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PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS FOR STATEN ISLAND’S
TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM
Dr. Cameron E. Gordon
Assistant Professor of Finance
Dr. Jonathan Peters
Assistant Professor of Finance
College of Staten Island/The City University of New York
Staten Island Project
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY PRESENT PROBLEMS AND FUTURE SOLUTIONS FOR STATEN ISLAND’S TRANSPORTATION SYSTEM Introduction This report covers a very important topic: Staten Island’s transportation system and its economic future. The key question this report discusses is whether this system is extensive enough, efficient enough, and effective enough to meet the needs of the Staten Island community, the Staten Island economy, and the New York City region as a whole. The Problem Staten Island’s transportation system can be summarized according to strengths and weaknesses. The strengths include a relatively extensive bus transit system; a “24-7” ferry service into and out of Manhattan, which operates at no charge to passengers; a heavy-rail commuter line that serves one segment of the Island; three bridge links into New Jersey and one into Brooklyn; and a number of surface road expressways and arterials, which carry large volumes of traffic relatively reliably. The weaknesses of the system include the total absence of subway links to the rest of New York City; no rail service on the Island outside of the SIRT; an almost complete lack of transit to New Jersey; a road system that is circuitous in many places, overtaxed in others, and clearly inadequate to meet future projections of travel; no ferry service to the Island within the growing private ferry system that crisscrosses New York harbor; gaps in bus service and general issues of lateness in all forms of transit service; heavily congested roads and bridges; and an average commute time, regardless of mode, that is among the longest in the nation, the region, and the City. Potential Solutions Various options exist for expanding both the transportation infrastructure of Staten Island and the level of service provided by that infrastructure. A discussion of these can be organized strategically in terms of time frames (i.e., those actions that could be taken within less than a year (short-term), those that could be taken within one year to three years (medium-term), and those that could be taken in more than three years (long-term). It is very important that these options be considered as part of an overall systemic improvement and not just piecemeal and isolated improvements. The list of these options includes the following: Short-term improvements (less than one year) Re-routing of existing buses to account for travel pattern changes Enhanced scheduling of bus service for more frequent and faster service with lower headways Traffic signal coordination Increased traffic law enforcement and management Increased frequency of Staten Island Ferry Service Increased express bus service
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Medium-term improvements (between one year and three years) Expanded ferry service Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lanes including integrated links to Staten Island Rapid Transit (SIRT) stations Improvements to highway geometrics, access and exit points from major highway corridors Strategic widening of service roads with enhanced and increased turning bays Park-n-Ride facility expansions Improved bus waiting areas, paved bus stops, passenger shelters at most stops and improved route markers Dedicated express bus lanes across major river crossings Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) improvements and investments Express buses and/or jitney service with direct service to major regional airports Long-term improvements (more than three years) North Shore rail reactivation West Shore rail spur between North Shore line and SIRT Link up with Jersey City light rail Subway link to Manhattan and/or Brooklyn Light rail corridor on Verrazano Bridge Integration of Staten Island rail with New Jersey Transit (NJT) rail system and possible “ring route” Pricing and Revenue Issues Staten Island travelers produce in excess of $400 million in bridge tolls each year. The PA and the MTA make in excess of $200 million each year in profit from these tolls above the operating costs of these facilities. These resources are used in part to subsidize the transportation system of the whole New York/New Jersey Metropolitan Region. To what degree Staten Island has profited from the reasonable reinvestment of revenues collected on its soil is an interesting question. It is certainly the case that the poor average commuting time for Staten Island residents as well as the heavy dependence on private automobiles for many local and regional trips does not speak well for the Staten Island transportation system. Although a number of transportation planners and advocates frequently state that transportation improvements on Staten Island need to be funded and that revenue sources are lacking for these transportation improvements, the reality is that the Staten Island Corridor and county appears to produce in excess of $250 million in transportation funds each year. How much is reinvested in the corridor needs to be explored. Such reinvestment could include subsidies to lower or eliminate fares on mass transit on Staten Island.
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Next Steps Next, research tasks will be necessary to consider the feasibility, cost, implementation, and economic development impacts of the proposed system improvements and pricing strategies that have been discussed. The tasks ahead include the following: R1: Prioritizing across Options Many different strategies have been offered here and they have essentially been suggested as a package. But what piece of the package should be emphasized and by how much? Which actions should come first, which later? A more detailed study of proper staging and prioritization of transportation improvement should be conducted. R2: Costing Options Part of the prioritization process, of course, involves cost. This study has made a diagnosis, provided a framework for possible solutions, and provided specific ideas to fill in that framework. Obviously, a next step is to cost out some of these ideas. R3: Feasibility And Implementation Studies of Individual Options Many of the options discussed in this report seem fairly straightforward but, as always, the devil is in the details. The details of implementation of particular alternatives and sets of alternatives needs to be spelled out and considered in more detail. R4: Financing Options Who will pay for system improvements? Can Staten Islanders afford it? If the assumption is made that all gross cost must be borne immediately and by Staten Islanders alone, the answer may be “no.” But transportation financing is a complex interaction of costs borne by different levels of government at different times. Once costs have been estimated, it is critical to do more detailed assessment of who will pay how much and when. R5: Governance and Management Many gains to transportation improvements are lost due to bad or uncoordinated management of the investment. Careful study of who currently does things in a specific transportation area and who should do things after an improvement is made must be conducted to ensure long-term success. This is particularly true of Staten Island, which is the smallest borough in the City of New York, closer geographically and in many ways to a completely different state, whose major bridge crossings are run by a bi-state independent authority. R6: Benefits of Improvements The benefits of transportation improvements need to be assessed as rigorously as possible and at as detailed a level as necessary. True, benefits-assessment is more of an art than a science. But omitting it leads generally to bad decisions or, even if the overall decisions are good, bad projects actually built on the ground. More detailed specification and analysis of benefits of transportation improvement options needs to be conducted.
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Introduction and Overview
This report covers a very important topic: Staten Island’s transportation system and its
economic future. The key question this report discusses is whether this system is
extensive enough, efficient enough, and effective enough to meet the needs of the Staten
Island community, the Staten Island economy, and the New York City region as a whole.
In many ways the transportation system of New York City is a wonder that has served the
region in general and Staten Island in particular, fairly well. However, demographic and
economic changes over the past four decades and changes that are projected to come over
the next four decades may require substantial changes to the area’s existing transportation
infrastructure in order to preserve and enhance the economic competitiveness of both
Staten Island and the region as a whole.
This report conducts a review of the existing transportation infrastructure and then
examines various options that could improve the functioning of that infrastructure. This
report is a preliminary effort that will rely on summarization of existing data and
analysis. The findings of the review could then serve as the outline for a larger and more
detailed assessment of the feasibility, cost, and economic development impacts of
specific improvements to Staten Island’s regional road, water, and mass transit system,
and changes to the pricing of that system, which could be conducted in the future.
This review will be divided into four parts:
(1) Overview of Staten Island’s current regional transportation system and assessment of
its overall performance
(2) Potential improvements to Staten Island’s transportation system: short-term, medium-
term, and long-term
(3) Pricing strategies for Staten Island and regional transportation
(4) Recommendations for further study
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Section (1) Overview of Staten Island’s current regional transportation system and
assessment of its overall performance
What transportation infrastructure does Staten Island have and how well does it work?
This section focuses on that basic question with respect to Staten Island transportation
and briefly outlines and describes:
• Staten Island’s physical geography and population;
• Staten Island’s existing intra-borough road, rail, mass transit, and water transportation
network;
• usage and performance of that system;
• linkages between the on-island network to the rest of the region (i.e., to the other four
boroughs of New York City, New Jersey, the local airports and seaports, and outlying
regions).
The focus will be mainly on passenger travel, though there will be some discussion of
freight traffic as well, where relevant. Existing planning studies, which have looked at
the performance of the current system, will be extensively relied upon.
A. Staten Island’s physical geography and population
Staten Island is 58 square miles in area with 19.1% of the area of New York City. (U.S.
Census). The Island’s greatest length is from St. George on the North Shore to
Tottenville on the tip of the South Shore, a distance of 13.9 miles; its longest width is
between Fort Wadsworth and Howland Hook, a distance of 7.3 miles. Staten Island is
the borough farthest from Manhattan, five miles from it at its closest point. The Island is
closer geographically to Brooklyn, separated from that borough by a one-mile stretch of
water known as the Narrows, and to the State of New Jersey, which at its closest point
along the Arthur Kill, is less than 500 feet away (Jackson, 1995).
The 2002 population of Staten Island is currently 457,383 people, according to the U.S.
Census. This population is expected to continue to grow, with a projected 569,636
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people on Staten Island in 2020 and 630,683 by 2030 (based on NYSIS at Cornell
University – the official U.S. Census Bureau partner for Population projections). Staten
Island had a population density of 7,886 people per square mile in 2002. That is about
30% of the average for the five boroughs (26,680) and about 100 times the national
average (79.6).
Staten Island is the borough that had the highest population growth of any county in New
York State from 1990 to 2000 – 17.1% in ten years. One must keep in mind, however,
that while this growth is outstanding from a New York State and East Coast perspective,
it is actually slow growth from a national perspective. Staten Island’s growth was 450th
in terms of growth nationwide.
To get a more finely tuned and longer-term vantage point on Staten Island’s population
growth relative to the U.S. and the City of New York over the last half of the 20th
century, consider the following statistics in Table 1.
Table 1: 1950 to 2000 Population
Growth
United States: +86.0%
New York State: +28.1%
Manhattan: -21.5%
The Bronx: -8.1%
Brooklyn: -9.9%
Queens: +43.9%
Staten Island: +132.6%
Source: U.S. CENSUS
Staten Island has had tremendous growth since 1950 in relative terms. It has grown more
than four times as quickly as New York State has in the same period, and more than 50%
faster than the national average during that period. What explains that pattern, of course,
is that Staten Island started from a very low base population when compared to
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Manhattan and other boroughs. With low base numbers, rapid growth is relatively easy to
attain and as the borough’s population base is getting larger, its growth relative to the rest
of the country has slowed, though, as mentioned before, it is still the top growth area in
New York State.
Another interesting point to consider is how Staten Island population growth compares to
the other five boroughs of New York City. Only Queens has grown more in terms of
total population between 1950 and 2000, and all the other boroughs have shrunken in
terms of population. Manhattan, in fact, has lost more than one-fifth of its population
during the period. These intra-city shifts are very important things to consider in terms of
transportation investment planning.
B. Staten Island’s Passenger Transportation Infrastructure
The population of Staten Island, living in this physical and geographical location, is
served by a passenger transportation system that consists of five major components:
(i) local streets and roads
(ii) highways and automobile arterials (including bridges)
(iii) mass transit buses and supporting facilities
(iv) passenger ferry and supporting facilities
(v) subway/light rail system
Each of these components is briefly described below.
(i) local streets and roads;
(ii) highways and automobile arterials (including bridges)
Staten Island’s surface road network can be broken down into three parts: local streets
and roads, which are intended to circulate travelers within a local area; highways and
arterials, which are intended to move people quickly from one local area of the Island to
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another; and connectors, which link Staten Island to points off of Staten Island (in this
case bridges only, since there are no tunnels going into or out of the Island. Connectors
can also be said to include those stretches of road servicing the bridges exclusively).
In terms of local streets and roads, Staten Island is served by a limited surface road
system that in some cases dates to the 17th century in terms of physical location and lane
size. In particular a number of cross-Island links occupy easements that were stagecoach
roads that were most likely predated by Native American trails (Burrows and Wallace,
1998). Arthur Kill Road, Richmond Road, and Amboy Road are typical examples of
such roads. While they may be picturesque in terms of their winding nature, they were
not designed in most cases to handle the traffic loads that they now carry.
A second series of roads dates from the late 18th to mid-19th century. Hylan Boulevard
and Victory Boulevard (formerly the Richmond Turnpike) and Richmond Avenue were
established at a later date and have somewhat better road capacity and road design.
Staten Island, for the most part, lacks the grid system of streets that was imposed on
Manhattan.
Figure 1 shows the major automobile routes on Staten Island (these routes obviously
serving mass transit buses and freight-carrying trucks as well). Some of these routes –
the Staten Island Expressway (SIE), the West Shore Expressway, the Korean War
Veterans Parkway, and the Willowbrook Expressway – were built especially to speed
auto traffic and have physical characteristics such as controlled access exit and entry
ramps, which are designed to increase traffic flow. Other routes, such as Father
Cappadanno Boulevard and Hylan Boulevard, are local streets that have evolved into
major carriers of traffic simply because of their geographic location.
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FIGURE 1: MAJOR SURFACE ROADS ON STATEN ISLAND
(Source: NYCDOT)
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Much of the existing highway system on Staten Island – the Staten Island Expressway
(SIE) and the West Shore Expressway as well as the partially completed Richmond
Parkway (now named the Korean War Veterans Highway) that was planned to extend
past Richmond Avenue along the Island and meet the SIE at Sunnyside – was outlined by
Robert Moses in early plans developed in the mid-1960s. The Willowbrook Expressway
was planned to extend past Victory Boulevard to link up with the unbuilt South Shore
Expressway at Great Kills (at the Gateway National Recreation Area). The South Shore
Expressway was planned to follow the South Shore coastline from Arrocar to Tottenville.
These final segments have not been built and likely never will be.
As far as arterials that are non-local roads, the SIE is a major route; 61% of trips on the
Expressway begin or end on Staten Island. It is also a very busy road. An average of
147,000 vehicles per day pass the Todt Hill Road exit. There are six travel lanes: three
eastbound and three westbound. The maximum flow rate is 2,200 vehicles per hour per
lane. (One interesting side note: the SIE was originally planned to be four lanes in each
direction) (NYSDOT 2002).
Although included in the category of roads and arterials for discussion purposes, bridges
in many ways constitute a category in and of themselves, providing linkages between
Staten Island to the surrounding community by four toll facilities – three that link Staten
Island to Central New Jersey and one that links to Brooklyn.
The New Jersey bridges are operated by the Port Authority of New York and New Jersey.
These bridges include the Bayonne Bridge (opened in 1931), the Goethals Bridge
(opened in 1928), and the Outerbridge Crossing (also opened in 1928). All three bridges
provide two lanes of travel in each direction for a total of 12 crossing lanes. As no road
capacity has been added to these bridges since their original construction, this number has
been constant since 1931, despite major increases in bridge-crossing traffic.
The one bridge linking Staten Island to the rest of the City of New York is the Verrazano-
Narrows (V-N) Bridge. The V-N opened in 1964 as the last great project of Robert
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Moses and was designed with built-in capacity for expansion. By 1969, it was already
necessary to open the lower deck and expand from three lanes in each direction to six
lanes in each direction (Reier, 2000).
On average, 196,041 vehicles a day cross the V-N Bridge to and from Brooklyn; 92.7%
are automobiles. 179,788 vehicles a day cross the Port Authority Staten Island Bridges to
and from New Jersey; 91.9% are automobiles. There has been strong growth in traffic
on the Outerbridge Crossing, which recently passed the Goethals in terms of total
vehicles per year; yet most of the focus has been on the Goethals Bridge due to its heavy
truck traffic volume.
The lack of new infrastructure in the Outerbridge Crossing is particularly distressing due
to the significant infrastructure investments that are being made in Middlesex County,
NJ. The new Driscoll Bridge over the Raritan River as well as the new Route 9 and
Route 35 bridges and ramp facilities will expand the road capacity of the region in order
to move the strong seasonal traffic between New Jersey and New York over the
Outerbridge Crossing; yet no capacity improvements are being considered to expand the
capacity to move traffic through and on Staten Island (NYMTC, 2001). It should also be
noted that there are ongoing maintenance issues on the Goethals and Outerbridge
Crossing due to their advanced age, mainly the likelihood of long-term overnight closures
to provide needed repairs. These closings will be very disruptive to regional traffic
flows, especially since the Outerbridge Crossing is very remote from other alternative
routes that will be needed to be taken to bypass service closures.
(iii) Mass Transit buses and facilities
The NYC Transit Authority (NYCTA) (part of the Metropolitan Transit Authority
[MTA]) operates 709 buses on Staten Island on 822 route miles. Staten Island buses
served approximately 39,650,000 passengers in 2002. This is slightly less than the
Detroit Bus System at 41,400,000 passengers annually, and more than the Phoenix Bus
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System at 31,600,000. On average, 140,000 riders use the system every weekday
(NYCTA 2002).
Publicly run buses in New York City and on Staten Island have three tiers of service.
There are Local buses, which make local stops. There are Limited buses, which run
along local routes but skip some of the stops that local buses make. There are Express
buses, which are designed to run with few stops between points on Staten Island and
points elsewhere. 63.2% of the Express bus routes run by the MTA in NYC were on
Staten Island in 2002.15.5% of the Local bus routes run by the MTA in NYC were on
Staten Island that same year. There are 31 Local and 24 Express bus routes. Staten
Island has two bus depots, accounting for 9.1% of the New York City depot space. There
are currently plans to build a new bus garage in Charleston on the South Shore, though
this is currently in a site selection process. Money for construction has not been allocated
and the facility planned is a bus storage lot/garage – not a full-service and maintenance
facility for site location (SIBP, 2004a, p. 7; NYCTA, 2002)
(iv) Passenger ferry and supporting facilities
The major transportation link between Staten Island and Manhattan and, in fact, the only
physically direct link, is the Staten Island Ferry.
Eighteen million passengers rode the iconic orange vessels of the Staten Island Ferry
during 2001, a daily average of almost 50,000 people a day. The service, which is run by
the NYC Department of Transportation, has experienced an increasing volume of riders
recently. After a 5% dip during NYC fiscal year 2001 (with the tragedy of 9/11 playing
an obvious role), the number of riders on the system increased by 3.3% in FY02 and
another 3.3% in FY03 (New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2004a, p. 53).
There is no charge for the service in either direction.
(v) Subway/light rail system
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After some fits and starts, rail service on Staten Island began in 1860. It became “rapid
transit” in 1884, along the familiar line that is known today, though with different
stations, after a number of ownership and other management changes. The passenger
train operator teamed up with the B&O Railroad, which used the line to carry freight.
Service along the North Shore began in 1886 along with a spur into South Beach (Leigh
and Matus, 2002).
Today, the Staten Island Rapid Transit Operating Authority (SIRTOA) runs the Staten
Island Railway (SIR) and is part of the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA).
SIRTOA operates and maintains the commuter rail line on Staten Island pursuant to a
lease and operating agreement with the City of New York. Only the main trunk line from
the St. George Ferry Terminal to Tottenville is still operating. The North Shore Branch,
which originally had connections to New Jersey, and the South Beach Branch, are no
longer in service. The last passenger trains on both the North Shore and South Beach
Branches ran on March 31, 1953. The North Shore ROW still exists, but the South
Beach Branch was eventually de-mapped and the tracks have been removed. The North
Shore Branch saw its last freight train in 1990.
What currently remains in service is the single 14-mile branch line that runs from the St.
George Ferry Terminal to Tottenville, with a very short spur line continuing from the
Ferry Terminal to the Staten Island Yankees ballpark where service is run before and
after ballgames. The service, run by the NYCTA, had an annual ridership of
approximately 4 million passengers in 2000 (New York City Office of Management and
Budget, 2003). Service costs $2.00 and can be paid for with a regular MetroCard.
However, all fares are collected at the St. George Ferry Terminal, either when passengers
board trains at that station or leave trains at that station. Otherwise, no fare is collected
from passengers who embark and disembark at stops other than the ferry terminal. (Fare
collection outside of St. George was eliminated in 1997 as part of the "One City, One
Fare" program, and riding free between stations other than St. George is perfectly legal
[SI Advance, 2004].) As all fares are payable by MetroCard, there are free transfers from
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the SIRT to buses on Staten Island or subways and buses in Manhattan (assuming they
are used within the two-hour period for transfers).
C. Usage and performance of Staten Island’s transportation system
The transportation system that Staten Island has in place is fairly dense and extensive,
particularly compared to other transit systems across the country. But who uses it? And
how well does it perform relative to the demands and needs of its users? This report does
not seek to make a formal assessment or judgment of the system. However, some salient
facts give a picture of the way in which transportation on Staten Island functions or does
not function, as the case may be.
Regardless of travel mode, Staten Islanders have the longest average commute in the
nation – 43.1 minutes each way – according to the U.S. Census American Community
Survey (ACS). This average commute time on Staten Island is about equal to that of the
Bronx and Queens. This compares to the average New York State commute of 31.7
minutes, the average United States commute of 25.5 minutes, and the average Staten
Island commute in 1990 of 39.4 minutes. According to the ACS seven of the 12 worst
commutes in the nation are in the New York Metropolitan area: The Bronx; Queens;
Staten Island; Brooklyn; Nassau; Monmouth County, NJ; Suffolk County, NY; and
Westchester County, NY.
First, consider the users of Staten Island transportation. Relative to the other four
boroughs of New York City, Staten Island is heavily auto-dependent. Staten Island has
the lowest percentage of commuters using mass transit in New York City (30.5% of trips
to work in 1990). For 1990 the figures were: Manhattan – 59.6%, Brooklyn – 57.4%,
The Bronx – 53.7%, and Queens – 47.4%. 79.8% of SI commuters to SI workplaces
travel in a private automobile (U.S. Census, 1990).
Staten Islanders are also much more likely to own a car than other New York City
residents. 237,031 vehicles were registered on Staten Island in 1999, compared to
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246,316 vehicles registered in Manhattan that same year. In other words, almost as many
cars were registered on Staten Island, despite the fact that Staten Island has less than half
of Manhattan’s population. There were 54.3 vehicles per 100 persons on SI versus 14.1
vehicles per 100 persons in Manhattan (NYMTC, 2001).
However, the dependence on autos varies widely across the Island. A recent report noted
that:
vehicle ownership on Staten Island is among the highest in New York City
with 1.38 vehicles per household, more than double the city-wide rate of
0.62 vehicles per household. In the more recently developed areas of
Community Boards 2 and 3 the vehicles per household figure is 1.44 and
1.65 respectively. Again these figures represent averages across the island,
with a higher number of vehicles per household in low-density
developments. In specific neighborhoods at the census tract level the range
of vehicles per household has reached 2.9, with seven tracts having figures
in excess of three times the city-wide average. (Staten Island Growth
Management Task Force Final Report, 2003, p. 8).
Despite this auto-dependence, Staten Islanders are six times more likely to use mass
transit to travel to work than the national average: 28.4% on Staten Island versus 4.7%
nationally (U.S. Census, 2000). This rate of transit use is down from 30.5% in 1990, but
still much higher than comparable rates in the classic automobile city of Los Angeles
(10.2% in 2000).
The discussion thus far has briefly described the overall usage of the system. Now
consider the performance of each transportation system component system in turn
(examined primarily just for on-island transport for the moment; linkages between the
Island and the surrounding region are discussed in more detail in the section on system
linkages).
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(i) Local streets and roads; and
(ii) Highways and automobile arterials (including bridges)
Many of Staten Island’s roads and arterials suffer from severe congestion - that is, too
many vehicles traveling on too little road space. The congestion problem is not uniform,
as the graphic in Figure 2 suggests. This figure shows the “volume-to-capacity” ratio.
This is a measure of how intensively a road is being used. A volume-to-capacity ratio
greater than 1 suggests that capacity has been exhausted. A ratio between 0.75 and 1.0
suggests a congested road with theoretical capacity to spare but whose function is
impaired because of traffic. This map indicates various bottlenecks on the SIE,
consistent clogging along Richmond Road and Arthur Kill Avenue, and slow traffic
along Richmond Avenue. Since road capacity is not expanding while traffic continues to
grow, the trends for traffic congestion are obviously not positive.
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FIGURE 2: TRAFFIC CONGESTION ON STATEN ISLAND
(Source: NYCDOT)
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The physical conditions on the Island’s surface roads are variable. Table 2 shows some
selected statistics on pothole repairs on Staten Island during FY03 and the first four
months of FY04, and the percentage of streets in FY03 with a pavement rating of “good.”
These figures show that quite a few potholes were filled on Staten Island (22,439 in
FY03), indicating, of course, the presence of quite a few potholes to begin with. Just
above 80% of the borough’s streets had “good” pavements in FY03, which is dead center
in the ratings for boroughs during that period, and not far below the best ranking in
Queens where 83.4% of the pavements had a “good” rating. In this sense, Staten Island
did a lot better than Manhattan, the bottom of the bunch, which had 67.9% of its
pavements in good condition. Of course, an 80.3% good rating still implies that 19.7% of
the pavements on Staten Island were “not good,” with corresponding impacts on traffic,
ride quality, and safety. This is particularly important for Staten Island, as the road
network in the borough functions as the backbone of most of the transportation network,
whether bus transit or private automobile, unlike other boroughs that have non-road-
dependent transit systems.
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TABLE 2: SELECTED ROAD QUALITY MEASURES FOR STATEN ISLAND AND
NEW YORK CITY
(1) Small Street Defect (Pothole) Repairs
FY03 FY03 FY04
Annual 4-Month 4-Month
Actual Actual Actual
- Staten Island 22,439 3,086 5,122
(2) Streets Maintained with a Pavement Rating of Good (%)
- City-wide 79.8%
- Bronx (%) 81.5%
- Brooklyn (%) 79.4%
- Manhattan (%) 67.9%
- Queens (%) 83.4%
- Staten Island (%) 80.3%
Source: New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2004b, pp. 40-41
Table 3 provides some additional information on capital expenditures for highways.
What stands out most from these figures is the relatively low costs of highway
maintenance on Staten Island, most likely due to a still relatively low population density.
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TABLE 3: SELECTED NYC ROAD INDICATORS FY03 Annual
Actual
FY03 4-Month
Actual
FY04 4-Month
Actual
CAPITAL BUDGET PERFORMANCE INDICATORS
Lane Miles Resurfaced
(In-House) 717.4 372.5 379.3
- Bronx 75.3 46.0 41.3
- Brooklyn 197.3 91.0 109.1
- Manhattan 89.1 54.7 49.7
- Queens 226.5 111.6 104.9
- Staten Island 90.5 49.3 51.2
- Arterials 38.8 19.9 23.2
Square Yards Milled by Borough 2,085,210 973,496 1,031,726
- Bronx 168,979 36,486 106,202
- Brooklyn 596,420 223,745 348,414
- Manhattan 359,296 192,108 56,389
- Queens 609,360 327,426 319,075
- Staten Island 121,198 74,912 29,506
- Arterials 229,957 118,819 172,140
Cost per Lane Mile Resurfaced
by Borough (Includes Milling) $91,231 NA NA
- Bronx $82,848 NA NA
- Brooklyn $80,157 NA NA
- Manhattan $109,167 NA NA
- Queens $97,983 NA NA
- Staten Island $79,820 NA NA
Cost per Ton of Asphalt Placed
by Borough (Includes Milling) $93.55 NA NA
- Bronx $85.78 NA NA
- Brooklyn $86.75 NA NA
- Manhattan $109.23 NA NA
- Queens $95.53 NA NA
- Staten Island $86.79 NA NA
Source: New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2004b, p. 43.
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The physical placement and direction of a road is certainly not the only characteristic that
will affect a driver’s travel time, safety, and overall driving experience. Road engineers
often refer to a road’s overall operational performance, a measure that is affected by the
abilities of the driver, the design of the road, and the overall environment in which the
road is placed (NCHRP, 2003, p. 2). Design characteristics (sometimes referred to as
“geometrics”) include things such as sight lines, curves, lane width, and highway
alignment.
How do Staten Island’s roads stack up on these dimensions? The recent SI Corridor study
by NYSDOT did a rather extensive assessment of Staten Island’s major highways and
recommended that there be improvements to lane width on key road segments, improved
signaling on most roads, building of turning bays in roads used heavily by trucks, and
major changes to Hylan Blvd. (e.g., use of a morning and afternoon third lane by
eliminating street parking).
Although the Corridor study stopped short of making definitive recommendations, it did
indicate the following problem areas that needed to be addressed, along with possible
solutions:
• the SIE/West Shore Expressway interchange should be rebuilt; service roads could be
connected between Slosson and Renwick Avenues by removing the unused
Richmond Parkway ramps;
• a substandard ramp at Slosson Avenue should be eliminated;
• a new interchange at the south end of the West Shore Expressway should be built to
provide service continuity from Howland Hook, the Goethals Bridge, and Gulf
Avenue to South Avenue;
• Improvements at the terminus of the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Expressway and
Victory Boulevard should be considered;
• The transit capacity along the Staten Island bridges and the SIE should be expanded,
particularly a BRT lane on I-278, and dedicated bus/HOV lanes on the Goethals
Bridge.
22
(iii) Mass transit buses and supporting facilities
It has already been mentioned that Staten Islanders have the longest average commute in
the nation, averaged over all travel modes. Staten Islanders also have the longest average
commute by mass transit in New York City. The SI commute by mass transit takes 68.4
minutes on average. The next worst borough is The Bronx at 54.2 minutes. (2000 U.S.
Census). The already cited NYSDOT Staten Island Corridor Study found that 25% of
Staten Island bus stops lacked sidewalks and 90% had no pedestrian shelters. 25% of bus
stops lack bus route markers. An extreme example, but by no means an unusual one, is
shown in Figure 3, which shows one of the poorer stops on Victory Boulevard. It is
important to note that this stop serves as both a Local and an Express bus stop.
23
Figure 3: Eastbound Bus stop on Victory Boulevard between Travis Avenue and Signs Road
(Source: Authors. Note that this is both a Local and an Express bus stop)
24
One measure of transit performance, even more important to most commuters, is
something called “headway,” which refers to the time between when the last bus leaves
(or other transit vehicle) and the next one arrives. Noontime average headway on the
Staten Island Local bus system (as opposed to Express Buses) is the longest in the City -
19.4 minutes, 261% longer than Manhattan (7.4 minutes) and 49% longer than Queens,
the next longest at 12.98 minutes. (NYCTA, 2002).
Staten Island does have the fastest buses on average in the City at 13.05 miles per hour.
The slowest buses are in Manhattan with an average speed of 7.4 miles per hour. But
since buses are road network-dependent, actual travel time can vary significantly from
the average depending upon the route taken and the time of day that travel is undertaken.
Also, because Staten Island has a very limited rail system and significant reliance on the
ferry, there is a three-mode-shift system for many commuters. Staten Island mass transit
users have a heavy dependence on Express buses (63% on NYC routes) (NYCTA, 2002).
(Note: the performance measures on speed are probably due in part to the fact that the
bulk of the Staten Island bus fleet is devoted to Express bus service; 312 buses are
dedicated to Local service and 397 are dedicated to Express bus service which is both
drive-r and equipment-intensive and does have higher route speeds [Source: Author
conversations with NYCTA staff]).
(iv) Passenger ferry and supporting facilities
While images of the Staten Island Ferry are romantic, with its free trip across the expanse
of New York harbor, its colorful and distinctive vessels, and its extensive use by tourists
seeking to snap pictures of the Statue of Liberty, the service is in fact a commuting hub
and the vast majority of its riders use it as such. How well did this system operate from
their point of view?
According to NYC DOT statistics, the service ran “on-time” 97.8% of the time during
FY03. In the first four months of FY04 its on-time performance was slightly lower (i.e.,
25
97.0%). Canceled ferries are counted separately (since they never departed they cannot be
“late”). The number of round trips canceled rose from 31.5 in FY02 to 41 in FY03.
These cancellations were attributed to unexpected mechanical problems during the month
of June 2003 (New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2003, p. 85).
Preliminary figures for the first four months of FY04 suggest, however, that this level of
interruption may not have been an isolated anomaly. Table 4 provides some additional
information.
TABLE 4: STATEN ISLAND FERRY
OPERATIONS
FY03 ANNUAL
ACTUAL
FY03 FIRST
4 MONTHS
ACTUAL
FY04 FIRST
FOUR MONTHS
ACTUAL
Round Trips Completed 16,709 5,686 5,643
Round Trips Canceled 41.0 5.0 37.5
On-Time Trips (%) 98.0% 98.2% 97.0%
Total Passengers Carried (000) 19,244 6,751 6,580
Source: New York City Office of Management and Budget, 2004b, p. 42
The exact definition of “on-time” is not clear (usually such definitions contain some
slippage, allowing for discrepancies of at least a few minutes or so from the printed
schedule). Assuming, however, that the definition of “on-time” means roughly what it
says it means, a 97% to 97.8% on-time rate means that out of 100 ferry rides, the ferry
will leave on schedule 97 to 98 times out of 100. For a five-day a week commuter with
ten round-trips a week, this implies that the ferry will be late two or three times during
ten weeks of commuting, or 10 to 15 times during 50 weeks of commuting (roughly a
typical year’s worth). With this many trips, there is also a good possibility of
encountering one or more of the 31.5 round-trip cancellations that occurred during FY02
(discounting the higher number reported in FY03 as an anomaly though, as mentioned
above, it may not be).
26
(It should be noted that one round-trip cancellation actually means a cancellation of two
trips – the departure scheduled from one end and the return trip scheduled from the other
end. Thus a cancellation of 31.5 round trips in a year amounts to a cancellation of 63
single trips. In addition, due to the extensive number of mode shifts in ferry travel, any
delay at one point often causes the traveler to miss a connecting mode of travel that may
very well increase travel time above and beyond the actual time of the delay of the ferry.)
Operationally, the Staten Island Ferry reported a decline in the average cost per
passenger, from $3.10 in FY02 to $2.89 in FY03. This came about entirely from an
increase in the number of riders and not any changes to ferry operations. The Samuel
Barberi accident, though, is obviously having major effects on operating costs, effects
that have not yet been clearly measured or manifested.
There are some significant operational issues surrounding the Staten Island Ferry that the
accident revealed quite starkly. These issues will not be discussed in detail here. What is
clear is that the ferry service has not utilized operating procedures that are standard in the
maritime industry; that there have been and will continue to be increased expenses in the
operations of the service to bring it up to acceptable standards regarding safety; but also
that the operating costs of the service before the accident were higher than typical, mainly
because of a unique 30-hour workweek for staff, which has resulted in significant
amounts of overtime pay in the past. A proposal has been made to shift ferry operations
to a 40-hour workweek, though the likelihood of this happening is uncertain (GMATS,
2004).
(v) Subway/light rail system
The SIR is a heavy rail system, using R44 cars, which are of a 1973 vintage. These cars
were standard for the newest cars then in use on the subway lines in the other boroughs at
the time the MTA took over operations from the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad (B&O) in
1971.
27
Unlike the New York City Transit Authority (NYCTA), SIRTOA is subject to rules of
the Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) but operates under a waiver that permits it to
exempt itself from certain rules of equipment and operation usually required by the FRA.
This FRA status complicates any plan for possible combined freight and passenger
operation in the future, since any operation of freight equipment or connection to the
national railroad system would threaten its waiver. The system is grade-separated from
nearby roadways throughout most of its length.
SIR’s farebox recovery ratio in 2001 was 0.16—that is, for every dollar of expense, 16
cents were recovered in fares, the lowest ratio of MTA agencies. [NYMTC, 2001]
D. Staten Island Transportation Linkages to the Region
A scan of a regional map shows a striking fact: Staten Island is geographically much
more of an extension of New Jersey than it is of New York City (see Figure 4). Only a
narrow body of water separates the Island from New Jersey and Staten Island’s terrain
and climate is very closely linked to the Jersey Bayshore and Meadowlands to which it is
closest.
28
FIGURE 4: STATEN ISLAND AND THE REGION
(Source: PANYNJ)
29
The Staten Island economy is critically affected by transportation links to the region.
There are two dimensions to consider here: where do resident Staten Islanders work?
And which regional residents choose Staten Island as a place of employment?
First consider resident Staten Islanders and where they worked. Of these residents,
191,145 were in the workforce in the year 2000. Of this total, the following worked in
the following places in 2000:
Staten Island – 86,197
Manhattan – 53,249
Brooklyn – 29,425
Queens – 5,628
Hudson County, NJ – 3,017
Middlesex, Essex, & Union – +6,000
(2000 U.S. Census)
Meanwhile there were 120,243 people working on Staten Island. In 2000, these workers
lived in the following places:
Staten Island – 86,197
Brooklyn – 9,381
Queens – 5,249
Monmouth County, NJ – 3,167
Manhattan – 2,765
The basic pattern seems to be that Staten Islanders tend to work on the Island whereas
relatively few people from outside the Island come to work here. Part of that pattern has
to do with the distribution of jobs across the region but part of it has to do with
transportation links within the region. Of course, there is a link between job base and
transportation links as well. A detailed discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of
30
this report, but a review of specific transportation facilities that link Staten Island to the
rest of the region is relevant, and follows below.
(i) Local streets and roads; and
(ii) Highways and automobile arterials (including bridges)
As already mentioned, Staten Island has only four physical links to the region: the three
bridges to New Jersey and the one bridge to Brooklyn. The bridges are currently used by
automobiles and buses. There are no dedicated transit links across them, either in the
form of BRT or rail, although the V-N does dedicate lanes to buses during rush hours.
There is no tunnel linking Staten Island to either the rest of New York City or to New
Jersey.
Staten Islanders have to share these bridges with traffic that is merely crossing over the
Island on its way to other destinations off the Island. This is especially clear in the case
of truck traffic. Of the trucks arriving on Staten Island from New Jersey, only 24% have
Staten Island destinations; 43% are destined for Brooklyn. Fully 76% of the truck traffic
that arrived on the SI Expressway from New Jersey is through traffic (NYSDOT, 2002a).
(iii) Mass transit buses and supporting facilities
Today, Staten Island functions with almost no mass transit to New Jersey. There is one
limited private bus line that runs between Staten Island and New Jersey, on limited routes
and schedules and at relatively expensive prices1. In 1990, 93.8% of commuters from
Staten Island to New Jersey drove (with 76% of these driving alone). 88% of commuters
from Staten Island to Queens drove. 87.4% of SI commuters to Brooklyn travel in a
1 This is the bus number 122, run by the Red and Tan Bus Company. The bus (“Staten Island [East Shore] - Jersey City – Hoboken,”) operates between Staten Island (East Shore) and Hoboken via Hylan Boulevard, Steuben Street, Clove Road, Forest Avenue, Grove Street Station, Exchange Place/NY Waterway terminal, Harborside, Newport Mall, and the Hoboken PATH station. It has six weekday trips during the hours of 6:05am - 8:02am and 4:05pm - 5:38pm, with a cash fare of $3.50, or a ten-trip ticket for $55.10 and a 20-trip ticket for $110.20. There is also a monthly pass for $206.15. (Source: Red and Tan Bus Company, July 29, 2004).
31
private automobile (with 59% traveling alone and 28% carpooling). On the other hand,
71.1% of the SI commuters to Manhattan took mass transit in 1990. (1990 U.S. Census).
These auto-dependent destinations are in the growing counties of the region in terms of
population, yet they are almost unreachable by mass transit, at least directly. In fact,
Staten Island is the only county in about a 50-mile radius of Manhattan without a rail
connection to Manhattan. There is no train or ferry service between Staten Island and
Central New Jersey, and only the aforementioned private bus line with its very limited
service.
How can Staten Islanders get from New Jersey to Staten Island by transit? Currently they
are stuck with having to go first through Manhattan. Figure 5 shows the response from
“CommuterLink,” a regional alternative transportation planning group, to one of the
authors when asked for the most direct transit link between a Monmouth County, NJ
location to the College of Staten Island. This trip would involve six mode changes and a
two-block walk in Manhattan. Transit links between Staten Island and Long Island are
not much better. The Express buses that go through Brooklyn do not stop there, leaving
commuters with the option of going through Manhattan or taking a local bus, which
terminates in Bay Ridge, and having to make their way from there.
32
FIGURE 5: EXAMPLE OF TRANSIT LINKS BETWEEN MONMOUTH COUNTY,
NEW JERSEY AND STATEN ISLAND
(Source: Authors)
33
FIGURE 5 – CONTINUED – MAP OF SUGGESTED COMMUTERLINK ROUTE
(Source: Authors)
34
(vi) Passenger ferry and supporting facilities
Only one passenger ferry serves Staten Island. That is the publicly operated Staten Island
Ferry that runs one route from St. George on Staten Island to South Ferry/Whitehall
Street in Lower Manhattan.
In addition to the Staten Island Ferry, whose route system and frequency of service has
remained unchanged for many years, New York City itself has an extensive and growing
network of ferries, most of them privately operated. Figure 6 shows the latest incarnation
of that network. What is interesting to note is that none of those ferries, other than the
Staten Island Ferry, originates from and/or terminates on Staten Island, though many of
these ferries of necessity go right around the Island.
For more details on the operations of this private ferry system, see Appendix 2.
35
FIGURE 6: NEW YORK CITY’S PRIVATE FERRY SYSTEM
(Source: PANYNJ)
36
(vi) Subway/light rail system
Passenger rail of any sort has never operated between Staten Island and the other
boroughs of New York City or between Staten Island and New Jersey. There was rail
freight service along the North Shore Rail Road into Cranford, NJ that commenced three
years after the B&O bought the SIRT in 1885 and the company connected it with the
Central New Jersey (CNJ) by way of a rail-float bridge (Bogart, 1951, p. 22). The New
Jersey section of the North Shore Line, Cranford Junction-Arthur Kill Bridge was
purchased by NJDOT.
Freight rail service on Staten Island ended in 1990 with the closure of a Proctor and
Gamble plant in Port Ivory, but New York City is looking at various options for starting
it anew. A contract was recently let to rehabilitate the electrical and control systems of
the Arthur Kill lift bridge across the Arthur Kill, the longest vertical lift-span bridge in
the world, and the Howland Hook container port has been re-opened. These, among
other activities, could create a potentially strong demand and capacity for rail cargo
movement. (Eisenstein and Darlington, 2004)
Conclusions
This brief review of Staten Island’s transportation system can be summarized according
to strengths and weaknesses. The strengths include a relatively extensive bus transit
system; a 24-7 ferry service into and out of Manhattan, which operates at no charge to
passengers; a heavy-rail commuter line that serves one segment of the Island; three
bridge links into New Jersey and one into Brooklyn; and a number of surface road
expressways and arterials that carry large volumes of traffic relatively reliably.
The weaknesses of the system include the total absence of subway links to the rest of
New York City; no rail service on the Island outside of the SIRT; an almost complete
lack of transit to New Jersey; a road system that is circuitous in many places, overtaxed
in others, and clearly inadequate to meet future projections of travel; no ferry service to
37
the Island within the growing private ferry system that crisscrosses New York harbor;
gaps in bus service and general issues of lateness in all forms of transit service; and an
average commute time, regardless of mode, which is among the longest in the nation, the
region and the City.
This report now turns to some possible solutions.
38
Section (2) Potential improvements to Staten Island’s transportation system: short-term,
medium-term, and long-term
This section will discuss the various options that exist for expanding both the
transportation infrastructure of Staten Island and the level of service provided by that
infrastructure. The discussion will be organized strategically in terms of time frames
(i.e,. those actions that could be taken within less than a year (short-term), those that
could be taken within one year to three years (medium-term), and those that could be
taken in more than three years (long-term). Where possible, rough cost estimates will be
provided.
Short-term improvements: Those possible to complete in one year or less
Improvements to Staten Island’s transportation system will take time. There are,
however, some things that could be done within a year or less that could significantly
ameliorate Staten Island traffic problems and improve the borough’s economic position
within the region (at least those elements of its position that depend upon reliable and
efficient transportation links). Some of these possible options are considered next.
Sometimes these proposals are, or could be, beginning phases of longer-term projects.
None of these options are offered here with definite endorsements. They are offered for
discussion only. Further study would be needed before making recommendations for or
against any of them, and this list, while extensive, should not be considered exhaustive.
ST1: Re-routing of existing buses to account for travel pattern changes
One of the easiest things to change in theory is bus routing. Since buses have no fixed
guideways or infrastructure, save for bus shelters (Bus Rapid Transit [BRT] discussed
later on, being an exception), all it takes to change bus routes is to tell drivers to drive
different roads.
39
This, of course, is not nearly as easy as it seems, not least because buses and their routes
are part of a system, and changing one route impacts the entire system, requiring general
changes in all or most route schedules, staffing, and operations. In addition, riders plan
their routines around existing stops, and if stops and routes are changed, particularly if
stops are eliminated, there will often be great protest from these riders, protest that must
be considered and planned around.
Having said that, there is good reason to consider an adjustment to Staten Island’s bus
routes. Many of the routes have not significantly changed for years while demographic
and economic activities on the Island that are served by those routes have changed
dramatically.
Figure 7 shows Staten Island’s bus route system in 1969. Compare this to Figure 8,
which shows the bus system as of 2004. What is immediately clear is that bus service has
expanded dramatically over the past 35 years. But at the same time, there are some
apparent routing anomalies given demographic and economic shifts during the
intervening years.
40
FIGURE 7: STATEN ISLAND BUS ROUTES IN 1969
(Source: scan from www.nycsubway.org/bus/maps/bklyn-si1969-frnt2-m.jpg, accessed August 2, 2004. Website: www.nycsubway.org)
41
FIGURE 8: STATEN ISLAND BUS ROUTES IN 2004 (Source: MTA)
42
One example of bus routing that should likely be changed is the service to Port
Richmond. Four buses ran to Port Richmond in 1969 and four buses still run there,
making this one of the better-served routes on the Island. Yet population has shifted
dramatically over the past 30 years and ferry service from Port Richmond to Bergen
Point, NJ, one of the major reasons to run so many buses to that terminus, terminated in
1962 (Jackson, 1995, entry on “Ferries”). Granted, to get there, these buses travel along
some heavily populated corridors, such as Victory Boulevard. But it would better serve
current needs to at least change the terminus of one or two of those routes to serve areas
more in need of the service.
The 1969 map also shows another interesting thing, namely a decline in bus service to
points to Brooklyn. It is true that there is relatively frequent bus service to the Bay Ridge
neighborhood at present. And it is also true that bus routes are being compared here, not
bus schedules, so frequency of service as opposed to breadth is not addressed.
Nonetheless, in 1969, five years after the opening of the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge, it
was possible to access Bay Ridge from various points on the Island without a transfer and
there was also bus service from the Port Richmond area to Downtown Brooklyn. Service
such as this could serve a real need now, given the increased connections between Staten
Island and Brooklyn formed since then.
This discussion focuses on regular bus service. Not in existence in 1969 but in existence
now is a whole network of Express buses that run larger vehicles with many fewer stops
than regular service (or its related but faster counterpart, limited bus service). Changes
to, and expansion of, this service should also be considered. Some of these potential
changes are relatively simple. For example, at least some of the Express buses to and
from Manhattan could make a stop in Bay Ridge, expanding the service between the
Island and that neighborhood. There is certainly enough existing demand, even with
relatively limited service; approximately 29,000 commuters move by bus between Staten
Island and Brooklyn each workday.
43
A detailed plan for bus re-routing is beyond a preliminary study such as this one.
However, at a minimum, service terminating at Port Richmond should probably be
decreased while service going to and from Brooklyn and the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail
should be increased. It must be conceded that changes to what is theoretically a flexible
network are not so easy in practice. Probably what could be accomplished in a term as
short as a year would be a fine-tuning of existing service that would basically add small
increments to service (e.g., adding a Brooklyn stop to Manhattan-bound Express buses, or
extending existing routes a small amount to extend the reach of existing lines). Such
changes would be very low-cost and should encourage little community opposition
(though in New York City, that is never a given). Of course more far-reaching and
longer-term route changes can and should be considered, particularly as other changes to
the transportation system are made. A seemingly obvious gap in planning that should be
addressed is the lack of a bus connection from Staten Island to the Hudson Bergen Light
Rail terminal in Bayonne, an option discussed in this report as a medium-term option.
ST2: Enhanced scheduling of bus service for more frequent and faster service with lower
headways
The option mentioned above discussed changes in bus routing. Closely related are
changes in bus scheduling. In other words, one can change the places that buses go and
how they get there. One can also change the frequency of buses along particular routes.
Staten Island has 42 numbered bus routes, not counting Express buses, which are
discussed separately in a different section. This number counts as separate routes
Limited-stop bus runs that are actually run on a single route with faster service and fewer
stops during rush hours. (SI Bus Schedule, September 2003)
The most frequently scheduled headway is eight minutes between buses. This headway
is run on the morning weekday peak hours between Howland Hook and the Staten Island
Ferry Terminal (the S40 bus); and the morning weekday peak hours between the ferry
terminal and Castleton Avenue (the S46). There is a nine-minute headway scheduled
44
during morning peak hours on the S53 route between Clove Road and Bay Ridge,
Brooklyn. There are ten-minute headways during the morning weekday peak travel time
on the S62, which runs up Victory Boulevard from the ferry terminal; the S91, which is
the Limited-stop bus on the S61 route from the ferry terminal to the Staten Island Mall;
and the S78, which runs from the ferry terminal up Hylan Boulevard. Quite a few buses
other than these have headways of 12 to 15 minutes, most of them running out to the
ferry terminal in the morning.
On the other end of the spectrum, the longest scheduled headway is one hour and 50
minutes, on the S93 Limited service between the College of Staten Island and Bay Ridge,
Brooklyn (the time between the next-to-last [5:10pm] and the last [7:00pm] departure).
Sixty-minute headways are common on the night runs of many bus routes, if there is
scheduled service at all. A few buses have daytime (though not peak-hour) headways of
40 minutes (e.g., the S55 and the S56) and 20- to 30-minute headways are common on
routes throughout the system.
The scheduling of bus service is very clearly oriented toward commuters to and from
Manhattan who travel during “standard” commuting hours( i.e., Monday through Friday,
roughly 6:00am to 9:00am traveling to the ferry and 4:00pm to 7:00pm traveling back
from the ferry). Service at other hours and in other directions falls off, and during the
weekends, service is reduced even further. That is the state of the scheduled headway.
Actual performance on the bus routes is worse, since buses are often late and are
sometimes canceled.
The problem, of course, comes for people who do not commute during “normal business
hours” or who are not traveling to work and leisure destinations in Manhattan. The issue
is very similar to Staten Island Ferry service: commutation, work, and living patterns
have been changing on Staten Island and the number of people overall who need to travel
has been increasing as well, yet frequency of service to account for these changes has not
seemed to occur.
45
One way to make bus service more attractive to users is to increase the number of times
that the buses actually run. A detailed proposal in regard to current bus schedules would
require more extensive study, and would also have to be analyzed in conjunction with
changes in the route system. One general possibility is to reduce both the lowest and the
highest headways system-wide. Eight minutes is now the shortest waiting time. Why not
make it six minutes? Putting aside the S93’s longest headway, if the longest waiting time
in the system is 60 minutes, why not make it, 30 minutes?
General mass transit studies show that if waiting time exceeds ten minutes, people begin
to become dissatisfied with the service and seek other alternatives (de Palma and Lindsey
[2001], Appleton, and Goldman [2004). Some systems, such as those in Shanghai, have
almost continuous bus service on many of their routes, mimicking subway service levels
in Paris and Tokyo (Author field observations, 2004). The population densities on Staten
Island may not yet justify that low a headway (though on selected heavily traveled routes,
this should not be ruled out), but the scheduled waiting time on many routes does appear
high and, given that population will continue to grow, an increase in overall service is
probably warranted.
Two points need to be made. First, scheduled headway is worth little if buses do not
keep at least some semblance of adhering to the printed schedule. There is ample
anecdotal evidence that many Staten Island buses are unreliable in this regard, at least
intermittently. Tight dispatching and monitoring systems are essential, even more so
where frequent buses are run.
Second, there may be consideration, in some cases, of running smaller buses on a more
frequent schedule. Some cities, such as Washington, DC, do this on bus runs between
Metro stations that are not well-served by current buses, and have constant demands for
service, but not at the level that standard buses are designed to meet. Other cities, such as
Los Angeles, run small buses as a way of attracting people to transit. This is the case in
their separate system of buses that is run to serve the downtown area. This system, which
is subsidized to cost much less than the regular system, is also designed to encourage
46
people to frequent businesses in the downtown core. Smaller buses cost less to operate,
and are more flexible in traffic (Author field observations, 2002).
Whichever options are chosen, there is no question that increased frequency of buses will
increase operating costs and, to the extent that new buses need to be purchased and
facilities to service those buses are upgraded or added to, capital costs as well. Within a
year, only modest changes could be made. But these changes could have some high
payoffs in terms of customer satisfaction and ultimate increase in service usage,
particularly if the buses themselves are kept as close to the schedule as possible.
ST3: Traffic signal coordination
Critical to traffic flow on surface streets is the timing and sequencing of traffic lights at
intersections. It is conceptually obvious that if traffic lights are set to change either too
quickly or too slowly, or if the timing of lights at one intersection has no relationship to
the timing to lights at a nearby intersection on the same road, then traffic will not travel
as quickly as it could and in severe cases may become jammed.
While obvious in principle, timing and coordination of traffic signals, particularly in a
congested city like New York, is not easy in practice. It also turns out that New York
does not have the most advanced traffic signal technologies in this regard. Technologies
that allow the use of real-time traffic information to adjust light timing and sequence on
an ongoing and responsive basis are not in use here, although such technologies do exist.
Los Angeles is a U.S. leader in this regard (Paaswell et. al., 2004, p. 13).
Currently, there are approximately 5,800 traffic signals under computer control
throughout New York's five boroughs. The New York City Department of Transportation
is expanding its traffic signal control system through its “Topics IV Signal
Computerization Project,” under which an additional 2,187 traffic signals and about 400
associated system sensors in the Bronx, Brooklyn, and Queens will be brought under
computer control. (TransCore Corporation, 2004).
47
At least two options for improvement are possible on Staten Island. The shortest-term
change would be to conduct a traffic study on the Island with the express purpose of re-
programming existing traffic lights. The results of such a study could be used to make
signal adjustments at the worst trouble spots. Such reprogramming has to be done based
on a careful study since an arbitrary adjustment could cause more problems than it would
solve.
A longer-term option would be to make Staten Island a pilot project for an NYC DOT
installation of advanced traffic light signaling. As mentioned above, New York City
currently uses a static coordination system: lights are programmed and their sequence
remains fixed until reprogrammed. A more advanced alternative is a dynamic system
using intelligent transportation systems. An intermediate option is to make Staten Island
the focus of the current NYC DOT “Topics IV” project, mentioned above (note: Staten
Island is not currently on the list of boroughs where this project is to be extended).
Whichever option is chosen, more intelligent and better-controlled traffic signaling is a
necessity given Staten Island’s current traffic conditions.
ST4: Increased traffic law enforcement and management
Related to traffic signal coordination is the enforcement of existing traffic laws and
management of traffic flows at intersections. Even with good signaling, human
intervention, in the form of direction by uniformed personnel, is a necessity.
By many anecdotal and subjective accounts, Staten Island appears to have little traffic
enforcement relative to other boroughs. Indeed, Staten Island appears to be the most
lightly policed of the five boroughs. Staten Island has two of the largest police precincts
in the City in terms of physical area – New Dorp's 122nd Precinct, which covers 27
square miles with a population of 191,090, and Tottenville's 123rd Precinct, with 17.5
square miles and a community population of 89,772. These two precincts are,
respectively, the largest and second-largest precincts geographically in the five boroughs.
48
The 122nd Precinct regularly schedules four patrol cars for each of three eight-hour
shifts, while the 123rd utilizes four patrol cars per eight-hour shift. The 120th Precinct is
relatively small with an area of 14.1 miles, but is the busiest in terms of law enforcement
activity. That precinct has a total of 17 patrol cars scheduled across its three shifts
(Harrell, 2004). Given that the aforementioned patrol cars must deal with all issues, not
just traffic enforcement, a current imbalance of resources may be suggested.
Two potential changes might be considered. The shorter-term change is to redeploy
some of the existing police force on Staten Island to focus on traffic trouble spots (a
curative approach) and to enforce existing laws more aggressively (a preventive
approach). Of course basic public safety must not be sacrificed in such an exercise, but if
there is room for more effective deployment of existing resources, devoting some of these
resources to traffic management could yield very high benefits on what are, by all
accounts, lightly policed roads.
Another change, probably longer-term, is an increase in overall police force deployed on
Staten Island. This may not necessarily require an increase in permanent police staff on
the Island. More analysis is required, but possible “borrowing” of traffic enforcement
police from other boroughs or use of other police forces with traffic enforcement
authority and capabilities (e.g., the National Park Police) might be useful strategies,
especially during peak travel times and/or for special occurrences such as public events,
which can temporarily increase congestion.
ST5: Increased frequency of Staten Island Ferry Service
One option that is relatively easy to implement quickly would be to increase the number
of trips made to and from St. George on Staten Island to South Ferry on Manhattan.
Current service during peak hours on weekdays is frequent: there are 49 departures to and
from Staten Island during the weekday peak hours of 6:00am to 9:30am and 4:00pm to
49
8:00pm.2 Put another way, of the 103 departures per weekday between Staten Island and
Manhattan, 49 of these are peak-hour departures. On the weekends, where service runs
hourly much of the day and never more frequently than on the half hour, there are 64
departures daily.
Clearly the ferry service is being run with a large orientation toward standard, Manhattan-
bound, peak-hour office commuters who work during the week. This is particularly clear
when comparing the weekend and the weekday schedule, where ferry service is reduced
by close to 40% in terms of daily departures. During an entire weekend day the ferry
only runs 15 more departures either way than it does during the rush hours, either way,
during a weekday.
This frequency of service might not be an issue if the timing of service matched the
timing of demand. However, the peak-hour commuting pattern has spilled over into
other hours and other days. It is true that few people leave for work earlier than 6:00am,
but many more than used to leave for work after 9:00am (the time when rush hour service
stops from Staten Island) and many leave work after 8:00pm (the time when rush hour
service stops from Manhattan). Many people also work on weekends, at least
intermittently, when service is thinnest. And leisure and other non-work activities, an
increasingly important generator of trips, obviously often take place during non-peak and
weekend hours. From this standpoint, particularly on weekends, the current ferry service
2 As of August 2004, ferry service ran as follows: from Staten Island to Manhattan, ferries run on 20-minute intervals from 6:00am and 8:00am (a total of seven departures); 15-minute intervals from 8:15am and 9:00am (a total of three departures); 20-minute intervals from 3:30pm and 5:30pm (a total of seven departures); and 15-minute intervals from 5:45pm to 7:00pm (a total of six departures). From Manhattan to Staten Island, peak-hour service runs every 20 minutes from 6:30am to 8:30am (a total of seven departures); 15-minute intervals from 8:45am to 9:30am (four departures); 20-minute intervals from 4:00pm to 5:00pm (four departures); 15-minute intervals from 5:15pm to 7:00pm (eight departures); and 20-minute intervals from 7:20pm to 8:00pm (three departures). Outside of these peak periods, weekday service runs every half hour between 9:00am and 3:30pm and between 8:00pm and midnight, from Staten Island to Manhattan. From Manhattan to Staten Island, the service runs every half hour between 9:30am and 3:30pm and between 8:00pm and 12:30am. Between midnight and 6:00am, weekday service from Staten Island to Manhattan runs hourly and from Manhattan to Staten Island it runs hourly from 12:30am to 6:30am. On Saturdays and Sundays, service runs hourly from Staten Island to Manhattan between 7:00pm and 11:00am and from Manhattan to Staten Island from 7:30pm to 11:30am. Otherwise the service to and from Staten Island and Manhattan runs every half hour on Saturdays and Sundays.
50
is likely a hindrance to economic development as it limits access to and from Staten
Island to Manhattan.
This issue takes on even greater prominence when one considers transit mode
connections at St. George. Buses and SIRT trains at the terminal do not necessarily wait
for the ferry to come in, and given the relatively low frequency of service on these
connecting modes, overall travel time can be increased dramatically. The problem is
service reliability: if all modes run as they are supposed to, travel times are predictable
and can be planned around. However, on-time performance is poor enough on both
ferries and buses, that travel times are not predictable. What is not predictable is hard to
plan around and things that are hard to plan around can be disincentives to economic
development.
One obvious proposal to consider is to increase the frequency of ferry service. There are
many variants of this option. One possibility considered here is to expand ferry service to
run every 15 minutes, every weekday, from 6:00am to midnight in both directions, and
every 30 minutes on weekends, from 6:00am to 1:00am. Hourly service between
midnight and 6:00am would be kept as is (or, since hourly ferry service does not start
from Manhattan until 12:30am both during the week and weekend, to avoid a slight
degradation in current service, one could leave hourly service as it is from that point from
Manhattan).
One reason to adjust to a single headway of 15 minutes is consistency. Ferry users will
not have the experience of missing a ferry because the 4:00pm ferry that they thought
they were going to catch actually left at 3:50pm because the ferry is now on a 20-minute
schedule not a 15-minute one or, worse, wait for the 8:30pm ferry because they did not
realize that weekend service from Manhattan changed to hourly at 7:30pm. Seasoned
travelers do start accounting for such things, but there is still much to be said for
consistent headways and departure times.
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Of course the other reason to increase service to such an extent is the intensity of use and
demand. Manhattan is one of the most densely populated areas in the world and a large
source of employment and entertainment for Staten Islanders. Frequent and consistent
ferry service, at most times of the weekday and weekend, would likely make Staten
Island a more desirable place for people to consider living (particularly on the North
Shore, which surrounds the ferry terminal) and working.
In addition, disruptions in ferry service, which do occur, impact a more frequent schedule
less severely than a less frequent one. A canceled ferry when ferries are set up to run
hourly on a weekend after 7:00pm, for example, has a much greater effect than the same
canceled ferry has when ferries run every half hour or, even better, every 15 minutes.
People make living and working decisions at least in part based on their average travel
times and the consistency of their travel experience. Frequent service on the ferry would
advantage Staten Island when people make such choices. This may also influence choice
of mode for many riders, mainly an increased dependence on automobile travel as a way
of circumventing the random mass transit disruptions.
Current levels of service reliability definitely should be increased as well. An
approximately 98% on-time performance sounds excellent, but what that means is that of
the 103 daily departures (during a 24-hour period), at least two of those trips are likely to
be late (calculated by multiplying 98% by 103, which equals 100.94 “on-time” trips).
Round-trip cancellations, though less frequent, are even more disruptive. This sort of
“random” element to ferry travel both degrades the commuting experience and has real
economic cost. People whose time is especially valuable are likely to avoid ferry travel if
lateness and cancellation are significant likelihoods.
As far as actually implementing increased ferry service, particularly on the scale
discussed here, there are probably two major issues: cost and capacity. If the Staten
Island Ferry were to increase its service to every 15 minutes between 6:00am and
midnight in both directions (ignoring, for simplicity, the possibility of an additional one
departure from Manhattan by leaving unchanged the half hour trip at 12:30am to avoid
52
lowering current service levels at that hour), this would increase the number of weekday
trips (a weekday here referring to a 24-hour period) from 103 to 152, a roughly 50%
increase over current levels. A move to half-hourly service on the weekends between
6:00am and 1:00am would increase the daily trips from 64 to 80, an increase of roughly
25% over current service levels.
This obviously would increase operating costs significantly, and these costs would have
to be covered somehow. If there is a successful move to a 40-hour workweek for the
Staten Island Ferry crew, this might allow for savings that could cover some of the
additional expenses. Also, changes to current loading and offloading procedures would
probably be necessary, such as allowing all-day loading onto the ferry at both upper and
lower levels of the Manhattan terminal and reverting to the previous policy of allowing
passengers (mainly tourists) to stay onboard if they desire rather than have to disembark
and get back on the ferry for the return trip to Manhattan.
There is the additional factor of capital cost. One or more new vessels would have to be
purchased to enable this level of service and new vessels would also likely entail
additional supporting capital costs in the form of additional dry-docking and waiting bays
and possibly enhancements to the new ferry terminals that are due to be completed at the
end of this year. However, prior additions of vessels to the Staten Island Ferry were
funded under the federal transportation act of TEA-21, so local funds required for these
purposes need not be large.
The other obvious issue is safety. Some of this issue pertains to the threat of terrorism,
which is the likely rationale for requiring everyone to disembark ferries after the trip,
regardless of their ultimate disembarkation point. The bigger issue, however, is related to
harbor traffic. New York Harbor is one of the busiest in the world and increased ferry
service obviously increases both the traffic levels (and congestion of course) and the
likelihood of accidents. This need not be an insurmountable obstacle, but it obviously
needs careful consideration.
53
Finally, the quality of connecting transit service at either end of the ferry is also
extremely important. Unless one lives and/or works in St. George or Lower Manhattan,
the advantages of more frequent ferry service will be lessened by poorly coordinated and
infrequent connecting bus and subway service on either end.
ST6: Increased Express bus service
Besides regular bus service, Staten Island has a number of Express buses. These buses
run exclusively to Manhattan, though most of them pass through Bay Ridge, Brooklyn to
get there, using the Verrazano Narrows Bridge to do so. Six of the routes take the
Goethals Bridge into New Jersey to make their way into Manhattan.
There are 26 numbered routes (though the X12 and X42 are linked variants of a single
route). Some of these buses go as far as the southern boundary of Central Park. Many of
them terminate at various destinations in Lower Manhattan.
In a few cases, scheduled service is more frequent than the regular or Limited bus service
(seven minutes, for example, on the morning run of the X1 bus and on the evening run of
the X17 bus). Eight-, nine-, and ten-minute headways are not uncommon on various
schedules, though there are many 15-, 20-, and 30-minute headways as well, depending
upon time of day and direction of travel, and some 45- and 60-minute intervals also.
The price of travel on Express buses is currently twice as much as the standard bus fare:
$4 versus $2. It is also almost exclusively a weekday system. In this regard it very much
resembles a commuter service, and its higher price has an element of premium to it that
would tend to appeal to workers whose income is higher, and also their value of time,
justifying the higher expense.
Actual time savings vary. To take one isolated (and not necessarily typical) example, the
average time it takes on the S62 bus to the ferry and then on to the Number 6 train up to
33rd Street, is, during peak travel hours, around one hour and 15 minutes (Author field
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observations, 2003-2004). The Express bus, if it is on time, runs perhaps around one
hour. This assumes that both systems are running optimally. The Express bus, in this
case, has no mode shifts and also saves potentially 15 minutes. Late-running service
obviously can quickly nullify the time advantage, though not the convenience advantage.
Most Express buses have regular bus alternatives, often running along the same routes for
much of the way or on nearby routes. There are a few exceptions in terms of specific
segments, mainly on the South and West Shores of the Island, though these are not
generally extensive.
Like much of mass transit on Staten Island, the Express buses are run with the classic 9 to
5, Monday through Friday, Manhattan-work-bound/Staten Island home-bound commuter
in mind (though Express bus service generally offers service late into the evening during
weekdays). And like much of mass transit on Staten Island, there are perhaps good
reasons to shift this model, not least because not as many people fit it any more.
One simple expansion of Express bus service is to simply extend the system’s operating
hours to weekends (a time during which, with a few exceptions, the system does not run).
The weekday frequency of service need not be maintained on weekend days. Weekend
service would probably start later, and possibly also end later. Another option is to
increase the frequency of Express bus service during the week. A third possibility is to
add some stops (likely no more than one or two to maintain highest possible average
travel speeds) in un-served areas. For example, the buses that go through New Jersey
could stop there for pickup and discharge, perhaps near a New Jersey Transit facility, and
the buses that go through Bay Ridge could stop there. A fourth option is to extend the
geographic limits of service, perhaps with Manhattan-bound buses going further uptown.
And a fifth possibility is to add entirely new routes.
Once again, this brief report cannot consider this alternative in depth. And the
possibilities offered above are obviously not mutually exclusive. The same issues that
apply to other bus system changes apply here: cost, management, and investment
55
expenditures would all increase, but service quality and frequency would also. It must be
noted that while extra stops and extensions of routes add costs, they also add potential
revenue by allowing more riders to use the service than do currently.
Medium-term improvements: one to three years
MT1: Expanded ferry service
As already discussed, there is only one ferry between Staten Island and anyplace else: the
Staten Island Ferry. There is also a growing network of ferries which ply the New York
harbor, many of which skirt directly around Staten Island. Staten Island could be plugged
into this network relatively easily.
Likely candidates for additional links include the following:
• Tottenville to Perth Amboy
• South Ferry to Brooklyn (e.g., the old Brooklyn Navy Yard)
• South Ferry to Jersey City and/or Hoboken
• Port Richmond to Bayonne
These links could be fast ferries (which have no formal definition as a class but for which
the term sometimes refers to vessels that travel 25 knots or more) or regular-speed ferries,
or some combination thereof. Besides Tottenville, other points between the South Shore
and New Jersey probably have the latent demand to support traffic on a well-considered
and well-designed route.
As noted in Appendix 2, the current model of ferry service in New York Harbor, outside
of the Staten Island Ferry, is private ownership and operation of the ferries. This model
has the advantage of generally ensuring that any service will be high-quality and efficient
because operators must turn a profit and riders will not pay for the service if it is not up to
certain standards. This model also has the advantage of requiring no operating costs from
56
the public sector, though it will involve certain capital and maintenance expenses when
public piers are involved, as they are in New York and New Jersey. However, these costs
can be generally recovered by charging ferry operators fees for their use of the piers.
This, too, is done in New York and New Jersey.
Moreover, the private ferry model has worked well thus far. Service is growing and
expanding. This is certainly due to the fact that there is a high enough base of high
income commuters who can afford and are willing to pay for the service, and to the fact
that, given current travel alternatives, ferries generally offer significant time savings and
convenience.
There are, of course, limitations to the private ferry model, some inherent to the private
market model itself, some due to other factors. For one thing, private service lives and
dies by the market. There was, for example, a high-speed ferry between Keyport, NJ and
Manhattan that quickly filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy in December 2003 because its
actual ridership did not meet the company’s projections (Reuters Investment Profile,
2004). Current ferry operators are profitable but generally private operators are prepared
to quickly cut or eliminate service if profit goals are not met, unlike public operators who
do not make profit and who also are more accountable to the public at large.
In addition, the private ferry service currently offered is not truly “mass” transit. Its
expense limits the number of commuters who can use it on a regular basis (generally
high-paid workers in the financial services industry) or to day-trippers on leisure trips
where the elasticity of expenditure is looser than for fixed everyday commutation costs.
Thus many ferry operators augment their income with recreational package travel to
special events, baseball games, and fireworks. As large as the numbers of travelers on
private ferries are and as fast as they have grown in the past, they are still dwarfed by the
numbers traveling on the Staten Island Ferry and their frequency of service is far lower as
well. If private ferry is to be a primary mode of travel then an appropriate level of subsidy
should be included in the provision of this service – either from NYC, the PANYNJ, or
the MTA.
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Ferries, public or private, do have other problems, as well, having to do with navigability
of waterways at selected times. For example, the Highlands and Atlantic Highlands
ferries in New Jersey were rendered inoperable during the extremely cold weather of
January 2003 when icing occurred. As cold weather in winter months here is a perennial
problem, this could be an important ongoing issue. (This particular problem could be
ameliorated or even eliminated if the U.S. Coast Guard was committed to permanent ice-
breaking in the harbor, a mission that the agency has been reluctant to add to its post-9/11
expansion of duties.) Additionally, ferries cannot operate during periods of dense fog or
in choppy waters. These are, however, much less common problems in New York
Harbor.
The problem of operations during bad weather should not be made too much of because
these problems have been infrequent and occur on other modes as well, particularly
airlines. However, unlike airlines, if ferries become key commutation routes for large
numbers of commuters, even infrequent but complete service disruptions can have severe
economic consequences for the region.
This argues for ferries as either a primary mode of travel with a secondary mode as a
backup, or ferries as a secondary mode backing up a primary mode. With regard to the
former case, the Highlands and Atlantic Highlands ferries do have a transit backup in the
form of privately operated buses (mostly run by Academy Bus Lines) that run along the
Jersey Bayshore into Lower Manhattan. Ferry-dependent commuters, in times of icing or
other disruptions, could and did use these buses as alternatives, and many people use
these buses daily in any case as they serve points not served by ferries as well as those
that are. Granted, bus travel is much slower and less comfortable, to say nothing of less
scenic, than ferry travel, but as the saying goes, it will do in a pinch. Such an alternative
is probably necessary to have in place for significant increases in ferry routes and
services.
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A recent report by the Partnership for New York City makes an argument for the latter
option of ferries as a backup for primary modes of travel, and also argues that ferries are
and will continue to be a critical component of the region’s economic development:
During the course of …interviews for this study, business leaders
expressed a great deal of interest in creating an integrated network of
ferries that would serve residents and commuters. In particular, chief
executives in Lower Manhattan are acutely aware of the value of ferries in
the aftermath of 9/11. Even after the PATH service to Lower Manhattan
resumes, these business leaders expect that segments of the Lower
Manhattan workforce will want to have the option of using ferries.
Moreover, workers in Manhattan, especially those in Lower Manhattan,
perceive ferry services to be a reliable form of transportation during an
emergency, as evidenced by the demand for ferry service during the
August 14th blackout.
While this study did not analyze the transportation or economic
development benefits of ferries, [the study] examined best practices for
ferry systems in the United States and overseas and reached the following
conclusions:
While ferries cannot handle the volume of passengers served by a subway
line, ferries are a valuable niche service that can fill some significant gaps
in the transportation network. For example, high-speed ferry service could
make it easier for commuters from the northern suburbs to reach Lower
Manhattan. Thousands of new riders could take advantage of ferry routes
that served the northern suburbs, Long Island, the five boroughs and
travelers headed to or from the city’s airports.
An expansion of ferry routes for commuters, city residents and visitors
could boost the value of the city’s waterfront property, encourage
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economic activity and accelerate the redevelopment of neighborhoods in
Brooklyn and Queens. Property values and economic activity in the
Hudson County waterfront community of Weehawken rose in part as a
result of ferry service that began in 1986.
An increase in ferry options that cater to visitors and residents interested in
leisure-time activities would create new opportunities to promote the city
as a tourist destination and as a global city that is getting easier to
negotiate.
In light of 9/11 and the August 14th blackout, businesses consider ferries
an important part of their disaster recovery planning. People migrate to
water-borne transportation during emergencies when other modes of
transportation are temporarily out of service. By expanding the network of
ferry routes, New York City can increase the resilience of its overall
transportation system. (Partnership for the City of New York, 2003, p. 17)
Whether ferry service will be a niche player filling peripheral needs or something larger,
there is no question that Staten Island is a prime candidate for such service, being, as it is,
an Island that is close to New Jersey and in the middle of New York Harbor.
Expanded ferry service does indeed increase capital requirements, not just to serve the
ferries directly, but also to serve the commuters once they get off the ferries and need to
go somewhere else beyond the ferry terminal. Thus expansion of ferry service must be
done as part of a general system-wide expansion and not in isolation.
Thus far this discussion assumes the expansion of a privately operated ferry system.
Other options for Staten Island are possible, including a public-private mix of operators,
or a privately operated system with public subsidies for underserved but unprofitable
travel routes, or to bring the overall price of travel down to appeal to a wider base of
users. Expansion of service could include both models. For example, new routes on
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Staten Island could begin as private operations and, if successful, could be broadened
through public subsidies or publicly operated routes piggybacking off the privately
operated ones.
This is not to argue for or against a particular option at this point, or to argue against the
current system. The current system works well for what it is. But if broad ferry service,
as opposed to niche ferry service, is contemplated, then significant public money is likely
to be involved. For example, the Partnership for the City of New York, in its report cited
above, argues for a public ferry system, run by the MTA:
New York City will never realize the potential of its waterways to
supplement rapid transit – at a fraction of the cost of underground subway
lines – unless the responsibility for planning, financing and operating the
ferry system serving the city rests with the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. It is critical to expand ferry routes available to visitors,
suburban commuters and city residents. A truly intermodal public-private
system would be best managed by the Metropolitan Transportation
Authority. (Partnership for the City of New York, 2003, p. 3).
Whichever way a private ferry system is run or operated, several issues must be
addressed. One issue is air quality. On the one hand, an expansion of ferry service
should take cars off of roads, reducing automobile emissions. On the other hand, diesel
ferries in particular are typically very dirty in terms of their airborne wastes, and a
significant increase in ferry service in the harbor could lead to some significant air
pollution problems. Also, the siting of ferry terminals can cause a great deal of
community opposition, particularly if these passenger terminals are tied in with freight,
which some analysts propose could be taken on by such ferries as a way of reducing
freight truck traffic and increasing revenues generated by the ferries themselves. Finally,
harbor safety and congestion are also issues. New York Harbor is already heavily used,
and increased ferry traffic will only increase the likelihood of congestion and possible
accidents. There are also potential organized labor issues depending upon how maritime
61
unions are involved (a real issue if freight handling is done using passenger ferries). One
thing that is not an issue is dredging, because current channel depths are generally deep
enough to handle shallow-draft vessels like passenger ferries. None of these issues
implies that ferries are therefore not an option, but they are not a “free ride” either
(Weisbrod, 2000).
One final note on possible financing sources for new ferries and terminals: for vessel
construction, federal funds are available under Title XI of Federal Ship Financing
Program of the Merchant Marine Act of 1936, as amended by the National Shipbuilding
and Shipyard Conversion Act of 1993, administered by the U.S. Maritime
Administration. This act provides loan guarantees for commercial U.S. flag ships
constructed in U.S. shipyards. As for terminals and other associated costs, these can be
funded through the Ferry Boat Discretionary Program as well as through CMAQ program
of TEA-21 (Weisbrod, 2000, p. 14). Federal transportation programs are currently being
reauthorized and these details may change, however.
MT2: Bus Rapid Transit (BRT) lanes including integrated links to Staten Island Rapid
Transit (SIRT) stations.
What is Bus Rapid Transit (BRT)? There is no firm definition, but it essentially is an
enhancement to bus mass transit that incorporates certain infrastructure and system
management features that are found in light and heavy rail transit systems. One study put
the matter as follows:
Bus rapid transit is not defined by any single feature or technology.
Instead, it coordinates innovations in service patterns, rights-of-way,
vehicle design, fare collection, passenger information, branding, and
intelligent transportation systems to meet the needs and constraints of the
particular urban area it wishes to serve. (Paaswell et. al. 2004, p. iii).
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The classic feature of BRT is grade-separated and limited access lanes that are reserved
strictly for buses. These lanes, which are analogous to corridors for trains, are often
served by expanded bus shelters that resemble light rail stations at each bus stop, with
comfortable seating, climate-controlled environments, and other amenities possibly
offered; fixed schedules, strictly adhered to, with named stops and schedules that are
designed to look like subway schedules; and intelligent transportation systems that
provide real-time information to riders, and where that information is used to manage the
buses to keep as closely to schedule as possible. The buses themselves may also be of a
different, and superior, quality to those plying local routes. (Paaswell et al., 2004).
This is BRT in a general sense. Of course grade-separated fixed bus routes, like railways,
require rights-of-way (ROW) that can be devoted to buses. Among the possibilities are:
(1) the use of existing and underutilized or unutilized ROW; (2) creation of new ROW
out of existing space; or (3) the use of existing but underutilized highway or road
capacity for dedication to buses during certain times of day using traffic flow restriction
techniques.
Staten Island, as it turns out, already has some BRT. A mile-long, dedicated bus lane
currently operates in the median of the Staten Island Expressway during the morning
peak hours and the NYSDOT is planning to extend this lane another 1.5 miles to the
west. This current arrangement is an example of option (3) above (i.e., the use of
existing highway capacity to carve out dedicated bus lanes). The Staten Island
Expressway arrangement is an example of what is known as a “contraflow bus lane,”
which converts an outbound traffic lane for the use of inbound bus traffic during the
morning rush hour. In this case, the SIE has a dedicated eastbound bus lane in its median
running about one mile between the Staten Island Railway tracks and the Verrazano-
Narrows Bridge toll plaza (Paaswell et al., 2004, p. 4).
It should be noted that the SIE contraflow lane is part of a larger contraflow system that
includes lanes on the Gowanus Expressway, the Church Street bus lanes in Manhattan,
the median bus lane on the Staten Island Expressway, and a contraflow lane on the
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Prospect Expressway. In the morning peak hour, 239 buses use the northern portion of
the Gowanus, carrying 7,800 passengers into Lower Manhattan; it is estimated that five
lanes would be required to handle an equivalent volume of single-occupant vehicle traffic
(Paaswell et al, 2004, p. 5).
On Staten Island, there are no current examples of options (1) or (2) for dedicated BRT.
One possible example of (1) would be to use old railway ROW for BRT, with or without
corresponding renewed light rail service along that same ROW. One possible example of
(2) would be to “carve out” an additional lane for BRT on the SIE by narrowing existing
lanes or using existing shoulders on that roadway.
Without taking a position on any of these options, the pros and cons of each one should
be briefly mentioned. As far as (1) – using existing ROW for BRT, assuming it is
available – this has the advantage of lowered expense and enhanced feasibility. After all,
the ROW is there ready and waiting to be utilized. The main problem with this strategy
is that there may be other competing uses for the ROW, some of which may have more
potential from a transportation improvement point of view. For example, while the North
Shore Rail Line ROW could be converted to a BRT, this could preclude the later
establishment of light rail service, which might be a superior long-term option.
Competing uses of existing ROW, transportation and non-transportation, need to be
carefully weighed against one another. Where multiple uses can be supported by the
same ROW, this problem may not be as pressing.
As for (2) – creation of new ROW – this obviously can be very expensive and may not
even be feasible in densely populated areas. It does require some creativity in many
cases to find new ROW, and such creativity often finds space where none seemed to be
available. One option of BRT, for example, is to use the second lane out from the
sidewalk rather than the first lane, which allows for continued easy access to the street
from the road for service by commercial and other vehicles in well-developed
commercial areas.
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As for (3) – using existing but underutilized road capacity – contraflow lanes have the
obvious advantage of low cost and high feasibility, but the disadvantage of limited time
of use, and use only in a single direction. Also contraflow lanes may not be an option at
all where there is simply too much traffic in both directions at the same time. While New
York State has been a pioneer in this area, and will continue to be so out of necessity, this
option is only a part of any BRT solution to transportation problems.
The recent Staten Island Expressway Corridor Major Investment Study included a wide
range of options for further improvements, including a reversible or two-way busway
with stations and dedicated access ramps, lanes that would be shared between buses and
carpools, or even a “high-occupancy toll” option in which single-occupant vehicles
would be able to pay a fee to access the bus/carpool lane. Providing the option of
integrating this service with a future Gowanus service should be an important criterion of
choice. If construction of a busway does proceed on the Staten Island Expressway, the
Port Authority should also consider extending it over the Goethals Bridge and into New
Jersey.
There are, by the way, many examples of BRT, here and abroad, that have been built both
with the use of existing ROW or which have created new BRT out of already congested
areas. Grade-separated, exclusive bus ROW are the archetype of a bus rapid transit
system. In North America, Pittsburgh has developed a system of busways using
abandoned or underutilized rail corridors with a current total system 18.5 miles in length,
and Park-n-Ride lots located at many of the stations along its route, serving more than
48,000 passengers daily (not including riders attracted by a 2.3-mile extension. Seattle
has built a 2.1-mile bus tunnel through its downtown, thus creating a busway in a Central
Business District where no land had previously been set aside. The tunnel links up five
underground stations and serves over 23,000 passengers daily. Finally, Ottawa, Canada’s
Transitway system stretches 19 miles, 22 stops, and carries over 200,000 passengers
daily. The travel time saved through these systems runs from five minutes per passenger
trip up to 25 minutes, depending upon the route. In addition, the experience of the bus
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rider is much enhanced through superior vehicles, stops, and facilities (Paaswell et al.,
2004, pp. 4-5)
Overseas, there has even been more use of BRT – Curitiba, Brazil; Bogota, Colombia;
and Quito, Ecuador being prime examples. BRT there has a higher average speed – 12 to
16 mph – as compared to that on a standard bus – 3 to 9 mph – and the frequency of
service is ten minutes or less (OECD, 2002).
It should be emphasized that for BRT to yield real savings in travel time, more needs to
be done than just dedicating lanes to buses. Vehicles that can be unloaded and reloaded
quickly should be used (these are generally low-floor buses, which have been estimated
to reduce loading time by 18% to 25%); prepaid or other forms of fare payment systems
which eliminate the need to pay a fare at the bus entrance, should be considered, thus
further reducing loading and unloading times; automated and “intelligent” routing and
dispatch systems, which can respond to real-time incident occurrence, need to be
employed; and advanced traffic signal coordination that employs real-time route
management information, thus allowing traffic lights to be retimed to allow buses to
adjust to traffic and other delays and remain on schedule, should be considered (Paaswell
et al., 2004). Some of these investments, such as traffic signal coordination, could and
should be broadened to include the whole transportation system. In addition, any
improvement program would include enhanced dependency on MetroCard access to
provide for faster bus loading times provided by improved fare collection. In the case of
Staten Island, that would require the deployment of more MetroCard sales points and
vending machines.
This discussion should make clear that BRT is a major investment which, to be effective,
requires broad changes to the overall transportation system in which it operates. True, it
is generally less costly to invest in than rail, but it is not cheap. For example, in building
the first phase of its Silver Line BRT, the City of Boston spent a total of $20 million for
the basic capital costs, including street reconstruction and new bus stops (Paaswell et al.
2004, p. 4). And, as far as rider preferences and potential time-savings, it generally does
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not match savings generated by well-designed and well-managed light rail or subway
systems. Some groups have talked about BRT as an alternative to things like rail, but to
do this is to misunderstand the economics of BRT. This is not to say that BRT cannot be
used alone, but that its travel time-savings and other advantages per unit cost in isolation
need to be closely analyzed and compared to other alternatives. Particularly on Staten
Island, where a light rail easement already exists, sole investment in BRT to the exclusion
of rail, without further analysis, could be imprudent.
Although most of this discussion has focused on BRT as a way of linking Staten Island to
other boroughs, an even greater value of BRT might be to improve connectivity within
Staten Island. Particularly if the North Shore rail line were reactivated, perhaps with a
West Shore spur, BRT could be an ideal way of connecting stations on the current SIRT
to these other lines. Even without new lines, BRT from SIRT stations could expand the
reach of this system, especially if both SIRT and BRT service were frequent. In many
ways, this would be an ideal integration, for the SIRT system is simple in structure and
many of its stations can be easily served by BRT because of nearby arterials (e.g.,
Giffords Lane in Great Kills, Richmond Avenue at Eltingville, and New Dorp Lane at
New Dorp)
MT3: Improvements to highway geometrics, and access and exit points from major
highway corridors;
MT4: Strategic widening of service roads with enhanced and increased turning bays
There is little question that automobile traffic on Staten Island’s surface roads is at a
crisis point. Besides the statistical and anecdotal evidence, the NYSDOT has examined
the problem extensively in its Major Investment Study of 2002 (NYSDOT, 2002a.
As already mentioned, Staten Island surface roads and arterials have many bottlenecks
and deficiencies. The nexus of many of these problems lies in the Staten Island
Expressway, which is “the only controlled access freeway carrying both commercial and
non-commercial trips from New Jersey (and points south and west) to Brooklyn, Queens
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and Long Island, along with serving trips by Staten Island residents” (NYSDOT 2002a p.
3). The study notes that 61% of the weekday trips on the SIE had an origin and/or
destination on Staten Island and that the route is also used by large numbers of Express
buses going to and from Manhattan. Congestion on the SIE and other routes that feed
into it is already heavy and projected to get heavier. The study predicts that by 2020
there will be a 19% increase in both transit and auto trips to and from and within Staten
Island (NYSDOT 2002a, p. 20).
Given this situation, the study analyzed and essentially recommended various capital
investments to improve the SIE and feeder routes. The road-specific improvements that
were discussed included:
• Reconstruction of the SIE/West Shore Expressway interchange, with a relocation of
mainline and entrance and exit ramps.
• Eliminating the discontinuity in service roads across Todt Hill by removing the
unused Richmond Parkway ramps and eliminating a substandard ramp at Slosson
Avenue.
• Construction of a new interchange at the south end of the SIE/West Shore
Expressway interchange to provide service road continuity from Howland Hook, the
Goethals Bridge, and Gulf Avenue to South Avenue.
• Controlling traffic volumes and speeds on the newly connected service roads through
moderate speed limits and timed traffic signals at service road intersections.
• Physical improvements at the terminus of the Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. Expressway
and Victory Boulevard, along with possible grade-separated turning movements at the
intersection of Victory Boulevard and Richmond Avenue.
• Major reconstruction, reorientation, and improvements of ramps at Sunnyside.
• Addition of ramps and a collector-distributor lane between Clove Road and
Richmond Road.
• Various local road widening, including that of Forest Hill Road from the College of
Staten Island to Richmond Avenue, Manor Road, Brielle Avenue, and Arthur Kill
Road between Richmond Avenue and Richmond Road.
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• Connection of Forest Hill Road and the College of Staten Island to the Martin Luther
King, Jr. Expressway.
• Connection of the Richmond Parkway terminus to Richmond Avenue (NYSDOT
2002a, p. 29; p. 45).
The study also discusses and puts aside some road-building alternatives that have been
discussed in the past. For example, completion of the final section of the Richmond
Parkway (now the Korean War Veterans Parkway), which now goes from the
Outerbridge Crossing to Richmond Avenue and which had been originally planned to
connect with the SIE, was not finished due to problematical impacts on the Greenbelt.
An alternative, to construct the Willowbrook Parkway from the Martin Luther King, Jr.,
Expressway to Great Kills, was determined in prior studies not to have sufficient benefits
relative to its costs (NYSDOT, 2002a, p. 3). Additionally, connection of the south
service road (South Gannon Avenue) from Manor Road to Slosson Avenue, while not
explicitly rejected, was noted to require de-mapping of 1.1 acres of Sports Park land,
something to which the New York City Parks Department objects even if the parkland
acreage were replaced (NYSDOT, 2002a, p. 45).
The report is very clear that the “no-build” alternative, (i.e., doing nothing), is not a
genuine option given that existing roads are carrying far more traffic volume for which
they were designed. It also notes that an all-highway solution is neither practicable nor
effective and emphasizes significant transit components in addition to highway
improvements. There is little question, though, that some highway and surface road
improvements are desperately needed on Staten Island, not only from the point of view of
congestion but also from that of safety, where accidents at some points on the network
are an all too common occurrence.
MT5: Park-n-Ride facility expansions
The NYSDOT currently has a project focused on Park-n-Ride facilities on Staten Island.
Its total description is as follows:
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“Small-Scale Park-n-Ride Facilities on Staten Island
NYSDOT, in collaboration with the Metropolitan Transportation Authority (MTA),
and with other New York Metropolitan Transportation Council (NYMTC) agencies, is
developing a comprehensive Transportation System Management (TSM) program to
improve mobility on the I-278 corridor. One of the TSM goals is to encourage transit
ridership by providing communities with safe, convenient, and well-planned Park-n-Ride
facilities.
The Staten Island project for the development and the enhancement of small-scale
Park-n-Ride facilities, enjoys the support of the Staten Island Borough President' s
Office, the elected officials, and the local residents. This project, identified as
PINX731.05, is currently under development and design phase by NYSDOT.
The project emphasizes community-friendly design that meets the following criteria:
* Park-n-Ride facilities should be small scale (about 150 spaces), can be used for
car/van pools
* Minimal community and environmental impact
* Community friendly and acceptable
* Safe and secure
* Convenient to transit / bus operators
* Convenient to resident, provide added value where possible
* Free parking, enhanced by transit kiosks, playgrounds, buffers, bicycle racks,
benches, parkland / recreational areas etc..
* Be implemented within a relative short time frame.
*Be affordable/maximize use of existing resources.” (NYSDOT, 2002b)
Three Park-n-Ride facilities have been built under NYSDOT auspices: facilities at
Pleasant Plains, South Beach, and on Arthur Kill Road are open. Additionally, the Staten
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Island Mall Park-n-Ride at Marsh Avenue reopened in 2004. One facility – the West
Shore facility – is in the design phase. The MTA has recently opened a Park-n-Ride
facility on Huguenot Avenue and the Richmond Parkway. All told there are five Park-n-
Ride facilities currently in operation on Staten Island (SIBP, 2004b). All appear to be
heavily utilized. Some of these facilities are shown in Figure 9.
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FIGURE 9: SELECTED STATEN ISLAND PARK-N-RIDE FACILITIES (Source: NYSDOT)
72
Park-n-Ride facilities are obviously only one small part of an overall transportation
improvement regime. However, they can be an important part of such a program,
particularly in areas like Staten Island where there is dispersed development but also
relatively dense pockets of population and development. It is clear that the full reach of
Park-n-Ride on Staten Island has yet to be exhausted and more facilities, properly
integrated with the overall system, should be considered.
MT6: Improved bus waiting areas, paved bus stops, passenger shelters at most stops, and
improved route markers
The performance of Staten Island’s bus system has already been discussed at some
length. Part of that performance is the quality of the riding experience for commuters.
Part of that experience could be enhanced through some substantial improvements made
to the physical infrastructure that supports the vehicles that operate along the routes.
These improvements may seem like matters of “mere” passenger comfort, (i.e., better
shelters and more of them, improved and better-lit waiting areas with more seating, paved
bus stops, and improved route signs with more real-time information about waiting time
and schedules provided). However, these investments have a wider significance than
merely improving the riding experience (not an unimportant goal in and of itself). For
one thing, the better the riding experience, the more likely people will be to use the bus.
Transit usage on Staten Island has fallen over the past decade and one reason for it has
certainly been that riding the bus is unpleasant, and, at night in particular, some people
perceive it as being unsafe. It does not have to be that way. Improving the facilities will
improve the experience and will draw more riders in (particularly in the context of a
system-wide change that offers a fuller range of travel alternatives and more bus service
overall).
In addition, these improvements could be the linchpin of larger changes to the bus
system. Almost by definition workable BRT depends upon investments like these and
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improved service on regular buses, less congested roads for private automobiles, and
more efficient and effective mass transit by modes other than bus, at least in part.
If nothing else is done, it is clear that Staten Island’s bus infrastructure is not in especially
good repair nor up to, in many cases, adequate standards. This situation should be
rectified. But an even better idea is to make such enhancements in coordination with a
larger and well-planned improvement to the overall transportation system.
MT7: Dedicated Express bus lanes across major river crossings
As already discussed under BRT, Staten Island already has a dedicated “contraflow” bus
lane that is integrated into a larger system and for which there are plans for further
expansion. Another possibility is to carve out exclusive bus lanes that would carry Local,
Limited, and Express buses as well as BRT.
In a way, this is not really a separate option from other bus improvements, but it is a good
opportunity to discuss some specific possibilities on Staten Island. One prime possibility
for a busway is over the Bayonne Bridge to link with the Hudson Bergen Light Rail. It is
the single underutilized corridor on Staten Island and provides a good opportunity to
develop a modern system pilot with little impact on other road users. It could also
provide an alternative to ferry travel to Manhattan, particularly for those not living on the
North Shore. There is the added advantage that there is already space on the bridge for a
busway if needed. Of course the major problem here would be a mode change or two –
one for people taking buses directly across the bridge to change to the light rail and two
for those going on into Manhattan or other points along the PATH system.
Other crossings, given current capacity constraints, are not as promising. The Verrazano-
Narrows is already heavily used and, as already mentioned, has a contraflow bus lane
going across it. The Goethals and Outerbridge Crossings are also currently heavily used.
This is not to say that truly dedicated busways across these routes should not be
considered. But given capacity constraints, such a move would work only with broader
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and more long-term changes in the system, which would reduce overall congestion to
make such busways feasible.
MT8: Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) improvements and investments
Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) is a broad term that encompasses not one single
technology, but a collection of disparate technologies, some not so new, applied to a
series of disparate transportation problems. One recent definition is as follows:
"Intelligent transportation systems (ITS) apply well-established technologies in
communications, control, electronics, and computer hardware and software to improve
surface transportation system performance." (Gordon, 2002).
NYSDOT currently has a project entitled “Staten Island Advanced Traffic Management
System (Project Identification Number X804.18) that focuses on ITS. Much of the
project appears to center on traffic cameras and automated message signs. The project is
supposed to apply to all arterials on the Island (NYSDOT, 2002a).
While the NYSDOT project is a start, its implementation has been slow and the
technologies being used are limited, focusing on “passive” signs that transmit information
to riders and then let the riders make their own decisions. Figure 10 shows an example
of what NYSDOT is primarily referring to when it uses the word “ITS.”
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FIGURE 10: EXAMPLE OF “ITS” TECHNOLOGY: “SMART” SIGNS
[Source: NYSDOT]
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ITS can be much more advanced in both its technologies and its applications. Such
technologies can include: sensing systems, which monitor the position and velocity of
vehicles on the infrastructure; communications from vehicle to vehicle, between vehicle
and infrastructure, and between infrastructure and centralized transportation operations
and management centers; computing systems, which process the large amounts of data
collected and communicated during transportation operations; and computer programs,
which dynamically operate transportation systems. For ITS to have true benefits, more
sophisticated technologies such as those mentioned above (assuming that they are
effectively managed) should be considered. Even less technically sophisticated
strategies, such as highway accident patrols, routed on the basis of incident management
information systems, can be very helpful in improving the movement of people. In fact,
to the extent that benefit-cost analysis has been done on ITS systems (and relatively little
has been done), this last technique has had the best results as far as minimizing
congestion, despite its relatively “low-tech” nature (Gordon, 2002).
Staten Island is a prime candidate for ITS but its implementation should be on a larger
scale, with a more systemic focus. Putting up smart signs is the lowest level of
implementation and its effectiveness is questionable, particularly where congestion is
constantly high and available route alternatives are few. How valuable is a sign saying
“congestion ahead” on the Staten Island Expressway during rush hour with Victory
Boulevard being the nearest exit, for example? As NYSDOT already has a project
focusing on this topic, this project should be expanded to consider other more advanced
strategies, integrating these with technologies and strategies being employed in other
regions (always, however, subjecting all considered improvements to a benefit-cost test).
MT9: Express buses and/or jitney service with direct service to major regional airports
One very obvious deficiency in the Staten Island transportation system is a lack of transit
links to regional airports. This is a more general problem in the City of New York, but it
is especially acute in the one borough that lacks a subway connection to the other
boroughs and a rail connection to New Jersey. Currently, Staten Islanders wishing to get
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to the airport either must drive there by private automobile, hire a private limousine, or
take mass transit into Manhattan and connect to other transit to the airports from there.
The SI Corridor Study recognized this deficiency, although it did not analyze the problem
or potential solutions to it in any great detail. In outline form, the study recommends a
busway down I-278 with bus service to Newark airport as a “potential SIE corridor
alternative.” Also mentioned is an “I-278 transitway” with service to Newark-Elizabeth
Rapid Transit and the Bergen-Hudson Light Rail, although nothing is said in this option
about further connections to the airport (p. 22).
A ready, efficient, and inexpensive transit link to metropolitan airports has long been
recognized as a key element of regional economic competitiveness and Staten Island has
no such link whatsoever. Therefore this is a key problem that needs to be addressed.
The options discussed in this report can be considered either as single and isolated
incremental changes or as a whole package of related system-wide changes to be taken in
conjunction with one another. A system-wide approach will have much more benefit
than an incremental approach and nowhere is this clearer than with airport links.
At the most basic level, if the Staten Island transportation system remains as it is, then the
only option for increasing the borough’s connectivity to the airports is to provide Express
bus service directly to those airports. In theory this is as simple as adding new Express
bus routes that head to JFK, Newark, and LaGuardia airports. Such service would allow
single-mode direct service, at least where travelers lived along or near the Express bus
stops. A related option would be to run smaller jitney vehicles rather than full-sized
buses, with the jitneys perhaps providing feeder service into main trunk routes. Current
services are almost entirely private-sector operations. Finally, Staten Island, unique
among the boroughs, lacks medallion taxi-cab service, a typical option for many other
New York City airport travelers.
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The major problem with the limited option of buses, jitneys, or cabs is that such service is
only as good as the roads on which they run. Staten Island’s roads are already heavily
congested, especially during peak hours when many air travelers need to get to the
airports. This is certainly why the authors of the Corridor Study discussed options such
as dedicated bus and/or rail links crossing into New Jersey.
If a BRT lane is built on I-278, then Express buses would be more reliable and faster than
they would be if simply dumped onto the existing road network. Such a BRT lane could
enhance service both to Newark and JFK airports, especially if links across the Verrazano
and Gowanus are enhanced as planned. A light rail corridor on I-278, properly designed,
could provide relatively seamless integration into New Jersey Transit’s current rail link to
Newark Airport. A combination of BRT that connects to the Newark-Elizabeth rail
system or Hudson-Bergen light rail is not as good as a single-mode connection, but, if
fast enough, and if the connections are easy enough, this would certainly offer a vast
improvement over current airport connection options.
One other possibility should be mentioned, though its feasibility is uncertain at this point
and that would be some sort of high-speed ferry connection between Staten Island and
JFK Airport. This particular possibility might offer the most pleasant and most efficient
transit to an airport, assuming that the technical and economic details could be worked
out.
MT10: High-Occupancy or Toll Lane on Staten Island Expressway
The NYSDOT in their SI Expressway corridor study proposed the development of a
High-Occupancy or Toll (HOT) lane on the Staten Island Expressway. The concept of a
HOT is a combination of a few road allocation methods that have been used before.
First, it utilizes the concept of a high-occupancy vehicle (HOV) lane. HOV lanes allow
only those private vehicles with multiple occupants to utilize the HOV lane. Buses,
taxicabs, and jitneys may also utilize the lane and, in some cases, general traffic flow is
allowed during off-peak hours. HOV lanes have been deployed in many cities around the
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country with varying levels of success. The HOV lanes on I-287 in New Jersey were
converted into general-purpose lanes due to low levels of utilization and political pressure
from residents of the region.
The HOT lane concept allows drivers of single-occupancy vehicles to utilize the “HOV”
lane in exchange for a payment of a toll. While this concept might offer some additional
benefits of road capacity management, it has a number of limitations in Staten Island’s
case. First, the high level of demand for road space on the SIE may overwhelm the HOT
lane capacity unless the toll is quite high. Recent work by Muriello and Jiji presented at
the Transportation Research Board (TRB) 2004 Annual Meeting showed that consumers
on the Port Authority Bridges had shown limited ability to shift travel patterns in
response to variable tolls. In addition, they found no change in demand during peak
hours and latent demand in some periods consumed any capacity made available during
peak hours.
Second, the idea of a toll on the SIE assumes that the person with the most ability to pay
is the most legitimate user of the public road space. In actuality, building a HOT lane on
the SIE would preclude other traffic lanes, so it represents an allocation of a scarce public
good to drivers with the highest ability to pay and places an inordinate burden on low-
income users in the region (due to HOT lane toll costs and/or by time costs caused by
using the overcrowded untolled lanes).
Finally, the Staten Island Expressway user already faces some of the highest tolls in the
nation to travel into and out of Staten Island and yet still have significant traffic and
delays on the SIE. The currently poor quality of Brooklyn and Staten Island bus transit
and the almost non-existent New Jersey mass transit alternatives create a situation where
SIE HOT lanes may result in additional cost for SIE users with little benefits in terms of
traffic flow. The SI corridor currently generates about 5% of the nation’s toll revenue
(FHWA, PANYNJ, and MTA). In spite of this fact, the SI corridor has numerous
transportation needs that are unmet by current funding programs. Any discussion of
further toll collections in this region should be directly linked to mass transit
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improvements and a strong guarantee that any revenues collected in the corridor would
be spent on corridor improvements.
Long-term improvements
LT1: North Shore rail reactivation
Running from the St. George area, parallel to Richmond Terrace, is a 5.1-mile right-of-
way (ROW) formerly used as a passenger and freight rail. It currently sits unused, and in
many areas is overgrown with weeds. However, given Staten Island’s current traffic
congestion, its existence has attracted obvious attention. One option to consider is to
reactivate rail service for passengers and possibly freight, along this ROW. Figure 11
shows the ROW along with some proposed railway stations for a reactivated rail corridor.
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FIGURE 11: REACTIVATED NORTH SHORE RAIL LINE WITH PROPOSED STATIONS
[Source: SIBP, 2004a, p.11.]
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A recent planning study by the Staten Island Borough President’s Office provides some
context:
Historically, the NSRR [North Shore Railroad] included 15.3 miles of
double track right-of-way from Cranford Junction, NJ, to St. George,
Staten Island, and a 3.3-mile branch line south to Travis on Staten Island’s
western shore. The New York City Economic Development Corporation
(NYCEDC) currently manages the Staten Island portion of the Right-of-
Way. The portion within the Study corridor is 5.1 miles in length, from
South Avenue to the vicinity of the St. George ferry terminal.
The Staten Island Rapid Transit Company and the Baltimore and Ohio
Railroad started operating double-track freight and passenger services
between Arlington Yard and the St. George ferry terminal beginning in
1890. North Shore passenger service ended in 1953, and freight service
ceased by 1989. In 1993, the City of New York acquired the Right-of-
Way. (SIBP, 2004a, p. 14)
As this study notes, there are a number of reasons why the area – the North Shore of
Staten Island – is a good candidate for reactivated rail service. It is relatively densely
populated with residential and commercial development that is particularly well-suited to
rail service; residents of the area are already heavy users of transit in the form of buses,
and use transit more intensively than in the rest of Staten Island; and the line is located in
a strategic position, with its terminus at the St. George Ferry terminal and with many bus
routes running into and out of the corridor, as well as parallel to it.
The current physical conditions along the corridor are variable. In some portions, the
ROW is in fairly good condition. In others, the ROW is severely deteriorated. Available
ROW runs from over 100 feet wide to as little as 20 feet wide. Substantial reconstruction
would be required to get the corridor into operable shape.
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“Reactivation” of transit service could take any number of forms. The Borough
President’s study considered five options: heavy rail (similar to that offered on the SIRT),
light rail, Diesel Multiple Unit (DMU) service (like light rail except the vehicles are
powered by diesel and not electricity), streetcars, and BRT. Preliminary estimated capital
costs for all alternatives were in a similar range, with $377 million being the highest for
heavy rail and $343 million being the lowest for streetcars. On the other hand, DMU
service had the lowest projected annual operating and maintenance (O&M) costs of
$5.19 million per year. BRT had the highest such projected annual costs, at $9.33
million, with the other three alternatives falling somewhere between these highs and
lows.
Daily ridership projections ranged from a low of 11,400 for heavy rail to a high of 15,600
for BRT, with the three other alternatives all having projected daily ridership of 13,600
(by the year 2015). This higher ridership for BRT is part of the reason that it has higher
O&M costs than the other modes. These ridership numbers compare favorably to other
built LRT and LRT-type systems already in operation and of a similar size and scope. For
example, the Hudson-Bergen LRT (a 9.5-mile route) has 12,650 riders per weekday. The
Newark City Subway – LRT (4.2 miles) has 16,500 riders per weekday; the MTA
SIRTOA – heavy rail (14.0 miles) has 12,600 riders per weekday; and the Pittsburgh
Airport Busway (6.1 miles) has 10,800 riders per weekday.
The standard recognized benefit for any transportation improvement is travel time saved.
Travel times were fairly similar for all five service alternatives, ranging from the lowest
travel time of 12:51 (12 minutes and 51 seconds) on heavy rail from one end of the
corridor to the other, up to 14:44 when riding a streetcar. All of these alternatives were
improvements on bus timetable travel times from Arlington to St. George ranging from
30 and 40 minutes and an estimated average automobile trip of 20-30 minutes.
The study did not conduct any formal benefit-cost analysis to determine if transit
reactivation of any sort along the North Shore Rail Line had benefits that exceeded the
costs, or to determine whether one alternative was superior to another. Each possibility
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has its pluses and minuses. Heavy rail, for example, offers the greatest compatibility
with SIRT service, a heavy rail system, while BRT offers the greatest compatibility with
bus service currently being run from Staten Island across the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge
into Brooklyn. A more detailed analysis of alternatives would need to be done before a
definite alternative is selected.
The report does make one thing clear: there is a significant latent demand for some sort of
truly rapid transit along the North Shore Rail Line. As noted above, the potential
ridership estimates are higher than nearby regional systems already in operation. It is
also clear that a well-designed North Shore alternative would provide more reliable, more
comfortable, and speedier service than current alternatives offer.
It should also be noted that system usage could be even higher, and the potential
economic impacts even greater, if reactivation is part of a larger system-wide
transportation improvement. For example, if BRT is significantly expanded across the
Island, and many of these BRT routes terminate and begin service from North Shore
stations, a greater pool of riders is thus added to the potential service area. If ferries out
of St. George increase in frequency of departure, this too would add to the attractiveness
of the North Shore service.
LT2: West Shore rail spur between North Shore Line and SIRT
The North Shore Rail Line currently has an ROW running south from its western end for
a spur line down to Travis. The Travis spur is to be reconstructed for freight service by
2005 according to a June 23, 2003, press releases issued by Office of the Mayor of the
City of New York (SIBP, 2004a, p. 14.) The spur line can be seen in Figure 12 that
shows the fullest extent of passenger rail on Staten Island in the middle of the 20th
century.
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FIGURE 12: (Source: Leigh and Matus, 2002)
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Of course freight transportation needs on Staten Island are great, but so are passenger
transportation needs and there is the possibility of carrying passengers as well as cargo on
that spur line.
The location of the ROW is in what is traditionally a lightly populated and heavily
industrialized area. However, population growth on Staten Island, as well as a substantial
increase in housing prices, has caused some significant residential development to begin
to occur there. Additionally, public economic development efforts – the Teleport in
particular – are designed to fill the area with more mixed uses than just traditional, and
declining, manufacturing enterprises. Thus one purpose of adding a passenger
component to rail reactivation along the West Shore would be to serve existing
populations there and also to support economic development efforts there. Improved
passenger transit would have the advantage of taking some of the automobiles off of the
West Shore Expressway by providing a transit alternative where few exist now.
There is another motivation for reactivating the Travis spur for passengers and that is to
increase the connectivity of the overall system, rail in particular. It is likely “pie in the
sky” to imagine that a ring-rail system could come to Staten Island, but putting the spur
into service could bring that notion closer to reality, particularly if the same sort of
vehicle that traversed a reactivated North Shore Rail Line also traversed the
southwesterly spur (and if heavy rail were chosen for those two segments, then all three
rail components, including the SIRT, could be served by a single technology).
Strategically placed BRT could make such connectivity even greater. Possible BRT
corridors could be between Travis and the Tottenville stop of the SIRT (making a true
ring route, though with a mode shift involved), or perhaps with one of the intermediate
SIRT stops such as Eltingville, which is now served by a new Park-n-Ride facility and
bus mall.
LT3: Link up with Jersey City Light Rail
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New Jersey Transit (NJT) now has funding in place to take the Hudson-Bergen Light Rail
to 3rd Street in Bayonne, which is about one mile from the Bayonne Bridge. The
Bayonne Bridge was constructed with rail easements on both sides of the roadway, thus
allowing for easy addition of a light rail link from Staten Island across that bridge and
into the Hudson-Bergen system.
The MTA has no existing mass transit connection to Hudson Bergen Light Rail and has
not even considered running bus service to Hudson Bergen Light Rail. However, such an
expansion of service would not be expensive. A probable Staten Island extension would
cost approximately $150 million and would have a probable ridership of 15,000 per
weekday from Staten Island (author discussions with New Jersey Transit). As noted in
the discussion of North Shore Rail Reactivation, these ridership estimates are well on a
par with justifications offered for the building of other new light rail systems, including
the Hudson-Bergen system itself.
It is important to note that new capital infrastructure is typically funded with 80% federal
money, and 20% in local matching funding. Local funding could be donated in kind,
such as the value of the bridge or land donated to the project. This is what happened in
the building of the New Jersey Transit Secaucus Train Station. That station cost $600
million in total, with $450 million coming from the Federal Government.
LT4: Subway link to Manhattan and/or Brooklyn
Currently, there is no direct subway link between Staten Island and any other borough of
New York City. This is an interesting story of the subway link that might have been, for
a connection to the BMT Subway System was mapped out in the Dual Contracts, under
which most of today's New York City subway routes were built; however, the route was
neither formally adopted or funded. One source provides some of the colorful details of
the history:
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By 1911, Staten Islanders who looked across The Narrows might have
noticed the growing prominence of the Brooklyn Rapid Transit Company.
The BRT was an amalgam of rapid transit and trolley railways of which
some were owned and others were leased. The BRT was locked in a battle
with the Interborough Rapid Transit Company (IRT) for the rights to
operate new subway and elevated lines planned or being constructed by
the City of New York for leasing to private operators.
Attempting to trump the IRT’s plans to monopolize new rapid transit
building in New York City, the BRT came up with a plan for a complete
transit system, including a proposal for a tunnel under The Narrows from
the Fourth Avenue (Brooklyn) subway tunnel to the vicinity of St. George.
It was the first time such a proposal had been made part of a serious transit
plan.
The BRT did capture all but one of the tunnels it sought, as well as having
nearly all of its other transit proposals underwritten in the Dual Contracts
of 1913, under which most of the current IRT and BMT Division lines
were built or rebuilt.
Though the idea of a connection between the BRT and the SIRT was
studied and mapped as part of the Dual Contracts, it was specifically
disavowed as being a funded part of the Contracts. Still this seemed to be
but a bump on the road to direct rapid transit access to Staten Island from
the rest of the City.
With the hope that a tunnel soon would be under way to the island, the
SIRT began to electrify its steam lines. From the Standard Steel Car
Company they ordered one hundred 67-foot cars similar to the BMT's
"Standard" design.
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Electrification of all three of the passenger branches was achieved with
dramatic speed, especially by modern standards. The Public Service
Commission approved preliminary plans for the project on May 1, 1924
and actual construction began around August 1st of the same year. On
June 25, 1925 the South Beach Line electrification was completed, with
the Tottenville branch following on July 2nd (the "official" date for these
two was July 1, 1925). The Arlington Line completed the system on
Christmas Day.
In that same year of 1925, tunnel headings were made in both Staten
Island and Brooklyn, but work ground to a halt, never to be reinstated.
Precisely why is one of those tangles of events and politics that leaves an
obvious effect but veils the cause.
Blame has often been placed on New York Mayor John Hylan (due to his
quarrels with the BMT) upon the not unreasonable assumption that he
obstructed the work because the BMT stood to benefit from this link.
Unquestionably Hylan did, at least, create some obstruction by putting
forth overlapping and contradictory plans for the tunnel to Brooklyn.
Another theory is that Alfred E. Smith, Governor of New York at that time
and later Democratic candidate for President had a hand in the project's
demise. Smith owned quite a considerable number of shares of the
Pennsylvania Railroad, the only railroad with operations to the south of
the city that entered it directly. (Leigh and Matus, 2002).
As this history thumbnail shows, there were plans for a subway link between Staten
Island and Brooklyn and such plans were an integral part of the implementation of the
1898 consolidation of the five counties into one City of New York. The reasons for this
not coming to pass are apparently lost to the fogs of historical speculation.
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What remains, however, is a striking disparity between Staten Island and the other
boroughs: the complete lack of integration into the City’s subway system. Currently the
MTA’s capital plan includes construction of a 2nd Avenue subway line paralleling the
already existing number 4,5, and 6 line along Lexington Avenue. Over 100 years after
municipal consolidation, there still is not even a mention of building the final link
between the one outlying borough without subway service of any kind.
While a link directly into Manhattan would be perhaps ideal, the distance to be covered in
terms of tunneling and construction is probably too great to be feasible in any current
economic sense. That leaves the obvious alternative, which is a link between the SIRT
and the N and R lines in Bay Ridge, Brooklyn.
There are actually two rail alternatives and they must be considered separately. One is
discussed next and that is a light rail corridor across the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge. The
alternative discussed here is an actual subway tunnel that would connect SIRT trains with
the N and R tunnel in Brooklyn and from there on to the rest of the City subway system.
The main distinctions between a subway link and a light rail link have to do with
seamlessness of connection and expense of construction. A light rail link to Brooklyn
would by definition involve a mode shift from heavy rail on the SIRT to light rail on the
bridge and back to heavy rail on the NYC city subway. A direct subway link would be
one mode traveling between the boroughs.
Because there is a lot to be worked out in designing an actual subway link, any discussion
here must be highly speculative. However, consider a hypothetical example that would
extend R service out to Staten Island. In this case the rolling stock would be the same,
the line designation would be the same, and the service would be the same. St. George
commuters could take the R train out to Brooklyn and on into Manhattan or they could
take the R train out to Tottenville (or, with a North Shore Rail extension, out to
Arlington). In this case service would be configured similarly to A train service out to
the Rockaways, where the service branches off in two different directions under the same
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letter designation, or to Howard Beach/JFK, where the service again branches off and
commuters must choose the A train going to the destination that they desire.
Whichever way the service would be configured, it should be clear that this is a more
attractive option to the commuter than a shift on and off of a light rail, however much
more attractive that option seems as compared to the status quo of today. As the history
above notes, it was an option of this sort that was being considered and planned for
shortly after the consolidation of five counties into a single City and it seems that such a
link-up was implicitly considered when that consolidation underwent a vote. From an
economic development standpoint, this option would also be more desirable than a mode-
shift option since travel speeds would be increased due to the lack of a need to shift from
one train to another.
There are two issues with which to contend under this option. One, of course, is expense.
Building a subway tunnel and integrating the SIRT with the R is certainly a multi-billion
dollar project. However, it would also vastly expand the reach of the New York City
subway system and provide service to a currently unserved area with rapid population
growth. The 2nd Avenue subway line has a current projected cost of around $17 billion,
with a construction period of over 17 years and while there is no doubt of the user
benefits of such a project, it is being built in the one borough that has lost population over
the past 50 years and in one of transit-richest areas of the system.
The other issue is the R corridor itself. The R is the only subway line for a good stretch
of an already densely populated corridor in Brooklyn. Expansion of service into that
corridor does raise issues of existing service capacity along that line. Clearly
improvements and expansions of train service along the R would likely have to be
considered if a significant number of Staten Island commuters were to be fed regularly
into the system. This is not an insurmountable obstacle by any means, but it has to be
considered in any design phase and in terms of figuring total costs.
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(One additional note: a Staten Island subway route would offer the potential to be linked
to New Jersey Transit service at Perth Amboy and provide an alternative “Outer Loop” to
the mass transit system. This is important for homeland security and would provide
critical redundancy and alternative routing for the New York metropolitan transportation
system. As was made clear on September 11, 2001, the loss of a very small geographic
area deprived New Jersey and New York of a large portion of their transit capacity and
no alternative route existed. The result was a need to rely on ferry and automobile travel
to replace Trans-Hudson service. A “ring route” is discussed in more detail under option
LT6.)
LT5: Light rail corridor on Verrazano Bridge
Related to but, as noted above, different from an expansion of the subway from Staten
Island into Brooklyn is to build a light rail corridor on the Verrazzano-Narrows Bridge.
There is one major impediment to this option from a structural standpoint and that is that
the V-N bridge, unlike most others of its era, was explicitly designed without any ROW
for transit or even pedestrians. Robert Moses, who got the bridge built, had a definite
bias against transit and designed the bridge in such a way as to make the addition of
transit to it very difficult. To allow operation of light rail across the bridge would either
require removing one or more lanes of traffic from service, or the construction of an
additional capacity for light rail. Since existing capacity is already overtaxed, it seems
almost certain that a new rail capacity structure would have to be added to the bridge.
Although detailed cost estimates need to be done, oddly enough the requirement of
significant capital costs to build a light rail across the bridge makes the cost differentials
between subway and light rail connections between Brooklyn and Staten Island less than
they might otherwise be. Thus one significant “pro” of a light rail link versus a subway
link – cost savings – is not necessarily as great as it might seem.
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The most compelling light rail option is to link the SIRT with the R line in Bay Ridge.
Since the SIRT and the R line are both heavy rail systems, a light rail link involves at
least one mode shift. If the SIRT remains heavy rail, commuters would have to get off
the SIRT train, get on the light rail and then get back off the light rail and on to the
subway in Brooklyn if they wanted to go beyond Bay Ridge. If the SIRT were to switch
to a light rail operation (a possibility if the North Shore Rail ROW were to be reactivated
as a light rail system and the SIRT were changed to a light rail to integrate with it), then
only one mode shift would be involved, (i.e., from the SIRT-V-N link to the subway).
As discussed above, a light rail link is not as seamless and as easy as a subway link
would be. Even with the building of a new ROW across the bridge, it would probably
not be as expensive to build as a subway link and probably could be built faster, although
neither of these advantages should be assumed without further study. Whatever the
relative merits and demerits, a light rail link between Staten Island and Brooklyn would
vastly improve current transit links between the two boroughs and, by extension, the links
between Staten Island and the rest of the City. Currently there is one Express bus that
runs from CSI to Bay Ridge via Clove Road, with limited service outside of rush hours.
Otherwise commuters need to take a local bus and for many commuters this requires
switching from at least one other bus.
Improved transit also would ameliorate a major current crisis on surface roads and that is
the fact there is simply not enough capacity to handle existing traffic volumes, much less
projected volumes along the V-N corridor. Transit would remove at least some of the cars
from the roads and reduce congestion.
LT6: Integration of Staten Island rail with New Jersey Transit (NJT) rail system (possible
“ring route”)
The events of September 11, 2001 showed that damage to a small section of Manhattan
crippled a huge portion of the metropolitan transportation system. This situation left
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thousands of people stranded on 9/11 and disrupted the system for months. Homeland
security issues make it prudent to consider transit links outside of the core of Manhattan.
To enhance system durability, serious thought should be given to creating a circle route
for mass transit commuters that links the regional transportation hubs outside of
Manhattan. In London, the subway and commuter rail stations are linked by The Circle
Line – a subway line that travels around the core of London and allows travelers to move
between the various commuter rail stations in Greater London.
To develop a ring transit system one would link the regional rail stations of White Plains,
NY; Jamaica, Queens; Bay Ridge Brooklyn; Perth Amboy, NJ; and Metro Park, NJ. The
SIRT would naturally form a part of the route. This would allow regional commuters and
Amtrak riders to divert around Manhattan in a number of ways if there was a security
threat or disruption of any kind. Prudent regional planning would respect both the needs
of commuters to travel into the region’s core as well as understand that there may be
times that we need to route around that core. Today, there is almost no way to travel by
mass transit from Long Island to New Jersey or Connecticut to New Jersey without
passing through Manhattan.
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(3) Pricing strategies for Staten Island and regional transportation
This section examines the costs and benefits of different pricing strategies for the system
improvements analyzed in section (2). One option to be considered is a “free-fare zone”
on Staten Island in which all transit trips are provided free of charge. This analysis also
considers expansion of the free-fare zone to other areas and integration of different transit
operations inside and outside of New York City into a single-fare zone.
A Free-Fare Zone for Staten Island Transit
Mass transit systems around the world are provided for the common good and in the vast
majority of cases the service is both subsidized and is partially paid by a user’s fare. The
sole exception to the rule of subsidies is the Hong Kong Subway, which covers all of its
costs through operation revenues. In the New York Metropolitan area, all major mass
transit systems are subsidized to provide riders with a discount to their fares. The general
purpose of subsidies is to encourage usage of mass transit and to avoid private
automobile travel.
In a few particular cases, mass transit is provided free of charge to promote usage and
other civic or business goals. Four relevant cases in three regions that might be useful in
understanding the benefits and the costs of creating a free-fare zone on Staten Island will
be discussed. The methods of funding free mass transit and possible revenue sources for
free mass transit will also be considered.
The first two cases are the Denver Link and Downtown 16th Street Loop buses, also in
Denver. The Denver Rapid Transit District operates a free bus service – “The Link” –
through downtown Denver. Denver also provides a downtown loop bus that links the
major transit stations and the light rail lines in downtown Denver. The services loop
around the downtown pedestrian mall and provide workers, students, shoppers, and
visitors with access to the downtown region without the need for an automobile.
The Downtown Denver Partnership characterized the 16th Street shuttle as follows:
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Downtown is the hub of the regional bus system with more than 65 bus
trips per hour during peak hours (6 to 9 a.m. and 3 to 6 p.m.) traveling in
and out of Market Street and Civic Center Stations. The transit stations
are anchored by the FREE 16th Street Mall shuttle, which stretches one
mile through the heart of Downtown. Serviced by a fleet of 26 shuttle
vehicles with 75-second intervals during peak hours, the mall shuttles
carry 61,000 passengers each day and over 15.4 million passengers
annually. Since it opened in 1982, the Mall Shuttle has provided service
for over 234 million passengers
(www.downtowndenver.com/transportation/).
The improvements in the Denver mass transit system have had significant impacts on
consumer usage of mass transit. Again, the Downtown Denver Partnership:
The one-way commute of Downtown employees averages 31 minutes,
with 55 percent usually driving alone, 35 percent using bus or light rail
and 10 percent walking, biking or carpooling. This represents a 10 percent
jump in the number of people using bus or light rail to travel to work in
the last several years—in a 1996 Partnership commuter survey, only 25
percent of Downtown employees reported using bus or light rail while 61
percent said they drove alone” (ibid). (See www.rtd-denver.com/; and
www.thelinkbus.com/ for more details.)
The third case is the National Park Service, which, in conjunction with the business
community in Bar Harbor, ME, organized the “Island Explore Shuttle” bus service on
Acadia Island. The Island Explorer bus service operates eight bus lines that serve the
Downtown Bar Harbor and Acadia National Park. The free fare service is sponsored by a
number of sources including the National Park Service, area towns, the U.S. DOT, Maine
DOT, L.L. Bean, local businesses, and the private advocacy group Friends of Acadia.
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The purpose of the service is to enhance access to the Acadia National Park for non-
vehicular travelers as well as promote access to the downtown Bar Harbor business
district. Acadia National Park is suffering from a high level of vehicle visits and the
accompanying vehicular emissions. To help preserve the park, the Island Explorer Bus
system was established. In addition, the service is promoted to relieve parking problems
in the park and to allow greater numbers of visitors during peak travel season. The
service operates from June to October each year. In 2003 it carried 340,336 passengers.
One of the authors has used this service and found it to be well-run with a number of
innovative features including GPS locating of buses on dynamic maps and compress
propane gas fuel systems. The lack of a fare did not appear to result in a poor quality of
service and it encouraged casual use by automobile travelers that might lead to more
intensive mass transit visits. It provides superior service to bike riders than almost all
MTA buses. (For more information, see www.exploreacadia.com/.)
Finally, with a free-fare zone operating legally from Tottenville to Tompkinsville, the
Staten Island Rapid Transit offers an opportunity to study free mass transit service closer
to home. While this service has been in place for some time, it has not been promoted as
free, nor is it general knowledge that free travel is both legal and ethical. A program to
promote passenger usage of this free service may be in order, with the business
communities around the various stations providing schedule information as well as
promotional materials and offers related to free travel on the SIRT. The authors have
heard that the SIRT is being used for “pub crawls” in the New Dorp area. This kind of
usage is both a safer form of travel for people visiting bars as well as environmentally
responsible.
A more full exploration of the cost and revenue sources needed to provide free mass
transit service on Staten Island would be needed before any concrete plans could be
established. Immediate implementation of a program to utilize the SIRT free-fare
program would be appropriate if there is significant interest in free-fare mass transit.
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To provide a very rough estimate of the cost of providing free bus service on Staten
Island (which, coupled with the free SIRT service already in place for most of the
stations, would create a largely free local system), the needed funds based on the current
level of service are calculated below.
There is a farebox recovery ratio of 28.1% of costs for SI local buses and 42.5% recovery
ratio for Express bus service and an estimated cost of operating the SI bus system of $219
million dollars a year (estimated base on NYCTA bus data and operating costs). This
implies a cost of $96.36 million to operate the 312 local buses and a farebox collection of
$27 million a year. Based on this estimate, Local free bus service would require an
additional subsidy of $27 million dollars a year to provide the current level of service free
of charge.
It seems quite reasonable to raise the $27 million a year from local sources to provide
free Local bus service to Staten Island. The money could be provided by diverting
approximately 13.5% of the PANYNJ and MTA Bridge profits of $200 million a year
back to this program. It would also be possible to make this part of any program to
provide HOT lanes on the SIE or any other toll increase. Also a local tax on businesses
or commercial property could also provide the funds.
The free-fare zone on Staten Island would serve the 86,197 workers who both live and
work on Staten Island. This would represent 45.1% of the whole resident Staten Island
labor force. Of key importance is the level of service and service quality that is provided.
A free mass transit system with low frequency of service is still imposing significant
costs on the riding public. The cost of time wasted in the commuting process may serve
to deter consumers from riding even a free system. Denver’s experience shows that
transit improvements and frequent service can increase ridership. Free fares may not be
enough to overcome the disincentive to travel represented by long commute times.
Establishing a free-fare zone on Staten Island would not resolve the cost of commuting
off of Staten Island for job opportunities in Manhattan (53,249 or 27.9% of SI workers),
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Brooklyn (29,425 or 15.4% of SI workers), and New Jersey (9,017 or 4.1% of SI
workers). These destinations – combined with the Staten Island local workers – make up
over 93% of the commuting needs for Staten Island residents. An important component
of any significant pricing strategy on Staten Island should be the establishment of an
integrated fare zone that is reflective of consumers’ needs and not the arbitrariness of
political/jurisdictional boundaries.
The discussion of free transit thus far has been relatively broad. Below is a discussion
that focuses on existing pricing policies on individual transit modes on Staten Island.
Also discussed, where relevant, are possible sources of revenue for free transit or other
subsidies.
a. Transit Fares – Ferry
The ferry was made fare-free in 1997. This was part of the program to reduce the
onerous burden of three fare zones in the City. Prior to 1997, the Staten Island commuter
was forced to pay three fares to travel to Manhattan or the other boroughs – a local bus or
train fare, the 50-cent Staten Island Ferry fare, and the subway or Manhattan bus fare on
the other side. Today, with free transfers on the MetroCard, a Staten Island commuter
can travel from SI to midtown Manhattan for one local fare. As pointed out above, the
need for better MetroCard service on Staten Island is critical to providing an actual a
single-fare zone for Staten Island commuters.
b. Transit Fares – Local Bus
Transit fares on Staten Island local buses are the same as other local buses operated by
the MTA. The service level on Staten Island appears to be much lower, with noontime
headways significantly longer than other boroughs. In addition, due to the long travel
distances on Staten Island as well as the need to change mode to the ferry and subway to
complete many commuting trips, the Staten Island local bus is a rather slow method of
travel and is probably most appropriate for short local trips.
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c. Transit Fares – Express Bus
The MTA continues to price the Express bus routes at a premium. This is particularly
disconcerting for Staten Island residents as 62% of the Express bus routes operated by the
MTA are located on Staten Island. Any discussion of changes in MTA Express bus fares
is largely a discussion of changing Staten Island fares while having minimal impacts in
other boroughs. To the degree that the MTA would like to make bus travel the mass
transit method of choice for Staten Island, serious consideration should be given to
lowering the Express bus fare from a premium (double) price to the standard fare. The
MTA is looking to bus service to provide the key mass transit services for the future of
Staten Island due to the low cost of operation. Given their desire to save on the capital
costs for mass transit infrastructure and the long distance of travel for Staten Island bus
riders, it seems unreasonable to continue to charge a premium for a service that is in fact
their basic one mode of service.
d. Transit Fares – Regional Linkages and Integration
Staten Island suffers from a lack of transportation alternatives as well as a number of
issues related to the interagency operations of regional transportation resources. The
Staten Island population is currently served by the MTA Bus and SIRTOA services, NYC
DOT Ferry services, as well as private bus service to Manhattan via New Jersey, and also
by the Red and Tan line service to Hoboken and Jersey City. With the single exception
of the Staten Island Ferry, all of these services charge a fare. How these fares are
established and what is a reasonable fare structure is the key issue to be explored in this
section of the report. In particular, the lack of an integrated fare system and collection
method can and will leave Staten Island commuters at a distinct disadvantage with regard
to fare costs and transfers between systems.
Within the MTA fare system, the introduction of the MetroCard has resulted in the ability
of most city residents to utilize a multimode form of transit with services provided by the
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MTA Buses, Subway, Roosevelt Island Tramway, and even sections of the Long Island
Railroad available for completing a trip for a single $2.00 fare.
On Staten Island, the traveler faces a number of obstacles to a fare and reasonably priced
mass transit trip. First, the majority of MTA Express bus routes are located on Staten
Island and they are priced as premium service at twice the normal transit fare. That fact
alone will result in a higher cost of service for the Staten Island travelers. If Express bus
service (be it BRT, standard Express bus, or skip stop service) is the desired form of mass
transit system that the MTA will be providing for the future of Staten Island due to their
own internal cost constraints, then the fare structure of Express bus service should be
adjusted to reflect the primary role of Express buses in Staten Island transit.
Availability of MetroCards, including the unlimited ride cards, should be enhanced on
Staten Island. With the lack of subway service on Staten Island, there is also a lack of
provision of MetroCard vending machines in the transportation system there. With the
exception of the St. George Ferry Terminal and the new Arthur Kill Road Transit Hub,
Staten Islanders must rely on private grocery stores, newspaper stores, other retail
establishments, and mobile MetroCard sales vans for their MetroCard needs. As the
MetroCard is quickly becoming the coin of the realm in terms of NYC mass transit, it is
patently absurd to have only two permanent public facilities for MetroCard purchase in a
community of 453,000 people. At this point in time, the MTA relies primarily on private
merchants to supply access to MetroCards on Staten Island. A quick review of the MTA
Website shows that these merchants are not uniformly distributed on Staten Island and
with some zip codes served by as few as one (for 11,669 people in 10307) or six (for
26,451 people in 10308) merchants.
Particularly troubling is the lack of a MetroCard Vending Machine in the SIRT St George
Ferry terminal prior to the fare collection point. Unique in the New York subway system,
SIRT riders must pay a fare to exit the St. George Station after they have left the train.
People wishing to travel further on an all day MetroCard are forced to pay the SIRT fare
prior to purchasing their all day MetroCard in the upper ferry terminal. This requires an
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additional $2.00 from SIRTs rider, unless they have managed to purchase a card from the
sparsely distributed merchants on the Island that sell them.
Another issue pertains to if and when the Staten Island transportation system is fully and
correctly integrated with the New Jersey mass transit system. In this case, much thought
must be given to establishing an appropriate regional fare structure for the utilization of
the most logical routes for the southern corridor’s mass transit riders. In particular, the
most logical route for mass transit riders from the West Shore of Staten Island to Lower
Manhattan in the future may well be to ride an Express bus to the Hudson Bergen Light
Rail (HBLR) in Bayonne and then travel the HBLR to the Exchange Place Station of the
PATH and then travel the PATH system to Lower Manhattan. In the case of a Brooklyn
commuter, the whole trip could be made using the New York City Subway at a cost of
$2.00 – say by taking the R train into Lower Manhattan.
For the Staten Island commuter using the most logical transit route, one could assume a
cost of $4.00 for the Express bus fare, a $1.50 fare on the HBLR, and a $2.00 PATH fare
for a total cost of $7.50 one-way. This is an excessive fare to pay for a slow, multi-modal
transit trip, so a fare system should be established that recognizes the regional nature of
transportation infrastructure as opposed to state boundaries or agency jurisdiction.
e. Bridge Tolls and Resources
The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey (PANYNJ) operates the Staten Island
bridges that charge a toll for their use. These facilities tolls produce revenue streams that
are above the current operating, capital, and depreciation costs of running these facilities.
In particular, the Goethals Bridge produced $31,190,000 in profit in 1999, the
Outerbridge Crossing produced a $32,854,000 profit in 1999, and the Bayonne Bridge
produced a loss of $5,136,000 in 1999. As an operation, the PA Bridges produced over
$58 million in profit in 1999 for the general operations of the Port Authority. Due to the
toll increases that were implemented in 2001 and increased traffic levels, the overall
profitability of the Staten Island bridges has increased to $102,419,000 in profit in 2003
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on a revenue base of $183,196,000 – a 55% profit rate (PANYNJ 2000 & 2003 Annual
Report). These facilities have made about $50-102 million dollars in profit each year for
about the past ten years. The bulk of this money comes from the Staten Island/Central
Jersey region as 61% of Staten Island bridge users begin or end their trip on Staten
Island. Much of this money is taken off the Island to subsidize other PA projects such as
the PATH trains and regional economic development programs in other counties.
The Metropolitan Transportation Authority manages the Verrazano-Narrows Bridge to
Brooklyn. This bridge also charges a toll that is greater than the current operating,
capital, and depreciation costs of running the facility. Based on the MTA’s annual report
and allocating the costs of operation on the basis of the revenue collected (a conservative
method as large facilities should be more efficient collectors of revenue), the Verrazano-
Narrows Bridge produced a profit of about $109 million in 2000. This profit is also very
consistent and has been growing based on the increased traffic flows as well as periodic
toll increases. The MTA uses this profit to subsidize its other operations including the
New York City Subway, The Metro North and Long Island Railroads, as well as the
NYCTA Bus System (authors’ estimates based on MTA Bridges financial reports).
In addition, a comparison of the toll discount programs offered in the region to frequent
users and/or residents shows that the Staten Island discount programs are rather modest.
The MTA offers a free fare program on the Cross Bay Bridge for residents of the
Rockaway Peninsula in Queens. The average full toll on the toll facilities we studied in
2003 was about $2.13 with the average discount toll of $.94: a 56% discount. The Staten
Island full-fare tolls are much higher than the average toll and the Staten Island discounts
were between 48% and 82%. This left the Staten Island bridge user with a toll that was
about $1.40 each way – 48% higher than the regional average for discount tolls. Further
study of this issue is necessary (authors’ estimates based on E-ZPass toll schedules).
About 5-6% of U.S. toll dollars are collected at the four toll plazas on Staten Island
(MTA, PANYNJ, and FHWA). To what degree these tolls extract capital from the
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community and deprive the local community from the economic benefits of this revenue
needs to be explored. Certainly, the toll costs are significant impediments to businesses
operating on Staten Island as well as deterrents to business seeking to locate on Staten
Island. For other counties in the region with high toll costs, the benefits of a subsidized
mass transit system provided by the toll revenues offsets some of the burden that tolls
place on the residents and businesses in the community. This is generally not the case for
Staten Island. In particular, the New Jersey corridor is almost completely unserved by
mass transit. Further analysis of this issue is needed.
f. Gasoline Taxes
Because of the heavy automobile dependency of Staten Island residents, Staten Islanders
contribute significant amounts of gasoline taxes to New York State as well as the Federal
Government. Staten Island has nearly as many automobiles as Manhattan, even with a
much lower population. Based on the number of vehicles registered on Staten Island as a
percentage of New York City vehicles, it is estimated that Staten Island residents pay
$24.8 million in federal gasoline taxes and $38.0 million in New York State gasoline
taxes, a total of $62.9 million dollars a year. These federal and state funds serve as the
core funding source for most transportation projects in the U.S. It is interesting to note
that the borough of Staten Island, due to its automobile usage, contributes significantly
more per capita to the Transportation Trust funds than other boroughs of NYC – $137.54
per person – over twice the NYC average of $65 per person. (authors’ estimates based on
NYMTC data).
g. Overall Resource Situation – Staten Island
Staten Island travelers produce in excess of a total of $400 million in bridge toll revenues
each year. The PANYNJ and the MTA make in excess of $200 million each year in
profit from these tolls above the operating costs of these facilities. These resources are
used in part to subsidize the transportation system of the whole New York/New Jersey
Metropolitan region. To what degree Staten Island has profited from the reasonable
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reinvestment of revenues collected on its soil is an interesting question. It is certainly the
case that the poor average commuting time for Staten Island residents as well as the
heavy dependence on private automobiles for many local and regional trips does not
speak well for the Staten Island transportation system. Although a number of
transportation planners and advocates frequently state that transportation improvements
on Staten Island need to be funded and that revenue sources are lacking for these
transportation improvements, the reality is that the Staten Island Corridor and county
appears to produce in excess of $250 million in transportation funds each year. How
much is reinvested in the corridor needs to be explored.
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(4) Recommendations for further study
The strategic options review has been, of necessity, broad in its coverage, with little new
research done. This final section will discuss which tasks and resources will be necessary
to consider the feasibility, cost, implementation, and economic development impacts of
the proposed system improvements and pricing strategies that have been discussed in the
scoping document.
R1: Prioritizing across Options
Many different strategies have been offered here and they have essentially been
suggested as a package. But which piece of the package should be emphasized and by
how much? Which actions should come first, which later? And although offered as a
package here, more careful study is required to assess whether this is the right package
for the problem. Perhaps some pieces, after more careful study, should be scaled back.
Maybe others should be scaled up. Still others should perhaps be eliminated. And there
may be options not discussed here that will become apparent later on as good choices.
Any follow-up to this preliminary study will need to consider this question of priority. It
is very important to avoid a problem that Staten Island has encountered in the past,
namely a lack of overall planning. Existing planning agencies with responsibilities for
the region should have been taking Staten Island into account more fully, but the
necessity of producing this report shows that they have not been.
Having said that, existing planning studies can serve as a template for what a report that
sets priorities looks like. The performance and use of the overall system is assessed, gaps
identified, solutions proposed, and solutions analyzed. It is possible that these existing
agencies might do this work with a fuller accounting of Staten Island integrated into
revised overall plans.
R2: Costing Options
107
Part of the prioritization process, of course, involves cost. This study has been designed
as a limited strategic scan of the current environment. For the most part, detailed or even
gross cost estimates have not been provided, not because such estimates are unimportant,
for they are obviously critical, but because costing of this sort was not part of the scope of
the study.
This study has made a diagnosis, provided a framework for possible solutions, and
provided specific ideas to fill in that framework. Obviously a next step is to cost out
some of these ideas.
Cost estimation, usually more an art than a science, need not be incredibly detailed or
resource-intensive, though it may be in some cases. It is also often an iterative process,
with initial cost estimates of initial proposals leading to more detailed cost estimates of
more detailed proposals. Whatever the process, cost estimates need to be done and are
suggested as a follow-up to this study.
R3: Feasibility and Implementation Studies of Individual Options
Many detailed options for system-wide improvement have been offered here but without
details. For example, the proposal that buses should be re-routed and scheduled more
frequently: to where should these buses be re-routed and how frequently should they
travel? Which schedule and route system would be the most optimal from a traffic
management point of view, reducing travel time the most and serving the greatest number
or riders? This is but one example. There are many others.
Although discussed linearly, it should be clear by now that further analysis of Staten
Island transportation system improvement is composed of interrelated parts. To set
priorities, cost information is needed, and to set costs, implementation and design of
individual options needs to be better specified. To set priorities, one also needs to have
some sense of feasibility, political and otherwise, and cost and implementation is a key
component of that judgment.
108
Having said that, these general options need to be spelled out in more detail, particularly
identifying hurdles and opportunities. As with everything else discussed in this section,
the level of detail may vary.
R4: Financing Options
The question of how much it will cost automatically leads to the question of who will pay
for it. This question obviously has all sorts of implications for feasibility, among other
things.
One question that comes up in a relatively small place like Staten Island is: can Staten
Islanders afford it? If the assumption is made that all gross cost must be borne
immediately and by Staten Islanders alone, the answer may be “no.”
This is to simplify matters far too much, however. Transportation financing is a complex
interaction of costs borne by different levels of government at different times. The
situation is particularly complicated in the New York region with multiple jurisdictions
and independent authorities overlapping with one another.
Once costs have been estimated, it is critical to do a more detailed assessment of who will
pay and when. This analysis is all too often not considered even in official planning
documents. It surely should not be omitted in follow-up to this work.
R5: Governance And Management
After the question of who pays, there is the question of who is responsible or who will be
responsible for running a particular improvement to a system. Many gains to
transportation improvements are lost due to bad or uncoordinated management of the
investment. A BRT corridor may be a great investment, but the benefits may be lost if no
one agency is clearly accountable for its success or failure operationally, or if other
agencies that manage systems into which the BRT feeds (e.g., highways or ferries) do not
take proper account of BRT operations as a matter of course.
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New York City is an area where operational responsibility is widely fragmented. This is
especially true in the transportation arena where even with the five boroughs there are
many different agencies responsible for intra-city movement of people and freight.
This is another area where even official planning efforts often fall short. Careful study of
who currently does things in a specific transportation area and who should do things after
an improvement is made must be conducted to ensure long-term success. This is
particularly true of Staten Island, which is the smallest borough in the City of New York,
closer geographically in many ways to a completely different state, whose major bridge
crossings are run by a bi-state independent authority.
R6: Benefits of Improvements.
Last, but far from least, is the assessment of benefits that system improvements will
incur. Many arguments have been offered here for economic development impacts that
are likely to occur if some or all of these proposals are carried out and the arguments
seem compelling.
However, one needs more than arguments. The benefits of transportation improvements
need to be assessed as rigorously as possible and at as detailed a level as necessary. True,
benefits assessment is more of an art than a science, even more so than cost estimation.
However, omitting it generally leads to bad decisions or, even if the overall decisions are
good, bad projects actually built on the ground.
There are many different benefit assessment and economic development measurement
approaches, some of which are quite complex and expensive to carry out. The best
approach methodologically tends to be one that is transparent, can be easily replicated,
and is understood by decision-makers, but acceptable under academic standards. Such an
approach need not be expensive or especially time-consuming, but it does need to be
carefully done.
110
APPENDIX 1: BRIEF HISTORY OF THE STATEN ISLAND BRIDGES TO NEW
JERSEY
The Goethals Bridge is a cantilever bridge on which construction started September 1,
1925. The bridge opened to traffic on June 29, 1928. The length of its main span is 672
feet and of its side spans is 240 feet. The bridge runs a total length of 1,152 feet
(including both span and approaches), is 62 feet wide, and has four traffic lanes. It
originally cost $7,200,000 in 1928 dollars. Construction of the bridge was assigned to
what was then a new agency: The Port Authority of New York and New Jersey. The
authority hired John Alexander Waddell, an American engineer, to design both the
Goethals Bridge and its twin to the south, the Outerbridge Crossing. In addition to its
four vehicular lanes, the Goethals was designed to have a pedestrian walkway. From the
1952 to 1972, the Goethals Bridge carried Route 439 from New Jersey to New York. The
I-278 designation was added to the bridge in 1958 (Reier, 2000).
The Outerbridge Crossing, as mentioned above, was built at the same time as the
Goethals Bridge, and was built by the same designer, and paid for by the same agency. It
is longer than the Goethals Bridge, with a 750-foot-long suspended center span and two
375-foot-long side spans. The Outerbridge Crossing has through truss spans (each
measuring 300 feet in length) at the end of each side span, which the Goethals Bridge
does not have. It opened for traffic the same day as the Goethals Bridge did. The bridge
cost $9,600,000 to build in 1928 dollars. Outerbridge, contrary to what the name might
seem to imply, was actually named after Eugenius Outerbridge, the first chairman of the
Port Authority and a Staten Island resident. Since 1952, the Outerbridge Crossing has
carried the Route 440 designation between New Jersey and New York. According to the
New York State Department of Transportation (NYSDOT), approximately 80,000
vehicles use the Outerbridge Crossing each day.
The Port Authority was also responsible for building and financing the Bayonne Bridge.
It is a steel-arch design planned by Othmar Ammann, the master bridge designer and
chief engineer of the Port Authority, with assistance from the architect Cass Gilbert, and
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based on the Gustav Lindenthal design of the Hells Gate Bridge, which connects Astoria,
Queens to the Bronx. Ground was broken for construction on September 1, 1928. It cost
$13 million to build. When the bridge opened on November 15, 1931, it was the longest
steel-arch bridge in the world, beating the Australia's Sydney Harbor Bridge (which also
opened that year) by two feet; it has since lost this title to the New River Gorge Bridge in
Fayatteville, WV, and must be content with a second-place record-holding. Since 1952,
the Bayonne Bridge has carried the Route 440 designation between New York and New
Jersey (Reier, 2000). According to the NYSDOT, the Bayonne Bridge carries
approximately 20,000 vehicles per day (AADT) over its four lanes. Unlike the Goethals
and Outerbridge spans, the Bayonne Bridge still has unused capacity. Its total length,
including approaches, is 8,275 feet, 85 feet in width, with four highway lanes and a
pedestrian walkway.
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APPENDIX 2: PRIVATE FERRIES IN NEW YORK CITY
New York City currently possesses an extensive network of privately operated ferries.
The administration of the private ferry system is obviously quite different from that of the
Staten Island Ferry. The primary difference is that the ferry operators are private
companies. NYCDOT sets landing fees and insurance requirements for private ferry
operators, and bills and collects permit fees from those operators. The New York City
Economic Development Corporation (NYCEDC) bills and collects landing fees and
security deposits and maintains the City ferry landings, making emergency and other
repairs and, when requested by NYCDOT, structural and capital improvements (City of
New York, Office of the Comptroller, Bureau of Management Audit, 2003, p. 1).
The growth and rate of change in this system has been impressive. The number of
passengers using private ferries in New York Harbor increased by 9.6% in FY01, 64.9%
in FY02, and 25.7% in FY03. The number of routes served by private ferries has also
increased prodigiously. There was an increase of 11.8% in the number of routes in FY01,
a 46.7% increase in FY02, and a 31.6% increase in FY03. Both passenger totals and
routes showed a small decrease in the first four months of FY04 (a 2.0% decline in
passengers and a 3.8% decline in routes during that period.) (New York City Office of
Management and Budget, 2004a, p. 53).
The City of New York has described its private ferry system, circa 2003, as follows:
The Department’s private ferry program continued to expand during Fiscal
2003. The number of routes increased from 19 to 25 and average weekday
ridership grew from approximately 53,000 to 67,000. [New York City]
DOT and the Economic Development Corporation made a number of
temporary ferry slips available during Fiscal 2003. Ongoing work on Pier
11, scheduled to be completed in Fiscal 2004, will provide an additional
slip and improved docking capability. Additional slips opened on property
managed by the Hudson River Park Trust at Pier 62 and Pier 84. Ferry
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service from the Brooklyn Army Terminal to Lower Manhattan was
assumed by a non-subsidized private operator in May 2003. New York
Waterway began operating seasonal weekend beach ferry service from
East 34th Street and the South Street Seaport to Riis Landing in the
Rockaways in June 2003.” (New York City Office of Management and
Budget, 2003, p. 85).
As of December 2002, four private ferry operators were using City ferry landings: New
York Waterway, Sea Streak, New York Fast Ferry, and New York Water Taxi. These
operators ran ferries between Manhattan and New Jersey, between Manhattan and
Queens, Manhattan and Yankee Stadium in the Bronx, and Manhattan and Brooklyn. The
ferry landings under DOT jurisdiction in Manhattan included Pier A (in Battery Park),
Pier 11 (near Wall Street), the East 34th Street Pier, the East 62nd Street Pier, the East
75th Street Pier, the East 90th Street Pier, and Pier 79 (at West 39th Street). In addition,
DOT was given jurisdiction over the 69th Street Pier in Bay Ridge and the Fulton Ferry
Landing, both in Brooklyn, and the Yankee Stadium Pier in the Bronx. It should be
noted that there are ferry landings within the City that are not under the jurisdiction of
DOT as well. (City of New York, Office of the Comptroller, Bureau of Management
Audit, 2003, pp. 4-5).
There are, it turns out, some operational issues surrounding New York City’s
management of private ferries, including failure to consistently bill private operators and
collect other fees, not properly accounting for some of the revenues that were collected
by the City, and generally charging private operators much less for landing and permit
fees than other comparable public authorities that oversee private ferry operations. (City
of New York, Office of the Comptroller, Bureau of Management Audit, 2003).
These issues aside, there is no centrally available measure of system performance. As
these are private ferries that need to make profit, it must be assumed that the services,
which can be quite expensive, generally run well enough to satisfy their customers,
though there is no way to independently confirm that. There certainly are quite a few
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users of the system. New York Waterway’s passenger reports show a monthly average of
302,591 passengers arriving at City ferry landings between July through September 2002,
while Sea Streak’s passenger reports show a monthly average of 73,762 passengers
arriving during the same period (City of New York, Office of the Comptroller, Bureau of
Management Audit, 2003, p. 14).
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