,‘defile’,‘sinful’,‘infidel’,‘pro-fane’,‘heretical’,and‘heathen’.Buttheunwillingnessofobjectorstousethesewordsisofquestionablesignificance,sincemanypeoplewhowhollyaccepttherelevantvaluesarealsoreluctanttousethem.Theworryisthatcertainparadigmaticallyobjectionablethickterms,like ‘chaste’, ‘blasphemous’,and‘perverse’,maybelonginthiscategory.Iftheydo,thentheirsignificancetothisdiscussionwouldbequestionable.Forthesakeofargument,however,Iwillassumethatanobjector’sreluctanceisdifferentinkindfromthatexhib-itedbywholeheartedbelieverswhowishtoavoid‘fornicate’,‘defile’,etc.

25. Iadd theceteris-paribusclausesoas toweakenVC inaway thatapproxi-matesVäyrynen’sownstatement.Hesaysthat,iftheantecedentofVCistrue,



negative strengthening. That is, (25) implicates (26) in the sameway that ‘Smith isnothappy’ implicates ‘Smith isunhappy.’ If theseclaimsarecorrect,thenachastity-objectorwouldclearlynotwanttoassert(25),becausethatassertionwouldimplicate(26).And(26)alsoembodiesavaluethatsherejects.

Giventhephenomenonofnegativestrengthening,wecanmakesense of the fact that ‘A is not chaste’ appears also to endorse thevalues that chastity-objectors reject. Very roughly, when negativestrengtheningoccurs, thedenialof avalueclaim implicatesavalueon the opposite end of the same evaluative scale. But the objectorin question is not someone who merely rejects one side of thatevaluativescale—sherejectstheentirescale!Andso,thisspeakerwillbereluctanttouttereventhedenialoftheoriginalvalueclaim.

ThestoryjusttoldprovidesreasontorejectVC,becauseitexplainstheobjector’sreluctanceinawaythatisperfectlyconsistentwiththeclaimthattheevaluativecontent(rejectedbythechastity-objector)ispartofthetruthconditionsof(24).29 VCmustthereforeberejected.

betweensomethingshemostlikelyaccepts—(25*)—andsomethingsheout-rightrejects—namely,(26).Moreover,wecannotethat(26)isactuallythemorecommonreadingof(25),whichsuggeststhatsomeonewhofindschaste objectionablewouldwithholduttering(25)withoutfurtherclarifications.

29.Toseethis,considerananalogousstory involving ‘right’.Supposeyou’reaMackie-styleerror-theoristaboutrightness.Andbythesametoken,youalsoreject theexistenceofwrongness.Due toyour skepticismabout rightness,youwouldbereluctanttoutterthingslike

(A)Goingtowarisright.

Butyouwouldalsobereluctanttoapplytruth-conditionalnegationto(A)byasserting

(B)Goingtowarisnotright.

Afterall,typicalutterancesofthissentencestronglyimply

(C)Goingtowariswrong.

byvirtueofnegativestrengthening.Butyourreluctancetoapplytruth-con-ditionalnegationto(A)canbegiventhesamekindofexplanationthatI’veprovidedwithregardto(24).Andthisaccountinnowayimpugnsthefairly

But I thinkVC is clearlymistaken. It is important to notice thatanypersonwhorejectstheevaluativecontentassociatedwithchastewill also reject at least one other evaluative content—namely theevaluativecontentassociatedwithunchaste.27 ButVäyrynenoverlooksthe possibility that a speaker’s reluctance to assert (25)might havesomethingtodowithherreluctancetobesaddledwithaclaimaboutA’sbeingunchaste.Inparticular,noticethat

(25)Aisnotchaste.

clearlyseemstoimply

(26)Aisunchaste.

Thiskindofimplicationiswhatlinguistscall“negativestrengthening”(Levinson2000,127).Oftentimes,when‘not’iscombinedwithcertainwords, such as ‘happy’, ‘believe’, ‘like’, ‘good’, and ‘bad’, the speakeriscommittedtosomethingstrongerthanwhatsheliterallysaid.Forexample,ifIutter,‘Smithisnothappy’,thisutterancewilllikelyconveythestrongerclaimthatSmithisunhappy.Linguiststypicallysaythatclaims like (25) and (26) arenot truth-conditionally equivalent, butthat (25) implies (26)byvirtueof conversational implicature (Horn1989,331ff;Levinson2000,127ff).Let’sassumethisistrueforpresentpurposes.28 Therelationshipbetween(25)and(26)appearstoexhibit27. Sincechasteandunchasteembodythesamegeneralevaluativeperspective,any

chastity-objectorwhodoesnotalsorejectunchastewouldseemtobeholdinganunintelligibleposition.Hertendenciesaboutassertingclaimslike(24)and(25)shouldthereforenotbetakenseriouslyasdataforthisdiscussion.

28.Amorecontroversialexplanationwould relyon theclaim that ‘not’ isam-biguous.FollowingJohnLyons,wemightsaythat,onsomeoccurrences,‘not’“convertsapropositionintoitscontradictory…”(1977,772).Onthisreading,(25)isequivalenttothefollowing:

(25*)It’snotthecasethatSmithischaste.

However,onotheroccurrences, ‘not’converts thepropositioninto its“con-trary”. Since the contrary of ‘chaste’ is ‘unchaste’, this explains the connec-tionbetween(25)and(26).Onthis“contrary”readingof‘not’,(25)isactuallyequivalentto(26).Ifthissortofviewiscorrect,thenwecanexplainthespeak-er’sreluctancetoutter(25)bycitingthefactthatthisutteranceisambiguous



And someone who thinks blasphemous is objectionable may notwanttoutter(27),forfearofbeingsaddledwithsomethinglike(28).Perhaps this explains Oscar Wilde’s reluctance to utter (27) whenfacedwiththeattorney’saggressivequestioning:“Didyouordidyounotconsiderthestoryblasphemous?”(WildeandCarson1895).31

Of course, we may not always have an antonym, like ‘reverent’,corresponding toeachpotentiallyobjectionable thick term.But thisismerelya limitationofour language,notofmyappeal tonegativestrengthening. Some languages are even more limited. As JosephGreenbergobserves,certainAfrican,Amerind,andOceaniclanguageshavenowordfor‘bad’.Nonetheless,speakersintheselanguagescanconveythatsomethingisbadbynegatingtheirtermfor‘good’(1966,52).TheirwayofexpressingthatAisnotgoodimplicatesthatAisbad,eventhoughtheyhavenowordfor‘bad’.So,negativestrengtheningcanoccurevenifwedon’thavetheappropriateantonymtoexpresstherelevantimplicature.

Anobjectionmayariseregardingwhethermyappealtonegativestrengthening over-generalizes. Väyrynen correctly notes that thereare some contexts in which chastity-objectors would be willing toassert‘Aisnotchaste’.Forexample,

(29)Smithisnotchaste,butneitherisheunchaste.

(30)Smithisnotchaste;themerefactthathe’sdedicatedtonotbeingsexuallyprovocativedoesnotmakehimgoodinanyway.

Doesmyappealtonegativestrengtheningincorrectlypredictthatthechastity-objectorwouldbereluctanttoassert(29)and(30)?No.Wecan understand the follow-up clauses in (29) and (30) as elementsthatcancel theconversational implicature from ’Smith isnotchaste‘to ’Smith isunchaste.’Thecancelation isobvious in (29), since thatimplicatureisexplicitlydeniedbythesecondpartof(29).In(30),theimplicatureisnotexplicitlydenied,butit’splausiblethatthefollow-up

31. ForanotherpossibleexplanationofWilde’sreluctance,seefootnote24.

It shouldbenoted thatwe could changeVäyrynen’s example sothatwefocusonadifferentthickconceptasidefromchaste.Butthiswillnotreinstatethetypeofclaimhewantstomake.Tobesure,withregardtosomethickconcepts,itislessobviouswhatimplicaturegetsgeneratedthroughnegativestrengthening.Forexample,sincethere’sno suchwordas ‘unblasphemous’, it’s notwholly clearwhatwouldbeimplicatedby‘Aisnotblasphemous’.However,thephenomenonof negative strengthening is not limited to expressions that can beprefixedwith‘un’.Forexample,‘good’cannotbecombinedwiththatprefix,butanutteranceof‘Aisnotgood’tendstoimplicatethatAisbad.Andit’splausiblethatsomethingsimilaristruefor‘blasphemous’.Anutteranceof

(27)Thestoryisnotblasphemous.

seemstoimplysomethinglike

(28)Thestoryissomewhatreverent.30

common view that (A) has an evaluative truth-condition. By analogy, thestoryI’vetoldaboutchasteisalsoconsistentwithclaimingthat(24)hasanevaluativetruth-condition.

30.Theadverb‘somewhat’isimportant,duetoanasymmetryinthewaypositiveand negative adjectives exhibit negative strengthening. Linguists typicallyacknowledgethat,although‘Aisnothappy’clearlyimplicates‘Aisunhappy’,theanalogousimplicatureisnotgeneratedby‘Aisnotunhappy’.Thatis,

(i)Aisnotunhappy.

doesnotstraightforwardlyimplicate

(ii)Aishappy.

However,itisoftenclaimedthat(i)implicatessomethinglike

(iii)Aissomewhathappy(thoughnotquiteashappyastheword‘hap-py’wouldsuggest).

Levinson(2000,145)andBlutner(2004,500–1)holdthistypeofview.Analo-gousclaimsholdfornegativethicktermslike‘blasphemous’and‘unchaste’.Thecentralpointhereisthat,eventhoughthereisanasymmetryasdescribed,theobjectorswillstillbeopposedtoweakerclaimslike(28).



trueduetoafalseantecedent.So,perhapsVäyrynen’sargumentcanberefocusedonconditionalsinsteadofnegation.

Inreply,letmefirstpointoutthatthedatainvolvingconditionalsismuchlesssecurethanthatofnegation.Bythis,Imeanthat(i)therearesignificantlyfewercontextsinwhichchastity-objectorswouldexhibitanyreluctanceatall,and(ii)theirreluctanceinthosecontextswouldbemuchweaker. To illustrate (i), we can easily imagine a chastity-objectorplayingdevil’sadvocatewithanoverlypiousinterlocutor.Inthis case, theobjectormight feelperfectlycomfortableuttering (31),andshewouldn’tneed toutterany follow-upclauses toqualifyherstatement(e. g.,‘…notthatIbelieveinchastity’).Regarding(ii),wecanimagineachastity-objectorwhoforegoestheopportunitytoutter(31)andinsteadreplies,’Iwouldn’tputitthatway,butIguessthatseemsplausible.’ This type of response illustrates a sort of reluctance thatismuchweakerthanwhatwewouldexpectwithregardto(25).Forthesereasons,Ithinkitisclearthatthedatainvolvingconditionalsislesssecurethanthatofnegation.

Nevertheless, in cases where objectors are reluctant to utterconditionals like (31),howcan their reluctancebeexplainedby theSemanticView?Sincetheseconditionalsdonotinvolvenegation,weobviously cannot appeal to negative strengthening. Nonetheless, astructurallysimilarexplanationisavailable.Inparticular,anutteranceof(31)inmanycontextsseemstoimply

(32)Abstinence from extramarital sex may be chaste, or itmaynot.

Accordingtomanylinguists(e. g.,Gazdar1979,59–62;Levinson1983,137;2000,108–9),therelationshipbetweensentenceslike(31)and(32)isatypeofconversationalimplicatureknownas“clausalimplicature”.By uttering the conditional ‘if p, then q’ (rather than the strongeralternative ‘since p, q’), the speaker conveys epistemic uncertaintyabout whether the antecedent is true. The conditional clausallyimplicatesthattheantecedent‘p’mayormaynotbetrue.Forinstance,accordingtoStephenLevinson,anutteranceof‘IfthereislifeonMars,

clauseprovidesenoughreasontodoubt that thespeaker intends toconveythatSmithisunchaste.So,theproblematicimplicatureisnotgeneratedby(30).Thus,myappealtonegativestrengtheningallowsfortheacceptabilityof(29)and(30)tochastity-objectors.32

Thus, it looks quite plausible that a speaker’s reluctance to uttersentences like ’A is not chaste‘ in typical contexts is explainablethrough negative strengthening. And if that’s so, then VCmust berejected,andtheargumentagainsttheSemanticViewfails.

Or is there an easy way in which Väyrynen can modify hisargument? That argument focuses solely on the unwillingness ofobjectors toutternegations.Buthealsoclaims that “[c]onditionalsexhibitthesamephenomenon”.Inparticular,hethinksthatobjectorsare typically unwilling to utter indicative conditionals whoseantecedents contain objectionable thick terms. Väyrynen providesthefollowingexample(2009,448):

(31) If abstinence from extramarital sex is chaste, then so isrefrainingfromdesiringextramaritalsex.

AccordingtoVäyrynen,achastity-objector’s reluctancetoassert (31)wouldbeinitiallypuzzling,sincethesepeopleshouldtake(31)tobe

32. Väyrynentriestoexplainthefactthatchastity-objectorsfindsentenceslike(30)tobeacceptablebyclaimingthatthesesentencesareinstancesofmeta-linguisticnegation(2009,449).SeeHorn(1989,377)foranaccountofmeta-linguisticnegation.However,if(30)canbeseenasacaseinwhichnegativestrengtheningiscanceled,thenIseenoreasontopostulatethat(30)ismeta-linguistic.Moreover,it’sworthpointingoutthat(30)failsHorn’sincorpora-tiontestformetalinguisticnegation(1989,392ff).Thenegationin‘ThekingofFranceisnothappy,becausethereisnokingofFrance’cannotbeincor-porated.That is,when ‘nothappy’ is replacedwith ‘unhappy’, the result isunintelligible:#‘ThekingofFranceisunhappy,becausethereisnokingofFrance.’Butnothingsimilaristruefor(30).Ifwereplace‘notchaste’in(30)with‘unchaste’,theresultisnottheleastbitunintelligible:

(30′)Smithisunchaste;themerefactthathe’sdedicatedtonotbeingsexuallyprovocativedoesnotmakehimgoodinanyway.

So, thisdisparity isprima facieevidenceagainst taking (30) tobemetalin-guistic.Of course,Horn’s incorporation test is notuncontroversial.Geurts(1998,280)isonecritic.



andunity,butletmebrieflysaywhytheproponentoftheSemanticViewdoesnotfalterintheserespects.

Despite initial appearances, theproposedwayof explaining thereluctanceofobjectorshasaunifiedbase.Bothclausal implicatureandnegativestrengtheningareformsofconversational implicature.Theseinferencesarethereforebasedontheaddressee’sassumptionthatthespeakerisfollowingcertainprinciplesofconversation,suchasGrice’sCooperativePrinciple(Grice1989,26).So,theunifiedbaseunderlyingtheproposedexplanationisthis:Objectorsarereluctantto utter sentences like (25) and (31), as well as certain modals,disjunctions, and belief reports, because such utterances wouldconversationallyimplicateclaimsthatobjectorswanttoavoid.Thereisnoclearsenseinwhichthisexplanationlacksunity,andsoIthinkthechargeisunwarranted.

It is also misguided to claim that the proposed explanationlacks simplicity. In appealing to negative strengthening and clausalimplicature, the proponent of the SemanticView is not postulatinganything that rival views would not already postulate for moregeneralreasons.35Forexample,it iswidelyacceptedthat ‘nothappy’conversationallyimplicates‘unhappy’.And,oncethisviewisgranted,itisextremelyhardtodenythatthissamerelationalsoholdsbetween‘not chaste’ and ‘unchaste’. So, even thosewho reject the SemanticViewwouldlikelyaccepttheparticularpragmaticrelationsappealedtoby theproponentof theSemanticView.Therefore, theproposedexplanationinvolvesnofurtherpostulates,andisnolesssimple,thantheserivalviews.36

35. Of course, the proponent of the Semantic View is postulating evaluativemeanings,whichrivalviewsdonotpostulate.But,asIarguedinsectionII,thesearenotpostulatedbeyondnecessity,becausetheyareneededforex-plainingtheinfelicityofsentenceslike(3)–(5).Moreover,rivalviews,suchasthatofVäyrynen(2012),tendtopostulatethatevaluationsproject,orarepre-supposed,whichisnotsomethingthattheSemanticViewneedstopostulate.Thus,thetwoviewsinitiallyappeartobeonparwithregardtosimplicity.Butseefootnote36.

36. Infact,itnowlookslikethechargeoflackingsimplicitycanbeturnedagainstrival views, such as Väyrynen’s appeal to projection (see his 2012). Why

theNASAbudgetwillbespared‘clausally implicates ’TheremayormaynotbelifeonMars‘(2000,36).Assumingthisiscorrect,weareonceagaininapositiontoexplainthechastity-objector’sreluctancebywayofconversationalimplicature.Chastity-objectorsarelikelytotakeissuewith(32)incertaincontexts,sincetheyfailtobelievethatabstinencemaybechaste.Andsince(31)conversationallyimplicates(32),theywouldbereluctanttoutter(31)inthosecontexts.33

Thus, Väyrynen’s strategywould fare no better if he focused onconditionals insteadofnegation. I shouldalsonote that the typeofexplanation justprovided (vis-à-vis clausal implicature) canalsobeapplied to disjunctive statements (e. g., ‘Either Smith is chaste, orhe’s keeping secrets’), belief reports (e. g., ‘ThePope believes Smithischaste‘),aswellasmodalstatements(e. g.,‘It’spossiblethatSmithis not chaste’) (Levinson 1983, 136–7; 2000, 108–11). For reasonssimilar to thosementionedearlier, Ibelieve thedatawithregard tothese statements ismuch less secure. But, in contexts where thereis reluctance, clausal implicature is a perfectly viable explanation.Disjunctions,modals,andbeliefreportsalsoimplicatethatthespeakerisuncertain(e. g.,aboutwhetherSmithischaste),andthisissomethingthechastity-objectorwouldwanttoavoidincertaincontexts.

Sofar,IhavearguedthatVCisfalseandthatitcannotbesalvagedthroughappropriatemodification.Proponentsof theSemanticViewcan appeal to pragmatic mechanisms—like negative strengtheningandclausal implicature—toexplainanobjector’sreluctancetouttercertainsentencesinvolvingobjectionablethickterms.However,evenifVC ismistaken, itmightbe challenged that theproponentof theSemantic View is here appealing to an explanation that is inferiortorivalexplanationsbecauseitseemslessunifiedandlesssimple.34 Spaceprohibitsacomparisonofexplanationswithregardtosimplicity

33.Ofcourse,thecontextsinwhichobjectorsarereluctanttoutter(31)wouldneedto“lineup”withthoseinwhichtheywouldtakeissuewith(32),butIseenoimmediatereasontothinkthatwon’tbethecase.

34. Väyrynen(2012)brieflyadvancesthesetwochargesagainstmyview.



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Thispaperhasrunthegamutofpossibleviewsonhowthicktermsmightbe associatedwithevaluations. I haveargued for aSemanticView,accordingtowhichmany(ifnotall)thickconceptsconceptuallyentailevaluativecontents.37 InsectionII,itwasarguedthatthisviewbestexplainscertaindatainvolvingthicktermsandexpressionslike‘goodinaway’and‘badinaway’.Anumberofrivalhypotheseswereshownunabletoexplainthisdata.

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