Pakulski (2014) - Confusions about multiculturalism

Journal of Sociology2014, Vol. 50(1) 23 –36© The Author(s) 2014

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DOI: 10.1177/1440783314522190jos.sagepub.com

Confusions about multiculturalism

Jan PakulskiUniversity of Tasmania, Australia

AbstractAustralian multiculturalism – an integrative policy strategy aiming at managing cultural diversity – was adopted as government policy in Australia in the 1970s. In its original rendition, Australian multiculturalism was embedded in classical sociological theory, integrative, reciprocal, egalitarian and respectful of the majority. However, it has also been confused with ethnic pluralism and assimilationist ‘melting pot’ approaches, and these confusions are apparent in the recent European and domestic criticisms. The article outlines the principles of Australian multiculturalism, identifies its theoretical foundations, and highlights some of the popular confusions about its meaning, focus and objectives.

Keywordsethnicity, immigration, integration, multiculturalism, pluralism

Multiculturalism is under critical scrutiny, if not open attack, especially in Europe. Critics question its reality, sustainability and desirability. The harshest critics portray multicultural policies either as harmful social engineering that tolerates ‘unassimilable’ immigrants and ethnic ‘ghettos’, or pooh-pooh it as a naïve ideology (‘Multikulti’) attributed either to the liberal ‘middle classes’ or politically alienated ‘elites’. They blame it for mal-integration of some immigrant and refugee groups, for encouraging social and cultural separatism, and even for the hostility of some immigrants to their host societies. Perhaps most importantly, multiculturalism is blamed for undermining national cohesion and promoting social segmentation. This segmentation, critics add, reduces ‘social capital’ (national cohesion and trust) and is experienced by some nation-als as a threat to their national identity.1 Supporters of multiculturalism are criticised as

Corresponding author:Jan Pakulski, University of Tasmania, Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. Email: [email protected]

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starry-eyed idealists, unrealistic liberals and/or socially disconnected elites, oblivious to the numerous pathologies that allegedly accompany mass immigrations and multicul-tural policies.

Moreover, while in the past criticisms came mainly from a handful of conservatives and radicals, today critics of multiculturalism find increasingly wide audiences and prominent champions, including conservative political leaders (David Cameron, Nicholas Sarkozy), conservative liberals (Angela Merkel) and disenchanted liberals (Thelo Sarazin), and they enrol supporters in all ideological camps. Somewhat surpris-ingly, these criticisms reverberate even in Australia, the country where multiculturalism – identified with bi-partisan policies of assisted integration and tolerant cultural plural-ism – has been endorsed by all governments since the 1970s, accepted by the public at large, and widely regarded as a success.2

These new waves of criticism are, I argue, based on confusion about the identity, goals, principles and consequences of multiculturalism, especially Australian multi-culturalism. For a start, some criticisms (like those by the German Chancellor Angela Merkel who announced that ‘Multikulti ist Kaput’) seem to be directed at a caricature of ‘multiculturalism’ that bears little resemblance to the original concept and strategy forged in Australia. The added irony is that many critics attribute to ‘multiculturalism’ those harmful effects that are, in fact, associated with the major rival of multicultural-ism – ‘assimilationism’. This is hardly surprising considering the fact that the European critics of multiculturalism come from countries that have never embraced multicultur-alism (assisted integration + cultural pluralism), and have instead practised liberal ‘assimilationism’.3

This does not mean, of course, that the European (and some Australian) criticisms of immigration and settlement policies are hollow. Mass migrations, especially the sudden and uncontrolled mass flows of immigrants and refugees such as those experienced by Greece, Italy, France and Great Britain – and the accompanying failures to integrate these new immigrants (economically, socially, politically) – do produce social problems, including dangerous social pathologies. Such problems and pathologies of mal-integra-tion – ethno-religious isolationism (‘ghettoisation’), ethno-racial exclusion and stratifi-cation, communal conflicts, ethno-specific crime – are real and serious. But (1) they cannot be pinned on ‘multiculturalism’, unless the original meaning of the term is dis-torted; and (2) they look very much like the side effects and the unintended consequences of (failed) assimilationism – the major rival of multiculturalism.

The pathologies that accompany such migrations – especially those triggered by con-flicts and natural disasters – have been exacerbated in today’s Europe by three factors: the recent intensification of uncontrolled migrations, due to labour market liberalisation within the EU and destabilisation outside the EU;4 the ‘Great Recession’ and the accom-panying high unemployment and financial austerities; and the political mobilisation of nationalistic movements hostile to ‘foreigners’. In these circumstances, immigrants and ‘foreigners’ become the proverbial ‘usual suspects’ and favourite ‘scapegoats’ to be blamed for most social ills. But such ills, including the widely publicised pathologies of mal-integration, have little to do with multiculturalism – a policy and strategy that has always stressed social cohesion as its main goal and non-discriminatory integration as the means. This is the main – but not the only – confusion addressed here. Addressing it



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involves, first, a clarification of the original meaning of ‘multiculturalism’, a brief out-line of the original principles of multiculturalism, as adopted in Australia, followed by a short reminder of the social-scientific foundations of the multicultural vision and strat-egy. This is an introduction to an overview of confusions and misconceptions marring the current debates about multiculturalism in Europe and Australia.

Multiculturalism – a vague and contested concept

‘Multiculturalism’ is an antonym of ‘monoculturalism’. Its etymological meaning is iden-tical to ‘cultural pluralism’ – a view that modern national cultures are composites of many ethno-specific cultures, regional and generational subcultures. This recognition of cultural heterogeneity and diversity is usually combined with approval of them as positive and desirable, or at least normal. Some even see multiculturalism as an ‘ideology’, that is, an outlook that promotes social and cultural diversity, and advocates tolerance of cultural differences. While such interpretations are rare, tolerance of cultural diversity has been a central feature of modern liberal ideology and, in this sense, tolerant cultural pluralism did become a popular creed among the metropolitan ‘middle classes’ in advanced societies. Multiculturalism has also featured prominently in the recent ‘culture wars’ between the advocates of liberalism and neo-conservatism, the latter critical of, if not openly hostile to, the concept of cultural pluralism and the sentiments behind it (e.g. Chapman, 2010). This implication of multiculturalism in the ideological debates about the ‘politics of identity’, ‘politics of difference’, ‘politics of recognition’ and even the widely debated ‘clash of civilizations’ and localised ‘culture wars’ confused the public at large.

Confusions come also from the proliferation of meanings. In a descriptive sense, mul-ticulturalism means simply a socio-demographic and socio-cultural diversity; in a nor-mative sense, it means approval of such diversity; in an ideological sense, it means promotion of cultural diversity, tolerance of diversity and the policies that supports both. Critics, by contrast, often skew the meaning and use of ‘multiculturalism’, making it synonymous with the superficial celebration of cultural difference for its own sake (‘Multikulti’), and turning multiculturalism into a caricature of its original meaning.

Moreover, as noted by most observers, the substance of multicultural vision and the content of policies in Australia have been evolving, and their champions have often kept this vision and strategy deliberately vague, to maximise political flexibility (e.g. Jupp, 2002; Tarvan, 2012). Yet, in spite of this semantic evolution and inevitable ‘conceptual stretch’, Australian multiculturalism seems to have maintained its core meaning and pre-served its original goals and principles (e.g. Bowen, 2011a, 2011b).

The core principles of Australian multiculturalism

Contrary to many criticisms, Australian multiculturalism was not a product of idealistic liberal reformers, and its key goal was not a mere celebration of cultural diversity. Rather, it was a pragmatic strategy for dealing with the problems posed by a post-WWII mass inflow to Australian of non-British immigrants. Its key aim was the smooth and effective settlement and integration of these immigrants; the problem was a failure of assimilation policies to secure such an effective integration.




The concept was forged in the Australian (and in a slightly different form, in the Canadian) reformist movement of the 1960s and 1970s.5 The Australian advocates of multicultural reforms aimed to correct what appeared as dysfunctions of the past poli-cies: securing the integration of immigrants from non-British sources; eliminating the discriminatory (White Australia) policies that guided the post-Second World War immi-gration and settlement programmes; and preventing the massive waste of ‘human capital’ (education and skills) that accompanied the absorption of the post-Second World War immigration wave. Assimilation policies (assimilationism) succeeded in providing the unskilled and semi-skilled overseas labour force for the rapidly developing Australian economy (especially in construction and manufacturing), but they also generated some problems of mal-integration, ethno-racial discrimination and dangerous ethno-racial exclusion. Perhaps most importantly, these assimilationist strategies caused a massive waste of the human capital brought by many European immigrants – a point raised by many sociological studies conducted in the post-Second World War decades.6

The alternative strategy was proposed by a group of (mainly ANU) academics and social activists, subsequently supported by both Labour and Liberal politicians. It involved a much greater tolerance for persisting cultural diversity in lifestyles and identi-ties of immigrants, and was labelled ‘multiculturalism’ and ‘cultural pluralism’ to stress this greater tolerance.

However, from the proverbial ‘day one’, multiculturalism promoted as its main goal social cohesion (the ‘outcome concept’) and social integration (the ‘process concept’). The contrast with past goals and policies was clearly drawn in the early statements:

Until quite recently there was an expectation in both Government and the community that … [settlers] should be assimilated as quickly as possible.… Gradually this gave way to a general policy of integration which accepted the principle of cultural diversity, and which acknowledged that the entry of migrants into Australian society necessarily involved adjustment in that society, as well as in the outlook of the immigrants themselves.… More recently there has been concern that cultural diversity should occur in a way which is consistent with maintaining the cohesiveness of Australian society. (APIC, 1977: 53)

These goals and principles were elaborated in the subsequent Brown, Blue, Green and White papers and repeated in recent ministerial statements.7 They included:

1. social cohesion understood as national integration – that is, institutional arrange-ments for allocating resources and resolving conflicts;

2. equality of opportunity and access;3. the freedom to choose and maintain one’s own cultural identity understood as

‘the sense of belonging and attachment to a particular way of living’; and4. the social duty of shared ‘responsibility for, commitment to and participation in

society’. (AEAC, 1977: 3)8

None of these statements diminishes the emphasis on the integrative goal of Australian multiculturalism, the importance of equity (fairness) as the main means of attaining inte-gration (cohesion), the tolerance for cultural pluralism, and – perhaps most importantly – the reciprocal nature of the multicultural policy.



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Theoretical foundations

The principles of multiculturalism were anchored in both social research and social the-ory. The results of research on immigrant adaptation – most conducted from the ‘inter-pretive-humanistic’ perspective sensitive to the ‘immigrant experience’ – formed the springboard for criticism of assimilationism and its mal-integrative outcomes. Sociological theory, in turn, especially its Durkheimian version, formed the theoretical framework in which multicultural strategy was embedded.

The theoretical foundation of multiculturalism involves a notion that ‘unity in diver-sity’ is a central goal of every modern society:

What we believe Australia should be working towards is not a oneness, but a unity, not a similarity, but a composite, not a melting pot but a voluntary bond of dissimilar people sharing a common political and institutional structure. (AEAC, 1977: 18)

This notion is central in Emile Durkheim’s (1933 [1893]) vision of modernisation that involves progressive diversification: occupational ‘division of labour’, social differen-tiation, ‘polytheism of values’ and diversification of social norms. The diversification, as emphasised by Durkheim, occurs spontaneously in every modernising society, and – what is worth stressing – does not undermine social cohesion. Progressive differentia-tion merely changes the nature of this cohesion (social solidarity) and the character of social bonds. Both change from the bonds of similarity and conformism (‘mechanical’), to the bonds of interdependency and complementarity (‘organic’). Thus the widening socio-cultural diversity cannot be seen as a ‘threat to national unity’ or a centrifugal force weakening social cohesion. On the contrary, it is the source of specifically modern ‘social glue’ that replaces the old and no longer viable bonds of conformism. As the ‘Father of Multiculturalism’ (Malcolm Fraser’s term) Jerzy (George) Zubrzycki subse-quently noted:

I found justification for this idea in Thomas Aquinas long ago, and in my sociological work, particularly in the writings of Emile Durkheim.… His ideas about integration, social cohesion, the community as a force in the wider society, have had a profound impact on my thinking.… And this idea, I think, is really the foundation of multicultural philosophy as I understand it. (quoted in Williams and Bond, 2013: 107)

The Durkheimian theoretical vision has also inspired five other aspects/principles of Australian multiculturalism. First was the insistence on equity as the ‘moral basis’ of modern social solidarity. The second was the emphasis on identity as the key ‘mediator’ of conduct. The third principle reflected Durkheim’s dictum that social integration requires regular social interaction – ‘participation in society’ or regular social engage-ment. The fourth concerned the role of ‘intermediate bodies’ – the key ‘social adapters’ to society at large. And the fifth pointed to the crucial role of state interventions in sus-taining social cohesion. When translated into plain English, these principles simply state that social unity in modern society has to be built on the moral foundation of fairness (equity); that fairness means equal opportunity, equal access, but not necessarily equal outcomes; that this sense of fairness underlies popular identifications and translates into




patriotic commitment; that the maintenance of this commitment requires regular social interaction; that this interaction involves families, friendship circles, as well as local ethnic communities; and, finally, that all these ingredients of social cohesion have to be backed by government and the members of the host society. In general, the founders and advocates of multiculturalism pointed out that while tolerant cultural pluralism has always been a central feature of Australian society and culture, this pluralism needs more deliberate and systematic cultivation.

The details of this cultivation, though, were never spelt out, doubtless in recognition of the need for political and policy flexibility. This is why the ‘foundational’ documents, especially the Brown, Blue and White papers, contain some ambiguities and question marks, and this is why multiculturalism – while maintaining its four core principles – developed into different versions (Tarvan, 2012). The radicalised versions promoted not only cultural pluralism but also some elements of ‘structural pluralism’, including not only ‘ethnic communities’ but also political organisations and even elements of legal code. One must stress that even these radical interpretations did not question the overall integrative goal of multiculturalism. But they accepted much wider diversity stretching beyond the realm of culture, lifestyles and identities. If such radical multiculturalism became the ‘mainstream’, and if it shaped governmental policies, multiculturalism could be blamed for ethno-religious fragmentation, particularism and even separatism. But the point is that the radical version of multiculturalism has never been embraced by Australian governments or by the public at large. Proposals for ‘legal pluralism’ or ethno-specific parties, for example, have always been dismissed as unrealistic and/or incompatible with the principles of national cohesion,9 though some elements of traditional Aboriginal criminal law have been recognised in sentencing.

These points are important for three reasons. They correct the perception of multicul-tural strategies as an idealistic-moralistic quest, divorced from reality and devoid of theo-retical foundations; they highlight the sober and pragmatic motivations of the founders and advocates; and they underline the moderate integrative intentions and goals of the multicultural strategies – to which we must now turn.

Integrative multiculturalism

In fact, multiculturalism was originally designed to counter the symptoms of social segmentation and exclusion, both generated – as an unintended consequence – by the assimilationist strategies embraced by the post-Second World War Australian governments.

There is a counter-intuitive element in this argument that requires clarification. Assimilationism, understood as a strategy of integration through cultural and lifestyle ‘conformism with the majority’, has never worked well. Instead of the expected smooth adaptation through assimilation, it generated, especially among non-British immigrants, socio-cultural exclusion and a sense of estrangement. Assimilationist pressures trans-formed into formidable barriers to social adaptation and integration by promoting the view that full or ‘proper’ integration requires not only shedding the cultural ‘heritage of origin’, but also the conformist adoption of the norms and lifestyle of the majority, and of an unqualified (vs. hyphenated) cultural identity. Multiculturalism, by contrast,



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de-stigmatised cultural differences by insisting that they are normal, and that ‘one can be a good Australian without being a typical Australian’.

Australian multiculturalism has also recognised that full integration is gradual, and that its success depends on a sense of belonging. This sense of belonging develops through families, neighbourhoods and friendship circles, as well as integrated religious and ethnic groups and communities. Therefore multiculturalism has always aided such integrative structures and supported their formation and maintenance – not as the agents of social segmentation and division, but as ‘social adapters’ to broader national commu-nity.10 Consequently, ethnic and religious communities have been supported only in this integrative role, in provision of the sense of belonging and in fostering broader social engagement. They have been condemned when they engage in the cultivation of ethnic or religious particularism or foster isolation.11

The integrative nature of multiculturalism has also been reflected in the selective acceptance of traditions and cultural practices introduced by immigrants. Such accept-ance, one should stress, has always been qualified by the ‘according to the law’, ‘no discrimination’ and ‘no harm’ principles. Consequently, all forms of culturally specific ‘traditional discriminations’, such as sexism, as well as harm-causing practices such as genital mutilations, are banned. So are polygamy, forced marriages and all forms of vio-lence, including family/communal violence ‘in defence of honour’.

Obviously, multiculturalism could not prevent harmful practices and ethnic mal-inte-gration. However, such pathologies have always been condemned as violations of multi-cultural principles. Moreover, there is no evidence of them being fostered or even supported by multicultural policies. Rather, such pathologies of mal-integration – rela-tively rare in Australia, in spite of ‘moral panics’ whipped up by the media – can be attributed to inadequacy of adaptive-integrative resources, unpreparedness of govern-ment agencies or policy implementation failures. Generally, such pathologies of mal-integration occur in spite of multiculturalism, not because of it.

Immigrant maladaptation does happen, and it is often tolerated because of negligence or opportunism. Directing scarce resources to migrant integration is politically difficult – and often unpopular among voters. Ethnic segmentation can be made politically profit-able. Politicians or parties may court the ‘ethnic vote’, privilege organised ethno-regional groups, or even encourage ethnic ‘branch stacking’ in pursuit of electoral advantage. Ethnic activists may embrace and support ethno-specific interests, even particularistic ones, in pursuit of status, influence and money. Religious sects and churches may organ-ise ethno-specific lobbies in pursuit of enlarged membership and favourite causes. But all such developments are independent of – if not contradictory to – multicultural princi-ples and policy strategies.

The non-negotiable elements

The closely related confusion concerns support for ethnic communities and organisations implied by a multicultural strategy. The founding parents of multiculturalism have accepted the formation of ‘ethnic communities’ and ethnic organisations as aids in inte-gration and not the agents of ethnic particularism. The Australian multicultural model envisages the formation of ‘open’ ‘integrative’ and ‘dispersed’ (rather than ‘closed’ and




territorially concentrated) ‘ethnic communities’ and the community-sustaining organisa-tions as social adapters to broader community. Consequently, multicultural strategy dis-courages exclusiveness and particularism, and rejects all forms of ethno-religious isolation and segmentation as dysfunctional. Migrants, in other words, are expected to form ethno-specific communities and organisations, provided that these communities and organisations aid social integration by becoming important ‘intermediate structures’ for social attachment and by nourishing a sense of belonging. A need for such ‘intermedi-ate structures’ is not only recognised by modern sociological theory, but also supported by research on migrant deracination and alienation. Therefore, while supporting ethnic communities and ‘ethnic community organisations’, the advocates of multiculturalism explicitly discourage other forms of ‘structural pluralism’, such as ethno-specific parties (even ethno-specific ‘party branches’), ethno-specific parishes and ethnically exclusive organisations.12

Australian multiculturalism, in other words, is not – and has never been – a licence for ethno-racial and ethno-religious particularism or closure. As the Brown paper (AEAC, 1977: 16) stresses, ‘in a cohesive multicultural society, national loyalties are built on ethnic loyalties’. The White ACPEA paper (1982: 2–3) adds:

This [multicultural society] is different from a society based on separate development, in which physical isolation or rigid inter-group barriers result in separate institutional arrangements – such as different legal, political or educational systems – and there is very little common purpose and shared identity.’

These limits to multicultural tolerance of diversity are often ignored by critics. In spite of the clear formulations of the ‘non-negotiable’ institutions and practices – includ-ing the Australian law and justice system, parliamentary democracy, and English as an official language – some of these critics still misrepresent multicultural policies as an endorsement of all particularistic-traditional cultural practices, including those harmful to, discriminatory and/or incompatible with Australian laws and core values.

Equity in multicultural policies

The second principle of Australian multiculturalism – equity – is often confused with equality (by radical critics) or with privilege (by conservative critics). Both confusions result in misinterpretation of policy goals and intentions.

Equity means fairness, that is, equal treatment, opportunity and access. Equal treat-ment has always meant ‘regardless of any ascribed characteristics’, including racial, eth-nic or religious background. Equity does not guarantee equal outcomes, but a ‘fair go’, a ‘level playing field’ in competition. Obviously, the implementation of this principle in the selection of immigrants has always been qualified. Australia has always selected immigrants according to some specific criteria (skills, education, family status, etc.) – and some discriminations were legitimate (e.g. related to security, health, etc.). But all naturalised new Australians could count on the same treatment as old Australians, keep-ing in mind that, as for any other general principle, equity/fairness is always an aspira-tion, rather than an accomplishment.



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This is important in clearing up confusions about ethno-racial prejudice and discrimi-nation. Their persistence – unfortunate as it may be – cannot be seen as evidence of failures or deficiencies of multiculturalism simply because the root causes of prejudice and discrimination are largely beyond the social realms covered by multicultural poli-cies. Similarly, a correlation between ethnicity and occupational status – which is quite complex and dynamic – cannot be seen as a failure of multicultural strategy (the viola-tion of equity) before the impact of other legitimately ‘stratifying’ factors (such as skills, experience, performance level, etc.) is taken into account.

In the eyes of some critics, multiculturalism gives a privileged position to non-British communities and cultures by supporting their sustenance. Even if there is a proverbial grain of truth in such criticism, the formulation is highly confusing. Culture-sustaining support (like the grants for language teaching typically channelled through ethnic com-munities and their bodies) has always aimed at promoting integration. Therefore it has been directed to weak communities, incapable of self-sustenance, and has been condi-tional on the overall integrative purpose of cultural initiatives and/or integrative func-tions of supported communities. In spite of occasional abuses of this principle, cultural/community support remains a central element in current multicultural policies (APIC, 1977: 53; Bowen, 2011a, 2011b).13

This brings us to the issue of relations with Australia’s indigenous peoples.14 It should be stressed that multiculturalism was designed principally for dealing with immigrant integration, and not for repairing relations with indigenous Australians. Nevertheless, multiculturalism’s affirmation of cultural diversity and its insistence on equity did affect relations between Anglo-Australians and Aboriginal peoples. However, the key elements of government strategy towards Aboriginal Australians – arguably the most disadvan-taged peoples (or set of communities) in Australia – are contained in the reconciliation programmes. Reconciliation involves principles and policies that transcend multicultur-alism. It recognises both the special position of the ‘first Australians’ and the harm caused by their disenfranchisement and expropriation and of the discrimination against them by European settlers. The programmes also propose much wider recognition of Aboriginal cultures and traditions, including some elements of indigenous lore and land rights. Such practices, though, should be seen as ‘special’, extending legitimately beyond the realm of multiculturalism and into the domain of reconciliation strategies.

Reciprocity and mutuality

There has also been a fair amount of confusion among both the critics and the advocates of multiculturalism about the issue of ‘reciprocity’ and ‘mutuality’. Australian multicul-turalism has always been ‘reciprocal’ in the sense of promoting both rights and duties/obligations. It has also been ‘mutual’ in the sense of specifying the rights and duties of minorities, as well as the majority. These rights are spelt out in a more explicit manner, including ‘the freedom to choose and maintain one’s own cultural identity understood as ‘the sense of belonging and attachment to a particular way of living’. They ‘involve respect for cultural differences (including the right to a distinct “cultural identity”)’ (AEAC, 1977: 3). The rights are backed, so to speak, by equity in pursuit of resources, especially resources for social integration. These rights are frequently targeted by




critics, and often confused with privileges. They cannot be seen as privileges because they are universalistic – that is, they extend to all minorities – and they are formulated together with obligations, the latter forming the ‘other side’ of the moral ledger. This other side is often ignored. It includes not only the duty of inter-cultural understanding and tolerance, as well as loyalty to the laws and political institutions of Australia, but also a duty of participation cum engagement in community life (‘the social duty of shared responsibility for, commitment to and participation in society’, AEAC, 1977: 3). The National Agenda for Multicultural Australia (Office of Multicultural Affairs, 1989: 8) articulates these reciprocal duties in a more specific way – as ‘premises’ and ‘limits to multiculturalism’:

•• multicultural policies are based upon the premises that all Australians should have an overriding and unifying commitment to Australia, to its interests and future first and foremost;

•• multicultural policies require all Australians to accept the basic structures and principles of Australian society – the Constitution and the rule of law, tolerance and equality, Parliamentary democracy, freedom of speech and religion, English as the national language and equality of the sexes; and

•• multicultural policies impose obligations as well as conferring rights: the right to express one’s own culture and beliefs involves a reciprocal responsibility to accept the right of others to express their views and values. (1989: 8)

Because the rights are formulated as a reverse of duties, and because of the strong emphasis on reciprocity, Australian multiculturalism may be interpreted as a form of ‘social contract’ between the majority and the diverse minorities. The majority accepts and protects minorities, affirms cultural differences and supports a degree of sustenance of minority cultures that is necessary for integration, but in the expectation that minori-ties fulfil ‘their part of the moral contract’, that is, that they remain socially engaged (participate in social life), loyal to Australia and respectful of the majority. This involves respect for the majority’s core values, norms, traditions and meta-institutions (such as law, justice system, parliamentary democracy and market economy). Such an interpreta-tion – implicit in the Brown, Blue and White papers – reveals, again, close links between multiculturalism and traditional liberalism.15 This also means that cultural assimilation (adoption of the mainstream/majority identity and culture) is not discouraged by multi-cultural strategies. It remains an option, a matter of choice.

Respect for the majority

Some critics and commentators portray multiculturalism as a rebellion against the Anglo-Australian majority and its culture and heritage, as an equivalent to a revolutionary chal-lenge to the postcolonial ‘dominant majority’. While the advocates of such rebellious multiculturalism – people who see it as a heroic struggle against the dominant majority – can always be found, they constitute a small minority. This is because the ‘rebellious interpretation’ is clearly at odds with all original formulations of multiculturalism, its



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theoretical foundations and its recent ‘official’ versions (Bowen, 2011a, 2011b). The original vision of multicultural Australia, and the current policy strategy embraced by the government, remain respectful of the majority culture and its institutions. They are also mindful of its anchoring in the British liberal tradition, a tradition that reflects, and origi-nates from, a powerful stream of British liberal philosophy and French classical sociol-ogy. The British philosophical tradition has been supplemented by the Australian egalitarian tradition of ‘a fair go’, both of which stress the value of individualism, respect for diversity, tolerant accommodation of differences, and concern with individual and group freedom. This is very much in line with the French sociological tradition that stresses the importance of social integration and the value of social cohesion. In turn, both make Australian multiculturalism compatible with Australian postcolonial tradi-tions (e.g. Levey, 2010; Williams and Bond, 2013).

Australian multiculturalism has always stressed respect for the majority: its history, traditions, core values and central institutions. Even the advocates of a more radical ver-sion of multiculturalism – those who insist on the right to resist assimilation and oppose ‘cultural domination’ – seldom see the status quo as imposed hegemony. There is wide-spread recognition of the ‘democratic rights’ exercised by the majority, as well as its ‘duty of recognition and care’ towards the minorities and their cultural heritage. This recognition seems to inoculate Australian multiculturalism against radicalisation – but it does not prevent confusions and misconceptions.

Conclusions

The confusions are likely to grow with multiculturalism torn by two trends. On the one hand, its key principles have been accepted in ‘planning for diversity’ (e.g. Inglis, 2008); on the other hand, it has been drawn into culture wars triggered by anti-immigration movements and social pathologies of mal-integration (e.g. Chapman, 2010). This turns multiculturalism into a contested concept and multiplies confusions. Various caricatures of ‘multiculturalism’ (like ‘Multikulti’) are publicised by leaders of anti-immigration movements, and they become favourite targets for criticism. But such caricaturing and scapegoating occur at a heavy price in terms of confusion and distortion.

This does not mean that multiculturalism is faultless or blameless, or that it always delivers on its promises of immigrant integration and social cohesion. Like all general visions and policy strategies, multiculturalism has already revealed most of its virtues – as well as its shortcomings. But in order to assess the overall ‘record of multiculturalism’ in a fair and accurate way – a task that is not undertaken here – we must start by clearing the confusions. When this is done, critics will realise that they have to do much more than pin the well-known problems and pathologies that accompany mass migrations on multiculturalism. Any fair assessment has to start by clearing the confusions, but then continue with a wide comparative analysis: monitoring the levels of social integration/cohesion, comparing the outcomes in societies embracing multiculturalism with out-comes in societies that embraced rival policies; and comparing the outcomes before and after the introduction of multicultural strategies. Criticisms based on confused interpreta-tions of multiculturalism are not able to do that.




Funding

This research received no specific grant from any funding agency in the public, commercial, or not-for-profit sectors.

Notes

1. See Barry (2002), Putnam (2007), Sarrazin (2010), Roth (2010); for a summary of criticisms of multiculturalism, see: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism_in_Australia<wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Criticism_of_multiculturalism.

2. For an overview of multiculturalism in Australia, see Lopez (2000), Castles (2001), Jupp (2002), Jupp et al. (2007), Marcus et al. (2009) and Tarvan (2012). ‘Multikulti’ refers to a superficial celebration of, and support for, ethnic diversity, with no consideration given to social integration.

3. Liberal ‘assimilationism’ is based on the expectation of immigrants’ gradual and spontaneous (i.e. largely unassisted) ‘acculturation/assimilation’ to their national ‘legitimate cultures’.

4. UN agencies have estimated the number of conflict refugees alone in mid-2013 at over 45 million.

5. For a history of its forging, see Williams and Bond (2013). 6. See, in particular, the early discussions of immigration and settlement strategies (e.g. Birrell

and Birrell, 1981; Jupp, 1966, 1984; Williams and Bond, 2013), as well as Zubrzycki (1964) and Martin (1972, 1978).

7. See the AEAC (1977) (Brown) paper Australia as a Multicultural Society, the APIC (1977) (Green) paper Immigration Policies and Australia’s Population, the APIC (1979) (Blue) paper Multiculturalism and its Implications for Immigration Policy, and the ACPEA (1982) (White) paper Multiculturalism for All Australians. For the recent statements see Bowen (2011a, 2011b).

8. The 1977 AEAC paper is the first document that clearly spelt out the principles of Australian multiculturalism. It was drafted under the chairmanship of the ANU sociologist, Jerzy (George) Zubrzycki.

9. See, for example, the Federal Treasurer Peter Costello’s declaration in 2006 that ‘there was no place for Sharia law [sic] in secular society like Australia’ and the 2010 state-ment by the then Attorney-General Nicola Roxon that ‘there is no place for Sharia law [sic] in the Australian society’. Quoted in: http://www.abc.net.au/religion/arti-cles/2013/05/10/3756163.htm

10. ‘Groups should not separate themselves from the rest of the community in a way that denies either the validity of Australian institutions or their own shared identity as Australians. The pursuit of group interests should not be taken so far that they damage the nation as a whole or unfairly infringe the rights of other groups’ (ACPEA, 1982: 26).

11. The Blue paper (APIC, 1979: 14) makes it abundantly clear: ‘We should oppose any tendency for ethnic groups to regard themselves as distinct from the wider Australian society, with an ethnic identification that excludes the concept of membership of the Australian community and nation’ (original emphasis).

12. Though the formation of ethno-religious ‘communities’ that spontaneously form around churches and priests is not opposed, and ethno-specific religious services (in ethnic lan-guages), as well as ethno-specific aged-care services, are also supported.

13. There are, though, some exceptions, especially in the distribution of age-care grants for ethni-cally specific services. But the overall purpose of such assistance remains integrative in the sense of preventing social isolation and exclusion of those immigrants who do not communi-cate in English.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Multiculturalism_in_Australia<wikipedia


Pakulski 35

14. The plural should be used here to stress the cultural diversity of native Australians.15. In line with the liberal tradition, multicultural strategy attempts to maximise the freedoms of all

citizens to choose an identity and a way of living that suits their plans. See also Levey (2010).

References

ACPEA (Australian Council on Population and Ethnic Affairs) (1982) Multiculturalism for All Australians (White paper). Canberra: AGPS.

AEAC (Australian Ethnic Affairs Council) (1977) Australia as a Multicultural Society (Brown paper). Canberra: AGPS.

APIC (Australian Population and Immigration Council) (1977) Immigration Policies and Australia’s Population (Green paper). Canberra: AGPS.

APIC (Australian Population and Immigration Council) (1979) Multiculturalism and its Implications for Immigration Policy (Blue paper). Canberra: AGPS.

Barry, B.M. (2002) Culture and Equality: An Egalitarian Critique of Multiculturalism. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Birrell, R. and T. Birrell (eds) (1981) An Issue of People. Melbourne: Longman Cheshire.Bowen, C.E. (2011a) ‘Why Sheridan and the Immigration Minister Parted Company on Road

to Multiculturalism’, The Australian 16 April. URL (consulted 9 December 2012): www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/why-sheridan-and-the-immigration-minister-parted-company-on-road-to-multiculturalism/story-fn59niix-12260396848124

Bowen, C.E. (2011b) ‘The Genius of Australian Multiculturalism’, speech at the Sydney Institute, 17 February. URL (consulted 12 September 2012): www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb159251.htm4

Castles, S. (2001) ‘Multiculturalism in Australia’, in J. Jupp (ed.) The Australian People: An Encyclopedia of the Nation, its People and their Origins, 2nd edn. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Chapman, R. (2010) Culture Wars: An Encyclopedia of Issues, Viewpoints and Voices. Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Durkheim, E. (1933 [1893]) The Division of Labour in Society. New York: Free Press.Inglis, C. (2008) Planning for Cultural Diversity. Paris: UNESCO-IIEP.Jupp, J. (1966) Arrivals and Departures. Melbourne: Cheshire-Lansdowne.Jupp, J. (1984) Ethnic Politics in Australia. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.Jupp, J. (2002) From White Australia to Woomera. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.Jupp, J., J. Nieuwenhuysen and E. Dawson (eds) (2007) Social Cohesion in Australia. Sydney:

Allen and Unwin.Levey, G.B. (2010) ‘Liberal Multiculturalism’, in D. Ivison (ed.) The Ashgate Research Companion

to Multiculturalism. Aldershot: Ashgate.Lopez, M. (2000) The Origins of Multiculturalism in Australian Politics 1945–1975. Melbourne:

Melbourne University Press.Marcus, A., J. Jupp and P. McDonald (2009) Australian’s Immigration Revolution. Sydney: Allen

and Unwin.Martin, J. (1972) Community and Identity. Canberra: ANU Press.Martin, J. (1978) The Migrant Presence. Sydney: George Allen and Unwin.Office of Multicultural Affairs (1989) National Agenda for Multicultural Australia. Canberra:

AGPS. URL (consulted October 2011): www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/agenda/agenda89/executiv.htm

Putnam, R. (2007) ‘E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-first Century – The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize’, Scandinavian Political Studies 30(2): 126–42.


www.theaustralian.com.au/nationalaffairs/why-sheridan-and-the-immigration-minister-partedcompany-on-road-to-multiculturalism/story-fn59niix-12260396848124

www.minister.immi.gov.au/media/cb/2011/cb159251.htm4

www.immi.gov.au/media/publications/multicultural/agenda/agenda89/executiv.htm



Roth, B.M. (2010) The Perils of Diversity: Immigration and Human Nature. Washington, DC: Summit Publishers.

Sarrazin, T. (2010) Deutschland schafft sich ab (‘Germany Is Doing Away With Itself’ or ‘Germany Is Abolishing Itself’). Berlin: DVA.

Tarvan, G. (2012) ‘No Going Back? Australian Multiculturalism as a Path-Dependent Process’, Australian Journal of Political Science 47(4): 547–561.

Williams, J. and J. Bond (2013) The Promise of Diversity. Melbourne: Grosvenor Books.Zubrzycki, J. (1964) Settlers of the Latrobe Valley. Canberra: ANU Press.

Author biography

Jan Pakulski is Professor of Sociology at the University of Tasmania and Fellow of the Academy of the Social Sciences in Australia. His publications include Postmodernization (1992), The Death of Class (1996), Postcommunist Elites and Democracy in Eastern Europe (co-edited 1998), Globalizing Inequalities (2004) and Toward Leader Democracy (2012).



Documents

Pakulski (2014) - Confusions about multiculturalism