primicias vs. fugoso.doc

8/14/2019 primicias vs. fugoso.doc

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G.R. No. L-1800 January 27, 1948

CIPRIANO P. PRIMICIAS, General Ca!a"#n Mana#er o$ Coale%&e' M"nor"(y

Par("e%,petitioner,

vs.)AL*RIANO *. +GOSO, Mayor o$ C"(y o$ Man"la, respondent.

Ramon Diokno for petitioner.

City Fiscal Jose P. Bengzon and Assistant City Fiscal Julio Villamor for respondent.

+*RIA, J.

This is an action of mandamusinstituted by the petitoner, Cipriano Primicias, a campaigmanager of the Coalesced Minority Parties against Valeraino Fugoso, as Mayor of the City

of Manila, to compel the latter to issue a permit for the holding of a public meeting at Plaza

Miranda on Sunday afternoon, ovember !", !#$%, for the purpose of petitioning thegovernment for redress to grievances on the groun that the respondent refused to grant such

permit. &ue to urgency of the case, this Court, after mature deliberation, issued a 'rit of

mandamus, as prayed for in the petition of ovember !(, !#$%, 'ithout pre)udice to 'ritinglater an e*tended and reasoned decision.

The right of freedom of speech and to peacefully assemble and petition the government for

redress of grievances, are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and

guaranteed by the Constitutions of democratic countries. +ut it a casettled principle gro'ingout of the nature of 'ellordered civil societies that the e*ercise of those rights is not

absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be in)urious to the e-ual en)oyment of

others having e-ual rights, not in)urious to the rights of the community or society. Thepo'er to regulate the e*ercise of such and other constitutional rights is termed the sovereign

police po'er 'hich is the po'er to prescribe regulations, to promote the health, morals,

peace, education, good order or safety, and general 'elfare of the people. This sovereign

police po'er is e*ercised by the government through its legislative branch by the enactmentof la's regulating those and other constitutional and civil rights, and it may be delegated to

political subdivisions, such as to'ns, municipalities, and cities authorizing their legislative

bodies, called municipal and city councils to enact ordinances for the purpose.

The Philippine legislature has delegated the e*ercise of the police po'er to the Municipal+oard of the City of Manila, 'hich according to section /$0# of the 1dministrative Code is

the legislative body of the City. Section /$$$ of the same Code grants the Municipal +oard,among others, the follo'ing legislative po'er, to 'it2 (pto provide for the prohibition andsuppression of riots, affrays, disturbances, and disorderly assemblies, 3u4 to regulate the use

of streets, avenues ... par5s, cemeteries and other public places and for the abatement of

nuances in the same, and 3ee4 to enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper forsanitation and safety, the furtherance of prosperity and the promotion of morality, peace,

good order, comfort, convenience, and general 'elfare of the city and its inhabitants.

6nder the above delegated po'er, the Municipal +oard of the City of Manila, enacted

sections 7$$ and !!!#. Section of the 8evised 9rdinances of !#/% prohibits as an offenseagainst public peace, and section !/"/ of the same 8evised 9rdinance penalizes as a

misdemeanor, any act, in any public place, meeting, or procession, tending to disturb thepeace or e*cite a riot: or collect 'ith other persons in a body or cro'd for any unla'fulpurpose: or disturb or dis-uiet any congregation engaged in any la'ful assembly. 1nd

section !!!# provides the follo'ing2

S;C. !!!#Free for use of pu!lic< The streets and public places of the city shall

be 5ept free and clear for the use of the public, and the side'al5s and crossings forthe pedestrians, and the same shall only be used or occupied for other purposes as


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provided by ordinance or regulation2Pro"ided, that the holding of athletic games,

sports, or e*ercise during the celebration of national holidays in any streets or public

places of the city and on the patron saint day of any district in -uestion, may bepermitted by means of a permit issued by the Mayor, 'ho shall determine the streets

or public places or portions thereof, 'here such athletic games, sports, or e*ercisesmay be held2And pro"ided# furt$er#That the holding of any parade or procession inany streets or public places is prohibited unless a permit therefor is first secured from

the Mayor 'ho shall, on every such ocassion, determine or specify the streets or

public places for the formation, route, and dismissal of such parade or procession2

1ndpro"ided# finally, That all applications to hold a parade or procession shall besubmitted to the Mayor not less than t'entyfour hours prior to the holding of such

parade or procession.

1s there is no e*press and separate provision in the 8evised 9rdinance of the City

regulating the holding of public meeting or assembly at any street or public places, the

provisions of saif section !!!# regarding the holding of any parade or procession in anystreet or public paces may be applied by analogy to meeting and assembly in any street or

public places.

Said provision is susceptible to t'o constructions2 one is that the Mayor of the City of

Manila is vested 'ith unregulated discretion to grant or refuse, to grant permit for the

holding of a la'ful assembly or meeting, parade, or procession in the streets and other

public places of the City of Manila: and the other is that the applicant has the right to apermit 'hich shall be granted by the Mayor, sub)ect only to the latter=s reasonable discretion

to determine or specify the streets or public places to be used for the purpose, 'ith the vie'

to prevent confusion by overlapping, to secure convenient use of the streets and public

places by others, and to provide ade-uate and proper policing to minimize the ris5 ofdisorder.

1fter a mature deliberation, 'e have arrived at the conclusion that 'e must adopt the second

construction, that is construe the provisions of the said ordinance to mean that it does notconfer upon the Mayor the po'er to refuse to grant the permit, but only the discretion, in

issuing the permit, to determine or specify the streets or public places 'here the parade or

procession may pass or the meeting may be held.

9ur conclusions find support in the decision in the case of >illis Co* "s. State of e'?ampshire, 0!/ 6.S., ("#. @n that case, the statute of e' ?ampshire P.A. Chap. !$(,

section /, providing that no parade or procession upon any ground abutting thereon, shallbe permitted unless a special license therefor shall first be obtained from the select men ofthe to'n or from licensing committee, 'as construed by the Supreme Court of e'

?ampshire as not conferring upon the licensing board unfetted discretion to refuse to grant

the license, and held valid. 1nd the Supreme Court of the 6nited States in its decision3!#$!4 penned by Chief Bustice ?ughes firming the )udgement of the State Supreme Court,

held that a statute re-uiring pe'rsons using the public streets for a parade or procession to

procure a special license therefor from the local authorities is not an unconstitutional

abridgement of the rights of assembly or a freedom of speech and press, 'here, as the statuteis construed by the state courts, the licensing authorities are strictly limited, in the issuance

of licenses, to a consideration, the time, place, and manner of the parade and procession,

'ith a vie' to conserving the public convenience and of affording an opportunity to provideproper policing and are not invested 'ith arbitrary discretion to issue or refuse license, ... .

>e can not adopt the alternative construction or constru the ordinance under consideration

as conferring upon the Mayor po'er to grant or refuse to grant the permit, 'hich 'ould be

tantamount to authorizing him to prohibit the use of the streets and other public places forholding of meetings, parades or processions, because such a construction 'ould ma5e the

ordinance invalid and void or violative of the constitutional limitations. 1s the Municipal


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+oards is empo'ered only to regulate the use of streets, par5s, and the other public places,

and the 'ord regulate, as used in section /$$$ of the 8evised 1dministrative Code, means

and includes the po'er to control, to govern, and to restrain, but can not be construed asynonimous 'ith construed suppressed or prohibit 3'ong Sing "s. City of Manila, $!

Phil., !D04, the Municipal +oard can not grant the Mayor a po'er that it does not have.+esides, the po'ers and duties of the Mayor as the Chief ;*ecutive of the City are e*ecutiveand one of them is to comply 'ith and enforce and give the necessary orders for the faithful

performance and e*ecution of la's and ordinances 3section /$0$ E! of the 8evised

1dministrative Code4, the ligislative police po'er of the Municipal +oard to enact

ordinances regulating reasonably the e*cercise of the fundamental personal rights of thecitizens in the streets and other public places, can not be delgated to the Mayor or any other

officer by conferring upon him unregulated discretion or 'ithout laying do'n rules to guide

and control his action by 'hich its impartial e*ecution can be secured or partiality andoppression prevented.

@n City of Chicago "s. Trotter, !0" @ll., $0D, it 'as held by the Supreme Court of @llinoisthat, under 8ev. ST. @ll. c. /$, article ( section !, 'hich empo'ers city councils to regulate

the use of public streets, the council has no po'er to ordain that no processions shall beallo'ed upon the streets until a permit shall be obtained from the superintendent of police,

leaving the issuance of such permits to his discretion, since the po'ers conferred on the

council cannot be delegated by them.

The Supreme C9urt of >isconsin in State e% rel. Garrabad "s. &ering, 7$ >is., (7(: ($.>., !!D$, held the follo'ing2

The ob)ections urged in the case of City of +altimore "s. 8adec5e, $# Md., /!%,

'ere also, in substance, the same, for the ordinance in that case upon its facecommitted to the unrestrained 'ill of a single public officer the po'er to determinethe rights of parties under it, 'hen there 'as nothing in the ordinance to guide or

cintrol his action, and it 'as held void because it lays do'n no rules by 'hich its

impartial e*ecution can be secured, or partiality and oppression prevented. and that'hen 'e remember that action or nonaction may proceed from enmity or pre)udice,

from partisan zeal or animosity, from favoritism and other improper influences and

motives easy of concealment and difficult to be detected and e*posed, it becomesunnecessary to suggest or to comment upon the in)ustice capable of being 'rought

under cover of such a po'er, for that becomes apparent to every one 'ho gives to

the sub)ect a moment=s consideration. @n fact, an ordinance 'hich clothes a single

individual 'ith such po'er hardly falls 'ithin the domain of la', and 'e areconstrained to pronounce it inoperative and void. ... @n the e*ercise of police po'er,

the council may, in its discretion, regulate the e*ercise of such rights in a reasonable

manner, but can not suppress them, directly or indirectly, by attempting to committhe po'er of doing so to the mayor or any other officer. The discretion 'ith 'hich

the council is vested is a legal discretion, to be e*ercised 'ithin the limits of the la',

and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer and arbitraryauthority, ma5ing him in its e*ercise a petty tyrant.

&n reFrazee, "0 Michigan 0##, 0D .>., %/, a city or ordinance providing that no person or

persons, or associations or organizations shall march, parade, ride or drive, in ou upon or

through the public streets of the City of Grand 8apids 'ith musical instrument, banners,flags, ... 'ithout first having obtained the consent of the mayor or common council of said

city: 'as held by the Supreme Court of Michigan to be unreasonable and void. Said

Supreme Court in the course of the decision held2

. . . >e must therefore construe this charter, and the po'ers it assumes to grant, sofar as it is not plainly unconstitutional, as only conferring such po'er over the

sub)ects referred to as 'ill enable the city to 5eep order, and suppress mischief, in


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accordance 'ith the limitations and conditions re-uired by the rights of the people

themselves, as secured by the principles of la', 'hich cannot be less careful of

private rights under the constitution than under the common la'.

@t is -uite possible that some things have a greater tendency to produce danger anddisorder in cities than in smaller to'ns or in rural places. This may )ustify reasonable

precautionary measures, but nothing further: and no inference can e*tend beyond the

fair scope of po'ers granted for such a purpose, and no grant of absolute discretionto suppress la'ful action altogther can be granted at all. . . . .

@t has been customary, from time immemorial, in all free countries, and in most

civilized countries, for people 'ho are assembled for common purposes to parade

together, by day or reasonable hours at night, 'ith banners and other paraphernalia,and 'ith music of various 5inds. These processions for political, religious, and social

demonstrations are resorted to for the e*press purpose of 5eeping unity of feeling

and enthusiasm, and fre-uently to produce some effect on the public mind by thespectacle of union and numbers. They are a natural product and e*ponent of common

aims, and valuable factors in furthering them. ... >hen people assemble in riotous

mobs, and move for purposes opposed to private or public security, they becomeunla'ful, and their members and abettors become punishable. . . .

@t is only 'hen political, religious, social, or other demonstrations create public

disturbances, or operate as a nuisance, or create or manifestly threaten some tangible

public or private mischief, that the la' interferes.

This byla' is unreasonable, because it suppresses 'hat is in general perfectly

la'ful, and because it leaves the po'er of permitting or restraining processions, andthier courses, to an unregulated official discretion, 'hen the 'hole matter, if

regualted at all, must be permanent, legal provisions, operating generally andimpartially.

@n 8ich "s. apervill, $/ @ll., 1pp. ///, the -uestion 'as raised as to the validity of the city

ordinance 'hich made it unla'ful for any person, society or club, or association of any 5ind,

to parade any of the streets, 'ith flags, banners, or transparencies, drums, horns, or othermusical instruments, 'ithout the permission of the city council first had and obtained. The

appellants 'ere members of the Salvation 1rmy, and 'ere prosecuted for a violation of the

ordinance, and the court in holding the ordinance invalid said, 9rdinances to be valid must

be reasonable: they must not be oppressive: they must be fair and impartial: they must not beso framed as to allo' their enforcement to rest on official discretion ... ;ver since the

landing of the Pilgrims from the Mayflo'er the right to assemble and 'orship accordingto

the dictates of one=s conscience, and the right to parade in a peaceable manner and for ala'ful purpose, have been fostered and regarded as among the fundamental rights of a free

people. The spirit of our free institutions allo's great latitude in public parades and

emonstrations 'hether religious or political ... @f this ordinance is held valid, then may thecity council shut off the parades of those 'hose nations do not suit their vie's and tastes in

politics or religion, and permit li5e parades of those 'hose nations do. >hen men in

authority are permitted in their discretion to e*ercise po'er so arbitrary, liberty is subverted,and the spirit of of our free institutions violated. ... >here the granting of the permit is left to

the unregulated discretion of a small body of city eldermen, the ordinance cannot be other

than partial and discriminating in its practical operation. The la' abhors partiality anddiscrimination. ... 3!# A.8.1., p. 7"!4

@n the case of Tru)illo "s. City of >alsenburg, !D7 Col., $/%: !!7 P. E/d, !D7!, the Supreme

Court of Colorado, in construing the provision of section ! of 9rdinance o. /%0 of the City

of >alsenburg, 'hich provides2 That it shall be unla'ful for any person or persons orassociation to use the street of the City of >alsenburg, Colorado for any parade, procession


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or assemblage 'ithout first obtaining a permit from the Chief of Police of the City of

>alsenburg so to do, held the follo'ing2

E! The po'er of municipalities, under our state la', to regulate the use of public

streets is conceded. 0( C.S.1., chapter !"0, section !D, subparagraph %. Theprivilege of a citizen of the 6nited States to use the streets ... may be regulated in the

interest of all: it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e*cercised in subordination

to the general, be abridged or denied. ?ague, Mayor"s. Committee for @ndustrial9rganization, 0D% 6.S., $#", (!": (# S. Ct., #($, #"$: 70 Aa', ed., !$/0.

E/, 0 1n e*cellent statement of the po'er of a municipality to impose regulations in

the use of public streets is found in the recent case of Co* "s. e' ?ampshire, 0!/

6.S., ("#: "! S. Ct., %"/, %"(: 7( Aa', ed. !D$#: !00 1.A.8., !#0", in 'hich thefollo'ing appears: The authority of a municipality to impose regulations in order to

assure the safety and convenience of the people in the use of public high'ays has

never been regarded as inconsistent 'ith civil liberties but rather as one of the meansof safeguarding the good order upon 'hich they ultimately depend. The control of

travel on the streets of cities is the most familiar illustration of this recognition of

social need. >here a restriction of the use of high'ays in that relation is designed topromote the public convenience in the interest of all, it cannot be disregarded by the

attempted e*cercise of some civil right 'hich in other circumstances 'ould be

entitled to protection. 9ne 'ould not be )ustified in ignoring the familiar red traffic

light because he thought it his religious duty to disobey the municipal command orsought by that means to direct public attention to an announcement of his opinions.

1s regulation of the use of the streets for parades and processions is a traditional

e*cercise of control by local government, the -uestion in a particular case is 'hether

that control is e*erted so as not to deny or un'arrantedly abridge the right ofassembly and the opportunities for the communication of thought and the discussion

of public -uestions immemorially associated 'ith resort to public places. Aovell "s.Criffin, 0D0 6.S., $$$, $(!:(7 S. Ct., """, ""7, 7/ Aa'. ed., #$# E#(0: ?ague "s.

Committee for @ndustrial 9rganization, 0D% 6. S., $#", (!(, (!": (# S. Ct., #($, #"0,

#"$: 70 Aa'. ed., !$/0 E!$0", !$0%: Scheneider "s. State of e' Bersey ETo'n of

@rvington: 0D7 6.S., !$%, !"D: "D S. Ct., !$", !(D: 7$ Aa'. ed., !(( E!"$: Cant'ellvs. Connecticut, 0!D 6. S., /#", 0D", 0D%: "D S. Ct., #DD, #D$: 7$ Aa'. ed., !/!0

E!/!#, !//D: !/7 1.A.8. !0(/.

E$ 9ur concern here is the validity or nonvalidity of an ordinance 'hich leaves to

the uncontrolled official discretion of the chief of police of the municipal corporationto say 'ho shall, 'ho shall not, be accorded the privilege of parading on its public

streets. o standard of regulation is even remotely suggested. Moreover, under the

ordinance as dra'n, the chief of police may for any reason 'hich he may entertainarbitrarily deny this privelege to any group. in Co* "s. e' ?ampshire, 0!/ 6. S.,

("#, 7( Aa'. ed., !D$#, !D($, said2

@n the instant case the uncontrolled official suppression of the privilege of using the

public streets in a la'ful manner clearly is apparent from the face of the ordinancebefore us, and 'e therefore hold it null and void.

The Supreme Court of the 6nited States in ?ague vs. Committee for @ndustrial

9rganization, 0D% 6. S., $#", (!(, (!": 70 Aa'. ed., !$/0, declared that a municipalordinance re-uiring the obtaining of a permit for a public assembly in or upon the public

streets, high'ays, public par5s, or public buildings of the city and authorizing the director of

public safety, for the purpose of preventing riots, disturbances, or disorderly assemblage, to

refuse to issue a permit 'hen after investigation of all the facts and circumstances pertinentto the application he believes it to be proper to refuse to issue a permit, is not a valid


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e*ercise of the police po'er. Said Court in the course of its opinion in support of the

conclusion said2

. . . >herever the title of streets and par5s may rest, they have immemorially been

held in trust for the use of the public and, time out of mind, have been used forpurposes of assembly, communicating thoughts bet'een citizens, and discussing

public -uestions. Such use of the streets and public places has, from ancient times,

been a part of the privileges, immunities, rights, and liberties of citizens. Theprivilege of a citizen of the 6nited States to use the streets and par5s for

communication of vie's on national -uestions may be regulated in the interest of all:

it is not absolute, but relative, and must be e*ercised in subordination to the generalcomfort and convenience, and in consonance 'ith peace and good order: but it must

not, in the guise of regulation, be abridged or denied.

>e thin5 the court belo' 'as right in holding the ordinance -uoted in ote ! void

upon its face. @t does not ma5e comfort or convenience in the use of streets or par5sthe standard of official action. @t enables the &irector of Safety to refuse a permit on

his mere opinion that such refusal 'ill prevent =riots, disturbances or disorderly

assemblage.= @t can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrarysuppression of free e*pression of vie's on national affairs for the prohibition of all

spea5ing 'ill undoubtedly =prevent= such eventualities. +ut uncontrolled official

suppression of the privilege cannot be made a substitute for the duty to maintain

order in connection 'ith the e*ercise of the right.

Section /$0$ of the 1dministrative Code, a part of the Charter of the City of Manila, 'hich

provides that the Mayor shall have the po'er to grant and refuse municipal licenses or

permits of all classes, cannot be cited as an authority for the Mayor to deny the applicationof the petitioner, for the simple reason that said general po'er is predicated upon theordinances enacted by the Municipal +oard re-uiring licenses or permits to be issued by the

Mayor, such as those found in Chapters $D to 7% of the 8evised 9rdinances of the City of

Manila. @t is not a specific or substantive po'er independent from the correspondingmunicipal ordinances 'hich the Mayor, as Chief ;*ecutive of the City, is re-uired to

enforce under the same section /$0$. Moreover one of the settled ma*ims in constitutional

la' is that the po'er conferred upon the Aegislature to ma5e la's cannot be delegated bythat department to any other body or authority, e*cept certain po'ers of local government,

specially of police regulation 'hich are conferred upon the legislative body of a municipal

corporation. Ta5ing this into consideration, and that the police po'er to regulate the use of

streets and other public places has been delegated or rather conferred by the Aegislatureupon the Municipal +oard of the City 3section /$$$ Eu of the 1dministrative Code4 it is to

be presumed that the Aegislature has not, in the same breath, conferred upon the Mayor in

section /$0$ 3m4 the same po'er, specially if 'e ta5e into account that its e*ercise may bein conflict 'ith the e*ercise of the same po'er by the Municipal +oard.

+esides, assuming arguendo that the Aegislature has the po'er to confer, and in fact has

conferred, upon the Mayor the po'er to grant or refuse licenses and permits of all classes,

independent from ordinances enacted by the Municipal +oard on the matter, and theprovisions of section /$$$ 3u4 of the same Code and of section !!!# of the 8evised

9rdinances to the contrary not'ithstanding, such grant of unregulated and unlimited po'er

to grant or refuse a permit for the use of streets and other public places for processions,parades, or meetings, 'ould be null and void, for the same reasons stated in the decisions in

the cases above -uoted, specially in >illis Co* vs. e' ?ampshire, supra, 'herein the

-uestion involved 'as also the validity of a similar statute of e' ?amsphire. +ecause thesame constitutional limitations applicable to ordinances apply to statutes, and the same

ob)ections to a municipal ordinance 'hich grants unrestrained discretion upon a city officer

are applicable to a la' or statute that confers unlimited po'er to any officer either of themunicipal or state governments. 6nder our democratic system of government no such


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unlimited po'er may be validly granted to any officer of the government, e*cept perhaps in

cases of national emergency. 1s stated in State e* rel. Garrabad vs. &ering, supra, The

discretion 'ith 'hich the council is vested is a legal discretion to be e*ercised 'ithin thelimits of the la', and not a discretion to transcend it or to confer upon any city officer an

arbitrary authority ma5ing in its e*ercise a petty tyrant.

@t is true that Mr. Bustice 9strand cited said provision of article /$0$ 3m4 of the

1dministrative Code apparently in support of the decision in the case of ;vangelista vs.;arnsha', (% Phil., /(( /"!, but evidently the -uotation of said provision 'as made by the

'riter of the decision under a mista5en conception of its purvie' and is an obiter dictum, for

it 'as not necessary for the decision rendered. The popular meeting or assemblage intendedto be held therein by the Communist Party of the Philippines 'as clearly an unla'ful one,

and therefore the Mayor of the City of Manila had no po'er to grant the permit applied for.

9n the contrary, had the meeting been held, it 'as his duty to have the promoters thereof

prosecuted for violation of section 7$$, 'hich is punishable as misdemeanor by section

!/"/ of the 8evised 9rdinances of the City of Manila. For, according to the decision, thedoctrine and principles advocated and urged in the Constitution and byla's of the said

Communist Party of the Philippines, and the speeches uttered, delivered, and made by itsmembers in the public meetings or gatherings, as above stated, are highly seditious, in that

they suggest and incite rebelious conspiracies and disturb and obstruct the la'ful authorities

in their duty.

The reason alleged by the respondent in his defense for refusing the permit is, that there is areasonable ground to believe, basing upon previous utterances and upon the fact that

passions, specially on the part of the losing groups, remains bitter and high, that similar

speeches 'ill be delivered tending to undermine the faith and confidence of the people in

their government, and in the duly constituted authorities, 'hich might threaten breaches ofthe peace and a disruption of public order. 1s the re-uest of the petition 'as for a permit

to hold a peaceful public meeting, and there is no denial of that fact or any doubt that it'as to be a la'ful assemblage, the reason given for the refusal of the permit can not be

given any consideration. 1s stated in the portion of the decision in ?ague vs. Committee on

@ndustrial 9rganization, supra, @t does not ma5e comfort and convenience in the use of

streets or par5s the standard of official action. @t enables the &irector of Safety to refuse thepermit on his mere opinion that such refusal 'ill prevent riots, disturbances or disorderly

assemblage. @t can thus, as the record discloses, be made the instrument of arbitrary

suppression of free e*pression of vie's on national affairs, for the prohibition of allspea5ing 'ill undoubtedly =prevent= such eventualities. To this 'e may add the follo'ing,

'hich 'e ma5e our o'n, said by Mr. Bustice +randeis in his concurring opinion in >hitney

vs. California, %! 6. S. 3Aa'. ed.4, !!D(!!D%2

Fear of serious in)ury cannot alone )ustify suppression of free speech and assembly.Men feared 'itches and burned 'omen. @t is the function of speech to free men from

the bondage of irrational fears. To )ustify suppression of free speech there must be

reasonable ground to fear that serious evil 'ill result if free speech is practiced.There must be reasonable ground to believe that the danger apprehended is

imminent. There must be reasonable ground to believe that the evil to be prevented is

a serious one . . .

Those 'ho 'on our independence by revolution 'ere not co'ards. They did notfear political change. They did not e*alt order at the cost of liberty. . . .

Moreover, even imminent danger cannot )ustify resort to prohibition of these

functions essential effective democracy, unless the evil apprehended is relatively

serious. Prohibition of free speech and assembly is a measure so stringent that it'ould be inappropriate as the means for averting a relatively trivial harm to a

society. . . . The fact that speech is li5ely to result in some violence or in destruction


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of property is not enough to )ustify its suppression. There must be the probability of

serious in)ury to the state. 1mong freemen, the deterrents ordinarily to be applied to

prevent crimes are education and punishment for violations of the la', notabridgment of the rights of free speech and assembly. >hitney vs. California, 6. S.

Sup. Ct. 8ep., %! Aa'., ed., pp. !!D"!!D%.4

@n vie' of all the foregoing, the petition for mandamus is granted and, there appearing no

reasonable ob)ection to the use of the Plaza Miranda, Huiapo, for the meeting applied for,the respondent is ordered to issue the corresponding permit, as re-uested. So ordered.

'oran# C. J.# Pa!lo# Perfecto# Bengzon and Briones# JJ.#concur.

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primicias vs. fugoso.doc