Quasi Adlaw Notes

8/6/2019 Quasi Adlaw Notes

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Quasi-Legislative Power

Delegation of Legislative Power

Doctrine of Subordinate Legislation; Limitations

rule-making power

cannot contravene a statute or the Constitution rules are not laws but have the force and effect of laws - partakes of the nature of statute

enjoy presumption of legality - therefore courts should respect and apply them UNLESS declared

invalid; all other agencies should likewise respect them

Q: Distinguish between Legislative and Quasi-Legislative power.

A: Legislative power is vested in the Legislature while quasi-legislative power is in the nature of

subordinate legislation or the rule-making power delegated to administrative bodies. Legislative

power is plenary while quasi-legislative is not plenary and therefore subject to limitations

e.g.Constitution , statute, and administrative law limitations such as the tests for valid delegation.Legislative power includes the power to determine what the law is and how it shall be applied. Quasi-

legislative power only includes the power to determine how the law is to be applied but not what the

law is; administrative bodies cannot determine the legality or illegality of an act, NOT UNLESS they

are duly authorized by Congress.

Q: Distinguish between Judicial and Quasi-Judicial power.

A: Judicial power is original, vested in the judiciary. Quasi-judicial power is derivative, a product of

valid delegation of power to administrative bodies. Judicial power includes the determination of rights

and obligations conclusively while quasi-judicial power is temporary in nature as courts have the finalsay. Judicial power is a primary power exercised by the judiciary while quasi-judicial power is

incidental to the primary function of administrative bodies of implementing and enforcing laws.

(NOTA BENE: It is called quasi-judicial because it is a power that belongs to the judiciary but is

exercised by a non-judicial body. In addition, it is only incidental to the primary function of

implementation and enforcement of laws.)

Q: Why is it important to distinguish between quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial power?

A: It is important to distinguish between these two powers of administrative bodies because there

are certain rules and principles in administrative law, which apply to one but not to the other. Thus,the requirements of due process (notice & hearing) apply when the administrative body is exercising

quasi-judicial functions because such power includes the determination of rights and obligations. On

the other hand, there is generally no need of prior notice & hearing in the exercise of quasi-legislative

power. Likewise the prior exhaustion of remedies and the doctrine of primary jurisdiction do not

apply in quasi-legislative processes, and only in the exercise of quasi-judicial functions. And finally, a

body exercising quasi-judicial functions is considered equivalent to a regional trial court. Hence, one

can seek relief from its judgment by appealing to the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court,

depending on the mode of appeal. A body exercising quasi-legislative functions is not considered

equivalent to a court. Hence, one can resort to the regional trial court to obtain relief.

Q: How are administrative rules interpreted?

A: It is a settled principle of law that in determining whether a board or commission has a certain

power, the authority given should be liberally construed in the light of the purposes for which it was

created, and that which is incidentally necessary to a full implementation of the legislative intent

should be upheld as being germane to the law. Necessarily, too, where the end is required, the

appropriate means are deemed given. (Matienzo v. Abellera, G.R. No. L-45839, June 1, 1988)



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People v. Exconde, 101 Phil 1125 (1957)

SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION, JUSTIFIED:

It is well established in this jurisdiction that, while the making of laws is a non-delegable activity that

corresponds exclusively to Congress, nevertheless the latter may constitutionally delegate authorityto promulgate rules and regulations to implement a given legislation and effectuate its policies, for

the reason that the legislature often finds it impracticable (if not impossible) to anticipate and provide

for the multifarious and complex situations that may be met in carrying the law into effect. All that is

required is that the regulation should be germane to the objects and purposes of the law; that the

regulation be not in contradiction with it, but conform to the standards that the law prescribes.

MUST CONFORM TO STATUTES:

The regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmonywith the provisions of the law, and for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions.

By such regulations, of course, the law itself can not be extended. So long, however, as the

regulations relate solely to carrying into effect the provisions of the law, they are valid. A violation of

a regulation prescribed by an executive officer of the Government in conformity with and based upon

a statute authorizing such regulation, constitutes an offense and renders the offender liable to

punishment in accordance with the provisions of law.

RULE ON PENAL SANCTIONS:

The legislature cannot delegate to a board or to an executive officer the power to declare what acts

shall constitute a criminal offense. It is competent for it, however, to authorize a commission to

prescribe duties on which the law may operate in imposing a penalty and in effectuating the purpose

designed in enacting the law. There are numerous cases in which the courts have sustained statutes

authorizing administrative officers to promulgate rules on a specified subject and providing that a

violation of such rules or orders should constitute a misdemeanor, punishable as provided in the

statute.

Where statutes provide that violation of a rule or regulation of an administrative agency shall be amisdemeanor, if the rule or regulation is reasonable, the enforcement of the penalty for its violation

is sustained by the courts, for the legislature and not the administrative agency made the action

penal.

Echegaray vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. 132601, Oct. 12, 1998

TESTS FOR VALID DELEGATION:

Although Congress may delegate to another branch of the Government the power to fill in the details

in the execution, enforcement or administration of a law, it is essential, to forestall a violation of the

principle of separation of powers, that said law: (a) be complete in itself it must set forth therein

the policy to be executed, carried out or implemented by the delegate and (b) fix a standard the

limits of which are sufficiently determinate or determinable to which the delegate must conform in

the performance of his functions.

IS IT COMPLETE?



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Considering the scope and the definiteness of RA 8177, which changed the mode of carrying out the

death penalty, the Court finds that the law sufficiently describes what job must be done, who is to do

it, and what is the scope of his authority.

DOES IT HAVE SUFFICIENT STANDARDS?

RA 8177 likewise provides the standards which define the legislative policy, mark its limits, map out

its boundaries, and specify the public agencies which will apply it. It indicates the circumstances

under which the legislative purpose may be carried out.

Land Bank of the Philippines vs. Leonila P. Celada, G.R. No. 164876, Jan. 23, 2006

RULES AND REGULATIONS HAVE THE FORCE OF LAW:

It is elementary that rules and regulations issued by administrative bodies to interpret the law whichthey are entrusted to enforce, have the force of law, and are entitled to great respect. Administrative

issuances partake of the nature of a statute and have in their favor a presumption of legality. As

such, courts cannot ignore administrative issuances especially when, as in this case, its validity was

not put in issue. Unless an administrative order is declared invalid, courts have no option but to apply

the same.

Tests of Delegation

(1) COMPLETENESS TEST- what is to be examined:

1. subject matter (what is delegated)

2. scope of the subject matter or measure

3. what job must be done

4. authority (who is to do it)

5. scope of authority

(2) SUFFICIENT STANDARD TEST

- what is to be examined:

1. legislative policy (whereas clauses)2. specific administrative agency to apply the legislative policy

3. scope of the policy and the circumstances under which it is to be carried out

Eastern Shipping Lines, Inc. vs. POEA, 166 SCRA 533 (1988)

WHAT CAN BE DELEGATED:

Legislative discretion as to the substantive contents of the law cannot be delegated. What can be

delegated is the discretion to determine how the law may be enforced, not what the law shall be. The

ascertainment of the latter subject is a prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative cannot be

abdicated or surrendered by the legislature to the delegate.

TWO TESTS:

There are two accepted tests to determine whether or not there is a valid delegation of legislative

power, viz, the completeness test and the sufficient standard test. Under the first test, the law must

be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature such that when it reaches



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the delegate the only thing he will have to do is enforce it. Under the sufficient standard test, there

must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegates

authority and prevent the delegation from running riot.

Both tests are intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is

not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative.

POWER OF SUBORDINATE LEGISLATION:

With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by

filling in the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide.

This is effected by their promulgation of what are known as supplementary regulations, such as the

implementing rules issued by the Department of Labor on the new Labor Code. These regulations

have the force and effect of law.

ACCEPTED SUFFICIENT STANDARDS:

(1) public interest; (2) justice and equity; (3) public convenience and welfare; (4) simplicity, economy

and efficiency; (5) sense and experience of men; and (6) national security.

Tatad vs. Secretary of the Department of Energy, 281 SCRA 330 (1997)

The true distinction is between the delegation of power to make the law, which necessarily involves a

discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution, to beexercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first cannot be done; to the latter no valid

objection can be made.

Santiago vs. COMELEC, 270 SCRA 106 (1997)

Empowering the COMELEC, an administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions, to promulgate

rules and regulations is a form of delegation of legislative authority. However, in every case of

permissible delegation, there must be a showing that the delegation itself is valid. It is valid only if

the law (a) is complete in itself, setting forth therein the policy to be executed, carried out, orimplemented by the delegate; and (b) fixes a standard the limits of which are sufficiently

determinate and determinable to which the delegate must conform in the performance of his

functions. A sufficient standard is one which defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps out its

boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances which the

legislative command is to be effected.

Doctrine of Potestas delegata non delegari potest; Exception

Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239 SCRA 386 (1994)

An administrative body may implement broad policies laid down in a statute by filling in the details

which the Legislature may neither have time nor competence to provide. However, nowhere under

the aforesaid provisions of law are the regulatory bodies authorized to delegate that power to a

common carrier, a transport operator or other public service.

EXCEPTION TO THE EXCEPTION:

The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range over and above



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the authorized existing fare is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of

legislative authority. Potestas delegate non delegari potest. What has been delegated cannot be

delegated. This doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not

only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate through the instrumentality of his own

judgment and not through the intervening mind of another. A further delegation of such power would

indeed constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated todischarge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change and increase their

fares at will would result not only to a chaotic situation but to an anarchic state of affairs. This would

leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators who may increase fares every hour, every

day, every month or every year, whenever it pleases them or whenever they deem it necessary to

do so.

American Tobacco Co. vs. Director of Patents, 67 SCRA 287 (1975)

CAN DIRECTOR OF PATENTS DELEGATE A FUNCTION?

It has been held that power conferred upon and administrative agency to which the administration of

a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in

order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an adequate source of authority to delegate a

particular function, unless by express provisions of the Act or by implication it has been withheld.

SUB-DELEGATION OF POWER:

A far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. This sub-delegation of power has been justified by sound principles of organization which demand that those at the top be able to

concentrate their attention upon the larger and more-important questions of policy and practice, and

their time be freed, so far as possible, from the consideration of the smaller and far less important

matters of detail. Thus, it is well-settled that while the power to decide resides solely in the

administrative agency vested by law, this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a

hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made.

The rule that requires an administrative officer to exercise his own judgment and discretion does not

preclude him from utilizing as a matter of practical administrative procedure, the aid of subordinatesto investigate and report to him the facts, on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. It is

sufficient that the judgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authorized by law.

There is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision

remains with and is made by said officer. It is, however, required that to give the substance of a

hearing, which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence, the officer who makes the

determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which justifies them.

Kinds of Administrative Regulations (Quasi-Legislative)

1. Legislative subordinate legislation; details of the law

2. Interpretative guidelines to the law to be enforced

Q: Why is it important to distinguish between legislative and interpretative rules and regulations?

A: It is important to distinguish between the two because the requirements of due process generally

apply to one but not to the other. Thus, interpretative rules and regulations do not require notice and

hearing or publication for their validity. However, legislative rules may require notice and hearing (1)

if the law itself provides that there is a need for observance of due process (e.g. provisional fixing of

rate); and (2) if the rule adds burden to the governed. Publication is likewise a condition precedent to



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the effectivity of legislative rules and regulations, EXCEPT if they are merely internal regulations (e.g.

letters of instruction).

Eslao vs. Commission on Audit, 236 SCRA 161 (1994)

COA, under its constitutional mandate, is not authorized to substitute its own judgment for anyapplicable law or administrative regulation with the wisdom or propriety of which, however, it does

not agree, at least not before such law or regulation is set aside by the authorized agency of

government i.e., the courts as unconstitutional or illegal and void. The COA, like all other

government agencies, must respect the presumption of legality and constitutionality to which statutes

and administrative regulations are entitled until such statute or regulation is repealed or amended, or

until set aside in appropriate case by a competent court and ultimately the Supreme Court.

Commissioner of Internal Revenue vs. CA, 261 SCRA 236 (1996)

LEGISLATIVE v. INTERPRETATIVE RULE:

A legislative rule is in the nature of subordinate legislation, designed to implement a primary

legislation by providing the details thereof. In the same way that laws must have the benefit of public

hearing, it is generally required that before a legislative rule is adopted there must be hearing.

It should be understandable that when an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its

applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance for it gives no real consequence more than

what the law itself has already prescribed. When, upon the other hand, the administrative rule goesbeyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the

implementation of the law but substantially adds to or increases the burden of those governed, it

behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and

thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

Peralta vs. Civil Service Commission, 211 SCRA 425 (1992)

INTERPRETATIVE RULE:

When an administrative or executive agency renders an opinion or issues a statement of policy, it

merely interprets a pre-existing law; and the administrative interpretation of the law is at best

advisory, for it is the courts that finally determine what the law means. It has also been held that

interpretative regulations need not be published.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION; EFFECT:

Administrative construction is not necessarily binding upon the courts. Action of an administrative

agency may be disturbed or set aside by the judicial department if there is an error of law, or abuse

of power or lack of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion clearly conflicting with either the letter or

the spirit of a legislative enactment.

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF AN INVALID ADMINISTRATIVE RULE?

The general rule vis-à-vis legislation is that an unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no rights; it

imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is in legal contemplation as

inoperative as though it had never been passed. But it is quite clear, however, that such broad



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statements as to the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with

qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such determination is an operative fact and

may have consequences which cannot always be ignored.

Melendres vs. COMELEC, 319 SCRA 262 (1999)

It needs to be stressed that the power of administrative agencies to promulgate rules in the

implementation of a statute is necessarily limited to what is provided for in the legislative enactment.

However, a long line of cases establish the basic rule that courts will not interfere in matters which

are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of

activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.

Generally, the interpretation of an administrative government agency, which is tasked to implement a

statute, is accorded great respect and ordinarily controls the construction of the courts. However,

courts will not hesitate to set aside such executive interpretation when it is clearly erroneous, orwhen there is no ambiguity in the rule, or when the language or words used are clear and plain or

readily understandable to any ordinary reader.

Eastern Telecommunications Philippines, Inc. vs. International Communication Corporation, G.R. No.

135992, Jan. 31, 2006

The interpretation of an agency of its own rules should be given more weight than the interpretation

by that agency of the law it is merely tasked to administer. Thus, in cases where the dispute

concerns the interpretation by an agency of its own rules, one should apply only these standards: Whether the delegation of power was valid; whether the regulation was within that delegation; and

if so, whether it was a reasonable regulation under a due process test.

Requisites of Valid Administrative Regulations

Authorized by Congress - must have Constitutional or statutory basis

Within the scope of authority (must not be ultra vires) - must be in harmony with the spirit and

the letter of law

Q: Is there a valid administrative rule that conforms only to the spirit of the law but not to its letter?If yes, how do you reconcile this with the rule that administrative issuances should be construed

liberally?

A: No matter how wise a rule may be, if it is not in harmony with the law, it is invalid. Thus, in People

vs. Maceren, the rule was held invalid for the reason that it made punishable an act which the law did

not specify as punishable even as the rule conformed to the legislative policy of protecting marine

life. This case is peculiar as it involved an administrative issuance which contained a penal provision.

As a rule, laws with penal provisions are strictly construed for they subject a person to punishment

and sanctions. Anent the rule that administrative issuances should be construed liberally, issuances

with penal provisions can be said to be an exception by their very nature. Moreover, while it is true

that administrative issuances enjoy the presumption of legality and accorded great respect, it is

likewise true the courts may declare them invalid based on grounds such as grave abuse of

discretion, lack of jurisdiction, error of law, abuse of power, and clear conflict between the statute

and the issuance.

Boie-Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. de la Serna, 228 SCRA 329

It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the



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law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a

particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry

into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.

Romulo, Mabana, Buenaventura, Sayoc & de los Angeles vs. Home Development Mutual Fund, 333

SCRA 777

The HDMF cannot, in the exercise of its rule-making power, issue a regulation not consistent with the

law it seeks to apply. Indeed, administrative issuances must not override, supplant or modify the law,

but must remain consistent with the law they intend to carry out. Only Congress can repeal or amend

the law.

A department zeal may not be permitted to outrun the authority conferred by the statute.

Observance of Prescribed Procedure: Notice and HearingHon. Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries, G.R. No. 164171, Feb. 20, 2006

In order to determine whether the rule has been issued or promulgated in accordance with the

prescribed procedure, it is necessary that the nature of the administrative issuance is properly

determined. As in the enactment of laws, the general rule is that, the promulgation of administrative

issuances requires previous notice and hearing, the only exception being where the legislature itself

requires it and mandates that the regulation shall be based on certain facts as determined at an

appropriate investigation. This exception pertains to the issuance of legislative rules as distinguished

from interpretative rules which give no real consequence more than what the law itself has alreadyprescribed; and are designed merely to provide guidelines to the law which the administrative agency

is in charge of enforcing. A legislative rule, on the other hand, is in the nature of subordinate

legislation, crafted to implement a primary legislation.

When an administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render

less cumbersome the implementation of the law and substantially increases the burden of those

governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard,

and thereafter, to be duly informed, before the issuance is given the force and effect of law.

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. v. Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622

(1987)

The function of prescribing rates by an administrative agency may be either a legislative or an

adjudicative function. If it were a legislative function, the grant of prior notice and hearing to the

affected parties is not a requirement of due process. As regards rates prescribed by an administrative

agency in the exercise of its quasi-judicial function, prior notice and hearing are essential to the

validity of such rates.

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all

enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.

Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding

of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Fair and Reasonable



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It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and

capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be

reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to

the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.

(Hon. Executive Secretary vs. Southwing Heavy Industries)

Publication1. file with UP Law Center 3 certified copies of the rule

2. file or publish with the National Administrative Register

Penal Regulations; Requisites for Validity

1. the law itself must make the violation punishable

2. the law itself must impose and specify the penalty

3. the regulation must be published

Q: What cannot be delegated to the administrative body as regards penal regulations? A: The Legislature cannot delegate to the administrative body (1) what acts should constitute a

criminal offense and (2) how they shall be punished.

Quasi-Judicial Power

Meaning and Characteristics of Quasi-Judicial or Adjudicatory Power

1. adjudicatory power involves specific parties

2. exercise of the power is done in a judicial manner

3. exercised by a person or body other than a judge

4. requires notice and hearing

5. set different requirements before going to court 6. when a body is exercising quasi-judicial function, it is co-equal with the RTC

Sanado vs. Court of Appeals, 356 SCRA 546

The action of an administrative agency in granting or denying, or in suspending or revoking, a

license, permit, franchise, or certificate of public convenience and necessity is administrative or quasi-

judicial. The act is not purely administrative but quasi-judicial or adjudicatory since it is dependent

upon the ascertainment of facts by the administrative agency, upon which a decision is to be made

and rights and liabilities determined.

PCGG vs. Pena, 159 SCRA 556

FACTS:

This is a case about the Presidential Commission on Good Government, created through E.O. 1,

charging it with the task of assisting the President in regard to the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth

accumulated by the Marcoses, including the power to issue freeze orders or sequestration of all

business enterprises owned by them upon showing of a prima facie case.

March 25, 1986 PCGG issued an order freezing the assets, effects, documents and records of two

export garment manufacturing firms: American Inter-fashion Corporation and De Soleil Apparel

Manufacturing Corporation. June 27, 1986 PCGG designated the OIC, Saludo, and Yeung Chun Ho

as authorized signatories to effect deposits and withdrawals of the funds of the two corporations.

Sept. 4, 1986 PCGG designated Yim Kam Shing as co-signatory, in the absence of Yeung Chun Ho

and Marcelo de Guzman, in the absence of Saludo. Feb. 3, 1987 Saludo, in a memorandum,

revoked the authorizations previously issued upon finding that Mr. Yim Kam Shing was a Hong Kong



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Chinese national staying in the country on a mere tourist visa. The PCGG Commissioner approved the

memorandum. Shortly, thereafter, Saludo withdrew funds from Metrobank against the accounts of

the two corporations for payment of the salaries of the stuff.

Yeung Chung Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Archie Chan instituted through Yim Kam Shing an action for

damages with prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction against the said bank, PCGG, theCommissioner and OIC Saludo with the RTC, questiong the aforesaid revocation of the authorization

as signatory previously granted to Yim Kam Shing. RTC issued TRO.

PCGG filed a motion to dismiss with opposition to Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction on

the ground that the trial court has no jurisdiction over the Commission or over the subject of the

case. RTC judge denied PCGGs motion to dismiss and granted Yims prayer for a writ of preliminary

injunction.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the RTC has jurisdiction over the PCGG

HELD:

The Supreme Court held that RTC and the CA for that matter have no jurisdiction over the PCGG in

the exercise of its powers under the applicable Executive Orders and Art. XVIII, sec. 26 of the

Constitution and therefore may not interfere with and restrain or set aside the orders and actions of the Commission. Under section 2 of the President's Executive Order No. 14 issued on May 7, 1986, all

cases of the Commission regarding "the Funds, Moneys, Assets, and Properties Illegally Acquired or

Misappropriated by Former President Ferdinand Marcos, Mrs. Imelda Romualdez Marcos, their Close

Relatives, Subordinates, Business Associates, Dummies, Agents, or Nominees" 1 whether civil or

criminal, are lodged within the "exclusive and original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan" 2 and all

incidents arising from, incidental to, or related to, such cases necessarily fall likewise under the

Sandiganbayan's exclusive and original jurisdiction, subject to review on certiorari exclusively by the

Supreme Court.

Powers of the PCGG

E.O. 1 created PCGG, charging it to assist the President in the recovery of all ill-gotten wealth

accumulated by the Marcoses, including sequestration and provisional takeover of allbusiness

enterprises owned by them as well as conduct investigations, require submission of evidence by

subpoena, administer oaths, punish for contempt. FreedomConstitution (Proc. No. 3) mandated the

President to recover ill-gotten properties amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous

regime.

Quasi-Judicial Function

As can be readily seen, PCGG exercises quasi-judicial functions. In the exercise of quasi-judicial

functions, the Commission is a co-equal body with regional trial courts and co-equal bodies have no

power to control the other. However, although under B.P. 129, the CA has exclusive appellate

jurisdiction over all final judgmentof regional trial courts and quasi-judicial bodies, E.O. 14

specifically provides in section 2 that "The Presidential Commission on Good Government shall file all

such cases, whether civil or criminal, with the Sandiganbayan which shall have exclusive and original



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jurisdiction thereof." Necessarily, those who wish to question or challenge the Commission's acts or

orders in such cases must seek recourse in the same court, the Sandiganbayan, which is vested with

exclusive and original jurisdiction. The Sandiganbayan's decisions and final orders are in turn subject

to review on certiorari exclusively by this Court.

Primary Administrative Jurisdiction and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies

The Court recently had occasion to stress once more, in G.R. No. 82218, Reyes vs. Caneba March 17,

1988, that "(T)he thrust of the related doctrines of primary administrative jurisdiction and exhaustion

of administrative remedies is that courts must allow administrative agencies to carry out their

functions and discharge their responsibilities within the specialized areas of their respective

competence. Acts of an administrative agency must not casually be overturned by a court, and a

court should as a rule not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative agency acting within

the perimeters of its own competence." Applying these fundamental doctrines to the case at bar, the

questions and disputes raised by respondents seeking to controvert the Commission's finding of prima facie basis for the issuance of its sequestration orders as well as the interjection of the claims

of the predecessor of American Inter-fashion and De Soleil Corporations, viz. Glorious Sun Phil.,

headed by Nemesis Co are allquestions that are within the primary administrative jurisdiction of the

Commission that cannot be prematurely brought up to clog the court dockets without first resorting

to the exhaustion of the prescribed administrative remedies. The administrative procedure and

remedies for contesting orders of sequestration issued by the Commission are provided for in its rules

and regulations. Thus, the person against whom a writ of sequestration is directed may request the

lifting thereof, in writing; after due hearing or motu proprio for good cause shown, the Commission

may lift the writ unconditionally or subject to such conditions as it may deem necessary, taking intoconsideration the evidence and the circumstances of the case. The resolution of the Commission is

appealable to the President of the Philippines. The Commission conducts a hearing, after due notice

to the parties concerned to ascertain whether any particular asset, property or enterprise constitutes

ill-gotten wealth. The Commission's order of sequestration is not final, at the proper time, the

question of ownership of the sequestered properties shall be exclusively determined in the

Sandiganbayan, whose own decisions in turn are subject to review exclusively by the Supreme Court.

It should be emphasized here, as again stressed by the Court in the recent case of Republic, et al. vs.

De los Angeles, et al., G.R. No. L-30240, March 25, 1988, that "it is well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary function may not be interfered with by the courts. In general,

courts have no supervising power over the proceedings and actions of the administrative

departments of government. This is generally true with respect to acts involving the exercise of

judgment or discretion, and findings of fact. There should be no thought of disregarding the

traditional line separating judicial and administrative competence, the former being entrusted with

the determination of legalquestions and the latter being limited as a result of its expertise to the

ascertainment of the decisive facts." This is specially true in sequestration cases affected by the

Commission for the recovery of the nation' s plundered wealth that may affect the nation's very

survival, in the light of the constitutional mandate that such sequestration or freeze orders "shall be

issued only upon showing of a prima facie case" 17 and the settled principle that findings by

administrative or quasi-judicial agencies like the Commission are entitled to the greatest respect and

are practically binding and conclusive, like the factual findings of the trial and appellate courts, save

where they are patently arbitrary or capricious or are not supported by substantial evidence.

United Residents of Dominican Hills vs. Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, 353 SCRA 782

Quasi-judicial function is a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc. of public administrative



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officers or bodies, who are required to investigate facts, or ascertain the existence of facts, hold

hearings, and draw conclusions from them, as a basis for their official action and to exercise

discretion of a judicial nature. However, it does not depart from its basic nature as an administrative

agency, albeit one that exercises quasi-judicial functions. Still, administrative agencies are not

considered courts; they are neither part of the judicial system nor are they deemed judicial tribunals.

FACTS:

Some 800 public school teachers undertook mass concerted actions to protest the alleged failure of

public authorities to act upon their grievances. The mass actions consisted in staying away from

their classes, converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peacable assemblies, etc. The

Secretary of Education served them with an order to return to work within 24 hours or face dismissal.

For failure to heed the return-to-work order, eight teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School

were administratively charged, preventively suspended for 90 days pursuant to sec. 41, P.D. 807 and

temporarily replaced. An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges.

When their motion for suspension was denied by the Investigating Committee, said teachers staged a

walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire proceedings. Eventually, Secretary Carino decreed

dismissal from service of Esber and the suspension for 9 months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo.

In the meantime, a case was filed with RTC, raising the issue of violation of the right of the striking

teachers to due process of law. The case was eventually elevated to SC. Also in the meantime, the

respondent teachers submitted sworn statements to Commission on Human Rights to complain that

while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly learned of their replacement as

teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to them.

While the case was pending with CHR, SC promulgated its resolution over the cases filed with it

earlier, upholding the Sec. Carinos act of issuing the return-to-work orders. Despite this, CHR

continued hearing its case and held that the striking teachers were denied due process of

law;they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to the administrative charges;

there had been violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission is empowered to

investigate.

ISSUE: Whether or not CHR has jurisdiction to try and hear the issues involved

HELD:

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the

Constitution to do so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, it has

jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine,

certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not

meant by the fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or

duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may

investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights

violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened

to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of



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receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function,

properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual

conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those

factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively,

finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law. This

function, to repeat, the Commission does not have.

Power to Investigate

The Constitution clearly and categorically grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms

of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own

initiative or on complaint of any person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of

procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance

with the Rules of Court. In the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it

may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request

the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in

the conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. But it

cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-

judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the

technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

Investigate vs. Adjudicate

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into,

research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely: inquire

into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an

official inquiry." The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain

information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a

controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the

inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and

accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to

inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn describe as "(a)n administrative

function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; . . .

an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter

or matters."

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide,

determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and

duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle

judicially: . . . act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial

or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy . . . ."

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine

finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially,

to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact,

and the entry of a judgment."



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Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot

and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in Striking Teachers

HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a

claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the teachers in question, initiated and

conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. Moreparticularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve on the merits" the question of (a) whether or

not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise

restricted by law; (b) whether or not the act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the

failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to

this effect by the Secretary of Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations

warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by

them; and (c) what where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if

any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

Who has Power to Adjudicate?

These are matters within the original jurisdiction of the Sec. of Education, being within the scope of

the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil Service Law, and also, within the appellate

jurisdiction of the CSC.

Manner of Appeal

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education indisciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence; whether or not the

proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process;

and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed "human rights violations

involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a

motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary Education himself, and in the event of an

adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

Quasi-judicial power distinguished from judicial power and quasi-legislative power

Philippine Consumers Foundation, Inc. vs. Secretary of Education Culture and Sports, 153 SCRA 622

QUASI-LEGISLATIVE v. QUASI-JUDICIAL:

When the rules and/or rates laid down by an administrative agency are meant to apply to all

enterprises of a given kind throughout the country, they may partake of a legislative character.

Where the rules and the rates imposed apply exclusively to a particular party, based upon a finding

of fact, then its function is quasi-judicial in character.

Requirements for Valid Exercise

(1) Jurisdiction

Q: How is jurisdiction determined?

A: Jurisdiction is conferred by law and by the Constitution. Thus, in order to determine who has

jurisdiction to take cognizance of a case, one only needs to look at the law whether or not it confers

jurisdiction on the body.



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Q: How do you resolve a conflict of jurisdiction between a quasi-judicial body and the court?

A: First, determine what the controversy is all about. Is the plaintiff questioning whether an

administrative body has a certain power? Or is he questioning how said power was exercised? In the

first, the particular law creating the body must be considered in order to determine whether or not

the administrative body has authority. If the law has been entrusted to that body for its

implementation and such law vests authority in said body, then it has jurisdiction. Upon the otherhand, if the case puts in issue, not whether the body has authority, but the questionable manner it is

exercised, then the courts have jurisdiction to determine whether or not in the exercise of such

powers rights and obligations have been impaired.

Globe Wireless Ltd vs. Public Service Commission, 147 SCRA 269

Too basic in administrative law to need citation of jurisprudence is the rule that the jurisdiction and

powers of administrative agencies are limited to those expressly granted or necessarily implied from

those granted in the legislation creating such body; and any order without or beyond such jurisdictionis void and ineffective.

Syquia vs. Board of Power and Water Works, 74 SCRA 212

FACTS:

Ruiz, Enriquez and Moses filed 3 separate complaints with Board of Power and Waterworks charging

Syquia as administrator of the South Syquia Apartments with the offense of selling electricity without

permit or franchise and alleging that Syquia billed them for their electricity consumption in excess of the Meralco rates.

In her answer, Syquia questioned the jurisdiction of the Board, saying that she is not engaged in the

sale of electric power but merely passes to the apartment tenants as the end-users their legitimate

electric current bills in accordance with their lease contracts.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Board has jurisdiction

HELD:

Respondent board as a regulatory board manifestly exceeded its jurisdiction in taking cognizance of

and adjudicating the complaints filed by respondents against petitioner.

Respondent board acquired no jurisdiction over petitioner's contractual relations with respondents-

complainants as her tenants, since petitioner is not engaged in a public service nor in the sale of

electricity without permit or franchise.

Respondents' complaints against being charged the additional cost of electricity for common facilities

used by the tenants (in addition to those registered in their respective apartment meters) give rise to

a question that is purely civil in character that is to be adjudged under the applicable provisions of

the Civil Code (not the Public Service Act) and not by the respondent regulatory board which has no

jurisdiction but by the regular courts of general jurisdiction.

Respondent board in resolving the complaints against petitioner and requiring her to absorb the

additional rising costs of electricity consumed for the common areas and elevator service even at a



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resultant loss of P15,000.00 a year arrogated the judicial function. Its orders were beyond its

jurisdiction and must be set aside as null and void.

Marino, Jr. vs. Gamilla, G.R. No. 132400, Jan. 31, 2005

HOW JURISDICTION IS DETERMINED:

Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and determined by the allegations in the

complaint and the character of the relief sought, irrespective of whether the plaintiff is entitled to all

or some of the claims asserted therein.

LIMITED JURISDICTION OF AGENCIES:

Administrative agencies are tribunals of limited jurisdiction and as such, can exercise only those

powers which are specifically granted to them by their enabling statutes. Consequently, matters overwhich they are not granted authority are beyond their competence. While the trend is towards

vesting administrative bodies with the power to adjudicate matters coming under their particular

specialization, to ensure a more knowledgeable solution of the problems submitted to them, this

should not deprive the courts of justice their power to decide ordinary cases in accordance with the

general laws that do not require any particular expertise or training to interpret and apply.

(2) Due Process

Q: What is meant by opportunity to be heard? A: It is the essence of due process. Due process in administrative proceedings includes the

opportunity to be heard OR the opportunity to explain ones side OR the opportunity to seek

reconsideration UNLESS administrative rules on proceeding do not allow such motion for

reconsideration. Thus, an opportunity to be heard does not require physical presence; for as long

as the party is provided a remedy with which he can appeal his case or seek relief from an adverse

judgment, then due process is complied with.

Utto vs. COMELEC, 375 SCRA 523

In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or an

opportunity to explain ones side or opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling

complained of.

Rivera vs. Civil Service Commission, 240 SCRA 43

MUST NOT ONLY BE IMPARTIAL BUT MUST ALSO APPEAR IMPARTIAL:

In order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a face, then

reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review; otherwise,

there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. The decision of the

reviewing officer would be a biased view; inevitably, it would be the same view since being human,

he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case.

Exceptions to requirements of notice and hearing

1. Summary abatement of nuisance per se

2. Preventive suspension





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It is a settled rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise

in matters within their respective jurisdictions, are generally accorded not only respect but even

finality. Moreover, in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, the Supreme Court reviews

only errors of law and not errors of facts. However, where there is divergence in the findings and

conclusions of the NLRC, on the one hand, from those of the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals,

on the other, the Court is constrained to examine the evidence.

BURDEN OF PROOF:

In termination cases, the burden of proof rests upon the employer to show that the dismissal is for

just and valid cause; failure to do so would necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal. The

employers case succeeds or fails on the strength of its evidence and not on the weakness of the

employees defense. If doubt exists between the evidence presented by the employer and the

employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter. Moreover, the quantum of proof

required in determining the legality of an employees dismissal is only substantial evidence.Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla of evidence or relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion, even if other minds, equally reasonable,

might conceivably opine otherwise.

Enforcement and Execution

Lapid vs. CA, 174 SCRA 258

Appeal will not stay the award, judgment, final order or resolution unless the law directs otherwise.

Res judicata in administrative decisions

Ocho vs. Calos, 345 SCRA 478

The doctrine of res judicata applies to both judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. The doctrine

actually embraces two concepts: the first is bar by prior judgment and the second is

conclusiveness of judgment.

The second concept is explained thus: The general rule precluding the relitigation of material facts or

questions which were in issue and adjudicated in former action are commonly applied to all mattersessentially connected with the subject matter of litigation. Thus it extends to questions necessarily

involved in an issue, and necessarily adjudicated, or necessarily implied in the final judgment,

although no specific finding may have been made in reference thereto, and although such matters

were directly referred to in the pleadings and were not actually or formally presented. Under this

rule, if the record of the former trial shows that the judgment could not have been rendered without

deciding the particular matter, it will be considered as having settled that matter as to all future

actions between the parties, and if a judgment necessarily presupposes certain premises, they are as

conclusive as the judgment itself. Reasons for the rule are that a judgment is an adjudication on all

the matters which are essential to support it, and that every proposition assumed or decided by the

court leading up to the final conclusion upon which such conclusion is based is as effectually passed

upon as the ultimate question which is solved.

Documents

Quasi Adlaw Notes